Ghana - Education Sector Adjustment Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OmCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 12622 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GHANA FIRST EDUCATION SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (CREDIT 1744-GH) DECEMBER 22, 1993 Population and Human Resources Operations Division Western Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Cedis US$1 = 128-151 Cedis (September 1986) US$1 = 512 Cedis (December 1992) FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CRDD MOE Curriculum Research and Development Division EdSAC I First Education Sector Adjustment Credit (Cr. 1744-GH) EdSAC II Second Education Sector Adjustment Credit (Cr. 2140-GH) ERP Economic Recovery Program GES Ghana Education Service JSS Junior Secondary School MOE Ministry of Education PMU Project Management Unit PNDC Provisional National Defense Council  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A Offic, of Direclor-General Operations Evaluation December 22, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Ghana First Education Sector Adjustment Credit (Credit 1744-GH) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Ghana - First Education Sector Adjustment Credit (Credit 1744-GH) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. It highlights the importance of mobilizing coalitions in favor of reform, institutional development, use of domestic skills and borrower ownership. It also stresses the usefulness of a Bank field presence. T'his credit provided support for an ambitious educational reform program that reduced the number of years required to complete pre-university schooling, revised the curriculum and expanded access to the junior secondary cycle, provided inputs (textbooks, supplies, equipment, training), strengthened planning and management of the system as a whole, and introduced a number of cost- sharing features. OED's review of the PCR indicates that the project outcome was satisfactory, a substantial degree of institutional development was achieved, and the results appear sustainable. The PCR is of good quality. Because of the importance of this project and the fact that it was supported by the first-ever adjustment credit in this sector, OED plans to audit the operation. Attachment This document has a restricted distnbution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their otficial duties. its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GHANA FIRST EDUCATION SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (CR. 1744-GH' PROGRAM COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONITENTS Page No. Preface . ...................................................... i Evaluation Summary ............ ................................. ii-iv PART I. PROGRAM REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE .... 1 A. Program Identity. 1 B. Background. 1 'he Macroeconomic Context. 1 The Education Sector. 1 T'he Old Structure. 3 Previous Attempts at Education Reform. 3 Previous IDA Lending to Sector. 4 C. Objectives and Description of the EdSAC I Reform Program. 4 Program Description. 4 Credit Preparation ............... 5 Financing Arrangements. 6 D. Implementation Experience. 7 Program Management. 7 Tranche Release Conditions and Performance Indicators. 8 Structural and Curricula Reforms. 9 Procurement. 9 E. Program Results .10 Enrollments .10 Resource Allocation .11 Instructional Materials .11 Teacher Qualification .11 Social Impact .11 Cost Recovery and Control .11 F. Exceptional Features and Lessons Learned ........................ 12 Bank Performance ........................................ 13 Borrower Performance ..................................... 14 Relationship Between Bank and Borrower ...................... 14 G. Sustainability ............................................... 14 H. Program Documentation and Data .............................. 15 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PART II. PROGRAM REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 16 A. Background .16 Introduction .16 Rationale Behind the Reforms .16 Objectives of the Reform .17 Nature of the Reforms .18 B. The EDSAC I Reform Programme .............................. 18 Funding of the Reforms .................................... 18 C. Implementation Review ....................................... 20 Implementation for 1987 .................................... 20 Implementation for 1988 .................................... 21 Implementation for 1989 .................................... 21 Structure ............................................... 21 Content ................................................ 22 Access .................................................. 22 Quality .............. ................................... 22 Financing ............................................... 23 Administration and Management ............................. 23 D. Lessons Learned ........................................... 24 Relationship Between Ministry and World Bank .................. 24 PART III. STATISTICAL INFORMATION .......................... 25 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits ................................ 25 2. Project Timetable ........................................... 27 3. Credit Disbursements .......................................... 27 4. Compliance with Percentage of Local Expenditures to be Financed Under the Credit .............................. 30 5. Project Costs and Financing ................................ 31 6. Use of Bank Resources ......................................... 32 7. Compliance with Covenants ..................................... 34 ANNEXES Annex A Tranche Release Conditions ............................... 39 Annex B Results of EdSAC I Reform Program in Relation to Program Objectives ................................... 41 Annex C Results of EdSAC I Reform Program in Relations to Growth in Enrollment, Number of Schools and Teachers in Primary Schools ........................... 43 Annex D Letter of Education Development Policy ...................... 44  GHANA FIRST EDUCATION SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT Cr. 1744-GH PROGRAM COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is the Program Completion Report (PCR) for the First Education Sector Adjustment Program (EdSAC I) for which a sector adjustment credit (Cr. 1744-GH) in the amount of US$34.5 million was approved and signed on December 9, 1986, and March 9, 1987, respectively. The credit closed on December 31, 1991, after two extensions totalling one year from the original closing date, and was fully disbursed in April 1992. It has been followed by a Second Education Sector Adjustment Credit of US$50.0 million (EdSAC II, Cr. 2140-GH). This PCR was prepared by the Population and Human Resources Operations Division, of the Western Africa Department. Part II of the report was prepared by the Ministry of Education on behalf of the Government of Ghana. Part I of this PCR was prepared by Ms. Patience Stephens, AF4GA, with inputs from Ms. Serena Wille (summer intern); and Part III by Ms. Johanne Angers (AF4PH). The preparation of this PCR is based, inter alia, on the Report and Recommendation of the President; the Development Credit Agreement; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; internal Bank memoranda; and interviews with Bank staff involved with the project.   GHANA FIRST EDUCATION SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT Cr. 1744-GH PROGRAM COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY Description By the beginning of the 1980's, Ghana's education system had virtually collapsed caused in part by severe macroeconomic difficulties and in part by poor planning and managing in the sector. There were severe shortages of all school supplies, while salaries absorbed the larger share of government expenditures on the sector. Government decided to address these problems through a major educational reform program that sought to reduce the duration of pre-university education from 17 years (6 primary, 4 middle, 7 secondary) to 12 years (6 primary, 3 junior secondary 3 senior secondary), while lengthening the school year. IDA provided a credit of SDR 28.5 million to the Government of Ghana to finance various actions in connection with introducing the reform. The credit, which was tranched with disbursements against a positive list approved annually by IDA, supported efforts to: (a) strengthen the planning and management of the education system; (b) provide training to the education sector; (c) rehabilitate educational buildings and provide essential equipment and supplies; and (d) develop, print, and distribute educational materials. Implementation Experience The credit became effective on April 8, 1987, one month after it was signed. However, the implementation of the program began well before that date with efforts to make the reform program acceptable to the public, especially to the middle classes who had been vehemently opposed to the reform. A radical restructuring of the Ministry of Education, including a number of key new appointments, were also in place before the credit was signed. Given the dearth of data for use in planning for the sector, a school mapping exercise was carried out between January and March 1987 to establish the location, numbers, sizes, and state of repair of school buildings and the numbers and qualifications of staff. As part of the reform program, government started in 1987 to phase out the old middle school, replacing it with 3 junior secondary school (JSS) classes which would also be the first three classes of a 6-year secondary school curriculum. In addition measures were taken to reduce the number of non-teaching staff, freeze the hiring of teachers except to replace teachers on a one-in one-out basis, increase book user fees and progressively reduce and eliminate food and housing subsidies at secondary and tertiary institutions. Implementation was generally smooth and performance exceeded IDA expectations. After two extensions totalling one year, the credit was fully disbursed and all major actions had been taken. Implementation benefitted from a high level of government commitment which helped smooth procurement actions and the distribution of books and equipment, even to remote schools.  Results The clearest result of the reform program is that the duration of pre-university education has been reduced with the elimination of middle schools. A new junior secondary school curriculum with greater emphasis on practical and technical skills and with greater relevance to the Ghanaian socio-economic conditions has also been elaborated and adopted. Access to secondary schools has also been provided for a large majority of middle school entrants who were previously screened out of secondary schools by the Common Entrance Examinations. Basic education enrollments have increased markedly since the EdSAC reforms were introduced. After years of decline, the gross primary enrollment ratios increased from 65 percent in 1987/88 to 68 percent in 1988/89 and 72 percent in 1989/90 -- a growth in total enrollments of almost 22 percent over the period. Enrollment in JSSI in 1988/89 was 24 percent higher than in the comparable Middle School Form I in 1986/87. In line with policy reforms supported by the credit, the proportion of the recurrent education budget devoted to salaries has been reduced from close to 90 percent in 1986 to 78 percent in 1989. A higher proportion of the budget is also being allocated to basic education (60 percent in 1987 and 1988, as compared with 44 percent in 1984). In-service training has been provided for some 25,000 JSS teachers, headmasters, circuit officers and tutors from teacher training colleges. Training covered both the new JSS curriculum as well as new methods of student evaluation which focus on continuous assessment rather than reliance on a one time examination. The education reform has led to renewed awareness and interest in schools, especially among rural communities. This is reflected in increased community participation and a willingness to contribute towards the construction and equipping of schools. This community determination is already evident and is being utilized in another IDA financed project -- the Ghana Community Secondary Schools Project (Cr. 2278-GH) -- which supports community construction of school facilities by providing a two-thirds matching grant to those communities that complete the first one-third of the construction with their own resources. Sustainability The biggest threat to the program's sustainability was initially from the middle classes and university students who saw the program as devaluing the quality of education because the program covered the acquisition of technical and vocational skills which were considered inferior to a more academic orientation. This opposition has, however, been dealt with quite effectively through public information campaigns. It is now highly improbable that any significant aspect of the reform will be reversed or moderated. However there is a risk, especially with the political transition underway, that specific aspects of the reform could be challenged and compromised. Cost saving through the freezing of teaching positions and the retrenchment of unqualified teaching staff are perhaps the most likely actions to be moderated under political pressure. Other cost recovery measures instituted under the program are also almost always at risk in periods of high inflation. The institutional changes made in connection with program implementation present a mixed picture. The Ministry of Education appropriately resumed certain functions from the Ghana Education Service (GES), and used the program to establish new systems or improve functions that GES previously did not perform or performed inefficiently. However, the Ministry's assumption of other functions, and concentration of program implementation in-house, left GES weaker than it should be. The division of responsibilities, and GES's internal weaknesses, should be assessed and tackled in future programs. Lessons Learned EdSAC I was well-designed, ably and forcefully implemented by Government, and supervised closely by the Task Manger who was located in the Ghana Resident Mission. These three factors jointly, along with staff continuity on both the Government and Bank side, were the most important reasons for the success and they demonstrated that even seemingly difficult reform programs can be implemented successfully with good program design and management. Typical  - iv - problems with education sector credits in areas such as delays in textbook procurement and distribution were largely avoided through forward planning and the use of non-traditional methods (the military) for distribution. Despite its overall satisfactory performance, the implementation of the program was slowed by the large number of conditions that had to be met before tranche reviews. While some of these conditions were essential to proper monitoring of the performance, others were much less relevant and drew limited staff away from key activities under the reform. This important lesson has already been applied in the design of the second IDA credit supporting this reform program (Cr. 2140-GH for SDR 37.9 million). Conditions have been made more relevant to monitoring progress under the reform and have also been limited in number. This is an important lesson, particularly relevant to adjustment operations where there is a temptation to introduce a large number of policy reforms under one credit without regard to their impact on implementation.   GHANA EDUCATION SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT Cr. 1744-GH PROGRAM COMPLETION REPORT PART I. PROGRAM REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. PROGRAM IDENTITY Credit Name: First Education Sector Adjustment Credit Credit Number: 1744-GH Credit Amount: SDR 28.5 million (US$34.5 million equivalent) RVP Unit: Western Africa Country department IV Country: Republic of Ghana Sector: Education B. BACKGROUND The Macroeconomic Context 1. By the mid-seventies Ghana, which had once enjoyed a fairly high standard of living relative to neighboring West African countries, was experiencing serious macroeconomic difficulties. Large budget deficits necessitated in part by a need to support a sprawling, inefficient public sector led to a marked acceleration in domestic inflation. As a result of reluctance to adjust the exchange rate, the fixed nominal rate became grossly overvalued shifting relative incentives away from exports to import trade. The reduction in exports led to severe shortages in foreign exchange which, in turn, led to major restrictions on imports. 2. As a result of declining export prices combined with reduced volumes of cocoa and gold exports, per capita real income declined by 30 percent between 1970 and 1982, import volumes dropped by a third, and real export earnings fell by 52 percent. Domestic savings and investment declined from 12 and 14 percent of GDP in 1970 to insignificant levels in 1982. With the collapse of the export sector came large budget deficits and much reduced real spending in all sectors. To add to these difficulties Ghana experienced a prolonged and severe drought in 1982 and devastating bush fires in 1983; this resulted in the worst food shortages since independence. In search of better conditions many, mostly able professionals, left the country during the latter half of the 1970s and early eighties, further crippling the economy by drawing away the most qualified workers from key sectors. The Education Sector 3. The education sector was particularly affected by the out-migration of the 1970s, losing qualified teachers at all levels of the education system. Because of the exodus of qualified teachers and uncontrolled increases in low wage employment, the untrained teaching staff as a proportion of the total increased over the 1970s and early 80s reaching 51 percent of primary and 25 percent of all middle school teachers by 1986. The pressure on qualified teachers to leave the country was partly a result of difficulties caused by the decline in the overall macroeconomy. It was also a direct result of a collapse of the  educational system which could no longer provide adequate facilities and the most basic equipment for schools. Government spending on education had declined from 6.4 percent of GDP in 1976 to I percent in 1985. Despite increasing enrollments spurred by a population growth of around 3 percent per annum, the total expenditure in real terms in 1985 was only about one-third of its late 1970 level. Even more severe was the fact that over 90 percent of Government expenditure on education was absorbed in the payment of wages to an expanding teaching and non-teaching staff whose true numbers and positions or responsibilities were unknown even to the Ghana Education Service. Thus in 1987, just before the EdSAC reform program became effective, a number of "ghost" workers were discovered through an exercise that sought to ascertain the staffing situation within the sector. The allocation of expenditure to education through the 1970s and early eighties was skewed in favor of higher levels of education. Only about one-third of total education expenditure in 1984 was in primary schools where nearly two-thirds of the total number of students were. Universities with less than half of I percent of students drew over 17 percent of total education expenditures. These high costs associated with second and third cycle education was contributed to in a large measure by Government subsidies of boarding students who were the norm, rather than the exception. Boarding subsidies to second cycle institutions in 1985 were about US$7.25 million -- more than the budgeted non-wage expenditures on primary education. 4. As a result of excessive Government commitment as well as a declining overall budget, teaching and learning materials were in short supply and shortages of textbooks and basic school materials were severe. One textbook to a class was not unknown, and for many classes a blackboard was the only teaching aid available. In many cases there was no chalk, no pencils or paper, no exercise books, and pupils had to bring their own desk and chair from home. 5. The physical quality of facilities themselves had deteriorated sharply by the mid-seventies and this situation was as peculiar to the previously well-endowed and privileged schools as it was to the smaller, regional and rural schools. So poor was the condition of physical facilities that an overview of problems in the sub-sector argued for their "immediate rehabilitation to prevent non-recuperable losses of both capital and human resources". 1/ 6. As a result of systemic inefficiencies and severe management weakness long-recognized by various Education Review Committees since Independence, there were also a number of problems in areas relating to the structure, costs, curricula and planning within the sector. The structure of pre-university education led to both inequity and wastage. Because of a long pre-university cycle and the high direct and indirect costs of secondary education, many bright students from poorer families could not continue to university. Further there was considerable wastage at the secondary level which was largely residential and highly subsidized, and which ran both a school year and day shorter than found in most other countries. The curriculum throughout the system was overly academic, emphasizing the passing of examinations at the expense of the acquisition of practical skills for meaningful employment. At the university level also there was considerable duplication and inefficient use of limited resources as all three universities sometimes offered the same programs, enrolling few students at each location, and each with inadequate qualified staff. 7. Lack of effective planning was evident everywhere as no norms were being applied to physical facility provision, spatial requirements, teacher allocation or financing. Other problems included a plethora of planning and policy making organizations, the separation of the planning and budgeting functions, and the provision of insufficient guidelines to planners. Scant attention had been given to equitable regional I/ Keith, S. Ghana Education Sector Review and Proposed Investment Strategy. August 1985. Unpublished paper.  allocation of resources with most of the resources being concentrated in the urban schools of the southern regions. 8. As a consequence of these problems the day to day management of the sector was extremely inefficient and was only responsive in the face of crisis. The Old Structure 9. Prior to 1987, education in Ghana consisted of four levels: Primary (grades 1 - 6); Middle (grades 7 - 10); Secondary (grades 11 - 17, the first five years leading to the 'O' level certification and the last two leading to the 'A' level); and Tertiary (three or four years for a first degree). Even though it was legally possible to skip the middle school years entirely or partially by passing Common Entrance Examination in class 6 of primary school, this was possible only for a minority who could afford private tuition or expensive preparatory schools whose curricula were geared towards passing the Entrance Examinations. The majority within the public system usually did not attempt these examinations until after their first or second year of middle school and in practice most children reaching Secondary Form 1 had already completed 8 to 10 years (or more in case of repetition) of primary and middle school. Pre-university education was thus inordinately long lasting 17 years for most compared with the international norm of twelve. 10. Alongside this standard program there existed two remnants of earlier attempts at education reform at the pre-university level. Continuation schools offered the middle school curriculum with practical vocational skills as an added component. Entry, as with the middle schools, was from class 6 of primary. However, unlike in the standard middle schools the curriculum was designed in recognition of the lack of practical, job market skills among standard middle school leavers. One hundred eighteen (118) Junior Secondary Schools also were developed in an attempt to provide an alternative to the academic bias of middle school education. This effort was initiated as major educational reform in 1975-76 -- to provide practical and vocational skills at the upper level of the first cycle institutions. 11. Second cycle institutions prior to 1987 consisted of senior secondary, technical, and vocational schools. Even though senior secondary schools expanded their enrollment by 8 percent annually between 1970 and 1980 (twice as fast as at the first cycle) the availability of places was well below the demand. 12. At the tertiary level, a number of specialized institutions, teacher training colleges, polytechnics, and three universities, one with programs designed to train teachers, and the others with regular academic programs provided a range of courses. Previous Attempts at Education Reform 13. Attempts to identify the systemic and management problems facing the education sector and to reform the education system in Ghana are many and date back to 1927, with at least nine attempts since independence in 1957. As a result a number of well thought out schemes existed, focussing on different aspects of education in Ghana, with a view to making an improved system of education which would "reflect the political, social, cultural, economic, industrial and technological needs and aspirations of Ghana". 14. The earliest of the post-Independence commissions, the Botsio Commission, was set up in December 1960 to advise the Government on the future development of university education. The Amissah Committee which was set up in May 1963 reviewed the structure and content of pre-university education. An Education Review committee was established in March 1968 and was charged with a review of the  - 4 - educational system with a view to making recommendations for avoiding inefficiency and waste. Of greatest relevance is perhaps the Dzobo committee of 1972 whose report on the New Structure and Content of Education in Ghana forms much of the basis of the reform program supported by EdSAC. Most of the reports of the 9 educational committees established between 1960 and 1975 identified similar problems and proposed similar solutions, principally the need for restructuring and introducing cost sharing/recovery especially at the tertiary level, yet serious implementation of key recommendations was not undertaken until the current reform program started in 1987. 15. Failure to reform the education system in Ghana after so much investigative effort was a reflection, in part, of the highly political nature of any decision to change a system in which the elite had vested interests. Even though pre-university education was excessively long, the more privileged classes could avoid the four additional middle school years by paying for private and better tuition for their wards in primary school, and thus enabling them to gain access to secondary schools directly from the sixth grade or seventh grade of "preparatory schools". They were also able to gain entrance into the better established secondary schools and consequently had better chances of entering university thereafter. Education reform as proposed by these early commissions would, at least over the short run, reduce the privileges of the elite groups and hence was politically unacceptable. 16. Only when macroeconomic conditions had deteriorated to such a point that the entire education system had virtually collapsed and even the privileged elite began to suffer the consequences of reduced Government spending, shortage of teachers, books and other facilities, did it become possible for reform to take place. Previous IDA lendine to Sector 17. The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), which came to power at the end of 1981, responded to the deterioration in the macroeconomic condition by developing a wide-ranging Economic Recovery Program (ERP). A number of reforms introduced in early 1983 resulted in some improvement as Government revenues increased substantially. IDA lending to Ghana, which had been suspended for several years prior, was resumed in 1984 and the first IDA lending for either education or health sector development in Ghana was approved in 1986. This credit of US$15.0 million equivalent for the Health and Education Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 1653-GH; closed on December 31, 1991) was to finance emergency inputs and thus arrest the deterioration in health and education sectors. An amount of US$5.0 million of the credit financed expenditures such as textbooks and basic school supplies, vehicles and strengthening of MOEs capacity at project preparation and management. 18. This credit was processed rapidly and was designed to arrest the deterioration of the sector by providing critically needed inputs. It did not seek to address the structural and systemic problems within the sector, and long-term sustainability was not a critical concern. But as this credit was being processed, dialogue had began to take place on the longer term reform which was later initiated under EdSAC I. C. OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION OF THE EDSAC I REFORM PROGRAM Program Description 19. Government began the current reform program in 1986 with a policy statement which forms the basis of the current reforms supported by IDA. Government's overall objectives were to improve pedagogic effectiveness and to recast the financing of education so that public and private expenditures are cost-effective and affordable within modest growth expectations. Specifically, Government sought to ensure  that primary school enrollments grew at about 5 percent, slightly more than the annual growth in the school age population (3.6 percent). Government also sought to expand access to children in remote and backward regions and to double secondary school throughput and regular enrollments in teacher training colleges. Cost savings were planned, particularly through reducing staffing levels, eliminating boarding subsidies and charging economic fees for the use of books. Government also planned to reduce the length of pre-university schooling from 17 to 12 years, whilst at the same time prolonging substantially the school year. This would allow scarce pedagogic resources to be concentrated more effectively and would reduce considerably the private and public costs of educating children, whilst at the same time increasing learning outcomes. 20. The Government of Ghana in its education reform program sought to: (a) change the structure of the school system; (b) improve the teaching/learning process; (c) reduce Government's share of recurrent costs of education; (d) make educational planning and management more effective. 21. The first part of the reform under EdSAC I focussed on reforming the basic education level (grades 1-10) and on laying the groundwork for extending the reform to the secondary and tertiary levels. Specifically it sought to: (a) change the structure of the education system; (b) improve the pedagogic efficiency and increase access; (c) improve budgeting procedures and effect cost savings and cost recovery measures. 22. To change the structure of the school system Government devised a plan to phase in a twelve- year pre-university program between 1987 and 1993. During the first phase of the program this reform involved the replacement of middle schools (grades 7-10) by a 3-year Junior Secondary School (JSS) into which all graduates of the 6th grade of primary schools -- whether public or private -- would progress. Improvements in pedagogic efficiency during the first phase involved the final elaboration and introduction into schools of a new curriculum for the Junior Secondary Schools. A number of actions were planned to introduce cost recovery and savings, including more effective control of the numbers of teaching and non- teaching staff, the elimination of all feeding subsidies, and the introduction of full cost textbook user fees. Credit Preparation 23. As part of the preparatory activities for this IDA operation, the Bank prepared a sector analysis in October and November 1985 and then engaged in intensive policy dialogue with Government in January, March, May and August 1986. In these reviews and in the dialogue, the main problems of each cycle were identified as follows: First Cycle (Primary grades 1 - 6 and 7 - 10) (a) limited access; (b) inefficiency; (c) limited efficiency and slow implementation of the JSS program initiated in 1976.  - 6 - Second Cycle (secondary grades I - 7) (a) lack of textbooks and essential teaching/learning materials; (b) serious deterioration in facilities; (c) serious administration overload in boarding institutions; (d) over-staffing especially at 6th form level. Teacher Training (a) deficit of trained teachers for first cycle schools; (b) low output; (c) poor retention of teachers; (d) high unit costs. 24. There was an unusually large number of closely-spaced Bank missions during the preparatory stages of the program (six missions between identification and negotiations). These missions, four of which consisted of one Bank staff member, were designed to intensify the dialogue with Government and to assist with project preparation. Dialogue with Government had to proceed carefully and with sensitivity, since the proposed reform program was a political process which sought to alter an education system that had a built-in inertia and faced resistance to change by influential vested interest groups. 25. Campaigns designed to sell the reform program throughout Ghana formed a key component of the preparation of EdSAC 1. The reform package was announced in a national radio and television broadcast in October 1986 and by public discussions and debates during the following year. There were clear statements made in favor of the reform by the Head of State which helped deal with some of the opposition from teachers, university students and other elite groups who saw their privileges challenged. 26. Clear implementation plans were prepared as part of the 1986 policy discussion. A detailed plan for implementing the structural changes at the basic education level was prepared and agreed upon. The preparation, printing and distribution of textbooks for JSSs began before the credit became effective in March 1987. A radical restructuring of the Ministry of Education, including a number of key new appointments, was also in place before the implementation of the restructuring program. Given the dearth of data for use in planning within the sector a school mapping exercise was carried out between January and March 1987 to establish the location, numbers, sizes, and state of repair of school buildings, and the numbers and qualification of staff. This revealed a highly uneven distribution of schools and also discovered schools which were being financed by Government without anyone's knowledge at the regional or national level. A parallel nominal roll exercise also discovered a number of ghost teachers and excessive non-teaching staff in many secondary schools. Financing Arrangements 27. Given the extensive nature of required reforms, it was realized early in the design of the project that no conventional investment project could begin to deal adequately with the restructuring required. Hence Bank management accepted that a sector adjustment credit would be most appropriate even though the Ministry of Education had little experience with Bank projects, and even though considerable local cost financing was required. To monitor and accelerate implementation, the credit was tranched with the satisfaction of each year's conditions being a prerequisite for the release of the next tranche. In addition a number of performance indicators were selected to guide implementation of the program.  - 7 - 28. The credit was designed to provide budgetary support to the Ministry of Education for three years to enable it to implement the reform program. Funds were to be allocated first to Government budget categories requiring foreign exchange expenditure, and then to categories of local expenditure. Actions to be financed included:- strengthening the planning and management of the education system; training education sector staff and increasing the number of trained teachers; rehabilitation of educational buildings and acquisition of essential minimum equipment and supplies for educational institutions; development and distribution of educational materials including texts and other printed materials; and other related support approved by IDA. 29. Disbursement of the three tranches of the credit was against a positive list approved annually by IDA. Each tranche release--of SDR 11.4 million, SDR 9.0 million, and SDR 7.5 million -- was subject to agreements being reached on both the overall education budget and the use of the proceeds of the credit to finance such expenditures. Tranche releases were also subject to satisfactory progress being made on other elements of reform including the implementation of various planning and budgeting norms. Tranche release conditions are shown in Annex A. 30. In addition to the specific tranche release conditions which required that Government take measures to institute the new structure and reduce costs through increasing book user fees, removing various student subsidies and freezing the hiring of teachers, Government agreed on its part to furnish to IDA and to implement promptly upon approval by IDA its: (a) Proposed curriculum for each grade of the new JSS program; (b) Plan to reduce the number of non-teaching staff in the Ghana Education Service and in the universities; (c) Comments and recommendations (including a plan of action) on a study on cost savings in the staffing, programs and facilities of Ghana's three universities. 31. In addition to the SDR 28.5 million IDA credit, EdSAC I was financed through parallel and co-financing arrangements both as grants -- UNDP (US$1.28 million equivalent); Switzerland (US$0.9 million equivalent); Britain (US$ 2.7 million equivalent); Norway (US$3.4 million equivalent), and on concessional loan basis -- OPEC fund (US$4.4 million at 2.25 percent interest for 17 years, including a five- year grace period). D. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE 32. Despite IDA's initial concerns about its first ever education sector adjustment operation, the implementation of EdSAC I was satisfactory and in many ways exceeded IDA expectations. When the credit closed in December 1991, some five years after the beginning of the reform program, all major structural and policy changes planned under the first phase of the reform had been launched. The credit had been fully disbursed and a second IDA credit of US$50.0 million for financing phase two of the education reform program under EdSAC II was already effective. Disbursements were particularly good in the first and last two years of the program. Program Management 33. According to the design of the program the Ministry of Education was to have overall responsibility for the reform program, and the Ghana Education Service was to have primary responsibility for implementation. However, the Government also had a wider agenda than simply implementation of the program. It wanted to relocate certain GES functions to the Ministry for the long term, such as planning and  budgeting and curriculum development; it wanted to establish an effective centralized system of procurement; and to increase its control over the GES. It used the reform program implementation and the EdSAC credit to carry out this agenda. Three Divisions previously under GES were absorbed in the Ministry: Supplies, Curriculum Research and Development, and Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation. Also, during the early years of implementation GES leadership was weakened, with many personnel being indicted and others removed or retired. Finally, the Ministry took over certain functions such as in-service training, with new or adhoc structures, which should probably have remained with a leaner but strengthened GES. Thus the Ministry assumed the principal role in implementation and overall coordination, and Government did not allow GES to play many of the roles previously expected of it. This led to resentment and opposition from various quarters in GES, which led to a further concentration of responsibility for program implementation within the Ministry and the Project Management Unit (PMU). The Ministry effort was supervised by a dynamic Deputy Secretary (Deputy Minister) for School Education. 34. The PMU was responsible for procurement, training, logistical and related functions under the credit. Planning and coordination of program implementation were achieved through a National Planning Committee for the Implementation of School Reforms. This committee was also under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary for School Education. District Committees for the implementation of the school reforms were established in every district to oversee implementation. Tranche release conditions and performance indicators 35. Program implementation against the tranche release conditions is shown in Annex A. Performance was generally very good although there were some delays in meeting tranche release conditions. The first tranche review mission was delayed by three months to March 1988 and the second tranche of the credit was not released until July 1988. The third tranche was released in March 1990 following a September 1989 mission which had been delayed for about 9 months because tranche conditions were not fully met. Delays were caused by slow progress in the preparation of a University Rationalization Study which would make recommendations on cost savings in the staffing, programs and facilities of the three universities. The study was later broadened in scope and agreement was reached with IDA that inadequate time had been given for the preparation of the study and a plan of action. 36. Government also experienced considerable difficulty keeping a freeze on the number of teaching staff within the GES, especially controlling the recruitment of untrained teachers. Overall employment in the GES in August 1987 was 154,130. Following retrenchment efforts aimed at non-teaching staff, total employment fell to 151,645 in February 1988. By the end of 1988, despite a freeze, employment had gone up to 158,102. This was a result of illicit hiring, especially of untrained middle school leavers. Draconian efforts at staff retrenchment took place, reducing overall staffing levels to around 146,000 by mid 1990, during a period of rapidly growing enrollments at all levels. Since then the Ministry has held GES staff within agreed limits, mainly by maintaining a one-in one-out policy for extended periods. 37. Other tranche conditions caused much less difficulty. It was clear, however, that there was considerable confusion over the multiple tranche conditions as well as a number of performance indicators and planning norms. Success was possible largely because of the presence in the Resident Mission of the Task Manager (who had been responsible for the initial 1986 dialogue with Government) who assisted the staff of the PMU in preparing for the tranche reviews. The high priority given to the reform program by Government also enabled the Ministry to harness all resources to ensure the satisfaction of the various conditions.  Structural and Curricula Reforms 38. To implement the change in structure, Government announced that starting in September 1987 intake into middle schools from class 6 was terminated and all graduates of primary class 6 would progress automatically into JSS-1 without taking the Common Entrance Examinations, the last of which was held in March 1989. By December 1991 when the credit closed, the fifth cohort of JSS students had entered JSS-1, and two classes had graduated into the new Senior Secondary Schools. A new JSS curriculum was prepared with detailed syllabi and well developed teaching materials. Existing locally developed primary school textbooks were reprinted and distributed. In the preparatory phase of the credit attention focussed on procurement of books and basic supplies for primary and JSS-1 students, and in subsequent years there was forward planning as the first JSS cohort moved to higher classes. 39. Even though the implementation of the structural modifications was on schedule, a number of bottlenecks arose. During the first tranche review in March 1988, the mission noted severe difficulty in obtaining teaching staff for all subjects. For the first cohorts entering JSS also, it was noted -- in agreement with complaints of teachers -- that the academic level of many entrants was very low, with poor comprehension of English. This sometimes necessitated departure from the JSS curriculum to teach material as low as the primary 3 level. There were also concerns about high absenteeism especially in rural schools, as children were required by their families to participate in household and market activity. These difficulties were, however, not unexpected in a system in which a majority of children were previously screened out of entry into secondary school by the Common Entrance Examinations. By removing the screening mechanism at Class 6, and permitting _ masse entry into JSS, the reform introduced greater variability into the calibre of secondary students. This suggests a need for major improvements in the quality of education at the primary level, especially in rural areas. 40. These problems could have been partly offset by ensuring that primary schools were taught by trained teachers and reducing the numbers of unqualified teachers, many of whom spoke English with some difficulty. However, as discussed earlier, some difficulties were experienced in controlling the number of untrained teachers. Important actions were, however, taken to familiarize teachers with the new system and curriculum. Government reformed the teacher training program to stop the enrollment of middle school leavers for a four-year program in favor of a three year program reserved for secondary school graduates which would eventually allow increased throughput. These were in addition to other donor assistance programs for the improvement of primary education, including a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Primary Education Project and a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Paper Commodity Assistance Project which provided free paper for printing primary school textbooks. Procurement 41. Delays occurred over the course of the credit in procurement. This was partly because bidding procedures were new to almost all local suppliers and contractors, resulting in a number of non- responsivc submissions under competitive tenders. The PMU thus took on, in instances, the added task of explaining the contents of bidding documents to prospective bidders. There were also problems with International Competitive Bidding (ICB) with major delays in delivery on the part of suppliers. 42. Procurement was sometimes delayed by a tedious national procurement policy requiring Central Tender Board, Public Agreements Board, and even PNDC approval of contracts. Consequently, the standard IDA 90-day bid validity period was insufficient as the process of contract approval took much longer. This factor became a problem, only after the first two years of the program's operations, as a special waiver of these prior approval conditions was given to EdSAC because of the high priority attached to the education reform programs by Government.  - 10 - 43. During 1990 there was sometimes considerable delay in award of contracts, as the waiver was withdrawn and thus all bid evaluations had to be approved by the Central Tender Board and other bodies, a process that added at least 3 months to the evaluation and award process. The impact of this was a delay in the procurement of equipment financed under this credit for use during the second phase of the reform program - EdSAC II. These difficulties necessitated two extensions in the credit from December 31, 1990 to June 31, 1991 and again to December 31, 1991 to allow for the delivery of these items. However, the overall performance on procurement under the credit was satisfactory in view of the complete lack of experience with bidding procedures at the start of the program. 44. A tender for the erection of 2,000 school pavilions (a low cost "roof on legs" structure) and financed jointly by IDA (50 percent), the Norwegian grant (33 percent), and the OPEC Fund (17 percent), also came under much negotiation and resulted in delays partly because of its size (US$9.0 million) and because the contractor later claimed price escalation of up to 100 percent. The contract, because of its size, was attractive to a number of contractors and hence even after a decision was reached on selecting the lowest evaluated bidder, considerable delay ensued in obtaining final Government approval. The start of construction was delayed and funds to cover the price escalation were drawn from the successor credit - EdSAC II. E. PROGRAM RESULTS 45. The clearest result of the reform program is that pre-university education which used to take up to 17 years to complete, was successfully replaced with a system which cut out the four years of middle school and one year of senior secondary school. As conceived under the two phases of the reform program the system which previously took 6:4:5:2 years has been changed to one which takes 6:3:3. EdSAC I consolidated the first 10 years of the new structure. Overall, the implementation of the EdSAC reform program resulted in: (a) accelerated enrollment growth; (b) better allocation of financial resources; (c) broad based training for education sector staff; (d) the development and distribution of instructional materials (e) more effective supervision of schools; (f) reducing subsidies while increasing fees; (g) increasing public awareness and interest in schools. 46. Detailed achievements in relation to program objectives are provided in Annex B. Performance in some of the areas in which the sector was particularly crippled before the reform are discussed below. Enrollments 47. Basic education enrollments have increased markedly since the EdSAC reforms were introduced. After years of decline the gross primary enrollment ratios increased from 65 percent in 1987/88 to 68 percent in 1988/89 and 72 percent in 1989/90. Intake into Primary one (P1) increased from 319,214 in 1987/88 to 388,951 in 1990/91 -- a growth of almost 22 percent over the period. Enrollment in JSSI in 1988/89 was 24 percent higher than the comparable Middle School form I in 1986/87. Most importantly, however, it appears that EdSAC has begun to address some of the serious regional imbalances in enrollment. There has also been a modest increase in the proportion of girls enrolled at the primary and JSS levels. The impact of the program on enrollments, schools, and teacher numbers is shown in Annex C. These indicators  - 11 - show successful expansion in the number of places in primary and junior secondary schools. Expansion in teacher numbers has been contained while simultaneously the overall quality of the teaching force has been improved. Primary school enrollment, for example which grew at less than 1 percent between 1986/87 and 1987/88, grew at rates between 6 and 8 percent per annum between 1987 and 1991. The proportion of trained primary teachers increased from 47.2 percent to 66 percent over 1986/87 to 1990/91 and for Junior Secondary and Middle Schools, trained teachers increased from 65 to 76 percent of all teachers over the same period. Resource Allocation 48. In line with the policy reforms supported and backed by conditions under the credit the proportion of the recurrent education budget devoted to salaries has been reduced from close to 90 percent in 1986 to 78 percent in 1989. A higher proportion of the budget is also being allocated to basic education (60 percent in 1987 and 1988, as compared with 44 percent in 1984) as subsidies at the secondary and tertiary level have been reduced and teacher salaries increased. Instructional Materials 49. As a result of the reform program supported by EdSAC I and partly also a result of the small emergency education component of the Health and Education Rehabilitation Project (Cr 1653-GH), textbooks and other instructional materials have returned to the classrooms. New texts are more relevant to the cultural conditions and are designed with a practical emphasis. The acquisition of education under the reformed system is therefore no longer only with a view to passing theoretical examinations but to enable the graduate to be more functional in society. Teacher Oualification 50. A more thoroughly trained teaching staff has contributed to improved education standards. The establishment of a National Planning and Implementation Committee which was set up initially to ensure that teachers were equipped to handle the new curriculum has increased training opportunities for teachers and headmasters. In-service training was provided to over 25,000 JSS teachers, headmasters, circuit officers and tutors from teacher training colleges. Training covered both the new JSS curriculum as well as new methods of student evaluation which focus on continuous assessment rather than reliance on a one-time examination. Social Impact 51. The education reform has led to renewed awareness and interest in schools, especially among rural communities. This is reflected in increased community participation and a willingness to contribute towards the construction and equipping of schools. Considerable numbers of new primary or JSS school were being constructed by the local community, largely with their own resources. This community determination is already evident and is being utilized in another IDA financed project -- the Ghana Community Secondary Schools Project (Cr. 2278-GH) -- which supports community construction of school facilities by providing a two-thirds matching grant to those communities that complete the first one-third of the construction with their own resources. Cost Recovery and Control 52. Despite the implementation of a number of innovative programs, the tight financial controls kept the real recurrent expenditures constant in real terms over 1986, 1987 and 1988. The share of GDP going towards education decreased from 3.6 percent in 1986 to 3.0 percent in 1988. Of recurrent  - 12 - expenditures -- including debt service -- the share of educational expenditures stayed between 32 percent and 36 percent for the years of 1986 to 1988, after increasing from about 27 percent in 1984. 53. Cost saving and cost recovery was gained through the elimination of all food subsidies in both secondary and tertiary education levels. Unit costs at Government secondary schools have been controlled by increasing the ratio of day students to boarding students and by requiring that at least 30 percent of all new intake into existing schools be day students from the surrounding communities. A large cost component - housing subsidies at the university level -- still remained, however, due to difficulties in transforming the dormitories into hostels and student protests against the elimination of such Government aid. F. EXCEPTIONAL FEATURES AND LESSONS LEARNED 54. A notable feature of this education reform program is the zeal and commitment which was shown by Government during implementation. Government officially declared the reform as being "of highest national priority". As a result special simplified contracting and importation procedures were allowed initially under the reforms. A National Task Force was set up in June 1988 to plan and oversee the importation and distribution of large quantities of books, equipment and other supplies for JSS schools. This was done with the assistance of a military coordinator who was released for this special assignment by the Ghana Armed Forces. The military were used in the distribution of books to schools. Practically every statement made by the Head of State in the early program years referred to the reform. 55. Within the Ministry of Eduction there was a complete sense of ownership of the reform program, and the PMU was not isolated but an important part of the Ministry's arm of implementation. The success of the reform despite earlier opposition over three decades was also because there were intense campaigns to educate the public about the nature of the reform and its implications well before full implementation. University students were strongly opposed to the reform program from its very inception, partly because they felt that it might devalue the Ghanaian degrees, but mainly because the cost recovery proposals would affect their pockets directly. The opposition was so intense that the universities had to be closed for several months in 1988. 56. In order to reduce the students' opposition to the cost recovery proposals, Government introduced in 1989 an innovative Student Loans Program. Under this program students could borrow from the Social Security and National Investment Trust (SSNIT - the Government social security agency). Up to the first five years of contributions made by the student and his or her employer would be used to pay back this loan. This meant the first contributions would not go to his or her pension, and thus after, say, 30 years service he or she would only be entitled to a pension as if he or she had worked only 25 years. For SSNIT to be protected against students who would never work in Ghana, each student, before taking a loan, would had to have a guarantor who was a contributor to SSNIT and part of whose entitlement would be automatically deducted from his/her and his/her employers accumulated benefits in case of default. Government has given SSNIT a grant to cover the interest foregone through providing these subsidized loans to students. 57. A major IDA concern was the relative inexperience of the Ministry of Education with any aid project, and certainly nothing as large as the EdSAC reform program. Another concern was that implementation was being undertaken without testing the new curriculum and structure. The success of EdSAC demonstrated the importance of management, perhaps above program design, to successful implementation. There was strong management of the program with dynamic, forceful and uncompromising leadership from the Deputy Secretary for School Education who headed the PMU and implemented all key decisions with decisiveness.  - 13 - 58. EdSAC's success was also a demonstration of the fact that the presence of Bank sector staff in the field office matters. In view of the lack of previous experience in credit preparation or implementation, and almost total lack of knowledge about Bank procedures on the part of the Ministry of Education, the presence of the experienced Task Manager who forged close working relationships with and among staff of the Ministry of Education and GES -- were critical in steering the PMU through difficult stages of implementation. It also facilitated the dialogue with Government which was necessary for the preparation of EdSAC II. 59. If there is an aspect of EdSAC not to be duplicated elsewhere it is that the number of tranche conditions should be strictly limited and focussed on only the key issues that require reform. The delays in the tranche releases under EdSAC were the result of Government having to cope with a number of conditions to be met across all cycles of the educational system. Some of these conditions were in the domain of the Ministry of Education, others in the Ministry of Finance and yet others in the domain of University management, thus creating a major need for coordination of the various efforts to meet tranche conditions. Bank Performance 60. This program could be taken as an example of how the Bank does, and can respond to particular circumstances in a flexible way. The preparation of the program did not follow the normal project cycle, but instead involved many months of dialogue with Government, carried out with considerable sensitivity. Though the program did not fit the traditional mold of a SECAL, the Bank decided that this would be the instrument that would give Government the degree of flexibility needed. Unlike with most SECALs, credit funds were allowed to be used to finance local costs. This decision was based on the realization that adjustment programs in the social sectors typically require considerable local cost input and, given the extensive nature of the reform program under EdSAC I, particularly large local resource commitments would be needed to finance it which would be both incremental to available budgets and limited to the year of the reform program. Under EdSAC I this local cost financing turned out to be crucial to the successful implementation of the program with the largest local expenditures being made on categories such as in-service training of teaching staff, transportation and distribution of large quantities of school supplies, operation of a number of urban schools under a double shift system, and on the continuous monitoring of the reform program. Without local cost financing the implementation of EdSAC I would probably have been considerably delayed and political pressure to halt or reverse the program would probably have mounted. As implementation drew to a close further flexibility was demonstrated in the Bank allowing the proceeds of EdSAC I and the new EdSAC II to be fully fungible, making it possible to advance procurement actions where necessary. 61. A further important feature of the Bank's performance is that it benefitted from total stability in Bank staff who were working on the program. From identification through implementation (and into the new EdSAC II) sector staff and management remained unchanged and maintained keen interest in the reform. The placement of an Education Specialist in the Resident Mission in 1987 was well-timed to have sector staff on the ground to assist in the implementation of the Bank's first education sector adjustment operation. 62. Because of the continuity, and the special relationships between Bank staff and Government personnel that developed, leaders of the tranche review missions had to be carefully selected and were those who had never been involved in the program. They were chosen as people who would be expected to take a firm line in insisting on full implementation of the tranche conditions and performance indicators. This led to Government taking the tranche conditions and performance indicators very seriously. 63. Perhaps the main weakness in the Bank's performance was a lack of a full analysis of the institutional capacity of the MOE and the GES to implement a program of such a complexity, and also to  - 14 - follow the Bank procurement guidelines prior to effectiveness. There should have been more emphasis on institutional development in program design. Borrower Perrormance 64. As a result of the realignment of roles under the program as between the Ministry and the GES (para. 33), the Ministry faced an overwhelming volume of work throughout program implementation. It generally, and the PMU in particular, demonstrated impressive commitment and organizational capability, even though the pace of reforms was rapid and intensive. It was the very high level of commitment and extraordinary long working hours of key implementation staff that enabled the program to be implemented without excessive delay. Thus borrower performance was impressive, meeting and in some cases exceeding the Bank's expectations. 65. Just as one reason for the success of this program was continuity of key Bank staff, of even greater importance was the continuity on the Government's side. The same Deputy Secretary has been responsible for the design and implementation of the program from its original conception (1985) to the present date. She has taken personal responsibility for ensuring effective implementation, and has motivated her staff to increasingly hard work. Relationships Between Bank and Borrower 66. Relationships between the Bank and government throughout the implementation of the program were excellent. Without this good rapport the program would probably have been much less successful. Despite equally good relationships between Bank staff and the Deputy Minister of Higher Education, implementation of program elements relating to university education were slower because of the opposition to the reforms at the tertiary level. G. SUSTAINABILITY 67. Even though the transitional costs of implementing the new structure have been high in the first six years, the control of costs during the transitional period resulted in a reduction in real unit costs and an increase in effectiveness. Some cost recovery is taking place as basic level school children are charged 50 percent of the cost of textbooks, whilst at the senior secondary school level the full cost is being charged. Residential students pay the full cost for boarding fees and the amount previously paid by Government is being directed to maintenance of buildings and basic equipment, whilst at the tertiary level students have to pay the full costs of their food and books. Most of the additional costs borne by students are covered by an innovative student loan scheme. 68. The program's success in instituting some cost recovery and the continuation of these efforts under EdSAC II will enable the program to be sustainable once fully launched. An area of concern is whether Government will resist the pressure to expand the numbers of teaching and non-teaching staff within the GES and the universities. This will probably depend on the overall success of the Economic Recovery Program and how it succeeds in generating employment opportunities elsewhere for staff redeployed from the education sector. 69. The institutional changes made in connection with program implementation present a mixed picture from the viewpoint of sustainability. The Ministry's assumption of the functions of planning and budgeting, and of curriculum research and development, was appropriate for the long term. The establishment of an effective centralized system of procurement was also desirable for the long term, and would probably have been impossible to accomplish with GES at that time, but its long-term location could be  - 15 - reviewed. GES was also reorganized during program implementation, with a reduction in the number of headquarters divisions, as well as a reorganization of district offices and an increase in their responsiveness to local concerns, which will strengthen its future performance. However, the Ministry's assumption of certain other functions which should be retained by GES in the short term, as well as its concentration of program implementation in-house, have left GES weaker than before. This has not affected performance under EdSAC I and even EdSAC II, as the dynamism of the Ministry has compensated for the weaknesses of GES, so that the Government's performance met or even exceeded IDA expectations. Nevertheless, to permit GES to resume a more normal role in the future management of the reformed school education sector, the division of responsibilities between it and the Ministry, and GES's internal weaknesses, should be assessed and tackled in future programs. 70. An important result of the preparation and implementation experience under EdSAC I is the continuous dialogue that has been generated between Government and the Bank, as well as within various institutions of the sector. As a result momentum has been generated for sustaining and continuing the reform at all levels. It is through this momentum that EdSAC II was prepared and launched. In addition a secretariat for external aid coordination has been set up recently within the Ministry to coordinate the expanding donor assistance to the sector. Under IDA lending, this expanded portfolio already includes a Tertiary Education Credit (US$45.0 million equivalent) to finance the extension of reform to the tertiary level. Similarly, a Vocational Skills Project and a Primary School Development Project are being considered under the Bank's future lending program in Ghana. H. PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION AND DATA 71. Because of its succession by EdSAC II and the need to review the implementation of EdSAC I, there is a large volume of well-organized information on this program. Educational statistics have been collected systematically from 1988/89. Regular information on staffing levels has been presented by the Controller and Accountant General from mid-1986 to date. Budget and expenditure data have been collected and analyzed within the framework of the Public Expenditure Review which has been held every year since 1986. The Ministry of Education is the only major ministry that provides expenditure returns within three months of the end of any quarter. 72. EdSAC I has contributed immensely to expanding the data base for long-term planning within the sector through the School Mapping Exercise and a parallel nominal roll exercise that provided accurate baseline data on schools and staff. 73. In addition, special studies and reports have been produced for each tranche review. These data have been carefully analyzed and used as background material for the preparation of EdSAC II. In addition progress reports prepared by the Ministry of Education provide information on implementation performance from the borrower's perspective. March 30, 1993  - 16 - PART II. PROGRAMME REVIEW FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S PERSPECTIVE A. BACKGROUND Introduction 1. In September 1987, after more than a decade of feet dragging, Ghana finally embarked on reforming its education system with the initial thrust on the nationwide implementation of the Junior Secondary School Programme. The education reforms are being carried out both in structure and content and run through the whole system of education from Primary to the University level. Rationale Behind The Reforms 2. The need for Education Reform had been felt as far back as 1973. This need was based on the recognition that any system of education should aim at serving the needs of the individual, the society in which he lives and the country as a whole and that the system should, in a country like Ghana, aim at instilling in the individual, an appreciation of the need for change directed towards the development of the human resources of the country. 3. Based on this recognition, an elaborate programme for Education from Kindergarten through Primary and Junior Secondary School to Senior Secondary School was developed in 1974 in the document, THE NEW STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF EDUCATION FOR GHANA (Dzobo Commnittee Report) and approved by Governrnent for implementation that same year. 4. Due, however, to the economic constraints that faced the country in the late 1970's as well as lack of political will on the part of previous governments, the new programme never went beyond the experimental stage. By 1983, it had become obvious that not only had education failed to attain its objective of improving the individual's life and his immediate environment but that it had also declined so much in quality that it was not even making any meaningful impact on pupils, especially at the basic education level. The decline in quality could be traced to the following:- Significant numbers of trained and highly qualified teachers had left the country as a result of the economic decline of the 1970s, and thus more than 50% of teachers in Primary and Middle Schools had been replaced with untrained and low grade teachers, resulting in ineffective instruction at the basic education level -- Successive Governments have had to cut back on real levels of financing of the education sector as a result of the general economic decline. The proportion of GDP devoted by Government to education declined from 6.4% in 1976 to about 1 % in 1983 and 1.7 % in 1985. The education sector was therefore starved of the necessary inputs it needed to raise quality and expand education in the country. The majority of school children and teachers were left without textbooks and stationery items because of the inadequate foreign exchange that was allocated to the educational sector and the excessive reliance on foreign textbooks. The system had been devoid of virtually any data and statistics needed for vital planning. Educational administration and management had therefore been low and most decisions had been taken on an ad hoc basis. Management of schools had virtually collapsed and schools were hardly inspected, especially at the basic level. 5. The PNDC Government recognized the urgent need for rehabilitation to arrest the fast decline of the system and the need to initiate reforms in content and structure of education within the framework of the Economic Recovery Programme.  - 17 - 6. Consequently, it negotiated an emergency package with the World Bank in December, 1985 under the Health and Education Rehabilitation Project. The package aimed at addressing the most urgent rehabilitation needs of the Educational System and at arresting the fast deteriorating rate pending the preparation of an Educational reform and restructuring package. 7. The main component of the Health and Education Rehabilitation Project (HERP) were: (a) Assisting in the printing and distribution of primary, middle and junior secondary school textbooks. (b) Providing urgently needed stationery items for the 1st Cycle Schools. (c) Assisting 2nd Cycle Institutions with limited quantities of textbooks. (d) Assisting the Universities with subscription of vital periodicals and library books. (e) Improving management of Education through: (i) Special training for textbook keepers to improve their competence. (ii) Local training for 1st Cycle School Inspectors. (iii) Carrying out repairs on existing textbook depots and warehouses. (iv) Assisting the Ministry in project preparation and implementation. 8. Seeing that the Educational system required an overhaul more than mere rehabilitation if it was to play any effective role in the national recovery and reconstruction effort, Government initiated discussions on major reform both in structure and in content towards the end of 1984. This was done with the full recognition that the development of a country's human resource is a vital prerequisite for its socio-economic development. Objectives of the Reform 9. By 1986, therefore, a new major Education Reform Programme had been drawn up to ensure that Ghana will be in a position to work towards the achievement of its national educational goals of expanding access to education throughout the system, improving the quality of education given, making education more relevant to the socio-economic needs of the country and of the individual and ensuring that the country would be in a position to sustain the Educational Reforms on national resources after the Adjustment period. 10. Specifically, the Educational Reform Programme seeks to do the following: (a) Provide all children of school going age with a basic education of 9 years consisting of 6 years primary and 3 years secondary education. (b) Shorten the unduly long statutory period of pre-university schooling from 17 years to 12 years;  - 18 - (c) Intensify time utilization at the secondary level; (d) Increase vastly the quantities of educational materials, textbooks and equipment in the system; (e) Improve the overall quality of teaching staff; (f) Vocationalise education and offer the opportunity for practical skill acquisition by shifting emphasis from an academic orientation to a more problem - solving, technical one; (g) Recognize and support non-formal education; (h) Rationalize education at the tertiary level to ensure relevance to national development, harmony with the lower levels of education and cost-effectiveness in the use of manpower and resources; (i) Increase access to education at all levels of the educational system; (j) and finally guarantee the sustainability and quality of the national educational programme through: (i) reduction of waste and costs of education; (ii) strengthening of vital units of the overall management of education so as to improve upon the functions of planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation. Nature of the Reforms i1. The above considerations have resulted in the adoption by Ghana of the 6 - 3 - 3 - 4 system of education with effect from September, 1987. Under this structure, the country now has 9 year mandatory Basic Education made up of 6 years Primary and 3 years Junior Secondary School Programmes. This is followed by a 3-year Senior Secondary School Programme and 4 years of University or tertiary education. In effect, Pre-university education has been reduced from 17 years to 12 years to cut down on the opportunity cost of schooling, especially at the basic level, and make funds available to improve both access and quality and thereby ensure that the majority of Ghanaian children acquire good Basic Education. B. The EDSAC I Reform Programme Funding of the Reforms 12. In order to undertake this extensive and all embracing reform, it was necessary for Government to secure additional funding.  - 19 - 13. The Education Sector Adjustment Credit (EdSAC) was successfully negotiated between 14th and 17th October, 1986, altogether the following amounts were mobilized from the following sources: International Development Association (IDA) 34.5 Million US Dollars Kingdom of Norway 25,000.000 N.KR UNDP I Million US Dollars Swiss Government Grant 1.5 Million SW.F UK Government Grant