Cameroon - National Agricultural Research Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OMCAL USE ONLY Report No. 13631 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT CAMEROON NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (LOAN 2766-CM) OCTOBER 25, 1994 Tyi e: l Agriculture Operations Division Occidental and Central Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EOUIVALENT (as of June 1994) Currency Unit: FCFA US$1.00 = 560 FCFA ABBREVIATIONS PCR Project Completion Report GTZ German Executive Agency for Technical Assistance ODA Overseas Development Agency FAO/CP Food and Agriculture Organization/Cooperation Program IRA Institute of Agronomic Research IRZV Institute of Zootechnics Research NARP National Agricultural Research Program ISNAR International Services for National Agricultural Research PEs Public Enterprises DRST Directorate of Scientific and Technical Research MRST Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research USAID United States Agency for International Development  FOR OFFICIL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation October 25, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Cameroon - National Agricultural Research Project (Ln. 2766-CM) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Cameroon National Agricultural Research Project (Ln. 2766-CM) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Part II was prepared by the Borrower; it points out the benefits of the project but essentially agrees with the conclusions and lessons of Part I of the Report. The project had some impact on the agricultural (IRA) and livestock (IRZV) institutes through human resource development and improvement in research infrastructure and equipment. Improved planning processes for research made some progress at IRZV, but less so at IRA. However, economic decline in Cameroon and a complete breakdown in funding eventually led to a vertical cessation of research apart from a few subprojects relying completely on external support. Considering the evolving economic conditions at the time of preparation and appraisal, the project design was inappropriate. A redesign of the project in 1988 was ineffective due to worsening economic conditions, and a similar attempt in late 1989 was abortive. A drastic restructuring and reduction in the research system proposed in 1993 (prepared by FAO/CP and with donor concurrence) is still under consideration by Government. The project outcome is rated as unsatisfactory with a modest institutional development impact. The limited benefits are of uncertain sustainability. The quality of the Project Completion Report is satisfactory. No audit is planned at this time. However, after completion of the Training and Agricultural Extension Project (Ln. 3185-CM), both projects may be audited concurrently; this would provide an opportunity to review the outcome of the ultimate research restructuring plan. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of thfir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (LOAN 2766-CM) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface . ..................................................... i Evaluation Summary ............................................. iii Part I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ................... 1 Project Identity ............................................. 1 Background ............................................... 1 Project Objectives and Description ................................. 2 Project Design and Organization .................................. 5 Project Implementation ......................................... 6 Project Results .............................................. 7 Project Sustainability .......................................... 9 Bank Performance ............................................ 10 Borrower Performance ......................................... 10 Project Relations ............................................ 10 Consultant Services ........................................... 10 Lessons Learned ............................................. 11 Part II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ... ...... 13 Part III. STATISTICAL INFORMATION ............................... 16 TABLES Table 1 Related Bank Loans ....................................... 16 Table 2 Project Timetable ......................................... 17 Table 3A Cumulative Loan Disbursement ............... .. ............... 18 Table 3B Disbursement by Categories .............. ................... 19 Table 4 Project Implementation ..................................... 21 Table 5 Project Costs and Financing .................................. 22 Table 6 Project Results ........................................... 23 Table 7 Compliance with Credit Conditions .............................. 26 Table 8 Use of Bank Resources ..................................... 27 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT National Agricultural Research Project (Loan 2766-CM) Preface This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) of the Cameroon National Agricultural Research Project for which Loan No. 2766-CM in the amount of US$17.8 million was approved in November 1986 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Two technical assistance grants complemented the loan: the German GTZ contributed US$3.3 million and the British ODA $2.8 million. The Loan was fully disbursed and closed, as scheduled, on June 30, 1993. The core of the PCR was prepared by the FAO/World Bank Cooperation Program (FAO/CP); Part II was prepared by the Government. Tlhe FAO/CP report was prepared on the basis of World Bank, GTZ, ODA and Government documents, successive FAO/CP reports on the restructring of agricultural research and a FAO/CP mission to Cameroon from July 7 to 16, 1993. The FAO/CP report was reviewed by AFlAG staff.   CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (LOAN 2766-CM) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives 1. The Project's objective, framed within the overall sector strategy, was to increase the productivity and incomes of the small-scale agricultural producers through improved technology creation and transfer. Specific objectives were to (i) improve agronomic and animal research programming through the development and application of methods responding to the agricultural strategy of the Borrower and to the needs of the smallholder sector; and (ii) improve the technical and operational capabilities of IRA and IRZV as well as the relevance of their work through farming systems research management. 2. To achieve the objectives outlined above, NARP was to introduce three major project components: agronomic research for the IRA, zootechnic research for the IRZV and joint facilities. The agronomic research component was to improve the capacity of IRA's central management, research planning, stations and antennas, to support research activities and to carry out a training program. The zootechnic research component was to improve IRZV's ability to manage and expand two research centers, support fisheries research and develop a training program. The jointfacilites component consisted of common infrastructure for the IRA and the IRZV which included: construction, equipment and the operation of a library, computer center and an information center. 3. Special emphasis was to be placed on the development of improved agricultural techniques and a new farming system focused on food crops and livestock production for local consumption. Promoting self-sufficiency in the scientific, technical and administrative expertise of the research institutes by increasing the skills of national staff engaged in agricultural research was equally important. Implementation 4. Project implementation was marked by a slow start; Government attempts to curtail the spending of public agencies, including the two research institutes within so-called performance contracts, financial difficulties experienced by the Government, delays of counterpart funds, and the Bank's suspension of disbursements, inhibited the realization of scheduled activities. The Loan Agreement was signed in November 1986, and became effective in December 1987, following completion of the project implementation studies. The Project was redesigned and the legal documents were modified in January 1988. Due to delays in obtaining counterpart funds from the Government and in recruiting experts in research management, implementation of the  iv IRA component did not start until March 1988 and implementation of the IRZV component until August 1988, a point in time when the country was already in a deep financial and economic crisis. 5. In light of the financial difficulties experienced by the Government, and the request by the Prime Minister (Mission for the Rehabilitation of Public and Para-Public Enterprises), IRA and IRZV, with the help of the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) in the Hague, Netherlands, drew up an action plan focusing on restructuring, replanning and rehabilitating agricultural research. Performance contracts were signed in December 1989 for the IRA and in 1991 for the [RZV. Unfortunately, the country's fnancial situation did not stabilize and the Government was unable to fulfiI its commitments as stipulated in the contracts, and agricultural research plunged into a deep crisis. 6. In 1992, when an improvement in the country's financial and economic situation was still not in sight, the Goverrunent, on the advice of the donors, finally saw the need to develop scenarios for a basic restructuring of agricultural research with a view to radically reducing costs and changing the instirutional setting. The respective study and decision-making process are still ongoing. 7. The cost of the Project had been estimated at US$43.2 million at appraisal (IBRD US$17.8 million, ODA US$1.6 million, Government US$23 million). At project closing, it was estimated that US$23.6 had been fianced by external aid, with IBRD, ODA, GTZ contributing US$17.5, 2.8, 3.3 million respectively. The Govermnent's contribution could not be established precisely; however, it was limited to staff salaries. Project Results 8. Project results have been mixed. Although the Project's specific achievements can be identified in three areas, namely human resources, physical infrastructure and equipment, and research output in improved agricultural seeds, the overall results fell short of expectations. Human resources were developed through formal and on-the-job training. Physical infrastructure, including equipment, was expanded and improved at many sites. Buildings were erected at 16 sites; most of the buildings were finished, but several were poorly executed and a few remained uncompleted due to poor contractor performance. A substantial amount of equipment, such as laboratory and computer equipment, were bought and installed. Despite of this, the Project did not achieve its specific objective to increase the effectiveness and relevance of agricultural research during its life time as most of the research activities came to a standstill due to the country's deep economic crisis. At the end of the Project, the crisis had resulted in an agricultural research system that had no operating funds, a large staff on strike and infrastructure that is not properly maintained.  v Sustainability 9. The results of three Project activities are likely to be sustained: the human resources and capability building program, physical infrastructure and equipment, and research output in agricultural seeds. Less likely to be sustainable are the results in forestry, animal and fisheries research and farming systems research, with cotton systems a possible exception. To increase long-term efficiency and relevance of research systems, a major down-sizing and change in the structure of agricultural research away from public to private sector type management and towards beneficiary domination is required. Lessons Learned 10. The following are some of the lessons learned from this project which can be applied in preparing future projects: (a) An adequate and stable macro-economic and sectoral environment is of utmost importance and special attention to it during all stages of the project cycle. (b) Financial commitment by the government and specialised agencies to agricultural research must be clear and ascertained early on. (c) The structure and management of the institutions to be supported must be sound at the outset. Civil servant and public sector management of agricultural research are most likely deficient, particularly when the public sector is weak. (d) Control and adjustment mechanisms during implementation should be strong, both on the side of the Borrower and the donors. Annual and mid-term reviews are very important, and so is the participation of non-research specialists. (e) The level of Bank supervision should be evenly maintained throughout project imnplementation in order to respond immediately to rising problems.   CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (LOAN 2766 CM) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identitv Project Name: National Agricultural Research Project Loan Number: 2766-CM Department: Occidental and Central Africa Sector: Agriculture Sub-sector: Research B. gBacklMund 1. Cameroon is a country with many, particularly agricultural, resources. After 1960 it enjoyed high growth for over twenty years; towards the end this growth was associated with rapid expansion of the public sector. However, between 1982 and 1986, during which period the project was prepared and approved, the country's economic and financial performance changed. In 1982, the year the project was identified, overall economic growth was at a high level, well beyond 5% p.a.; oil production and exports were the new source of growth, as opposed to the broad-based agricultural exports of the past. Growth levels remained high until 1985 in spite of the stagnation of agricultural exports and falling prices. In 1986, the year the project was appraised, world market prices for oil and the traditional agricultural exports slumped and it was obvious that the country was facing an economic and financial crisis. The ultimate depth and duration of the crisis, however, was beyond the imagination of most. 2. Between 1982 and 1986, the outlook on and the strategies for the agricultural sector changed. A relative neglect of agriculture during the oil boom gave way to a renewed emphasis on agriculture, when reserves and income from oil were declining. Within the sector emphasis shifted from exports to import substitution and food production, as agricultural imports were rising fast; it also shifted from public enterprises (PEs) as development engines to the rationalization of PEs and smallholder-based development, as the export-oriented PEs proved increasingly inefficient and costly, whereas smallholders continued to provide the bulk of the food and export production. As a consequence, the tools of developing small-scale agriculture and food crops, namely agricultural extension, research and input supply, received increasing attention. After years of neglect, it was discovered that the performance of agricultural extension services was weak and had little impact on smallholders and food crops.  -2- 3. In agricultural research, instrmental for improved extension, the perspectives changed also. The effort concentrated on the two large public research institutes: IRA for agronomic and forestry research and IRZV for animal and veterinary research. They had grown rapidly in terms of research staff, usually delegated from the various sectoral ministries, and support staff hired on contract. The constraints identified were: weak overall and research management; poorly trained staff; inadequate facilities; and research that was too academic, not well adapted to the needs of smallholders, neglecting food production of the crop and animal type, and remained in the drawers of researchers rather than reaching the beneficiaries. 4. To address these constraints in agricultural research, the Government of Cameroon approached the World Bank for assistance. A prolonged project preparation and implementation process was set in motion. It started with identification through an FAO/CP mission in January 1982. An appraisal mission visited Cameroon in 1983. A final appraisal report was prepared in October 1986 and the Project was approved by the Board of Directors in November 1986; the loan became effective in March 1988 and was closed in June 1993, allowing for the usual four months grace period. C. Project Objectives and DescriDtion Objectives 5. The Project's overall objective was to increase productivity and the incomes of small- scale agricultural producers via improved technology creation and transfer. The Project's specific objective was to increase the effectiveness and relevance of agricultural research by (a) improving the planning of agronomic and animal research through the development and application of methods focusing research on the agricultural strategy of the country and the needs of the smallholder sector; and (b) improving the technical and operational capabilities of IRA and IRZV as well as the relevance of their work through farming systems research and better research management. 6. Three project components - agronomic research, animal research and joint facilities - were to help achieve these objectives. The agronomic research component covered measures to improve IRA's central management as well as capacity at the level of research centers and stations to support priority research activities and to carry out a training program. The measures included the following: (a) Central management: (i) research planning: the development and application of methods based on a critical analysis of research against the needs of users and the country's agricultural development strategy; the establishment of a biometrics unit to provide statistical assistance to researchers and log the results of experiments; (ii) administrative and financial management: (i) assistance in the development of  - 3 - financial and administrative management procedures; (ii) development of financial control mechanisms and computerized accounting inventories; and (iii) reorganization of logistical services; (iii) preparation of technical documents and extension material through the establishment of a publishing and reporting service which would function in collaboration with the above biometrics unit; and (iv) construction, rehabilitation and equipping of office facilities and staff accommodation, and acquisition of equipment and vehicles. (b) Research centers: (i) carrying out experimental work with improved management and technical procedures; and (iO) developing a farming systems approach by ecological zone and by type of farming and effective liaison with extension services; (iii) establishing and operating a research center at Foumbot and two field trial grounds in Minkomeyos and Mouda to serve the Nkolbisson and Maroua centers; and (iv) constructing and equipping housing, offices, storage, laboratory and garage facilities, construction of access roads and fences, and acquisition of vehicles, equipment and implements. (c) Priority research activities: (i) crop research, including the improvement of the Njombe research center, and acquisition of specialized equipment for the cotton fiber technology laboratory and the phytopathology laboratory at the Ekona Research Center; and (ii) forestry research, including the improvement of the Maroua station and the Foumban station through the construction and equipping of laboratories, staff houses, office facilities and cold storage facilities for seeds, and acquisition of vehicles and field equipment. (d) Training: Carrying out a training program, including seminars, scholarship awards for post-graduate studies, specialized study tours abroad and local training. 7. The animal research component included measures to improve IRZV's central management, expand research at two research centers, to support fisheries research and carry  - 4 - out a training program. The measures included the following: (a) Central management: (i) formulation of a long-term research strategy that meets the herders' needs; (i) assistance in developing advanced financial and administrative management procedures; (iii) assistance to field staff in the design and economic analysis of surveys and in identifying and taking into account relevant social factors; (iv) statistical assistance to researchers and installation of storage facilities for research data; and (v) construction and equipping of office facilities and staff housing and acquisition of vehicles and equipment. (b) Research centers: Expanding research at the Bambui (Western Highlands) and Wakwa (Northern Savannah) research centers to solve problems of livestock producers and to develop improved livestock management systems which are acceptable to producers, including: (i) carrying out initial surveys to establish husbandry patterns and production parameters, experimental programs and follow-up surveys covering ranching and agro-pastoral activities, (ii) pasture improvement; and (iii) the acquisition of equipment, vehicles, mobile laboratories, scales and supplies. (c) Fisheries research: Carrying out surveys and collecting baseline data. (d) Training: Carrying out a training program, including seminars, granting fellowships for post-graduate studies, specialized study tours abroad and local training. 8. The joint facilities component covered the following: (a) the construction, equipping and operation of a library and information center at  -5- Nkolbisson for the joint use of IRA and IRZV staff; and (b) the construction, equipping and operation of a computer center at Nkolbisson for the joint use of IRA and IRZV staff. D. Project Design and Organization 9. The Project's concept was to increase short and long-term efficiency and the relevance of the existing research system. The concept assumed that the size of the research system and the institutional structure were basically sound; thus, the design did not aim at major structural innovations. It seems that this concept, as well as basic assumptions, were shared by the Borrower as well as by the staff who prepared and appraised the Project. 10. In retrospect, it is safe to say that the above assumption about size and structure was wrong. The size of the research system and its operating costs were beyond the country's capacity and needs; soon after loan effectiveness the country could not afford the Project's counterpart funding. Furthermore, in recent years agricultural research was basically inoperable due to a general lack of funds; they were not even sufficient to pay salaries. Recent studies also showed that the system in place cost more per year to run than some of the large international agricultural research centers. The institutional structure was evidently also flawed. Because the research system was part of the civil service structure, it was difficult, if not impossible, to manage personnel, finances and research efficiently and adapt to different circumstances. The country's civil service was and still is politicized and oversized and lacks transparency and accountability in its management. Such an environment is not conducive to professionalism and good management neither in research nor in other areas. Tne root cause of the lack of relevance and efficiency and of the bloated size of agricultural research, was its public and civil service nature; it renders research unaccountable, in general, and to beneficiaries such as the farmer community and the extension services, in particular. That this was not seen and addressed at the design stage is surprising; it was only when the crisis became a reality for a prolonged period that the problems were fully recognized. 11. The Directorate of Scientific and Technical Research (DRST) of the Ministry of Higher Education, Informatics and Scientific Research (MESIRES) (replaced in 1992 by the Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research, MRST) was responsible for organizing the activities of IRA and IRZV and for approving and auditing their annual budgets. The organizational structure, with a Studies and Project Unit, a Program Monitoring Unit as well as a Technical and Scientific Cooperation Unit, was to ensure coordination of project activities, particularly with regard to the preparation of the National Agricultural Research Program which was to be prepared during the first two years of the Project. The program was supposed to be the basis for the planning and scheduling of agricultural research. The DRST was also responsible for links between the institutes and external cooperation agencies. 12. The management capacity of the institutes was to be strengthened to enhance effectiveness through decentralized management, improved financial and research services, better planning,  -6 - monitoring, documentation and scientific information. For this purpose, plans had been made to recruit additional staff (43 man-years of technical assistance, 145 man-years of Cameroonian researchers and 239 man-years of technicians and administrative assistants). E. Project ImDlementation 13. Project implementation was marked by a slow start; timid attempts by the Government to curtail the spending of public agencies, including the research institutes, within so-called performance contracts; a gradual recognition of the need for a major restructuring of agricultural research; problems in non availability of counterpart funds and suspensions of disbursements; and, nevertheless, spending of substantial amounts of money from Government and donors sources. 14. The Loan Agreement was signed in November 1986, but only became effective in December 1987, pending completion of the project implementation studies. In November 1987, the Project was redesigned and the legal documents were modified in January 1988. Due to delays in obtaining counterpart funds from the Government and in recruiting experts in research management, implementation of the IRA component did not start until March, and August 1988 for the implementation of the IRZV component, by which time the country was already in a deep financial and economic crisis. 15. So-called performance contracts were the Government's tool to reduce costs and improve effectiveness of public entities when the financial crisis became a reality. At the request of the Prime Minister (Mission for the Rehabilitation of Public and Para-Public Enterprises), IRA and IRZV, with the help of ISNAR, drew up action plans focussing on restrcturing, replanning and rehabilitating agricultural research. Performance contracts were signed in December 1989 for the IRA and in 1991 for the IRZV. 16. The performance contracts were based on a master plan for agricultural research in the country and the different ecological regions; it defined the financial, human and physical needs required under assumptions of somewhat reduced costs and public finances stabilizing at a lower level. Unfortunately, the financial situation did not stabilize and the Govermment was unable to fulfill its commitment as stipulated in the performance contracts. Agricultural research plunged into a deep crisis caused by a complete absence of operating funds associated with increasing delays in payment of salaries, prolonged strikes and degradation of its vast infrastructure. 17. In 1992, with no improvement in the country's financial and economic situation in sight, the Government, urged by the donors, finally saw the need to develop scenarios for a basic restructuring of agricultural research with a view to radically reducing costs and changing the institutional setting. The respective study and decision-making process are still ongoing. FAOICP assisted in the process with two studies, one in September 1992 and another in December 1993. Donors met in September 1992 in Rome promising to support an agricultural research system with annual costs half of what they used to be, management decentralized, IRA  and IRZV merged, personnel managed along private sector lines and with strong beneficiary participation. A detailed restructuring proposal was presented in the FAO/CP's study of December 1993; the basic institutional structure and the legal framework, particularly with respect to the roles of the state and the beneficiaries, still remain to be defined and agreed upon. The opinion prevailing widely in 1994 is that (a) halving the annual cost will not suffice for the system to be sustainable, given the continued difficulties in the country's public finances; sub-regional division of labor in research, focus on a small core research system dependent on public funds and increased beneficiary participation in research funding would help to reduce costs; and (b) beneficiary domination and private sector type management are essential for donor support of the core research system. 18. The Bank loan of US$17.5 million was completely disbursed. Bank funds were available throughout the life of the Project except after September 1992, when disbursements to Cameroon were suspended several times for a total period of almost one year. Suspensions occurred due to Cameroon's failure to service its debt with the Bank; which slowed down activities considerably, apart from those related to training where disbursements continued. The Government's direct counterpart funds were small in the initial years and completely absent in the last three years of the Project. Total annual investments and operating subsidies for agricultural research, which in the fat years of 1980 to 1984 amounted to CFAF 5 billion, were reduced to less than CFAF 2.7 billion in 1991. Later the treasury was unable to effectively pay the allocations for agricultural research in the state budget. The absence of direct counterpart funds was a main cause for delays in disbursement, in spite of an adjustment in disbursement categories. The last such reallocation was made on May 18, 1992. Overall Bank disbursements are recorded in Table 3B. Most of the expenditure went into construction, vehicles and equipment. ODA and GTZ withdrew from the Project in 1993. GTZ extended its support to December 31, 1993, with a view to eventually assisting a quick transition to a restructuring mode. Such a quick transition did not materialize, however. 19. The total cost of the Project for its five years of implementation was estimated at US$43.2 million at appraisal (Table 5A). US$20.2 million were to be provided by external sources - US$17.8 million by the Bank, US$1.6 million by the ODA, US$0.8 million by the GTZ - and US$23 million by the Government. At loan closing, it was estimated that US$23.6 million had been financed by external aid, with the EBRD, ODA and GTZ contributing respectively US$17.5, 2.8 and 3.3 million. The Government's contribution could not be established precisely; it was limited in essence to staff salaries. Since the accounting system in place does not record expenditure by grant donors and is incapable of systematically monitoring costs of the activities of the institutes or its various research and production programs, only overall figures are available. All Government expenditure for agricultural research, including salaries and counterpart costs for all projects related to research (NARP, FAC and USAID projects) were globally estimated by the PCR mission at US$34 million. F. Project Results 20. The Project's results have been mixed. Although the Project's specific achievements can  - 8 - be identified in three areas, namely human resources, physical infrastructure and equipment, and research output in improved agricultural seeds, the overall results fell short of expectations. Hulman resources were developed through formal and on-the-job-training. The Project enabled two staff members of IRA to obtain PhDs or Doctorates and four staff members to obtain Master of Science degrees or DEAs. Sixteen IRZV staff members obtained PhDs and nine Master of Science degrees or DEAs. There is now a large pool of highly trained research staff of both institutes as follows: post-graduate degrees: 35 PhDs, 52 Master of Science degrees or DEAs and 77 trained as engineers at IRA; and 16 PhDs and 47 Master of Science degrees or DEAs at IRZV. Hundreds of staff were trained on-the-job, through seminars and minor training exercises. Such training covered a wide variety of fields ranging from planning and doing actual research, to cost accounting and computerization. Most of this know-how is not being put to proper use under the current circumstances, but will serve the country in its future agricultural research or other development activities. 21. Physical infrastructure, including equipment, was expanded and improved at many sites. buildings were erected at 16 sites (Abong Mbang, Bambui, Bertoua, Dibamba, Dschang, Foumban, Foumbot, Garoua, Kribi, Nkoemvone, Nkoolong, Maroua, Ngaoundere, Njombe, Nkolbisson, Wakwa). Most buildings were finished, but several were poorly executed and a few remained uncompleted for reasons of poor contractor performance or lack of parallel investments such as electricity supply. The duplication of IRA and IRZV buildings was a problem at several sites. A joint IRA/IRZV library was established in Nkolbisson and the number and quality of publications available has increased. A system for computerized data processing was created and is available to researchers for the collection, analysis and processing of research and personnel data. A substaial amount of equipment (laboratory equipment, computers, etc.) was purchased and installed. Most of the equipment is still used today, even if conditions of operation are less than optimal; some were not installed and some may even have disappeared from research by now, most likely still rendering service to the country in an unplanned manner. A fairly large number of vehicles were acquired under the Project and most vehicles still function today. 22. In spite of this, the Project did not achieve its objective to increase the effectiveness and relevance of agricultural research during its lifetime, as most of the research activities came to a stand still due the country's deep economic crisis. At the end of the Project in 1993, the crisis had resulted in an agricultural research system that had no operating funds, a large demoralized staff on strike due to many months of salary arrears, and an infrastructure that was rapidly deteriorating due to a lack of maintenance and pilferage; only some donor-financed islands of research were able to maintain somewhat normal activities. In late 1993, a scientific audit examined the results of agricultural research and concluded that, while there were many potentially interesting research results, agricultural research was still not beneficiary oriented; it did not sufficiently consider the economic environment of the beneficiaries, and its link to extension as well as attention given to the presentation and distribution of research results in a manner accessible to potential users were still very weak. 23. One of the Project's objectives was to improve research programming and output. This  - 9 - objective was achieved with regard to the IRZV, which, in 1991 and 1992 made good progress in systematic application, planning and methodology, with assistance provided by the GTZ. Programming improved at least temporarily at the level of IRZV. With GTZ support, notably the systematic application of its planning by objective methodology, good progress was made in 1991 and 1992. Eight research programs were developed; a survey was conducted on IRZV's client/supplier relationship with regard to products and service. A bibliography and an analysis of the research results during the 1982-1991 period were produced. Research programming at IRA, in contrast, made only little headway. It remained complicated by five large national programs; certain programs, namely on production systems and agro-forestry, remained ill-defined with overlaps. Although a database for use by the extension services contains much useful technical information, it has not been updated since 1990; the same applies for the catalogue of publications of IRA's library. 24. It is difficult to assess the output and impact of the research carried out, and in the absence of detailed studies, no concrete conclusion can be drawn. It is more than likely that progress was made in the area of agricultural seeds, and that after the Project, it will still bear some impact. Results in forestry, animal and fisheries research are far less palpable. Likewise results from farming systems research or research on sustainable systems are meager, with cotton systems a possible exception. As far as agricultural seeds are concerned, the vegetative material of the cash and plantation crops of the southern part of the country, such as palm oil, rubber, banana, cacao and coffee seems to have improved; seed material of IRA origin continues to be used by the large commercial plantations and by small-scale producers in areas where adequate extension and seed distribution systems have developed. Productivity of cotton, the cash crop dominant in the North and Extreme North Province, has also improved with IRA providing research assistance to the cotton company, SODECOTON. Food crops also benefited from research. This applied to rice, important in the North and North West, maize (West and North West), sorghum and millet (North), plantains, cassava, sweet potato and potatoes. The Njombe base succeeded to providing well adapted fruit plants and processing techniques. Relations with rural development agents and technology transfer to small farmers are still very weak, as confirmed by the above scientific audit (para. 6.01). Research driven improvements in relations were achieved in the early stages of the project, but came to a halt. At present, the push for collaboration comes to research from such projects as the Bank financed National Agricultural Extension and Training Project or the French funded Garoua II Project. G. Project Sustainabilitv 25. For the reasons highlighted above, the results of three project activities are likely to be sustained: the human resources and capability building program, physical infrastructure and equipment, and research output in agricultural seeds. Less likely to be sustained are the results in forestry, animal and fisheries research and farming systems research, with cotton systems a possible exception. To increase long-term efficiency and the relevance of research systems, a major down-sizing and change in the structure of agricultural research away from public to private sector-type management and towards beneficiary involvement is required. Part of the investment made during the Project will certainly be used by a restructured research system.  - 10- H. Bank Performance 26. The Bank's performance was weak. The Bank might have given more consideration to the worsening economic and financial condition of the country and assessed its potential effect on the Project and subsequently introduced measures to limit the negative impact of the crisis or made adjustments to the Project's concept. Signs of an impending economic crisis were evident as early as 1986 when the Project was negotiated. 27. During implementation, a rigorous mid-term evaluation of the Project would have been appropriate to correct the project. Supervision missions should have been more critical; they should have alerted the Bank and the Borrower early on about the development objectives not being achievable during these years of crisis and under the present structure of the institutes. Firmer insistence by the Bank on the Borrower's compliance with Bank procurement rules and provision of counterpart funds, and more attention of supervision missions to financial and mranagement issues would also have helped to avoid wasting some resources. I. Borrower Performance 28. The Borrower's performance was also very weak. The deficiencies listed above, and in particular non-adjustment to the worsening fmancial situation during project preparation and implementation and lack of critical analysis of the structural weaknesses of agricultural research, also apply. Moreover the Borrower's commitment to agricultural research seemed weak. The complete absence of counterpart funds since 1991 and salary arrears can be explained by the financial crisis, but it reflects the low priority given to agricultural research by the Govenmment; although expenditure cuts occurred everywhere, they hit agricultural research earlier and more severely than other sectors and services. Whether the lethargy in the face of mounting signs of a breakdown in the system was greater in the case of agricultural research than elsewhere is difficult to assess, but it was certainly great. Procurement, accounts and financial management posed problems throughout the project period, reflecting the weakness and lack of rigor in public management; the PCR mission found it difficult to find clear management practices at the level of a department, center or station; the system in place seemed seriously disorganized, particularly at the field level. J. Project Relations 29. Relations between the Bank and the Borrower were generally satisfactory. A few problems surfaced, nonetheless, during the recruitment of counterpart staff working alongside international experts, and in June 1992, when the Special Account was not replenished due to the unavailability of counterpart funds. K. Consultant Services 30. Consultants were employed for IRA in the areas of research and financial management, biometry, scientific editing, nematology and documentation, and for IRZV in the areas of  - 11 - research, administrative and financial management, biometry and animal husbandry. A planned consultancy in fisheries became redundant when qualified IRZV staff came on board. Generally, consultant services were of good quality. GTZ staff performed particularly well as the progress in IRZV's research programming shows; later this assistance proved very useful in providing the background for the restructuring of agricultural research. L. Lessons Learned 31. The following are some of the lessons learned from this Project which can be applied in the preparation of future projects: (a) An adequate and stable macro-economic and sectoral environment and close monitoring of all stages of the project cycle, is of utmost importance. One main reason for this Project not achieving its objectives was the lack of reaction of the Bank and the Borrower to changed circumstances. The sectoral policy framework was ill-defined throughout the Project's life, particularly with respect to sectoral institutions and mechanisms of technology transfer, and this was in part responsible for the lack of relevance of agricultural research. For future involvement in agricultural services and research, this would imply: (i) a strong presence of macro-economic as well as sector and institutions specialists in preparation and appraisal teams, on the donor side, and increased involvement of the agencies involved in macm-economic, financial and sectoral management, on the Borrower side; (ii) waiting with major investment projects in agricultural research until the macro-economic and sectoral policy framework is safe and stable; and (iii) that in periods of rapid change, assistance should remain limited in size and concentrate on adjustment rather than maintenance or expansion of service activities. (b) Overall commitment by the Borrower to agricultural research, and not only commitment by the specialized agencies concerned, is important and must be ascertained early on. One important way to test such commitment could be to obtain guarantees for adequate counterpart funding in the legal agreement, during negotiations, and up-front payment of annual counterpart funds, during implementation. (c) The structure and management of the institutions to be supported must be sound at the outset. Civil servant and public sector management of agricultural research is most likely deficient, particularly when public sector management is weak in general. Private sector-type management in agricultural research should be a precondition for major future support; such management can be assured by  - 12 - effective beneficiary involvement, rather than administration or researcher domination in its control mechanisms. Competition and cooperation in research at the national and regional levels rather than a concentration on monolithic and large national institutes is another way of fostering efficiency and relevance. (d) Control and adjustment mechanisms during implementation should be strong both on the Borrower and donor side. Annual and mid-term reviews are very important, with the participation of beneficiaries and of non-research specialists, such as specialists in management, institutions, financial management and extension. (e) Successful research projects would require not only a broad commitment by the government, but strong leadership and a relevant accountability mechanism . It is essential that project activities be coordinated and that the responsibility for such coordination be assigned to one person both by the Borrower and the Bank in order to ensure a coherent vision for the realization of project objectives. (f) Agricultural research projects should not be overly ambitious, particularly in an enviromment of weak institutions and local capacity. The size of the and design of the project must take into account the availability of local resources, not only in terms of volume but also the timeliness and sustainability. Moreover, equal attention should be give to both 'the hardware" and the technical output of the project (quality and relevance of scientific and technological output). 32. Effective application of these lessons in Cameroon remains to be seen, but there is reason to be optimistic as the Borrower has undertaken and continues with important steps in the right direction. A plan for restrucuring agricultural research was prepared in December 1993. It foresees (a) the creation of a new institute replacing IRA and IRZV; (b) the reduction of annual operating costs of the agricultural research system by half through staff reduction, particularly but not exclusively excessive support staff; (c) the strong decentralization and client participation in research; and (d) the application of private sector management principles. Staff reductions have started with FAO technical assistance, and fmancial support from the European Union, from the Bank-financed Agricultural Extension and Training Project. The main points of the restructuring plan are still under consideration by the Government and, hopefully, will be resolved in the coming months in consultation with interested donors.  PART II: PROJECT REV[EW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 33. In November 1986, the Government of Cameroon signed a Loan Agreement with the World Bank for US$17.8 billion to strengthen agricultural research in Cameroon through the National Agricultural Research Project (NARP). The principal objective of the Project was to consolidate the national research system for food crops, livestock production and appropriate technology with a view to increasing the incomes of small-scale producers. Specifically, the NARP sought to: (a) develop human resources, particularly through staff training; (b) expand existing infrastructure by building accommodation for researchers and laboratories, and by providing a variety of scientific and technical equipment and vehicles; (c) redefine research programs by making them more compatible with the real needs of those who use the results of research activities; (d) improve the organisation and management capacity of the IRA and the IRZV; and (e) strengthen access to scientific and technical information, and introduce the general use of computers. 34. Although the agreement was signed in 1986, the NARP did not actually become effective until 1988 and closed five years later in 1993. Project Results 35. The NARP achieved notable results, which are summarised below: * the IRA and IRZV facilities have tripled in size; * a common scientific infornation center for the IRA and IRZV was built; * a computer processing center was built and equipped; * human resources were developed: 18 researchers received PhDs or Doctorates and 13 received DEAs or Master of Science degrees. Hundreds of technicians were trained on- the-job through seminars and workshops; * the availability of scientific equipment and mobile laboratories increased considerably; * the management capacity was generally improved as a result of computer usage; * the relationship between the Borrower and the Bank was satisfactory, and was largely  - 14 - marked by mutual agreement. Lessons Learned 36. The main lessons learned are the following: (i) When the Project was designed, the national capacity to finance research over a medium to long-term period without external aid, was overestimated. This, coupled with the drastic and general reduction in public revenues after 1987, made it impossible for the Government to honor its agreement to provide counterpart funds. (ii) The Borrower's inability to meet its financial commitment has compromised the sustainability of the Project. (iii) A mid-term review of the Project should have been conducted to redefine its objectives and adapt them to the critical economic situation in Cameroon. (iv) Generally speaking, the total lack of coordinatior between the IRA and the IRZV has affected the definition of the research programs. (v) Despite the establishment of a joint library and computer centers, the policies developed in these areas by the IRA and IRZV were neither coordinated nor in harmony. (vi) Although the Project made a large investment in increasing infrastructure and scientific equipment, a commensurate maintenance component was not introduced. (vii) The recurrent costs generated by the first phase of the Project are substantial and exceed the country's present capacity to ensure the smooth operation and maintenance of the Project's achievements. (viii) There have been few opportunities for international consultancy assignments, although there are Cameroonian nationals available who have the required skills for such assignments. (ix) It is relevant to question the rationale for limiting the duration of such a large research program. The Project came to an end just when the physical components (infrastructure, equipment, training) were achieved, in the face of a very difficult macroeconomic situation. Prospects 37. Having examined the project completion report for the National Agricultural Research  - 15 - Project, written and presented on behalf of the donors by the FAO/CP mission, the Government is generally satisfied with its conclusions, with some exceptions as indicated above. 38. At the end of the first phase of the NARP, the Government considers that the Project has demonstrated that adequate and well-focussed international cooperation can significantly contribute to improving the prospects for sustainable rural development. In light of the positive achievements of the Project, and taking into account the importance of the food security objective, the need to improve the productivity and the living conditions of rural populations, it is imperative to build on the shortcomings or inadequacies of the first phase. It is equally important that the first phase be judged as it was at the design stage - in other words, a pilot phase to define the long-term objectives and to develop or establish the means for the effective implementation of subsequent phases. 39. Thus, it would be unfortunate for the NARP, and all parties concerned with its implementation, to give up because of the aforementioned difficulties. The commitment of the Cameroonian farmer, who has to bear the responsibility for the loan, and is the true borrower under the Project, should be given careful consideration. This can only be done by the implementation of a second phase of the Project which would ensure the sustainability of the achievements and justify the investments made under the first phase. 40. With the support of its partners, the Government is ready for this new challenge in national agricultural research.  - 16 - Table 1: Related Bank Loans Project Title Subjec Yeer of Amo of Nan- Project Remarof Approa Lam (SDR Disbursed Closin Dte . mmAn) _mnt L 2560-CAM Speedal ftnin 1935 25.0 7.33 12.31.93 New codang for rwal dot L 29120-CAM ReabIitatio 19S - 61.70 29.65 12.31.9S of cocoa L 30140-CAM Dewdopmet 19S9 34.60 2519 06.30.95 Of liven6ock ____ ___ ____ __ sector _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ L 3150-CAM SALI: 1939 1500o0 50.00 03.31.93 New closig shucm- date Adinba L 31350.CAM Tranig m_ 1990 21.00 1732 03.31.97 L 32060.C" SDA - H _in 1990 21.S0 13 __ 12.31.97 Reaourme __ L 3313J0CAM Foo" aeut 1992 23.00 20.9 0630.90 L 27660-CAM NaI 197 17. 0.33 0 93 RA_lek _____ Pnerco  - 17 - Table 2: Project Timetable Item Date Revised Actual Remarks Scheduled Date Date Identification 5/81 1/82 1/82 FAO/CP Preparation 2/83 - 2/83 FAO/CP Appraisal misison 4/83 11/83 11/83 Appraisal report 5/83 6/85 6/85 Most recent version 10. 14.86 IBRD approval of loan - - 11/86 Loan Agreement No. 2766 CM Signing of loan - - 11/86 Effectiveness 12/87 3/88 3/88 IRZV in August 1988 because the Coordinator of the National Agricultural Research Project was appointed at that time Completion 12/92 12/92 Closing 6/93 6/93  Table 3A: IBRD Credit Disbursements Estimated Disbursements Actual Disbursements Actual as % of Estimate World Bank Fiscal Year Semestre _ _ _ Disbursements Cumulative Disbursements Cumulative Cumulative Annual 1987 _ 1I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1988a/ _ 360 360 Ii 710 1070 92 92 9 13 1989 __ 1420 2490 ___ . B1600 4090 3137 3229 78.2 106.2 1990 __ _ __ 2140 6230 il 2140 8370 7501 10730 128.2 1753 1991 l 1950 10320 _I _ li1960 12280 2516 13246 107.8 69.5 1992 _ 1600 13880 __ li 1420 15300 2235 16481 101.1 74 1993b/ 1 900 16200 _ li 8 9 0 1 7 0 9 0 1 5 2 1 1 7 0 0 2 9 9 .5 85 19 94 1 710 17800 537 17539 98.5 75.6 aI P ro je c t e ffe c tive n e s s d ate : 0 3 . I8 .8 8 b/ Prjc lsng dt:0309  ~~~~~~~~~~~~Tal 3B: IBRD Credit Disbursement by Categories IUS$000) Category Appraisal Estimate Amonmdmant 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total at Non-Dibuvrsed Project Closing Arnount PROJECT I + 6 Construction 8300 8878 921 1778 4753 1151 688 247 8689 2 + 7 Vehicle supplies 3100 4782 0 680 1629 699 937 689 4535 3 + 8 Technical assistance 4100 1445 0 311 334 259 2101 270 1383 4 + 9 Training 4300 1358 0 1 ee 314 176 329 252 1236 5 + IO Operatirng Expenses 0 1337 0 303 472 231 9 1 63 1160 1 1 Non allocated 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 Total disbursed 17800 17800 92 3137 7501 2516 2235 1521 17002 Funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 537 Total= = i 11. IRA IA Construction 5600 e923 92 1212 3787 1015 592 131 6830 2A Vehicle supplies 2200 2542 0 467 554 433 689 201, 2345 3 Technicasl Assistance 1200 660 0 183 165 90 115 69 612 4 Training 1800 763 a 16X 202 92 117 65 636 5 Operating expenses 0 1092 0 202 396 189 085 52 924 Total disbursed 10800 11980 92 2224 5094 1819 1598 518 11347 II.IRZV. 6A Construction 200 1455 0 5668 470 136 48 116 1335 7A Vehicle supplies Soo 2140 a 113 1031 258 232 466 2100 Techinical Assistanice 2900 785 a 128 179 169 95 201 771 Training 2200 595 0 6 112 84 212 187 Soo Operating expenses 0 245 a 101 76 42 6 11 236 Total disbursed 5800 5220 0 914 1868 689 593 981 5042  Table 3B: IBRD Credit Disbursement by Categories IUS$OOO i (cont'd) Category Appraisal Estimate Amnrdment 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total ct Nonl-Dsbursed Amount COMMON ACTIVITIES b/ 6B Construction 500 500 0 0 496 0 2 8 O 524 7B Vehicle supplies 400 100 0 0 44 8 22 90 8 Technical sssistance 0 0 0 0 0 0 O O O 9 Training 300 O O 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 Operating Expanses 0 0 O 0 0 0 O O O _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~17539 Total ct 1200 fOO 0 0 540 8 44 22 614 Non-Disbursed Amount O O O O O OOOO at Amendment of May 18. 1992. __O b/ Included in IRZV's disbursements with lines for the IRA. cI Differences are due to rounded up figures.  Table 4: Key Implementation Indicators Unit Objecrives set at A raisal Irnpleentation (June 1993) IRA IRZ COMM IRA IRZV COMM Remarks A. Construcfion Ltaboratories (with basic uaterial) m2 1590 0 0 3200 0 0 Wold Bank agreement Offices (furmished) m2 1280 2000 0 0 2000 0 IRA-tenovatons Fumished accommodation for high level officials unit 54 7 0 is 4 0 IRA -18 neI w and 40 renovated Executives (furnished) unit 45 0 0 is 0 0 Support strff (fumished) r2 45 0 0 to 0 0 Libmry at Nkolbisson. Bjanbui, cotnputer centre at Nkolbison. Other consttuction work t23520| 0 550 O 0 550 reading om at Bambui. 3 shop B. Other Infnsffucture Fencing km 34 0 0 10 0 0 Roads krn 28 0 0 2 0 0 IRA - Nkolbisson C Vehicles Cars unit 40 20 2 6 3 0 4x4 Pick-Up Truck unit 31 8 0 24 14 4 4x4 unit 5 2 2 0 0 0 7-tonne trucks unit 6 2 0 I I 0 Dibambs for paIm oil (IRA). Mtnkon (IRZV) Motorbikes unit 103 16 0 10 0 0 |overnmtns to decide wbether to reduce Specilised vehicles unit 0 6 0 0 6 22 mobile labontofies Tractors unit II I 0 2 I 0 N 20-seater bus unit I 0 0 2 0 0Foumbot aml Nkolbisson (Word Bank agreement) D. Equipment Field equipment set 22 7 0 0 4 90 Fara equipment et 3 0 0 0 0 0 Garage equipment aet 6 2 0 0 2 0 Agru-meteorology statins utuit 9 0 0 0 0 0 Difficulty aelecting English or French mnterfa 100 km radio unit 6 2 0 -2 0 |USAID nalle the radios Computers unit 7 3 1 10 9 0 Portable computers unit 0 0 I 0 0 0 Textile laboratory unit I 0 0 0 0 0 Too cosdy Equipment for phyto-enthomology laboratory set I 0 0 I 0 0Marua Equipment for nematology laboratory set I 0 0 1 0 0 Other equipment 0 yes yes yes yes 0 0 E. Technical Assistance IRA - Cordylas audits carried out between 1989 and 1993 not Planning and administrative support man-notdis 144 96 72 96 |inchded Systems and research disciplines man-rnontbs 204 240 72 54 100 0 F. Trtining Seminars (cnsulutnts) mnu-months 16 16 0 19 0 0 MSc overseas main-mtont5hs 240 360 0 192 90 0IRZV - not necessasy; level has been reached already Ph.D overseas tmn-tonths 72 160 0 72 191 0 StudymvisitsAnisn-montlns 138 24 O 0 0 Funded by other BDFs IRA - financed by other sources Study visits rnaa16 0IZ - ritht bY3ot24 s0u0c0 Administration (in Cxmeroon) mati-nionths 582 201 0 1 16 0IRZ finned by other sources Laboratory Assistants man months 168 0 0 192 0  Table 5: Project Costs and Financing I - - ~~~~~I -- a Total 18RD ODA GTZ Govrt Total 18RD ODA GTZ Govt. Apprsisal Estimate Expenses A. Total Research Costs 43200 17800 1600 800 23000 82607 17539 277Sa/ 3330 58963 /. IRA Toral _ 29900 10800 900 0 18200 11347 0 40993 Construction 11200 5600 0 0 6800 6830 0 10945 Vehicles/materials 4500 2200 100 0 2200 2345 0 Technical Assistsnce 1800 1200 600 0 0 612 0 0 Training 2000 1800 200 0 0 636 O 0 Operating costs/salaries 10400 0 0 0 10400 924 0 30048 1. IRZ Total 10000 5800 200 800 3200 5042 3330 17970 Construction 500 200 0 0 300 1335 0 2603 Vehiclas/materials 1000 500 0 100 400 2100 770 Technical Assistance 3800 2900 200 700 0 771 1250 0 Training 2200 2200 0 0 0 600 510 0 Operating costs/salaries 2500 0 0 0 2500 236 800 15367 ll. Common Toral 3300 1200 500 0 l600 1228 220 0 Construction 1000 500 0 0 500 524 0 0 Vehicles/materials 800 400 100 0 300 90 0 0 Technical Assistanca 400 0 400 0 0 0 0 0 Training 300 300 0 0 0 e14 0 0 Opereting costs/salaries 899 0 0 0 800 0 0 tieneral Researrh Cosrs 43200 17800 1600 800 23000 82607 17539 2775a/ 3330 58963 Construction 12700 6300 0 0 6400 8689 0 13548 Vehlcles/materials 6300 3100 200 100 2900 4535 770 Technical Assistance 6000 4100 1200 700 0 1383 1250 0 Training 4500 4300 200 0 0 1236 510 0 Operating costs/salaries 13700 0 0 0 13700 1160 800 45415 Funds 637 0 a/ 1 /9U L sterling (exchange rate on Iure 30 1993 51.00 - US$1 551_ Thr mrssTcr rmt ncrtv ttn speerTrc _ data. ODA experts said that the US$2775 were mainly used for technical and material on the basis of an analysis of the Institutes debts at 03.30 93. and JiOi lotal operating costs (salaries included) of both institutes,  - 23 - Table 6A (1): Project Results (IRA) A. Direct Benefits Indicators SAR Estimate' PCR Estimate 1. Increase in productivity Increase in corn in the West per unit. and North, and in cassava in the West and South in .___ _particular. 2. Increase in work Difficult to appreciate. efficiency. 3. Contribution to food Despite the increase in the self-sufficiency. population, food supply is good. Food security in the North has increased at the sarne rate as cotton production. 4. Increase in income- Improved village palm oil, generating produce. banana for export, rubber and cotton. 5. Increased farmiing Not obvious because of the revenue. crisis Oowering prices). 6. Improved rural living Stagnation and/or conditions. regression. 7. Improved technical and Improvement was scientific standards for necessary, but the operating researchers. costs were not forthcoming, which inhibited the recruitmnent of researchers. 8. Soil conservation and Research underway for soil vegetation . conservation. 9. Improved farming In the North (culture ( systems. crops), in the West (marketing gardening). 10. Rationale for using For cocoa (brown when pesticides. rotten). Reeducation in the number of cotton treatment administer. 'No data available.  - 24 - Table 6A (2): Project Results (IRZV) A. Direct Benefits Indicators SAR Estimate' PCR Estimate 1. Increase in productivity Increase in poultry, rabbit per unit. and pork production. 2. Increase in work Difficult to appreciate. efficiency. .. 3. Contribution to food The results of the research self-sufficiency. done on dairy production were used to create two ______________________ production companies. 4. Increase in income- Improved poultry, rabbit generating produce. and pork produce. 5. Increased farming Not obvious because of the revenue. crisis (lowering prices). 6. Improved rural living Difficult to assess. conditions. 7. Improved technical and Improvement was scientific standards for necessary, but the operating researchers, costs were not forthcoming, which inhibited the recruitment of researchers. 8. Soil conservation and vegetation. 9. Improved farming systems. 10. Rationale for using pesticides. 'No data available  - 25 - Table 6B: Project Results A Economuc Impact' Remarks Increase in GDP for agriculture by about Considering the worsening economic crisis 0.25% (US$5 million) per year from 1990 Cameroon has been facing since the to 2010 (equivalent of ERR of 12%). beginning of the Project, it is difficult to evaluate the economic impact of the research on the GDP for agriculture, which dropped from CFAF 976 to CFAF 852 billion between 1987 and 19912. Table 6C: Studies C. Studies3 _ _ Study Tide Institute Subject Impact of the I_________ aRZ14RM 1st A Study on Poultry IRZV (Prof P. Crossbreeding Breeding Research Horst). poultry in in Cameroon. Caneroon. 'The Economic Rate of Return (ERR) has not been calculated. 2Source: The World Bank, 1993: World Table 1993. 3These studies were not anticipated in the SAR, however, several studies were undertaken as part of the NARP and by vanous BDFs (see the ltst in Annex 1).  Table 7: Status of Covenants Credit Subject Complepkon Statu Agreement No. Deadlne 202 (b) BofTower to open two special accounts: (a) Not specified. IRA and IRZV: the special accounts opened at the Bank of Credit IRA, (b) IRZV (for the IRZV and joint and Commerce) were transferred to the Sociitc commerciale des activities) in a comrnmercial bank. banques - Credit L)ynnais. 2.03 Closing date: June 30, 1993. June 30, 1993 On schedule. 3.02 (b) (c) Borrower to deposit its contribution into the IRA: initial deposit of CFAF 175 million (BCC) and a contribution IRA project accounts (CFAF 450 million) of CFAF 85 million. and CFAF 350 million into the IRZV IRZV: no deposits made. project accounts. 3.04 (a) IRA: Employment of consultants In line with project Achieved, except for recruitment of consultant specialised in fishing, specialised in research management, implementation because a highly qualified Cameroonian executive was recruited. biometrics, scientific writing, nernatology, schedule. and docunentation. IRZ: Employment of consultants specialised in research management, M administrative and fuiancial management, a' biometrics, fishing, computers. 3.05 (a) Detailed annual training plan. April 30 of each IRA: Plan submitted for 1989/90 only. year. IRZV: Plans submitted in line with schedule. 401 (b) Special accounts and project accounts to be Every fiscal year. Audits for 1988189 were sent to the World Bank on April 7, 1991. audited, certified copies to be sent to the The 1991/1992 audit is on-going. World Bank six months after the end of the fiscal year. 4.01 (c) Proper maintenance of financial documents. Achieved, according to the nationals, but there were two accounts books - one national and one for the NARP. 4.02 (b) Ensure that there are sufficient resources After June 30, 1993. Not ensured. afler Project closing. 5.02 Draw up a national plan for agricultural December 31, 1988 Not achieved. research. 5 01 Annual seminars - IRA, IR.V and other Every year. Not achieved. The GTZ did, however, organise a few national technical institutions. seminars. 5.04 Establish a technical auditing committee June 30, 1987 Not established. Two technical audits were carried out in 1989 and a (IRA, IRZV). scientific audit was carried out in July/August 1993 following the closing of the NARP.  Table 3: Use of Bank Resources Stage of Projec Cycle FY No. of No. of Specialisation Cot in Rab Fq Types of Remarks peopleI people usSooo Problem4 _ _ _ _ ~~~~~~~~~sminm _ _ _ Identificatio_m L Prqaation, preappnusa 1912 25.5 3 ECN RD, EDO N.D. 3 - S,TMF I. Appraisad 1983 18.5 3 AOR R. ECN N.D. 3 2 S,TMYF ELt epwration, weapyraul 1913 100.0 7 AGR, R, ECN, LVS, EDO N.D. 3 2 S,M,F H. Apraisa 1984 34.9 3 CPA. SRE N.D. 2 1 S,T,M,F Negotabons 1914 36.5 1 R N.D. 3 2 . Negoiations 1985 16.6 3 OPA. ECN N.D. 3 2 MF Negoiations 1986 23.0 6 AOR, ECN.D N.D. 3 2_M2 Negotiations 1917 6.2 2 ECN.D N.D. 2 1 MF __ _ Superviuion I 1987 2.1 1 N.D. 3 2 M Supervision 2 1911 10.7 4 ECN, D N.D. 3 2 M Supervision 3 1989 8.6 3 ECN.D N.D. 3 2 MF Superision 4 1990 15.2 3 ECN,D N.D. 3 2 MJF (26.5)? SupervisionS 1991 21.6 6 ECN,D N.D. 3 3 MJF (15.0) Supervision 6 1992 12.7 2 ECN,D N.D. 3 3 MY (14.5) 1 Supervision 7 1993 8.1 3 ECN.R N.D. 3 3 MF . {~~~~~~~~~~7.0) Project complio 1993 4.0 R/AOR N.D. !Specialisation AGR - Agronoist RD - Rt - e p.. . ECE - Ecnmist R Rarche, LVS Livestock Specialist; CPA - Operations Assistant; D = Divae upecialisations or non-spciald caliso 21 = no problns, or few; 2 = moderte prbes; 3 maqo problem. 31 = improvent; 2 no changc, 3 worseig. 4S -Scientific, T - Techucal; M = MmegenFt; FinnFn ciahl. 1n brackets in line with the revised pl