India - Himalayan Watershed Management (Uttar Pradesh) Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 12875 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA HIMALAYAN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2295-IN) MARCH 23, 1994 Agriculture Operations Division India Department South Asia Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfornance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA HIMALAYAN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PROJECT (Loan 2295-IN) CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Name of Currency = Indian Rupees (Rs) Currency Exchange Rates At Appraisal Year (May 1983) US$1.00 = Rs 9.50 At Mid-Term Review (1988) US$1.00 = Rs 14.48 At Completion Year (September 1992) US$1.00 = Rs 28.00 BORROWER Government of India IMPLEMENTING AGENCY Government of Uttar Pradesh FISCAL YEAR 1 April - 31 March WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS ERR Economic Rate of Return FAO/CP Food and Agriculture Organization/World Bank Cooperative Program GOI Government of India GOUP Government of Uttar Pradesh M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MTR Mid-Term Review NBC Natural Breeding Centres NGO Non-Government Organization PCR Project Completion Report SAR Staff Appraisal Report T&V Training and Visit  FtOR OMICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation March 23, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Himalayan Watershed Management Project (Loan 2295-IN) Attached is the Project Completion Report on India - Himalayan Watershed Management Project (Loan 2295-IN). Parts I and m were prepared by the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program and Part II by the Borrower. The project, as initially designed was ambitious and complex. The principal emphasis was on establishing small, local plantations, constructing soil conservation structures, and improving crop and livestock practices so as to minimize the deterioration of land and related resources. Initial progress towards the goals was slow, hampered by the problems of coordination among the several line agencies responsible for execution. At the Mid-Term Review some of the initial objectives were scaled back, and organizational changes were agreed. Progress improved markedly and the revised goals were met. The PCR reestimates the ERR of the forest component at 5 percent, compared to 24 percent at appraisal, the difference being attributed to lower yields and higher establishment costs than foreseen. The ERRs for the agricultural components were not reestimated because of lack of data. The institutional objectives were minor and their impact modest. As a result, the project is rated as marginally satisfactory and sustainability uncertain. The Borrower, in Part II, has provided extensive commentary on the performance of the project. This notes several disagreements with the conclusions of the PCR. In particular, it challenges the judgement that the use of check dams for soil erosion control was ineffective. The completion report provides an adequate account of project implementation. Because of the differences in judgement noted, an audit is planned. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  I  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA HIMALAYAN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2295-IN) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ...................................................... i EVALUATION SUMMARY .................................................... iii PARTI ...................................................... 1 1. Project Identity .................................................... 1 2. Background .................................................... 1 3. Project Objectives and Description ........................ ............................. 2 4. Project Design and Organization .................... ................................. 3 5. PProject Implementation .................................................... 4 6. Project Results .................................................... 6 7. Project Sustainability ..................................................... 9 8. Bank Peiformiance .................................................... 10 9. Borrower Performance .................................................... 10 10. Lessons of Experience ...........1.......................................... I 11. Project Relationship .................................................... 11 12. Consulting Services ..................................................... 12 13. Project Documentation and Data .................................................... 12 PART II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ......... ................ 13 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PART mg. STATISTICAL INFORMATION ............ .. ................ 87 1. Related Bank Loans and Credits .87 2. Project Timetable .87 3. Credit Disbursements .87 4. Project Implementation . 88 5. Project Costs and Financing.. 89 A. Project Costs. 89 B. Project Financing. 90 6. Project Results ..91 A. Direct Benefits. 9 1 B. Economic Impact .91 7. Status of Covenants .92 8. Use of Bank Resources ............................. 92 A. Staff Inputs ............................. 92 B. Missions ............................. 93 APPENDICES 1. Typical One Hectare Farm Crop Model ............................. 94 2. Crop Budgets .95 3. Annual Plantings by the Project. 107 4. Annual Outputs from Project Plantations .108 5. Project Implementation - Key Indicators .109 6. Project Costs. 110 7. Economic Analysis . 112 8. Project Publications ............... 113 MAP IBRD 16813  i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA HIMALAYAN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PROJECT (Loan 2295-IN) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Himalayan Watershed Management Project for which a Bank Loan of US$46.2 million (Loan 2295-IN) was approved on May 31, 1983. US$15.0 million and US$1.0 million were cancelled in November 1989 and December 1991, respectively. The Loan closed on September 30, 1992, two years behind schedule. Final disbursement from the loan was made on February 18, 1993 and the balance of US$1.9 million was cancelled. The Preface, Evaluation Summary, Part I and Part III of this PCR were prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization/World Bank Cooperative Program (FAO/CP) mission which visited India in March 1993. The report was based on a review of the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the legal documents, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, internal Bank memoranda, relevant Bank reports on the sector, and discussions with the Borrower's project staff and the Bank's staff at Headquarters in New Delhi who had been associated with the project.   iii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA HIMALAYAN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PROJECT (Loan 2295-IN) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives 1. The primary objective of the project was to minimize, in selected areas, further deterioration of the Himalayan ecosystem, caused by depletion of forest cover, overgrazing, bad land use and careless road construction, all of which resulted in increasing erosion in these areas. In addition, efforts were to be made to improve agricultural productivity and enhance rural incomes. The main components of the project were: (a) fuel and fodder tree plantations; (b) soil conservation; (c) livestock development; (d) improvement of agricultural extension; (e) horticultural development; and (f) irrigation development. Implementation Experience 2. Implementation took nine years instead of seven because of delays during the early years of the project (para 4.5). The total loan disbursements were US$28.3 million or 61.2 percent of the original loan amount of US$46.2 million. Up to the Mid-Term Review (MTR), which was completed in July 1988, the project made only limited progress towards achieving its targets. This was primarily as a result of the six line departments being charged with the individual implementation of different project components and then giving somewhat low priority to these additional responsibilities. There was also little consultation with the beneficiaries and poor coordination between the various line departments, so that the project activities became widely dispersed over the sub-watersheds. Following the MTR, these problems were mostly resolved by the creation of a unified management system with line department staff seconded to the project. Project targets were revised and better consultation with the beneficiaries was instituted. As a result of these changes, the project made satisfactory progress towards achieving the revised targets. 3. The most critical variances between planned and actual project implementation are the significant shortfalls in the planting of fuelwood and fodder trees. However, the area actually available for afforestation was much smaller than originally estimated. The project considerably exceeded its targets for physical gully control and also most agricultural production targets, which mainly involved distribution of improved seeds. Cattle exchange was dropped after three years, but this was replaced by the development of Natural Breeding Centers (NBC) which resulted in improved dairy production.  iv Results 4. The project had mixed success in attaining its stated objectives. While there was substanial success in the agricultural components and the animal breeding activities, resulting in substantial increases in fann incomes, the project fell far short of attaining its targets in the forestry and soil conservation components. Given that the latter were the main activities of the project, their mediocre performance reduced the overall impact of the project and it is doubtful that the project made substantial headway in achieving its primary objective in minimizing further deterioration of the Himalayan ecosystem in the selected project areas. However, the impact of the agricultural program has been considerable, in so much as about 80 percent of farmers in the project areas are now growing improved high-yielding varieties of rice and wheat and are using small quantities of fertilizers. Consequently, crop yields have increased by about 50 percent. 5. Whilst, according to current practice, no Economic Rate of Return (ERR) calculation has been made for extension activities, and lack of data about the benefiting area and number of beneficiaries made it impossible to recalculate ERRs for the horticulture and irrigation components, the ERR for the forestry activities has been re-estimated at 5 percent, taking into account proportionate administration costs. If these costs are excluded, then the ERR improves to 8.5 percent. The low ERR is due mainly to high plantation establishment costs and potential yields re-estimated at much lower levels than at appraisal. Sustainability 6. The areas planted for fuelwood and fodder are insufficient to meet the annual needs of adjacent villages and a sustainable supply of these materials will depend on careful management of the resources by the local communities. The checkdams are unlikely to be maintained. 7. The training and visit extension introduced into the area by the project has now ceased and thus there is little chance that the improved technological agricultural base will be built upon. Similarly, with the closure of virtually all tree and fruit tree nurseries in the project area, the project tree planting activities are unlikely to be sustained. The activities of the NBC appear to be sustainable. Findings and Lessons Learned 8. Through the project the Bank made a resource contribution towards the development of the Himalayan watersheds. New technologies were introduced and valuable lessons can be learned from the experience. The main lessons are: (a) project areas should be of a manageable size; (b) in ecosystem rehabilitation projects, erosion control measures should be targeted according to the need of the area rather than to the availability of land for planting; (c) mid-term reviews should be completed on schedule; (d) frequent changes of senior project staff should be avoided; (e) local communities should be involved in project identification, be active participants in, and make contributions to, the project; and (f) where a new technology is being tested, such as the introduction of vetiver grass on steep slopes, all project participants (staff and farmers) should be made aware of this fact and effective long-term monitoring and evaluation arranged.  1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA HIMALAYAN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PROJECT (Loan 2295-IN) PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity Project Name Himalayan Watershed Management Project Loan No. 2295-IN RVP Unit South Asia Country India Sector Agriculture 2. Background 2.1 The Himalayas form the source and main catchment area of all the major rivers of the Indo-Gangetic plains. These plains are subject to annual flooding which periodically have a devastating effect on agricultural land and property. Also, the life and viability of multi-purpose irrigation and hydropower schemes are put in jeopardy due to the excessive run-off and silt load carried by these rivers. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the severity of flooding increased, even though there was no discernible increase in annual rainfall. 2.2 The Himalayan and Shiwalik regions of the State of Uttar Pradesh extend over 58,000 kM2, with elevations above sea level of between 300 and 7,000 m. Two thirds of the area is classified as forest, although actual forest cover is much less. The area has a highly fragile ecosystem and highly erodible soils. The regions have very steep slopes in the upper catchments, which, in combination with high intensity rainstorms result in rapid erosion, even when not interfered with by man. High densities of people and livestock result in fuelwood and fodder extraction far exceeding annual biomass production, thereby causing accelerated denudation. Further, because of increasing population pressure, crop cultivation has been extended to unsuitably steep unprotected slopes, thus contributing to erosion. 2.3 After the worst ever floods hit Northern India in August 1978, the Government of India (GOI) appointed a Working Group to formulate an action plan for flood control in the Indo- Gangetic basin. It was envisaged that the program should integrate downstream engineering works with upstream soil conservation, reforestation and other watershed treatment measures of the flood-prone rivers and their tributaries. As part of the proposed program, Bank assistance was sought for two watersheds, Nayar and Panar, in the outer and middle Himalayas in Uttar Pradesh.  2 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.1 The primary objective of the project was aimed at minimizing, in selected areas, further deterioration of the Himalayan ecosystem, caused by depletion of forest cover, overgrazing, bad land use and careless road construction, all of which has resulted in increasing erosion in these areas. In addition, efforts were made to improve agricultural productivity and enhance rural incomes. 3.2 The project consisted of the following components: (a) establishment of 59,000 ha of mixed species plantations (for fuel and timber), 27,800 ha of fodder tree plantations on government and panchayat- owned land, and fuel and fodder trees on some 81,000 ha of privately- owned wastelands, which are not regularly cultivated and on field boundaries; (b) construction of soil conservation structures (by the Forest Department) designed to protect existing infrastructure such as roads and villages and including some 1,650 brushwood/stone checkdams, 1,300 cratewire dams and 700 simple drop structures. Construction of terraces (by the Agriculture Department) on 6,000 ha of arable farming land; (c) livestock development, including a cattle exchange program in which 10,500 buffaloes would be exchanged for local cattle and provision of better livestock services through improvements to 40 existing livestock dispensaries; (d) improvement of agricultural extension services through provision of staff, equipment, housing and staff training; (e) horticultural development, including multiple grafting of wild-growing trees with improved material of 3,900 ha of existing, but wild, orchards and establishment of 1,500 ha of new fruit orchards; (f) irrigation development (by soil conservation staff), including improvement, construction and lining of 250 km of small channels and construction of 650 small water tanks; (g) development of research and training activities connected with watershed development; (h) project administration at State, Watershed and Sub-watershed level; and (i) establishment of a National Watershed Development Policy Committee at national level, assisted by a Watershed Development Council for appraisal of sub-projects, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of project progress. 3.3 The total project cost, over a period of seven years, was estimated at appraisal at about US$69.12 million (Rs. 656 million), of which only US$0.80 million (Rs. 7.3 million) would involve foreign expenditures. Approximately 70 percent of the project cost net of taxes and duties (US$66 million) was to be financed by a Bank loan of US$46.2 million. , ~ ~ ~ ~ -- - - - -  3 3.4 Overall responsibility for coordination and execution of the project rested with the Ministry of Agriculture. The Secretary, Hill Area Development Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh (GOUP) was responsible for project implementation at the State level. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.1 The project was identified and prepared by the GOUP assisted by the GOI, with the Forest Department, GOUP, providing the majority of the input. The project was appraised by the Bank in November 1981.1 4.2 The basic project concept was that the components selected for development should be acceptable to local populations and so designed that the great majority of people living within areas selected for rehabilitation would perceive themselves as direct beneficiaries of project actions and be involved in the planning and execution of project components, such as fuelwood and fodder plantations and pasture development. However, the potential beneficiaries were not involved in project identification. 4.3 In addition, the project incorporated the following planning principles: (a) the approach to development of special problem areas was to be comprehensive rather than piecemeal; (b) the characteristics of a given location, its susceptibility to natural hazards such as drought and erosion, and its potential for development and reclamation were to be established through a multi- disciplinary approach involving close cooperation between specialists in the various disciplines; and (c) planning and coordination of physical improvement activities and mobilization of human resources were to be carried out within natural boundaries so that area development plans can be executed gradually, micro-watershed by micro-watershed. 4.4 Drawing on the lessons learned in the Kandi Watershed Protection Project, the SAR emphasized the use of low-cost agricultual/silviculturl solutions. Land closure, afforestation and removal of free-grazing livestock had proved to be the most effective methods of restoring ground cover and reducing run-off of rainwater. Engineering works for soil conservation in upper catchment areas would be limited to protecting blocks of arable land, forest land and existing infrastructure (e.g., roads, villages, etc.). 4.5 Although the timing of the project was appropriate and its conceptual basis was sound, the project was not particularly well prepared. The main initial focus was on the achievement of physical targets and there was not enough emphasis on social issues. The absence of clearly defined implementation roles and responsibilities and a detailed implementation plan reduced the chances of success of the project. The six line departments charged with implementation of the various project sub-components gave low priority to their additional responsibilities under the project. There was also little consultation with the beneficiaries and poor coordination between the various line departments, so that the project activities became widely dispersed over the sub-watersheds and consequently the project made only limited progress towards achieving its targets during the first five years. Some of these problems could have been overcome by a project launch workshop which would have meant that all parties had a clear idea of their role and responsibilities in the project. 4.6 The project design was relatively complex and overly ambitious given that it involved implementation by six line departments and involved some 13 major activities plus many minor I SAR, dated May 10, 1983.  4 activities. Further, the project area was unrealistically large and being relatively remote, faced considerable access difficulties. Another special problem confronting the area was the movement of able-bodied men out of the hills for work, but this was not given adequate weighage in designing the project. The manpower resources required to implement the project and achieve its targets were expected to be developed in the course of the project. However, the project lacked a well-funded training component and this adversely affected subsequent implementation. 4.7 Because the project was viewed as a pilot project developing replicable technologies for watershed development, effective M&E was considered at appraisal as a particularly important project activity. The arrangement that a State Government Agency was entrusted with project evaluation was not entirely satisfactory. The setting up of project M&E unit would have ensured better control of M&E activities and would have been preferable. Essential basic information on the impact of the project is not available, as, for example, the number of beneficiary families and the area and average yields of improved cropping are not known. 5. Project Implementation 5.1 The Bank loan was approved on May 31, 1983 and signed on June 8, 1983. The project became effective on September 9, 1983 with an original closing date of September 30, 1990, which was extended twice to September 30, 1992. The total disbursements were US$28.3 million, or 61.2 percent of the original loan amount of US$46.2 million (see Part III/3). Altogether US$17.9 million of the loan was cancelled on November 7, 1989 (US$16.0 million) and on February 18, 1993 (US$1.9 million). 5.2 Up to the Mid-Term Review (MTR), which was delayed and only completed in July 1988, the project made only limited progress towards achieving its targets and it was apparent that there was no focus on the important components, the project's main objectives were not being addressed and there was little cooperation between line departments. A serious constraint was the lack of a coordinated nursery establishment policy. 5.3 Following the MTR, these problems were mostly resolved by the creation of a unified management system with line department staff seconded to the project. Project targets were revised and better consultation with the beneficiaries was instituted, with non-government organizations (NGOs) voluntarily assisting the project as motivators. As a result of these changes, the project made satisfactory progress towards achieving the revised targets. However, better progress would probably have been possible if the repetitive transfers of senior project staff had been avoided. 5.4 Although by 1988 the project had planted 16,574 ha with tree seedlings, there was little visible impact on stabilizing the ecosystem. Also, enough fodder tree seedlings were distributed free of charge to farmers to, in theory, plant 17,891 ha under the farm forestry program. Due to very low survival rates of the seedlings, this latter program was assessed to have had virtually no impact and was discontinued after the MTR. The SAR plantation target of 86,000 ha was based on extrapolation of data from Machiad sub-watershed. It was subsequendy found that only 55,000 ha were actually available for afforestation. Consequently, the MTR reduced the afforestation target to 35,905 ha, with emphasis placed on fuelwood and fodder plantations. 5.5 A shift from sub-watershed to micro-watershed planning (as originally proposed in the SAR) occurred in the post-MTR period and it was only in late 1988 that general agreement was reached among senior management that the basic technical objectives of the project were slope stabilization and fuel and fodder production, and that more emphasis should be given to improving  5 in situ moisture conservation. A significant reduction in seedling mortality might have been achieved if these measures had been taken up in 1985, when they were advocated by a supervision mission. A shift in focus to meet local community needs for fuel and fodder did not materialize because of insufficient efforts by the project management team to create avenues of interest on this point and to adapt the project to meet this basic objective. Although not included in the SAR, the project introduced energy saving devices, such as improved wood stoves, biogas plants, smokeless chulhas and solar cookers to try to reduce pressure on the forests for fuelwood. 5.6 The MTR forestry targets, revised to cover plantations on degraded land, blank areas and land near to villages, were exceeded, mainly because communities allocated more land for planting than expected. However, the forestry nurseries in the project areas were closed at the end of the project.2 The project also exceeded the MTR target in pasture development. The exclusion of cattle from grazing areas increased ground cover by indigenous grasses, which protected the soil from being loosened by raindrop impact and increased grass yields by 30-40 percent. V-ditches cut on the contour helped infiltration and increased available moisture for plant growth. However, there was a tendency to adopt a blue print approach.3 For example, the contour ditches were cut at 6 m intervals regardless of sudden changes in slope angle. The long length of the ditches increased the danger of gully erosion by concentrating run-off at low points. Vetiver grass, planted on the contour to slow down run-off velocity, showed very poor growth after 3 years and its effect on intercepting run-off was negligible. Whether a Vetiver hedge will develop in succeeding years is not clear and needs close monitoring. Love grass, on the other hand, looked good, forming dense clumps. Trials using clover to increase soil fertility look promising but the leguminous Styloanthes failed to establish itself. 5.7 The project exceeded its targets considerably for physical gully control structures (brushwood/stone checkdams, cratewire dams and drop structures). However, due to poor design, construction and location, most of the structures inspected by the mission were not slowing run-off velocity and controlling siltation. In many instances the structures accelerated erosion of nala walls by directing water around the structures instead of over the spillways.4 5.8 Between 1987 and 1991, the GB Pant University of Agriculture and Technology Hill Campus undertook studies on standardization of propagation techniques of indigenous shrub species, suitability trials of grasses and legumes, optimum doses of fertilizers for natural pastures, and preliminary estimates of the optimum carrying capacity of pasture (2 cattle units/ha). The Forest Research Institute started its research program in 1988, but some studies did not begin until 1991 - too late to obtain any worthwhile results. The potential to gather data on the reduction of environmental degradation in the project area was lost because the project failed to repair the recording instrument installed to measure run-off and soil loss from a mini-watershed early in the project life.5 5.9 Following the MTR, project management put emphasis on the improvement of agricultural production, mainly through the distribution of improved seeds, such that all physical targets, both SAR and MTR revised, were exceeded, except those for the development of seed production centers and the distribution of seed minikits. In the latter case, a seed multiplication program was intnduced successfully to offset a shortage of seed for the minikits. The agriculture 2 GOUP clarified that the forest nurserics were not closed but transferred to the line departments. 3 GOUP disagrees citing considerable flexibility in approach and methodology for soil conservation. 4 GOUP maintains that despite some instances of faulty designs, overall quality and cost effectiveness were adequate 5 This is disputed by GOUP, stating that a standby instrument was used for regular data collection and maintenance of run-off and sedimentation information.  6 program was supported by the introduction into the project area of a T&V system of agricultural extension. The research institute Vivekananda Parvatiya Krishi Anusandhan at Almora provided excellent support to this extension service. 5.10 Horticultural assistance to farmers included the top grafting of wild pear trees, rehabilitation of old orchards, planting of new orchards, mainly of citrus, and the distribution of tools. Except for the top grafting of pear trees, where the achievement fell well short of the target, all other targets were exceeded. The potential impact of this sub-component is considerable and should improve significantly the cash incomes of beneficiaries once all trees are in full bearing. Even though about 75 percent of the project fruit tree seedlings were imported from outside the State and there was thus significant scope for local production of seedlings, most horticultural nurseries within the project area have ceased production following the closure of the project6 5.11 Initially, the animal husbandry sub-component consisted of catde exchange, feed supplies and the strengthening of veterinary and bull centers. The cattle exchange system, due to various practical difficulties, was unsuccessful and was dropped after about two years. Other activities, such as artficial insemination, were tried but after the MTR the project concentrated on the development of Natural Breeding Centers (NBC), where first cross Jersey/Local catde breed bulls and improved buffalo bulls were stationed and used on local young female stock. As a result of the program, large numbers of improved female progeny are spread throughout the zones of influence of the NBCs and, in general, these animals are producing yields of milk up to five litres per day compared to one litre per day from the local stock. 5.12 Three risks which were identified at appraisal were not avoided during project implementation. The development of low-cost technical packages was poorly supported by research, but the biggest adverse effect on the project's results was due to lack of participation of the local people and the inadequate organization and management structure. Conversely, the decision taken at the MTR to change the management structure and involve the beneficiaries in the planning process was the action that had the most positive effect on project implementation. Clearly, the project would have benefitted greatly if the MTR had been completed earlier, as originally scheduled. 6. Project Results 6.1 The project had mixed success in attaining its stated objectives. While there was substantial success in the agricultural components and the animal breeding activities resulting in substantial increases in farm incomes, the project fell far short of attaining its targets in the forestry and soil conservation components. Given that the latter were the main activities of the project, their mediocre performance reduced the overall impact of the project and it is doubtful that the project made substantial headway in achieving its primary objective in minimizing further deterioration of the Himalayan ecosystem in the selected project areas. 6.2 The main physical targets at SAR and as revised at the MTR and the actual achievement are set out in Part III/4. This shows that although the project failed to achieve the majority of its SAR targets, it exceeded most of its MTR targets. One sub-watershed was dropped from the project. 6.3 There were large shortfalls in the areas planted to forestry. Only 40,253 ha was planted to fuelwood compared with the SAR target of 59,000 ha, and anticipated fuelwood 6 GOUP suggests that planting materials continue to be available from line department nurseries.  7 production over 20 years is only 0.8 million tons as against the SAR estimate of 3.2 million tons. This huge variance in fuelwood production is explained by the reduced areas planted to fuelwood and fodder, and large differences in expected yields. As will be seen from the following table, SAR fuelwood yields are based on an average of 38.9 and 18.1 t/ha from forestry and fodder plantations, respectively, whereas the mission estimates that they will be only 18.9 and 10.0 t/ha after 20 years, respectively. It must be stressed that the mission's estimates cannot be verified as the project did not monitor or evaluate growth rates or potential yields. However, field observations showed that stands included about 40 percent of species (Quercus, Cedrus, Cupressus) that would not be harvested in the first 20 years, thus reducing yield estimates. Only those plantations planted in Year 1 of the project are harvested twice (in Years 10 and 20). See Part III, Appendix 4 for further details. Comparison of SAR, Mid-Term Revised and Project Completion Fuelwood Production Estimates after 20 Years Area Estimated Yield Production (ha) t/ha) (tons) A. SAR Estimate Fuelwood plantations 59,000 38.87 2,293,380 Fodder plantations 27,800 18.08 502,524 Farm forestry 81,000 5.02 406,675 Total 167,800 3,202,579 B. Mid-Term Revised Estimate Fuelwood plantations 31,679 23.32 a/ 738,754 Fodder plantations 4,226 10.85 '/ 45,852 Farm forestry 17,891 b/ b/ Total 53,796 784,606 . Actual At Project Completion Fuelwood plantations 40,253 18.91 761,329 Fodder plantations 4,226 10.00 42,260 Farm forestry 17,891 b/ b/ Total: 62,370 803,S89 60 percent of SAR estimated yield. b Negligible. I I The 784,000-ton MTR estimate of fuelwood is much more comparable with the completion estimate than the SAR estimate, when the SAR yield has been reduced by 40 percent to allow for non-harvesting of timber species. 6.4 There is also a considerable variance between the SAR estimate of 1.30 million tons of fodder and actual expected production of 0.38 million tons. This difference is explained by the smaller area planted, frequent lopping, lower rates of regeneration due to cold winters and poor site conditions. 6.5 The expected production of 1.6 million tons of grass from project activities is 50 percent of SAR estimates. The variance is due to the reduced project area and lower yield expectations (the 20-year average project grass yields from fuelwood plantations are half those calculated in the SAR).  8 6.6 Except for drop structures, the project exceeded considerably the limited targets which the SAR set for physical gully control structures. Despite supervision missions repeatedly advising that engineering control works in torrent gullies be given low priority or deferred to avoid loss of investment, the Soil Conservation Department carried out its own program regardless of the project's recommendations. Labor costs were exceptionally high (12 man-days for one checkdam, 250 man-days for each cratewire dam and drop structure) and benefits appear to be extremely small. Most of the gully control structures seen by the PCR mission were accelerating erosion in generally stable nalas. Poor location, design, construction and failure to account for the source of eroding material resulted in the checkdams directing water around the structures against the sides instead of over the spillways. Warnings by supervision missions about these faults were ignored continually. 6.7 The impact of the agricultural program has been considerable, in so much as about 80 percent of the targeted beneficiaries are now growing improved high yielding varieties (HYV) of rice, wheat and other crops and are using small quantities of fertilizers. Consequently, crop yields have increased by about 50 percent. Appraisal estimates and actual yields obtained or expected to be achieved are set out in Part HII4 for the major crops and activities. There was significant improvement in crop yields by farmers who adopted the improved packages introduced by the project. Yields of 3 and 2 tons per ha were achieved with irrigated and unirrigated HYV of rice, respectively, compared to 2 and 1.2 tons, respectively, without the project. There was also a substantial increase in HYV wheat yields which rose to 2.4 and 1.8 tons per ha for irrigated and unirrigated fields, respectively, compared to 1.2 and 1.0 tons, respectively, without the project. There were also significant improvements in the yields of lentil. See Part III, Appendix 2 for detailed crop budgets. 6.8 Farmers participating in the project enjoyed substantial incremental incomes (see Part III, Appendix 1). At farm level, farmers increased their net financial retums by Rs. 4,150 per ha in the kharif season and by Rs. 2,924 per ha in the rabi season. On an individual crop level, farmers posted significant increases in returns to family labor, which more than doubled in the case of rice, wheat and peas. A crop model for farmers growing fruit trees under the project shows an expected financial rate of return close to 35 percent. 6.9 The project had a considerable impact on job creation in the project area. About 900 full-time jobs were created to operate and manage project activities. No reliable data are available about the total number of casual jobs created by the project but the project provided a great deal of temporary work for the local inhabitants, particularly in the forestry and soil conservation activities. 6.10 The costs of establishing the fuelwood and fodder plantations were much higher than expected due to the following factors: (a) siting the forest nurseries away from permanent water and poor nursery management in the early years of the project led to an aggregate 70 percent mortality of seedlings in the nurseries and during transport, sub-standard seedlings from nurseries contributing to the high mortality rates in the plantations (40-50 percent in some cases); (b) the planting rate of 5 to 12 trees per man-day was excessively low compared with a norm of 36 trees per man-day; and (c) protecting the plantations by building dry stone walls (estimated at 2 m per man-day) was ineffective as they were easily breached and seldom maintained. Although only 37 percent of the SAR targets for plantations were achieved, plantation costs were 73 percent of the  9 SAR estimate.7 The largest cost overrun was with project administration, which exceeded the SAR estimate by 96 percent.8 6.11 The Economic Rates of Return (ERR) estimated at appraisal were 24 percent for forestry activities, over 100 percent for agricultural extension, 35 percent for horticulture, 64 percent for irrigation and 23 percent for the whole project. According to current practice, no ERR calculation has been made for extension activities, and lack of data about the benefiting area and the number of project beneficiaries has made it impossible to calculate revised ERRs for the horticulture and irrigation components. An ERR has therefore been re-estimated only for the forestry activities. The recalculated ERR for forestry based on actual areas planted and anticipated yields (see Part III, Appendix 7) is 5 percent, if proportionate administrative costs are taken into account. If these are excluded, the ERR improves to 8.5 percent. This low ERR is due to several factors: first, the yields estimated at appraisal were very optimistic as explained in para 6.3 above. The ERR was also depressed by the high plantation establishment costs, which had high labor content. 6.12 The tree and fodder plantations were too scattered and too thinly populated to make any discernible impact on improving the environment and, as the individual plantations are not large enough (only 3-15 ha) to meet the future fuelwood demands of the communities, further depletion of the remaining forest cover must be expected. On the steep slopes biological soil conservation measures, which prevent soil particles from being loosened by raindrop impact, were more successful in preventing further degradation when backed up by physical measures such as V- ditches. Even though 2,536 ha of pastures were established as against a target of 560 ha, difficulties in obtaining seed repeatedly restricted this activity. Although V-ditches cut on the contour helped infiltration and increased the availability of moisture for plant growth, improved species of grasses and legumes failed to become established satisfactorily. The exclusion of livestock from grazing areas, however, increased ground cover by indigenous grasses but without monitoring the improvement in cover with time could not be evaluated. 7. Project Sustainability 7.1 Fuelwood and Fodder. The areas planted for fuelwood and fodder are insufficient to meet the annual needs of the adjacent villages. Once the plantations are cut, the communities will be forced to use the natural forest cover until such time as the plantations have grown enough to be harvested again. An issue that was not satisfactorily addressed by the project was the failure to introduce a plan for the future management of common properties. A sustainable, though limited, supply of fodder, fuelwood and grass will depend on the introduction of adequate management of the resource by the local communities and their ability to limit exploitation to the regenerative capacity of the vegetation in the plantations. 7.2 Pasture Development. It is unlikely that fertilizer will be applied to pastures and repeated close cropping may ultimately exhaust the root reserves and have similar effects to over- grazing. Having established a pasture, the key to sustainable production will lie in good management. Controlled cutting of protected plots during the course of the project could have provided some indication of future resource use. 7 GOUP disputes cited statistics. S GOUP clarifies that this was mainly due to upward revision of pay scales.  10 7.3 Soil Conservation. Checkdams, and other structures constructed in steep natural torrent gullies do not provide the farmers with any visible benefits and are unlikely to be maintained. As they were rarely designed to cope with the large volumes of run-off and debris that get channelled in the gullies, many will eventually collapse. The estimated 2.4 million man-days used to construct the structures could have been used more effectively in stabilizing the catchment area of drainage channels by planting grasses and fodder trees, which have benefitted the farmers. 7.4 Agriculture. The extension staff trained under the project have or are, returning to their line department where the T&V system of extension has not yet been introduced. Consequently, T&V extension has now ceased within the project area. There is, thus, little chance that the improved technological base introduced into the project area will be built on in the foreseeable future. Steps should be taken by GOUP to give priority to the re-introduction of the T&V system in Pauri Garhwal and Almora Districts. 7.5 Nurseries. Except at one or two small private horticultural nurseries, production of all tree and fruit tree seedlings in the project area has ceased, thereby putting in jeopardy particularly the sustainability of the project-supported horticulture sub-component. 7.6 Livestock. The activities of the NBC appear to be sustainable, provided full cost recovery measures are introduced so that the improved bulls stationed at the centers can be replaced at the end of their working lives. 8. Bank Performance 8.1 Through the project the Bank has made a resource contribution towards the development of Himalayan watersheds. New technologies were introduced and lessons can be learned which would be invaluable when applied to similar projects in the future. 8.2 The Bank provided a great deal of supervision input which was commensurate with the high degree of difficulty in implementing this complex project. The supervision missions included a wide range of pertinent specialists. However, one possible fault was that for the 15 missions, from December 1981 to November 1987, a forester made only four visits; although a forest economist was included on the three initial missions (pre-appraisal to commissioning). The lack of a specialist forester during the project preparation stages could possibly have been the cause of the very optimistic yield predictions included in the SAR. Unfortunately, the supervision effort up to the MTR seems to have had only minimal impact, probably due to the fragmented nature of the project management. For example, the missions alerted the project about the excessive construction of physical conservation structures in upper watershed areas and, as early as 1985, attention was drawn to new low cost technical innovations such as V-ditches, but these were not adopted until after the MTR in 1988. In view of the known problems with management in the early project period, it is difficult to understand why the Bank did not insist on the MTR being carried out on time. 8.3 After the MTR, supervision was comprehensive and very detailed and useful supervision reports were produced, which had a positive impact on the performance of the project during its later years.  11 9. Borrower Performance 9.1 After a shaky start both Central and State Governments performed satisfactorily in implementation of this project, except that line agencies continued to apply their routine practices regardless of recommendations made by supervision missions to improve their performance. This was probable due to poor communication between management and field level and lack of confidence in initiating new ideas and practices on the ground. Future projects would benefit from technical assistance to stimulate and direct field-level innovations. A major problem was the constant rapid turnover of staff, particularly at senior level, coupled with delays in filling key staff positions. 10. Lessons of Experience 10.1 The lessons that can be learned from the project are: (a) the objectives given in the SAR should be clear, unambiguous, and take into account the difficult conditions in the project area, such that the project area is of a manageable size; (b) in ecosystem rehabilitation projects, it is important to distinguish between the area that needs to be planted to prevent erosion, and the area that can be planted. The first covers all the degraded land while the second may be only that made available by the community. As this project has shown, the land made available for planting was in small scattered patches. Achievement of targets based on the latter is unlikely to achieve the overall project objectives; (c) to ensure maximum impact, mid-term reviews should not be delayed, but completed at, or before, half the scheduled time frame of the project has elapsed; (d) the project was handicapped by frequent changes of senior staff and positions left unfilled for long periods of time. Such occurrences should be avoided in future projects; (e) in terms of identifying with the project, it would probably have been preferable if the local communities had been involved in project identification and had been asked to contribute, by, for example, setting up and providing the labor for nurseries, thus leaving the project to supply free of charge seeds, polypots, tools, supervision and training; (f) the project ended with a community unmotivated and lacking in the ability to spontaneously expand the project activities on their own initiative. A campaign to increase community awareness of the goals of the project and to invite their active participation at the beginning of the project would have promoted a feeling of involvement in, and commitment to, the various components; (g) where a new technology is being tested, such as the introduction of Vetiver grass on steep slopes, all project participants should be made aware of this fact and long-term M&E arranged.  12 11. Project Relationship 11.1 Throughout the project period a good working relationship existed between the Borrower and the Bank. This was enhanced through the continuity of Bank staff, particularly during the later stages of the project, and by the high level of technical assistance offered by the Bank staff during supervision missions. 12. Consulting Services 12.1 The only consultancy was for evaluation, which was particularly weak. This is reflected in the project costs such that only 6 percent of the amount budgeted for evaluation and studies was spent. 13. Project Documentation and Data 13.1 The SAR and loan agreement were generally perceived as sufficient to provide a useful framework to guide initial implementation. Although the SAR acknowledged that the cause of environmental degradation in the Himalayan watershed is over-exploitation of natural resources by the local communities, the SAR objectives did not clearly give priority to meeting the farmers' objectives and requirements (for food, fodder and fuelwood). One important goal of the project should have been to provide the communities with the encouragement and skills to be able to expand, improve and manage their environment themselves after the end of the project. 13.2 Monitoring activities were limited to routine reports of physical and financial achievements. Crop and forage productivity was not adequately assessed, nor was the survival and growth of seedlings properly monitored and there was no assessment of the results of the project's efforts in energy biomass production and energy conservation. 13.3 The project published a large number of useful field manuals and technical pamphlets and booklets. These are listed in Part III, Appendix 8. Other very useful documents were the MTR, the supervision reports, particularly those after the MTR and the draft Project Completion Report produced by the Watershed Management Directorate in March 1993.  13 PART II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Summary Himalayan Watershed Management Project, Uttar Pradesh was launched with World Bank Assistance (Loan No.2295 IN) in 1983-84 in Nayar and Panar Watershed in U.P.hill districts. Primary objective of the project was to attempt to minimise in selected areas further deterioration of the eco-system caused by depletion of forest cover, overgrazing, bad land use and careless road construction. The project implementation was taken up in only selected sub-watersheds & microwatersheds. Out of the 9 SWS given in SAR, only 8 SWS were taken up for treatment. In 1983-84, work started in the first SWS and in 1984-85 in the second SWS. In 1985-86 work started in 4 more SWS. One SWS each was taken up in the year 1986-87 and 1988-89 respectively. Thus,work in the different subwatersheds of the project was started in a phased manner from 1983-84 to 1988-89. The main components of the project included Forestry, Soil Conserva- tion, Agriculture, Horticulture, Animal Husbandry, Energy Conservation and Minor Irrigation. A small component of drinking water/rainwater harvesting was also included from 1990-91 on approval from the World Bank team. The project was initially sanctioned for a period of 7 years. The project activities were carried out by the concerned line departments of the Govt. of U.P. from the year of start in 1983 till 1988. A Mid Term Review (MTR) of the project was done during 1987-88,jointly by a team of World Bank, GOI & GOUP. On such review, the project implementa- tion through the line departments was found to be unsatis- factory. As per the recommendations made in the MTR report and later agreed by the World Bank and the Govt."Unified Command" system for project implementation was introduced from 1988-89. It was also agreed that the project period would be further extended on annual basis upto 1993. The project was completed successfully in Sept. 92. Contd...  14 At the onset of the project the total cost of the project was 66.0 million US$. The World Bank assistance was fixed at 46.2 million US $. It was realised in 1989 that due to unfavourable exchange rate, it would not be possible to utilize the total amount of the Loan even in the extended period upto 1993. Therefore, in agreement with the World Bank, the amount of loan for the project was reduced to 31.2. MUS $. Persuant to structural adjust- muents the loan amount was further revised and reduced by 1.0 MUS $ w.e.f. Dec. 1991. Thus the final loap amount for the project had been fixed at 30.2 MUS $.  15 The Proiect The project covers 9 Subwatersheds (SWS) and B3 Micro- watersheds (MWS) involving an area of 3,12,000 ha. The following table gives the year of commencement of work in different sub- watersheds and other relevant details Table-i Name of watershed Name of SWS Number of MWS Area Year of I (000ha) start 1 2 3 I 4 5 Nayar l.Machlad 4 16.8 1983-84 2.Srinagar 11 36.6 1984-85 3.Rudraprayag 4 15.2 1985-86 4.Randigad 4 16.1 1985-86 5.Nayar Right 2 10.1 1985-86 6.West Nayar 22 76.0 1986-87 (Pashchimi) 7.East Nayar 19 69.5 1988-89 (Purvi) 8.Nayar Left 8 25.3 Not start( Saryu 9.Panar 9 46.4 1985-86 Total 83 312.0 In MTR, the programme was modified to 8 subwatersheds with an area of 286.7 thousand ha.* instead of the original 9 Sub- watersheds. (A) Pre-MTR Period At the onset of the project, GOUP associated,by an order in Oct.1983 the following Line Departments for implementation and execution of project activities as per the prevailing work norms and specifications of their respective departments- 1. Forest 2. Soil Conservation 3. Hlorticulture 4. Animal Husbandry 5. Agriculture 6. Minor Irrigation * In MTR document, the area of these 8 Subwatersheds has been eroneously given as 2.47 lakh ha.  16 /\clewIu;tl ilIcremerLtal sUaff was sanctioneld to Lltese I I ii'' cIf'1,:i 1 eilIl Ii l{fliv p)ropl rl- o l tl I' live p)roje(t worlkit enit-usted Lao them iii addition to thielr normal departmental aictivities ihe liine (lepa rtments were I nipiplemeinetirig thie sectoral project activities under the administrative and riniancial coniLrol of their respective departments.The Watershecl Managemirent Organisation was responsible for plavining, moiiitorinig and evaluation of project activities wI-il e thie actL'l executioni was the responsibility of thie linic depart menLs IThe Iiiie departments were requirecl to en1sure that the land improvement and all sectoral develop- mental activilies in any area in the sub-watershed are carried ouLt in an integrated manner. Project implementation in the pre-MTR period was la;rgely on subwatersihed basis.Though the objective was to phase out the project activities by selecting critical M1WS First aimd work on thein and move on to oLlier MWS later,in pracl-;p , however, the project activities were spread all over a laige area in the subwatersheds. In additloni to the overall progra'mme spread-over the SWS, at least one mini- watershed, each of about 200-500 ha. and comprising of a cluster oF 2 or 3 vilages was selected In each SWS for inciiv;iye lrea t nt I.1hese minilwat.ershedls were to serve as ;I mo0del andl deinolistration For a new integrated approach 1lor a rva dleveloplileilt  17 'Flie projecl Look some time to tale off due to initial teetliniig problems,like delay In sanction,a]]otmenL ol hti(Iget and posItioning 01 l saff. TIlere were maniy more constlrai ts in Liw inmplementatLion of the projecL through I i ie depart ient s ,who perfo[rmecd iin a st ereco-typed manner, wer e mostlIy working dlepartmeit altly ini an isolated mannier and Loolk thle project activities as a mere aciditlonality lo their parallel departmental programmes.An inLegrated project approach could not be proniotecl as there was lack of co--ordination between different line departments in implement al ion of sectoral activities. As a result, thie work was scattered all over lhe sub watershed area. Tlhe La lgtcs oF di[ferent work and( sectoral componenLs were looked iint o by the li ne depart.nients on piecemeal basis. As a resu1lt, liltIe visible i mnpact could be produced in th1e SWS andc muclh was left to be done on integrated and participatory plannlig,co-ordination and execution of the proc ject.Sinlilarly,suggestions and recommendations abutL t(ecchnicca1 c hanges anici improvemeit-s could not be translateJinito action. lhe project being of innovative nature,nmodifications and chaniiges in Lhe technology as well as conLtenits were being made whiile p]anninig thie field works,but tihe iine departmenLs couldJ not readily illcorlporat e Lh' same clue to administraLive probl ems andl 1acCk Of adeq(luate individual inlterests and [lexibili ty in tl ici r dIepa)rtLmeltal system of wurking.  18 (1B) lPost MIR P'eriod 'I'lle pro ject had( an ii 11bi I L inec hatif sii for Ml (I 'rermi Review to be unclertaken in order to improve the project impl crmenVat ioni in the I iglit of lihe experiences gainled lhe joinlt Mid Term Review was initiated during 1987-88 ancd the report was subMiLtted to Govt. of India in March 1988. MtFR proposals were final ised in May 1988 As per the decision takcen after thie MTR, basic clianges were made in the organisational structure, management ;inid impl1emenLLtation strategy of thie project. A IUniFJed Commanid" system of project impl enientation was adopted and the incremental sLaff was put directly under the administrative control of the project authority . Certain modificationswere also made in the progranime contents after the MTR . The " Unified Commaid ", introdluced from the year 1988-89, liad two Project Directors (1l1Ds) at the operationiaJ level who were macle responsible for Ith1e implementation of the project in the field. A niultidisci- plinary Leam consisting of speL.alists of various disciplines at the level of Dy. Project Directors was constituted uncder the PI)s to develop an effective delivery system keeping in view tlhe targets ancd integrated approach of the project.  19 J1roic ct (oiLte lLts A (J(eL ai I ed waLe-rsiie(l ma nagemeiLt pI aII was prepared bY GOIJ P and( revi(-wedJ by the I D A. Appraisal Mission. On 1(h ( aI i ;s 1- lI) is -ev Iew, tlc diiffere-cit coimiponeiAi s were identLified and tIleir targets were finalised. Project Reports f(ur oLt cr S!W)' WeVrC p repa red on lhe I i nl(s or Lle project report fo Machli adl SWS. DuL-ing lihe course of imp]ementation and execution of thie projecl, it was observecl that some of the project components adicI Lhei r programimie contenits requi red changes/modifi catiolns/ aI djust uiIe't. liTe observa(ions ref]ected in the field reports olF tLhe Review Mi ssion of Wor lI Ban k also necessitated thlese Clianges/old i fo icat ions . lany i mport ant ch1anges were made in tLe proc)gramIlml e cont ents alfter iTR in 1988 Conside rinig the i nniovaL i ve anld pi l ot nature of the pro ject ,thie need for such frecluenL modifications and changes was natural. The main cause of degradaLion of tile ecosystem in tlhc project area is over exploitation of thie resources by the cver increasinig humani and caltle population. An attemlpt was made to clesi gn and sui tab] y modify the project contenits i h a.;i waiy S) ;as tLo meLt the r-equl celilenllts of thle watershed communiLi y in a susLainiable niainier and witliout causinig damage t o tUle eco-usy sI eml Various project componenits are dliscussed below I 1 FOR EST RY Role of the forestry couiiponieit s is pivo.Lal in meeting lie reqtuir, menIw of fuel and Foddeer. In ilie p re- ii R period ,the works i del)id i f e uniler forest ry component il incil !(I fuel wooc  20 anid FoIdde r planLtations and farm forestry.Thle plantation model ;1(lo)I (dI FOr Fteto I wood 1)Ia nt at i oui ii n lie (ldg;rad(ed(l reserve Forests conlsi sle(l oF 1 600 I)planits per la .whiereas in Civil and Soyam Fo rest ;t rea:s 2500 p)l aniits per ha. were pIlanited because such- areaos are o fLeti (levoicl of tree growth. Thie fodder plantatLions w:ere Ik;sC(I 111;m II y o n C,ivi I ancl Soya m a a reas wi th 1000 trees/ha. Und er far in forestry, foddcer plants were distributed to the ; r ile-rs For l) aint irig on Farm bu ids oF their ciLi Ivatedc fields :;IId oII wase I aIdls After (lie mi(- terimi review, the Fol lowi nig )l1 antatIon inodI' I S we re adopt eI : (1) Otn degraded forests - 1600 plants/ha. (2) On blank areas - 2500 plants/ha. (3) Near vi llages - 1)000 pl ants/haa. Atleast 40% of the plants raised near villages consist Of fuel and Focdcler species. Improved varielies of fodder grasses and legumes were introduced in these areas and the production of local grasses was promioted by use of fertilizers. I'roduction of seasonal energy biomass was also introducedl from 1989 in which annual woody c-rops like Cajanus c;uj;Ial and sesb)alli ;S spp. were raised. Ihe physical targets and achieveinentj of the activities un(ler forestry component are given in the fol lowing table  21 Item Unit SAR target MTR target Achie- Expendi- Sept.83 to (1988 to vement ture . March 88) 1993) (lakh Rs) 1.Fuel wood ha. Plantation (a) Reserve forest ) 7590 253.17 (b) Civil forest ) 21,265 - 4759 219.23 2.Fodder Plantation ha (a) Civil forest )- 2779 72.79 (b) Private land ) 9,185 - 1447 14.07 3.Farm forestry ha 29938 - 17891 1.75 4.Plantation on degraded forest land ha - 7,130 10656 580.14 5.Plantation in blank areas ha. - 6,980 9869 711.74 6.Plantation near ha. - 5,220 7379 409.53 villages 7.Energy Plantation ha. - - 1086 12.05 (seasonal energy biomass) In addition to the items mentioned above Rs.505.72 lakh was spent onraising of nurseries,distribution of plants to farmers etc. Note: The SAR targets indicated against item no. 1 to 3 were fixed for 7 years period by extrapolating data from Machlad SWS.Short fall shown against SAR targets of item no. 1,2 and 3 is due to following reasons : a. These extrapolated SAR targets were-unreclittic. b. These SAR targets were fixed for a period of 7 years while work against these targets was carried out for 4 ycars only,after which SAR targets were revised and replaced by the new MTR targets.The MTR targets are given against item no.4,5 and 6. As is apparent from the above table,at the time of closure c of the project,total achievement was 63,456 ha,while the initie SAR target was 60,388 ha. Soil Conservation In the pre MTR peirod,soil conservation component consisted of construction of a series of brushwood/stone checkdams,cratewire :!arr.rnC5 dror. structures across the nalas. The objective of these  22 soil conservation structures was to reduce the velocity of run-off and check erosion in the stream banks and along the length of the nala.Vegetative reinforcement of these structures wias also carried out.In the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), terracing was also proposed to check soil erosion from the sloping agricltural terraces. However,this attivity was not taken up as this was not found cost effective. After the MTR,some new programmes were added in the soil conservation cornponent,viz.vegetativerehabilitation of abandoned terraEces and raising of vegetative barriers of vetiver or other suitable grass/shrub species on. field boundaries. The physical targets and achievements under various activities of soil conservation component are given in Ithe following table : ------------------------------------------------------------------- Item Unit SAR targets MTR targets Achie- Expen- (Sept.83 to (1988 to 1993) vement diture March 88) (lakh) 1. Brushwood/stone No. 533 10,170 29717 107.48 checkdams 2. Cratewire dams No. 490 1,739 7941 211.95 3. Drop structures No. 180 135 222 14.24 4. Vegetative rehabilitation of abandoned terraces ha. - 6,000 962 21.65 5. Repair of damaged agricutlure terraces ha - 550 2914 96.32 RMTR - 880 In addition to the items mentioned above,stabilisation of slips,planting of vetiver on terrace bunds, in-situ moisture conservation,maintenance of old structures etc was also carried out. Expenditure on these items was Rs.63.68 lakh. Construction of checkdams,cratewire dams and drop structures was carried out according to the treatment plans of the nalas. Accordingly,a number of small low cost structures were constructed,instead of a fewbig and costly structures. It explains the more than double achievements. In the case of vegetative rehabilitation of abandoned-  23 terraces the achievemnents fell short of MTR targets due to thle problem of absentee land lords. Proper selection of sites for soil conservation structures A~t was always stressed upon.iWhere nala was straight with minimun width and firm banks was preferred for such structures. Series of small, low cost clheck dams were constructed. The wing walls of the check dams were "keyed- in" with the firm banks.Where the /velocity of wiater was too much, counter check dams were designed. Designing of spillway was done as per the rule of thumb and height was mostly restricted to 40-60 cm. These structures were strengthened through vegetative measures. When the structures got siltecl-up,cuttings and seedlings of suitable species were planted up to stabilise the trapped silt. These structures helped considerably in checking erosion of nala beds and stream 'banks. Iiorticulture The role of horticulture in providing a permanent vegetal cover alongwith an alternative land use in the erosion-prone hill slopes can not be over-emphasised. The following programnmes were included in the project : (1) Top working-Large scale grafting of cultivated high yielding varieties of Pear on the trees of Mehal (wild pear which is found largely in groves in the community land and in the marginal lands in agricultural fields was carried out. (2) Planting of new orchards,mainly citrus was successful. (3) Raising of individual orchards - In the intial years,this activity was to be carried out by providing loans to individuals at a very low rate of interest. But this could not find favour with the local people.Later on the modus operendi of this activity was changed and the work was donc departmentally on private lands but in a limited