Turkey - Agricultural Extension and Applied Research Project

Doemnt of The World Bank FOR OFFIaAL USE ONLY Report No. 13614 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND APPLIED RESEARCH PROJECT (LOAN 2405-TU) OCTOBER 14, 1994 Agriculture and Environment Operations Division Country Department I Europe and Central Asia Regional Office This document bas a restricted distribution and may be used bv recipients only in the performance of their ofricial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Turkish Lira (TL) US$ 1.00 (at Appraisal, 1984) = 270 TL US$ 1.00 (at Closing, 1993) = 12,980 Th WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.20 pounds 1 metric ton = 1,000 kilograms 1 hectare (ha) = 10,000 square meter 1 decare (da) = 0.1 ha 1 meter (m) = 1.09 yards ABBREVIATIONS APK = Research, Planning and Coordination Council AEARP II = Second Agricultural Extension and Applied Research Project DAI = Department of Agricultural Inputs DE = Department of Extension DEC = Department of Evaluation and Coordination DES = Department of Economics and Statistics DR = Department of Research DP = Department of Publications DTCC = Department of Technical Cooperation and Coordination DVC = Department of Village Construction ESG = Extension Support Group FTE = Farmers' Training and Extension GDAA = General Directorate of Agricultural Affairs GDAR = General Directorate of Agricultural Research GDOF = General Directorate of Forestry GDOS = General Directorate of Organization and Support Services GDPA = General Directorate of Personnel Affairs GDPI = General Directorate of Project and Implementation GDPP = General Directorate of Protection and Control GDRS = General Directorate of Rural Service MAFRA = Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural Affairs MARA = Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation MOPWR = Ministry of Public Works and Resettlement OED =Operations Evaluation Department PAU =Project Administration Unit PDA = Provincial Directorate of Agriculture SAR = Southeastern Anatolia Region SDC = Swiss Development Cooperation SMS = Subject Matter Specialist TZ = Field Extension Service of GDAA T&V = Training and Visit System TZDK = Agricultural Supply Office VGT = Village Group Technician VGTC = Village Group Training Center WTR = Western Transitional Region YAYCEP = Agricultural TV School ZB = Agricultural Bank FISCAL YEAR Government of Turkey = January 1 to December 31 World Bank = July 1 to June 30  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation October 14, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Turkey - Agricultural Extension and Applied Research Project (Ln. 2405-TU) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Turkey Agricultural Extension and Applied Research Project (Ln. 2405-TU) prepared by the Europe and Central Asia Regional Office. Part II was provided by the Borrower, and, inter alia, expresses satisfaction with the Bank's cooperation during project implementation. The project attempted to enhance the adoption of new technology by expanding the T&V extension system (previously used in a number of Bank-supported development projects) to cover about 40 percent of Turkey's cultivated area and farming population, as well as by testing and developing various forms of mass media; applied research was also to be supported at six major institutes in the project area. The project provided, albeit with major delays, useful equipment for project agencies, enhanced transport facilities (eventually 64 percent of target), external training of staff, a reduced amount (29 percent) of civil works and some improvement in the very poor linkage between research and extension. However, the project had a number of serious implementation problems, including major institutional changes at the beginning of the project which led to responsibility and coordination issues which were not satisfactorily resolved; administrative problems and severe budgetary constraints severely delayed awarding of civil works contracts (with no civil works being undertaken at the research facilities); and in-service training was deficient for both the technical specialists and village technicians. Most surveyed farmers (84 percent) indicated increases in wheat yield over the previous ten years, while increases in other important crops were much rarer. No significant differences, however, were observed in the rate of change in wheat yields nor in the reduction in fallow area (the two most important agricultural changes in the 1980s in Turkey) between project and non-project provinces. The report concludes that, considering the diverse agriculture and rapidly changing demographics in the project area, it was unwise to impose such a uniform extension methodology. Despite the reported problems, the Region considers that there were sufficient benefits to rate the project as marginally satisfactory with modest institutional development impact and uncertain sustainability. The PCR is satisfactory in supplying useful information and analysis, and is based on extensive field survey; however, its presentation could have been improved, the implementation and outcome of the mass media component should have been further elaborated, and at least the evidence for the critical project/non-project area responses attached as an annex. An audit is planned, possibly in conjunction with the Extension and Research Project II, at which time the outcome rating will be reevaluated. Robert Picciotto by H. Eberhard K6pp Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMIPLETION REPORT TURKEY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND APPLIED RESEARCH PROJECT (Loan 2405-TU) Table or Contents Page No. Preface . .....................................................i Evaluation Summary . .............................................i Part I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK PERSPECTIVE ................ 1 1. Project Identity ........................................... 1 2. Background ............................................ 1 Sector Development Objectives and Strategy ...................... 1 3. Project Objectives and Description ............................... 2 Project Objectives ...................................... 2 Project Description ...................................... 3 4. Project Design and Organization ................................ 3 Design ............................................. 3 Organization .......................................... 4 5. Project Implementation ...................................... 4 General ............................................. 4 Agricultural Extension ................................... 4 Applied Research ....................................... 7 Monitoring and Evaluation ................................. 8 Training ............................................ 8 6. Project Results and Impact ................................... 10 Achievements in Production ................................ 10 Improved Research-Extension Linkage ......................... 10 Improved in Extension Service .............................. 10 Institutional Support ..................................... 10 7. Project Sustainability ....................................... 11 8. Bank Performance ......................................... 12 9. IFAD Performance ........................................ 12 10. Borrower Performance ...................................... 13 11. Project Relationships ....................................... 13 12. Consulting Services ........................................ 13 13. Project Documentation and Data ................................ 13 14. Lessons Learned .......................................... 14 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Part II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .... .......... 15 1. Introduction ............................................. 15 2. Performance of the World Bank ................ .. ............... 15 3. Performance of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs .............. 16 4. Lessons Learned .......................................... 19 Part III. STATISTICAL INFORMATION ............................... 20 Tables 1 Related Bank Loans ........................................ 20 2 Project Timetable ......................................... 21 3 Cumulative Estimated and Actual Loan Disbursement ................... 22 4 Project Implementation ...................................... 23 5 Project Costs ............................................ 24 6 Project Financing ......................................... 25 7 Project Results ........................................... 26 8 Status of Convenants ....................................... 27 9 Staff Inputs ............................................. 29 10 Staff Input and Mission Data .................................. 30  PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Agricultural Extension and Applied Research Project in Turkey, for which Loan 2405-TU, in the amount of US$ 72 million (equivalent), was approved on April 17, 1984. The project was co-financed by IFAD Loan 143- TU in the amount of US$ 10 million, which was approved on May 16, 1984. The last disbursement from the IBRD Loan was on April 25, 1994, nearly four years behind the original schedule. US$ 61.9 million was disbursed and US$ 10.2 million of the IBRD Loan was canceled. The IFAD Loan disbursed US$ 6.6 million and the closing date was extended to June 30, 1994. This PCR was prepared jointly by the Agriculture and Environment Division, Country Department I, Europe and Central Asia Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III) and the Borrower (Part II). This PCR was initiated in April 1993 and is based, inter alia, on extensive field work and analysis by the senior author, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Loan Agreement; supervision reports; correspondence among the Bank, IFAD, and the Borrower; internal Bank Memoranda; and information gathered by the Resident Mission. The field work, carried out in 1993, covers 18 provinces, with questionnaire responses from 330 field-level extension staff and 130 subject matter specialists, 26 research scientists and 288 farmers. Results are summarized in nine background papers available in the Bank's regional files, viz., Project Implementation; Village Group Technician Survey; Subject Matter Specialist Survey; Researcher Survey; Farm Survey; Impact Evaluating Study; Management, Reorganization and Implementation; Project Implementation in Southeastern Anatolia; and Changes in Wheat Yields and Area Under Major Summer Crops.   iii EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives The main objective of the project was to enhance the adoption of new agricultural technology at the farm level. This in turn was to raise farm incomes and generally increase the growth of agricultural GDP. Project objectives would be realized by strengthening the General Directorate of Agricultural Affairs (GDAA), of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs, realigning research to ensure more appropriate technology, enhancing communication media support for extension, provision of training facilities, establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system, and the provision of consultant support. Implementation Ministry commitment to project objectives and design was uneven and varied throughout the life of the project. A reorganization of the Ministry in 1984/85, three months after project effectiveness, essentially delayed most implementation activities for two years. Perhaps more important was that the reorganization scattered implementation units to several General Directorates, with the Department of Extension separated from the main implementing agency. A subsequent Ministry reorganization in 1991 did not correct this. Timely and sufficient provision of counterpart funds was always a problem - even when the Bank increased disbursement percentages to 80% in 1991-93. Budget restrictions further aggravated implementation delays, particularly with respect to procurement and civil works. Only 29% of the originally-planned buildings were constructed. Implementation of the training component was also problematic -- in part due to delays in implementing the training arrangements and partly because of the lengthy procedures for candidate selection/processing. Results Of the farmers surveyed for the PCR, 75% attributed yield increases to new genetic material, 70% to better use of fertilizer, and 52% to better use of chemicals. For these same farmers, after "friends and relatives", the local extension worker was the most frequently- mentioned (sixty percent) source of new agricultural information. Sixty-six percent of these farmers also reported that they felt extension services had improved in the project area. Eighty-four percent of the surveyed farmers reported increases in wheat yields over the last ten years; considerably fewer for barley, sugar beet, cotton, and milk (17%, 7%, 6%, and 6%, respectively). The area under horticultural crops, particularly in Balikesir, Bursa, and Manisa, increased sharply. There appears to be at least a casual association between increases in production and extension effort. However, given the number of influences that impact on farmer land use and enterprize options, such as prices, improvements in transportation, better varieties, access to fertilizer, etc., the degree of causality can not be determined with precision. OED, in a recent review of extension services, states that extension's most important  iv contribution is in speeding up the rate of change. From that perspective, considering the rate of change in wheat yields and the rate in the reduction of fallow area (the two most important agricultural changes in Turkey in the 1980s), no significant difference was observed in the rate of increase in wheat yields or in the rate of fallow reduction between provinces covered by the project and non-project provinces, (the latter under the Agricultural Extension II project). Sustainability With the demographic changes going on in rural areas and the budgetary limitations that continue to face the Government, the sustainability of the project as designed, i.e., the concentration on villages and use of large numbers of front-line staff, will be difficult. Authorities have been unable to ensure that professionals who received training under the project remain in the project area. There already has been a significant dissipation of trained professionals, in part through uncoordinated reassignments. With respect to agricultural research, the biggest sustainability problem relates to the aging and retirement of scientists and the nearly decade-old Ministry moratorium on new recruitment. Findings and Lessons Learned Given the variations in location, need for timeliness in agricultural operations, and markets, as well as the heterogeneity of agriculture and farm people, blanket prescriptions for a centralized extension service can not be expected to work very well. For services such as extension, accountability and responsibility linkages between users and providers of the service must be in place. Tight management and supervision systems of government staff, using government norms, is not enough to ensure relevant and responsive service. Had the implementing agencies been more involved in the preparation of the project, there more likely would have been a greater degree of "ground truth" with respect to what was necessary and sustainable under Turkish conditions. Besides developing an enhanced sense of project ownership, this also would have developed an early familiarization, understanding, and commitment to the project objectives by the staff of the implementing agencies. Because the project required considerable, complex inter- and intra-institutional coordination, a strong coordinating body should have been established as a precondition to the project. More attention should have been given to ensuring correct phasing of activities and to having a trained staff in place with responsibility and authority. In that context, at preparation the Bank estimated that above-average supervision coefficients would be needed. However, no additional supervision resources were made available. Indeed, in four of the project years actual supervision coefficients were below average. In addition, of the fifteen supervision missions, only six had an extension specialist as a member of the mission. It seems clear that higher than average levels of supervision are required for this type of project under these kind of circumstances. It is also clear that supervision missions need to be staffed consistently with appropriate professional capabilities.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND APPLIED RESEARCH PROJECT (LOAN 2405-TU) PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identitv Project Name: Agricultural Extension and Applied Research IBRD Loan No.: 2405-TU IFAD Loan No.: 143-TU RVP Unit: EC 1 Country: Turkey Sector: Agriculture Sub-sector: Extension/Applied Research 2. Background 2.01. In June 1980 the Government requested Bank assistance to finance a nationwid extension improvement project. The Bank instead suggested a phased approach based on agro-ecological zones. The Government accepted this recommendation in 1982 and initiated project preparation in GDAA, a directorate of MAFRA. This was followed by project preparation assistance from the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program (CP) in August/September of 1982. Subsequently, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) expressed interest in co-financing the project. Following a formal Bank preparation mission in March/April 1983, and a pre- appraisal mission in May/June 1983, the project was appraised by the Bank in March 1984, and became effective on September 5, 1984. In 1992, SDC participated with IFAD in co-financing the project and, based on the understanding between SDC and IFAD, a grant of US$6 million was made available to the Borrower. Sector Development Objectives and Strategv 2.02. While the relative importance of the agriculture sector in Turkey's economy is declining, the sector generated about 16% of total GDP and averaged about 21% of export earnings in recent years (1985-88). It continues to generate substantial employment, meet most domestic food requirements, supply industrial raw materials, and generate considerable foreign exchange. Through the 1970s, Turkey's agricultural policies were inward-looking, stressing food self- sufficiency through subsidized inputs and producer prices. Agricultural growth was relatively rapid in the early 1970s, averaging 4.7% annually from 1972-75. Sectoral growth rates slowed to 1.5% per year in the late 1970s, largely due to a sharp reduction in incentives, ineffective investment policies, weak technical services, and inadequate marketing and credit systems.  2 Starting in 1980, with Bank assistance, the Government began strengthening agricultural support services. Input trade and distribution were liberalized, regulatory restrictions were reduced, and the private sector played an increasing role in marketing and processing. Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s there was a continuing policy bias against the sector as compared to industry. 2.03. One of the main agricultural sector development interventions of the Government has been support for the modernization of production techniques to raise productivity, yield and farmer income. Agricultural lending by the Bank to the Government aimed to increase production, exports and rural employment, and to support reforms necessary to the sector. Therefore, extension components were included in some early Bank-assisted infrastructure and farm development projects in Turkey. 2.04. Under Stage II of the Seyhan Irrigation Project the T&V system of extension first was introduced prior to its inclusion in Bank-supported projects in other countries. It failed to win the clear support of Government; the T&V activities were not implemented by the regular extension system. 2.05. In the early 1980s, GDAA had the largest field staff of any state agency providing extension services to farmers. Responsibilities covered virtually every aspect of crop and livestock agriculture. GDAA's field organization was represented in all provinces and counties, and on a pilot basis in some villages. However, most of the staff were also extensively involved in administrative, regulatory and record-keeping duties besides extension. GDAA's agricultural research institutes were involved with occasional cooperation on specific projects. Such activities were not regularly programmed, and communication between research workers and extension agents remained largely dependent on individual initiative. This situation limited the usefulness of some of the investigations undertaken by the research institutions; extension workers were often unaware of existing research results. Inadequacy of the technical and specialist expertise available to support the extension work of the county staff, limited availability of transportation, infrequent use of audio-visual materials and mass media, and insufficient M&E also limited the effectiveness of GDAA's extension operations. 3. Project Objectives and Description Project Objectives 3.01. The project's main objectives were to stimulate use of improved crop and livestock production methods to augment the production of basic food and export crops, raise farm incomes, and boost agricultural GDP. This would be accomplished through investments to: a) strengthen GDAA extension service b) realign research to make available appropriate technology for extension c) provide communication media support for extension d) provide training facilities for upgrading the technical competence of research and  3 extension personnel e) provide facilities for monitoring and evaluating extension f) provide consultant support in selected fields. Project Description 3.02. The project's objectives were to be achieved through four components over a six-year period: a) Agricultural Extension: Employing additional village-level extension agents to provide technical advice to farmers; establishing county- and province-based SMSs to provide training to extension agents; training SMSs in monthly workshops; assignment of staff exclusively to administrative matters in provincial extension offices; create an information center to establish a library, produce audio-visual aids and disseminate information through mass communication. b) Applied Research: Strengthening the capacity of six research institutes serving the project area to carry out research; monthly training workshops for SMSs; constructing facilities at the research institutes and housing and facilities for training of extension agents; equipping the research institutes; coordination of research work; definition of research priorities; and dissemination of technical information. c) Monitoring and Evaluation: Establishing a management information service responsible for internal monitoring and evaluation; strengthening of the external M&E unit within GDAA. d) Training: In-service training; overseas training of selected central and provincial staff involved in extension, M&E, and research activities. 3.03. Total project costs were estimated at US$ 205.7 million (equivalent). The World Bank and IFAD would contribute about 40% of total requirements by providing, respectively, US$ 72.2 million and US$ 10 million in loans. The remaining US$ 123.7 million equivalent (or 60% of total costs) was to be met locally by the Government. In August 1992, under the Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Switzerland, represented by SDC and IFAD, SDC made arrangements for the partial co-financing of Part A (Agricultural Extension) of the Project and provided a grant of US$ 6 million. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.01. Design. The project was to address major problems facing agricultural extension, such as insufficient technical and specialist expertise, lack of systematic linkages with research, heavy bureaucratic workloads of extension staff, fragmented research and a lack of coherent research priorities.  4 4.02. Project design reflected the socio-economic realities in Turkey during the late 1970s/early 1980s and heavy reliance on state intervention. It concentrated on state-financed extension, detracting attention from altemative, possibly more cost-efficient approaches. Signals of rapid demographic, market, economic, and structural developments that began to emerge in rural Turkey in the early 1980s were not foreseen sufficiently. 4.03. The design had high recurrent cost implications. At the time of project approval, the Government's budgetary position was sound. Inflation subsequently became a major issue, and the Government was increasingly hard-pressed to provide planned-for budgetary support. Organization 4.04. The project had a complex organizational arrangement and covered a large, diverse geographical area. Overall responsibility for implementation was given to GDAA, under which the bulk of extension services and research institutes already operated. In the original design, GDAA would implement the project through its six departments (Extension, Research, Training, Technical Cooperation and Coordination, Economics and Statistics, Externally Financed Projects). However, the Ministry went through a major reorganization in 1984/85 which hindered project organization. 5. Project Implementation 5.01. General: MAFRA's reorganization prevented expeditious start-up of project components. Much delay was caused by the wait for by-laws defining responsibilities of the new General Directorates and for appointments of the senior administrators at the central, regional, and provincial levels. It took almost two years for the project to become operational. Subsequently, implementation suffered from: i) lack of overall technical authority for project implementation; ii) lack of clear task boundaries among related agencies; iii) low levels of "ownership" (particularly at managerial levels); iv) staff turnover at central and field levels, v) lack of direct control by the General and Provincial Directorates over their staff; vi) limited counterpart funds due to shortfalls in state budget allocations; and vii) lack of control of the General and Provincial Directorates over their yearly budgets. 5.02. The two-year lag in project start-up put the project time-table behind, a delay which was not subsequently made up. Severe procurement delays, in part stemming from limited counterpart funds and the Government's "saving instructions," also curtailed implementation. Although the project was originally scheduled to be completed by December 31, 1990, it was extended four times: first to June 30, 1991, then to June 30, 1992, then to June 30, 1993, and finally to October 31, 1993. The last disbursement from the loan was on April 25, 1994. 5.03. Agricultural Extension: Although in April 1985 (seven months after effectiveness date) all 67 new PDAs were appointed and started to organize staff and determine responsibilities, the new organization was not fully operative until late 1986.  5 5.04. After the reorganization, control of extension was diffused among sixteen (later eighteen) PDAs and three General Directorates in Ankara (with the latter reduced to largely advisory and monitoring roles). Two General Directorates, GDAPD and GDOS, were considered the major agencies for project implementation. GDPD had responsibility for implementation, but found it difficult to get higher management to solve the implementation problems encountered. It also lacked authority over other general directorates or PDAs. GDOS, to which DE was transferred, played only a limited and sometimes unclear role in implementation, although it was to have technical control of the project. Lack of clearly defined task boundaries between GDPD and GDOS resulted in vague ownership over much of the project life. 5.05. Central review and follow-up to correct field-level deficiencies was not always effective. A GDPD-based monitoring group to visit provinces and assess implementation was not activated, mainly due to budgetary problems. In 1990 the Bank recommended establishing a full-time ESG in GDOS. It was established, functioned poorly due to limited commitment from GDOS, and abolished in 1993. GDPD appointed a team of four to coordinate project activities at the central level, but only in the last year of the project. Because each Provincial Director is responsible directly to the Minister of MARA through the Undersecretary and monitoring bodies remained ineffective, supervision and support to the field level activities reamined weak throughout the life of the project. 5.06. Project appraisal called, on average, for nine VGTs to live in a central village within each area of operation. Although criteria for site selection of the VGT Centers were defined clearly, they sometimes were circumvented by local interests. VGTC construction started with MOPWR and was shifted to GDRS in mid-1985 due to coordination and quality control problems. It was concluded originally that conventional housing would have a longer life and lower maintenance cost than prefabricated housing. Later, based on GDPD's 1991 proposal, two-story prefabricated houses were built. Severe delays affected the schedule of every type of construction. Major reasons for construction delays were: i) shortage of funds due to high inflation; ii) lengthy delays in MAFRA for the authorization to start; iii) time-consuming tender preparations caused by limited experience in Bank procedures; iv) limited capacity of provincial GDRS staff to tender, supervise, and inspect construction; and v) limited capacity of the small contracting firms employed to manage construction. 5.07. The civil works component suffered from lack of adequate quality control. The Staff Appraisal Report envisaged construction contracts packaged by county, but because of the scattered nature of specific construction jobs, they were contracted as single units. This resulted in awards to small, inexperienced and underfinanced contractors which made supervision difficult. Through the project life, quality of construction was a problem due to the limited capacity of Provincial MOPWR and GDRS staff and to the lack of a full time PAU Architect/Engineer to supervise construction. 5.08. Overall only 29% of the anticipated buildings units were constructed under the project.  6 5.09. During the project VGTs were assigned to village centers for undefined periods. With this uncertainty, some VGTs sought ways to go back to towns as soon as they could. In some areas there was frequent turnover. Unsuccessful VGTs who stayed in the villages reflected their unhappiness in poor performance. If MARA had clearly defined lengths of stays in villages (e.g., four years), the problems of vacant VGTCs and turnover might have been lessened. 5.10. Delay in procurement of transport equipment was a major problem. Transportation is more crucial for key lower level staff, i.e., VGTs, because of their need for direct contact with farmers. VGTs without motorcycles visited farmers by using public transport, hitching rides, or walking, which wasted time and affected morale. The VGT survey indicated that, to visit farmers' fields/orchards/barns in central villages, 54% of VGTs used motorcycles, 36% drove their private cars, 14% used farmers' vehicles, and 48% walked. Thirty-six percent of the VGTs reported using public transportation to other villages in their areas. Project motorcycles were purchased early in 1991, but by 1993, 575 of them were still not available due to import duties not budgeted by MARA. 5.11. The level of expertise of the SMSs was another problem. Most of the VGTs (71%) received in-service training. The systematic technical training of the VGTs by SMSs was to have been an important feature of the project. Fortnightly training organized by County Group SMSs began in the initial years of the project. In the absence of certain specialists, the County Groups were backed up by provincial SMSs. Although SMSs were important supports to the VGTs, shortage of qualified SMSs remained a problem. Assignment to an SMS position provided neither prestige nor financial advantage for PDA staff. In the circumstances, being an SMS was not attractive for the underemployed staff. 5.12. Lack of academic specialization and technical background also limited the assignments. The SMS survey indicated that the limited available pool of those holding bachelors' degrees did not match the current assignment area for 41 % of surveyed SMSs. The arrangement of Provincial and County Group SMS teams also was problematic. The double layer of SMS teams had blurred the line of command between the FTE Director and the County Group SMS team. 5.13. Supervision at all levels in the system was limited, in part due to a shortage of vehicles until the end of 1989. Major reasons for vehicle procurement delays were: i) the Government's "saving instructions" for state procurement; ii) lack of experienced staff; iii) delays in decision- making at MARA. Even after provision of the vehicles supervision remained insufficient due to limits on vehicle use and operational budget allocations. At the provincial level, vehicles usually were allocated by the Section of Administrative and Financial Affairs based on demand coming from six technical sections, not just extension. The FTE section had to compete with other PDA staff for project vehicles and they did not obtain them as frequently as they deemed necessary. The same problem existed at the county level. 5.14. Performance in extension management varied greatly among provinces. Differences were in commitment to the project, management ability, and initiative shown by the PDA and FTE. Provincial variation also stemmed from the frequent high degree of turnover, particularly at  7 managerial levels. Among sixteen project provinces, only four had the same PDA through all nine years -- in others, changes occurred up to four times. Because T&V is a management system, establishing a high-quality, viable extension system depends heavily on management by an effective PDA. After the 1984/85 reorganization, neither GDPD nor GDOS had control over the field staff -- only rarely were poorly-performing PDA Directors replaced. 5.15. The new extension modalities were considered part of a limited, Bank-supported project, not part of a general extension system. Both IBRD and MARA concentrated more on the hardware side of the project than the software side; communication aspects were left in the background. At the provincial level T&V was looked upon as a special project that provided inputs (vehicles, buildings, training, etc.) for the PDA, not a management system or an educational activity. Although orientation courses were conducted by MARA for central and provincial staff, the desired level of understanding and ownership of the new concepts was not fully achieved. 5.16. The planned Central SMS team that would approach extension based on regional land-use systems was not established; neither was a technical strategy for different agro-ecological zones. PDAs did not know well enough what technical factors most limited productivity gains for different categories of farmers, viz., which farmers needed assistance most. Lacking problem analyses, county and provincial staff were unable to set precise and explicit objectives. There was also little farmer participation in problem analyses, increasing the risk that advice given to farmers would be irrelevant. 5.17. DP, supported with equipment, technical assistance and staff training, produced good quality audio-visual and mass media aids for the project in its earlier years. Its focus was diverted from the project later and dialog with project implementation agencies got weaker. Since mid-1992 DP has been busy with YAYCEP, a cost-effective effort, but not directly related to the project. 5.18. Applied Research: The applied research activities were limited by institutional changes and procurement delays. The 1984/85 ministerial reorganization fragmented the research, disrupted ongoing research programs and discouraged researchers. The 1991 reorganization did not adequately correct this situation. However, the research institutes started monthly training programs for SMSs shortly after project effectiveness, as envisaged during appraisal. Through the life of the project these were conducted with varying degrees of success. 5.19. The research component also suffered from excessive procurement delays in civil works. None of the Loan funds for research civil works (research complex in Haymana/Ankara for the Field Crops Research Center, additional research facilities, dormitories and housing) were utilized. Since the available land for construction was limited by unexpected land allocation problems in Haymana, the plan was modified to enable further development of the Eskisehir Transitional Zone Research Institute. The tender process for this was started in 1988 but only completed in 1993. During that period, the decision to initiate construction was delayed several times due to changes at the ministerial level. One tender was cancelled even though the bid  8 evaluation was complete. The third tender was approved, but by the end of the project completion date no disbursement had been made. 5.20. Procurement of research equipment was seriously delayed. Audio-visual equipment was purchased earlier than other goods, with a June 1988 contract award date, July 1990 customs clearance date, and November 1990 distribution. Contracts for field equipment were awarded in March 1992, cleared customs in September and were distributed in October 1992, eight months before project completion. The laboratory equipment tender began processing late in 1989 and continued until 1993. Though bid evaluation was completed at the end of January 1993, contracts were signed 18 months later. When the contract was approved, time left for payments was limited, so the Bank extended the Loan Closing date for three months. The contracts were signed and the equipment shipped, but at the date of PCR preparation the equipment has not been made available to the research institutes. 5.21. The project envisaged a team of four extension coordinators to be stationed permanently in research institutes and to act as field trial coordinators and links with the extension effort. Due to an unclear chain of command, this arrangement was sustained only at Eskisehir. 5.22. Notwithstanding several difficulties, the research institutes produced a number of valuable recommendations. Multi-disciplinary research yielded, e.g., more sustainable rotation systems, soil tillage techniques, environment-friendly pesticide and fertilizer applications, and more efficient uses of water. On the other hand, research in livestock remained largely unproductive. This limited message formulation in extension. Survey data indicated that fewer extension efforts were focused on livestock production (11.6%) than on crop production (77.5%). 5.23. Monitoring and Evaluation: Monitoring focused largely on inputs and outputs and paid insufficient attention to the project's impact and achievement of long-term objectives. An internal monitoring and evaluation system was established in 1986. Reporting forms for VGT, county and provincial staff were designed, and training of M&E staff at the provincial level took place. Data on extension went regularly from the VGTs through the system to the central level, where quarterly reports on problems and progress were produced. However, the data were less than fully used for management purposes. 5.24. Since M&E traditionally was seen as an instrument of control, there was lack of clarity at the provincial level as to the responsibilities divided between the Sections of Projects/Statistics and Farmer Training and Extension. M&E was given to Projects/Statistics on the assumption that another unit would be biased. This approach actually lowered the quality of the data provided and prevented FTE from assessing its own activity. 5.25. Training: The project provided initial orientation programs for staff at all levels. Starting in 1984, eight different orientation seminars were organized for various implementation levels and counterpart agencies. There appears to have been too little emphasis on the point that the project was a comprehensive management system. Training also was needed in communication skills and management to improve communication between central level and provinces. This was not done.  9 5.26. Training provisions also included in-service and refresher courses and fortnightly training sessions for VGTs (and monthly for SMSs). In the project provinces, fortnightly training for VGTs became routine, though 61 % of VGTs surveyed rated its quality as insufficient. 5.27. Training of staff in "training and extension techniques" were organized by GDOS (assisted by consultants) for SMSs, and by trained SMSs for VGTs in the provinces, in initial years of the project (1987-88). Given the turnover, these were not enough either to upgrade staff skills of the staff or to maintain the achieved level. 5.28. Many SMSs performed below expectations because of insufficient training in technical requirements and unfamiliarity with farming and cropping systems of their posted area. During the project years (except for a few attempts) no agency was given clear responsibility to upgrade SMSs' technical knowledge beyond the monthly workshops. 5.29. Training provisions included financing for an extensive program of overseas training: 174 MSc and 510 short-term, including study tours and short-term courses. The MSc program was implemented from 1986-92 and 91 staff members received degrees from foreign universities. This program required foreign language proficiency possessed by few staff members, a factor which delayed its start. GDPD organized language courses in various regions. After reaching the required TOEFL score the majority of the candidates started their overseas training in 1987 and 1990 (48% and 31%, respectively). Areas of training were: crop breeding (27%), agricultural extension (26%), crop agronomy (15%), plant protection (13%), agricultural economics (11 %), information/media (2 %), livestock production (2 %), food technology (2 %), apiculture (1%), and mechanization (1%). The majority received training in the U.K. (59%) or U.S.A. (40%). Average length of training varied from 7 to 32 months -- 83% of trainees spent 15-27 months in their respective universities. 5.30. Short-term courses started in 1987. During the project 252 person-months were spent by 380 staff members in 26 subjects. Major areas were crop breeding (16%), monitoring and evaluation (15%), crop agronomy (12%), plant protection (8%), and horticulture (6%). No courses were made available in communication or management skills. 5.31. Study tours involved 155 person-months for 204 staff, starting in 1987. The majority of tours was organized in 1990-91, six years after project effectiveness; 77% of participants went abroad. Nine percent of the participants were PDA Directors or Deputy Directors, 5% were FTE Directors, 6% were VGTs, and 80% were SMSs. The tours were for ten days (76%) or two weeks (24%). The main recipient countries were the Netherlands (32%), the U.K. (23%), France (9%), and Italy (9%). 5.32. Overseas training programs suffered from lengthy delays -- in part due to slowness of putting training arrangements into place. Lengthy procedures in candidate selection and processing in MARA added further delay, as did frequent changes in procedures and staff turnover at decision-making levels. These programs attracted some MARA staff with no relationship to the project.  10 5.33. The training activities were a significant strength of the project and were effective in imparting knowledge. But problems were encountered in retaining trained staff through the project. Overseas training provided valuable opportunities for staff, but subsequently they often moved to positions outside the project. The magnitude of the problem was not quantified although clearly recognized as a substantial issue. 6. Project Results and Impact 6.01. Achievements in Production: The majority (84%) of the farmers surveyed for the PCR reported yield increases in the last decade. Yield gains most frequently reported were in wheat (38%), barley (17.1%), sugar beet (7.2%), cotton (6.3%), and milk (5.9%). Seventy-five percent attributed yield increases to new genetic material (high-yield crop varieties developed by research institutes and imported pure or cross bred cattle). Seventy percent attributed increases to improved fertilizer application, 52% to improved chemical application, 24% to new equipment, and 18% to various agronomic techniques (improved soil tillage, seeding methods, and irrigation). A number of these research innovations were attributable in part to project activities. There is also some suggestion, although the underlying statistics raise some questions, that the number of beneficiaries covered under the project may have been greater than anticipated in the SAR. 6.02. ImDroved Research-Extension Linkage: The project regularized linkages between: i) researchers and SMSs; and ii) SMSs and VGTs. Extension and research staff indicated that articulation between research and extension staff increased, but not sufficiently. Only 15% of SMSs rated the previous extension-research linkage "good." Most believed extension-research linkage improved with the project; the ratings were 52% "good," 40% "fair," and 8% "poor." Existing linkage also was evaluated: 35% of researchers found it strengthened, and 59% found it somewhat strengthened, while 6% indicated no difference. 6.03. Improvement in Extension Service: In the farm survey, 66% of the farmers reported that extension services available to them had improved in the last decade. As sources of technical information useful in their operations, 62% reported friends/relatives, 60% the extension worker, 9.7% TV, and 5.2% other agencies (mostly private companies). The majority (85%) reported that they were in contact with their extension worker. 6.04. Institutional Support: The project strengthened PDAs, although with substantial delays, by provision of VGTCs, PDA and county offices, vehicles, motorcycles, audio-visual and field equipment, and improvement of technical and, to a lesser extent, language skills through training. The project also strengthened research institutes, through improvement of research and language skills and long- and short-term training. It contributed to DP through provision of printing, photography, film and video units, and improvement of skills through training. The project strengthened GDPD through the established M&E unit and computer network, although the intended use of the available information was not always made clear.  11 6.05. Of planned totals, research institutes received 100% of field equipment, 100% of laboratory equipment, 3.5% of audio-visual equipment, and 4% of vehicles (28% of large trucks). PDAs received 91% of audio-visual equipment and 68% of vehicles (61% of large trucks). The Publication Department received 5 % of the audio-visual equipment. The central ministry got .4 % of the audio-visual equipment and 1 % of the vehicles. The rest of the vehicles and trucks were allocated to other research institutes and production stations (14% of vehicles were sent to PDAs outside the project area). 6.06. Beneficiaries of the training program were distributed as follows: research institutes received 63% of the MSc training opportunities, 68% of the short-term course graduates, and 3% of the study tours; PDAs received 21% of the MSc awards, 14% of the short-term graduates, and 73% of the study tours; the central ministry received 16% of the MSc awards, 11 % of short-term graduates, and 24 % of the study tours; the Publication Department received 2% of the short-term graduates and production stations 5 % of the short-term graduates. 6.07. Actual civil works construction fell substantially short of appraisal targets. No construction was carried out for the research institutes or Publication Department. For PDAs, the achievements as percent of planned were 67% for Provincial Directorate offices, 45 % for County Offices, 18% for County staff apartments, and 42% of the VGTCs. 7. Project Sustainability 7.01. The project provided office and housing facilities and transportation at the village level. This was envisaged for four diverse agro-ecological regions. With growing urbanization and improved transportation, the question arises as to the appropriateness of constructing some of the training facilities at village level. Where extension professionals and training facilities should actually be located should be reviewed. 7.02. Offices and housing constructed were not of expected quality. Even before the end of the project, maintenance expenditure was a growing demand on limited funds, adding to the issue of financial sustainability. 7.03. The project intended to establish a relatively costly, labor-intensive extension method, requiring adequate operational funds at all levels. One key to sustainability will be the continuity of sufficient budget allocations from the Government. Given financial constraints and competing demands on its budget, the Government is likely to find it difficult to carry this financial burden for all regions or all categories of farmer. To ease the financial burden on Government, efforts should be made to seek cost-efficient alternative approaches, as well as shift some of the burden to farmer beneficiaries. 7.04. Problems were encountered in retaining trained staff through the project. These problems are likely to continue as long as field-level support and staff motivation remain insufficient. 7.05. Research institute capabilities are declining due to aging of staff and lack of recruitment for nearly a decade. As long as the MARA moratorium on new staff recruitment remains, sustainability of applied research and MARA effectiveness of research-extension linkages are in jeopardy.  12 8. Bank Performance 8.01. The Bank's decision to complement the Government's commitment to increase productivity and agricultural incomes through enhancement of extension and research capabilities was appropriate. However, the Bank's recommendation of uniform design for the four agro- ecological regions was wrong. Insufficient vision was exercised on the implications for the project of the diverse agricultural and rapidly-changing demographic conditions. Insufficient attention was given to the need to have demand-driven, beneficiary-accountable, extension services in which users also assumed some responsibility for supporting extension. 8.02. The momentum the Bank displayed during preparation was not maintained through implementation. It was envisaged that above-average supervision coefficients would be needed due to the complexity and large geographical coverage of the project. In fact, no additional supervision resources were made available and allocations were below average in 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1990. The "software side" of the project was not thoroughly supervised. Of fifteen supervision missions, only six had an extension specialist and only one had a communication specialist. 8.03. When the Government reorganized MARA, the Bank failed to adequately recognize the need to accommodate the new organizational realities. One result was that significant coordination problems hampered project implementation throughout the life of the project. 8.04. Through periodic supervision missions, the Bank was informed of shortcomings in project implementation. Resolution of key problems, was left to the fulfillment of Government but frequently inadequate action was taken on solutions suggested by the Bank or consultants. Frequent changes in Task Managers within the Bank further aggravated this problem. 8.05. Two major findings of the Bank's mid-term review in 1987 were organizational weaknesses in project implementation and construction delays. These problems remained when project extensions were discussed in 1990, 1991, and 1993. In negotiations on project extension, the Bank stressed construction delays, with too little attention paid to organizational weaknesses. 8.06. The Bank strongly supported the project during the Gulf Crisis by deciding (pursuant to a policy designed to assist borrowers affected by the Crisis) in 1991 to increase temporarily its share of funding of project costs. In 1992, on the request of the Turkish Treasury, the Bank agreed to extend the increase in disbursement percentages through 1993. 9. IFAD Performnance. 9.01. IFAD, which also administered the Swiss Grant, helped ensure the utilization of available financing from IFAD and the Swiss Grant in an effective and timely manner. The contribution of the Swiss Government through a grant toward local costs (originally to be met from Turkish Government sources) helped meet critical financing needs for the project. The opening of a Special Account for the Swiss Grant was delayed and reduced in effectiveness due to the complex accounting system of the Turkish Government. Representatives from IFAD, which helped finance project activities in Southeastern Anatolia, participated in only about a quarter of the supervision missions.  13 10. Borrower Performnance 10.01. In MARA, commitment to the objectives and design of the project was uneven through the implementation period. Strong initial ownership of the project was diluted with ministerial reorganization and different priorities of new decision-makers in MARA. 10.02. After the 1984/85 reorganization of MARA the implementing units were spread to several general directorates. Separation of DE from the main implementing agency had a negative effect on implementation. MARA did not adequately adapt the project to organizational changes to ensure timely implementation. The 1991 reorganization did not correct the problem. 10.03. MARA did not respond fully to an issue that was raised by almost every mission for the nine years of the project -- to provide adequate full-time staff for project management. 10.04. Counterpart budgetary funds were neither sufficient nor prompt enough for smooth and timely implementation. Even when the Bank increased the disbursement percentages to 80% in 1991-93, the full complement of needed local resources was not provided. 10.05. MARA support of the VGTs, many of which faced serious logistical and technical support issues, was frequently inadequate. Few incentives were provided for those who were the "critical cutting edge" of the Government's extension effort in the villages. 11. Project Relationships 11.01. The relationship between the Bank and the Borrower was satisfactory, with both sides working to seek solutions to implementation problems. 12. Consulting Services 12.01. There were considerable delays in recruitment of consultants: 27% were recruited by the end of 1985 and 73% in early or mid-1986. Further time was needed to visit the provinces and familiarize themselves with field conditions. Some failed to do so at all and contributed very little to the project. Others spent a good deal of productive time in the field situation. Although they might have been employed better in a course-planning role and.in training of trainers, the contribution of some consultants as trainers was invaluable, given the limited technical background of some extension staff. 12.02. Reports prepared by the consultants were too often poorly utilized. Some were not translated; some were not thoroughly circulated and used with full effect by MARA and too often remained "on the shelf". The training contractor, because of slowness in planning and implementing overseas training programs, contributed to lengthy delays in training activities. 13. Project Documentation and Data 13.01. The original and amended Loan Agreements were understood well by all parties concerned. The Staff Appraisal Report and the Project Implementation File were useful tools to project management. The operational files of MARA were satisfactory for preparation of the  14 PCR. In spite of significant changes affecting the project and the responsibility diffused among various units, the filing of the relevant information was adequate. The Audit Reports prepared by the Borrower usually were delayed and sometimes lacked annexes or audit statements for the Special Account. The Resident Mission did not routinely receive all project documentation and was therefore handicapped in its oversight and supporting role. 14. Lessons Learned 14.01. The project provided several important lessons: i) In designing projects, diversity of circumstances among beneficiaries must be considered; blanket prescriptions do not work. ii) Implementing agencies must be involved more in project preparation. This will provide for more realism and facilitate timely implementation. iii) For diversified time- and agro-ecologically-specific services such as extension, strong and timely accountability and responsibility linkages to users must be in place. Supervision related to "government norms" is not enough to ensure relevant and responsive extension services to farmers. iv) Staff need to be thoroughly familiarized in advance with project objectives and the proposed system and convinced of its advantages over the system in place. v) Correct phasing and synchronizing of project activities are essential to success. vi) When project implementation involves complementary input from several units, a strong coordinating body must be established and maintained. vii) Coordinating committee members must be selected on the basis of the specific contribution each can make, not simply as members of a concerned agency. viii) In complex projects the Bank's supervision coefficients have to be above-average. ix) A viable M&E system must provide timely, useful information and must be seen as a tool to improve performance, rather than as a means of control.  15 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Introduction: 1.01. The agricultural sector has a great responsibility in the country since the national economy is based mainly on agriculture and agro-industry. In order to meet the food needs of the population which increases average 2 % per year according to the last census, to provide the necessary foreign currency for the importation of the raw material and the goods of the other sectors need and to create employment possibility to the increasing manpower are expected from agriculture. In order to be able to meet these expectations, it is necessary to utilize the existing arable land that reached to the limit, in the most economic and efficient way. 1.02. It is essential to develop extension and research services to enhance agricultural development, to strengthen research extension linkage as well as to increase the use of inputs such as chemicals, seed and seedlings fertilizers, which are the basic elements of the agricultural development to augment the contribution of the agricultural sector to the economy of the country. In the previous years transfer of the new technologies to farmers could not be realized at a desired level due to weak research-extension linkage. 1.03. For this reason, to transfer the technological saving of the research institutions to farmers with the shortest way, First Agricultural Extension and Applied Research Project has been prepared as a knowledge flow system. 2. Performance of the World Bank: 2.01. The value increase of US Dollar was unpredictable during project preparation and the implementation. 1 US$ was equal to TL 270 in the project preparation period and it increased up to TL 12980 in June, 1993 which was the closing date of the project. This increase of dollar could not be estimated at any stage of the project. 2.02. During the project implementation, relations with the World Bank was the Ministry and the Bank worked in close cooperation. The Bank missions visited the project areas together with the ministry staff to supervise implementation twice a year and did their best to solve the problems met until from the initiation of the project to the opening of the World Bank office in Ankara. 2.03. With the opening of the Resident Mission, the relationship between the Bank and the Ministry was more frequent and easier. This, provided a comfort in terms of communication and reaching a mutual conclusion for application in a short time. The positive approach of the Bank Missions during the supervision particularly in the last two years made useful contribution to the project implementation.  16 2.04. Various equipment and vehicles were imported to meet the infrastructure needs of the project. According to the Loan Agreement the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs would pay tax, stamp and fees due to the importation. However, these payments reached to the internal source level due to the increase in dollar, especially during the last years. 2.05. It was envisaged to form a "Central Project Management Unit" which would be responsible for the implementation of the Bank Projects. However, when the administrative body and the existing facilities of the Ministry are taken into account, it could not be possible to establish such unit and appoint additional staff there. 2.06. To lay pre-conditions by the World Bank during implementation had a negative impact on project implementation. For example, the construction of a given number of VGTC's in a given period has been delayed. 3. Performance of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs: 3.01. With the initiation of the project implementation most of the services envisaged had been realized during the project period. Central Coordination Committee, Central Executive Committee, Regional Coordination Committees have been established and continued their activities and met regularly during the project time and the project institutions were directed through these committees. All the procurement envisaged in the framework of the project had bought. Most of the overseas training and the civil works were realized. (See Annex - I). 3.02. Nine international consultants were employed on various topics for a total 127 man/month period. Printed material and the videos related to the project had been prepared and distributed to the institutions. During the project period monitoring and evaluation activities have been carried out and the problems met and the efficiency of the project have been followed in every stage end for every component of the project. 3.03. Following the initiation of the project in late 1984, a major reorganization changed central and provincial body of the Ministry in 1985. Since the project was designed for the General Directorate of Agricultural Affairs, the reorganization caused difficulties in implementation. As a result of reorganization, the Department of Extension was transferred to a different General Directorate and the linkage with the project was weakened. 3.04. Although a strong cooperation and linkage were needed to implement the project, the fragmentation caused by the reorganization made it very difficult. Problems arisen particularly in the areas of personnel planning, budgeting, research and extension management. 3.05. Human resources were a crucial factor in the project. However, the needed personnel could not be provided in terms of both quality and quantity as it was foreseen in the project. Even if the regulation of the Ministry on appointment and transfer applies seriously, the personnel need of the project can meet partially. However, the lack of personnel in the same provinces reached a critical stage.  17 3.06. The personnel matters are handled by the General Directorate of Personnel (GDP). The political interference in the assignment and transfer of provincial staff caused important problems in the provinces. The General Directorate of Personnel does not ask the views of the central units which are responsible for the implementation. In this respect the personnel planning could not be realized according to the needs and the targets of the project. 3.07. The project aimed to give training to the project staff both at in-service and academic level. Some of the trained staff have appointed to the places out of the project area. 3.08. Master degree program envisaged in the project had been delayed because the foreign language level of the candidates could not meet the requirements of the universities abroad. Most of the candidates started to take foreign language course from the beginning level and the six months course was not enough to improve their foreign language level. They needed further foreign language training. Especially, when the foreign language courses of the candidates needed to take abroad, the evaluation of the period for master studies could not be realized accordingly. 3.09. Another problem concerning training was the high ratio of the beneficiaries who were not involved in the project activities. This situation demoralized the project staff. In connection with this, more problems emerged in the implementation of the project. 3.10. Foreign exchange use depends on the internal budget allocations. First, the funds needed for the project activities period for master studies could not be realized accordingly. 3. 11. Another problem concerning training was the high ratio of the beneficiaries who were not involved in the project activities. This situation demoralized the project staff. In connection with this, more problems emerged in the implementation of the project. 3.12. Foreign exchange use depends on the internal budget allocations. First, the funds needed for the project activities are provided from the internal budget than the same amount is requested from the corresponding categories of the Loan. Each year, during the preparation of the annual budget the allocations used to be escalated based on the currency changes. However, since 1989 annual budget allocations for the project continuously decreased. 3.13. Since the intemal budgetary funds were insufficient, planned investments were not realized. This, resulted in low disbursements rates and payment of commitment fees. The delays due to limited funds were particularly significant in the civil works component. The VGTC construction program could not be realized because of high costs resulted from high inflation. Tax, duty and fees for the important goods were not paid due to insufficiency of funds, later with the storage costs and penalties the amount reached to 80% of the costs of goods.  18 3.14. The project activities had been severely affected due to insufficient local counterpart funds provided by the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade and the State Planning Organization. Besides, to meet the expenses such as fees and duties in importation and to be able to underline the construction work, an emphasis was placed on category 700 (for construction) and category 800 (for tax and fees). This application caused a limited allocation for the other services. FUNDS PLANNING OF TYUAP II (Million TL) First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Amount of the 11.194 22.182 32.767 28.508 20.763 34.053 - internal purposed with the project Amount of the 8.60 8.150 12.300 16.00 34.800 33.153 23.500 internal source allocated in the application _ _ _ _== Funds allocated for 1992: 37.073 Funds allocated for 1993: 64.158 1 US$: TL 585 in 1985, TL 767 in 1986, TL 1033 in 1987, TL 1399 in 1988, TL 1800 in 1989, TL 2956 in 1990, TL 2604 in 1991, TL 4082 in 1992, TL 6820 in 1993 (according to SPO data). 3.15. During project years 641 VGTC's were constructed and together with the 235 VGTC's constructed before the project, the number of VGTC's reached to 876. The World Bank stipulated the construction of a minimum of 200 VGTC's to extend the project. Later, as a result of series of discussions flexibility was provided. Due to insufficient budget allocation and incomplete procedures for transferring required amounts into the budget of General Directorates of Rural Services (GDRS), problems arisen in the implementation of 1992 civil works program. 3.16. Construction of 331 VGTC was planned in 1992 program to use IIAD and IBRD Loans. It has been planned to meet 20% of the construction costs from the internal budget and 80% from IBRD pass limited budget possibilities. The construction tender document had prepared by reaching an agreement with the World Bank and forwarded to the GDRS in the attachment of 1992 construction program.  19 3.17. However, the GDRS had been stated that the amount of the tender to be hold would be as much as the funds amount in the intemal source. The reasons are shown below; - difficulty and delay transferring the allocation in the GDRS's investment budget of 1992 to supplementary budget, - delay in the transfer 80% of the amount to be met from the credit to their budget, - difficulty in the payments of contractors, - delay in the tender according to the World Bank methods due to some processes such as permission of the Court of Account and the Finance. The construction program had been revised according to the amount of the intemal source and the tender had been hold, but the tender was cancelled by the Ministry. 3.18. The construction project and the tender documents for the construction of Eskisehir Research Complex were prepared by a consulting firm and the tender was opened. It has been envisaged to fund 75 % of the costs by IBRD and 25% by the government but, the tender amounting TL 48 billion was cancelled by the Ministry. Later, an agreement was reached with the World Bank to hold the tender again. The necessary changes have been done and the tender was hold again. The necessary changes have been done and the tender was opened again. However, the formalities were not completed to fund the construction under the project. Therefore, the Loan was not utilized for this purpose. An agreement was reached with the Bank to fund the complex under the Loan 3177-TU. 3.19. Procurement of goods was done through international bidding under the project. According to the Loan Agreement, the payment concerning tax, duties and fees would be paid by the Turkish Government. Customs clearance of the goods was delayed because of the lengthy procedures. Besides, the payments to be made reached high levels. 3.20. For this reason, it would be useful to exempt tax, duties importation fees from the prices in respect of carrying out the services rapidly. TUGEM which is the responsible agency for the application of the project, attempted several times to solve this matter but failed. 4. Lessons Learned 4.01. Some progress was recorded in research-extension linkage. It was determined that during the implementation period, not only managers, all technical staff contacted each other, discussed the issues at different platforms and searched solutions. In previous years, the research-extension linkage was very poor, even in the same province there was almost no contact between research and extension staff. Today the activities in Aegean and the Marmara region have been continued at more advanced level than envisaged during appraisal particularly in terms of research-extension linkage. Not only the institutions which were involved in the project also the universities in the region, other provinces and research institutions work in close cooperation.  20 Table 1 PART m: STATISTICAL INFORMATION Related Bank Loans Project Loan/Credit Amount Status No (US$M) Seyhan Irrigation I Loan 63-TU 25.2 Completed Seyhan Irrigation I Credit 38-TU 20.0 Completed Seyhan Irrigation III Credit 143-TU 12.0 Completed Seyhan Irrigation II Loan 587-TU 12.0 Completed Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Export Loan 762-TU 10.0 Completed Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Export Credit 257-TU 15.0 Completed Irrigation Rehabilitation Completion Credit 281-TU 18.0 Completed Ceyhan Aslantas Multipurpose Credit 883-TU 44.0 Completed Ceyhan Aslantas Multipurpose Credit-360-TU 30.0 Completed Corum-Cankiri Rural Development Loan 1130-TU 75.0 Completed Second Fruit and Vegetables Loan 1967-TU 40.0 Completed Erzurum Rural Development Loan 2094-TU 40.0 Completed Second Extension and Applied Research Loan 3177-TU 63.0 On-going Agricultural Research Loan 3472-TU 55.0 On-going Eastern Anatolia Watershed Rehabilitation Loan 3567-TU 77.0 On-going  21 Table 2 Project Timetable Activity Date Planned Revised Date Actual Date Identification June 1980 Preparation (Interim) Sep 1982 Preparation (Final) Mar/Apr, 1983 Pre-Appraisal May/Jun, 1983 Appraisal June 6, 1984 Negotiations Feb 21, 1984 Board Approval Apr 17, 1984 Loan Signature Apr 25, 1984 Loan Effectiveness Jul 25, 1984 Sep 5, 1984 Project Completion Dec 31, 1990 Jun 30, 1991 Jun 30, 1992 Jun 30, 1993 Jun 30, 1993 Loan Closing Mar 31, 1990 Oct 31, 1993  22 Table 3 Cumulative Estimated and Actual Loan Disbursements As of Dec 31, 1994 IBRD IFAD4 TOTAL Appraisal Estimate (US$ Million)2 72.00 10.00 82.00 Actual Disbursements (USS million)3 61.90 6.60 68.50 Actual as % of Appraisal Estimate 85.97 66 83.53 Date of Final Disbursement April 25, 1994 - 61.98 2/ Per SAR and Loan Agreements. I/ Per WB disbursement records. 4/ IFAD Loan Closing Date was extended to June 30, 1994/  23 Table 4.Project Implementation Table 4 Indicator Appraisal Actual or | Actual as % of Estimate PCR Estimate SAR Estimate Civil Works (m2) 327 022 93 541 29 Research 25 596 _ _ Extension 301 426 93 541 31 Vehicles (unit) 2 661 1 705 64 Equipment (no of items) Field (for research) 57 78 137 Laboratory (for research) 96 139 145 Documentation/information equipment (for research 112 122 109 and extention) Animal/Plant material (no 2775 700 25 of items) Training Msc (numbers) 174 91 52 Shortterm (personmonths) 510 407 80 Consulting services 110 127 115 (personmionths)  Table 5A Project Costs and Financing A. Project Costs (US$M equivalent) Appraisal Estimate Actual Component Local Cost Forex Cost Total Local Cost Forex Cost Total Extension in service 85.5 42.0 127.5 76.9 39.1 116.0 Ext. Information cent 2.0 2.4 4.4 0.3 0.8 1.1 Applied research 9.1 10.8 19.9 14.6 16.1 30.7 Pro. Management m&e 0.8 0.3 1.1 2.0 0.8 2.8 Training 0.4 11.3 11.7 0.0 9.3 9.3 Technical assistance 0.2 1.5 1.7 0.6 2.2 2.8 Physical contingen. 5.7 1.4 7.1 Price contingen. 20.0 12.3 32.3 Sub-total 123.7 82.0 205.7 Project end fee 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 Grand total 123.7 82.2 205.9 94.4 68.5 162.9  Table 5B B. Project Financing (US$ equivalent) Planned Revised Actual 1BRD SRD IfAD TOTAL IBRO IFAD TOTAL IBRO IFAD TOTAL 1. (a) Civil works and furn. for extension offices in Southeastern Anatolia 2 200 000 2,200,000 3 110 000 3 110 000 805 305 805 305 (b) Construction of information center and new research buildings/facilities/ext. buildings housing 11 700 000 - 11 700 000 11 112 000 5 703 202 - 5 703 202 2. Vehicles 11 440 000 1 560 000 13 000 000 11 535 000 1 560 000 11 581 214 1 569 920 3. Equipment and Books 4 900 000 - 4 900 000 13 954 000 - 12 770 780 - 4. Overseas Training 10 120 000 1 380 000 11 500 000 7 575 000 1 380 000 8 173 493 1 114 353 S. Consultant Services 1 470 000 - 1 470 000 2 119 000 - 2 233 563 - 6. Incremental Operating Costs 17 820 000 2 430 000 20 250 000 21 321 500 2 360 000 21 321 079 2 857 504 7. Initial deposit to Special Account for categories la, lb, 6 4 400 0001 600 000 5 000 000 4 400 000 600 000 2 998 990 255 470 8. Fee 180 o50 180 050 180 050 . 180 050 - 9. Unallocated 10 169 950 1 830 000 11 999 950 3 450 990 000 . TOTAL 72 200 000 10 000 000 82 200 000 72 200 000 10 000 000 61 966 379 6 602 552 Source: SAR, World Bank disbursement records, Government records  26 Table 6A Project Results A. Direct Benefits AppraisaL Estimate PCR Estimate/Actual Total Number of Beneficiariesl 253,000 353,000 Incremental Enptoyment (Jobs 1,500 N/A Wheat YieLds' (kg/ha) 2,010 2,191 1 The undreliable nature of the underLying statistics raise questions about the comparability of these figures. 2 Are.yieLds 1982/84 and 1990/91  27 Table 7 Page 1 of 2 Status of Conai ts i _____________________ Subject Status 1.Section 3.02. (b) Open & maintain at T.C. Merkez Bankasi a Bank Special CompLied and a Furd Special Account in accordance with Schedules 6 & 7 2.Section 4.01 (a) Carry out project with due diligence and efficiency Partially complied, difficulties mainly to l ____________________ budgetary constraints 3.Section 4.01 (b) EstabLish and maintain PartiaLLy complied, CCC exists (i) a CentraL Coordination committee, a Central but not effective 4 RC exist Executive Committee, four RegionaL Committees and but not effective additionaL Project Acdninistration Unit staff recruited lii) recruit and assign additional staff 4.Section 4.02 GDAA to enter and maintain protocoLs with CompLied (1) the agr. facuLties at the Universities of Ankara, Izmir, and Adana to assist in training of Provincial Extension staff (2) TURDOK, FRT and TRT to assist with EIC 5.Section 4.03 (a) employ an organization for the administration of Complied the overseas training program; (b) employ consuLtants satisfactory to the Bank 6.Section 4.04 Issue revised job descriptions for all Provincial Complied, but late Extension staff in the project area by September 30, 1984 7.Section 4.05 (a) Insure imported goods against hazards incident Complied 8.Section 4.05 (b) Use Bank and Fund Loans excLusiveLy for project PartiaLly complied, vehicle purposes allocation not always exclusively for project use. 9.Section 4.06 (a) Furnish the Bank promptLy with pLans, specifications, PartiaLLy complied, Late, for reports, contract documents and construction and vehicles, equipment and civil procurement schedules for the project works: procurement deLays 10.Section 4.06 (b) GDAA shall (i) record and monitor project progress (costs and Partially complied benefits) (ii) enable Bank/Fund representatives to visit the CompLied project (iii) prepare for each semester progress and Complied evaluation reports (iv) furnish at regular intervals information PartiaLly complied, costs and concerning the project, its cost, benefits, benefits missing expenditures financed by the Bank/Fund loans (v) furnish prior to the end of the 2nd year of Not available project execution terms of reference for mid-term review (vi) carry out mid-term review during third year but Partially complied, 1988; not later than March 31, 1987 delays in start-up 11.Section 4.06 (c) Prepare a Project Completion Report not later than Open six months after the closing date  28 12.Section 4.07 Acquire rights in respect of Land for carrying out Complied project 13.Section 4.08 (a) Furnish a draft Annual Work Program not later than PartiaLLy compLied, Late, September 15 of each year for the foLlowing year mechanicaL exercise Revise said draft AnnuaL Work Program and inform Partially complied, unforeseen 14.Section 4.08 (b) Bank/Fund of budgetary allocations budget shortfalls impeded implementation of plans 15.Section 4.09 (a) Establish and maintain ministerial working groups to Not complied, due to deveLop inter alia the reorganization and ministerial reorganization consolidation of the extension and research services 16.Section 4.09 (b) Discuss the findings and recommendations of said Not complied, due to ministerial working not later than June 30, 1986 ministerial reorganization 17.Section 5.02 (a) Maintain separate accounts and records by Complied participating institutions to reflect operations, resources and expenditures to be submitted within two months after the end of each semester 18.Section 5.02 (b) (i) Maintain separate accounts reflecting aLl CompLied expenditures on accounts (ii) Retain untiL one year after closing date aLl Open records (iii) Enable Bank/Fund representative to examine such Complied records 19.Section 5.02 (c) ti) Have the separate accounts mentioned under Complied, sometimes late 5.02 (a) audited each fiscal year by independent auditors (ii) Furnish a certified copy of the audit in English Complied, sometimes Late not later than 9 months after the end of each fiscal year incLuding a separate opinion in respect of the expenditures and records mentioned under 5.02 (b) 20.Section 5.03 (a) Maintain and renew buildings, equipment and machinery Partially complied, building maintenance poor budget problems 21.Section 5.03 (b) Maintain in the project area for at Least ten years Open following compLetion of the project the extension and research systems introduced under the project and provide the necessary funds, facilities and services for that purpose 22.Section 5.04 Take all measures necessary to ensure availability to Partially complied, farmers in the project area of a) credit facilities availability of seeds and and b) agricultural inputs credit 23.Section 7.01 Conditions of Loan effectiveness: (a) Fund loan agreement authorized or ratified and Complied the Fund has appointed the Bank as Cooperating Institution (b) Bank/Fund Special Accounts opened CompLied, but not functioning (c) Administrative entities under 4.01 (b) have been Complied established (d) Protocols referred under 4.02 signed Complied (e) Ministerial working groups 94.09) established Not complied 24.Section 7.02 Additional matters to be included in the opinion to Cooplied but not functioning be furnished to the Bank (a) estabLishment of the Central Coordination Committee, the Central Executive Coffnittee, the 4 regionaL committees and the Project Administration Unit (4.01(b)) as administrative entities (b) protocols (4.02) signed, delivered and ratified ource: Loan Agreements, supervision Reports and GL)PU  29 Table 8A Use of Bank Resources: A. Staff Inputs (staff weeks) PREP. & APPR. NEGOT. SPN PCR TOTAL PREAPPR. FY82 2.7 2.7 FY83 51.3 23.6 74.9 FY84 47.6 7.1 1.5 56.2 FY85 10.3 10.3 FY86 28.0 28.0 FY87 24.9 24.9 FY88 35.2 35.2 FY89 23.8 23.8 FY90 17.9 17.9 FY91 14.6 14.6 FY92 8.3 8.3 FY93 10.2 10.2 FY94 5.0 5.0 TOTAL 54.0 71.2 7.1 174.7 5.0 312.0  Table 8B Use of Bank Resources B. Staff Input and Mission Data Stage of Sent by Month/Year No. of Period in Specialization Performance Types of Project Cycle Persons Field Represented Rating Problems (week) || Identification FAOCP Aug 9-Sep 5, 82 2 4 E/EX * Preparation WB Dec 18-22, 82 1 1 E * Preparation WB Cons. Jan 15-27, 83 1 2 EX * Preparation WB Mar 1-22, 83 4 3 E/AE/EX/L * Mar 31-Apr 8, 83 Preparation WB May 23-Jun 5, 83 8 3 A/E/AE/EX/ * Appraisal 1/ WE Jun 6-21, 83 8 3 L/AR/C * Supervision WB Sep 17-29, 84 2 2 A/AR * Supervision FAO Feb 19-22, 84 1 5 C * Supervision WB Apr 14-27, 85 1 2 A 2 2/4 Supervision WB Oct 20-Nov 2, 85 1 2 A 2 4 Supervision WB Jun 15-Jul 7, 86 3 3 A/P 2 7 O Supervision WB Jun 1-Jul 9, 87 2/ 10 5.5 A/L/AR/H/E/EX 3 2/3 Supervision WB Jun 6-29, 88 3 3 A/EX/AR 3 2/3/8 Supervision WB Feb 27-Mar 3, 89 1 1 A * Supervision WB May 29-Jun 21, 89 6 3.5 P/EX/E 2 2/4 Supervision WB Jun 11-29, 90 5 3 AE/P/EX/A/F 4/5 Supervision WB Apr 1-11, 91 2 2 A/P * Supervision WB Jun 4-21, 91 2 2 P/EX * Supervision WB Jan 27-Feb 14, 92 4 3 E/A/ZX 2 2/3/5/6 Supervision WE Nov 5-16, 92 3 2 E/A/AE 2 3/4/5 Supervision WE Apr 26-May 6, 93 2 2 A/A 2 2/3/4 1/ Preappraisal-cum-appraisal, 2/ mid-term review mission * 590 not prepared or not in files Tyve of vroblems: 2. project management performance, 3. availability of funds, 4. procurement progress, 5. training, 6. TA progress, 7. disbursement, 8. development impact A. Agriculturalist, AR. Architect, E. Agricultural Economist, E. Economist, C. Communications Specialist, F. Forestry, Specialist, H. Human Resources Specialist, L. Livestock Specialist, EX. Ext. Specialist