Rwanda - Third Education Project

Doament of The World Bank FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 13641 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1683-RW) OCTOBER 27, 1994 Population and Human Resources Operations Division South-Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENT (period average) Currency unit: Rwanda Franc (RwF) 1985: US$1.00 = RwF 101.26 1986: US$1.00 = RwF 87.64 1987: US$ 1.00 = RwF 79.67 1988: US$ 1.00 = RwF 76.45 1989: US$ 1.00 = RwF 79.98 1990: US$1.00 = RwF 82.60 1991: US$1.00 = RwF 125.14 1992: US$1.00 = RwF 133.35 1993: US$1.00 = RwF 144.25 MEASURES 1 meter = 3.28 feet 1 kilometer = 0.62 mile 1 square kilometer = 0.39 square mile 1 hectare 2.47 acres GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS CERAI Centres d'enseignement rural et artisanal integr Centers for Integrated Rural and Artisanal Education DEP Direction de l'enseignementprimaire Directorate of Primary Education ILO International Labor Organization IMPRISCO Imprimerie scolaire - School Print Shop MINEPRISEC Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education MINESUPRES Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research MILNIFIN Ministry of Finance and Economy MINI-FOP Ministry of Public Service and Professional Training MINITRASO Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs NBR National Bank of Rwanda - central bank NUR National University of Rwanda NVTB National Vocational Training Board NVTC National Vocational Training Center PCR Project Completion Report SAR Staff Appraisal Report SFCS-PIU Service de financement et de constructions scolaires (project implementation unit) SW Staff-weeks TSS Technical Secondary School UNDP United Nations Development Programme UPE Universal Primary Education FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 SCIIOOL YEAR September to July  FOR OFFICMIL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation October 27, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Rwanda Tbhird Education Proiect (Cr. 1683-RW) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Rwanda - Third Education Project (Cr. 1683-RW) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. A letter with comments by the Government has been issued as Part II. The PCR gives a satisfactory account of the project experience. The project aimed at improving quality and efficiency of primary and post- primary education through investments in textbooks and a strengthening of educational administration, and to assist in training technical manpower through the establishment of a technical secondary school and a vocational training center. The project outcome is rated as unsatisfactory. Even though implemen- tation took eight instead of the planned five and a half years, by the time of Credit Closing only two thirds of the funds had been disbursed and one component was operational. While the unstable and deteriorating political situation was to be blamed for most of the shortcomings, inadequate project preparation was also a contributing factor. Institutional development impact was modest. In view of the recent catastrophic events in Rwanda, project sustainability appears unlikely. No audit is planned. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1683-RW) TABLE OF CONTENTS P R E F A C E ....................................................i EVALUATION SUMMARY ................................................... ii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK' S PERSPECTIVE 1 A. PROJECT IDENTITY ...................................1 B. BA CK GRO U ND .....................................................1 C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION ........................................2 Project O bjectives ....................................................2 Project Description ..................................................3 (a) Supply and Distribution of Textbooks and Teaching Materials ..................................................3 (b) Technical Secondary School (TSS): ..................................... 3 (c) National Vocational Training Center (NVTC): ..................... 3 (d) Institutional Development Studies: ....................................... 4 D. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION ............................................4 E. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ...................................................5 Credit Effectiveness and Project Start-up ..............................................5 Implementation Schedule ...................................................6 Procurement .....................................................8 Project Costs ....................................................8 Disbursements and Credit Allocation ...................................................9 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their |official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  F. PROJECT RESULTS ....................................9 Project Objectives and Physical Results ......................................9 Institutional Strengthening ..................................... 10 Action Program for Improved Efficiency ..................................... 10 Impact of Project .............................1........ 1 G. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY ..................................... 11 H. BANK PERFORMANCE ................ ..................... 12 I. BORROWER PERFORMANCE ..................................... 12 J. PROJECT RELATIONSHIP ..................................... 13 K. CONSULTING SERVICES ..................................... 13 L. PROJECT DOCUMENTATION AND DATA ..................................... 13 M. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED ..................................... 13 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 15 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION 17 1. Related IDA Credits ............................... 18 2. Project Timetable ............................... 19 3. Credit Disbursements ............................... 19 4. Project Implementation ............................... 20 5. Project Costs and Financing ............................... 21 6. Project Results ............................... 22 7. Status of Covenants ............................... 23 8. Use of Bank Resources ............................... 26 MAP IBRD 19109  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1683 - RW) PREFACE 1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Third Education Project in Rwanda, for which Credit 1683 - RW in the amount of SDR 13.5 million was approved on April 15, 1986 and signed on May 23, 1986. The Credit became effective on February 27, 1987 and was closed on December 31, 1993, about two years behind schedule. The last disbursement under the credit was on March 29, 1994; only 69% of the credit was disbursed, with a balance of SDR 4.16 million that was canceled effective March29, 1994. 2. The PCR was prepared by the Population and Human Resources Operations Division of the South - Central and Indian Ocean Department (AF3PH). There was no completion mission. The Bank sent the Borrower Parts I and III with the request to prepare Part II which was received in March 1994. 3. The PCR is based on the President's Report, the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the Development Credit Agreement, reports by and correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, internal Bank memoranda and interviews with Bank staff who have been associated with the Project over the years. 4. The PCR reviews the situation of the Project up to the beginning of 1994, and therefore does not take into account the impact that the tragic events unfolding in Rwanda since the beginning of April, 1994 may have had on the Project, particularly its results and sustainability.   ii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1683 - RW) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives i. The Project was designed to assist the Government in its plan to improve the quality and efficiency of its primary and post-primary education system by providing for the supply and distribution of textbooks and other teaching materials, establishing a self-sustaining textbook/teaching materials replenishment scheme, and strengthening the management and planning capacity of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MI1NEPRISEC) and the Ministry of Public Service and Professional Training (MINIFOP) through training and studies. In addition, the Project was to assist in alleviating shortages of critically needed manpower by providing for a Technical Secondary School (TSS) at Kibuye and a National Vocational Training Center (NVTC) in Kigali (Paragraph 5). Implementation Experience ii. The overall implementation experience of this project is not satisfactory. The forecast in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) that the Project would be completed and the credit fully disbursed in five and a half years turned out to be very optimistic, despite the fact that MINEPRISEC was an "old" borrower of the Bank and that the design of the Project included a substantial input of technical assistance. After about eight years, only 69% of the credit had been disbursed, and of the three main components only one was fully operational. There were considerable delays in the preparation of final designs and bidding documents, the award of contracts, the delivery of paper for textbooks, and the construction of NVTC, as well as in securing the financing from UNDP for the technical assistance for the NVTC component. The preparation of the Project was not as advanced as it should have been to ensure that it be implemented without undue delays. For the most part, implementation delays were due to weaknesses in project management. Both the Government and the Bank did not appreciate fully the burden that the carrying out of this project would place on the managerial and implementation capabilities of MNNEPRISEC and SFCS. Obviously, the deterioration in the political situation and the war from 1990 to 1993 did not help, but the Government could have made more efforts to limit the turnover of project directors and to address the chronic problems that delayed project implementation: weaknesses in institutional capabilities, slow decision making by MINEPRISEC and MlNIFOP, cumbersome administrative procedures, unfamiliarity and/or poor compliance with Bank procedures, and failure to follow Bank recommendations (paragraphs 11 to 23).  iii Results iii With only one component fully operational before the tragic events of April 1994, the actual results and impact of the Project were limited, but there were plans to continue project implementation and secure more satisfactory results which will now have to wait for a return to a normal situation in the country. On balance, the overall outcome of the Project is judged to have been unsatisfactory and its overall achievement in terms of institutional development was partial (paragraphs 24, 28 and 32). iv. The component for the supply and distribution of textbooks and teaching materials would have made available in 1994 1.5 million textbooks to 1.2 million students (one set for two students) and provided teaching manuals for all primary school teachers which should have led to an increase in the quality of education for the students and in the job satisfaction of teachers. With the established fees, the cost-sharing replenishment scheme for textbooks would have yielded about two-thirds of the appraisal estimate. The use of international competitive bidding for the purchase of paper by IMPRISCO brought about a 50%-60% reduction in cost. Finally, the component permitted the setting-up of a system for the production and sale of school notebooks which has been a profitable activity for IMPRISCO. At the beginning of the school year 1993-1994, the Kibuye TSS had a total of about 320 students and the first technicians were due to graduate at the end of 1994-1995. On the basis of its design and almost complete construction by the beginning of 1994, the NVTC should be able to achieve its estimated yearly outputs if it is ever completed (paragraph 24 to 27, and 31). V. The technical assistance and fellowship training benefited mostly IMPRISCO, but the overseas training of the TSS and NVTC teachers is also a positive result of the Project. In general, the Project increased training capacity, but did not strengthen significantly the planning and management capacity of the ministries (paragraph 28). vi. Progress in achieving the objectives of the action program for the improvement of the quality and cost effectiveness of education has been limited. However, the Government had a continuous dialogue with IDA on its educational policies and plans in connection with the development of two education sector projects (paragraphs 29 and 30). Sustainability vii. Once the country's situation returns to normal, the chances of success of the component for the supply and distribution of textbooks and teaching materials, which will rely on churches particularly for distribution in the regions, are good, provided that rental fees are deposited into the School Supplies Revolving Fund. The prospects for the NVTC (if and when it is completed) could be satisfactory, provided its legal status gives it administrative and financial autonomy and allows the participation and involvement of the private sector in all aspects of its management, operations and financing. On the other hand, the sustainability of the Kibuye TSS, which is unlikely to be able to benefit from cooperation with enterprises, is uncertain. On balance, and in view of the above-mentioned provisos, the overall impact of the Project in terms of sustainability was uncertain (paragraphs 33 to 36). Findings and lessons learned viii. The Project was not fully prepared, and this was one of the reasons for the considerable delays in implementation. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) rightly identified questions concerning Rwandese management and implementation capability as the two main risks of the Project. Those risks were  iv supposed to be minimized with technical assistance and training, through effective coordination on planning, programming and execution, and close monitoring. In practice, this effective coordination and close monitoring did not happen. For its part, the Bank did not devote sufficient resources to supervision. The extent of the coordination difficulties likely to be encountered during project implementation was not fully appreciated by the Bank nor by Government (paragraphs 42 and 43). ix. A number of lessons (paragraph 44), some of them obvious and not unique to this Project, can be drawn from the experience with the Project so far: (a) A project should not involve more than one ministry, at least for the same component. If it is necessary to involve two ministries, good management is critical to project success, and such a project would require a suitable coordination mechanism. (b) The more detailed and complete the project preparation, the more likely the project is to be implemented without undue delays. (c) Whenever cofinancing by another donor is crucial to the successful implementation of one or more components, any condition on the availability of that cofinancing must be strictly enforced. (d) Whenever an action program is agreed to as part of, or in connection with a project, the implementation and monitoring of that program must be taken seriously not only by the Borrower but also by the Bank. (e) Institutional development aspects of a project need to be closely monitored. (f) The Bank should insist that project accounts include all sources of financing and provide a summary presentation on the same format as the project cost table included in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). (g) Relying on organizations with a monopolistic position, like IMPRISCO, to implement projects or project components, is not advisable, unless there is no other altemative available.   PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1683 - RW) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK' S PERSPECTIVE A. PROJECT IDENTIlY Name Third Education Project Credit Number 1683 - RW RVP Unit Africa Region Country Rwanda Sector Human Resources Sub - Sector Education B. BACKGROUND 1. At the time of project appraisal, Rwanda's salient characteristics included its small size, an annual population growth rate of 3.7 percent (ranking among the highest in Africa), a population density (in terms of agricultural land) of about 500 per square km (ranking among the highest in the world), hilly terrain and high average altitude, a landlocked position, lack of natural resources (including a serious shortage of arable land), underdeveloped physical and institutional infrastructure, and a very low level of development as measured by a variety of social as well as economic indicators. These indicators included a per capita income of about US$270 (1983), among the lowest in the world; an average life expectancy of 47 years; an adult literacy rate of 37 percent; and an infant mortality rate of 115-125 per 1000. 2. Rwanda's formal education system consisted of: (a) eight years of primary education followed by either three years of pre-vocational education in CERAI (Centers for Integrated Rural and Artisanal Education) or six years of secondary education, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MTNhEPRISEC); and (b) higher education courses provided by the National University of Rwanda (NUR) on two campuses under the authority of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MfNESUPRES). Other formal as well as infornal training was offered by various ministries for training in administrative and commerce skills, postal and communications services,  2 extension services, health and nutrition. Vocational and home-making training were provided by many church-related agencies. Despite a variety of vocational training activities, the sector lacked adequate coordination at the national level. 3. The education and training system was considered insufficiently relevant to Rwanda's needs. Although major reforms had been introduced in 1979 to increase the vocational orientation at all levels, their implementation had not been very successful. The main problems of the sector remained closely related to financial constraints and the likely stagnation or even reduction of the education budget in real terms. The Government had to undertake strategic planning and implement action programs designed to optimize the use of resources in order to be able to face the following issues and constraints: (a) alignment of policy objectives and targets to financial capacity; (b) rigorous application of cost control; (c) gearing training programs to the needs for priority economic and social development and job opportunities; (d) improvement of internal efficiency, quality and equity as far as financially feasible; (e) modernization of administrative skills and office technology; and (f) coordination of programs to improve literacy. Regarding primary education, enrollment ratios were reasonable and unusually even among prefectures (all in the 60 to 70 percent range), but attrition and repetition rates were very high. The low quality of education was attributed mainly to unqualified teachers, insufficient textbook provision (one set per eight students) and the double-shift system in grades 1-3. In addition, teaching of workshop subjects in grades 7-8 was generally weak. The CERAIs (post primary schools) suffered from lack of equipment and especially textbooks, and the quality of education was mixed. While the main objective of the CERAI was training for employment in the local milieu, lack of such employment opportunities was becoming a problem. 4. The Bank Group had supported Rwanda's education sector through two education projects, emphasizing primary (pre-vocational) and secondary education development, respectively. The First Education Project provided workshops and established project implementation and textbook printing capacity, but the management of the school print shop was weak and satisfactory textbook distribution was not achieved due to lack of storage space and consistent financial support. The Second Education Project supporting commerce, nursing and primary teacher training in specialized secondary schools and institution building was being implemented satisfactorily. The Bank overall strategy for educational development, taking account of the major problems of severe financial constraints and rapid population growth, emphasized the most efficient use of funds to enable increased participation, improved quality and meeting the needs of economic development. By supporting improved quality in primary and post- primary education and the development of technical/vocational education, the Third Education Project was to address some of the identified sector deficiencies that were not being addressed by other donors. C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION Project Objectives 5. The Project was designed to assist the Government in its plan to improve the quality and efficiency of its primary and post-primary education system by providing for the supply and distribution of textbooks and other teaching materials, establishing a self-sustaining textbook/teaching materials replenishment scheme, and strengthening the management and planning capacity of MINEPRISEC and of the Ministry of Public Service and Professional Training (MINIFOP) through training and studies. In  3 addition, the Project was to assist in alleviating shortages of critically needed manpower by providing for a technical secondary school and a national vocational training center. Project Description 6. The Project consisted of the following components: (a) Supply and Distribution of Textbooks and Teaching Materials * Planning, programming and monitoring, as well as the supply and distribution of educational materials, to be carried out by the School Print shop. * The construction and equipping of a new central storage depot in Remera, including office space, and of regional transit depots in each of the other nine prefectures. a The introduction of a cost-sharing program through the collection of fees from pupils to ensure the continuous replenishment of books and materials. * Training through fellowships abroad of about ten technical staff of the School Print shop. (b) Technical Secondary School (TSS): 'The construction, organization, staffing, furnishing and equipping of a new Technical Secondary School at Kibuye with a total of about 270 student places including boarding facilities and at least sixteen housing units for staff. 'The training, through fellowships abroad and through in-service pedagogical training at the Technical Secondary School at Kicukiro, of about 14 teachers of technical and practical subjects, to provide teachers for the Technical Secondary School. (c) National Vocational Training Center (NVTC): * The construction, organization, staffing, furnishing and equipping of a National Vocational Training Center in Kigali, including housing for staff and a canteen for trainees, to provide training, inter alia, in mechanics, welding and metal work, electricity, auto-mechanics, carpentry and construction. The establishment of a National Vocational Training Board under MINIFOP, comprising representatives of other concerned ministries, the private sector and trade rnissions, to assist the Ministry in the formulation and carrying out of policies concerning technical and vocational training. The training of trainers for the Center through fellowships abroad and in-service training.  4 (d) Institutional Development Studies: The strengthening of administration through: (i) monitoring the operations of the School Print shop; (ii) carrying out studies for the improvement of school inspections and management and the improvement of educational administration; and (iii) carrying out evaluations and preinvestment studies related to the project and to the educational sector. 7. An important feature of the project was its technical assistance program which provided for 30 staff years of specialists' services and 46 staff years of fellowship training. Five staff years of specialists' services were included for an expert advisor/accountant to manage textbook distribution and maintain project accounts; two staff years for expert(s) in printing techniques; and two staff years for a director of the TSS. However, the major portion of technical assistance services (18 staff years) was allocated to the NVTC, of which eight for MINNIFOP institution building and preparation for launching the center; the remaining 10 staff years were for vocational trainers for start-up of NVTC training. The major portion of fellowship training (28 staff years) was allocated to the TSS for 14 selected Rwandese to train abroad for two years each in the specialties they would teach upon return. Training abroad was included for the Rwandese director and training chief of the NVTC, as well as for the trainers in the six specialties to be taught. D. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION 8. A Bank reconnaissance mission visited Rwanda in February-March 1984 and reviewed with the Government and donors priority items which could be included in the Project. The Government wanted a bigger project than the one identified by the Bank mission; on the other hand, the Bank list included components for which the Government had not requested financing from the Bank. The main issue and focus of dialogue with the Government during project preparation centered upon the appropriateness/readiness of the development of a new second campus of the National University of Rwanda (including a Faculty of Education and an Assembly Hall) which had been proposed by Government as a top priority and a major element of the Project. The problem regarding its inclusion in the Project was solved with the decision to undertake a study of the higher education sub-sector financed by UNDP. The composition of the Project was finally agreed with Government during the November 1984 preparation mission, but the degree of Government ownership of the Project remained rather low. Sectoral problems were detailed and analyzed in an Education Sector Memorandum which was discussed with Government during the processing of the Project, and the credit agreement included a covenant that an evaluation of progress in achieving an agreed action program for the improvement of the quality and cost-effectiveness of education would be provided for Bank Group review by not later than July 31 each year 9. Technical preparation was undertaken by a mission of the Bank-UNESCO Cooperative Program in June-July 1984, and also by Rwandese officials and organizations and consulting firms with financing from Cr. 1217-RW (Fonds d'Etudes) for NVTC and Cr. 1263 (Second Education Project) for MINEPRISEC items. Within the Bank, questions were raised by the Loan Committee, and answered satisfactorily by the staff, on the apparent high cost per student and the status of preparation of project activities, particularly whether the Project was ready for Board consideration. MINEPRISEC Textbook Commission undertook an inventory of available primary school and CERAI textbooks and prepared a report on the operations of IMPRISCO, including production, use of equipment and paper, administrative procedures, accounting system and audit. Also, exploitation of MINIPLAN household expenditures  5 survey was applied towards the development of the cost sharing scheme. It does not seem that alternatives to the use of IMPRISCO were considered. As there was concern about the attrition rate for the TSS, it was agreed that based upon the results of a study on the causes of very high attrition in the Kicukiro TSS, proposals satisfactory to the Bank for improved internal efficiency would be introduced for the Kibuye TSS. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) conveys the impression that the Project was reasonably well prepared, with the exception of the NVTC component. However, experience showed that even the preparation of the other components was not as complete as would have been advisable to ensure that the Project be implemented without undue delays. 10. The SFCS (Service de Financement et de Constructions Scolaires) was to implement the MINEPRISEC components of the Project. The Director of Training at MINIFOP was to be responsible for the implementation of the MIfNIFOP element (NVTC). The expert advisor/accountant in the SFCS would maintain project accounts both for SFCS and MINIFOP. SFCS weak organization and functioning led the Government and the main donors (IDA and UNDP) to agree that it should be reorganized, with emphasis on management and project implementation rather than on the architectural aspects. E. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Credit Effectiveness and Project Start-up 11. The credit was approved on April 15, 1986 and signed on May 23, 1986. Additional conditions of effectiveness included the opening of, and an initial deposit into a Project Advance Account, the entering of an agreement between Government and UNDP for the provision of technical assistance to the NVTC and the selection of consultants for the design for the construction of the NVTC. The credit was made effective on February 27, 1987, a delay of about five months from the originally planned date, although only one additional condition of effectiveness (regarding the Project Advance Account) was met, and despite the fact that by that date the Borrower was not in compliance with some dated covenants on staffing and technical assistance (Implementation Program in Schedule 4 of the Credit Agreement). Regarding the other two additional conditions of effectiveness, it turned out later that the selection of the consultants for NVTC was not acceptable to IDA, and the agreement between Government and UNDP was only for a "preparatory assistance" project and not for all the technical assistance required for NVTC. The lack of an agreement with UNDP (and 1LO as executing agency) on technical assistance, which continued for a number of years, delayed the implementation of the NVTC component as did the absence of consultants for the design (which was finally undertaken by SFCS). 12. The delay in credit effectiveness did not mean that all that time was lost for project implementation. During that period, the Bank fielded three supervision missions, and the Borrower took some steps to start the Project. After an initial delay of six months which was surprising considering the number of architects and draftsmen employed by SFCS, architectural studies and plans were finally prepared for the MIfNEPRISEC items. Also, an agreement was signed with ILO for the procurement of equipment. However, progress was very slow regarding IMPRISCO. To improve its efficiency, a new organizational structure whereby it became a Directorate (or Regie d'etat) of WNEPRISEC was introduced in June 1986, a new director was appointed, and a contract was signed with a consulting firm; but the expert advisor and accountant were only employed in January 1988, a year late. Similarly, not much was done to improve the organization and operations of SFCS.  6 Implementation Schedule 13. At the time of the appraisal of the Project, the typical disbursement profile for Rwanda was eight years. The forecast in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) that the Project would be completed in five years (the completion date in the credit agreement is June 30, 1991) and the credit fully disbursed in five and a half years nevertheless seemed reasonable in light of experience with the Second Education Project, and considering also that MIvNEPRISEC was an "old" Borrower and that the Project included substantial technical assistance. The SAR forecast tumed out to be extremely optimistic. Actually, project implementation has been very slow, with two components out of the three main components not quite completed by early 1994. 14. For the construction of the Technical Secondary School (TSS) at Kibuye, the preparation of bidding documents and bidding proceeded smoothly, but the award of the contract was delayed by several months because the Government did not want to award the contract to the firm that had submitted the lowest evaluated bid substantially responsive to the bidding documents (eventually the contract was awarded to the lowest evaluated bidder). At the beginning, disbursements were held up until the Government furnished the results of the study of internal efficiency at the Technical Secondary School at Kicukiro, a condition of disbursement for the Kibuye TSS civil works. That study was carried out by the Bureau Pedagogique de l'Ensezgnement Secondaire (Pedagogical Office of Secondary Education); it was due in December 1986 but was completed only in August 1989. There is no information available as to whether the study was used for the purpose intended, namely to provide for Bank review and comment satisfactory proposals to introduce improved procedures to ensure internal efficiency for the Kibuye TSS. Equipment, whose procurement was handled by EQUIPRO/ILO, was delivered between September and December 1989, and the fourteen future teachers completed their training in France (during which special efforts had to be made to convince them that the training should be practical and that they had to get their hands dirty) in October/November 1989. Since construction was not completed until the second half of 1990, there were problems with the installation of equipment and the release of the final payments to suppliers, and to ensure that the trained teachers were meaningfully employed in other schools until the opening of the Kibuye TSS. Despite those problems, on balance this component was relatively well implemented. The Kibuye TSS opened in October 1990 (about a one year delay compared to the SAR forecast) with 162 students, and has been operating since then. In 1993, Bank agreed to the use of available funds from the IDA credit for a multi-purpose auditorium (salle polyvalente) which has not yet been completed. 15. Many things went wrong with the implementation of the National Vocational Training Center (NVTC) component. By the time the design was completed by SFCS in mid-1988, the land that was originally allocated to NVTC had been used for something else. A new site was selected in December 1988, but with very difficult terrain conditions, so that new architectural plans had to be prepared. In the meantime, the Bank was concerned that the technical assistance to be financed by UNDP be substantially in accordance with the needs that had been agreed with Government during appraisal and at negotiations, since it became apparent that the Government was concerned with the high cost of such technical assistance. It took years to resolve the differences of opinion between Government and UNDP on the one hand and ILO as Executing Agency on the other hand on technical assistance and fellowships. It was only on June 20, 1990 that a revised Project Document (which included a UNDP contribution of US$1.3 million for 1990 to 1993) was signed. The signing of the construction contract was delayed because again the Bank had to insist that the contract be awarded to the firm that submitted the lowest evaluated bid. Construction started in February 1992, experienced a number of delays and had not yet been  7 completed at the time of the project completion. The procurement of equipment took almost as long; the equipment was finally delivered in 1993, but its installation may present a problem 16. On the pedagogical front, surveys in local enterprises helped identify the main disciplines for which training and retraining at the Center would be undertaken, and also indicated the expected objectives of the NVTC and the professional profiles of persons to be trained or retrained. The training in France and Italy of thirteen trainers (for seven disciplines out of the eight selected) was completed in 1992, and for that component there would also be the risk that trainees might find employment somewhere else if the opening of the Center were delayed for too long. The training programs were finalized, and the various training modules and detailed contents of each course were elaborated with the help of an 1LO expert on Training Methodology. The Center was therefore pedagogically ready, but it would not be able to start operations until it is completed physically and until the decree on its establishment and organization is issued. 17. Regarding institutional and organizational aspects, the terms of reference for the studies on the legislative and regulatory texts governing the establishment, organization and functioning of the NVTC and a training coordination structure were prepared in November 1991. A team composed of an international and a local consultant drafted a number of texts which were discussed at a seminar organized in Kigali in April 1993 with representatives of various groups (employers, workers, NGOs and relevant ministries) and subsequently revised. However, no text had yet been approved by the Council of Ministers. It should be noted that during 1992 the responsibility for the implementation of the NVTC component was transferred from MINIFOP to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MlNITRASO). 18. In summary, as of the beginning of 1994 the NVTC component was not yet completed and operational, although according to the appraisal forecast it should have started operations in mid-1989. The center was pedagogically ready, but construction was about 90% complete, the equipment had not yet been installed, a power transformer was lacking, no contracts had been signed for the furniture, and the decree on the establishment and functioning of the Center had not been issued. The study on training coordination was due to be completed shortly, but the establishment of a Training Coordination Agency was not likely to take place any time soon. 19. The component for the Supply and Distribution of Textbooks and Teaching Materials also experienced extraordinary delays, primarily because of unusual difficulties with the procurement of paper (which was finally delivered in April 1993), somewhat beyond Government control. The central depot in Kigali and the nine regional depots were constructed in the early years of the Project (basically in line with the appraisal forecast). The purchase of cupboards to store books experienced delays because of repeated changes in the type of cupboards to be used (wooden or metallic); finally metallic cupboards were delivered to Kigali in December 1993. The technical assistance provided to IMPRISCO between early 1988 and mid-1990 included an expert for setting up the distribution network and the rationalization of administrative, accounting and financial procedures, and a specialist in printing techniques. Two staff members (experts in printing techniques) of IMPRISCO received training in Belgium for eight months, and some departments of IMPRISCO were computerized. The Management Committee was established in late 1987, and functioned regularly; some of its members left following the April 1992 ministerial reshuffling and were not replaced. 20. Up to 1993, IMPRISCO produced and distributed exercise books only. Partly because of the delays for the supply of paper for textbooks, the main objective of the component, namely the setting up  8 and functioning of a system of textbook rental in order to ensure their availability to students, had not yet materialized by early 1994; however, there was agreement on the scheme and the various pieces were in place. In 1993, IMPRISCO printed textbooks for grades 1, 2, 3 and 6 (print runs for these four grades totaled 1,010,000 copies in 1993, with an additional 55,000 copies to be printed in 1994). Textbooks for grades 4 and 5 (456,000 copies) were to be printed between January and April 1994. A publicity campaign, including meetings and the use of radio and newspapers, was conducted to sensitize regional MINEPRISEC officials and representatives of religious institutions on the book rental system, and in July 1993 a Rwandese delegation visited Lesotho to familiarize themselves with Lesotho's rental textbook system which is so far the only successful system in Africa south of the Sahara. The Arrete (legal instrument) setting up the book rental system was signed by the Minister of Primary and Secondary Education and a Textbook Rental Committee set up to monitor the preliminaries and launch of the rental system. Finally, in late November 1993, the Directors of IMPRISCO and DEP met with the regional and district primary school managers to brief them on the rental system and establish the fees, which would vary from RwF 130 to RwF 185 per pupil per year depending on the grade, to be deducted from the school fees. The stage was therefore set for launching the system, with the books to be distributed and with the rental fees to be collected and deposited into the bank account in April/May 1994, for grades 1, 2, 3 and 6, and in September 1994 for grades 4 and 5. Procurement 21. Weaknesses in procurement accounted for part of the delays in project implementation. While there may have been a few occasions where the Bank could have done a better job in advising the Borrower and monitoring the procurement process, most of the problems that arose were due to the poor performance of the Borrower, including SFCS and the technical assistance provided under the Project. Despite repeated communications from the Bank and the procurement training provided to SFCS staff, all too often the preparation of bidding documents was inadequate and bid evaluation did not follow the criteria specified in the bidding documents. Previously agreed bidding documents were changed unilaterally and made incompatible with the credit agreement, hence the need for endless review of procurement documents. One even has the impression that at times SFCS was making special efforts not to comply with Bank guidelines and not to follow agreed upon procedures. There have also been unacceptable delays for payments to suppliers (particularly final payments normally due upon commissioning of equipment). Problems arose not only for the procurement of civil works and goods, but also for the recruitment of consultants. The difficulties encountered almost every year for the selection of independent external auditors could have been minimized by entering into multi-year contracts. Project Costs 22. Project accounts were kept only by disbursement categories of the IDA credit with all expenditures summarized in a balance sheet. There is little information available in the files on the actual contribution by Government, and none at all on the actual contribution by UNDP. In any event, there are no figures on the actual cost of each project component which could be compared with the estimates included in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) Variations between 1986 and 1993 in the rate of exchange between SDRs and US dollars increased the dollar amount available from the IDA credit, all of which would not have been needed to complete the Project, Assuming that the total of the UNDP and Government contributions has been about the same as the appraisal estimates, the actual cost of the whole project (including a few additional items) would be about 10% less than the appraisal estimate.  9 Disbursements and Credit Allocation 23. The cumulative estimated and actual disbursements of the credit are given in Table 3 of Part III. As mentioned earlier, the five and a half years disbursement forecast of the SAR tumed out to be unrealistic. Disbursements in SDRs represented 69% of the credit, whereas the same disbursements expressed in US dollars equivalent were equal to 81% of the US dollars equivalent amount of the IDA credit shown in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). The allocation of the proceeds of the credit was amended three times to reflect the changes in financing requirements. Disbursements of the IDA credit were (a) more than estimated at appraisal for (i) paper and supplies for textbooks and teaching materials production, (ii) fellowships, training, consultants' and experts' services, and (iii) furniture and equipment, (b) less for civil works and operating costs, and (c) nil for transport (including packing cases) for the distribution of teaching materials. The original closing date of the credit was December 31, 1991, but the credit was closed only on December 31, 1993 and the last disbursement was on March 29, 1994; at that time, $195,000 of the special account remained undocumented. The closing date was postponed twice, one year at a time, in the hope that it would permit orderly completion of the Project, including the construction and equipment of the NVTC, the provision of paper for the printing of textbooks by IMPRISCO, and the provision of equipment and furniture for the School Depots in which textbooks will be stored. F. PROJECT RESULTS Project Objectives and Physical Results 24. With only one component fully operational before the tragic events of April 1994, the actual results of the Project were limited, but there were plans to continue project implementation and secure more satisfactory results which will now have to wait for a return to a normal situation in the country. The assessment of project results in table 6 of Part m is based on the assumption that the components will be implemented eventually in the way that was planned in early 1994. 25. The Kibuye TSS started operations in October 1990 with 162 students for the school year 1990- 1991; at the beginning of 1993-1994, it had a total of 322 students. The first technicians of level A3 are due to graduate at the end of the school year 1994-1995, and those of level A2 at the end of 1995-1996. 26. In its first year of operation (1993-1994), the component for the supply and distribution of textbooks and teaching materials would have made available 1.5 million textbooks to 1.2 million students (compared with the appraisal estimate of "up to a million students"), and provided teaching manuals for all primary school teachers (appraisal estimate of 20,000 teachers). This would have provided one set of textbooks for each two students in all six grades of primary school. With the fees established, the cost- sharing replenishment scheme for textbooks would have yielded RwF 185 million per annum, or about two-thirds of the appraisal estimate. One benefit of that component was the very significant reduction (from 50% to 60%) in the purchase cost of paper for IMPRISCO following international competitive bidding, compared to the price that IMPRISCO had to pay when it received its supply of paper from the Ministry. The availability of textbooks and teaching manuals would have increased the job satisfaction of teachers and the quality of education for the students. The establishment of regional transit depots would have meant a sizable reduction in distances and time required for the supply of books with a favorable impact on schools and communities. Finally, the component permitted the setting-up of a system for the production and sale of school notebooks which has been a profitable activity for IMPRISCO.  10 27. The NVTC was constructed to have 120 places with 240 training stations to provide both initial training programs - maximum length 9 months - and shorter upgrading courses; yearly output would be about 60 skilled workers of A3-level and about 240 for other training, subject to maximum 120 enrollment at any one time. The design and implementation of that component up to the beginning of 1994 are such that the yearly outputs could be achieved if the NVTC is completed. Institutional Strengthening 28. The Project was intended to strengthen planning, management and training capacity in MINEPRISEC and MINIFOP through provision of about 30 staff-years of specialists' services - 16 to be financed by UNDP - and about 46 staff-years of fellowship training - 6 to be financed by UNDP. Unfortunately the information available on technical assistance and fellowship training actually provided is incomplete. It appears that fellowship training was successful, and technical assistance less so. IMPRISCO seems to have benefited most from both, but the overseas training of the teachers of the TSS at Kibuye and the NVTC in Kigali is also a positive result of the Project. In general, the Project increased training capacity, but did not strengthen significantly planning and management capacity in MINEPRISEC and MINIFOP. This was because the Government did not give priority to that aspect of the Project. The overall achievement of the Project in terms of institutional development was therefore partial. Action Program for Improved Efficiency 29. With reference to Section 4.03 of the Development Credit Agreement, the Government committed itself in a supplemental letter to review regularly with IDA its policies and plans for improvement of educational quality and cost-effectiveness, and to furnish to IDA by July 31 of each year an evaluation of progress in achieving an action program covering the following: (a) increasing the proportion of qualified teachers in lower primary education from the initial 40 percent, improving the inspection system and educational management of school; (b) defining a comprehensive system for development of technical/vocational education, including improvement of technical teacher training and broadening the range of training in technical secondary schools; (c) improvement of enrollment ratio in primary education from the initial 65 percent and assessment of shortening the primary education period from existing eight years together with progressive lessening of double-shifting in grades 1-3 of primary education; (d) updating a three-year rolling public investment budget for education with definition of education projects included in the Plan and progress with their implementation; (e) external aid to education during previous year and commitments for later years; (f) improved student/teacher ratios in second-level education from the initial 15:1 in the CERAI and 16:1 in secondary education; and  11 (g) improved educational planning/administration capacity among MINEPRISEC staff with less reliance on expatriate staff, and modernization of office technology related to accounting, examination, information and inventories systems. 30. The annual submission of an evaluation of progress in achieving the action program was not complied with. However, the Government had a continuous dialogue with IDA on its educational policies and plans in connection with the development of two Education Sector Projects. Progress in achieving the action program has been rather slow. Impact of Project 31. Because of the long delays in implementation, the impact of the Project so far has been negligible. In 1994 and the following years, when the country's situation returns to normal, the impact of the component for the supply and distribution of textbooks and teaching materials could be substantial in view of its pedagogical and financial benefits. The long-term impact of the TSS and NVTC is less certain. 32. On balance, the overall outcome of the Project is judged to have been unsatisfactory. G. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 33. The Technical Secondary School (TSS) at Kibuye was in operation for three years. Like any secondary school, it relied and would continue to rely mainly on government budget allocations for its operation and maintenance. As for any technical school, technical expertise and close collaboration with enterprises would be important for its success and sustainability. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) acknowledged that "as a modern institute having valuable, sophisticated equipment, the TSS will require high standard institutional management, and that improvement of internal efficiency aspects will require close monitoring". Apparently nothing was done regarding internal efficiency. According to the SAR, "the location of the TSS in Kibuye should positively influence development in a town having potential as a pole of growth". The existence of a technical school, however, is not sufficient to ensure development. For the foreseeable future, the TSS will suffer from its poor location at Kibuye where there are essentially no enterprises with which it could cooperate on such things as the provision of teaching staff and supplies, and the conduct of evening classes. Although the sustainability of the Kibuye TSS is not assured, the school should nevertheless have a positive impact on teaching quality and on access to secondary education. 34. The prospects could be satisfactory for the National Vocational Training Center (NVTC) in Kigali once it is completed if it is given the right kind of statutes. Enterprises were consulted for the preparation of the curricula and training modules and for the selection of equipment, and emphasis has been put on flexibility in the manner in which the NVTC should operate to enable it to respond quickly to the changing needs of enterprises. Texts governing the legal status of the NVTC were not yet finalized and approved. Ultimately the success of the NVTC will depend on the extent to which it is granted administrative and financial autonomy, and on the participation and involvement of the private sector in all aspects of its management, operations and financing.  12 35. The chances of success of the component for the supply and distribution of textbooks and teaching materials could be promising. Once fully operational, the management of the textbook scheme would rely on churches, particularly for distribution in the regions. The most crucial aspect, on which the sustainability of the component would hinge, would be the payment of rental fees by students and their deposit into the School Supplies Revolving Fund. This would need close monitoring. 36. The overall impact of the Project in terms of sustainability was therefore uncertain. H. BANK PERFORMANCE 37. There were a number of design flaws (like the location of the Kibuye TSS, or the reliance on a single organization with a monopolistic position like IMPRISCO), and the failure to anticipate that a project with different components involving different ministries would be difficult to implement. The credit was processed while the preparation of the Project was not as advanced as it should have been to ensure successful implementation (for example, the preparation of detailed design and bidding documents as well as early recruitment of technical assistance would have helped to reduce implementation delays). The rush to go to the Board was followed by a similar rush to make the credit effective. The Bank did not recognize that the Project would require stronger management on the Borrower's side than was available in MINEPRISEC (particularly SFCS) and MINIFOP, and that special efforts needed to be made to ensure that the implementation of the various elements within each component be properly coordinated. Also, the Bank allocated insufficient resources to supervision (117 SW over the project implementation period, with a maximum of 17 SW in FY 1993 - not unusually low for the time but still inadequate), and with the exception of the last two years had to rely on limited outside expertise at all on technical/vocational training. The Bank did not do enough to ensure satisfactory progress on the institutional development aspects of the Project and to monitor the action program. It is somewhat surprising that for most of the time, despite all its problems, the Project was not rated as a "problem" project. _. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 38. Overall management of the Project left much to be desired. There does not seem to have been any spirit of cooperation, nor any mechanism to ensure cooperation between MINEPRISEC and MINIFOP for the NVTC component. MINEPRISEC somewhat neglected that component, and even used for its own purposes the land that had been originally allocated to NTVC. SFCS was poorly managed and, despite the strengthening of its staff, performed unsatisfactorily on procurement, construction supervision, project accounts and progress reports. The SFCS was also in charge of construction for the Family Health Project, and the same types of problems occurred. The SFCS did not display much interest in the studies included in the Project. Many covenants were only partially complied with, and sometimes after considerable delays. Obviously, the deterioration in the political situation and the war from 1990 to 1993 did not help, but the Government could have done a better job in limiting the turnover of directors (there were four directors in seven years) and in seeing to it that SFCS be better managed since there was plenty of financing available (including IDA and UNDP) for institutional strengthening. Just as the Bank did not appreciate fully the burden that the Project would put on SFCS, the Government did not act to strengthen SFCS and, with respect to NVTC, to ensure proper coordination between the two ministries involved. The Government should have made more efforts to address the chronic problems that delayed project implementation: weaknesses in institutional capabilities,  13 lack of resolve in decision making, cumbersome administrative procedures, poor knowledge and/or compliance with Bank procedures, and failure to follow the recommendations of Bank missions. J. PROJECT RELATIONSHIP 39. The Bank relationship with MINEPRISEC and MINIFOP on the Project was not always good. The poor performance of SFCS on project management in general and on procurement, progress reports and project accounts in particular was a source of tension during project supervision. K. CONSULTING SERVICES 40. There is little information available in the files on the performance of experts and specialists employed under the Project. While some appear to have been interested in and made efforts to transfer skills and know-how, others seemed to have been more preoccupied with perpetuating their services. On balance the consulting services can be rated mediocre to satisfactory, a rather disappointing situation considering the volume and importance of the technical assistance incorporated in the design of the project. It seems that neither Government nor Bank tried very hard to get better results. L. PROJECT DOCUMENTATION AND DATA 41. The Staff Appraisal Report, the President's Report, the Development Credit Agreement and supplemental letters, and the working papers prepared prior to project approval were not a completely adequate documentation for the implementation and supervision of the Project. Progress reports were irregular, incomplete and submitted with delays; audit reports were also submitted late, although the situation improved in recent years. The fact that progress reports were incomplete and that updated information on project costs by component is not available did not facilitate the preparation of this PCR. M. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 42. With only one component fully operational before the tragic events of April 1994, the actual results and impact of the Project were limited, but there were plans to continue project implementation and secure more satisfactory results which will now have to wait for a return to a normal situation in the country. On balance, the overall outcome of the Project is judged to have been unsatisfactory, its overall achievement in terms of institutional development was partial and its overall impact in terms of sustainability was uncertain. 43. The overall implementation experience of this project is not satisfactory. Implementation delays were due to the fact that the Project was not fully prepared and to weaknesses in project management. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) rightly identified questions concerning Rwandese management and implementation capability as the two main risks of the Project. Those risks were supposed to be minimized with technical assistance and training, through effective coordination on planning, programming and execution, and close monitoring. In practice, this effective coordination and close monitoring did not happen. For its part, the Bank did not devote sufficient resources to supervision.  14 44. A number of lessons, some of them obvious and not unique to this Project, can be drawn from the experience with the Project: (a) A project should not involve more than one ministry, at least for the same component. If it is necessary to involve two ministries, good management is critical to project success, and such a project would require a suitable coordination mechanism. (b) The more detailed and complete the project preparation, the more likely the project is to be implemented without undue delays. (c) Whenever cofinancing by another donor is crucial to the successful implementation of one or more components, any condition on the availability of that cofinancing must be strictly enforced. (d) Whenever an action program is agreed to as part of, or in connection with a project, the implementation and monitoring of that program must be taken seriously not only by the Borrower but also by the Bank. (e) Institutional development aspects of a project need to be closely monitored. (f) The Bank should insist that project accounts include all sources of financing and provide a summary presentation on the same format as the project cost table included in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). (g) Relying on organizations with a monopolistic position, like IMPRISCO, to implement projects or project components, is not advisable, unless there is no other alternative available.  15 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1683 - RW) PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE MINISTRY OF PRIMARY Kigali, March 18, 1994 AND SECONDARY EDUCATION FINANCING AND SCHOOL No. 08.01.04/1757 CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT P.O. Box 622 KIGALI Mr. David Berk, Chief, Population and Human Resources Division World Bank Subject: Project Completion Report for Third Education Project, Credit 1683-RW Dear Sir: Further to your letter dated January 13, 1994, seeking our comments on the Project Completion Report for the Third Education Project (Cr. 1683-RW), I am pleased to express here my Department's satisfaction with this report. Following the meetings about the project completion held by Messrs. Peter Ngomba and Paul Geli of the last Bank mission with the Project Unit (Financing and school construction Division), the officials of the departments concerned, and the Ministry of Social Affairs, we confirm the data given in Part III of this PCR. However, from the discussions above and in the light of the information provided by the various parties, the issues raised in Part I of this report should be reviewed in-depth to reflect the actual status of project implementation. These comments are the following: - It is true that the production and distribution of textbooks have suffered delays from IMPRISCO. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the project involvement in IMPRISCO will be beneficial in regards to the availability of textbooks at the primary level. In addition, the system of renting school books will secure a fund for the renewal of these books.  16 - The problems of the Kibuye Technical School could have been solved if the Project had been in a position to purchase the needed additional equipment. Yet, we are confident that in the future this school should have a positive impact on the teaching quality and on the access of our children to secondary education. I would like to emphasize that we extend our appreciation to the Bank participation in this project implementation, namely: - the many and carefully planned supervision missions; - the quick handling of documents sent to the Bank. Consequently, the relationship between the Bank and the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education has always been frank and has benefited from a mutual understanding. As to the performance of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education in project implementation, some gaps have indeed been noted, especially on the following points: - The incomplete utilization of the Credit. The budget item (category 2-A) "Transportation of school equipment" has not moved, due to major delays in procuring the equipment for school warehouses. The implementation of these contracts has coincided with the Project Closing Date. This delay was entirely caused by the officials involved in procurement, because of their review of bidding documents at different times, for various reasons. At this stage, it should also be emphasized that changes in the value of the dollar against the SDR have affected the percentage of actual disbursements. - The late recruitment of the high level staff of the project to support the Administration in project implementation. In spite of this staff constraint which was a major handicap, the Project Unit has fully committed itself to the success of the project. With the strong help from the Project Unit (First Education Sector), major steps have been taken during the last three months of 1993. This gives hope to the implementation of future projects. These are the views and comments which I wished to share with you concerning the implementation of the Third Education Project. At the same time, I assure you that the gaps which have hampered this project will be a lesson for the ongoing and future ones. With my best regards, Mbonimpa Jean-Marie V. Minister of Primary and Secondary Education  17 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1683 - RW) PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION  18 1. Related IDA Credits Project Title/ Purpose Year of Status Comments Credit Number Approval First Education To improve quality 1975 Completed Following initial delays, Project was Project (Cr. 567-RW) of primary education 1983 reasonably successful in provision of and its relevance to primary school workshops (including a job opportunities, commendable community effort), and and institution establishment of project implementation building for project and textbook printing capacity. However, implementation teaching of practical subjects in workshops remained unsatisfactory, and management of school print shop remained weak and textbook distribution unsatisfactory. Second Education To support 1982 Completed There were delays in the recruitment of Project commerce, nursing 1989 technical assistance, design and (Cr. 1263-RW) and primary teacher procurement. Despite implementation training in delays of about two years, the Project was secondary schools, successfully implemented. It met all its and institution quantitative targets for additional student building on the places, and contributed to the provision of quality/pedagogical skilled manpower in critical areas side as well as the (commerce and nursing). However, the administrative side. additional places created in primary teacher training institutions did not lead to a corresponding increase in enrollments. First Education To support policy 1991 Credit Some progress has been made on policy Sector Project reform in primary effective reform with the reduction of the duration (Cr. 2227-RW) education, to 06/24/92 of primarv education from 8 to 6 years. improve the quality After almost two years of inaction, the of education, to Project finally started in early 1994 with consolidate and about 50 communities signing agreements expand primary to benefit from the Primary Education education by Fund. increasing access and equity of access, and to strengthen the sector management capacity.  19 2. Project Timetable Item Timetable Date Revised Date Actual Identification 02-03/84 02-03/84 Preparation 11/84 11/84 Appraisal Mission 02-03/85 02-03/85 Credit Negotiations 03/86 03/86 Board Approval 04/15/86 04/15/86 Credit Signature 05/23/86 05/23/86 Credit Effectiveness 09/23/86 11/21/86 02/27/87 Credit Closing 12/31/91 12/31/92 12/31/93 3. Credit Disbursements Cumulative estimated and actual disbursements (US$ million) Fiscal Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Appraisal 1.0 5.0 10.4 14.4 15.2 15.6 - Estimate Actual 0.5 1.6 3.1 5.6 6.8 7.4 8.7 12.6 Actual as % 50% 32% 30% 39% 45% 47% 56% 81% of estimate I_I I_I I I Note: Because of an increase in the value of the SDR in dollars since the signing of the IDA credit, the available IDA financing represented more dollars than the amount estimated at appraisal.  20 4. Project Implementation Indicators Planned Actual or PCR Estimates Date A. Audit of accounts of the School Print shop for 1985 07/31/86 Complied with on February 25, 1987 B. Furnishing to the Association for review and 07/31/86 Partially complied with after considerable comment proposed terms of reference for, and CVs of, delays; CV of chief technical advisor received the chief technical adviser, planner and extension on November 14, 1989. experts and their respective Rwandese counterparts for the National Vocational Training Center. C. Taking up of positions described in B above: Partially complied with after delays (technical 1. technical adviser, planner and their counterparts 01/01/87 adviser or "CTP" in January 1990). 2. extension experts and their counterparts 01/01/88 D. Expert advisor/accountant for School Pnnt shop in 01/01/87 January 1988 position E. Furnishing to the Association for review and 06/30/88 April, 1988 comment proposed syllabi for fourth-, fifth- and sixth- year programs for heavy- duty mechanics and plant maintenance. F. Furnishing to the Association for review and 09/30/88 Complied with after delay of more than a year. comment terms of reference for, and CVs of, Director and Deputy Director of the Technical Secondary School at Kibuye. G. Appointment of Director and Deputy Director of 01/01/89 Same as above. Personnel was in place and the Technical Secondary School. school started operation in October 1990. H. Completion of Studies under the Project. 12/31/90 Partially complied with. The Improvement of Educational Administration Study was completed in July 1988 and the Private Education Study was completed in January 1989. Other planned studies, like Monitoring Textbook Distribution & Cost Sharing, and Improved School Inspection & Management, were not undertaken.  21 5. Project Costs and Financing A. Project Costs (Appraisal Estimate) Local Foreign Total (In US$ million) (a) Textbook/Teaching Materials 1.0 3.6 4.6 (b) Technical Secondary School 1.8 3.5 5.3 (c) National Vocational Training Center 1.0 2.6 3.6 (d) Institutional Support 0.3 0.9 1.2 Total Base Costs 4.1 10.6 14.7 Physical Contingencies 0.3 0.6 0.9 Price Contingencies 1.0 2.4 3.4 Total Project Costs (including US$1.3 million in taxes and duties) 5.4 13.6 19.0 Note: Because project accounts have been kept by expenditure category of the IDA credit, there is no information on the actual cost of each project component which could be compared with the estimate included in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). B. Project Financing Plan (Appraisal Estimate) Local Foreign Total (1 n US$ Million) IDA 3.3 12.3 15.6 Government 2.1 - 2.1 UNDP - 1.3 1.3 Total 5.4 13.6 19.0 Note: Because project accounts have been kept by expenditure category of the IDA credit, there is no information on the financing that has been actually provided by Government, IDA and UNDP by project component.  22 6. Project Results Indicators Appraisal Estimates PCR Estimates (As of, or for year ended (Most recent information 12/31/93) available) Teaching manuals Providing teaching manuals for If implemented as planned in some 20,000 teachers earlyl994, manuals would be provided to all primary school teachers. Textbook Increasing textbook provision If system is implemented as from the present 12% to 50% planned in early 1994, textbooks (one set per two) for up to a would have been provided to 1.2 million students. million students, on the basis of one set per two, in 1994. Cost-sharing replenishment Scheme to yield about US$ 2.0 Established fees would yield scheme for textbooks million yearly (1985 prices) about two-thirds of appraisal estimates. Alleviating acute shortages of Yearly outputs of 36 engineering With 55 students in their 3d year trained labor force personnel and technicians for the Kibuye TSS. and 40 in their 4th year, providing suitable candidates for appraisal target is likely to be higher education exceeded. Yearly outputs of 60 skilled If NVTC is ever completed as workers and 240 other designed, yearly outputs could vocationally trained personnel be achieved. for_the NVTC.. I_I  23 7. Status of Covenants Section in Subject Deadline for Status Credit compliance A2mreement 2.02(b) Operation of Special Account Continuous Satisfactory 3.01(a) Borrower's commitment to objectives Continuous The Project has not been carried out with of the Project; Borrower to carry out due diligence and efficiency; there has Project with due diligence and been considerable delays in many steps in efficiency, and in confornity with the process, and disbursements have been appropriate economic, financial, slow. No problems with commitment and administrative, technical and the provision of funds facilities, services educational practices, and to and other resources for the Project. provide, promptly as needed, the funds, facilities and other resources required for the Project 3.01(b) Borrower to carry out Project in Continuous Partially complied with, and with accordance with implementation considerable delays (see table 4 on Project program in schedule 4 to DCA Implementation). 3.01(c) Borrower to maintain a Project Continuous Opening of Account and initial deposit of Advance Account with initial RwF 500,000 was a condition of deposit of RwF 500,000, and effectiveness which was met in October quarterly deposits thereafter to pay 1986. Additional amounts have been for expenditures under the Project deposited as necessary. not financed by the credit, leaving at all times a minimum of RwF 50,000 in such account 3.02 Procurement Continuous Procurement and employment of consultants have been unsatisfactory. Borrower failed repeatedly to comply with Bank guidelines, which resulted in delays in project implementation and unduly heavy supervision burden for the Bank. 3.03(a) School Print Shop to employ expert 01/01/1987 Complied with; experts were employed advisor/accountant and experts in. from early 1988 to mid-1990. printing techniques  24 Section in Credit Subject Deadline for Status Agreement compliance 3.03(b) Borrower to establish in NBR a 06/30/1988 Being complied with. On November 4, School Supplies Revolving Fund 1993, IMPRISCO opened an account in with student fees to be deposited Banque Continentale Africaine du pursuant to MINEPRISEC Rwanda. The rental system started in instructions. January 1994 for grades 1,2,3 and 6 (with the rental fees due to be collected and deposited into the Bank account in AprilMay 1994), and was due to start in September 1994 for grades 4 and 5. 3.03(c) Operations of the School Pnnt Shop Continuous Committee was established in late 1987, to be guided and monitored by a and functioned regularly but did not Management Committee. contribute to project semi-annual progress reports. Some of its members have left following the April 1992 ministerial reshuffling and have not been replaced. 3.03(d) No major revisions in textbooks for Continuous Complied with. pnrmary or post-primary schools for 5 years (from 4/1/87 to 3/31/92). 3.04 Trainees benefiting from fellowships Continuous Partially complied with; some of the to work in their respective trainees for the TSS Kibuye and the NVTC institutions for a minimum of 5 had left before April 1994. consecutive years following the completion of their training, pursuant to legally binding contracts satisfactory to the Association. 3.05 SFCS (now DFCS) to be adequately Continuous SFCS has not been adequately managed. managed, staffed and maintained Audit reports have highlighted weaknesses during project implementation, in the internal accounting system, despite including employment of an the recruitment of an accountant in accountant with qualifications and September 1993. SFCS prepared and experience satisfactory to the began implementing an action plan for Association. improvement (A accountant-manager and an assistant accountant have been recruited).  25 Section in Credit Subject Deadline for Status Agreement compliance 4.01(a) Borrower to maintain project Continuous Unsatisfactory. Project accounts have been accounts kept by expenditure category of the IDA credit, and not by project component and financing from all sources. 4.01(b) & (c) Borrower to have project accounts Continuous Audit reports have been submitted with audited annually, with audit reports delays (sometimes considerable ones), as submitted not later than six months follows: after the end of the year. 1987: in March 1989; 1988: in January 1990; 1989: in June 1991; 1990: in August 1991; 1991: in July 1992; 1992: in October 1993; 1993: not due yet. 4.02 Borrower to have 1985 accounts of July 31 of each Audit carried out by HSD-Expertise et School Print Shop audited. year Conseil; report submitted on February 25,1987. 4.03 and Borrower to exchange views from July 31 of each The annual submission of an evaluation of supplemental time to time with IDA on its year (for progress in achieving action program as letter policies and plan of action for the evaluation of spelled out in supplemental letter was not improvement of the quality and cost progress) complied with. However, there has been effectiveness of education, and to continuous dialogue with government on furnish to IDA by July 31 of each educational policies. Dialogue led to a year an evaluation of progress in policy seminar in Kigurfi in May 1988 and achieving such objectives. the development of the First Education Sector Project (with an emphasis on primary education) approved in June 1991, the dialogue is continuing with a focus on secondary education (seminar planned for March 1994). Section II of Employment of consultants and Continuous Partially complied with, after delays. Schedule 5 and experts Supplemental letter  26 Section in General Subject Deadline for Status Conditions Compliance 9.06 (and Semi-annual Progress Reports Continuous Partially complied with; reports have been Section 11 of irregular, incomplete and submitted with Schedule 4 to delays. DCA) 9.06 Completion Report 06/30/94 Government subnutted Part U and some comments on Parts I and III. 8. Use of Bank Resources A. Staff Inputs (in Staff-weeks) Stage of Project Actual Through Appraisal 68.7 Appraisal through Board Approval 65.3 Board Approval through Effectiveness 4.4 Supervision 117.3 Total 255.7  27 B. Missions Stage of Month/ No. of Days Specializations Performance Types of Project Cycle Year Persons in represented Rating Problems Field (a) (b) (c) Through Appraisal Identification 02-03/84 3 20 EP, AR, VT Preparation 06/84 1 7 EP Preparation 11/84 2 17 EP, AR Appraisal 02-03/85 5 28 EP, EC, AR, VT, _______ TEX _ _ _ _ Follow-up 06/85 1 14 EP Follow-up 10-11/85 1 8 EP Follow-up 11-12/85 1 13 AR Follow-up 01-02/86 1 5 EP Board approval through effectiveness Supervision 1 06/86 3 4 ED, EC, ED Supervision 2 11/86 2 9 ED, AR 1 Supervision 3 02/87 1 5 AR Supervision 4 11/87 3 11 ED, AR, TEX 2 AOF Supervision 5 03/88 1 7 ED Supervision 6 05/88 1 7 ED Supervision 7 10-11/88 2 14 ED, TEX Supervision 8 01-02/89 2 14 ED, AR  28 B. Missions Stage of Month/ No. of Days Specializations Performance Types of Project Cycle Year Persons in Represented Rating Problems Field (a) (b) (c) Supervision 9 11-12/89 2 18 ED, AR 2 PMP, PRO Supervision 10 05-06/90 3 ED, VT, TEX Supervision 11 10/90 2 ED, EC Supervision 12 04-05/91 3 17 ED, VT, EC Supervision 13 10/91 1 10 VT Supervision 14 11/91 2 EC, TEX PDO, PRO, Supervision 15 10/92 3 10 EC, VT, TEX 2 PMP PDO,PRO, Supervision 16 1 04/93 1 2 1 19 EC/EP, ED 2 PMP Specialization represented: Types of Problems: AR. Architect AOF: Availability of funds EC: Economist PDO: Project Development Objectives ED: Education Specialist PMP: Project Management Performance EP: Education Planner PRO: Procurement TEX: Textbook Expert VT: Vocational Training/Technical Education Specialist   MAP SECTION  IBRD 19109 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Mb- -d Kw ANDA ___^ RWANDA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT U G A N D A * EX80 DSTIETs D EPOTS (1 2 t A TECRNICAL SECONDARY SCHOOL NATIONAL VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTER - PAED ROA-S