Benin - Technical Assistance Project for Planning and Economic Management

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 15031 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (CREDIT 1530-BEN) NOVEMBER 13, 1995 Country Operations Division West Central Africa Department Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = CFA franc (CFAF) The CFAF is tied to the French franc (FF) in the ratio of FF I to CFAF 100 following the January 12, 1994 devaluation of the CFAF from a ratio of FF I to CFAF 50. The French franc is currently floating. FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BCP Department of Projects (Bureau Central des Projets) CAA Debt Management Department (Caisse Autonome d 'Amortissement) COTECNA Pre-Inspection Shipping Company DCA Development Credit Agreement DEP Direction des Etudes et de la Programmation ECU European Currency Unit EDF European Development Fund EDI Economic Development Institute FAC French Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation ICR Implementation Completion Report IMF International Monetary Fund INSAE National Institute of Economics and Statistical Analysis (Institut National de la Statistique et de I 'Analyse Economique) MCT Ministry of Commerce and Tourism MEMH Ministry of Energy, Mining and Hydraulics MIPME Ministry of Industry and Small and Medium Businesses MPS Ministry of Plan and Statistics (Ministere du Plan et de la Statistique) MTEAS Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs MTPT Ministry of Public Works and Transport PAGE Economic Management Project (Projet d'Appui ci la Gestion Economique) PE Public Enterprise SAL Structural Adjustment Loan TA Technical Assistance UNDP United Nations Development Program UNDTCD United Nations Department of Technical Cooperation and Development UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ............................................................................... Evaluation Summary ....................... PART I: Program Implementation Assessment ........ A. Evaluation of Objectives ....1I B. Achievement of Objectives .3 C. Major Factors affecting the Project .4 D. Project Sustainability 6 E. Bank Performance .7 F. Borrower Performance .8 G. Assessment of Outcome .9 H. Future Operations .9 I. Key Lessons Learned .10 PART II: Statistical Annexes .................... 12 Table 1: Summary of Assessments . . .13 Table 2: Related Bank Credits . . .14 Table 3: Project Timetable .. ..14 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual . 15 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation 15 Table 6A: Key Indicators for Project Operation . . .16 Table 6B: Fellowships for Training Abroad ..19 Table 6C: Summary of Estimate and Actual Technical Assistance Provided 20 Table 7: Studies Included in Project 21 Table 8A: Project Costs .22 Table 8B: Project Financing .23 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits .23 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants .24 Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements 29 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs 29 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions .30 APPENDICES Appendix A: Completion Mission's Aide-M&moire (with English Summary) Appendix B: Borrower's Contribution to the ICR Appendix C: Description of Technical Assistance Experts Appendix D: Auditors Report (Summary) This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT CREDIT 1530-BEN PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Technical Assistance Project for Planning and Economic Management for which an IDA Credit 1530-BEN in the amount of US$5.0 million was approved on December 13, 1984. The credit was declared effective on September 13, 1985. It was the first broad based Technical Assistance Credit made by IDA to Benin. It has since been followed by another Economic Management Project (PAGE) which became effective on January 31, 1995. The credit was closed on March 31, 1994 three years after the originally scheduled closing date of March 31, 1991. Final disbursement took place on November 4, 1994, as of which date a balance of US$836,728 was canceled. Cofinancing for the project was provided by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the French Ministry of Cooperation, the European Development Fund (EDF), and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UJNFPA) all of whom received and cleared the report. The ICR was prepared by Jean-Paul Dailly (Country Officer) and Rosemary Cubagee (Consultant) of the Country Operations Division, West Central Africa Department. It was reviewed by Mrs. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, COD Division Chief and Mr. Franz Kaps, Operations Adviser and approved by Mr. Olivier Lafourcade, Director. The Borrower provided comments that are included as appendices to the ICR. Preparation of the ICR is based on materials in the project files, interviews with the Government Officials and the Technical Assistance Experts. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by providing views reflected in the supervision mission's aide-memoire, and preparing its own evaluation of the project's execution.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT CREDIT 1530-BEN EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Background. As fiscal and balance of payment deficits became unmanageable in the early 1980's, the government sought economic advice and financial support from the donor community and requested Bank technical assistance in June 1982. The Bank responded positively to the govermnent's request and the Technical Assistance Project for Planning and Economic Management (TA) was approved in December 1984 and became effective in September 1985. 2. Objectives and Implementation. The main goal of the project was to strengthen the overall economic management capacity of the government. Specifically, it aimed at reinforcing institutions responsible for macroeconomic policy analysis, public finance management, public investment programming, project preparation and statistics through training and long-term and short- term technical assistance. 3. The project's objectives proved to be overambitious considering the country's circumstances when the project was approved. Implementation was severely hampered by inadequate management and weak, poorly-structured institutions. Furthermore, the lack of motivation in the civil service and the unhealthy political climate of the time were also major obstacles for running an effective staff development program. 4. The project did not achieve most of its training, capacity-building and institutional development objectives. Little progress was made in terms of improving the public investment programming and monitoring public debt. The performance of the Customs Department did improve and a revised "budget nomenclature" was prepared. 5. The achievements of the TA project are limited and are not considered sustainable. The most useful components were the studies, strategy papers and public sector audits carried out by short- term consultants for the preparation of adjustment programs. The modest contribution of the project to the design and implementation of the structural adjustment program will have a lasting impact if these programs mark the beginning of long-term improvements in the country's economic performance. 6. The Bank's performance at the project identification, preparation and appraisal stage was unsatisfactory. In view of the weak management capacity available in Benin at the time of project preparation and appraisal, the Bank should have pursued more limited institutional development objectives. Extensive discussions with the government and future project beneficiaries about the role, performance and priorities of existing economic management institutions would have shown that the government and the Bank did not have a common institutional development agenda. 7. The Bank's supervision performance was also unsatisfactory. Despite non-compliance with key convenants in the DCA, disbursements were never suspended. The overall supervision input fell  -_jj- short of the Bank's commitment, formally expressed in the President's Report, to provide intensive supervision. Supervision missions did not include training/institutional development specialists. The project also suffered from the lack of continuity in Bank supervision due to the frequent turnover of Bank staff. Although the project was to be jointly supervised by its cofinanciers, joint supervision missions were never organized. 8. The borrower's project preparation performance was generally unsatisfactory. The government produced a few reports and documents which alluded to major institutional problems but did not propose adequate solutions. These reports did not reflect the need to coordinate the project's design with the country's economic management and institutional development objectives. The review of preparation reports seems to indicate that the government preferred a piece-meal approach to technical assistance and training rather than the more comprehensive design recommended by the Bank. With hindsight it appears that the government's approach may have been more suitable to the political and institutional climate prevailing at that time. 9. The borrower's performance during project implementation was clearly deficient. Key covenants in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) were not complied with. The covenants were essential to implementation and included restructuring of the Ministry of Planning, availability of counterpart staff to the TA personnel and systematic evaluation of the technical assistance. Training programs and their impact on the performance of the trainees were not monitored. Despite recommendations in the report of auditors, project-financed vehicles and computers were not identified. Overall, the government's commitment to the project was weak at all stages of the project's cycle. 10. The outcome of the TA project is unsatisfactory. Although the project produced some valuable outputs in terms of statistical and financial data, macroeconomic analyses and policy recommendations, the project's institutional development objectives were not met. As indicated in paragraphs 13 and 28 of Part I of this report, a much smaller operation could have produced most of the limited benefits actually derived from the project. 11. Key Lessons Learned: The review of the project confirms lessons derived from similar stand alone TA projects: (i) a strong political commitment of the government is essential to project success and managers and staff assisted by the project should participate actively in the design of the operation; (ii) the project's objectives and design should be based on a careful analysis of structures, operational processes and skills requirements of the institutions concerned. Where institutional capacity is weak, project objectives should be modest; (iii) monitoring of project implementation and evaluation of the performance of long term TA advisers should be based on detailed implementation plans and performance criteria; and (iv) the Bank should allocate adequate resources to project supervision; supervision missions should include an appropriate skills mix of economists/country officers and institutional development specialists capable of adjusting project design to changing country circumstances. Furthermore, a minimum of continuity in supervision staff is essential. 12. Experience with the TA project also shows that some of the most important project achievements did not really need long-term technical assistance and could have been obtained with the help of a smaller, flexible operation financing a variety of short-term activities, including strategy papers, audits, special studies, workshops and training.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT CREDIT 1530-BEN PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 1. In the mid-1970s, Benin opted for a marxist-leninist political, social and economic system. One of the principal objectives of the new government was to accelerate economic growth through a major expansion of the economic role of the State. The powerful politburo of the single political party assumed responsibility for macroeconomic policies and monitored the activities of all economic ministries. Economic growth accelerated significantly between 1976 and 1981, in part due to the indirect impact on Benin's economy of an oil and uranium boom in Nigeria and Niger respectively. When Nigeria and Niger began to experience serious economic difficulties, Benin also went through a period of economic recession. Furthermore, economic institutions, weakened by fear and rent seeking, were unable to provide appropriate solutions to worsening economic problems. As fiscal and balance of payments deficits became unmanageable, due partly to public enterprise (PE) losses, the government sought economic advice and financial support from the donor community. It requested Bank technical assistance in June 1982 to strengthen its economic management, particularly its debt management agency which had been dysfunctional for several years. 2. The Bank responded positively to the government's request and proposed to help in three different ways: first, technical assistance to improve economic management and develop national capacities, second, a Public Enterprise Rehabilitation project, and third, the opening of a resident mission which would provide policy and operational advice to the government. The resident mission was opened in 1983. The Public Enterprise project became effective in 1987. The Technical Assistance Project for Planning and Economic Management (TA) was approved in December 1984 and became effective in September 1985. 3. The Bank's objective in making these three proposals was to develop a more confident operational relationship with Benin and to lay the groundwork for future macroeconomic and sectoral reforms when political and economic conditions would be more favorable to an extensive policy dialogue between the government and the Bank. The TA project was just one of the operational instruments of the proposed strategy. 4. The main goal of the project was to strengthen the overall economic management capacity of the government by reinforcing institutions responsible for macroeconomic policy analysis, public finance management, project preparation and statistics. As described in the President's report, the project had six specific objectives: (i) improving the government's performance in the formulation of its development and economic management strategy; (ii) strengthening public investment programming, budgeting and monitoring processes; (iii) improving project preparation  -2 - and project evaluation; (iv) developing a coherent framework for public finance management; (v) strengthening agencies responsible for collecting and analyzing economic statistics; and (vi) providing training in economic analysis, statistics, project preparation, business accounting and business management. 5. The project was expected to provide the government with a number of new economic and public finance management instruments. Its components included: (a) Public Investment Programming mechanism that would help the Ministry of Planning: (i) design public investment programs based on realistic macroeconomic projections and coherent sectoral priorities; and (ii) select, prepare and support well-conceived, high-priority development projects; (b) a Budget Framework that would facilitate appropriate monitoring of public investment programs and expenditures; (c) a Debt Management system, based on improved debt accounting practices, that would provide the data and analysis necessary for effective debt portfolio management; and (d) updated naional accounts and economic statisties. 6. Project inputs and outputs would include: (a) data collection, economic analysis and policy advice by technical assistance personneL including 18 long-term advisers and a variety of short-term TA assignments; (b) staff training in the form of (i) counterpart training by technical assistance personnel; (ii) local training programs; and (iii) fellowships for advanced studies abroad in economics, finance and statistics; and (c) equipment and logistical support for a number of economic management agencies. 7. Although IDA was cognizant of existing political constraints and institutional weaknesses, it appeared that these could be overcome leaving Benin with an improved economic management process. In retrospect, the project's objectives were overambitious considering the number of obstacles to be overcome as a result of the country's circumstances when the project was approved. * First, political conditions were not favorable to an open economic policy dialogue between government officials and technical assistance experts. This was a major constraint for implementing a TA project in the field of economic management. Intemational experts could help develop a more  - 3 - adequate data base for economic, public finance and debt management; they could also initiate detailed economic/sectoral analyses and project preparation studies; but it was virtually impossible to influence decisions made by the govemment on the basis of data and analyses provided by the project. * Second, the institutional framework was not consistent with the economic management processes promoted by the project. The mandates of the agencies concerned were ill-defined, and constant political interference weakened official decision-making mechanisms. * Third, the lack of motivation in the civil service and the fear inspired by the political leadership were also a major obstacle for running an effective staff development program. The quality of Benin's civil service had been affected by the departure of some of its most competent officials who did not support the govermment's political and economic policies. In addition, most of the junior staff who had joined the civil service at a later stage had not received the type of basic economic training necessary to derive adequate benefits from more specialized economic and public finance management training. The local University was particularly weak in this field. Rather than on-the- job training and specialized training programs organized with the help of TA personnel, a "higher education project" aimed at improving the curriculum of economic studies, strengthening the performance of the economic faculty and organizing ad hoc training programs for government officials, could have been a more effective method to achieve some of the training/staff development goals of the project. 8. The project objectives were never formally revised. However, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the project was de facto restructured to better serve the objectives of three successive structural adjustment programs. The new orientation of the TA project de-emphasized the use of long-term technical assistance personnel and emphasized the performance of more specific tasks directly related to preparation and implementation of ongoing and future adjustment programs. In addition to specific macroeconomic and sectoral studies, the project was expected to carry out a number of "audits" aimed at providing in-depth analysis of the objectives, performance and institutional weaknesses of existing government agencies. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 9. The project did not achieve most of its training, capacity-building and institutional development objectives. Little progress was made in terms of improving the public investment programming and monitoring process. Better data was obtained on public debt, new borrowings and actual disbursements; the performance of the Customs Department improved' and a revised "budget nomenclature" was prepared. The project, however, was unable to computerize debt and public finance information, due to poor project coordination. A training center was built and the project eventually organized a number of specific training programs. In the absence of follow-up I See paragraphs 20 and 39 below.  by the civil service department, it is not possible to evaluate the quality and the impact of these programs. Most of the civil servants who were trained overseas never returned to their country despite stipulations that they return to serve. 10. Although eighteen long-term advisers were to be provided by the project, only eight were actually recruited, due to weak project management and cumbersome administrative procedures. Overall, their performance was not satisfactory. Some of them produced useful data and analyses, but much of their output has been lost because of the poor quality of Benin's filing systems. The ICR completion mission was unable to identify any evidence of impact of TA personnel in terms of skills development of their Beninese counterparts. 11. The most useful components of the TA project were the studies, strategy papers and public sector audits carried out by short term consultants in the context of the first, second and third adjustment programs. A study identified structural reforms and other measures necessary to improve the competitiveness of Benin's economy as a result of the devaluation of the CFA franc. Organizational audits of five key Ministries2 provided the basis for institutional reformns to be implemented in the context of the FY94 Economic Management project. 12. In other words, while technical assistance and training achieved very little, most of the other less ambitious project components were much more useful to the government and the Bank. Eventually, the TA project proved to be a flexible operational instrument which helped the Bank and the government improve their knowledge and understanding of key macroeconomic and sectoral issues. When the government, in 1986, established a committee responsible for preparing the first structural adjustment program, the TA project financed several activities viewed as necessary to identify policy and institutional reforms to be included in the program. Although the Performance Report of the first structural adjustment program concludes that its results were mrixed, the program marks the beginning of a series of macroeconomic and sectoral reforms that had a positive impact on the country's public sector management and economic performance. 13. Overall, less than half of the project components (in terms of share of total project costs) produced useful outputs. Long term technical assistance for institutional development had virtually no impact. In other words, a much smaller operation financing a wide variety of specific activities (audits, special studies, macroeconomic and sectoral strategy papers, strategy discussions, workshops, special training programs), for which there was a demand in the country, could have achieved most of the benefits actually derived from the TA project. C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 14. The general insecurity that prevailed during the political transition from 1988 to 1991 slowed down project implementation and weakened the proposed institutional development effort. 2 Ministry of Commerce and Tourism, Ministry of Energy, Mining and Hydraulics, Ministry of Industry and Small and Medium businesses, Ministry of Public Works and Transport and Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs.  - 5 - 15. Frequent changes in government personnel, including project coordinators, also affected project execution. Newly appointed project coordinators often did not have the skills necessary to handle many different project activities, government departments, TA advisers and donor agencies. Overwhelmed by routine administrative tasks and procurement procedures on behalf of weak implementing agencies, project coordinators could not perform their principal role of coordinating and monitoring training and technical assistance. 16. Delays in recruiting TA personnel defeated the coherence of the overall technical assistance program.3 Eventually the macroeconomist recruited under the project assumed the role of project coordinator and, therefore, was unable to deliver expected outputs in the field of macroeconomic analysis. 17. Existing institutional set ups were a major obstacle to improving economic management processes particularly when they involved several government agencies. The specific functions of individual agencies and procedures for inter-agency coordination were not clearly defined. The mandate and the structure of the Ministry of Planning, a vital agency for the TA project, was inadequate. The Ministry was unable to coordinate preparation of sound development strategies and coherent public investment programs. It was not equipped to monitor ongoing projects. Finally, the government had to create a new institution - a Special Inter-ministerial Committee - to handle preparation of the first structural adjustment program in 1986. 18. Information systems were also inadequate. Lack of established procedures for the circulation of information, and poor filing systems, prevented potential users to have access to studies, reports and other project outputs produced by TA personnel. During the ICR mission, the government was unable to find copies of key reports produced under the project. 19. Weak civil service management systems also influenced the project's performance. Appointments of agency managers were not coordinated with ongoing programs aimed at strengthening the agencies. No significant effort was made to identify training needs and to integrate training assignments into career development plans. Often staff trained under the project were appointed to positions unrelated to the training they had received. 20. Managers of implementing agencies were not properly briefed about the project's objectives and procedures. TA personnel was often used for activities which were not in accordance with their terms of reference. Lack of secretarial support, computers and equipment was also a major problem for many long-term advisers, with the notable exception of FAC- financed experts (French Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation) assigned to the Customs Department. 3 A major feature of the project was the coherence and the coordination of various activities to be performned by project-financed long-termr advisers.  - 6 - Directly supervised by the French resident mission in Cotonou, FAC-financed advisers were always provided with the logistical support needed to perform their functions. 21. A combination of the lack of a well prepared training program before the beginning of project implementation and the poor performance of TA personnel responsible for training resulted in a delay in project implementation and affected the overall quality of the project's training component. This training component was restructured in 1992. Emphasis was placed on short-term training in statistics and accounting for the Statistics Department. About 40 staff members of Statistics were trained under the project. 22. The project also suffered from the lack of continuity in Bank supervision. New staff was unaware of views expressed and recommendations made by previous "supervisors". In addition the response of headquarters staff to government requests for comments/non-objection was not always as prompt and diligent as desirable. 23. A particular feature of the TA project was that it was cofinanced by the Bank and four other bilateral and multilateral donors. Coordination between donors proved to be a difficult task. Differences in procedures and policies complicated project management and implementation. A disagreement between the Bank and the United Nations Department of Technical Cooperation and Development (UNTCD) weakened project supervision. Because UNTCD was responsible for assisting the project coordinator, it challenged the right of the Bank to supervise the project and receive detailed accounts on project expenditures. The problem was eventually resolved when the UNDP replaced UNTCD as cofinancier of the project. 24. The resident mission made a useful contribution to the project. The review suggests that the mission made effective use of some of the project's output to influence government officials and stimulate their interest in policy analysis and eventually policy reforms. In 1991, the resident mission assumed full responsibility for the supervision of the project and played a leading role in re-orienting project activities in support of ongoing structural adjustment programs. D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 25. The achievements of the TA project are limited and are not sustainable. The modest contribution of the project to the design and implementation of three structural adjustment programs will have a lasting impact if these programs mark the beginning of long-term improvements in the country's economic performance. Similarly the audits of government agencies were used in the preparation of an Economic Management project which was approved by the Executive Directors in FY94. The design of the Economic Management project took into account lessons of the TA project's experience. There is no evidence of long-term benefits that may have been derived from the other project components.  -7- E. BANK PERFORMANCE 26. The Bank performance at the project identification, preparation and appraisal stage was unsatisfactory. A Bank economic mission in 1982 identified a number of critical economic management and long-term priority development issues which needed to be addressed by the government and the Bank. The mistake was to conclude that long-term technical assistance could achieve significant capacity-building and institutional development objectives considering the country's political and institutional environment in the early 1 980s. The character of the regime in place did not permit consideration of significant reforms of existing institutional structures and economic management processes. A political revolution, not a group of long-term advisers, eventually changed the country's attitudes and economic policies. Training was perhaps a more feasible short-term objective, but not on-the-job in a highly inadequate institutional environment. In addition, the project's preparation work did not include preparation of a training program. A well-prepared training program, based on a competent assessment of training demand and training needs, would have helped identify institutional and other conditions necessary to make the training program relevant and effective. In this context, withdrawing EDI experts from the Bank preparation team because of budget constraints was an unfortunate decision. EDI's experience in training would have been a major asset for project preparation. 27. In view of Benin's situation at the time of project preparation and appraisal, the Bank should have pursued more limited institutional development objectives. Extensive discussions with the government and future project beneficiaries about the role, performance and priorities of existing economic management institutions would have shown that the government and the Bank did not have a common institutional development agenda. A comprehensive technical assistance and institutional reform program was therefore unrealistic. 28. The rationale for the Bank decision to go ahead with the project in FY85 was the assumption that economic and political conditions can evolve rapidly. Sudden transformations in the country's environment could offer opportunities for policy and institutional dialogue which the Bank should not miss. Indeed, Benin's example shows that sudden political changes during project implementation are possible and require a rapid response by the Bank. In such circumstances the availability of a flexible operational instrument, like an ongoing TA project, can be particularly useful. In this regard, the Benin TA project proved to be an extremely valuable instrument during the political transition, when the country was beginning to understand the need for change and sought Bank assistance for defining the most urgent economic management and institutional reforms that should be initiated in the context of structural adjustment programs. However, as indicated in paragraph 13, there was no need for a large technical assistance project to take advantage of these opportunities. A much smaller operation could have financed all the audits, studies, workshops and training programs necessary to analyze and begin to address macroeconomic, sectoral and institutional issues identified by the government and the Bank.  -8- 29. The project design did not take into account important factors which were already known when the project was appraised and had a strong negative impact on project implementation. Parts I and III of the appraisal report accurately described most of the constraints that affected institutional capacities. Nevertheless, Part IV described project objectives that largely ignored these constraints. In addition, the complexity of the project was not adequately recognized. Managing a multi-component, multi-agency and multi-donor project was obviously beyond the capacity of the Ministry of Planning. 30. The Bank's supervision performance was also unsatisfactory. The overall supervision input fell short of the Bank's commitment, formally expressed in the President's Report, to provide intensive supervision.4 Economists and Country Officers were responsible for supervising the TA project. Supervision missions never included training/institutional development specialists. The President's report also promised that the project would be jointly supervised by its cofinanciers. There is no evidence in the Files that joint supervision missions were ever organized. 31. Ten of the fourteen supervision missions were staffed by staff who had never been associated with previous missions concerning the Benin TA project. A review of supervision reports shows that new reports seldom reflected the findings and the concerns of previous missions. There was an obvious lack of consistency and continuity in the analyses and recommendations of successive supervision missions. The Bank does not appear to have taken actions to remedy non-compliance to project covenants by the borrower.5 32. In 1991, the resident mission assumed full responsibility for project supervision (and became the task manager for the project). The mission, however, was never provided with additional resources to carry out its new functions. F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 33. The borrower's project preparation performance was generally unsatisfactory. The government produced a few reports and documents which alluded to major institutional problems but did not propose adequate solutions. These reports did not reflect the need to coordinate the project's design with the country's economic management and institutional development objectives. The review of preparation reports seems to indicate that the government preferred a piece-meal approach to technical assistance and training rather than the more comprehensive design recommended by the Bank. With hindsight it appears that the government was probably right considering political and institutional constraints prevailing at that time. Out ef'80 rffweeks alocaled to ipervisu n zmring poject imnplementation, only 12 stdaffweeks wee in the field, excluding time spent by the resident nission in support of headquarters' supervision missions. Only one supervision report contained mandatory infonnation on legal covenants. Until 1991, performance ratings in the supervision reports did not adequately reflect that the project major objectives were comproniised and that implementation was unsatisfactory.  -9 - 34. The borrower's performance during project implementation was clearly deficient. Key covenants in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) were not complied with. The Ministry of Planning did not reorganize the Directorate responsible for public investment programming, as promised during negotiations. The government did not make the agreed contribution to the project financing in the form of additional staff in support of technical assistance personnel. There is no record of systematic evaluations of TA experts by their superiors. No effort was made to ensure continuity in the management of the project. Both the officers in charge of project coordination and the counterparts to TA personnel changed frequently. The Ministry of Planning, which was responsible for project management, did not take corrective actions to improve the performance of TA personnel. Training programs and their impact on the performance of the trainees were not monitored.6 Despite recommendations in the report of auditors, project-financed vehicles and computers were not identified. In other words the government's commitment to the project was weak at all stages of the project's cycle. G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 35. The outcome of the TA project is unsatisfactory. While the project produced valuable outputs in terms of statistical and financial data, macroeconomic analyses and policy recommendations, the project's institutional development objectives were not met. As indicated in paragraphs 13 and 28, a much smaller operation could have produced most of the limited benefits actually derived from the project. H. FUTURE OPERATIONS 36. A US$5.2 million Economic Management (Projet d'Appui a la Gestion Economique, PAGE) project was appraised in 1993 and approved by the Executive Directors in 1994. The new project aims at improving the structure and operations of the same agencies that were expected to benefit from the TA project. The design of the Economic Management project avoids some of the most obvious shortcomings of the TA project. It uses only short-term technical assistance, drawing mostly from local or regional resources.7 A national training center competes with other training institutions to meet training needs which were evaluated before project became effective. A recently created national capacity-building committee matches identified training requirements in the civil service with existing training programs in the country. There is a clear agreement between the government and the Bank on the type of institutional reforms' to be carried out in the context of the project. A detailed training program was prepared and discussed with beneficiaries 6 During the ICR mnission, the goverunent was unable to indicate who had received training and which positions were occupied by the trainees before and after the training prograns. 7 TThe project was recently restructured and the long-tern TA component was eliminated. Based on audits carried out during the TA project.  - 10 - before project appraisal. The Civil Service Department will update personnel files, now linked to the payroll file, and will take into consideration training received in future decisions concerning appointments and promotions. 37. The project was restructured in early 1995 to improve beneficiary participation at all stages of project implementation. The main focus of project activities will be on realistic economic management objectives. To correct the shortcomings as regards the training component of the TA project, the restructured PAGE provides for a detailed training needs assessment of all staff to be trained under the project as well as a monitoring system of the training obtained. A detailed project implementation manual specifies performance indicators to be monitored during project supervision. Continuity is being maintained in supervision which is carried out by the Resident Mission. L KEY LESSONS LEARNED 38. The review of the TA project in Benin confirms lessons derived from similar stand-alone technical assistance projects: (a) a strong political commitment of the government is essential to the success of the project; (b) managers and staff of the agencies assisted by the project should participate actively in the design of the operation; (c) the project's objectives and design should be based on careful analysis of structures, operational processes and skills requirements of the institutions concemed. Where institutional capacity is weak, project objectives should be modest; (d) flexibility in adapting the project to changing circumstances is required; (e) adequate attention should be accorded to project management and coordination issues, particularly for projects involving several agencies; (f) monitoring of project implementation and evaluation of the perfomiance of long term TA advisers should be based on detailed implementation plans and performance criteria. In fact, in line with the Afiica Region's guidelines for long term TA, such assistance should no longer be provided, except under special circumstances with very tight pre-conditions; (g) the Bank should allocate adequate resources to project supervision; supervision missions should include an appropriate skills mix of economists/country officers and  institutional development specialists. Furthermore, a minimum of continuity in project supervision staff is essential; and (h) training should only be provided on the basis of detailed training needs assessments and continuous monitoring of the trainees, including the provision of follow-up training. 39. The Bank does not seem to have a comparative advantage when it comes to planning and monitoring the employment of long term technical assistance. Bilateral agencies appear to be better equipped to handle resident advisers, as evidenced by the better performance of the FAC- financed component in the context of the Benin TA project. 40. Experience of the TA project also shows that some of the most important project achievements did not really need long-term technical assistance and could have been obtained with the help of a smaller, flexible operation financing a variety of short-term activities, including strategy papers, audits, special studies, workshops and also training. This is the way many other TA projects were effectively restructured at the end of project implementation when all the long term advisers had already left the country. Eager to improve their knowledge and understanding of specific macroeconomic, sectoral and institutional issues, the Bank and the government used the undisbursed balance to promote a number of specific activities which proved to be much more valuable than the original project components.  - 12 - IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT CREDIT 1530-BEN PART 1I: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessment Table 2: Related Bank Credits Table 3: Project Timetable Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation Table 7: Studies Included in Project Table 8A: Project Costs Table 8B: Project Financing Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions  - 13 - Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable Macro Policies Sector Policies I Financial Objectives Institutional Development I Physical Objectives Poverty Reduction Gender Issues .1 Other Social Objectives I Environmental Objectives I Public Sector Management .1 Private Sector Development VI B. Project Sustainability Likely UnUkely Uncertain C. Bank Performance Highly satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification V Preparation Assistance Appraisal 'I Supervision / D. Borrower Performance Highly satisfactory Satisfactory Ddicient Preparation / Implementation Covenant Compliance I E. Assessment of Outcome Highly Elighly satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory nusatisfactory .  - 14 - Table 2: Related Bank Credits Cradit Titi. ~~Purps Year Of Stts _________________________ ~~~Approval _ _ _ _ Public Enterprise Sector To assist the Govenment in the 1987 Closed Rehabilitation (Credit 1748- rehabilitation of its public and parapublic BEN) enterprise. SAL I (Credit 2023-BEN) To support a fundamnental reorientation of 1989 Closed the economy away from state intervention towards greater reliance on market forces. SAL II (Credit 2283-BEN) To support the second phase of the 1991 Closed Government's Structural Adjustment Program. Projet d'Appui a la Gestion Economic Management Support Project 1994 On-going Economique (Credit 2552-BEN) SAL HI (Credit 2727-BEN) To support the implementation of key 1995 On-going measures designed to strengthen the supply response to the devaluation of the CFA franc and to consolidate reforms initiated since 1990. ,,, .. - Table 3: Project Timetable Steosi i Proiect Cycle Date Planned Date Actual/Latest Estimate Identification June 1982 June 1982 Preparation June 1982 Appraisal December 1983 December 1983 Negotiations October 1984 October 1984 Board Presentation December 13, 1984 Signig February 28, 1985 Effectiveness June 1985 September 13, 1985 ProjectCompletion March 31, 1991 March31, 1994 Credit Closing ___________November 4, 1994  - 15 - Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (UJSS million) FY8S FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 I FY92 FY93 FY94 Appraisal Estimate 0.5 1.6 2.7 3.6 4.2 4.6 5.0 - - - Actual 0 0.4 0.9 1.4 2.4 3.0 3.8 4.4 5.1 5.4 Actual as % of Estimate 0% 25% 33% 39% 57% 65% 76% - - - Date of final Disbursement November 4, 1994 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Key IZplementation Indicators in President's Report Estimated Actual Planning and Project Preparation 1. Strengthen mnacroeconomic analysis May 1988 June 19881 2. Improve project analysis and selection capability May 1987 May 19902 3. Strengthen link between investment programs and budget May 1987 May 19903 4. Improve industrial project preparation and supervision May 1987 May 19874 5. Develop livestock sector program June 1987 Not implemented Public Finance Management 6. Improve the operations of the CAA March 1986 January 1990' 7. Improve budget structure June 1986 Not implemented 8. Improve the operations of the Treasury March 1986 Not implemented 9. Strengthen generation of public finance statistics and related January 1987 Not implemented indicators 10. Evaluate customs operations January 1987 Not implemented Statistics 11. Improve basic statistics produced December 1988 February 19906 Training 12. Assessment of training needs in key ministries and agencies August 1988 January 19877 and design of training program for counterpart staff 13. Improve skills in project preparation and supervision June 1987 N/A s 14. Improve skills for business accounting December 1987 N/A 15. Improve skills in tax auditing December 1986 N/A I TA was laid off due to incompetence; as a result objective was not met. 2 TA resigned after 1 year due to bad working conditions; as a result objective was not met. 3 Objective was partially achieved. 4 Objective was not met. s Objective was partially achieved. 6 Objective partially achieved. 7 Objective was partially achieved. 8 Not available  Table 6A: Key Indicators for Project Operation KVey Opeh Ini catorsit Esdnmed TA Experts Estaftd Re__ts Actu TA Experts Atual Rendla Cornf t PriM * Repet (Mf) I:::: ::__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Inpu b :: ,_ _ ;_::__ _ (ha) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :_: Part :A Planning and Project Preparation 1. Stegthen m _acroeconomcs Macreconomist 1. Improved analysis and Macroconomist Target not met Expert was laid off due to analysis (36 mr/mr) projections to produce 'Notes (36 m/m) inc _ee Expert de Conjuncture" quarterly assued the role of -i o conwha ainded of Task sagned 2. Improve project analysis Project Analyst 2. Introduction of formal Projec Analyst Expert (12 Actual target wa not iet Expert rigned after I year and selection caability (24 m/m) project analysis and selection m/rm) Howvvre following were bad imiplaenuted: cnkos * Analysis of the situation. * P-Hnazy preparation for orgnizing projects analy*is and * Organization of project _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ cyclc. 3. Strne link bdween Investment Prgrmmer 3. Established procedure Pro Expsat Target w partiml etL inveshment prograns and (24 m/n beginning 6/85) linking invesment program (24 m/ni, Mardc 19S6-June The following were budget with anTent budget 1990) itnpl in v * Set-up investment p rmgan over seveal * Elaborated a metbod for m St-ups technique for program baalwe exaaatim aNW * Prepard a computer manual for use in _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~training prograns. 4. Inmprve industrial project Industrial Advisor (24 rn/mn 4. Formal industrial project (24 rn/rn) Targe not suet prepaation and supervision ________ preparation procedures _______ 5. Develop livestock sector Livestock Advisory Services 5. Livestock sector strategy August 86 - November 87 Target not meL Expert's work and finlu report program (36 m/m) (15 m/m) did not meet component objective  operating Judietors In Estimat TA Experts Estuaa Resus Actual TA _pert Act1 Rels C _ Predsdut's Rqert (11mW) Inpub _b _) . Part: B Public Finance Managmrent 6. hnprove the operations of (i) Acontng Advisor (6 6. Adaptation of CAA's 2 experts were rcruited for I Tsget w not achieved. The computa zaion of the the CAA mr/n) counting to suit National year. Computer expert and National public debt Acudting plan Accuning expert The following were mn_nemet was n (ii) Computer Syse Cmputerization of national (12 rn/m) implemented: achieved. Analyst (9 n/rn) public debt management * A diagosis study ofthe operations CAA. * A dafting of a manual for accouting procedures; and * In fomation system for CAA 7. Improve budget structure Public Finance System 7. Introduction of uniform Expert recruited from the Target wa achieved Specialist (12 m/n) budget nomenclature nternational Monetary Fund Introduced budget (IMF) for 2 years nomenclature (24 rn/m)r S. Improve the operations of (i) Accountant 8 Revision of accounting Two experts were recruited Targt not achieved The expats left the country the Treasury (ii) Computer Specialist procedures and regulations, under FAC flnancing No activity and did not accomplished the (9 mrlm) updating and computerization task. of Treasury accounts 9. Strenghen generation of Economic Statistician 9. Procedures for regular Target not achieved The experts left the country public finance statistics and specialized in public finance production of public finance No activity and did not accomplished the related indicators (18 m/mn) data and economic indicators task. 10. Evaluate customs Short-tem consultants 10. Genral diagnosis ofthe Implemented Under FAC T t partaBy operations (6 m/m) 'Direction des Douanes"and financing arget ba iall inter alia evaluation ofthe a foploenng: custofms collectionsthfooig * Evaluation of customs duties; * A study oftaniff protection systen; and the taxation system; * A stdy of pricing and price fixing; and