Guinea - First Agricultural Services Project

Docmzcnt of The World Bank FOR OFFCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 13148 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GUINEA FIRST AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (CREDIT 1636-GUI) JUNE 10, 1994 Agriculture Operations Division Occidental and Central Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used bv recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS Currency: Guinean Franc (GF) AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE (GF per US$) 1985 US$1 = GF 24.3 1986 US$1 GF 345.0 1987 US$l = GF 428.0 1988 US$l = GF 475.0 1989 US$1 = GF 591.6 1990 US$1 = GF 661.0 1991 US$l = GF 792.0 1992 US$1 GF 850.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFDF African Development Fund BCEP Central Studies Office (Bureau Central d'Etudes des Projets) BSD Bureau for Strategy and Development (Bureau de Strategie et de D6veloppement) EDF European Development Fund EEC European Economic Community FAC French Fund for Aid and Cooperation (Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation) LPDA Lettre de Politique de Developpement Agricole MARA Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (Ministare de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales) MDR Ministry of Rural Development (Ministere du Developpement Rural) MPRN Ministry of Planning and Natural Resources (Ministere du Plan et des Ressources Naturelles) ONADER Agency for Rice Development (Operation Nationale pour le Developpement Rizicole) ORG Op6ration Riz Gueckedou FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Direotor-Gon.ral Operations Evaluadon June 10, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECr: Project Completion Report on Guinea First Agricultural Services Project (Credit 1636-GU9 Attached is the Project Completion Report on Guinea-Furst Agricultural Services Project (Credit 1636-GUTI) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. The objective of the project was to enhance the capacity of the Ministry of Rural Development in rural sector planning, project evaluation, and strategy and policy development, through the establishment of a Bureau for Strategy and Development (BSD) within the Ministry. The project supported BSD through the provision of technical assistance, facilities and equipment, and local and foreign training. This effort was initially conceived as part of a broader, production oriented operation, but was expanded and reconstituted as a separate project. Preparation and appraisal were limited. Weak technical assistance and BSD management, political interference, poor financial management, and lack of counterpart resources all contributed to minimal achievement of project objectives. Institutional development impact is rated as negligible and the overaUl project outcome as unsatisfactory. Sustainability is considered unlikely. The Borrower, in its Part II submission, sees the project in a more favorable light. Viewing it in the perspective of the overall context in which BSD operated, it considers that, while specific targets of the project were not achieved, the project provided basic facilities and training to a core of staff who have continued to provide a key input to the Ministry. The completion report provides an adequate account of project implementation. An audit is planned. Attachment This document ha a restricted dlstribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance d their ofcial duties. fts contents may not otherwise be dlsclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GUINEA FIRST AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (CREDIT 1636-GUI)- TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface. .................................i Evaluation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM IDA'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1. Project Identity ..... . 1 2. Background ........................ 1 3. Project Objectives and Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4. Project Design and Organization. 3 5. Project Implementation ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Project Results .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Project Sustainability .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. IDA Performance .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Borrower Performance .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. Project Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. Consulting Services ..................... . 7 12. Project Documentation .................... . 7 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . 9 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1. Related World Bank Loans and/or Credits . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2. Project Timetable ...................... . 13 3. Credit Disbursement ..................... . 14 4. Project Costs and Financing ................. . 15 5. Project Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. Status of Covenants ................. 18 7. Use of IDA Resources.. ................ 20 MAP: IBRD 19107R This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their of icial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GUINEA FIRST AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (CREDIT 1636-GUI} PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the First Agricultural Services Project for which Credit 1636-GUI in the amount of SDR 7,600,000 (US$7.5 million equivalent) was approved on November 26 1985. The Credit was closed on June 30 1992 on schedule. A balance of SDR 2,038,238.17 was canceled from the Credit. Parts I and III were prepared by a consultant and revised by staff of the Agriculture Operations Division of the Occidental and Central Africa Department. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. Preparation of the PCR was done about nine months after the Credit was closed. It is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Development Credit Agreement, supervision reports, correspondence between IDA, the Borrower and the implementation agency, internal IDA memoranda, reports prepared by the implementation agency and discussions with representatives of the Borrower and IDA staff.   iii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GUINEA FIRST AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (CREDIT 1636-GUI) EVALUATION SUMMARY Project Obiectives (Part I, para. 3) 1. The objective of the project was to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR) in rural sector planning, strategy and policy formulation and project analysis. This was to be achieved through the establishment of the Bureau for Strategy and Development (BSD), provision of technical assistance, and staff training. Project Design (Part I, para. 4) 2. Although the project was consistent with the Government's macroeconomic and sectoral adjustment programs, the normal stages of the project cycle were not followed. Identification and preparation were not conducted. In addition, the project had too many components which the weak local institutions could not properly manage, and neither had a proper time horizon nor adequate provisions for manpower training and skills transfer. Implementation Experience (Part I, para. 5) 3. The project became effective on schedule. However, overall implementation was unsatisfactory and was adversely affected by the inability of the Government to make timely budget contributions, the tendency of the Ministry of Rural Development to misuse project funds and assets, the general lack of collaboration from the departments of the Ministry of Rural Development, and a poor selection, and unsatisfactory performance of consultants. Project Results (Part I, para. 6) 4. Project results were disappointing given that no significant institutional building took place and no specific studies, policy or planning documents were produced. However, this must be viewed within the context in which the project was undertaken: the country was coming out of three decades of socialism characterized by widespread economic mismanagement, weak institutions and low absorptive capacity. Therefore, one could not expect these shortcomings to be overcome instantly. Sustainabilitv (Part I, para. 7) 5. The project is not sustainable because no significant institutional building took place and the Government does not have the means to continue supporting technical assistance costs on its own. IDA Performance (Part I, para. 8) 6. The performance of IDA was mixed. The project conception and design process were not properly managed. Staff continuity in supervision was not ensured and the lack of Government compliance with key covenants was not dealt with effectively. More importantly, IDA failed or was slow to detect that the environment in which the BSD operated had changed after project implementation started and that its role therefore had to be redefined.  iv Borrower Performance (Part I, para. 9) 7. The performance of the Borrower was inadequate. It did not meet its financial obligations and misused project funds and assets. Findings and Lessons Learned 8. The main findings and lessons learned can be summarized as follows: (a) Project processing should follow the normal stages of the project cycle, especially in the case of Guinea which was emerging from years of centralized economic management. This particular project should have been duly identified, prepared and appraised as a separate entity. Failure to do so prevented a systematic, useful, and comprehensive discussion of important issues within IDA, within the Government, and between the two. (b) One issue that could and should have been discussed is whether IDA has a comparative advantage in the provision of technical assistance on a credit basis vis-a-vis the grant financing that can be provided by bilateral donors and UNDP. (c) In a situation where institutions are weak, project design should be kept simple and the number of components limited. (d) Institutional building components should have clear objectives in terms of transferring skills, training programs, performance yardsticks for consultants and transfer of responsibilities. In addition, too much emphasis was placed on overseas training, with no tangible benefits. (e) The expected budgetary contributions from the Government should be put at a realistic level that is consistent with its resource availability as ascertained by IDA at the macro-economic and not the sectoral level. Failure to do so often results in the project not receiving timely counterpart funding. (f) Soon after BSD was created, many of the functions it was supposed to carry out were performed either by newly launched projects or by newly staffed departmental services of the agricultural ministry. The raison d'etre of BSD thus became questionable, and IDA failed to react promptly in taking corrective measures, such as closing the project early (which was eventually done) and refocusing project objectives.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GUINEA FIRST AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (CREDIT 1636-GUI} PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM IDA'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Proiect Identity Project Name First Agricultural Services Project Credit Number 1636-GUI RVP Unit Africa Regional Office Country Republic of Guinea Sector Agriculture 2. Background 2.01. In 1985, Guinea had a population of about 5.8 million inhabitants. Per capita income was about US$300, among the lowest in the developing countries, life expectancy was only 44 years and infant mortality about 17 percent. About 90 percent of the population had no access to safe water and 80 percent of the adult population was illiterate. 2.02. Despite its agricultural, mineral and energy resources which make it one of the best endowed countries in Africa, Guinea experienced declining economic performance from independence in 1958 to the early 1980's. A major reason was the displacement of the private sector by a pervasive network of state enterprises in all sectors as the Government increasingly followed a centrally- planned model of economic management. These public institutions proved to be ineffectual and investments made outside the mining enclave unproductive. 2.03. In the human and institutional areas, repressive policies sapped Guinea of its intellectuals and its best entrepreneurs who emigrated in vast numbers. The legal system was in shambles as arbitrary authority was substituted for due process. At the central government level, particularly in the technical ministries, the capacity to plan, undertake studies, develop strategy, implement and monitor programs and projects was very weak. In addition to the weak human resource base, there was an acute scarcity of adequate housing facilities, office space, office equipment, basic supplies and reference materials, all of which had a detrimental effect on working conditions. 2.04. Though not yet committed to meaningful economic structural reforms, the Government recognized in the early 1980's that such a process would require a strengthening of its capacity for economic management. In 1981, it formally requested IDA financing for a technical assistance project intended to strengthen the Ministries of Planning and Statistics, State Control and the Central Bank of Guinea. 2.05. The change in Government following the death of President Sekou Toure in March 1984 resulted in a radical shift in economic orientation as the new Government was committed to liberalizing the economy and therefore to more far reaching economic and institutional reforms. 2.06. The First Agricultural Services Project was conceived and developed in a way consistent with the decision of the new authorities to undertake a complete overhaul of the relevant economic management institutions as evidenced by its chief objective to assist the Government to improve the planning and management of the rural development sector.  2 3. Proiect Obiectives and Description 3.01. Project Obiectives. The objective of the project was to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR) in rural sector planning, strategy and policy formulation and project analysis, through the establishment of the Bureau for Strategy and Development (BSD), provision of technical assistance and staff training. 3.02. Project Description. The project had ten main components: (i) establishment of BSD, the project implementation unit; (ii) strategy and policy planning and development; (iii) project identification and preparation; (iv) project monitoring and evaluation; (v) statistics and data collection; (vi) agricultural research and small-scale irrigation strategy; (vii) logistical support for new projects; (viii) consultants and studies; (ix) training; and (x) house and office construction. 3.03. BSD, an appropriately staffed and equipped core unit, was to serve as the main advisory body of the MDR. Its five divisions, one administrative and financial and four technical, were to implement or coordinate the implementation of the project. 3.04. The Strategv and Policy Planning and Development component was the responsibility of the Planning Division of BSD. Its purpose was to define an agricultural sector strategy and propose policies affecting, inter alia, prices, marketing, food and export crop production, input distribution, small scale irrigation, livestock and forestry development and coordinate the preparation and revision of the agricultural part of the three-year investment program. 3.05. The Project Identification and Preparation component was under BSD's Prolects Division with responsibility for economic and financial analysis of projects for the rolling investment program (para. 3.04), sector investment program, preparation of summary analysis of all rural development projects as appropriate, and annual updating of these projects for the three-year rolling investment program. 3.06. The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) component, implemented by BSD's Monitoring and Evaluation Division, was to assist in the establishment of M&E units within projects, help train the staff of such units, assist the units to prepare their annual work programs and supervise the execution of such work programs. This division was also to prepare project completion reports including an analysis of the impact of the projects on the economy and the concerned sector or subsector. 3.07. The Statistics and Data Collection component, run by the Statistics Division within BSD, was initially intended to define a work program based on identified data needs and to begin sample surveys within an agreed time frame. 3.08. The Agricultural Research and Small Scale Irrigation Strategy component was to be implemented by MDR's Research and Rural Engineering Departments with assistance from the project in the form of provision of an expatriate researcher and an expatriate rural engineer. The objective was to help develop long-term strategies and plans for research and small scale irrigation development. 3.09. The Logistical Support for New Projects component was to be the responsibility of BSD's Monitoring and Evaluation Division. The support was to be in the form of assistance for M&E and missions by various BSD's technical divisions to on-going projects. 3.10. The Consultants and Studies component provided for a total of 105 staff-months of consultant time, of which 20 staff-months to prepare a master plan for the agro-industrial sector, and 30 staff-months for specialist  3 consultants in training (para. 3.11), sociology, fisheries, forestry, irrigation and other areas. 3.11. The Training component provided for a full-time trainer for the MDR and a training consultant who would visit the project each year to prepare and help implement a program of technical and professional training linked directly to the work program. All resident specialists were also to participate actively in the training programs, and to prepare Guinean staff to take over from them when they leave. 3.12. The House and Office Construction component was meant to help alleviate the acute shortage of office and housing facilities in Guinea (para. 2.03). 4. Proiect Design and Organization 4.01. Proiect Design. The project was an emanation of IDA's involvement in technical assistance to MDR through the ONADER component of the Rice Development project (Cr. 952-GUI, FY80). The preparation report of the second phase of that project provided for a project (Gueckedou Agricultural Development Project, Cr. 1635-GUI, FY86) with three main components: (i) an expanded rice development scheme to include other food crops; (ii) an expanded research component; and (iii) more institutional strengthening. After the death of President Sekou Tour6 during appraisal, and given the subsequent radical change in economic orientation of the new Government (para. 2.05), it was decided to turn the technical assistance component of the Gueckedou Agricultural Development project into a free-standing technical assistance project. 4.02. The project concept was consistent with the economic reform program then being prepared, to be later financed under a structural adjustment credit (SAC, Cr. 16590-GUI, FY86). More importantly, it mirrored, although at a more limited sector level, the Technical Assistance Project for Economic Management (TAPEM, Cr. 1559-GUI) approved on March 21, 1985. The principal objective of TAPEM was to improve the quality of the Government's economic management through a three-year, first-phase program of technical assistance and staff training. The project had five main components: macroeconomic planning, investment analysis, preparation of economic data, control of public expenditures and revenues, and training. 4.03. The project design was therefore a coherent part of the macroeconomic and sectoral adjustment programs being undertaken by the Government and the donor community. It was an important part of the Government's agricultural sector strategy whose main objectives at the time were to (i) seek to increase smallholders' productivity; (ii) develop satisfactory incentives for farmers; (iii) enhance the Government's capabilities for policy formulation, investment planning, project identification and preparation; (iv) improve overall organization of rural development services; and (v) help create effective and efficient field level support services (extension, research, data collection, monitoring and evaluation, credit and input supply). Finally, the decision to focus on one key agency was appropriate given the weak manpower base. The broad conceptual orientation of the project reflected the constraints and opportunities in the country. 4.04. The project as conceived however had a number of shortcomings. First, it did not follow the normal stages of the project cycle: it was not identified or prepared as a stand-alone TA project. From a component of the Gueckedou project (para. 4.01), its scope grew considerably wider to cover the rural sector as a whole, not just rice. Further, it wao appraised on short notice without proper review within IDA. Failure to go through the normal initial stages of the project cycle such as identification and preparation did not allow for an in- depth discussion of issues within the Government, within IDA, and between the Government and IDA. Issues that seem not to have been thoroughly investigated include detailed training duties for the experts, measures to insure that  4 training actually takes place and that progress can be monitored and measured, procedures for monitoring the consultants's overall performance, and the relationship between the project and the central Government services that are traditionally responsible for many of the functions that were now assigned to the project, taking into account their relative strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the important issue of whether technical assistance should be financed by credit, therefore at a considerable cost to the Government, or by grant financing as provided by bilateral donors or UNDP was not discussed. 4.05. Second, the project had too many components (para. 3.02) considering the weakness of the rural development sector institutions and the lack of experience of the civil service with, and their reported ambivalence to, the concept of technical assistance, at least on the scale proposed. 4.06. Third, the project as adopted failed to incorporate a proper time horizon. Institutional building, especially in the case of Guinea after long years of mismanagement under a centrally-planned economy, is a long-term undertaking that requires a long-term perspective or a phased approach to take account of the time needed to achieve meaningful reforms in public sector management. The Technical Assistance Project for Economic Management (para. 4.02), by introducing the notion of a multi-phased approach, had such a time perspective. 4.07. Fourth and finally, given the baseline situation of a weak manpower resource base, poor data availability and almost total lack of familiarity with economic reform management that prevailed in Guinea, the introduction of a radically new approach to economic management required putting perhaps a bit more emphasis on (i) establishing ground rules with the Government on the methodology to process, supervise and manage technical assistance by both IDA and the Government; (ii) clearly defining the consultants' role in establishing or enhancing the delivery of technical assistance and training; and (iii) defining pragmatically the broader goal of reducing the dependence of the Government on external technical assistance. The project could not achieve this. 4.08. Prolect Organization. Project organization was simple and well suited to the situation. Interagency coordination requirements were kept to a minimum, consistent with the weakness of local institutions. However, while entrusting the project implementation unit (BSD) with the chief responsibility of sector planning, project identification and preparation, project supervision and practically the management of the whole sector, it singularly failed to define the nature and context of BSD's relationship with the Technical Departments of the then newly created Ministry of Rural Development and to indicate how this relationship would evolve over time. 4.09. It is only mentioned in passing that " ... the Planning Division within BSD would be responsible for this activity (developing a strategy for the sector, defining policies, elaborating an investment plan) and would coordinate with other BSD Divisions and the Technical Departments of MDR in developing the strategy" (para. 39 of the November 4, 1985 President's Report No. P-0415-). The only other mention of existing services is in paragraph 49 of the same report which says: " ...The organizational structure of BSD would take account of the new ministerial structure and would include staff from the various sub-sectors to cover all aspects of rural development". 4.10. The inadequate treatment of this key organizational issue may have been due to the lack of a normal project initiation procedure (para. 1.22). As the project was implemented, staff of the Technical Departments came to resent what they considered as BSD's encroachment on their prerogatives and refused to collaborate, making the rational management of the sector difficult. 4.11. Finally, the project was effectively put under the direct authority of the Minister of Rural Development. This made it more vulnerable to political pressure and manipulation. Although this organizational arrangement may have  5 appeared appropriate at the time, other formulas that had been used with more success elsewhere should have been tried. They include the use of a permanent secretary-type position to coordinate project activities of the creation of a supervisory body at the level of the office of the president. 5. Project Implementation 5.01. Credit Effectiveness and Proiect Start-uD. The project was appraised in October 1984, negotiated on August 1st 1985, approved by the Board and signed on November 26 and December 27 respectively of the same year. Finally, the project became effective on July 31, 1986. All these events were broadly on schedule. The project was closed on the originally planned date of June 30, 1992. 5.02. Management of Prolect ComDonents. The organizational aspects of the project were dealt with immediately: BSD was created even before the project became effective and land allocated to it as agreed. Technical assistance personnel were selected without much delay through a consulting firm that served as an umbrella. However, the actual arrival of the technical assistance team in the field occurred six months after the project was declared effective. The recruitment of local staff was also done through a different consulting firm using tests that made staff selection as objective as possible. Office and housing construction was completed as planned. 5.03. Overall, however, project implementation was adversely affected by weak technical assistance, the inability of the Government to make timely budget contributions as required and by the repeated use of BSD by the Minister to provide logistical support in an attempt to meet general shortcomings within the Ministry and at times the Government. Later on, the lack of collaboration of the Ministry's Technical Departments hindered BSD's work. BSD's management was weak. Both the Government and the donors (including the World Bank) recognized this fact and eventually bypassed it. 6. Proiect Results 6.01. Project results have not been satisfactory. One of the key tools for the planning, implementation and control of project activities, the elaboration of annual work plans, was not used. The inadequate project performance can be seen through the review of individual components. 6.02. The major objective of improving the capacity of MDR in rural sector planning, strategy and policy formulation and project analysis through the establishment of BSD does not seem to have been achieved. Financing for BSD was stopped on September 30 1989, two years and 11 months after project effectiveness and two years and nine months before the closing date because BSD was found by both the Government and IDA to be ineffective. 6.03. Strategy and Policy Planning and Development. No sector strategic initiative or specific policy affecting, inter alia, prices, marketing, food and export crop production, input distribution, livestock and forestry development seem to have been produced as a result of the project. Further, BSD does not seem to have provided any impetus in the preparation of a three-year agricultural investment program as envisaged at appraisal. 6.04. Prolect Identification and PreDaration. BSD does not seem to have identified or prepared any project. The few studies that BSD claims to have realized are, on closer analysis, a recycling of existing information or studies. Donors continued to identify and prepare their own projects, although they occasionally associated with some BSD staff. 6.05. Monitorina and Evaluation. BSD did establish summary data sheets on about 90 projects and helped organize a national seminar on monitoring and evaluation. It is not clear, however, that BSD helped establish Monitoring and Evaluation units within projects, assist these units to prepare annual work programs and supervise the execution of these programs.  6 6.06. Statistics and Data Collection. No visible results were achieved for this component, the funding for which was transferred to a different project called Permanent Agricultural Statistics Service (PASS) which is jointly financed by FAO. The PASS is being successfully run with effective assistance from an FAO consultant. 6.07. Agricultural Research and Small Scale Irrigation. These two activities, not managed by BSD, were financed by French bi-lateral funds and were under the responsibility of the relevant departments within MDR. They have achieved positive results: the Government's policy on research and small scale irrigation is taking shape and a number of project ideas are being generated. One small scale irrigation project has been identified and is being processed. 6.08. Logistical Support for New Projects. Little specific assistance was provided to projects under this component. 6.09. Consultants. The selection of consultants was not rigorous. In fact IDA had expressed reservations on their qualifications and selection process. At the insistence of the Government, IDA had to compromise its position to avoid further delay in the effective start of the project. After the project started, IDA's concerns over the qualifications of the consultants materialized and these concerns were brought to the attention of the Government in due course to take corrective measures. The technical assistance experts for agricultural planning, project preparation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) did not fulfill their expected attributions. The Financial Controller failed to produce accounts in a timely manner to facilitate planned project audits --even then, these accounts were sometimes not sufficiently documented. The M&E specialist felt the need for, and was authorized to attend prior training in project monitoring and evaluation procedures (in Benin and Togo); nevertheless, he failed to develop a business plan for the M&E unit. As a result, all technical assistance contracts were terminated by October 1989. 6.10. Studies. No studies were undertaken that could be attributed to the project. The agricultural sector strategy document (LPDA) was essentially conceived outside of BSD, although it contributed to its elaboration, like other services of the Ministry of Agriculture. 6.11. House and Office Construction. An office building was erected and staff houses built as planned. The office structure has become the home of the Ministry of Agriculture. 6.12. Pro-ect Impact. Except for the office building and staff houses, the project has had a very limited impact, if any, on the agricultural sector and on institutional building. 6.13. The major reasons for the unsatisfactory performance of the project are: (i) The weakness of the technical assistance team. The personnel provided were not those proposed in the bid documents and proved to be incompetent for the most part. This was further complicated by their late arrival, high turnover, and the problems of availability of basic amenities in Guinea. (ii) Basic flaws in the conception, design and processing ofthe project as explained earlier (para. 4.04-4.11). (iii) The strong and repeated interferences of the Minister of Agriculture with BSD. The project was the only unit of the Ministry with funds and equipment. The project's vehicles and funds were frequently used outside objectives and the scope of the project. (iv) The shortcomings of the project manager were compounded by point (iii) above.  7 (v) Failure by IDA and the Government to recognize in time that the institutional environment in the Ministry of Agriculture had changed and that, consequently, BSD's mission as originally conceived had to be redefined. After the ministry's services were staffed, the main weakness remaining was in the area of planning and policy definition. It would have been advisable to transfer BSD's other responsibilities to the operating departments and to keep only those two. 7. Prolect Sustainability 7.01. The project, as conceived and implemented, was not sustainable. First, the Government does not have the financial means to support the costs associated with the program that the project was meant to implement. Second, training of local staff was not properly done and it is not clear whether they could carry on the work load of the project. Finally, even the modest amount of manpower capacity building that took place had been transferred out of the project unit. In conclusion, the project's impact on institutional development has been negligible. 8. IDA's Performance 8.01. IDA's performance has been mixed. First, as mentioned earlier (para. 4.04), the project cycle was not properly managed which may have prevented an in- depth investigation of important issues. Second, although the project was regularly supervised, there was, at times, no continuity in the staffing of the supervision missions. This created some confusion for the project unit resulting in a lack of follow-up on the issues and problems raised. Third, the supervision missions were slow to react to the lack of performance of the technical assistance team and the undue interference of Government officials, namely the Minister of Agriculture (para. 6.13). Fourth, IDA was not forceful enough in emphasizing compliance with the financial and accounting management as well as the audit requirements. Finally, IDA was slow to realize that the Ministry of Agriculture had evolved with the staffing of most its services and that BSD's mission had to be redefined in light of the new developments. 9. Borrower's Performance 9.01. The Borrower's performance has been disappointing and inadequate. The project manager was weak and ineffectual. The Minister interfered constantly with project's matters by misusing its funds and using its assets, mainly vehicles, for non-project related activities. Finally, the Government failed to make timely budget contributions and this had a negative effect on project implementation. 10. Pro-ect Relationship 10.01. The relationship between IDA and the Borrower was often strained because of the latter's lack of compliance with key project dispositions such as proper financial management. 11. Consulting Services 11.01. The performance of the consultants was unsatisfactory. The main reasons for this were (i) the lack of proper background of the consultants who were used. The initial consultants identified in the proposals were not the same as those sent to the project (para. 6.13 (i)); (ii) the high turnover of the consultants who were posted to the project; and (iii) the difficult living conditions prevailing in the country that forced consultants to initially spend a large part of their time on logistical matters. 12. Prolect Documentation 12.01. All project documents (legal agreement, staff appraisal report)  8 were comprehensive and provided a useful framework for IDA and the Borrower during project implementation. They also provided sufficient flexibility to project management to allow them to adapt to changing conditions.  9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GUINEA FIRST AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (CREDIT 1636-GUI} PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 1. The need to strengthen capacities in the areas of project and policy analysis and formulation at the ministerial department responsible for agriculture became evident soon after the change of regime that took place in Guinea in 1984. At the request of the Guinean Government, IDA agreed to finance a project providing institutional support for the then Ministry of Rural Development (MDR), within the framework of the First Agricultural Services Program. The project financed the creation of a Bureau for Strategy and Development (Bureau de Strat6gie et D6veloppement - BSD]. 2. In their desire to expedite the reinforcement of MDR's capacities, both parties lost no time in completing the project design, preparation and negotiation phases, evidencing a disregard for IDA's normal project cycle. The result of this haste was that several phases were skipped, with the consequent impairment of the quality of the project documents. This factor alone was obviously going to create problems during implementation. 3. The BSD was created at a time when ministries were seeking and undergoing a new experience in a sociopolitical environment totally different from the one they had known for the past 26 years under the preceding regime. 4. The project did not pay sufficient attention to this aspect, which in reality demanded a more considered approach, with a view to gradually bringing about the necessary changes in institutions and attitudes. Unfortunately, the project was over-ambitious, setting a multitude of objectives to be achieved through a multitude of components. In addition, the project's financing package provided for a large contribution of counterpart funds without first having sufficiently analyzed the Government's capability to make local resources available. S. Despite these weaknesses, and despite the rather average quality of the technical assistance received by the BSD, certain components did result in interesting outcomes. 6. At the institutional level, while not all expectations were realized, the BSD helped to provide the department with a team of competent local officials selected on the basis of tests, which proved right from the start to be a well- matched group. With their experience and varied backgrounds of training, the team members provided, and are still providing, technical and methodological support for the various MARA agencies. In particular, DNGR and IRAG were created with BSD support. 7. BSD today serves as the ministry's memory and technical secretariat. Its excellent contribution to the National Agricultural Census through the Agricultural Statistics Division paved the way for the implementation of the project's institution of a Permanent Agricultural Statistics Service (PASS), which has already achieved a commendable level of performance. 8. The LPDA, despite having been drafted concurrently with certain BSD activities, is one of the Bureau's best contributions to MARA. This statement is justified by the fact that it is based on experience acquired at the BSD and was prepared mainly by BSD staff. 9. In the area of training, the project had emphasized on-the-job training, to be supplemented by additional, essentially short-term training  10 assignments overseas. Some initial progress was made with the training program prepared in 1988, which then came to an end in September 1989. 10. Professionals from all divisions received training in various disciplines both in Guinea and overseas. The following are the various training programs concerned: Name Division Trainin Area Place Yer Amadou Oury Diallo DSE Project management Atlanta/USA 1988 Mamadou Conde DMP Project management Atlanta/USA 1988 Bakan Kaba DEAP Project management Atlanta/USA 1988 Saikou Oumar Balde DEAP Project analysis Forhum/France 1988 Alimou Fofana DEAP Project analysis Forhum/France 1988 Sekou Cisse DSE Project analysis Forhum/France 1988 Sory Barry DSA Agricultural statistics Germany 1988 Telly Diallo DMP Rural credit Forhum/France 1988 T. Marouane Diallo DMP Rural credit Forhum/France 1988 Ibrahima Bah DSA Agricultural statistics Forhum/France 1988 Alpha Oumar Sow DATGR Photointerpretation Forhum/France 1988 Kadiatou Barry DATGR Photointerpretation Forhum/France 1988 Sekou Sylla DATGR Study of production Forhum/France 1988 systems Amirou Diallo DSA Agricultural statistics Forhum/France 1988 Diawara DSA Agricultural statistics Forhum/France 1988 Sekou Beavogui DATGR Biostatistics Forhum/France 1988 Data processing training, Conakry, 1989 Name Divson Fode Friguiagbe Camara DSE Djibril Cisse DSE Alhouseiny Sylla DSA Alimou Fofana DSE Kadiatou Souare DEAP Sekou Sangare DEAP Thomas Bangoura DEAP Amninatou Barry DMP N'koya Souare Secretaire Sidy Conde DAF The project may take credit for having executed the construction component as provided in the agreement. The offices now house the ministry. A start was made on the computerization program with the training of an initial group of professionals (see preceding table) and the provision (in 1988) of PCs for the following divisions: No. of PCs Administrative Division 2 Agricultural Statistics Division 3 Monitoring & Evaluation Division 1 Studies and Project Analysis Division 1 Vehicles and other items of equipment for the BSD were procured at  11 different stages of the project, with a total of 14 vehicles, 3 photocopying machines, and miscellaneous items of equipment purchased. 11. These items of equipment, particularly the vehicles, enabled BSD staff to make field trips in connection with the different studies and project monitoring and evaluation activities. They were also used now and then for other operations of the ministry. This is explained by the fact that MDR was suffering at the time from a general shortage of equipment, the BSD being the only unit receiving any appreciable financing and possessing equipment suitable for field trips. 12. This feature actually represented one of the weaknesses of the BSD, a de facto pocket of prosperity in an environment of deprivation that could hardly be ignored. 13. BSD started operations somewhat behind schedule. The technical assistance was not put in place until the last quarter of 1986, and the local staff were not recruited until January 1987, project effectiveness having originally been scheduled for early 1986. 14. This delay made it impossible to carry out certain activities on time, such as the selection of criteria for new projects to be supported by the BSD (which should have taken place by June 1986) and the review with IDA of the agricultural services restructuring program to have been designed by the BSD by September 1986. 15. BSD's status as de facto provider of day-to-day technical secretariat services for the ministry meant that its staff were not always able to keep their ideas or discussions focused on the aspects of project design, analysis, and orientation that should have constantly commanded their attention. 16. At the project implementation stage, certain difficulties and weaknesses were encountered, some of the reasons for which are given above. 17. The Guinean authorities recognize these, and we have learned lessons from them that will enable us to improve our performance in terms of future project preparation and implementation. 18. With respect to IDA's performance, in addition to the problems mentioned above in the areas of project design and preparation, the matter of supervision of the BSD should also be mentioned. 19. IDA maintained a regular program of supervision. However, the frequent changes in supervision teams during the course of the project led to a lack of continuity and made it difficult to act for the various recommendations to be implemented. This was obviously not conducive to the production of regular overall assessments of the project's achievements and weak points.  12 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related World Bank Loans and/or Credits Date of Credit Title Purpose Approval Status Pineapple Development Pineapple Production 6/75 Closed (Cr. 0569-Gui) Guinea Rice Rice Development 9/79 Closed (Cr. 0952-Gui) Livestock Livestock Dvpt 9/80 Closed (Cr. 1063-Gui) Gueckedou Agr. Promote Rural 11/85 Closed (Cr. 1635-Gui) Livestock Increase herd 7/86 Closed Rehabilitation productivity (Cr. 1725-Gui) Agricultural Increase seed 12/87 Under Seeds production and SPN (Cr. 1864-Gui) improve quality Research Improve research 9/88 Under Extension and extension SPN (Cr. 1955-Gui) Forestry and Strengthen Forest. 10/89 Under Fishery and Fishery SPN Management institutions (Cr. 2068-Gui) National Rural Develop rural 3/90 Under Infrastructure infrastructure SPN (Cr. 2106-Gui) Agricultural Increase export of 7/92 Under Export Promotion fruits and SPN (Cr. 2407-Gui) vegetable products  13 2. Proiect Timetable Identification * Not identified as stand-alone project Preparation * Not prepared individually Appraisal October, 1984 Negotiations August, 1985 Board Approval November, 1985 Signing December, 1985 Effectiveness July, 1986 Closing June, 1992 * Project was an offshoot of Rice Development Project (Cr. 952-Gui, FY80) and 2nd phase of Gueckedou Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 1635-Gui, FY86)  14 3. Credit Disbursements (in US$ million)* Fiscal Y-ar Ouarter Dieb Cumul. Cumul. (Actual) (Actual) (Estim.) 1987 1 0.88 0.88 0.50 2 0.73 1.61 1.00 3 0.30 1.91 1.50 4 0.55 2.47 2.00 1988 1 0.44 2.91 2.40 2 0.21 3.12 2.80 3 0.36 3.48 3.20 4 0.56 4.04 3.50 1989 1 0.14 4.18 3.90 2 0.59 4.77 4.30 3 0.72 5.49 4.70 4 0.15 5.64 5.10 1990 1 0.45 6.09 5.50 2 0.09 6.18 5.90 3 0.18 6.36 6.20 4 0.04 6.40 6.50 1991 1 0.20 6.60 6.80 2 0.09 6.69 7.10 3 0.12 6.81 7.30 4 0.01 6.82 7.50 1992 1 0.00 6.82 7.70 2 0.11 6.93 7.90 3 0.02 6.95 7.97 4 0.18 7.13 8.04 1993 1 0.09 7.22 2 0.00 7.22 3 0.00 7.22 4 0.00 7.22 * A credit amount of SDR 2,038,238.17 was canceled. The apparent disproportionate difference between the approved and actually disbursed amounts in SDR (SDR 7,600,000 and 5,561,761.83) and the corresponding amounts in US Dollars (US$7,500,000 and 7,202,216.85) is due to the depreciation of the dollar with respect of the SDR over the disbursement period.  15 4. (A): PROJECT COSTS -Appraisal Estimates- ------Actual 1/ Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total -----US million ----- -----US million----- 1. Vehicles and Equipment - 0.5 0.5 - 0.7 0.7 2. Construction 0.3 0.9 1.2 - - 1.5 3. Operating Costs 0.5 0.7 1.2 - - 0.02 4. Technical Assistance, Studies and Fellowships - 4.9 4.9 - 4.4 4.4 5. Local Personnel 0.3 - 0.3 - - - 6. Refunding PPF 312 GUI 0.7 Total Base Costs (BSD) 1.1 7.0 8.1 Physical Contingencies 0.1 0.3 0.4 Price Contingencies 0.5 1.1 1.6 TOTAL COSTS 1.7 8.4 10.1 7.3 2.8 7. Cancelled amount 10.1 1/ Estimated costs of completion were based solely on disbursement documents avaiLable at IDA in Washington. Actual project costs were not compiled by, and could not be obtained from, the Borrower (see para. 6.09), which is one of the reasons why there are stiLl three outstanding audit reports. 4. (B): PROJECT FINANCING (Appraisal Estimates) Local Foreign Total ----US million--- IDA - 7.5 7.5 FAC - 0.9 0.9 Government 1.7 - 1.7 Total 1.7 8.4 10.1  16 5. PROJECT RESULTS A. Policy, Planning, Studies, and Research Key Indicators Timina Result Review of master plan study Before Sept. Done and preparation of work 30, 1986 program Prepare timetable for Before June Not done elaboration of rural 30, 1986 sector strategy and policies Review investment program Before Dec. Not done and prepare project briefs 31, 1986 for all projects in 1986/88 program Prepare Monitoring and Before June Not done Evaluation manual in 30, 1987 consultation with projects Introduce in provinces and Before June Not done prefectures simple survey 30, 1988 systems to measure impact of rural development policies Prepare a work program for Before Dec. Not done statistical activities and 31, 1988 methods of MDR Estimate of area, production Before June Not done and yield of major crops, 30, 1988 to be done annually Study production patterns Before Sept. Not done by ecological zone and 30, 1986 determine short-term research needs Prepare long-term research Before June Not done program 30, 1987 Do inventory of irrigation Before Dec. Done in part and rural works resources 31, 1986 Establish long-term program Before Dec. Done in part and data needs for 31, 1987 irrigation and rural works Do agro-industry study During 1986 Not done  17 B. Training Component Location Source Result Project Design Project T.A. staff Not done Consultants Managing Rural Project T.A. staff Not done Development Abroad Consultants Institutional Project T.A. staff Done in part development Abroad Consultants Rural Sector Project T.A. staff Done in part Planning and Abroad Consultants Policy Development Project Economic Project T.A. staff Not done and Financial Abroad Consultants Analysis Price, Credit and Project T.A.staff Not done Marketing Policy Abroad Consultants Analyses Statistical Project T.A. staff Done in part Analyses and Provinces Consultants Methods Monitoring and Project T.A. staff Done in part Evaluation Provinces Consultants Abroad Micro-computer Project T.A. staff Not done use Basic Accounting Project T.A. staff Not done Senior staff Typing and Project Senior staff Done in part Secretarial skills Vehicles and Project Senior staff Not done Equipment Maintenance Technical Project T.A. staff Not done Abroad Consultants  18 6. STATUS OF COVENANTS Development Credit Aareement Covenant Description Section Compliance Remarks Borrower to open account 3.01(c)(i) Yes and deposit equivalent of $100,000 in commercial bank Borrower to deposit amount 3.01(c) (ii) Not usually done equivalent to requirements of project at beginning of each quarter Amounts deposited to be 3.01(d) No used only for local expenditures or goods and services for project Borrower to establish and 3.02(i) Yes maintain BSD Borrower to employ Guinean 3.02(ii) Yes as head of BSD Borrower to review with IDA 3.02(iii) No each year BSD's annual report and work load program Borrower to permit IDA's 3.02(iv) Yes representatives to visit projects financed Borrower to determine 3.02(v) No criteria for BSD's support to new projects before June 30 1986 Borrower to review with IDA 3.02(vi) No BSD's work program to restructure agricultural services before September 30 1986 Borrower to furnish IDA 3.02(vii) Yes contracts of experts and consultants and list of Guinean counterparts to be kept in post for duration of experts' and consultants' contracts Borrower to facilitate work 3.03(a) Yes of consultants Borrower to cause consult- 3.03(b) No ants to participate in training of local staff  19 Borrower to cause BSD to 3.03(c) No prepare and submit annual work programs and budgets Borrower to furnish 3.04(a) In part qualifications of candidates for fellowships and program of studies Borrower to employ trainees 3.04(b) No for at least two years after fellowship Procurement to be done 3.05 Yes according to Schedule 3 of agreement Borrower to maintain or 4.01(a) No cause to be maintained adequate project accounts and records Borrower to have accounts 4.01(b) No audited, to submit audit (i,ii,iii) report within six months of the end of fiscal year and furnish any other requested information Borrower to maintain or 4.01(c) No cause to be maintained and (i,ii,iii,iv) retained adequate records for withdrawals on basis of statements of expendi- tures  20 7. USE OF IDA RESOURCES A. Staff Inputs Total Staff Weeks Preparation 2.6 Appraisal 5.7 Negotiations/Board 4.4 Loan Processing 8.9 Supervision 41.1 Project Administration 2.1 Project Completion Report 4 0 Total 68 8  21 B. Missions (Staff and Consultants) Stage of Mo/Yr Per Weeks Specialization Rating Pnmble Project -sons in Represented (**) Listed Cycle (no.) Field (*) Identification Appraisal 1984 1 10 a Supervision 02/1986 2 3 a,b 1 10/1986 1 7 a, 1 03/1987 2 11 b,c 2,2,2 F,M,S 06/1987 1 4 a 2 F 06/1988 2 4 a,b 2,2,2,2 F,M,I,S 10/1988 2 5 a,b 2,3,2,2 F,M,I,S 09/1989 1 3 b 3,3,3,3 S,DO,C, 2 M,F 06/1990 1 3 b 3,3,3,3 S,DO,C 2 M,F 10/1990 1 3 b (*) a: economist; b: financial analyst; c: agriculturalist (**) 1: no significant problems; 2: moderate problems; 3: major problems which are being addressed adequately; 4: major problems not being addressed adequately. (***) F: financial; M: management; I: development impact; S: overall status; DO: development objectives; C: compliance with legal covenants     TO~ X..... E N E ALED90 ) I~~~~~~~~~b La~~~~~~~~~~~~~RSAC FIRST AGRleUtjp~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ SERVICES PROJE'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~STRP RJ Ki m lo,,cl7 w /~~~~~~~~PE Ati J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~UY19