Somalia - Livestock Health Services Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OMCAL USE ONLY Report No. 13159 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA LIVESTOCK HEALTH SERVICES PROJECT (IDA CREDIT 1647-SO & IFAD LOAN 182-SO) JUNE 15, 1994 Agriculture & Environment Division Eastern Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used bv recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY AND EOUIVALENT UNITS Somalia Shilling (So. Sh.) = 100 cents US$1.00 (at appraisal) = So.Sh. 42.00 US$1.00 (October 1990) = So.Sh. 2577 US$1.00 (September 1993) = Unavailable WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 Hectare (ha) = 10,000 m2 I Square Kilometer (km2) = 100 ha I Metric Ton (mt) = 1,000 kg ABBREVIATIONS AHD = Animal Health Department of MLFR FAO/IC = Food & Agriculture Organizationllnvestment Center GOS = Government of Somalia GTZ = German Technical Assistance IDA = International Development Association IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development IRC = Inter-Regional Committee LHSP = Livestock Health Service Project MLFR = Ministry of Livestock, Forestry & Range MTR = Mid-Term Review PC = Project Committee PMU = Project Management Unit SAR = Staff Appraisal Report WFP = World Food Program FISCAL YEAR GOS January I - December 31 [FAD January 1 - December 31 IDA July 1 - June 30  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Dfrator-oeral Operation Evaluation June 15, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT Subject: Project Completion Report on Somalia Livestock Health Services (Credit 1647-SO) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Somalia-Livestock Health Services (Credit 1647-SO) jointly prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Africa Regional Office. There is no Part II. The quality of the report is satisfactory given the lack of field data. The main goal of the project was to reduce the economic losses which resulted from animal diseases, strengthen the institutional capabilities of Government's Animal Health Department, and involve the private sector in the delivery of veterinary drugs. The underlying strategy of the project was to have a first phase operation of three and a half years during which pilot activities would be tested, followed by a second phase of three years during which successfully tested pilot operations would be implemented. The project was to draw on the experience of other livestock projects under implementation in northern Somalia. The implementation experience from this project is limited because the project ceased effective operation due to civil insecurity only 13 months after the credit became effective in April 1987. Despite difficulties and uncertainties due to security problems, the project made a good start. Govemment staffed the project unit as envisaged, technical experts were appointed on time and some construction took place. Two lessons can be drawn from the project experience. The pilot nature of the project design was flexible enough to likely meet project objectives except during the height of civil war. The project included an adequate force majeure clause. Such clause assisted considerably in an orderly winding down of operations without penalizing the involved parties. The project is rated as unsatisfactory, sustainability as unlikely, and institutional development as negligible. No audit is planned. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   SOMALIA FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LIVESTOCK HEALTH SERVICES PROJECT (IDA CR. 1647-SO & EFAD LN. 182-SO) TABLE OF CONTENTS Currency Equivalents/Abbreviations PREFACE ........................................ i EVALUATION SUMMtARY .............................. ii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE .... 1 1. Project Identity ............................. ... . 1 2. Background and Sector Context ......................... 1 Background ............................. . 1 Sector Development Context ....................... 2 3. Project Objectives and Description ....................... 2 Objectives ............................. 2 Description .............................. 2 4. Project Design and Organization . ....................... 3 Design .................................... 3 Organization .............................. 4 5. Project Implementation ........................ 4 6. Project Results and Impact . . .......................... 5 7. Sustainability .............................. 5 8. Bank Performance .................................. 5 9. Borrower Performance ...................... . 6 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanc of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  10. Project Relationships ................... ............. 6 11. Consultant Services ................................. 6 12. Project Documentation and Data .7 13. Lessons Learned .7 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .. 8 PART I STATISTICAL INFORMATION .9 TABLES 1. Related Bank Loans/Credits 2. Project Timetable 3. Cumulative Credit Disbursements 4. Key Implementation Indicators 5. Project Costs and Financing 6. Project Results 7. Status of Major Covenants 8. Use of Bank Resources  SOMALIA PROJECT COMEPLETION REPORT LIVESTOCK HEALTH SERVICES PROJECT (IDA CR, 1647-SO & [FAD LN, 182-SO) PREFACE This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Livestock Health Services Project (LHSP) in Somalia, for which IFAD Loan 182-SO, in the amount of SDR 5.8 million, and IDA Credit 1647-SO, in the amount of SDR 4.1 million were approved on 5 February, 1986. The Loan and Credit were suspended in December 1990, two and a half years before the official closing date of 30 June, 1993, due to civil war. About SDR 8.2 million remained undisbursed. Parts I and III of this PCR were prepared by the staff of the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program (CP) for the Agriculture and Environment Division, Country Department II, Eastern Africa Region of the World Bank. Since Somalia is still in a state of civil war, a draft of this report has not been sent to the Borrower for comment. No field visits were undertaken for the purposes of this report because of the security situation in the country. The report is therefore based entirely on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan and Credit Agreements, supervision reports, correspondence between IDA, IFAD and the Borrower, internal Bank memoranda, and consultations with Bank staff associated with the project. i   SOMALIA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LIVESTOCK HEALTH SERVICES PROJECT (IDA CR. 1647-SO & IFAD LN, 182-SO) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives The main goal of the project was to contribute towards the reduction of economic losses in the livestock sector which resulted from animal diseases, and to strengthen the institutional capabilities of the government agency concerned with the livestock sector. The Agricultural Sector Review of 1981 had identified livestock as one of the areas which could quickly generate increased production and exports. A subsequent Development Plan also assigned the highest priority to livestock development with particular emphasis on the reduction of losses caused by disease. The major constraint to the improvement of livestock health was the lack of well-defined and regionally focussed disease control programs which were economically justifiable, cost effective, and monitorable as to their effectiveness in achieving established objectives. LHSP was designed to address this need, targeting three northwestern districts of Somalia where livestock farming was the most important economic activity. The underlying strategy of the project was to have a first phase operation during which pilot activities would be tested followed by a second phase operation during which the successfully tested pilot operations would be implemented. Implementation Experience The implementation experience from this project is understandably very limited because the project ceased effective operation due to the civil war only 13 months after the Loan/Credit became effective in April 1987. Project life at appraisal was expected to be some six and a half years. Despite difficulties and uncertainties due to security problems, the project made a good start. Government took the necessary first steps to facilitate implementation including the establishment and staffing of a Project Management Unit (PMU). The technical assistance (TA) activities were sub-contracted to a consulting firm and the majority of the long-term consultants were in post by early 1988. After considerable delay, the construction contract was awarded to an international construction firm; a local engineering firm was awarded the contract for the supervision of construction work. Construction work was also initiated in early 1988. ii  The security situation however continued to deteriorate. In May 1988 the project activity was completely disrupted by the civil disturbances. Operations were halted and consultants and senior project management had to be evacuated from the project headquarters in Hargeisa. The civil works program was equally affected. After making good progress and with an estimated 20% of the construction work completed, the contractors were forced to abandon the sites. Reportedly, much of this construction work undertaken was destroyed. GOS decided to terminate the construction contract at the end of December 1988 and the contractor was compensated. For the next few months, the project was kept as a holding operation. With no improvement in sight, the technical consultants were subsequently given notice and their employment was terminated on 31 March, 1989. Only the Technical Director remained, but his contract too was terminated on 30 June 1989. An IDA supervision mission which visited the country in March 1989 recommended that if the situation did not improve and the project area remained inaccessible by the end of December 1989, a firm decision should be taken by all concerned parties on the desirability of continuing attempts to implement the project. As the situation did not subsequently improve, the Loan and Credit were eventually suspended in December 1990. They however could not be formally closed because a serious outbreak of fighting in Mogadishu disrupted the closure procedures. Project Results and Impact Because of the early interruption and subsequent termination of operations, the project achieved no concrete results in physical terms, or in the planned technical investigations and animal health programs. Sustainability As the bulk of the project's programs were never implemented, it is not possible to determine their sustainability or otherwise. However during the short period that the project was operational, problems of inadequate counterpart funding were already evident. Findings and Lessons No significant lessons can be derived from the project because the implementation period was too brief. Perhaps the very important lesson is whenever during project implementation the project area suffers serious protracted strife, the lenders and the borrower should put in place a contingency plan including arrangements for the possible closure of the project. Another lesson learned is that procurement contracts should include adequate force majeure clauses. In this project the presence of such clauses assisted considerably in the orderly winding down of operations. iii  SOMALIA PROJECT COMIPLETION REPORT LIVESTOCK HEALTH SERVICES PROJECT (IDA CR. 1647-SO & [FAD LN. 182-SO) PART 1: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity Project Name Livestock Health Services Project Credit/Loan No. : IDA Credit 1647-SO & [FAD Loan 182-SO RVP Eastern Africa Department Country Somalia Sector Agriculture Sub-Sector Livestock 2. Background and Sector Context Background 2.1 The Livestock Health Services Project (LHSP) was identified by [FAD with the cooperation of the FAO Investment Centre (FAO/IC) in June 1983. A subsequent FAO/IC mission was mounted in mid-1984 to prepare the project, and issued a preparation report in July 1984. The report formed the basis on which IDA, at the request of IFAD, appraised the project in November/December 1984. It was approved by the IFAD and IDA Boards in February 1986. The project became effective in April 1987, following delays by Government in fulfilling the conditions for effectiveness, particularly those relating to the recruitment of consultants. The project was scheduled to be implemented over a six and a half year period through 30 June, 1993. However, due to the escalation of the civil strife into a war, project operations were suspended at the end of December 1990. 1  Sector Development Context 2.2 Since the early 1970s, a series of internationally funded projects supporting Government policy and strategy in the agricultural sector had been initiated in Somalia. Within the livestock subsector, increasing degree of attention was being focused on the management and preservation of critical range resources and involved two large projects - the Northern Rangelands Development Project (financed by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development) and the Central Rangelands Development Project (supported by multi-donor financing including IDA, IFAD, USAID, WFP and GTZ). A pilot epidemiology study was undertaken under the Central Rangelands Development Project, which later formed the basis for some of the animal health activities in the livestock subsector. 2.3 The Agricultural Sector Review of 1981 emphasized the need to strengthen and develop certain key areas within the agricultural sector, such as livestock, which could quickly generate increased production and exports. In 1983 when LHSP was being identified, it was estimated that about 50% of the country's population were nomads or semi- nomads and depended on livestock for their subsistence. About 80 percent of the country's exports were being generated from sales of live animals, and nearly 40 percent of GDP was related to the livestock subsector activities. The subsector therefore had a pivotal role in the Somali social and economic life. However, despite its importance, in 1984 only some 4% of the national budget was devoted to the sub-sector. Given its vast potential (in boosting the country's foreign exchange earnings and as a source of revenue through taxes and cost recovery), Government decided to allocate more resources to the subsector. 2.4 The Government's Four Year Development Plan 1982-86 also assigned the highest priority to the livestock sub-sector, focusing on the reduction of waste caused by disease and the expected subsequent increases in the level of offtake. The major constraint to the improvement of livestock health was the lack of well-defined and regionally focussed disease control programs which could be simultaneously economically justifiable, cost effective, and monitorable as to their effectiveness in achieving established objectives. The strengthening of the technical and organizational base for animal health planning in support of the formulation of regional disease control programs was therefore an immediate priority. LHSP set out to address this need, targeting the north-western districts of Awdal, Galbeed, and Togdheer where livestock farming was the most important economic activity. 3. Project Objectives and Description Objectives 3.1 The gcals of the project were to contribute to the reduction of economic losses in the livestock sector which resulted from animal diseases and to strengthen the institutional capabilities of the Animal Husbandry Department (AHD) in the Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range (MLFR). 2  Description 3.2 The project was comprised of the following 5 components: (a) Laboratory Services: the construction of a new central veterinary laboratory at Hargeisa and the rehabilitation of an existing laboratory at Burao; financing the services of an internationally recruited senior laboratory technician; and funding incremental local staff and operating costs for laboratory services. (b) Field Services Investigation: financing the disease investigation program including the provision of technical assistance, incremental local staff costs, 4-wheel drive vehicles and trucks as well as their operating costs and consumables. (c) Field Services Development: rehabilitation of a small number (unspecified) of AHD veterinary district offices, provision of drugs and financing incremental operating costs. (d) Training: provision of overseas training for 9 staff of AHD and local on the job training of veterinary and other staff. (e) Project Management: employment of an internationally recruited technical advisor to the post of Project Director; provision of staff housing for 6 internationally recruited advisors; purchase of two 4-wheel drive vehicles; financing short-term consultancies and incremental local staff salaries and other operating costs of the Project Management Unit (PMU). 3.3 Project activities were to be implemented over a two phase period. During Phase I, which would cover the first three and a half years, the project would concentrate on disease investigation activities and livestock health services planning on a pilot scale to establish the future plan of action. During Phase II, which would cover the last three years of the project, emphasis would be put on implementing the beneficial results of pilot scale operations conducted in Phase I. 3.4 Total project costs were estimated at US$ 11.6 million, of which [FAD would finance US$ 6.3 million or 54% of the total, and IDA would finance US$ 4.3 million or 37% of the total. Government of Somalia (GOS) was to finance the remaining US$ 1.0 million. 4. Project Design and Organization Design 4.1 The project concept was well understood by all concerned parties. However, the lack of a baseline survey meant that the data and assumptions used were not necessarily current. The project planned to address this issue by carrying out such a survey at Mid-Tern Review (MTR). The six and a half year period given for implementing the project appears to have 3  been unusually long, but is justified given that the project had to be implemented in two separate but interdependent phases so as to be able to attain the maximum desired impact. The two stage implementation concept was an innovative approach. Organization 4.2 The responsibility for project implementation was assigned to a Project Management Unit (PMU) which was created within MLFR. The PMU was located in Hargeisa and was headed by a Somali Project Director assisted by an internationally recruited Technical Director. An Inter-Regional Committee (IRC) was set up to secure cooperation with other Government and non-Government institutions; its members were the regional representatives of those institutions. The Project Director acted as Secretary to the committee. A Project Committee (PC) under the chairmanship of the Minister or Vice Minister or Permanent Secretary of MLFR was set up to supervise project implementation and oversee the PMU. In the short period during which the project was operational, these arrangements worked satisfactorily. 5. Project Implementation 5.1 The project became effective on 2 April, 1987, some nine months behind schedule, largely because of GOS delays in finalizing recruitment of consultants which was a condition of Credit effectiveness. 5.2 The project got off to an uncertain start due to security problems. The first IDA supervision mission which visited the country in February 1987 was unable to visit the project area because armed conflicts had broken out on the Somalia-Ethiopia border. The next two supervision missions which visited Somalia in October 1987 and March 1988 were able to visit the project Headquarters in Hargeisa and reported a good start on project operations; however, the security situation continued to deteriorate. In May 1988, just over one year after effectiveness, project activities were completely disrupted by the civil disturbances. Operations were halted and consultants and senior project management had to be evacuated from the project area. With no improvement in sight, the technical consultants were subsequently given notice and their employment was terminated on 31 March, 1989. Only the Technical Director remained, but his contract too was terminated on 30 June, 1989. 5.3 The civil works programn was equally affected by the insecurity which hit the project area. After bureaucratic delays, the construction contract was awarded to an international construction firm and a local engineering firm was awarded the contract for the supervision of construction work. Construction work started in early 1988 and the contractor was making good progress when, at the end of May 1988, the civil works had to be abandoned because of insecurity. By then about 20 percent of the construction of the laboratory and staff houses at Hargeisa had been completed. Reportedly, much of this construction work undertaken was later destroyed. As the possibilities for resuming work continued to recede GOS decided to terminate the construction contract at the end of December 1988. 4  5.4 With all the construction work abandoned, the consultants gone, and the 6 vel procured by the project lost or damaged beyond repair, the project's planned progra, been dealt a severe blow. An IDA supervision mission which visited the country in ] 1989 therefore recommended that if the situation did not improve, (and an IDA revit mission could not visit the project area), by the end of December 1989, a firm decis would have to be taken by all concerned parties on the desirability of continuing atte implement the project. A review mission which visited Mogadishu in December 198 unable to reach the project area because of the worsening insecurity there. At a mee top Government officials including the Minister, MLFR, it was decided to terminate project by the end of that month. Subsequently the Minister of Finance wrote to IDS IFAD requesting the termination of the project "due to the unconductive environmen project area". A serious outbreak of fighting in Mogadishu disrupted the project clob procedures. The Loan and Credit therefore could not be formally closed. 6. Project Results and Impact 6.1 Project implementation effectively lasted only 13 months to May 1988. That t short slice of a planned six and a half year project life, no concrete results or impac achieved either in physical terms or in the investigative and animal health programs. financial and economic benefits of the project were supposed to be analyzed at the n review planned for the beginning of the fourth year of the project. However, the M not be undertaken. An opinion cannot therefore be forrmed as to whether the propose interventions would have resulted in significant financial and socio-economic benefit project beneficiaries. 7. Sustainability 7.1 The sustainability of the planned project activities cannot be determined as the the project program could not be implemented. It is however likely that had the proj allowed to run its full course, it would have met considerable problems of counterp* funding - as was already becoming evident. The project had a large expatriate TA e; with long-term consultancies totalling almost 30 staff-years which implies there was substantial lack of these skills locally. The continuation of the scientific and technical programs of the project would therefore have depended on how quickly the TA staff would have passed on their expertise to their local counterparts. 8. Bank Performance 8.1 The Bank's performance during the various stages of the project cycle was satisfactory. The SAR was well documented and clearly laid out what interventions undertaken at various stages of project implementation. The civil war which broke c 1988, well over 3 years after project appraisal could not have been foreseen by the; mission. The project area was at the time considered fairly safe and the only risk re in the SAR was insecurity along the international borders with Ethiopia and Djibout 5  8.2 As shown in Table 8, the project was actively supervised. Seven supervision missions visited the country although only two were able to reach the project area due to insecurity. When hostilities broke out in the project area and elsewhere, the Bank Resident Mission was very helpful and worked closely with the visiting supervision missions in keeping abreast of developments and in preparing GOS for the eventual closure of the project. 8.3 As the PCR mission was unable to visit the country for discussions with the local officials who were closely associated with the project, it is not possible to obtain their assessment of Bank performance. 9. Borrower Performance 9.1 GOS showed strong commitment to the project up to the very end. However, there were emerging problems of unavailability of counterpart funding. The PMU performed satisfactorily during its short tenure. Many local staff stayed on at Hargeisa, even after project operations basically came to a stand-still in May 1988, until project closure in December 1990. 10. Project Relationships 10.1 Although the project was implemented under very trying conditions, the relationships between IDA, IFAD and GOS remained amicable throughout. The parties collaborated together even upon reaching the difficult decision to close the project. 11. Consultant Services 11.1 The project engaged long-term consultants in the fields of veterinary investigations, laboratory techniques, range ecology and pastoral systems. Their input was however limited as they had to be evacuated a few months after commencing their work. During that period, their performance was rated satisfactory. A local consulting engineering firm hired to supervise the civil works construction, also performed satisfactorily. 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.1 Without a field visit to the project headquarters, it is not possible to ascertain the quality and adequacy of data and documentation at field level. However, quarterly progress reports and interim work plans and budgets were submitted to IDA on time. This indicates the existence of a reasonable data and documentation system in the field. At IDA, the SAR was well documented. No issues of interpretation arose out of the Loan and Credit Agreements which implies that they were clear and well understood by all parties concerned. 6  12.2 At MDA, some key documents such as a signed copy of the IFAD Loan agreement were not available. Lessons 13.1 Project implementation was too brief to afford any significant lessons. Perhaps the key lesson is that whenever during project implementation the project area suffers serious and protracted civil strife, the lenders and the borrower should put in place a contingency program with various action plans. In any case the two parties should reduce the level of operations, start sorting out outstanding contractual obligations, and update financial records for the probable closure of the project. It may be fruitless to continue operations in the hope that the situation might improve. 13.2 Another lesson learned is that procurement contracts should contain adequate force majeure clauses to protect both parties and to allow a quick winding down of project operations. In this project, this aspect was extremely well covered, which facilitated the closure of project activities in a smooth manner. 7  PART 1I: REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Due to the war situation in Somalia, it is not possible to obtain the Borrower's perspective on the project and on Parts I and HI of this report. 8  PART III. STATISTICAL INFORMATION TABLE 1: RELATED BANK CREDITS LOAN/CREDIT PURPOSE YEAR OF STATUS TITLE APPROVAL Northwest Region Agriculture Incrmasing farm incomea by 1976 Completed in 1985 Developme'it Project-Phase I addressing the crucial issues of (Cr. 635.SO; USS 10 million) severe soil erosion service, poor agricultural practices, poor seed quality, ard inadequate distzibution of water resources. Central Rangelanda Project (Cr. Increasing rangelanda and 1979 Completed in 1988 906-SO; USS 8 million) livestock productivity by strengthening management and trauning. Agriculture Extension and Farm Strengthening agricultural support 1979 Completed in 1987 Management Training Project services. (Cr. 905-SO; USS 10.5 milion) Bay Region Agricultural Laying the ground work for 1979 Completed in 1989 Development Project (Cr. 972- increasing crop and livestock SO; USS 12 million) production in the Bay Region. Semi-Mechanized Rainfed Increasing agriculture production. 1987 CanceUed Agriculture (Cr. 1774-SO; USS 13.4 million) 2nd Agriculture Extension (Cr. Strengthening extension services. 1987 Cancelled 1794-SO; USS 12.7 milion) Central Rangelands [1 (Cr. To build on the initiatives of the 1989 Cancelled 1957-SO; USS 19 million) first phase Rangelands Project. Source: IDA records. 9  TABLE 2: PROJECT TIMEIABLE liEm | Date Planned Actual Date Identification 6/83 6/83 Preparation 7/84 7/84 Appraisai 4/84 11/84 Post - Appraisal 2/85 2/85 Negotiations 9/85 1/86 1/86 Credit Signature 2/86 2/86 Credit Effectiveness 7/86 2/87 4/87 4/87 Credit Closure 6/93 1/ 1/ GOS in its letters of October and December 1990 requested IDA and [FAD to terminate the project due to the security situation in the project area. The credit and loan could not be closed formally because fighting in Mogadishu disrupted project closure arrangements. Source: IDA records TABLE 3: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS I __________________ -______ B(SDR_Millions)___ IDA Fiscal year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 SAR Estimate: -IDA Credit 0.86 1.53 2.29 2.86 3.34 3.72 4.10 -IFAD Loan 0.67 1.43 1.53 2.19 3.72 5.06 6.01 Total 1.53 2.96 3.82 5.05 7.06 8.78 10.11 Actual -IDA Credit 0.13 0.55 0.94 0.99 0.84} -IFAD Loan - 0.32 0.80 0.81 0.81} Total 0.13 0.87 1.74 1.80 1.65)1/ Actual as %of 8 29 46 36 23 Estimate I/ The last transaction took place on 7 September, 1990 when the equivalent of SDR 147,000 was refunded to IDA. Source: IDA and IFAD disbursement records. 10  TABLE 4: KEY IMPLEMENTATION INDICATORS UNIT SAR ACTUAL COMMENTS ESTIMATE A. Tamzmg -Sbff Tnvel Ova No. 9 B. Propect M gmrm t - HouSin Quaters Cotuctcdi No 6 AR"er compctg about - Office Accommodaoo No 1 20% of te cosricooo. work Wu stopped because of the d isubAancms. The civil works cOpeted were iater destroyed. -Micro Compuer No 2 - 4x4 Vehicks No 2 2 All vehicles were stolen or - MiiUns No 1 completely destroyed durng. civil disbutatnces - Shon Term Cowuitant m/mobths 20 C Tecbnial Atance (TA) - lneernzabonaly Rwntned TA m/yean 30 All TA oovw were termiad by lJue 30. 1919 beefffie Of the civil D. Field Services -4x4 Vehicls No 2 2 All veickes we stole or deryed. -5 to 4 whbee tucks No 2 2 -DistrkVetVucray Offiwe No N/A ReabiLb tss E. Laborsory Services No 2 After compe about - Labomtory Buildings Contnicted 20I of dw buMig oaae,Is|cb. wok stped due to d war. Source: SAR and Supervision Reports 11  TABLE 5: PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING A: COSTS (USS 000) | CQnwonA LAR Actual Laboratory Service 1410 N/A Field Services (Phase 1) 3456 N/A Field Services (Phas 11) 4778 N/A Project Managenent 1905 N/A Triining 79 N/A Total 11629 2.200 1/ I/ This is an estimate based on IDA and IFAD disbursements which totalled USS 2.2 million. The oontribution of GOS is not known. but a estimated at some USS 0.1 million. B: FINANCINO (SDR 000) PER ACTUA ACTUAL AS LOAN % LOANJCREDIT CREDIT O A: 1DA Cary AGQM C. cahm Services 3,660 679 19 2. Tanmig 75 3. Project PwWarato Advance 190 121 64 4. Unailocatd 175 Sub-Totfl 4,100 1/ 840 B: [FAD Catesory 593 46 1. Equqmuml Vehicles, dc. 1,290 17 4 2. lncrmatsl Recurrent Colt 390 - 3. DevelopKmt PuFd for Vet. Services 3,920 200 100 4. Special Acc<Al Alkbcaij 200 5. Ullocated Sub-Tal 5,800 V 310 1 C: OOS 950 1 80 I Tol _ 10.850 1.730 1 A Source: IDA and [FAD disbursement records. GOS figure is an estimate as indicated in Table Sa. I1 E UN 4.3 MQ_ 12  TABLE 6: PROJECT RESULTS A: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL No economic and financial analysis were done at appraisal because at that time project benefits could not be quantified due to lack of key data like livestock mortality and morbidity rates in the project area. A rate of return analysis was planned to be done at the Mid-Term Review but the MTR never took place because of the war situation in the country. B: STUDIES Ttle9 Purpose u Defined at Wa2 lawtn Aoorwisal 1 LivCStock Marketing Study To understnd how the livestock Studies worn not None since system operate in Somalia perforned due to studies not inecurity. undertaken. 2. Export Marketing Study To appraie ways in which - Somalia can imnprove its competitive position in livestock exports. 3. Social Dynamnics of Somalia Livestock To analyze the livestock systen from a social perspective. 4. Fesibility Study: Technical feasibility of private sector fomulation and packaging of drugs. 5. User Fees Study To dctermine cost of the proposed quarmntine facilities and the fees that should be charged to tLad who use them. 13  TABLE 7: STATUS OF MAJOR COVENAS 33 02 (b) in order to _ s the Borower - curyig out the Projec. the Borrower Complied shall employ vderinary, agricultural md odter oosultib wbose qucificah~m, cxperce we tem snd coulexim of empkrymmt hal be sfutaory to the Acabom. 3.03 The Borrvwer bhilL for the purposc of the Projec. op an d thereafter Complid mintaiz in ide Catted Bak of Somalia. a Projea Aoooina at ropknq l aich bacout quarterty so _to m aintin it at a level l A the Aociao may reasonably requd ul conmpirem of the Project. Tle Borrower shsil ablih sad thereb fer aunimu until the comnpkion 3 .04(a) of the Project a Proecat Msogemta Unit located at Harem. Complint Tie PMU shafl be baded by a Projet Directo whos qualficaboo s ad Complied 3.04(b) expence shill be intrfwy to the Amocaib. The Borrower shal caume PMU to mubmit so the Asoclab not lhe tha Not dom due to otj- 3.05 September 30. 1919 a Report on its Dise_e lvestigation and livestock biuk of Civil War Healt Servaca Planning actviua. Tle Borrower shall owme PMU to ebmit to the Anocitbo quslerty CaPied 3.07 progres repor a formt aceptable to the A_ocAib. The Borrower shil cnus PMU not lwer d Novmber I d e year Complid 3.08 to ubsit to tke Asoci for VA rvw med approval the dikd Annual Work Pl ans Budget. The Borrower oah not hr tha Decmber 31, 1989, cwry out e Not dm hscetu of 3.11 ,onsutaio with the Amocio a Mid-Term Rew of the profer of the aeily tmdia- the ProPcL The Borrover sell maiti or cum to be _naoataked rcd md lely Complied 4. 01(a) aocoun to reflect in sortace with sound a coomaticg pr;sM the opernOt.o resource and expaadin s in repct of the ProjecL The Borrower sl. 4.01(b) (1) bive the accounts referred to e paryqbph (a) of dutoc Dom incluadin the Specal ACcout for ea fical yeer saiied, a aooorace wlth appropriA teAditig prumcWpe intaesady appLi;d, by iadependmt tadhionr alceptabl to the Amporintoec (Q ftun to de Asocitn. e soon - available, but in any Certified m repo - nt later t tha "I wtts after the id of ech year, a wime tbmie lte. cufied oopy of the repoat of mrch adt by the mid aditon. of rich sope atd e mct detail t e AsociA on shill hove rI-o mbly requeetd; ad (ij) fwnahb to the Amcm, mich oder efornabm coeeng Cmpied e sid =accoua and the audit terof ad mad recowtb _ the A _socwbo shuill from me to time rmmbly requs. 14  TABLE 8: USE OF BANK RESOURCES A: Staff Inputs Stage of '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 Project Cycle Identification l/a Prepartion n/a Lit Appraisal 25.0 Negotiation 1.9 Supervision 0.5 1.4 3.5 3.9 0.2 Other (PCR) 2.7 TOTAL 26.9 0.5 1.4 3.5 3.9 0.2 2.7 We- PrjP* _ pfm d _ m _A,m_ by IFAD A FAO  TABLE 8: USE OF BANK RESOURCES B: Missions S"e of Kim" Sm U y No. of D%Y* in F sjoci iom, Pafonmmc Typs of PmbadCycle ft,P Emim ,Puo Id~ficaai~m IFAD/FAO 6183 U.e n.S n.c P,qm6i IFAD(PAO 7/U4 n.. n. *.A Appiunl IDA 1I/U 5 25 E.LV,AE Pdg-Appsilu IDA 2/85 U.S. U.S. n.a. Smpav.wn I IDA/IFAD 2/87 2 10 L,E 2 S 2 IDA 9/187 I 10 L 2 S 3 IDA 3/U8 1 8 L 2 P 4 IDA 12/88 1 2 E S/t S 5 IDA 3/S9 1 14 L 4 S 6 IDA 11/89 2 10 LE 4 S 7 IDA 11/90 1 n/a F R.& S Prnjo FAO/CP 9/93 1 13? F Soure: World Ban Documet I/ Specialization: E= Econonmics; L= Livestock; V= Aninal Health; AE= Agric. Economiat; F=Finmnce /J Types of Problxn: S= Security; P = Pro_urmt 3/ Desk work in WahingLon n.a = Inormtion not available frmm file.