India - Second Haryana Irrigation Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 12543 PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT INDIA HARYANA IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDIT 1319-IN) NOVEMBER 24, 1993 MiICROGRFAPHICS Report No: i2;4i4z Type: PCR Agriculture Operations Division Country Department II South Asia Regional Office hiis documnt has a reskickd diibouon and may be used by redpie is only In the perfonnanoe of *b.,.1.. ,,EUlI Ane Ifr i'ant mav not otherwise be diselosed without World Bank authoriZaIon  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA HARYANA IRtIGATION II PROJECr (Cr.1319-IN) CURRENCYEQUIVALENTS Name of Curency = Indian Rupees Apraisal Year (1983) US$1 = Rs.9.00 Completion Year (1992) =Rs.28.00 Fscal Year of Borw April 1 -March31 ABBREVIATIONS ATW Augmentation TubeweJi BMB Bbakra Main Branch CAC Computer Application Cell CADA Command Area Development Authorities CCA Commanded Cultivable Area CDO Cenral Desigo Office efs cubic fea per second CRRI Central Road Research Institute CSSRI Central Soil Salinity Resrch Institute CWC Centri Water Commission CWPRS Cent Water and Power Research Sttiou DEA Department of Economic Affairs EC Electro-conductivity ERR Economic Rate of Retum EIC Engineer-In-Chief GOH Goverment of Haryana GOI Govenment of India HAU Hissar Agricultural University HSMTC Hyana State Minor Irigation and Tubewell Corpoaton Lited ID irrigation Department IDA I oa Development Associatio IRR Intelnal Rate of Return km kilometers LDPF Low Density Polyethylene Film M and E Monitoring and Evaluation NDO New Delhi Office (of the World Bank) NPV Net Present Value NWDP North West Drige Project OFD On-Farm Development O&M Opeation and Maintenance PCR Project Completion Report PWD (B&R) Public Works Department (Bridges and Roads) R&D Research and Development RD&T Research, Development and Training SAR Staff Appais Report SCF Standard Conversion Facor SDR Special Drawing Rights SIA Spriner Iigaton Assocat UNDP United Nations Development Prora VHF Very High Frequency WPI WholesalePrice Idex WRCP Water Resource ConsoLidation Project WYC Westen Yamuna Canal  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.SA Ope ofi. evaludon November 24, 1993 MEMDORANDUM TO THE EX E DIRECrORS AND THE PRESIDEN SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Haryana krrfaton II Project (Credit 13192-Th Attached is the Project Completion Report on India - Haryana Irrigation II Project (Credit 1319-IN) prepared by the South Asia Regional Office. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. The project was implemented in accordance with the original design, with some variation in the size of the components Savings derived from exchange rate movements were utilized on additional work of the most successful components. The project achieved most of the canal lining objectives and a significant increase in irrgated area, though less than anticipated. Yields higher than anticipated and changes in cropping pattern more than offset the shortfall in incremental irrigated area, and the project's economic rate of return, at 33 per cent, is higher than the appraisal estimate of 29 per cent. The project's overall outcome is assessed as satisfactory, and likely to be sustainable. Institutional development objectives were substantially achieved. Project works were completed under cost, but in eight years rather than the four anticipated at appraisal The main reasons were shortage of local funding, lack of management continuity, and procurement delays, compounded by a severe drought lasting four years followed by the worst flooding in the century. The PCR is of good quality, complete and informative. No audit is planned. Attachment Ttis document has a res_tc distbutIon and may be used by ret)pients only In the performance of their ffcal duties. ts cortents may not otherwise be dsclosed witrutA W vld Bak authzation.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETON REPORT INDIA HARYANA IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDIT 1319-IN) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .. ..... ,, *. i. EVALUATION SUMMARY ...................... .. .,... m PART L PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANKS PERSPECTIVE I Pro~ject Identity ...1. 2.Background ........ 1 3.ProjectObje vandDescription...... 3 4. Pro,jwt D)esign and Orpgnizatio.-. 6.Iecipnation ...................... 7 6.1 cbetResests..8 7.I?rcictSustaiai..ty. 12 8.BanlcProroniance..14 9.1Bo6we PuMomunce 16 10. Project ReItionsbip ...................... 17 1 1.Cons1tingServices ..17 12. Pject Lunenaon and Data.. .1 13.Issu..andtheFutu..18 1 PART H. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWEER'S PERSPECTIVE 22 PART m STATISTICAL TABMLES 1.RelatedBankLoansandCredits ..32 2. Priject 'inetable 33....33 3.CreditDisbursements .................. 33 4. Project Implementation ..34 5. . ..oj..t C..st and Financing. 35 6. P. . . ..Resu.ts. 36 7.St...sofCovenan... 43 8.Use ofBank Resos ......45 ANNEX KI: FNANCIAL AND ECONOMUC RE-EVALUATION .47 Figure ............................... 51 Tables: 1. Area Irigated, Water Availability and Rainfa l.52 2. Increamof CopwedAra .................a........................... 53 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  4. Crop Input Requirements per Hectue (based on Haryana Agric. Uiversity) .5........... 5 5.Cop Input Requrements per Hecta(basedonSAR) .... ... 56 6. Crop nput Requirements per Hectare(withoutthe proj ) ........ 57 7. Fnancial and EcononiicPic . ........................................ 58 8.DerivadonofEconomic PicesinYear1992 .................... 59 9.DerivationofEcononmicPricesinYear2000 .................... 60 1. EconomuicCropBudget(1992) ............................... 61 11.Econonoic(CropBudget(2000) ............................... 62 12. EcononmicAnalysisWithHAU YiekdandInputs .... ................63 13. Econonic AnalysisSAR Ciop Budget ....... ........................ 64 14.FinancialCopBudget(1992) ............ ............ 65 ANNEX 2:IEP N A ............................... 66 MdAP IBRD 16552 R  PROJECT COMPLEIION REPORT INDIA HARYANA IRRIGATION I PROJECr (Cr. 13 19-IN) PREFACE Tbis is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Haryana Irrigation II Ptoject for which an IDA Credit of SDR139 MiUion (Credit 1319-IN) was approved in January 1983. The credit was closed on March 31, 1992, four years behind schedule. Dwirig the funds redeployment exercise for India in December 1991, SDR15 rillion was canceled. The final disbursement from the credit was made on April 29, 1992 and the balance of SDR124 million (net of cancellation) was fully disbursed. The Preface, Evaluation Summary, Part I and Part Im of this PCR were prepared by the Food and Agsiculture Organizaion/World Bank Cooperatve Program mission which visited India in July/August 1992. Part It (Project Review from the Borrower's Perspective) was prepared by the Government of Haryana. The report was based on a review of the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the Legal documents, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, internal Bank memoranda, relevant Bank reports on the sector, and discussions with the Borrower's project staff and the Bank's staff at Headquarters and in New Delhi who had been associated with the project. This report differs slightly in format and content from previous PCRs in ordler to reflect the Country Department's latest views on desirable features in a PCR; these include more emphasis on issues and a greater suress on subjects helpful to forthcoming projects both in Haryana and, where applicable, elsewhere in India.  iii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA HARYANA IRRIGATION II PROJECT (Cr.1319-IN) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objeives 1. The main objectives of the project were to improve the effieiency of the irrigation systems and the equity and teliability of water distribution, and thus to increase the area irrigated by 245,000 ha (paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2, Part I), and stabilize watertable levels. The project also provided for a series of studies and pilot projects aimed at institutional strengthening and solg the watrlogging and salinity problem (Part I, paragraph 3.3 (iv)). ImAlMenttio Exnce 2. Project implementation closely followed the SAR, but there was some variation in the size of components. Because of depreciation in the value of the rupee in terms of the US dollar and Special Drawing Rights (SDR), expenditure in rupees corresponded to less in dollars and SDR than estimated in the SAR. The resultant excess funds were spent on additional work for the more successful components, vilage water supplies, village roads and lining of both canals and watercourses. The most significant deviation between planned and actual implementation was the failure to complete the replacement of irrigation control structures. The Government of Haryana had difficulty in retaining senior engineers in their posts. The project has taken eight years to nearly complete the original four year program. As of April 29, 1992, about 89 percent of the original credit amount of SDR 139 million (100 percent of the revised credit amount) had been fully disbursed (Part I, Section 5). -Results 3. The project achieved mos't of the canal liinin objectives and did achieve a significant increase in area irrigated (174,600 ha), though less than anticipated due to failure of the augmentation tubewell component. Farming research and monitoring have indicated that higher yields are being achieved than estimated in the SAR.I These higher yields more than offset the shortfall in incremental irrigated area; and the economic rate of return (ERR) has been reestimated at 33 percent, compared with 29 percent in the SAR. Sustainability 4. The project is likely to maintain an acceptable level of net benefits throughout its economic life. At present, substantial benefits are being obtained, and if operation and maintenance are well carried out, benefits should continue (Part 1, Section 7). 1 Source, Hissar Agricultural University and Evaluation and Monitoring Section, Haryana Irrigation Department.  iv 5. The incremental demand for domestic water will, over the next 20 yeas, amount to 80 peeent of the SAR estimate of total water "saved". 2 Unless additional water can be released from the headworks, an alternadve source of water for domestic use can be found, or a substitution made, the increnental irigated area provided by the project may decline. 6. The canal lining will gradually deteriorate. It must be expected, even with -good maintenance, that the lining wil require replacement in about 50 years. Fmdinga ,and Lessonslearned 7. Findines: The project was generally well prepared. The project concept was sound and the roles and resonsibilities of the main agencies were well defined and understood. The components dealing with problem-solving for the future (e.g. Research and Development concepts and coordination) and fine-tuning distribution were not described in sufficient detail nor progressed with sufficient drive by the Irrigation Deparunent. The standard of supervision was excellent. The project has met some of its implementation targets, although with significant delays. Project benefits at present are substantial but may decline in the future (Part I, paragraphs 6.10 and 6.1 1). 8. Lessons LTmd lhe main lessons of experience for the Bank are (Part L, paragraph 8.5): (a) good maintenance is crucial to sustainability; (b) previous related project lessons should be incorporated; (c) research and development components need to be defined in detail and their objectives clearly stated; (d) project design and credit agreement phrasing should attempt to preempt predictable bureaucratic obstacles. The main lessons for the Borrower are (Part 1, paragraph 9.3): (a) senior staff must be kept in their posts for much longer periods; (b) aU parts of a component need to be completed to obtain maximum, sustainable benefits; (c) canals and their associated watercourws should be lined simultaneously to maximize benefits; (d) priority should be given to watercourse lining in pump-lift areas;3 (e) it is essential to ensure the flow of local funds to the project; (f) provision of adequate transport is essential for good implementation, operation and maintenance; (g) research and development components demand the same attention as construction. Issues for the Future 9. A number of issues were identified that should be noted for reference in future project preparationlappraisal (Part I, Section 13). These are: (a) resistance to new ideastprocedures in the Irrigation Departnent; (b) need for Irigation Department to concentrate on operational aspects of inigation; (c) dainage.efficient disposal problem and the appropriate tpe of drainage; (d) need for foreign expertise; (e) rapid increase in domestic water demand; (f) short post incumbency of key staff. 2 Domestic water use is increas'ng rapidly as towns and villages receive piped water supplies and population increases. 3 It should be noted that the pump-lift areas refenred to are supplied by surface water through a canal system, water being pumped up hill by a series of pump stations.  1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA HARYANA IRRIGATION 1I PROJECT (Cr.1319-IN) PART L. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. ErQt Idenltiy Project Name : Haryana hrigation II Project Credit No. Cr.1319-IN RVP Unit South Asia Region Country India sector : Agriculture Sub-sectors Irrigation 2. Iagrojund 2.1 Since independence irrigation has been given extremely high priority by the Govenment of India (GOI) to achieve foodgrain self-sufficiency and to contribute to local and national economic growth. The development objectives of GOI at project formulaton in 1981 continued to emphasize irrigation, energy generation, and infrastrcture, with increasing priority given to alleviating rural poverty hirough increased production and work opportuniies. However although the irrigated area increased by about 0.6 million ha annually between 1950 and 19814, yields remained low, especially in the areas irrigated from surface water sources, for severa reasons. Pre-independence irrigation development was generally planned to provide famine protection, and concentrated on distributing water thinly among many farmers. In many cases water supplies were unreliable since irrigation was from run-of-river diversion with litle or no water storage. Irrigation development subsequent to independence placed reliance upon the development of reservoirs and construction of irrigation works down to outlet only, the farmers being responsible for construction and maintenance of the unlined distdbution system from minor canal outlets to individual holdings. This was generally beyond the farmers' capability in both financial and organizational tenns, and delayed utilization of the main irrigation system. However in Haryana this was generally not the case: the main canal systems, being quite old, have substantial watercourse development, and in much of the area holdings, have been consolidated; 4 'India, Irigation Sector Review", Main Report, Volume L Para 1.9. Page 2, World Bank Report No. 9518- IN, December 20, 1991.  2 the lift-pump areas in contrast are recent developments and the watercourse system is less developed. 2.3 In the 1970s Command Area Development Authorities (CADA) were formed to ensure the development of the minor systems, and to assist farmers to obtain institutional credit for land development including watercourse construction. Tley were not very successfil because farmers, especially those at the tail end of the system, had little confidence in the reliability of irrigation water supply and were thus reluctant to accept loan obligations. 2.4 Three factors appeared crucial for efficient irrigation and successful, productive, irigated agriculture: reliable water supplies, greater emphasis on watercourse development, and pronotion of effective fanner involvement through group action and cooperation. In Haryana watercourse development was well advanced compared to many other states, but command and water control needed a lot of improvement. 2.5 In Haryana the Bhakra and Western Yamuna Canal (WYC) systems cover most of the state (Figure 1), together with the relatively new pump-lift canal systems in the arid and sandy southwest regions which are mainly served from the WYC system. The other canals are the nonperennial Agra and Gurgaon canal systems in the soudt The Bhalra (1.2 million ha, built in the early 1950s) and WYC (1.1 million ha, built from 1820 - 1880) systems provide irrigation to 63 percent of the state's irigable area. The Bhakra system is supplied from the large Bhakra Dam, which is shared with Punjab, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. The Narwana and Barwala Branch Canals link the Bhakra and the WYC systems. The WYC diverts its supplies from the Upper Yamuna River, a tributary of the Ganga, at Tajewala 6. 2.6 The Bhakra and the WYC systems were designed and operated on upstm control principles. The systems are water-short, and each farmer is allocated water in proportion to his holding but is not able to irrigate all his land from surface supplies. Also, because supplies fluctuate (particulaily in the WYC system which depends upon run-of-river diversions), water is provided to farmers, subject to availability, on a canal rostering basis. 2.7 At watercourse level, irrigation is c,rried out by 'turns" and is operated on the warabundi system. The irrigated area served by an outlet (an ungated proportional module or open flume) is divided by the nwnber of hours in a week (168). Each landowner is then allocated the futl discharge of the outlet for a length of time proportional to the area of his holding on the outlet command. This allocation of flow remains the same unless a change is made to the warourse (realignment, lining or adjustment to the area) The outlet flows continuously whilst water is supplied to the minor canal from which the outlet is served, hence about half the farmers of an outlet must irrigate during the night. Because the supply of water is limited, canals are rotated (there are four systems of rotation depending upon the reliability of water supply to a branch canal command). Canals are generally divided into two, three or four groups at distributary leveL These groups are divided into descending priorities: priority I assures ful supply level in all distuibutades in the group; priority 2 serves as many channels as possible at full supply level after those in priority 1 have been fully supplied; priority 3 divides any water avalable after all priority 2 canals 5 See aLso Annex 2. The Pukka Nukka' regarding control of water in watercourses. 6 The mission visited this barrage complex during its field visiL The strucues are very old and the head regulators for both the WYC and the UP canal show signs of structural disuess. lbis appears to indicate that the proposed new barrage at Hathmiund or an alternative equivalent development is required.  3 have been supplied and so on. he canal groups in most cases run on eight day rs. flling during day one and emptying during day eight, effectivtly providing a seven day supply. At twe conclusion of each turn the prioritics are changed so that the previously priority one group becomes the lowest priority and the previously prionrty two group becomes priority one and so on. The system operates so that, on average, the farmer receives two tiirds of the water he would rceive if all groups were fully supplied with water. 2.8 As might be expected in an area .vhich has a semi-arid climate and a long history of irrigation, watertable movement and quality have become a mater of concem. Groundwater level and quality vary a lot throughout the state. In the northeastern regions fresh groundwater is generaly located at depths of about 3 to 8 meters. Private use of fresh groundwater is heavy and in some areas the watertable level is declining. In the western inteaor basin, groundwater is generally deeper at about 12 to 25 meters below grwund level, and is generally bracidsh to saline. Because of high seepage from unlined canals, watercourses, and also from fields, recharge has ben large and some other saline groundwater levels ir both eastern and westem areas have been rising at an average rate of 0.3 meters per year. There are several areas where saline high watertables exist (deph <3- meters): these areas total about 135,000 ha. 2.' Limited drainage works (mainly surface drinage) have been built in the command arem; -- currently draining into the Ghaggar7, irrigation canals or into the river Yanuna. Drainage disposal in Haryana is constrained. The state is located on the divide between the Indus and the Gangetic plains, and about 800 km from the sea. If saline watr is to be drained in large, quantities, its disposal, particularly during dry weather, into either the Ganga or the Indus would be problematic because of the downstream use of the water. Altrative disposal routes involve high pumping heads (80 meters). 2.10 CADA activities in Haryana are restricted to specific canal commands where fe actual cropping intensities are well below design (mainly lift canal areas and the Ourgaon canal command). Elsewhere the Haryana State Minor Irrigation TubeweLls Corporation Limited (HSMrTC) has been established as the agent for development below the outlet, and in particular for the construction of lined watercourses. E. oect Obecives and Descripdon 3.1 With this background the Bank took the opportunity in 1978 to support improved water distribution, reduced seepage and augment water supplies through the Haryana Irigation Project (Credit No. 843-IN (closed February 28, 19831, referred to here as Haryana I). The subject project, Haryana II, was a second time-slice of Haryana Iand built on the experence and achievements of the initial project, which was considered to be exemely successful, generating a good rate of return with well distibuted benefits8. 3.2 The main objectives of the project were to improve conveyance, distribution and operational efficiency of the systems, augment those water supplies available to the canal networks, and improve the equity and reliability of water dstributon within the area. The reduction in seepage losses from the canal system, combined with groundwater augmentaton, was 7 An ancient river cowse which originates from Himachal Pradesh and passes thro Haryana and Punjab. oe river flows west from West Haryana naa disappe the Ibar deset 8 Project Performance Audit Report. INDIA - Haryana lIrgatioa Project (Credit 843-IN), May 17, 198S.  4 estimated to enable, at full development, an additional 245,000 ha of land to be irigated (see .Annex I, Economic Analysis) and at th* same time stabilize watertable levels and assist in reducing salinization of irigable land. In addition the project attempted to introduce modem irigapdon (sprinler), improve rural infrastructure, and to provide for the future by including a series of studies aimed at solving the problem of how to reduce salinity and dispose safely of the resultant dminage water. 3.3 These objectives were to be achieved primarily through modernization of the Bhakra and WYC canal systems. The project consisted essentially of: (i) Cail Moernization: (a) Canal lining in the branch, distributary and minor canal systems (totalling about 2,900 km), improvement of control structures and of canal communication by provision of radio communication devices; (b) Watercourse lining and improvement of structurt.,; (c) Provision of 325 augmentation tubewells (1.75 cfs capacity) with dedicated power lines which would pump good quality water into irigation canals for use downstream. (ii) Modern Irrigaton Metods: (a) Inslation of 100 sprinkler irrigation sets serving about 4,000 ha mainly in the pump-lift areas with very light soils; (iii) Rural (a) Construction of about 120 village water supply schemes for use in areas which were short of good domestic water supplies. (b) Construction of 196 km of all-weather village access roads connecting 1I1 villages to main roads. This component included financing a pilot study to analyze the problem of damage to hard surface roads caused by anmal (bullock) drawn carts with iron rimmed wheels; (iv) reoadng for the Future: (a) Development of a long-term manpower training program in the igation Departnent for in-service and new recruit training; and (b) Research and Development and Technical Services. These included many activities to be supported by the existing Research and Development (R & D) wing of the Irrigation Department (ID), including pilot projects on water control and cost recovery, and experiments and studies related to canal modernization and land drainage: - EPilot irects: canal regulation pilot project; water charges and farmer organization pilot project; and groundwater salnity and drainage study;  5 St1ies- and iExprimgnt: dynamic canal regulation; micro hydro-electric power generation; special purpose lining systems; canal system management; and farmer organizion; management, organizational analysis and manpower needs; command area capacity factors; actual field application efficiencies; optimum use of conjunctive water; economics and inigation flexibility; alternative methods for watercourse improvement; altnative augmentation tubeweJl (ATW) link canal methods; examination of optimum watercourse discharge; computerized water scheduling programs; and project preparation for irnigation/drainage projects. 3.4 The project was modified during implementation to take account of implementation experience, currency variations and other factors (Section 4, Part IL). The modifications did not alter the objectives of the project and merely represented a change in size of components based upon implementation performance and availability of funds. Major increases took place in the village water supply schemes (94 percent) and village access roads (82 percent). The major decrease was in ATWs (15 percent installed of which 2 percent energized). 3.5 The total project costs were estimated at appraisal to be Rs. 2,702.7 million (US$300.3 million equivalent, January 1983 prices). An IDA credit of SDR139 million was to finance about 50 percent of the project cost, ir,cluding aU the foreign exchange component Overall responsibility for project execution was vested in the Goverment of Haryana. Execution of the works was the responsibility of the Secretary, Irigation, Govenunent of Haryana. 4. Project Design and Organizaion 4.1 The project was- formulated by Government of Haryana (GOH) and the Project Preparation Cell of the Central Water Commission (CWC). Bank involvement commenced in 1981 with identification. Appraisal was carried out in May, 1982 and the Staff Appraisal Report was issucd on January 5, 19839. 4.2 Tlhe major aspects of project design were simple and clear, consisting of lining canals and watercourses to reduce seepage losses and using the water saved to extend the annual area irrigated. In addition, Research and Development and Technical Services were to assist development and try to anticipate likely problems. The main design and project objectives appeed to be well understood by all concerned but problems occurred in conceptulizing the purpose and content of the numerous studies. 4.3 There was little innovation contained in the project except as envisaged through the various studies. This was due to its nature and also because it was a second time-slice project Two innovative features (both minor in tenns of cost) - 'Warimetric' water charges (already started under Haryana I and to be continued in Haryana 11 as part of the pilot distributary 9 Repo"t No. 4099-IN. Staff Appraisal Report. India *Haryana rrgation U Project". Jauary 5, 1983. South Asia Pojcts Department, hrigation nI Division.  6 prearranged delivery studies), and a pilot study about modernizing bullock carts 1, were not a success. 4.4 The scope and scale of the project were appropriate to the circum stn with regard to tie project's main thrust (water saving by canal and watercourse lining) but in two comnonents (sprnkler irrigation and augmentation tubewells) were inappropriate. It is very difficult t =an and operate an effective overhead irrigation pilot project witln the command area of a water-short gravity irigation scheme which rations water by rotaing canal supplies"1. It would have been better to concentrae upon a demonstradon of spinkler inigation with credit available to meet any demand generated. In the ATW component the negative expenence gained during Haryana I was not taken into account nor were the effects of dedicated electricity supplies (ie. separate power lines fom sub-station to avoid frequent power outages) to ATWsl2. 4.5 The project was generly wel prepared with regard to the main components. The project concept was good. The time schedule for carrying out the works was slighdy opdmistic given that the Harna I project could have been used as a guide13. 4.6 The timing of the project was appropriate with regard to govenmment policies at the time (para 2.1). Staff experience in the Irrigation Deparment had been successfully improved by the effect of the Hary.ana I Project, and as a very similar second time-slice project, the timing for Haryana II was excellent. 4.7 In general the roles and responsibilities of the main institutions and agencies responsible for the project were clearly defined and understood. However, the objectives, methodology, and allocaton of responsibilities for the Research and Development and Technical Services Component should have been much more clearly defined and descnbed. 4.8 The project was genera}ly successfuL This was because the main components were practical, sensible interventions which increased te availability of irrigation water and hel control its distibution. The successfil components relied upon construction for their objective to be achieved; it is obvious that Haryana is capable of constructing rapidly and to very good standards. The components involving less attractive staff postings such as traning and research, and those which required specialist knowledge not fully available in India (spdnkler inrigation, waterlogging and salnity pilot studies and planning drainage development)14 were less successfuL 10 TI. SAR (pma 3.49) bdLly desibs this study but provides no rationale for it I1 f work coatinues on spdier inigation in this area. an approach which would be of interest would be each farmer or famees group having ir own pvc (or simia) lined rvoir in wich to st is warabundi water for use by hist pnkl over the foliowing few days. Experiene In India generally ponts to the spinkler owne having control of his wwatr source as a prerquisite for succes. 12 See paraah 3.05 'Augmenaon Tubewells (ATW' and 'Power Supply', pargrh 8.06, 'INDIA, Hatyana Iigation Project (Cret No.843-I). Project Completon Report, May 30. 1984. Irigation IL South Asia Projects Deparment Mis report was not available for the ispal mission for Hayana IL 13 Tbwe wa a geat simlhaity between Hayana I and II projects both in scope and scal. Hayana I closed almost on tite (sia mohs delay) but did not complwe on time (mainly because of delys to waexwour contuction [60 prcentj, markets Mad land levelling). 14 Tehical Sevices - see SAR. page 31, paragraph 3.63. (01 appaety promised to provide funding though an exising UNDP Water Management Gant ('Advisory Sevice for Modeniaton and Waw Scbemes') but in the event did not recmit expatiate cosultants; this caused a wate of project funds In connection with conceptual and repotg work on Waterlogging and Salnity. In addition the sevices of tho CentaW Soil Salinity Researc titste (CSSRI) at KaRal, Haryana, do not seem to have been utized  7 Those components which were not thought through (ATWs, ox-cart development) did least well. TIe radio commurncation component, whilst well conceived, suffered from delays in drafting and agreeing to the specification, and, as a result, was entirely paid for by Government 5. Project Itnplmentation 5.1 The project met most of its implementation targets. These results were not, however, achieved in the four year project period. In fact project implementation took eight years. Delay was caused primarily by shortage of local funding caused by: (i) drought expenses and other reasons for Haryana State finance being in short supply; (ii) currency devaluation; (iii) initially because funding of HSMITC for watercourse construction was to be pardy provided by farmers repayments; this left a shortfall when it was decided not to charge farmers for watercourses in this manner. Delay was also caused by managerial problems primarily caused by lack of continuity of senior staff posted to the project Delay also occurred whenever clearances had to be obtained from central government- this mainly related to purchase of imported goodslS. 5.2 Variations between planned and actual results appear minimal as listed in Section 4, Part Ell (Indicators as defined at Appraisal). However in one or two cases the unit used to measure the amount of work done masks some items of a component. Examples of this are the modernization of canals component, which shows 100 percent complete (revised estimate) in temns of canal lining but does not show that out of 208 regulators to be replaced only 89 (43 percent) were completed, with similar shortfalls in other structures (falls, 72 percent; bridges, 66 percent; new outlets, 43 percent). Road bridges across minor and distributary canals are important; if they are not remodelled the bridge soffitl6 in many cases becomes submerged and throttles the flow, this reduces the water level downstream and affected outlets do not draw their ful share of water. There was an inability to keep construction coherent; in some cases lined watercourses were constructed on unlined canals and Wice versa 5.3 In the case of ATWs 2 percent (6 no.) of the SAR target (325 no.) wer energitd out of 15 percent (50 no.) installed (this changed to 100 percent developed of the rnvised target (50 no.) of which 12 percent (6 no.) were energized). In some other cases actual development exceeded that planned, in most cases because of agreement to enlarge the planned amount of successful components (village water supply +94 percent, village access roads +82 percent [original estimate basis]). 5.4 Comparison of pre-project targets and post-project results for Haryana I and It are revealing. The projects are similar in overall cost (US$222.15 and US$300.30 million equivalent respectively), main components very similar in content but all the irrigation components were the same or larger in quantity for Haryana L Haryana I completed six months late taldng four and a Lalf years, Haryana nI completed four years late taking eight years. In both projects the major cause of delay was financing for watercourse reconstruction. The difficulties of persuadng farmers to pay for even a proportion of the watercourse modernization cost is acknowledged in the SAR (page 9, and footnote on the same page), the attitude of the appraisal mission appears ambivalent - they recommend collection of 45 percent repayment, and then, in the footnote, comment that, at the time of writing the SAR, "it is now practice throughout India for govermnent lS For example the purchase of a tile drainage trenching machine. Permission was first requested from CWC in 1985; at the time of wrting thbis report (August 1992) the news has been received in Chandigarh that approval is about to be given. Such delays are caused by examination of each request to datermine whether any part of the order can be placed inside India. 16 Under-surface of architave, arch, balcony, etc.  8 to pay aU costs of watercourse construction down to the 5 to 8 ha block". Ihere appears to have been a strong desire in the Bank that costs for watercourse lining should be at least partly recovered from the fanners. In October, 1987, the Bank agreed to cancel the covenant requiring water charges to include 45 percent of investment costs (see Table 7, Covenant 3.04(b), Part I). With hindsight, not having this covenant and allowing for all watercourse lining to be paid from project funds, would have benefitted project progress. 5.5 Project risks were generally correctly identified. These were: the amount of water saved by lining, cost overrun, wheat price, lag in benefits. Calibration was reastic and where the envisaged risks materialized the results reflected predictions. Risks not mentioned or quantified included a continuing slide in the value of the Rupee vis-a-vis the U.S Dollar and SDR currenies throughout the project period, and political intervention in 1986 which waived the need for fanners to pay for their watercourse lining. This in fact meant that from 1986 farmers were being subsidized by the state by about Rs.2,300,O00 per year for construction work (about Rs.3/ha). 5.6 In other sub-sectors probably the most signifiant contribution of the project has been to forestry. Lining the canals reduced their overaU width and allowed the ID to lend the surplus canal reserve land to the Forestry Departnent who have planted the areas released with bodt Eucalyptus and Kikkar trees. Growth of other tees in the social forestry area has been encouraged by the additional area irrigated. 5.7 Three factors appeared not to have been foreseen, but in view of the Bank's experience in India, should have been: (i) Research, Development and Training were known to be unpopular postings: this was likely to produce a continuous change of staff, and thus a slow take-off on the items to be studied by the prcject. (ii) The delays in purchasing imported machinery should have been foreseen and, so far as possible, avoided. (iii) Other bureaucratic delays should have been foreseen (delays in local purchase approval -- vehicles, approval of expenditure by for pilot canal regulation work). 6. Pnrgject R>esults 6.1 !aeneral. The project achieved its main specified objective of canal and watercourse lining (100 percent completed). There was a delay in achieving this and other minor objectives which doubled the length of the project period. There is some doubt about the actual amount of water saving taking place; this has been resolved so far as possible whilst completing this report It is unlikely that a fully accurate figure can ever be isolated because of the number of parameters involved (rainfall, river flows, cropping pattern, fanners' choice in allocating water (paragraphs 7, 8 and 9, Annex L Economic Analysis). 6.2 T hee were no changes in overall project objectives. However the number of ATWs were substantially reduced; this component took little account of farmers' reaction or of the difficulties inherent in obtaining priority supplies from an unreliable source (electricity). A similar problem occurred in one of the studies included in the project (pilot distibutary pre-arranged delivery study), when an attempt to provide and study on a pilot basis guaranteed timely water deliveries, was considered to have restricted allocations of irrigation water to others not included in the pilot study.  9 6.3 Regulation. As noted in paragraph 5.2 major variance occurred in the number of regulation structures built or remodelled. Much clearer guidance should have been provided in the SAR about these structures (SAR, para 3.08): in particular the SAR should also haveclearly identified the difference between replacement of existing structures and the proposed upstream and downstream control pilot study (SAR, para 3.56). There are difficulties in replcing large regulation stiuctures in an operadonal irrigation scheme, because the structme cannot be completed at canal closure time and by-pass works, somedties including temporary regulation, are required. Such works need detailed supervision and are not of such a routine construction nature as canal lining. On the original time-scale ID would have been hard-pressed to compie 90 sutumes (45 of which would be capable of a discharge above 100 cfs) per year. However, over the eight year period the reduced target of 45 structures a year was clearly possible. The disappointing achievement on structures is not so visible as a shorfall in lining, because the existing structures are capable of regulation even though in some cases this is crudely carried out The concenation of resources on lining and lack of transport all militated against completion of the regulton structures program. 6.4 Modern ifigation. Whilst most of the sprinkler sets are in place, the operating arrangements are poor, and water supplies to the sprinklers are not, in many cases, assured (because in many cases they are located on canals which form part of a four-group rotation). However, farmers are now participating in location and operation and maintance, and have agreed to bear some costs in the near future. Sprinkler Irrigation Associations have been formed. There is however little discernable impact from this component Under present arrangements the sprinkler component cannot be economically viable17. 6.5 The use of spdrinlder irrigation on the very light soils of the elevated hilly areas may not be economically viable, but cerainly the "greening" of these hills has much improved the environment and gready reduced sand invasion of the gravity irrigated plains perimeter. It has also reduced road maintenance, removal of sand dunes, etc. 6.6 BusaLrnfrstuct. The village water supply component has undoubtedly improved the physical environment by providing a safe supply of domestic water 700 villas. Thus about 1,100,000 rural people are enjoying better health by having clean water for dnidng and cooldng. In addition cattle and other domestic animals have benefitted by a better supply of water. 6.7 The provision of 356 km of all weate access roads to link 197 villages including dhamies to main roads will assist in provision of better services to the villages and provide a more efficient means of exporting the production surplus generated by the project In addition, the roads have generated development along their verges (small shops and cafes, repair workshops) and tractor and small vans are now using the village roads for delivery of agricultural inputs 6.8 Preparing for the future. The manpower taining program appears to be proceeding well despite inordinate delays in completing construction of the Haryana Irrigation Training Institute at Kurukshetra. 6.9 The following results were obtained from the pjlumi = !&: Canal regulation suffered from a doubtfdul concept. Whilst the farmers on the pilot area canals are reported to have liked the regular and reliable irrigation supplies, no overall trend in yield incrases were noted. Farmer organization results have been inconclusive. This is pardy due to lack of interestldrive being put 17 Whilst sprinklr irrigation may not be 'economic, an efficient sprdnler set-up would be most desirable in the pump-lift areas whiuc have very pcnmeable sols anid unev topography. The psent atempts to establish sprinkler as a viable system should be persisted with, possibly fumded by the Northwest Drainage Project (NWDP). if funding is not provided the spinler component is liMely to fil fom inalkla and lack of opeation and maintenance (0 & M) funds.  10 behind organizing famers. Groundwater salinity and drainage study, a fairly useful series of basic studies - "Studies for the Use of Drainage Water in the Command Areas of higation Projects, Haryana, India" were carried out by HSMITC in the period 1982-1985, and commented upon favorably'k. In addition two pilot vertical drainage areas were built and tested. 6.10 UInder studies and experiments the following progress was made (see Part m, 6C. "Studies" for full details): Micro-hydroelectric - desk studies done by HSMrIT, likely potential is 26 and 20 megawatts on WYC and Bhakra canals respectively; Special lining systems - bricks were substituted for tiles, no work reported on high strength plastic composite materials'9; Canal system management - mathematical model studies in progress, progress very slow and mainly obtained by using an independent consultant; Management development, some taining being done and continuing; Capacitv factors and field efficiencies - no work reported; Flexible inigation economics (see SAR, Annex 1, para 7, other studies and experiments) - no work reported; Altenative watercourse improvement - base lining with low density polyethylene film (LDPF), said to greatly reduce seepage, some experimental precast sections were also produced but were not successful; altemnative ATW link canals - in view of problem with ATWs this item was not executed; optimum watercourse discharge - no work reported; computerized water scheduling - no data; project preparation - believed to include preliminary work on Water Resources Consolidation Project (WRCP), Ottu Weir (Headworks)20. 6.11 Appraisal economic results were based upon the assumption that the project-funded woriks would be completed in four years. In fact, the project took eight years. The incremental area generated by the project was less (71 percent) than that predicted at appraial and the cropping pattern did not alter as much as expected towards high value crops. The economic rate of return (ERR) for the project is restimated at 33 percent (all costs included) as compared with 29 percent (all costs included) at appraisal. This ERR would drop to 17 percent, if the SAR crop models' are used (Annex 1). Since farners did not contribute to project costs, the financial rate of return has not been calculated. However, farmers benefitting directly from project works would have experienced an increase in income of some 20 percent. 6.12 At full development the annual production2l is estimated to increase by a total of 407,000 tons. This includes 233,000 tons of wheat (SAR 311,000), 92,000 tons of paddy (SAR 126,000), 25,000 tons of oilseeds (SAR 11,000), 9,000 tons of other grains (SAR 37,000) and 48,000 tons of cotton (SAR 47,000). Additional production of sugarcane amounted to 288,000 tons per year. The fact that the cropping pattern "with project"t did not follow that predicted in the SAR caused some of the production differences (see Annex I, Economic Analysis). 18 *A review of paper by HSMITC", W. Barber, Delhi February 8, 1985. 19 See SAR, Annex 1, paragraph 4, 'Special Purpose Lining Systems". 20 During the field visit the Mission briefly visited this site of an old regulator built in the early 19th centuy on the upstream reach of the River C-haggar. ID have a proposal to increase the storage behind the weir, improve regulation, increase irrigated area and provide better communications by upgrading the bridge. This proposal might be of interest to Bank identification missions. but it should be noted that it is believed that the water resources of two tributaries (Tangri and Markanda) to the proposal are also proposed to be used elsewbere. 21 Based on HAU yield estimates.  6.13 Secnd fits: The implementation of the project has made a number of positive contributions to secondary benefits and hence to the development of the project area and to the resources of the state, as shown below: 6.14 . A benefit not identified at appraisa which was directly brought about by the project was the reduction in the number of "hallars"22. About 3,500 were made redundant by the realignment and lining of watercourses. This saved a considerable expenditure of energy. 6.15 A large number (2136) of Catte Ghats23 were built alongside the deep and relatively swiftly flowing branch canals as part of the lining work They are very popular and have come to form one of the social points of village life. 6.16 Two parts of the project had a direct effect on human resource development: fustly the training component which provided in-service taining and refresher courses for ID staff members and new recruits2-4; and secondly by the project providing the opporunity to practce these skills in "the real world". 6.17 Fanners have been involved in supervision of contractors through a program insdtuted by HSMITC in which the farmers agree to always have three farmers from their watercourse suprvg construction. This is said to have improved the standard of watercourse construction. In one case a group of farmers had forned a contracting firm and contracted with HSMITC to construct their own watercourse. The work done was excellent and it would seem to be an initiative to be encouraged. 6.18 Impact on the environment is difficult to quantify, but positive: canal lining and extension of irrigation ara wili reduce the rate of waterlogging and salinity; the extra cropped area esults in additional transpiration; and in the sandy lift irrigation areas, provision of both surface and spinkler irrigation increases the rate at which these desert areas become stabilized and green. 6.19 Change in the technological environment is difficult to judge. In this respect the project was startng from a low base and it is possible that the foundations having now been laid, the rate of improvement of the technological environment will increase. 6.20 The project interventions were not targeted at the poorer social groups, as the major thrust was to improve the efficiency and extent of inigation of all farmers. Village water supplies will have benefitted some of the landless. The sprinkder component was likely to provide positive impact on the poorer people being located in the recendy reclaimed desert bordering Rajastban, which contains a poor population, however the impact of this component was small. 6.21 The project addressed state level development and thus the effect on national insdtutions was minimaL The national institutions which dealt with the project included Deparent of Economic Affairs (DEA), Central Road Research Institute (CRRI) and Central Water 22 A 'Jhar is a low-lift device (usually of nudimentay persia-wheel type and powered by one or two oxen, but sometimes a motorized pump) located on an unlined watercoums and used to lift inigation water to a higher section of the same watermurse to ensure command of a farmees land. 23 Catle Ghats" are batbing places for cattle usually on both sides of a large canal and are provided with protection barriers or walls to prevent cattle being caried downstream by the velocity of the water. 24 In fact there has been a moratorium on recitment of junior technica staff into the Irigation Department since 1983. hence training of now junior staff has not been possible  12 Commission (CWC). Tne Central Soil Salinity Research Istitute (CSSRI) became more involved wiith the project during its implementadon and, through exchange of information and provision of data, was the most affected of the national instutions. It is very desirable th this very competent instution should continue to be encouraged to intest ite i waterlogging, salinity and drainage in Haryana. 6.22 Local institutions were much more affected. In pardcular HSMIT is now an efficient and competent contracting company, with excelent workshops aso serving other states. The lTigation Department could have benefitted a lot more by taing advantage of the project to trin staff in new approaches to irrigation. CADA is now an effecdve development organiaon2s. The division of responsibilities is that the Irrigation Department deal with all matters down to outlet; HSMr1C deal with watercourses and groundwater i devel areas and CADA opert in the less developed areas (mainly liftpump area). This is a sesble system which avoids overapping. 6.23 Project impact on macro growth consisted of the grain surplus provided by Haryana to the central pool for wheat and rice. This is difficult to measure because the coutribution comes from both irigated and rainfed land. The contibution for L State of HIayana for the last three years are: Year Rice Wheat ............. .(.1,000 Tonnes). 1988 642 1,266 1989 815 1,971 1990 1,129 2,591 Source: GOI Statistics Department The incremental production from the project would represent about 5 percent of the rice contribution and 9 percent of the wbeat contribution at 1990 levels. 7. Eij Sustainabft 7.1 he project is expected to maintain acceptable benefits throughout its economic life26, but benefits will only continue if maintenance is good. Projects which rely upon extensive construction such as canal lining, which is only a skin laid on earthembne are more prone to damage than rigid structures (eg. regulators). Canal lining is unforgiving of poor maintenance. This is because the occunence of a leak or physical hole in the lining has two effects; it reduces the beneficial effect of the lining for a large area around the leak and hence the benefits previously enjoyed, and it causes a foundation instability undemeath, encourging rapid detioratin. This is 25 It should be noted thtCADA was only involved on the peribkey of ayn . 2S a ~~i w CA oya EvLi 26 For the pmnpose of this wport thde economic lif" of the prgect has been umd equa to disconi period usd In ERR c atons. Iba is. in te ce of dhs proct, 20 yeam  13 acceleraed by the erosive effect of canal water flowing past the eak Continuation of beefits rests almost entirely upon the standard of construction and regular, good maintenance27. 7.2 At present maintenance is good and financial provision for it is presently at the level required for sustainability.28 It is important that such provision is continued. Three aspects of maintenance need some attention: when lifting gear for regulator gates becomes damaged it must . be repaired immediatelY; minor subsidence causing a depression in lining and some cracking should be -attended to as quickly as possible - there should be an "action gang" at each circle able to move in and repair such damage as soon as it is noticed; and some attention should be given to the manner in which grass is prevented from growing on tile and brick hining joints. Ihegrass roots grow down the sides of the mortar joints. At present the grass is scraped off, using long handled steel scrapers; these cut the grass off neatly but tend to leave the roots still embedded in the mortar, ready to sprout again. An annual treatment at the most appropriate time with a suitable, safe, herbicide is recommended in addition to the regular scraping. farmer involvement and Water Users Associations (WUA) are not a major feaue of the Haryana irrigation system. To some extent this is to be expected in an irrigation area which has a very long history of watercourse control through the Warabundi system (paragraph 2.7). Nonetheless such WUAs or Sprinkler Irigation Associations (SIA) should be encouraged in the lift irrigation areas especially where farmers will be using sprinkler irrigation. The present arrangements for SIA's were very late in being instituted and are not strong nor being enthusiastically promoted by the government. 7.3 The shortfall in construction of regulatory structures will affect the overal performance of the project and is disappointing because the project was a canal modernization project intended to have a substantial impact on regulation. 7.4 Watercourse maintenance will become a problem because the use of rigid lining materials upsets, to some extent, the former responsibility of the farmers to mamtain the watercourses (Haryana Canal and Drainage Act). WhILst the SAR envisaged HSMITC repaining the lined watercourses on a contract basis, provision has to be made for the funds to pay for the work. This is a problem given the farmers' reluctance to pay additional fees and the politicians desire not to insist. At present maintenance is carried out on an ad hoc basis with labor contributed by farmers, and materials and experise by the HSMrIIC. 7.5 A good deal of training and encouragement has been devoted to maintenance during the implmentation period, more is needed. It is a subject that should be addressed through the 27 See also issues paragraph 13.11, domestic water supply demands will reduce the net gain of water provided by this project by about 80 percent by 2012. 28 The water courses are not the subject of a fonnal budget and whflst being maintained at present on an ad hoc basis by both farmers and govermment, may suffer from lack of forma funding and hence maintenance in the future.  14 next Bank water resource pwject in Haryana29 by an effecdve operadon and maintenance Iraining and execution component, alternatively it might be addressed at national level because it is a problem that is not restricted to Haryana but is of national concern. 8. Bank Perfi=ang 8.1 The main strength of the Bankes performance throughout most of the project cycle has been its mature and professional approach to supervision, and its ability to respond to the need for change when parts of the original (appraisal) design were found to need adjustment. This was reinforced by the very high standard of engineerng supervision provided, which was effective although field visits were of short duration30. 8.2 Bank performance during project preparation/appraisal stages can be faulted in a failure to incorporate the experiences of Haryana I which resulted in the inclusion of ATWs; inadequate specification of the research components (the relevant SAR annex of three pages covers fifteen subjects); and an inappropriate attempt to pilot-test "improved upstream and downstream automatic control structures" 31. This was resisted by te Iigation Department and no such gates were tested. Nevertheless the SAR was overall a competent report which designed apractal and effective method of increasing cropping intesity and reducing loss of water. 8.3 Some of the pilot works (i.e the Canal Operation Study and the Groundwater Recharge Study) were designed with major help from the Bank during implementation. WhL it may be necessary and, in fact. essential to leave some design at this stage, it is preferable to design a component before implementation. This is certainly the case here. Conceptual problem in the final design could have been avoided if rigorous analysis of the proposal had been carried out at appraisal. 8.4 Supervsion was well carried out with a flexible approach and a good understanding of most problems and excellent efforts at solving them. There were fifteen supervision misions over the period April 1983 to January 1992. Usually missions visited twice a year but this dropped to once a year in 1989 and 1990. The composition of the missions was predominantly technical with only one visit from a financial analyst and one by an economist. In view of recurrent supervision reports about moderate problems with finance and management the inclusion Of more financial analysts' time and a few visits by a managementspecialist might have helped 29 lbe proposed Water Resources Consolidation Project. 30 Usually missions spent five days in the field, whicb, even aUowing for the closeness to New Delhi and the compact project area, is too short a perod to supervise an area of about 2 M ha. As a result some items (particularly R&D) apper to have received lees attention than would have been desirable. 31 Esntially the Neyrtec design. A very good system in appropriate cizumstances. This was probably not the best place to try such a system since at this stage half the canal system had already been lined on a uniform flow design and by the dme this pilot test was complete the other half would have been copleted to the same design. In view of the Banks adverse experience with these same gates in Chambal 11 (soe PCR. India, Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation U Project, Credit 1288-N) it would seem that the use of these gates in an old, established Indian system, such as Haryana, might be reviewed in depth. It shold be bome in mind that pdority in dealing with regulation problems should be accorded to improving existng system operation and assessing whether the hydrology of the system allows more sophisticated methods to be used  15 resolve or ameliorate the problems32. As noted above the superson field visits were of short duration and Xt staff involved did a very good supervisory job. Had they been allowed more time it is likely that the subcomponents and smaller components would have benefitted greatly. 8.5 Experience gained from this project provides the following lessons: (a) Maintenance of the project works are crucial to the sustainability of the project. Future projects must address this problem. (and study how, within Bank and Borrower constraints, a solution may be provided which guarantees establishment of continued effective maintenance). (b) Lessons from a closely related and very relevant project (Haryana I) should have been more closely studied and analyzed. This would most likely have avoided the waste of time and resources on ATWs. (C) Components such as ch and DeomentandTechnal Servces must have Borrower commitment. Posts in RD&ET are not popular with Irrigation Departnent engineers. Project design should seek methods to make swh postings more attractive. This might be remedied by including promotion and other material advantages. (d) A tougher attitude during the implementation period to Haryana's enforcing supervision criticisms (e.g. reduction in funding in some years, delays in issue of go-ahead for agricultural census by Haiyana Agicutural University, delays in purchase of equipment, etc.,) might well have inceased the rate of progress and shortened the implementation period. (e) Given the negative reaction of GOI to expenditure on imported items (trenching machine, foreign consultants, VHF equipment), it would be desirable, in future, to provide fully detailed specifications in the SAR and make the clearances required for purchase either a condition of effectiveness or dated covenants. (0 Given GOHrs almost complete embargo on vehicle purchase for use by the rrigation Department, the vehicles included in future SARs should be fully specifed and the purchase within 6 months of effectiveness made a condition of the credit agreement33. (g) The general need in fte prevailing conditions to design the project at appraisal time in such a manner dtat bureaucratic obstacles to implemenation are, so far as possible, minimized. lTis should include ensuring Borrwver commitmt to aU components and taing early and firm action to assist the Borrower when delays occur. 32 See paagrapb 105 regarding re-alloctdon of project funds by DEA. 33 At present te ID has a technc staff of 2,611 engineers, out of an authorized establishment of 2,800. They have a total of 253 Jeeps and 9 saloons. Of these 35 vehicles are condemned, and al but 53 have logged more than 160,000 km (43 have achieved more than 300,000 kn). Average vehicle age is about 8 years.  16 (h) It is customary 34 to use the project implementation indicators listed in the SAR (normally under the "Project CostsW section) as the nonn for measriing progress during supervision. There is a large variation in the detail in which these indicators are given in SARs. In this case the very minimum detail was given in the SAR. Nonetheless the supervision reports used the SAR format. There is a danger here in that if the details of each component are not fully described, supervision wi}l dwell on the obvious indicators (eg. canal lining done) and overlook individual items (eg. structures associated with the lining). It is apparent that two methods of dealing with this problem am possible, the first is to ensure that appraisal teams fully detail the indicators in the text of the SAR, and the second is for supervision missions to examine the SAR indicators critically and if not satisfied, set up their own indicators based on the SAR Detailed Cost Tables. 9. BorroMy rPerfor_ance 9.1 The main strength of the Borrower was the ability to undertk a very large progmm of design, procurement and construction and maintain a high quality of work. This was partly the result of the experience gained during Haryana I and demonstrates the advantage of in-work experience and the desirability of time slice projects. Some problems arose in having procurement (particularly of imported items) authorized by the Central Government. 9.2 The main weaknesses of the Borrower were a lack of management continuity, cash flow aiculties in mid-project (state level) and inital under-funding of HSMIlC partly caused by releasing the farmers from paying for watercourses. The management problem was caused by the frequent transfers of senior staff -- not by an inherent lack of expertise. Budget cuts ate a familiar feature of large projects once implementation has commenced, the reasons for this may be convincing but a Borrower should meet the agreed obligations and should realize that delays in implementation caused in this way will adversely affect future project benefits. The management problem was also reflected in the lack of awareness of the need for modernization and of lack of drive and continuing momentum instilled in the R&DT program. 9.3 The main lessons for the Borrower are: (a) The need to keep senior staff in the same post throughout the implementation period. (b) The need to complete a component in order to obtain maximum benefit (e.g. the stuctures part of the cana lining component). (c) The need in future projects to give priority to watercourse lining in pump-lift areas m order to locally optmize the use of water and provide more equity in supplies. (d) The need to ensure the flow of local funds to the project. (e) The need to ensure provision of adequate transport for use of construction, operation and maintenance staff. 34 'Guidelncs for Preparing Project Completion Reports'. Cental Operatons Department, World Bank, June, 1989, Table 4. Page 8. Annex A.  17 (f) The comprehension by the Ihigation Department that studies to allow better system management and to identify methods of dealing with waterlogging and salinity and disposal arrangements are as important as construction components. This leads to the need to ensure that the R&DT departmt should be strongly staffed and encouraged to lead the Irrigation Deparnment into the future. 1Q. ELgie, Relatognship 10.1 The relationship between the Bank and the Borrower was positive and constructive. The proximity of the project area to the Bank's Resident Mission in New Delhi enabled the Borrower to keep more closely in touch with the Bank than would normally be possible3S. 10.2 Enquiries to the Borrower about project components included in the SAR, which the Borrower felt inadvisable, led to a response that because the donor had demanded these items the Borrower had been reluctant to exclude them. 10.3 The Bank had good working relationships with Central Government Departnents (DEA, CWC) and with participating institutions (CRRI). 10.4 Coordination between the Irrigation Department and other GOH departments was required, and generally worked well. However there were difficulties in obtaining approvals from the Central Government (particularly CWC) for purchasing imported equipment, although their technical contribution to the activity was minimal. 10.5 Towards the end of the project about SDR15.0 million was canceled from the credit at the request of DEA but without discussion with GOH. There was a delay of several months before GOH, at Bank insistence, was informed. During that period GOH committed much of the amnount on project works. The result of this lack of communication by the Central Goverment resulted in budgetary embarrassment for the Irrigation Department, an ongoing dispute between the two parties, and damage to trust and working relationships. 11. Consulting Services 11.1 Consulting services, although provided in the SAR, were sparingly used. Only three consultants were employed, one on systems analysis, one on dynamic modelling, and the third on ox-cart modernization. 11.2 The ox-cart modemization study was to develop a new ox-cart wheel which would not danage black-top roads (the traditional type of Haryana cart had steel tired wheels). Appraisal did not take account that pneumatic tires were used on modem carts and generally preferred by farmers. Conflicting reports have been received about farmers reaction to "improved ox-carts" issued for trials. No fmal report and feedback from the Buildings and Roads Departnent have been received by CRRL 11.3 For systems analysis and dynamic modelling, GOH employed independent consultants to assist in development of the computer cell and with two studies in 1989 and 1990. A 35 The mission several times came across instances where when the Irrigation Department applied for changes or assistance in interpretation from both Bank and Cental Government. the Banks response could be measured in days wbilst that of central government in months.  18 systems model using dBase language and a dynamic canal flow model using "Dwoper"36 were commenced. The cel has m ide good progress leaing how to use the "Dwoper model but has done no i.eld calibration. Field calibration should be carried out in order to ensure that the "Dwopet' model can be properly tested and then used. 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.1 The legal agreements for the project worked well, no real problem arose in connection with them. GOH complied with all of the covenants, except one which was deleted in October 1987 requiring that 'Haryana shall promptly make adequate arrangements.... to ensure hat current charges collected annually shall include: .. (b) at least 45 percent on average of the investment costs amortized over a nine year period for watercourse modernization, including maintenanc charges of about 3 percent per annum of the watercourse capital cost." This deletion was a recognition of the reality that such charges were not being levied in other states and thus considered politicaly not possible in Haryana. 12.2 The SAR was a useful document for the main components and formed a prctical fiamework for Bank and Borrower during project implementation. It would have been even mome useful had it contained detailed specifications for equipment to be purchased (drainage trenching machine, VHF sets) and had specified the studies to be carried out in more depth. 12.3 The data relevant to the PCR were examined both in Washington and New Delhi. Most of the data required were readily available. Correspondence had been excellently kept and filed in the Bank's New Delhi Office but Irrigation Department quarterly reports had not been systematically kept. Difficulty was experienced, as usual, with the consolidation of national and credit funds and their split into the amountsi spent on each component. During this particular period n India difficulties occurred in reconciling accounts in sums expressed in US$. SDR, and Rupees, because of the rapid decline in the value of the Rupee. 13. Issues and the Futue 13.1 This section of the PCR considers issues relevant to preparation of future projects for Haryana and its adjoining states. Some of these comments apply to India as a whole. 13.2 Issue No.1: Acceptance of ChangCe. Results of this project in terms of modeniion of irrigation have been disappointing. The targets of canal lining and an increase of irrigated ara have been achieved, but this depended upon using familiar techniques. Wherever the project attempted to bring about change from what is known or widely practiced, little happened (e.g. modemization of canal structures and regulation equipment, radial gate, etc., and RD&T Unit studies on informal canal operation and regulations). 13.3 Several hypothesis can be advanced for this reaction; it could be the effect of: - difficulty of organizing the execution of items which impinge on other Irrigation Departnent section's responsibilities; - lack of exposure to design of modem regulating structures; - a general philosophy that if a procedure works, even if inefficient, it is not worth the effort to change it; 36 Dynamic model developed by U.S. National Weather Service.  19 - lack of suitable traning both factual and inspirational; - overworked design circle. Whatever the cause, the forthcoming project preparation teams need to identify these constraints and to take them into account in designing the project. It is the missions view uat an essential start to solving this problem is that the appraisal process should obtain commitment for the changes and that staff changes should be kept to a minimum. The mission also thinks that selected design engineers who would be required t sta in their pr9je Posts for the pmject od should be sent abroad to study and learn the design aspects of modem structures (U.S.A., Britain, the Netherlands, Germany). 13.4 Issue 2- System eraton. The current basis of rotated canals and Warabundi is not fully enforced. It is apparent that though new, lined watercourses, had been provided, the necssary "new" warabundi has not always been arranged and that it ould be very difficult to chage ncetheuntevisdJA rabundi becatne V=cdgatL 13.5 It is difficult to properly operate the canal system without efficient regulating structures. The position about building these has been described earlier (paragraph 6.3). The apparent lack of awareness of the importance of these structures is indicative of the lack of appreciation of the need for good operation in order to achieve maximum return to water. 13.6 Similar lack of awareness and drive was noticeable in the approach to operational studies for dynamic canal regulation, canal system management, and computerized water scheduling37. 13.7 Future design of projects must reemphasize systems operation and also ensure that supervision is carried out in a most detailed manner. 13.8 Issue No. 3: Solution of the Three-State Drainage and Disposal Problem and the Urgent Need to Model the Whole Drainage System. The drainage problem (described in paragraphs 2.8 and 2.9)38 is general and involves Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan. Eventually a common disposal system will be needed after localized measures have been exploited. Any wa_ resource proect repared for Haryana must take account of this problem and deal with it as a matter of the highest priorit. 13.9 Issue No. 4: t Type of Drainage to be Used. Work was done on both verdcal (wells) and horizontal drainage (tiles), but the results, whilst indicating that both could be used, were not successful in providing the cost and technical parauneters necessary for planning, and decisions on timing, and type of installation. Any water esource project ppared for these states must take account of this problem and help by creating studies to assist in identifying a solution 37 he Irrigation Department is not short of staff, the technical establishment (in position) includes 2051 engineers or about one engineer per 1,600 ha cultivable command area (CCA)- a very generous overall allowance. 38 For a fuller description of this subject see "TIhe Rising Water Table and Development of Water Logging in Northwestem India' (a Drainage Subsector Report), W. Barber, South Asia Projects Department, Irigation II Division, July 15, 1985 and also 'Land Drainage and Reclamation". Irrigation Sector Review, L.K. Smedema, Euroconsult, Armahem, Netherlands, for World Bank, India Department, March 1990.  20 (t OpgeXg wesi dia Danage S is a start in tIis direction. and would have bn tPmmh enhanced if dt adee from r sn iZ th eXtn an d giad at a0pial) 13.10 Isue NH. 5; de Need froeign ertise. Waterlogging and salnity problems ax relatively new to India, and the expertise required to plan remedial actions is not available. It is essential that experts be provided to concemed institutions to assist with planning. In addition, study tours for design and monitoring staff, who would be reouired to sta in thi Ut for the Qjc pedgrioLshould be funded for these staff to visit countries which are experienced in dealig with the problem (Australia, Egypt, Pakdstan, USA). Any water resource project prepared for Harvana or oter concerned states must orovid he minimum racticable foreien input and the mainrum lea tndian instutin;; 13.11 Issue No. 6: The Problem of Domestic Water Supply At present domestic demand is about 7 percent of irrigation supplies and demand at 2012 is estimated to be about 15 rcent of supplies. The estimated increase in demand over the next twenty years rpm,nt ahQi.tiJprcnt of te ,estimated water saving provided by this project. Whist there will be some return of this water as sulage (mainly to groundwater and probably high in dissolved solids), water is lost from the gravity system and a good deal will contribute to the saline watertable areas where it cannot easily be reused for irrigation. AWy water resource roiect repad for Haryana must be aware of this need and design a proiect that takes account of and orovides for the future domestic water suDply ne of the 13.12 Issue No. 7: The Problem ogf ShortPost I,ncumbency. A factor of particular relevance to the limited success of the institutional components of the project was the frequent changes of incumbent in senior posts of the technical line departments. For example the Engineer-in-Chief (EIC) post had five changes of incumbents in the period May 1989 to July 1992 (average incumbency about 7 months), these changes related to three engineers - that is the EIC was being posted back and forth (generally between ID and HSMITC but occasionally including CADA). Similarly there were six changes at Chief Engineer level in the Irigation Dqnrte in the period May 1989 to February 1992. It is obviously undesirable that such short-term postings should occur. Future project praton missions swold fte1w if some d this situation could not be devised. 13.13 Lssye No. 8: Viability of Sprinlder Irri ation. In view of the slow implementation of the Sprinkler Irrigation Associations (SIAs) and their perceived necessity for effective use of communally-owned overhead irrigation sets, thej as ti, whether spinlde irrigadon is viable a.s utainable basis shoul be examined and reported upon in detail in the forthcoming Hyana V IRCP. 13.14 Issue No. 9; Cost Recovery for Works Maintenance. Maintenance of lined watercour raises the issue of farners' payment for such works, and the further issue of whether it is correct tc charge farmers for expenditure on wodrs which the farmers did not request. This issue needs lobe solved by the appraisal mission for th,e WRCP. Such examination should consider the policy with regard to watercourse lining charges in neighboring provinces (Utwar Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan). In addition the mission should determine whether it is ethical to force 39 NwNwhcst Drainage Project", Draft final report, 3 Volumes, Water and Power Consultancy Services (O) Limited, New Delhi, India, May, 1992. 40 It should be noted that tbe Indo-Netherlands Collaboradve Project working through the CSSRI at Kal, Haryana, is a very positive example of technology exchange on this subject at national level which will undoubtedly be of assistance to Haryana. However, assistance is also required to be injected at state institutional level.  21 farmers to pay for works they did not request, and lay down a method of consultaion with farmers to decide which groups would support lining and give a guarantee to pay for the maintenance in the forthcoming project 13.15 Issue No. 10: Use of Sea= Water Suntiesbv Pumpin or Through GravtM.m oMMUt te use of scarce water tU,D hil pmth irueh tv An ihe plains) needs to be resolved. The WRCP apprsal mission should examine this issue in detail and effect a solution by establishing values for snd quantfying the environmental benefits obtained, the effect of reduced seepage by sing sprinlers and the loss of percolation water to the saline water undedying the hill areas. In addition the socia benefits of setding the previously semi- nomadic gypsies in the hill areas should be established. L,.fli  22 PAIRT4II PRECT REr FQ BOa:WtERStS PMRSPECTIVE Confirnation of Adequacy and Accuracy of infoz=atiop in Part I end III. 1.1 Information contained in Part T and Part III have been verified and