Tanzania - Seventh Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MICROFICHE COPY Report No. 1)622-TA Type: (PCR) BARQUERO, / X31757 / T9 017/ OEDD1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TANZANIA SEVENTH EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1056-TA) MAY 4, 1992 Population and Human Resources Division Southern Africa Del.artment Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used bY recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Currency Equivalents Currency Unit = Tanzania Shilling (TSh) US$1 = TSh Year TSh 1977 7.94 1978 7.41 1979 8.22 1980 8.18 1981 8.37 1982 9.33 1983 12.53 1984 18.19 1985 45.26 1986 46.06 1987 90.49 1988 122.49 1989 136.72 1990 199.44 1991 200.10 GLOSSARY CURE Coordinating Unit for Research and Education (MOE) DANIDA Danish International Development Agency D.Kr. Danish Kroner GOT Government of Tanzania NEC National Examinations Council OED Operations Evaluations Department (IBRD) PCU Project Coordinating Unit (PMO) PMO Prime Minister's Office TCRS Tanganyika Christian Relief Services TES Tanzania Elimu Supplies UPE Universal Primary Education Fiscal Year July 1 to June 30  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Oirectowt.eurwl Opertimns Evalatim May 4, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on TANZANIA Seventh Education Proiect (Credit 1056-TA) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on TANZANIA - Seventh Education Project (Credit 1056-TA)n prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoration.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TANZANIA SEVENTH EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1056-TA) TABLE OF CONTENTS Dor lb. Preface .... . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . i Evaluation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Project Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 1 Project Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Project Objectives and Description . . . . . . . o . . . 2 Project Design and Organization . . . . . . . . r 3 Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Major Results of the Project .. . . . . .o . ... . . . . 6 Project Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Bank Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Borrower's Performance . . . . . .&o . . . . . . . . o 11 Project Relationship . . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Consulting Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . 13 III. STATISTICAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Related Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Project Time-Table . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Loan Disbursements . ... e ........ * .**. . . 26 Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursemer.t . . . . . . . . . . 26 Planned and Actual Completion Dates of Project Components ......... .. ...... .. 27 Project Costs . * . . . . 28 Project Financing . . . . . ****. * . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Allocstion of Credit Proceeds . .. . **...... . ... 30 Direct Benefit of the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Compliance with Credit Covenants ...**9. .* ........ 34 Staff In-put by Stages of Project Cycle ... .. . . . . . . . . 35 Mission Data by Stage of Project . ... ..*.. 36 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TANZANIA SEVENTH EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1056-TA) PREFACE This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) of the Seventh Education Project in Tanzania, for which Cr. 1056-TA in the amount of US$25,000,000 equivalent was approved on July 29, 1980, by the Board of Executive Directors of the International Development Association. The Government of Denmark, through the Danish International Development Association (DANIDA) provided a grant of Danish Kroner 115,000,000 million (US$20 million equivalent) for financing part of the project. The Credit was officially closed on December 31, 1990, four years after the planned closing date. In spite of persistent delays, most of the project elements were implemented, in accordance with revised project targets agreed between the Borrower, DANIDA and IDA in 1984. $1.35 million equivalent of the Credit was canceled. The PCR was prepared by the Population and Human Resources Division of the Southern Africa Department (Preface, Evaluative Summary, Parts I and III), and the Borr Ter (Part II). Arrangements for the PCR were initiated during the last supervision mission in April, 1991 and completed following a Completion Mission in August, 1991. The Report is based inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report (Report No. 2782-TA) dated June 2, 1980, the Development Credit Agreement (Dated September 26, 1980); the Joint Financing Agreement between the Governments of Tanzania and Denmark and IDA (dated September 26, 1980); supervision reports; correspondence between the Borrower and IDA; internal Bank memoranda; comments from DANIDA; progress reports by the Borrower's implementation agency; and interviews with Bank staff and Tanzanian Government officials who were closely associated with the project at the time the project was initiated and implemented.  - iii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TANZANIA SEVENTH EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1056-TA) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives i) The project's objectives were to: (a) expand access to primary education in hitherto underserved areas and to improve the quality of primary education by providing instructional materials and expanding the output of qualified teachers; (b) alleviate manpower bottlenecks by expanding enrollment in upper secondary schools (Forms V and VI), and in that context to expand female enrollment in upper secondary schools; and (c) enhance the capacity of key parastatal and government agencies to manage the sector. In the socio-economic context of the late 1970's when the project was initiated, those objectives were timely and consistent with government's overriding policy concerns of: (a) promoting regional as well as gender equity in primary education; and (b) ensuring that educational quality was not jeopardized ae a result of the massive expansion of primary education under UPE. It was also consistent with Government strategy of selective expansion of secondary education in line with manpower requirements. Implementation ExNerience: ii) The main variance between planned and actual implementation weres (a) The implementation period was extended from six to ten years, through two extensions of the Closing Date; and (b) the scope of the project was reduced in 1984, partly in response to the economic difficulties facing the country at the time, and partly to the depreciation of the Danish grant which rendered the contribution of the Danish Government less than half its original value in dollar terms (the Danish grant of DRr. 115 million was worth about US$20 million when the Credit was signed in 1980, but had depreciated to the equivalent of about US$10 million in 1984). Also, changes in Denmark's foreign assistance policy toward Tanzania gave priority to rehabilitation and consolidation of existing iavestment rather than establishing in new institutions which would have added to the Government's recurrent budget burden. As a result of this policy change, only $4.5 million of the $10 million Danish contribution (after the depreciation) was earmarked for the project. The balance ($5.5 million) was reallocated for general budgetary support and for other Danish-assisted operations in Tanzania. The major factors that explained the unusually long implementation period (4 years above appraisal estimates) included: (a) a sharp deterioration in the macro-economic situation in the country, resulting in a great scarcity of construction materials, fuel and spare parts and (b) high inflation coupled with major devaluations of the local currency, that forced many of the original small contractors to abandon construction. It took almost four years to negotiate contracts for their completion; and (c) generally weak project management resulting in part from the existence of two separate units for project implementation. Eventually, toward the end of the implementation period, the Government signed a one-year contract (until December, 1989), subsequently extended by a further one year to December  - iv - 1991, with a non-Governmental Agency (the Tanganyika Christian Relief Service (TCRS)) to complete the schools. As a result of its experience and overseas connections, TCRS was able to import building materials in bulk, thereby reiucing costs and expediting implementation (Para. 9). Resultas 3) Considering tho unusually long implementation period of ten years, and the extremely adverse economic and financial climate of the period, the project's results in strictly quantitative terms were quite satisfactory (Para. 13). One of the objectives of the project was to expand access to hitherto underserved areas in four remote districts of the country. This objective was met, or exceeded in some respects (Para. 13). Another benefit of the project lay in its contribution in alleviating critical manpower shortages by expanding access to upper secondary schools. This resulted in the addition of about 7200 Forms V and VI places, about 4Z above the appraisal target. Similarly, 9 secondary schools with a combined enrollment of 6,000 student-places were rehabilitated, and their facilities for science teaching upgraded and reequipped, as planned. A related objective -- that of expanding female enrollment in secondary schools was also achieved. The number of female secondary students exceeded the appraisal target by 250%. 4) However, there is little indication that the quality of primary education has been improved as originally intended. Also, the project's record in respect to enhancing the capacity of key parastatal and sector institution, was negligible (Para. 13). While the project made some contribution in strengthening the National Examinations Council (new physical facilities, staff training and printing and related examinations processing equipment), due to changes in Tanzanian Government policy regarding parastatals, the Tanzania Elimu Supplies is being phased out, and the project's assistance (five large warehouses, staff trained under the project, vehicles) has yet to be put to good use. The research unit (CURE), has been somewhat strengthened with the additional training provided to its staff, but its research output is of rather limited quality and quantity, largely because of inadequate budgetary support and lack of a well thought-out research agenda. SustainabilitX: 5) Overall the project is likely to be sustained, although at a modest level of sustainability. The project contains some of the features identified by OED as essential ingredients for sustainability, including government commitment. The principal challenge to the project's sustainability is not whether, but at what level of quality and efficiency the project institutions will be sustained. And to a large extent this will be determined by the level of resources -- public and private -- available to the sector on a sustained basis to provide an acceptable level of essential school in-puts, as well as for the maintenance of buildings and equipment. Largely as a result of the Economic Recovery Program initiated beginning in 1986, the prospects for this is much improved. After a steep decline during the late 1970. and early 1980s, real per capita expenditures for the social sectors have stabilized, and have even begun to increase in real terms. The government has also begun to increase the level of cost recovery for social services in the form of modest school fees paid by parents. At the  - v - secondary school level, almost two-thirds of the secondary schools are now run by NGOs, thereby reducing the G,veznment's recurrent cost burder l These policies are expected to continue at an even more accelerated pace, tbtus increasing the potential for the sustaiL,ability of the project institutionus at a modest level of qualit- and efficiency. Findings and Lessons Learned 6) Lessons derived from implementation of the p ojeat include the following (Para 19): a) The project brings to the fore once again the difficult question of what the Bank's position should be when a project faces persistent and virtually intractable implementation impediments that are clearly beyond the scope of the project entity or even the sector as a whole. In this particular case, the Bank together with the Government and the co- financier (DANIDA) undertook a "tripartite" review of the project's scope and decided to scale down the project. But this proved to be inadequate, as the so-called "scaling down" turned out to be merely a modest reduction in the number of facilities to be constructed, and not a thorough redesign of the project, such as for instance, dropping altogether an entire project element (such as the primary school component). The lesson to be derived from the implementation of this project is that when the Bank is faced with a situation wher2 a project is facing significant implementation impediments arisit.g from a major deterioration in the financial and economic condition of the country, the Bank should stand up to the challenge, and consistent with its policy on this matter, as a minimum, redesign the project in consultation with the Borrower. Depending on the circumstances, the Bank might also consider whether the project ought to be discontinued entirely, should the Bank and the Borrower conclude that the economic and financial situation in the country has changed so drastically from the time the project was appraised. b) Another lesson to be derived from this project pertains to the valuable, and even critical, role that NGOs could potentially play in school construction. This was especially the case, as in this project, when the construction industry had come to a virtual halt on account of the shari deterioration of the economy. The economic crisis had a particularly devastating effect on the construction industry which traditionally relies heavily on imported building materials, for which foreign exchange was critical. Contracts for primary school classrooms were awarded to small local contractors (as these vere not attractive to foreign contractors and ICB procedures were not applicable). When the economic situation deteriorated, many of these small contractors were forced to abandon their sites as they were unable to obtain the necessary construction materials and spare parts. Toward the end of the implementation period, in October 1988, the Bank and the Borrower agreed to award the construction of the uncompleted or remaining sites to an NGO, the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS). The consensus among Tanzanian government and education officials with whom the completion Mission discussed the matter is that the involvement of TCRS was a  - vi - critical element in getting the primary school component completed. (Paras. 9 and 19(b)). c) Further, the experience derived from the project confirms previous Bank experience that the design of Bank projects should be kept very simple and unencumbered with too many and diverse components that often render a project too complex and unwieldy. In this particular case, the project's objectives were laudable and justifiable as they quite correctly identified tne critical needs of the sector as perceived at the time (Paras. 4 and 6). The SAR contained some 13 project elements (including primary school expansion, promoting equ_tv in access to primary school, expansion and qualitative improvement .- ondary education, expanding and improving secondary school science tea-aing, ecc.). To make matters worse, the primary school components were under a different implementing agency, as re'sponsibility for primary education was at the time under the Prime Minister's Office and not under the Ministry of Education. In retrospect, it would have been more prudent and justified to respond to those needs through successive projects, rather than to try to address the identified needs through one all-inclusive project. The lesson that this project reinforces is that project deeign should be as simple as possible, if possible under only one agency. In short, Bank performance in terms of project design, restructuring, and to a lesser extent in supervision, was below expectation. Supervision suffered largely because supervision missions, particularly during the latter part of the implementation period were too occupied with the new project under development sometimes at the expense of this project. Also, in retrospect supervision missions could have played a more effective function if they had taken a more proactive role in the resolution of implementation obstacles (Paras. 17-18). d) As indicated in the Government's contribution to this report (Part II, Paras. 25 and 42), even though the project became effective in December, 1980, construction work did not start until five years later in 1985-86. In addition to the adverse economic conditions of the period, the reasons for the long delay in starting construction included delays in the completion of standard school designs, lengthy and cumbersome tendering procedures of the Government, shortages and frequent turn-over of technical staff at the Project Office, inadequate transportation facilities, and lack of fuel to transport building materials, particularly to remote rural areas where the primary schools were to be built. In retrospect, the Bank and the Government were far too optimistic than was warranted under the circumstances in respect to the logistical and implementation arrangements required for carrying out the project as planned. The Government's contribution to the report rightly concludes that the lesson to be derived from the implementation of this project is that constraints such as those mentioned above should be considered carefully and realistically at the time a project is prepared, appraised and launched.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TANZANIA SEVENTH EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1056-TA) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW PROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity Namet Seventh Education Project Credit Number: 1056-TA RVP Unit: Africa Region Country: Tanzania Sector: Population and Human Resources Subsector: Education B. Project Background 1. Sector Development Objectives. Since Independence in 1961, Tanzania has turned to education with an ever increasing conviction that development of its human resources forms an integral part of national development. At the time of Independence, Tanzania had a very small number of nationals with post-secondary education. High priority was therefore attached to the training of at least a minimum cadre of middle and high-level manpower. Manpower requirements were projected over long periods and those projections constituted an integral part of the country's development plans. At the time the project was launched, the Government had just initiated its third Five-Year Plan, having already completed with mixed success two Five-Year Plans (1964-69 and 1969-74). For the Third Five-Year plan period (1976-81), the Government had anticipated high real rates of GDP growth, averaging 6Z p.a. However, this did not materialize for a var:.ety of reasons, in particular due to an unusually low prices for the countiy's principal expor-s crop (coffee), and the heavy drain on public expenditure brot ght about by the war effort on tehalf of Ugandan liberation fighters. In the {ace of deteriorating performance of the economy, and in particular in light of an acute shortage of foreign exchange reserves, in 1979 the Government was forcad to revise down,-r;rds its estimates of sectoral growth rates as well as its estimates of rral growth of GDP for the balance of the Plan period from 6% to 4.5% p.a. It was in the context of this adverse economic climate that the project was designed and launched. 2. Policy Context. The Arusha Declaration and the educational manifesto, Education for Self Reliance provided the conceptual foundations for the Second Five-Year Plan (1969-74). The strategies for economic and educational development enunciated in those policy documents shifted priority in favor of Universal Primary Education (UPE), which was to be achieved by 1989. In addition, a large program was launched to eradicate illiteracy. These efforts resulted in a dramatic increase of enrollment in primary schools which grew rapidly from 1 million in 1972 to 3 million in 1978. By November 1977, virtually  -2- all 8 year old children had been admit4sd into the first grade of primary school (Standard I). D spite this focus on UPE and mass-oriented education, the target of reaching self-sufficiency in higher- and middle-level manpower was retained. After successfully universalizing Standard I intake in 1977, the Ministry of Education established an internal committee for Educational Consolidation to take stock of major sectoral issues and constraints a..sing from the massive growth of the education and training system. The Commirtee was successful in providing much needed guidanct and directives on a variety of educational issues such as text-books, examinations, teacher training, and promotion of regional and gender equity. 3. Linkates BR.een Project. Sector and Macro Policy Objectives. The project's objectives were an integral part of the country's overall strategy which accorded priority to human resources devElopment. The project was likewise successful in assessing to the main sector concerns identified during project preparation. The project included specific interventions aimed at addressing these concerns, in particular, promotion of regional and gender equity and expansion of higher secondary aducations (Para. 4). C. Proilec obiectives and Description: 4. Proiect Objectives. Following the massive expansion of primary education, the Government had two overriding concerns: first, to promote regional as well as gender equity for access for primary education, and secondly, to ensure educational quality was not jeopardized in the course of the quantitative expansion of the school system. In line with these concerns, the project's specific objectives were: (a) to improve the quality of primary education by increasing the supply of qualified teachers and instructional materials; (b) to expand access to primary education in hitherto undeserved rural areas; (c) to improve female participation rates and to alleviate critical manpower bottlenecks by expanding enrollment in upper secondary schools; and (d) to enhance the capacity of key parastatal and government agencies to manage the sector. 5. Proiect ComDonents. As appraised, the project included the following components: i) Primary Education. Construction of 360 new primary school classrooms, with related office/storage and sanitary facilities and staff Louses, in four hitherto underserved districts. The four districts were: Monduli and Kiteto districts in Aruisha region, and Kilwa and L'tdi Rural districts in Lindi Region; ii) Secondarv Education. Construction, furnishing and equipping of: 23 new Forms V and VI classrooms (and staff housing) at 10 existing secondary schools; two new secondary schools (at Ngara and Dodoma); a Demonstration Seccndary School at the University's Department of Education; and financing of 100 staff-yeare of expatriate volurteer-type science teachers. iii) Teacher Training. Construction, furnishing and equipping of a new primary school teacher training college in Zanz:..bar (including staff houses and boarding facilities) with a total capacity of 400 places; and  -3- rehabilitation of an existing primary teacher training college (Kwame Nkrumah), also in Zanzibar; iv) Improvement of Educational Qualitv. Teaching materials, classroom equipment aitd furniture for Primary echools (at an average base cost of $250,000 per district)i textbooks, science equipment and classroom furniture for Forms V and VI in 9 secondary schools: science equipment, textbooks and furnishing for four primary school teacher training colleges; and rehabilitation and equipping of science laboratories at Dar es Salasm technical ollege; v) Strengthening Institutional Capability. a) Tanzania Elimu SuRvlies (TES): Naw warehouses, trucks, related transport and storage equipment, as well as local and overseas training (10 staff-years) for TES to enhance its overall capability and efficiency to procure, store and distribute textbooks, instructional materials and equipmen'; b) National Examinations CoLuacil (NEC): Technical assistance (12 staff-years), local and overseas training (32 staff-years), data processir.g equipmert as well as an office building for the NEC to strengthen its capability to develop and administer a more reliable system of examinations at the post-primary and post-secondary levels; and c) Coordinating Unit for Research and Evaluation (CURE): Local and overseas training (36 staff-years) to upgrade the professional knowledge and research skills of education sector staff from the Inspectorate and the newly created CURE; and vi) Studies and Evaluation: Short-term consultants (for a total of 6 rtaff-years) and a portion of operating costs for undertaking studies of a pre-investment, project monitoring and evaluative nature. D. Prolect Desien and Orxanization 6. The project's conceptual foundation reflected a clear and balanced analysis of the issues facing the country in the area of human resources development. The project's central thrust, particularly expansion of secondary education and quantitative improvement of primary education (coupled with expansion in remote regions) was in fact a continuation of the Bank's previous assistance in these areas under earlier projects, two of whicel (the Fourth and Fifth Education Projects) were still under implementation when the project was under preparation (Part III, Table 1). Two other projects -- The First and Second Education Project, Credit 45-TA and Credit 149-TA, respectively -- both of which were already completed at the time the project was identified in 1978, had also focused on secondary school expansion and primary school teacher training. Thus by concentrating on these same areas, the project was attempting to further consolidate MOE's efforts, thereby contributing to their sustainability.  7. The project's overall objective was thus in clear conformity with the country's overall developmental strategy; its timing was likewise appropriate. In retrospect, however, the project design was for too ambitious in terms of the number and types of institutions that were included for assistance, and the physical dispersion of especially the primary schools over wide and inaccessible districts of the country. The difficulties inherent in implementing a large and rather complex project was felt quite early in the implementation period as evidenced by the efforts of the Bank and DANIDA (co-financier) to scale down the scope of the project by reducing the number of institutions to be established under the project (Paras 9-10). E. P-oiect Implementation 8. Critical Variances in Proiect ImRlementation. The following factors were responsible for the variance between planned and actual implementation: (a) the implementation period was extended from 6 to 10 years; (b) the scope of the project was reduced, dropping in particular two new secondary schools (one planned at Ngara, and the other, a Demonstration School planned at the University), and a nww PTTC planned in Zanzibar. Also, the primary school component was reduced by approximately 120 student places. 9. The implementation period was extended formally first in 1986 by two years to December 31, 1988 Ln view of the acute economic and financial situation in the country which had particularly adverse effect on sectors such as the construction industry which depended heavily on foreign exchange for importing construction materials and spare parts. The situation in respect to availability of construction material improved somewhat when the Bank established a Special Account in February, 1985, with an initial deposit of US$ 300,000 (increased to US$ 1 million in October, 1987). The establishment of the Special Account helped in particular the non-primary school components of the project, such as those involved with the upgracing and equipping of secondary schools, as those components required an infusion of foreign exchange for procurement of textbooks and laboratory equipments. In addition to foreign exchange shortages, the primary school component had been experiencing persistent delays also on account of the geographical dispersion of the school sites over wide and remote areas, coupled with inadequate and underqualified supervisory staff and weak logistical arrangements. As the economic and financial situation in the country deteriorated in the early 1980's, many of the contractors had abandoned their sites and construction was virtually at a standstill. In an effort to get the primary school component back on track, the Government and the Bank decided in 1988 to award the primary school construction program to a non-Governmental organization (NGO), the Tanganyika Christian Relief Service (TCRS), a local NGO aff Lliated with the Lutheran World Federation. As a result of its experience and overseas connections, TCRS was able to import building materials in bulk, thereby reducing costs and expediting implementation. To allow TCRS to complete the primary schools, the project's Closing Date was formally extended by one year to December 31, 1989 and subsequently by an additional year to December 31, 1990. 10. The scope of the project was reduced for the following reasons: (a) the devaluation of the Danish Kroner diminished significantly the Danish financial contribution to the project. When the project was signed in late 1980, the Danish grant to the project was Danish Kroner 115 million (equivalent to US$ 20  million at the exchange rate prevailing at the time). By April 1984, the value of the Danish contribution in dollar terms had decreased by almost 50X to about $10 million; (b) a change in Danish foreign assistance policy to Tanzania that gave a much higher priority to rehabilitation and consolidation of existing facilities rather than establishing new facilities (including schools) which would entail additional recurrent cost burdens for the Government. At a joint meeting of representatives of the Tanzania Government, IDA and DANIDA held in Copenhagen in April, 1984, the question of reducing the scope of the project was discussed at length. The DANIDA representative advised the Government delegation and the Bank (preliminary discussion and exchange of correspondence between the three parties had already taken place before the Copenhagen meeting) that the contribution of DANIDA would be reduced to D. Kr. 44.55 million (US$ 4.5 million equivalent), and that the balance (estimated at $5.5 million equivalent) would be reallocated to other programs in Tanzania, including foreign exchange support. In percentage terms, this represented a reduction in DANIDA' a contribution to the project from 33Z of total project costs (at appraisal) to only 131. At that meeting, agreements were also reached regarding the specific institutions that were to be dropped. 11. Prolect Risks. In retrospect, the Appraisal Report was too optimistic in its assessment of potential risks to project implementation. The only such risk identified during project preparation and appraisal was the possibility of "seasonal disruptions" to transportation of materials to small contractors. In fact a number of other factors, some of which could not have been foreseen at the time the project was identified and appraised, contributed to the long implementation delays (4 years above Appraisal estimates). Some of the unforeseen factors that led to implementation delays included: (a) sharp deterioration in the macro-economic situation in the country, resulting in a great scarcity of construction materials, fuel and spare parts; and (b) high inflation coupled with major devaluations of the Tanzania currency, rendering previously signed construction contracts impossible to implement. It took almost four years (between 1985 and 1989) to negotiate construction contracts that took into account the new value of the Tanzanian currency and the high inflation rates prevalent at the time. By then many contractors had already abandoned construction sites, and long delays had become inevitable. Only one firm of international contractors that was responsible for the construction of the National Examinations Council and the warehouses for books was able to remain on the sites and complete the buildings, more or less as scheduled. 12. Bank supervision missions were fielded half-yearly on a regular basis and the missions reported almost routinely the lack of progress in implementation. In retrospect, Bank supervision missions could have been more helpful had they provided, to the extent that their schedule permits, direct assistance to projects staff by working closely with them in such matters as, for instance, revising construction contracts. With the departure of the DANIDA architects who used to work in the PCU, it was already clear that what the project office needed was more than recommendations; it required direct technical assitance on the part of the Bank's supervision missions. Eventually, toward the end of the implementation period, in 1989, a Bank mission in fact provided direct assistance to the Tanzanian PCU staff in revising construction contracts, as well as in arranging with an NGO to complete the construction of primary schools.  -6- F. Major Results of the Prolect 13. Prolect Objectives. Considering the unusually long implementation period (10 years), and the extremely adverse economic and financial climate of the time, the project's results in strictly quantitative terms were quite satisfactory. (i) As indicated in Para. 4, one of the project's main objectives was to improve the quality of p_imary education by expanding the output of qualified primary school teachers and by providing instructional materials. This particular objective was met only to a limited extent: a new PTTC (planned to be located in Zanzibar) had to be canceled when the scope of the project was reduced (Paras. 8-9). Rehabilitation of an existing PTTC, Nkrumah PTTC, also in Zanzibar, however, was undertaken as planned (albeit the delays). To compensate (at least partially) for the deletion of the new PTTC, it had been agreed during the Copenhagen "tripartite" meeting (Para. 10) to add 120 new places at the Nkrumah PTTC. The additional facilities were completed substantially as agreed. However, the PTTCs were provided with only a limited amount of instructional materials; much of the textbooks and instructional materials procured under the project was allocated to secondary schools. (ii) The second major objective of the project, that of expanding access to primary school in hitherto undeserved areas, was substantially met as planned. At appraisal a total of 360 new classrooms and related facilities (teachers' houses, stores/offices and sanitary facilities) were planned in remote and underserved districts (Monduli and Kiteto districts in Arusha region and Kilwa and Lindi rural districts in Lindi Region). The target was scaled down to 280 classrooms when the scope of the project was reduced in 1984 (paras. 8-9). At Project Completion 330 classrooms had been built (or 10% above the revised target) in those four districts and in neighboring Mtwara rural district. The number of teachers' houses, stores and sanitary facilities (pit latrines) were also close to the revised targets (in the case of storage/offices, the revised target was in fact exceeded by about 752). (iii) The third objective of the project, that of expanding senior secondary school enrollment (and in that context, female participation) in upper secondary schools was also substantially met. In the ten secondary schools where new or additional Forms V and VI classes/streams were added, the number of female students increased from a total of 920 at appraisal to 3291 at completion (or two and half times the planned Appraisal target of 1340). Similarly, nine secondary schools were rehabilitated and their facilities for science teaching were upgraded and reequipped, as planned. (iv) However, in respect to the fourth objective of the project, that of enhancing the capacity of key parastatal and government agencies, the project's achievement was inadequate. The project has contributed in strengthening the National Examinations Council (in terms of staff training, equipment, and physical facilities). However, due to government policy changes to phase out parastatals, Tanzania Elimu Supplies (TES), is no longer expected to play a lead role in the procurement and distribution of textbooks and other instructional materials, even though book warehouses were provided under the project. With respect to studies financed under the project, the completion mission was not able to find clear evidence (such as copies of the studies) that the studies had been carried out. 14. Prolect ImRact and Benefits. The main project elements (improvement and expansion of primary, secondary and teacher training) had been assisted under three previous IDA projects (First, Second and Fourth Education Projects, Cr. 45- TA, Cr. 149-TA, and Cr. 371-TA, respectively). The project thus complemented and  - 7 - to some extent reinforced previous IDA assistance in these areas (Para. 6). Perhaps the project's most significant benefit was in regard to expanding access to four of the most remote districts in the country which hitherto had lagged behind the nation in terms of provision of primary school facilities. Another equally significant benefit lies in its contribution to alleviate critical manpower bottlenecks by expanding access to upper secondary schools, through the expansion of Forms V and VI and in strengthening science teaching (Para. 13). In respect to the physical t.ivil works) aspects of the project, the Completion Mission confirmed that classroom designs developed by the PCU for the primary schools were sufficiently simple, affordable, and maximize the use of local building materials. As a result, the designs are being replicated by communities in various self-help school constructior schemes around the country. This is a further benefit derived from the project. G. Proiect Sustainabilitv 15. The project contains some of the factors identified by OED as important indi_ators for the sustainability of education projects, including, government commitment. As the institutions supported by the project are an integral part of the country's educational system, government commitment and support in the post-completion period, an important indicator for sustainability of education projects, is also assured.' The principal challenge as regards to the project's sustainability is not whether, but at what level of aualitv and efficiency the project institutions will be sustained. And to a large extent this will be determined by the level of resources that will be available for the social sectors as a whole and for education in particular from public and private sources to provide on a sustained basis an acceptable level of essential school in-puts (properly trained and qualified teachers, instructional materials, laboratory equipment and supplies, etc.), as well as for maintenance of buildings and equipment. Largely as a result of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) initiated in 1986, the prospects for this are much improved now than they were in the early 1980s. After a steep decline during the late 1970's and early 19809, real per capita expenditures on the social sectors (including education) were stabilized in the mid-1980's, and have even begun to increase in real terms since the late 1980s. The Government has also begun to increase the level of cost recovery for social services -- modest parental contributions (per child, per school) have been introduced at the primary school level. The Government has also been giving encouragement to non-governmental organizations to support education; indeed, almost two-thirds of the secondary schools are now run by NGOs. These policies are expected to continue at an even more accelerated pace, thereby increasing the potential for the sustainability of the project institutions at least at a modest level of quality and efficiency. 16. The prospects for sustainability of two of the three sector institutions assisted under the project (Para. 13) is rather limited. One of these institutions (NEC) has benefitted from the assistance provided under the project (for instance, all but five of the 23 staff that received additional professional training overseas are still with NEC; the new headquarters built in part with I The Sustainability of Investment Projects in Education OED, October 28, 1990.  - 8 - project funds is properly utilized, as are the printing presses). However, data processing equipment (with software) that was planned for the NEC as part of an overall effort to introduce a partly electronically operating system has not been utilized. Nonethelese, the NEC is now involved in a much broader range of examinations and assessment activities in the country, and is assuming an indispensable function as a national center for student selection and educational assessment generally. On the other hand, as already noted (Para. 13), the other sector institution assisted by the project, Tanzania Elimu Supplies (TES) is in the process of being phased out as part of the Government's overall policy on parastatals. The expensive, and rather over-designed book warehouses have yet to be put to good use. The Completion Mission was assured that MOE is in the process of formulating plans for the use of these warehouses. The third institution building effort provided under the project, CURE, was successful only marginally. Further assistance to strengthen MOE's research capability is being provided under a follow-up project. H. Bank Performance 17. Maior Strengths and Weaknesses. Bank supervision missions were fielded at regular intervals, especially during the first half of the implementation period (1980-85) when the project was supervised from the Nairobi Office. Eight (8) supervision missions were undertaken until the middle of 1985 when education staff in the Nairobi office were reposted to Headquarters. Bank supervision during that period, in terms of staff composition and continuity was satisfactory. After 1985, nine (9) supervision missions were sent from Headquarters (Table 11). As most of these missions were combined with identification, preparation and appraisal of a follow-up project (Education Rehabilitation Project), as noted in Part II of this report (prepared by the Government), less than adequate time was devoted by Bank missions on supervision of the project (Para. 50 (i)). In retrospect, Bank performance in terms of project design was too ambitious and unwieldy (Para. 7). The SAR contained some 13 different project elements, to be implemented by two separate and uncoordinated Ministries, with many of the project sites scattered over large and inaccessible partsi of the country. On the positive side, the Bank was helpful in establishing a Project Account (denominated in dollars) at a time when the country faced an acute foreign exchange constraint. Also on the positive side, the Bank was helpful in facilitating a reputable NGO to take over the implementation of the primary education component after it became clear that the small private contrartors had defaulted due to circumstances beyond their control on their contracts to complete construction of the primary school classrooms (Para. 9). 18. Also, IDA and the Government have not put in place a strong project implementation unit capable of addressing all aspects of implementation (engineering, accounting, project management, etc.). The fact that responsibility for project implementation was divided between two separate ministries (Education and Local Government) made it even more difficult to evolve a unified and strong implementing agency. In retrospect, as the depressed economic and financial climate that prevailed during much of the supervision period precludec a close and timely attention to removing implementation bottlenecks on the part of the government, a more proactive role by the Bank's supervision missions was called for. In other words, Bank supervision missions  -9- might have been more effective if they had gone beyond their traditional function of identifying implementation constraints to assist the PCU in resolving the constraints. Also in retrospect, Bank supervision missions which were often also given responsibility for the identification and preparation of a follow-up operation, spent a disproportionate amount of their time and efforts on the new operation, leaving little or no time to visit supervision sites or to provide expertise in the resolution of implementation impediments (Para. 17). 19. Lessons Learned. For future projects the following lessons learned from implementation of this project may be of value: (a) The project brings to the fore once again the difficult question of what the Bank's position should be when a Bank-assisted project in a particular sector faces virtually intractable implementation obstacles that are clearly and unarguably beyond the control of that particular project entity, or even the sector as a whole (education in this case). The first half of the project's unusually long implementation period (1980-1990), coincided with a period of serious economic crisis in the country, characterized by declining per capita GDP, inappropriate economic policies, and in general a bleak economic and financial climate. As a recent Bank Economic Report on Tanzania put it, "following rapid growth during the mid-1960's and early 1970's, the Tanzanian economy began to slow down in the mid-to-late 1970s. Two major oil price increases, fluctuating international prices for traditional export commodities, variable weather conditions, the break-up of the East African Community and the war with Uganda imposed a number of significant external shocks during the conditions, the break-up of the East Africa community and the War with Uganda imposed a number of significant external shocks during the decade...By 1982 the economy was in a serious crisis, per capita GDP was declining at about 3 percent per annum and the impressive gains achieved in the preceding decade on education and health were being eroded..."2 To be sure, the Bank together with the Government and DANIDA (the co- financing agency) undertook a "tripartite" review of the project's scope and agreed to scale down the project. But this proved to be clearly inadequate, as the so-called "scaling down" turned out to be reducing somewhat the number of facilities to be constructed rather than a thorough re-designing of the project. Inevitably, even after the "scaling down", the same impediments pe:tisted (lack of construction materials, shortage of foreign exchange, wv, k project management, etc.). Under the circumstances, a major redesigning of the project (for instance, postponirg to a follow up project the entire primary education component, which in any event was under a different Ministry), would have greatly improved the situation, and reduced the implementation period. The lesson to be derived from this experience is that when the Bank is faced with a situation where a project is facing significant implementation impediments arising from a major deterioration in the financial and economic conditions of the country, the Bank should be firm in upholding its policy 2 Tanzania: Economic Report -- Toward Sustainable Development in the 1990s. World Bank, June 1991, Chapter 1, Paras 1.2 and 13.  - 10 - of redesigning the project to fit the new financial and economic realities. Depending on the circumstances, the Bank might also conclude whether the project ought to be discontinued entirely, should the Bank and the Borrower agree that the economic and financial situation in the country has changed so drastically from the time the project was appraised, that discontinuing the project would be in the interest of the Borrower and the Bank. b) Another lesson to be derived from this project pertains to the valuable, and even critical, role that NGOs could potentially play in school construction. This is especially the case, as in this project, where the construction industry had come to a virtual halt on account of the sharp daterioration of the economy The economic crisis had a devastating effect especially on the construction industry which relies heavily on imported building materials for which foreign exchange was very scarce. The establishment of a project account (in convertible currency) helped the importation of some project elements (such as textbooks, laboratory equipment, etc.) but was not of much help to small contractors who had contracts for small primary schools in the remote districts of Arusha and Lindi Regions. Many of these contractors had in fact abandoned their sites and most of the primary school construction program had come to a standstill. Toward the end of the implementation period, in October 1988, the Bank and the Government agreed to award contract for construction (as well as furniture production and training of district building supervisors) at all remaining primary school sites to an NGO, the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS). Under a two-year contract ("Memo of Understanding") with the Government, TCRS arranged for direct payment from the Bank to its overseas account for the procurement of building materials and other related expenses and was able to complete the construction of the remaining primary schools within the specified period. Indeed TCRS "saved" money from its contract amount, and agreed with the Government to build additional schools in Lindi. The Completion Mission visited some of the schools constructed by TCRS in Arusha and Lindi and found them on the whole of acceptable design and quality. The consensus among Tanzanian officials and Bank staff with whom the Completion Mission discussed the matter is that the involvement of TCRS was a critical element in getting the primary school component completed. The TCRS experience reinforces the valuable contribution of NGOs in the implementation of Bank projects (Para. 9). (c) Further, the experience det *ed from the project confirms previous Bank experience that the design of Bank projects should be kept very simple and unencumbered with too many and diverse components that often render the project too complex and unwieldy. In this particular case, the project's objectives were laudable and identified correctly the needs of the country as perceived at the time (primary school equity, alleviating enrollment bottlenecks in senior secondary schools, strengthening science teaching in secondary schools, improving quality at PTTCs, and institutional strengthening, Paras. 4-5). In retrospect, it would have been more prudent and justified to respond to those needs through successive projects, rather than to try to address a'l the identified needs through one all-inclusive project (the SAR contained some 13 different project  - 11 - components (SAR, Annex 1)). Implementation of the project was further complicated as one of the most important components -- primary school expansion in undeserved areas -- was under the Prime Minister's Office (which operated the country's primary schools at the time), while the other components were largely under MOE. The lesson that this project reinforces is that project design should be as simple as possible, if possible under only one agency. (d) As indicated in the Government's contribution to this report (Part II, Paras. 25 and 42), even though the project became effective in December, 1980, construction work did not start until five years later in 1985-86. In other words, when construction finally began, the project was only one year away from its planned completion date (1986). In addition to the adverse economic conditions of the period (discussed elsewhere in this report), the reasons for the long delay in starting construction included delays in the completion of standard school designs, lengthy and cumbersome tendering procedures of the Government, shortages and frequent turn-over of technical staff at the Project Office, inadequate transportation facilities, and lack of fuel to transport building materials, particularly to remote rural areas where the primary schools were to be built. In retrospect, the Bank and the Government were far too optimistic than was warranted under the circumstances in respect to the logistical and implementation arrangements required for carrying out the project as planned. The Government's contribution to the report rightly concludes that the lesson to be derived from the implementation of this project is that constraints such as those mentioned above should be considered carefully and realistically at the time a project is prepared, appraised and launched. If necessary, the Bank should stand ready to provide early assistance at the preparation stage to ensure that designs and tender documentation are completed (or are at an advanced stage of completion) before a project is declared effective. I. Borrower's Performance 20. Apart from the economic and financial problems prevalent in the country during much of the implementation period, other factors that adversely affected the Borrower's performance in project implementation included: (i) Lengthy Government procedures, especially in regard to tendering (short-listing, evaluation of tender by MOE tender board, awardinLg of contracts, etc). Similarly lengthy procedures applied to procurement of imported materials: short-listing of suppliers, documentation, and in particular obtaining of import licenses, clearing at entry points/ports were extremely time-consuming and often needlessly over-bureaucratic. Similarly the Government was tardy in submitting yearly audit reports, and the Completion Mission  - 12 - was unable to obtain audit report for FY90, in spite of persistent reminders from IDA.' (ii) At the central level, especially the PCU, planning and supervision capacities were inadequate. The situation was further exacerbated when staff morale was adversely affected as a result of the gloomy economic environment which all civil servants had to endure during much of the implementation period; ;and (iii) The support to the regions and districts were inadequate at least until DANIDA's support was introduced (one project engineer and vehicles) in 1985. J. Proiect Relationshi, 21. Bank staff and officials of the Borrower involved in the implementation of the project had, on the whole, a healthy professional relationship. However, their relationship would have been even more strong if there had been a better continuity of Bank staff working on the project. Also, the existence of two separate project implementation entities (one under MOE and the other under the Prime Minister's Office) affected project coordination and at times caused some strain among the two units as well as with Bank staff. This appears to have been remedied with the follow up project where implementation appears far more unified than was the case under this project. K. Consulting Services 22. Consultants for construction activities were used by the PCU for the design of the TES warehouses and the NEC. While these components were completed on time and without cost overruns (with international contractors), the Completion Mission has noted that the warehouses in particular were over-designed and difficult and expensive to maintain. The PCU also contracted ILO/EQUIPRO for the procurement and distribution of textbooks, laboratory equipment and supplies. EQUIPRO performed well in discharging its contractual responsibilities. Finally, as already noted in Paras. 9 and 19 (b), the Government contracted in October 198s the services of TCRS to complete the construction of the remaining primary schools that was begun some five years earlier with private contractors, but had come to a virtual standstill when the economic situation in the country deteriorated. TCRS's performance has been outstanding. 3 As delays in submission of audit report has become a major issue in Tanzania, in most sectors, Bank Management recently (November, 1991) initiated a major effort to have all Tanzania project audits current.  - 13 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TANZANIA SEVENTH EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1056-TA) PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THF. BOPROWER'S PERSPECTIVE A. Background. 23. The sectoral focus of the project was on human resource development, qualitative improvement and equity considerations. The specific objectives of the project were: (a) To improve the quality and increase output of upper eecondary education particularly in order to improve female participaticn rates and alleviate the manpower bottlenecks in science fields. (b) To enhance the capacities and quality of supporting services to the education sector. (c) To improve the quality of Primary Education with the provision of more teaching materials and furniture and to provide with greater access to primary schooling. B. The Proiect Components 24. The pr ject components are as described in Part I of the completion report. C. Project Imolementation 25. General. The Seventh Education Project co-financed by IDA, DANIDA and the Tanzania Government to the tune of $45 million was approved and became effective in December 1980. The planned completion da-.e was March 31, 1986 and the closing date was September 30, 1986. However the project did not take-off in time due to: (a) Delayed completion of designs and tender documentation due to shortage and frequent turn-over of technical manpower. (b) Adverse economic conditions that led to devaluation of currencies and shortage of building materials and fuel in the country. 26. Due to the above factors it was proposed that the project be re- negotiated. The project cost was thus revised at $29.5 million ($4.5 millon DANIDA grant and 25.0 million IDA Credit) and the scope reduced in 1984. The reduced scope of the project necessitated the in-built areas and the deletion of some projects, the objectives and the pleading by the Tanzania Government to retain them, notwithstanding. (i) Ngara Secondary School (ii) Demonstration Secondary School, University of Dar as Salaam (iii) Mkokotoni Teachers College, Zanzibar  - 14 - (iv) The provision of Lecture rooms and procurement of Science equipment to four colleges (v) Procurement of laboratory equipment to Dar es Salaam Technical College (vi) Reduced number of classrooms, staff houses, and toilet units in the primary subsector 27. At the re-negotiation in 1984 it was agreed to allow importation of building materials not available in the country. However, the process of obtaining approvals, tendering procedures and delivery caused further delays. Imported materials reached the project sites between 1987 and 1988. The project closing date earmarked for December 1989 was extended to December 31, 1990. Because of the above delays, reduction of scope, the importation of building materials and the unexpected refusal by the Bank to allow the utilization of the anticipated savings for procurement of science equipment urgently required for improvement of science education in other schoo's, the project closed on June 30, 1991 with a balance of $1,049,592.61. Part A. Primary Subsector: Prime Minister's Office 28. Summary (i) The 7th IDA Education Project was the first project that included the financing of Primary Education (ii) The main objectives for the Primary Subsector were (a) to improve the quality of primary education through the provision of teaching materials, furniture and (b) to provide poorer rural districts greater access to primary education by constructing new buildings, furnishing and provision of teaching materials. (iii) During rhe implementation, the Government faced many constraints such as shortage of building materials, vehicles and fuel. These led to the extension of the project, importation of building materials, and contracting the unstarted project sites to TCRS in Lindi and Arusha Regions. The project was also scaled down by the reducing number of classrooms, staff houses and toilet units to be constructed. (iv) The achievements of the project is that 330 classrooms were constructed, 123 staff houses, 87 offices/stores and 52 pit latrines. For furniture 34,782 school desks, 1902 cupboards, 4 Bank staff responsible for project implementation explained to the Completion Mission that the reason for not approving the Government's request was due to a disbursement freeze that was in effect at the time for non-compliance with audit covenants.  - 15 - 2,794 tables and 2,978 chairs have been made and delivered to schools. Various teaching materials were purchased and distributed to the project schools. (v) The project, the first in the primary subsector, has achieved considerable success in meeting the objectives. The experiences gained would help in preparation and implementation of similar projects in the future. D. Civil Works 29. Benefits (i) Construction of 330 new permanent classrooms enabling 14,850 students to be enrolled thus improving access to education. (ii) Teachers have provided with accommodas.ion by addition of 123 staff houses. (iii) In some localities community mobilization to participate in self- help schemes had improved and in nomadic areas people have started to settle around the newly constructed schools. (iv) The revised design for classrooms used by the project has now been adopted by the Government for use in primary schools. 30. Problems Mi) The project was delayed to start due to lack of transport facilities, shortage of building materials and fuel. (ii) Local fundis (artisans) were not available in some project sites and had to be brought in from nearby districts/regions. In some cases the fundis ran away when they were not paid or not supplied with materials in time. Also, labor cost rates were not attractive to the artisans. (iii) The shortage of water was acute in some sites especially during the dry season. (iv) Some remote sites were not accessible during the rainy season. (v) The vehicles provided for each district were not enough compared to the size of the district. 31. Lessons and Recommendations (i) The means of transport should be considered at the beginning of the project and be provided with enough spare parts.  - 16 - (ii) Where problems of direct labor are experienced emplcymenui of small contractors be considered. (iii) Labor cost rates should vary according to the local environment. (iv) Use of locally available buildinp materials should be encouraged. (v) A policy on maintaining project buildings should be introduced immediately after the completion of the project. (vi) In future the construction of school buildings should be integrated with other socio-economic infrastructures such as water supply, heath, etc. (vii) The provision of staff rooms should be considered. E. Furniture 32. Benefits Mi) The school desk designed by the project has proved to be strong and has been adopted by the Government for use in all primary schools. (ii) The addition of 34,782 school desks reduced to some extent the problem of desks. Attendance has also improved as pupils no longer sit on the floor. 33. Problems Mi) Some of the furniture suppliers awarded the tender lacked modern equipment to complete the tenders in time. (ii) PCU had recommended that furniture be assembled at selected centers close to the schools. This was not followed and as a result some furniture was broken on the way to schools. 34. Lessons and Recommendations Mi) School desks should be made of hard-wood only. (ii) Floor finishes should be durable to minimize breakage of furniture and reduce termite attacks to furniture. (iii) It is recommended that every classroom be provided with enough desks, a cupboard, a teacher's table and chair. F. Teachina Materials and Equinment 35. Benefits Mi) Examination performance had improved in project schools  - 17 - (ii) Enrolment and attendance had improved in previous years. For example in Urambo district enrollment had improved from 60.8 to 852. Iramba 86.8 to 962 and Chunya district from 89.3 to 982 etc. (iii) Schools under the project do better in outdoor activities than other schools. (iv) Pupils have gained much interest in reading supplementary books. 31. Problem. (i) Transportation of teaching materitls was a problem due to inadequate transport means. Hiring charges were too high. (ii) Storage facilities at PCU and district centers was a problem. 37. Recommendations Mi) Teaching materials and equipment should be identified at the beginning of the project. (ii) The project should be provided with transport facilities for distributing teaching materials to schools. (iii) It is recommended that seminars for teachers in project schools should be organized on the use of some teaching materials and equipment provided as well as keeping stock of materials. 38. Proiect Management and General Recommendation M) Each implementing ministry should correspond directly with IDA. (ii) It was easier to correspond with the Regional Officer in Nairobi than it is now in Washington. (iii) It is recommended that project staff should visit other countries implementing similar projects to exchange experiences. (iv) Seminars should be conducted by IDA to all project leaders from all countries implementing similar projects. (v) Project staff should be given orientation courses on implementing the projects. (vi) The World Bank visiting mission should not be biased even before visiting the project areas in order to understand the actual successes and problems of the projects. (vii) Recent frequent changes in the World Bank visiting missions which had been made to Tanzania have caused inconsistencies in the proper follow-up of the project.  - 18 - (viii) There should be % full time Project Coordinator team comprising the Project Coordinator, Project Accountant and his assistant, two full-time Architects/Civil Engineers, Quantity Surveyors, one Procurement Officer one full-time Secretary and Supporting staff. The Project team should not be transferred during the duration of the project. Part B. Post Primary Sector Ministry of Education 39. Proiect Objectives. The project objectives as defined in Part I, of this Project Completion Report were in line with the Sectoral policy and the overall national socio-economic development strategy. 40. The Project Comvonents. The project components as described in Part I, of the PCR covered the stated objectives. However the reduced programme of the project fell short of attaining the stated objectives especially in the field of teacher training aimed at improving primary education and support to less developed areas. 41. Adequacy and accuracy of Factual Information. The country data defining the project profile at the project completion as presented in Part III was compiled by PIS/PCU, visits made to selected institutions and discussions with the heads of institutions and teachers/workers. 42. Proiect Implementation. (Performance, Assessment, Problems and Lessons Learned) a. Civil Works (i) Construction work for most of the project was considerably delayed to start due to shortage and rapid turn-over of technical manpower, the completion of the standard designs, adverse economic conditions leading to inflation and devaluation of currencies and shortages of building materials and fuel. The above problems necessitated revision of the project costs, reduction of built areas and deletion of some projects in 1984. (ii) Construction work did not start until 1985/86. When the project was revised it was agreed that importation of building materials be approved. The building materials were not delivered on project sites until 1987/88 due to long procedures of gaining approvals, tendering and delivery procedures thus contributing further to the delays. All the above factors contributed to the delays in completion of the projects causing unwanted time and cost overruns. By 1987 it was discovered that the overruns would make it impossible for contractors to complete the works at their original tender sums and the contracts were revised in 1988.  - 19 - (iii) In relation to buildings, institutions have raised concern as to the small size of stores without racks for storing equipment and chemicals, laboratories lacking gas fittings, fume cupboards, perimeter shelves and bench cupboards, perimeter shelves and bench cupboards for storing such items as tripod stands, beakers, etc. It is recommended that the present design should be modified to include the above mentioned shortcomings and meet user needs. (iv) As for TES godowne the change of policy has affected their use. TES is no longer the sole distributor of educational materials. Alternative uses of the godowns should be considered. (v) The availability of building materials and technical staff to carry out the designs should be considered carefully at the project appraisal. If need be the possibility of PPF funds should be made available to ensure that the designs and tender documentation are completed before the project effectiveness. 43. Furniture Most of the furniture has been delivered and installed. Installation has not been completed at Shinyanga Commercial, Sengerema, Rugambwa, Same and the National Examination Council completion of furniture was delayed due to the delay in construction works and in some cases suppliers failed to complete delivery of furniture. Generally the furniture is of good quality and acceptable standard but a few problems have been mentioned by institutions such as benches, stools and chairs lack braces on the legs and as such easily break. Beds are too small and cannot take standard mattresses. The furniture design should be modified to suit the conditions of users. The tender for furniture should not be awarded tot he main contractor to avoid delays. 44. Equipment. Textbooks and Vehicles (i) Tenders for equipment, textbooks and vehicles were administered by the project unit and some by ILO - Equipro specialists. Most of the equipment has been delivered and is appreciated that it is of good quality and relevant. The selection of the equipment lists was done by experienced teachers in schools and school inspectors and approved by the relevant directorates. The teachers and pupils are very happy. The supply of good quality equipment e - textbooks has made a positive contribution to the performance of students. This is evident from the pressure of parents and pupils wanting to go to the proper schools leading to overcrowding in some cases. (ii) Transport support to NEC and TES face the problems of spare parts thus affecting the performance of the institutions.  - 20 - (iii) The contracting of procurement of equipment to ILO faced some problems of communications. In some cases the containers were sent to the school without consulting the Procurement Unit. It took some time to dispatch procurement officers to go and issue the deliveries and start to use. Generally the procurement was successfully done and the use of experienced teachers in preparing the lists should be emphasized. 45. Professional Services (i) Most of the professional services to the project were executed by the Project Implementation staff - architectural, engineering, land surveying, tender documentation and procurement. The only professional service contracted was soil investigation. (ii) For NEC and TES godowns the professional services were contracted to an external firm because the designs are non-standard and are not in our room program. This indicates that P.I.S. has been able to render most of the professional services thus reducing the costs. However, there has been attrition of technical staff and there is need to strengthen it in terms of training equipment and transport. (iii) Procurement services were performed by the PIS except when the Bank insisted that the Ministry should use ILO - Equipro to procure science equipment involving unnecessary expenditures. Support to the procurement will enable it to render better services. 46. Technical Assistance (i) A total of 32 science and math teachers were recruited from India and Pakistan to teach in secondary schools end teachers' colleges under local terms in order to cut down costs. However, some of the teachers did not come. This was compensated by the recruited teachers extending their contracts. A total of 84.7 staff years were utilized against the 100 man years planned. (ii) The placement of these teachers in schools alleviated the shortage of graduate science teachers and greatly improved the performance of pupils in science subjects. (iii) Another technical assistance utilized was for the National Examination Council. A short term consultant carried out a need assessment for institutional development, including specifications of software and computer. Another consultant/M/S Computer Consultant (K) Ltd. carried out the development of computer programs, data analysis for 4.5 man years.  - 21 - (iv)" A short term consultant (architect) from DANIDA carried out revision of primary school building designs and produced a standard design which has been adopted by the Government. (v) The technical assistance received has been very useful. However, it would have been beneficial if a program of training science teachers would have been tied up with the recruitment of expatriate teachers. 47. Fellowships Training of manpower for NEC, TES, CURE, PIS and tutors for laboratory technicians DSM Technical College has been implemented. A total of 64 staff years has been utilized. Iost of the people trained are in place. Some attrition resulting from retirement, death or moving to other institutions has occurred. The training has ben useful and productive. 48. Pre-investment Studies and Evaluation The studies undertaken during the project includes study tours to study the teaching of integrated science, evaluation of the primary subcomponent, preparation of the expansion program for day secondary schools and income-generating activities in secondary schools. The studies have been useful for decision-making especially on integrated science and expansion of day schools. 5 There is need for most study on educational issues. 49. Prolect Manaaement (i) During the project period there were frequent changes of technical and accounting staff. The designs passed through many architects/engineers, each re-starting the design. Supervision of projects was faced with transport problems, as well as shortage of staff. Lack of permanent supporting staff also contributed to the delay of work. (ii) The most crucial issue was lack of smooth project accounting. Payment procedures follow the general system in the Ministry. It is difficult to retrieve the documents for preparation of audit reports and disbursements. The lack of permanence of project accountants has exacerbated the problem. Four accountants had dealt wii.h the project. New accountants had to start to learn the work thus contributing to delay in preparation and submission of auditet accounts. Thee is a need to have a separate accounting S The Completion Mission was not able to rind copies of these studies.  - 22 - system for the project and that accounting unit should be full time. 50. Evaluation of Bank Performance (i) During the project implementation, there were frequent changes in the Bank supervision mission personnel with different outlook and interests. Though the frequency of the missions was adequate, the missions lacked consistency and understanding in dealing with problems and issues. While the earlier missions understood the inherent problems and were cooperative in solving them, the later missions seemed to have formed their own biased ideas even before discussing the issues with field staff. It is unfortunate that the same supervision mission was involved in preparation of the new project to the extent that they got carried away in the new project and became insensitive to the problems and issues of this project. (ii) It is a pity that the reqt.ests made by the Government to utilize the anticipated savings (estimated at $2.0 million) for procurement of science equipment, laboratory fittings and training (which were in line with project objectives) was refused by the Bank for no apparent reason. At first the Bank had agreed to the proposal and suggested that the procurement be made through ILO to which the Government paid $118,400.00. But when the tender awards were submitted to the bank for approval the Bank did not approve for unknown reasons. Hence the unspent balance funds of $1,049,592.61. 6 (iii) The Government had proposed that the project should be implemented as planned to meet the sectoral needs and priorities, except that the areas be reduced to cut down costs and be within the available funds. However, new construction was not in donor's favor and the Government's proposal was rejected. There is a need for closer cooperation and understanding between the borrower and the donors. There is a need to streamline the accounting procedures for smooth and timely implementation of projects. The project staff should be retained during the project life and be given appropriate training in Bank operations. 6 Bank staff responsible for project implementation explained that the reason for not approving the Government's request was due a to disbursement freeze that was in effect at that time for non- compliance with the project's covenant on submission of audit reports.  - 23 - 51. Generally the project objectives have been realized, despite the considerable delays, the shortcomings in buildings and furniture, the reduced scope of the project and the underutilization of credit funds.  - 24 - PART III: STATISTICAL INFORHATION A. RELATED IDA CREDITS Table 1: OTHER RELATED CREDITS Credit Title Purpose Year Status Credit 45-TA Secondary school improvement 1963 Completed First Education 12/67 12/67 Project Credit 149-TA Secondary school expansion; 1969 Completed Second Education diversification of secondary 12/76 Project curriculum; primary school teacher training expansion; introduction of technical, agricultural and commercial subjects in teacher training, colleges and secondary schools Credit 232-TA Expansion and improvement of 1971 Completed Third Education agricultural training 4/78 Project Credit 371-TA Lower secondary school 1973 Completed Fourth Education expansion; primary teacher 12/80 Project expansion; quality upgrading of science and health teacher training; expansion of medical training; re-orient medical training to include public health; management training Credit 607-TA Village management training; 19t6 Completed 6/82 Fifth Education diversification of secondary Project school curriculum; improvemeat of training for auditors and accountants; strengthen educational planning Credit 861-TA Expansion of skill training 1979 Completed 6/88 Sixth Education (vocational, technical, Project accounting and management) Credit 1056-TA Qualitative improvement of 1980 Completed Seventh Education primary education; improving 12/90 Project access to primary schools; expansion and upgrading of secondary education; institutional strengthening Credit 237-TA Institutional strengthening; 1990 Ongoing Educational qualitative upgrading of Planning and primary and secondary schools; 1 Rehabilitation resource mobilization for education and training  - 25 - B. Prolect Timetable Table 2 s PLANNED, REVISED AND ACTUAL DATES OF PROJECT TIMETABLE Item Planned Date Revised Date Actual Date Identification 10/78 10/78 10/78 Preparation 1-2/79 1-2/79 1-2/79 Appraisal 5-6/79 5-6/79 5-6/79 Post Appraisal 9-10/79 9-10/79 9-10/79 Negotiations* 4/80 4/80 4/80 Board Approval 7/80 7/80 7/80 Credit 12/80 12/80 12/80 Effectiveness Project Completion 12/86 12/88, 12/89, 12/90 12/90 Project Clos1ng 3/87 6/89, 6/90, 12/90 6/89, 6/90, 12/90 *Negotiations were held in Copenhagen 52. Comments on Timetable. At the Goveroment's request, the Credit Agreement was amended to extend the Closing Date by two years, from December 31, 1986, to December 31, 1988, in view of the acute economic difficulties facing the country at the time which had particularly adverse effect on the construction industry which relied heavily on imported construction materials, which were now in extremely short supply. At the time it was also felt that following the reduction in project scope that were agreed upon at the "tripartite" (GOT, IDA and DANIDA) held in Copenhagen in April, 1984, project implementation, which hitherto had been slow, would accelerate sufficiently to have the various components completed by 1988. A further extension of the Closing Date was agreed upon, following the signing of contract with TCRS in 1988 to complete construction of primary schools (Paras. 8-9). C. Loan Disbursements Table 3: Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursement (US$ Million) Bank PY 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Appraisal n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 25.0 -- - -- -- -- Estimate _ Actual 0.01 0.28 0.51 1.67 3.89 5.65 8.73 16.88 21.0 23.08 23.64 Actual as S -- -- -_ -- -_ 23.0 35.0 68.0 84.0 92.0 95.00 of Estimate - Date of Final 07/23/91 Disbursement  - 26 - 53. Comments on Disbursements. The appraisal estimates included projected disbursements from the co-financed portion (DANIDA), while the amounts shown for Actual Disbursement (recorded by the Bank's Loan and Trust Department) refer to disbursements from the IDA credit only. It is not therefore possible compute "actual" as a percentage of appraisal estimates. The co-financed portion (DANIDA) was fully disbursed on 8/8/90. Because of the devaluation of the Danish Kroner during the implementation period, the total amount of the co-financed portion (Danish Kroner 45 million) was equivalent to the US$ 6.97 (US$ 20.00 million at appraisal). D. Proiect Imglementation Table 4: Planned and Actual Completion Dates of Project Components (Civil Works) Components BAR Target Actual starting jActual | Months of dates completion Delay 1. Lower Secondary Schools lsalato S9 5/85 6/85 8/90 63 Same SS 5/85 12/85 11190 66 Sganta SS 5/85 9/86 7/89 50 Senegerema ss 5/85 9/85 12/90 67 odomda Day 5/85 9/85 6/90 61 2. Higher Secondary Schools Iloboru 5/85 3/87 9/89 52 Tambaza 5185 6/84 12/89 55 Kilakala 5/85 6/86 11/89 54 Korogve 5/85 12/85 12/89 55 Rugsmbva 5|85 12/85 1/91 68 Shinyanga 5/85 9/85 12/90 67 3. PrImary Teacher Training Colleges Nkrumhah TTC 9/85 6/86 | 9/91 72 New PTTC - Zanzibar: Component ys deleted 4. TES 9/83 9/86 12/87 51 Warehouses* 5. NEC 12/84 3/85 5/86 17 Headquarters Prlmary schoole _ _ School 9/85 - 12/90 63 construction in five districts _ __ _ *lIve of the six warehouses were completed; the sixth warehouse was deleted as a result of the change in Goverment policy to phase out parastatals such as TEB.  - 27 - 54. Coaments on Project Imnlementation. The reasons for the delay in civil worka has been explained in Part I (Paras. 8-10), and also in Part II written by Government. Essentially, the main reasons were the acute economic difficulties prevalent in the country during the period of implementation which resulted in shortages of construction materialo, spare parts, fuel, etc. Also, major devaluations of the local currency necessitated revisions of the construction contracts, which took a much longer period than anticipated to finalize. The primary school component experienced persistent delays on account of the geographical dispersion of the school construction sites over wide and remote districts in the Arusha and Lindi regions, coupled with inadequate and underqualified supervisory and managerial staff and weak logistic arrangements. E. Pro1ect Cost and Financing Table 5: PROJECT COSTS (US$ Million) ESTIHATED COSTS ACTUAL COSTS Category Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Civil Works 11.48 9.40 20.88 8.73 7.14 15.87 Furniture, Equip. 1.29 11.65 12.94 6.80 5.57 12.37 Textbooks and Vehicles e Technical 0.28 2.58 2.8 0.05 0.41 0.46 Assistance Research and 0.33 0.49 0.82 0.46 0.70 1.16 Professional 0.52 0.77 1.29 0.59 0.88 1.47 Services Project Admlnilt. 0.50 0.12 0.62 1.32 0.33 1.65 Una11oCated/ -_ 16.08 16.08 -- 1.13 1.13 Undisbursed TOTALA 14.40 41.09 55.50 17.95 16.16 34.00 * Totals for forein and local costs have been rounded off. 55. Comments on Pro1ect Costs. The appraisal estimate of total project costs was US$ 55.5 million. At the time the project's scope was reduced following the Copenhagen meeting between the Government, the Bank and DANIDA the total cost of the project was also scaled down to US$ 35.0 million. Much of the reduction was from the Danish contribution which was reduced from US$ 20 million equivalent to only $4.5 million equivalent. (The Danish currency appreciated later during implementation so that by the end of the project, the Danish contribution Was estimated by the Bank's Loan and Trust Department as about US$7 million equivalent.) As explained in Part I (Par&. 10),  - 28 - this was partly a result of change in Danish foreign assistance policy for Tanzania which to give higher priority to rehabilitation (and foreign exchange support), and partly also to the large depreciation of the Danish currency that took place at the time. The total project cost of about US$ 34 million equivalent was very near the revised total project cost of US $35 million, the shortfall was largely due to the US$1.1 million undisbursed from the Bank credit (and subsequently cancelled). Table 6: PROJECT FINANCING (US$ million, net of taxes) Planned Revised Actual _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Government 10.5 5.2 2.0 IDA 25.0 25.0 25.0 DANIDA 20.0 4.5 7.0 TOTAL 55.5 34.7 34.0 56. Comments on Prolect Financina. The financing plan was revised at the Copenhagen meeting in April, 1984 in the context of reducing the scale of the project (Para. 10). The Danish contribution was reduced significantly from US$20 equivalent (D. Kr.115 million) at appraisal to US $4.5 million equivalent (D. Kr. 44.55 million at the exchange rate prevailing at the time). As indicated earlier this was partly a reflection of the depreciation of the Danish Kroner at the time, and partly a deliberate Government policy to reallocate Danish; assistance to Tanzania to rehabilitation of existing facilities, thereby reducing investment in new institutions which would potentially increase the Government's recurrent cost burden. Later during implementation period, the Danish contribution was worth the equivalent of about US$ 7 million, as shown in Table 6, above. The IDA credit of US$ 25.0 remained unchanged. On account of the sharp economic deterioration in the country, the Government's actual expenditure was about US$ 2.0 million equivalent, and much of it was disbursed for project administration.  - 29 - Table 7: ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS (US $ Million) Category Original Actual ________________________ _ j ,llocation 3isbursement I. Civil Works 10.00 8.78 |II. Furnture, Eqpt. 5.50 11.39 Textbooks & Vehicles. I III.Technical Assistance 1.40 0.47 IV. R&D, Studies, Trng. 0.39 0.97 V. Professional Services 0.50 1.37 VI. Project Administration 0.06 0.66 Unallocated 7.15 _-____ TOTAL 25.00 23.64 57. Comments on Allocation of Loan Proceeds. 95.52 of the creCit was disbursed; the undisbursed amount totaling about $1.35 million was canceled. The DANIDA grant was fully disbursed. F. Project Results. Table 8a: DIRECT BENEFIT OF THE PROJECT (Construction of Primary Schools)* Districts Appraisal Revised Actual No. Completed Target Target Completion by TCRS (1984) _ Mondull 63/11/32/21 49/9/25/17 54/12/22/13 20/5/15/10 Ngorongoro 63/10/31/21 48/9/25/16 48/11/22/12 22/5/8/7 Kiteto 72/12/36/24 54/9/28/20 48/13/21/9 45/9/11/4 Lindi Rural 90/15/45/30 75/14/34/20 72/16/31/14 12/3/4/3 Kilva 72/12/36/24 54/9/28/17 70/16/31/14 13/-48/6 TOTAL 360/60/180/120 280//50/140/ 302/70/123/52 112/22/49/30 Mtvara** ___ 28/17/-/- -__ *Figures indicate number of classrooms/office-stores/teachers' houses/pit latrines. ** Mtwara opted for classrooms in lieu of furniture.  - 30 - 58. Commento on Pro1ect Bene its QPrim*r, School Construgction): Originally only four districts were identified for construction of primary schools. During the project period, Monduli district was divided into two adding Ngorongoro to the list. Additionally 17 classrooms were constructed in the adjoining district of Mtwara, which was not included in the appraisal estimates. The completion ratios for the various facilities were as followst 1072 for classrooms (1172) if Mtwara is added), 882 for staff houses, 1402 for office/storage, and 58S for pit latrines. About 37Z of the classrooms were completed by TCRS, all during the last two months of the implementation period. The Completion Mission noted that the quality of constructicn of classrooms constructed by TCRS was on the whole comparable or even better than those built earlier by private contractors. In any event, a sizeable portion of those constructed by the private contractors were not fully completed in the sense that they sometimes lacked windows, doors or floors. There were no set targets for furniture, but a lump sum of TSh. 13,664,600 was allocated for all 16 districts. For the five districts mentioned above, classrooms and offices were to be furnished along with the construction. At the time the TCRS commenced work (January, 1989) an estimated 362 of the civil works had roofs and were in use. However, many schools were without doors, windows and floors.  - 31 - Table Sb. DIRECT BENEFIT OF THE PROJECT (Fxpansion of Enrollment) Type/name of Actual Institution Appraisal Revised (1991) ____________________________ ___________ Ta rge t I I PRIMARY EDUCATION Monduli/Ngorongoro District 6,300 2,850 5,100 Kiteto District 3,600 2,700 2,400 Lindi Rural District 4,500 3,750 3,600 Kilva District 3,600 2,700 3,500 Mtwara ___ ___ 1,400 TOTAL FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL 18,000 16,000 ____ ____ ___ ____ ___ ____ __ ____ ___ 12,000 _ _ _ _ _ _ II. SECONDARY SCHOOLS Appraisal Tareet Actual (1991) Msalato (Girls)--Dodoma 828 | 848 Same (mixed) --Killmanj. 500 | 344 Nganza (Girls)--Mwanza .500 | 458 Senegerema (Girls)--Hwanza 820 _ 701 Ilbora (Boys)--Arusha 720 804 Tambaza (mixed)--Dar 1040 1697 Kilakala (Girls)--Morogoro 720 771 Korogwe (Girls)--Tanga 660 697 Rugambwa (Girls)--Ziwi M. 720 517 Shinyanga Commercial 420 341 Kibaha (boys)--Coast 720 711 Minaki (boys)--Coast 600 511 Pugu (Boys)--Dar 900 811 Mazengo (Boys)--Dodoma 1060 996 Moshi (Boys)--Kilitnanjaro 720 709 Shinyanga (Boys)--Shinyan. 600 651 Tabora (Boys)--Tabora 600 651 Tabora (Girls)--Tabora 660 537 Ihungo (boys)--Zlwi M. 600 551 Dodoma Day (Mixed)--Dod. 800 692 Total for Secondaryl 14,278 13,998  - 32 - Comments on Project Benefits (Enrollment Expansion) The project has exceeded the revised enrollment epansion target for the primary school component by 33S, and was in fact very close (882) to achieving the original appraisal target. In the case of enrollment expansion for upper secondary schools, the project has virtually (98Z) attained the target. Another important objective of the project, that of expanding girls' enrollment in upper secondary schools was also attained. At the time the project was appraised the total number of girls in upper secondary schools that were assisted by the project was only 920. The project sought to increase this number to about 2770. At the time of project completion the appraisal target was exceeded by almost 20S, and the number of girls attending the project-assisted schools had risen to over 3290. Table 8c* DIRECT BENEFIT OF THE PROJECT (Technical Assistance and Fellowships) Project Item SAR Target (SlY) Actual (SlY) A. Technical Assistgace 1. Secondary School Voluntary Teachers 100 87.5 2. National Ixamination Council 12 __ Total TA 112 87.5 3. Fellowships __ TUB 10 2.75 315 32 15.25 WEE 36 38.25 Dar Technical 6 ColOge 36 Project I Administration : Total fellowships 78 63.25  - 33 - G. Status of Credit Covenants Table 9: COMPLIAMOR WITH CREDIT COVENANTS Section Covenant Status 3.08(b) Borrower to furnish IDA with a ten-year plan Not met for the training, posting and retention of Tanzanian science teachers, by 6/30/81 3.09 Borrower to furnish IDA by 3/31/81 a plan of Partially action: 1) for studies to be undertaken with met project funds, il) supporting infotmation and materials for such a plan l 3.10 Borrower to enlarge class group size by In full 12/31/83 compliance 3.06 Borrower to provide IDA by 6/30/81 with a In full list of villages locations (and relate4 compliance school location planning data) to be included in part A (il) of the project l 3.08(a) Borrower to provide IDA by 3/31/81 a plan for In full the recruitment of expatriate graduate compliance science teachers 4.01 Borrower to maintain to maintain a separate Partially (a) account for SOEs met; record keeping not sufficientl y systematic 4.01(b) Borrower to retain, until one year after the In project's Closing Date, all financial and Compliance; expenditure records pertaining to the Credit record keeping not sufficientl y systematic 4.01(c) Borrower to provide IDA audit reports for Submission each of the accounts established for the of audit project for each of the Government's fiscal reports was year within a maximum of a year after the irregular; close of the fiscal year part of audit report for FY89 and for FY90 not received  - 34 - H. Use of Bank Resources Table 10: STAPF INPUTS BY STAGE OF PROJECT CYCLE IN STAFF WEEKS (in Staff-weeks) Planned Revised Final/Actual Stage of Project Cycle ____ ___ ___ ___ _ BQ Field E Q Pil dl HQ Field Through Appraisal 58.6 8 56.6 -- 58.6 8 Appraisal to Board 62.4 23 62.4 -- 62.4 23 Board to Effectiveness 6.4 0 6.4 r - 6.4 0 Supervision 70.0 31 70 r - 126.5 63 TOTAL 197.4 62 197.4 -- 253.9 94 Comments on Staff Inouts Staff inputs for the early year until appraisal was about average for education projects. Also, the appraisal process was quite adequate. The supervision period, however, was almost double (both headquarter time and time in the field, reflecting the unusually long implementation period which was extended by about five years (from 1986 to 1991). The project was supervised at regular intervals (about seventeen supervision missions, plus an "in-depth review mission" over ten years), particularly during the first half of the project's life when supervision was fielded from the Nairobi office (Para. 17).  - 35 - TableI 1: MISSION DATA BY STAGE OF PROJECT Mission Month/Year No. of Staff Performance Persons 1j Weeks Status by in the Activity k/ _______________ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Fie td_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Identification 10/19-26/78 1 (ES) 2 = = = Preparatio 01/19-02/10/79 2 (ED, TE) 6 Appraisal 05/04-06/01/79 5 (ES,EC, 17 __________________ EC, TS, A) Post-Appraisal 04/27-10/10/79 3 tES,EC,A) 6 Total 31 _ l ~ ~ __ _ _ C___ P M E Supervision I * 04/22-05/06/81 2 (A, ED) 4 1 1 2 Supervision It 10/21-11/01/81 2 (A, TE) 4 1 _ 1 2 Supervision III 04/26-05/06/82 3 (A,AD,TE) 6 1 - 1 2 Supervision IV 10/21-29/82 3(EP, TE,A) 3 2 2 1 2 Supervision V 04/18-29/83 2 (TE. A) 4 2 2 2 3 Supervision VI 10/18-28/83 2 (ED, TE) 4 3 2 1 3 Supervision VII 03/17-23/85 2 (TE, A) 4 2 2 1 2 Supervision VIII 10/10-21/85 2 (ED, TE) 4 2 2 1 2 Supervision IX 02/01-14/86 3 (ED.TE,A) 6 2 2 2 1 Supervision X 10/21-11/05/86 2 (TE, A) 4 2 2 2 2 Supervision XI 03/19-31/87 2 (TE, A) 4 2 2 2 2 Supervision XlI 08/04-11/87 2 (ED TE) 2 - Supervision XIII 12/08-16/87 4CED.A,A,A) 4 _ Supervision XIV 03/10-18/88 1 (TE) 1 2 2 2 2 Supervision XV 06/08-18/88 2 (ED, ED) 3 . Supervision XVI 06/30-07/09/88 1 (A) 2 2 2 2 2 Supervision XVII 07/18-08/03/90 1 (ED) 3 2 3 1 Total 61= A=Architect; EDnEducator; ES:Educational Sociologist; EC*Economist; TE=Technical Educator; TS=Educational Testing G=General Status; PeProcurement; M4Nanagement; F-Financ(al * In addition an "in-depth" review mission consisting of two architects was fielded during June 4-20, 1991 to help cost the project following the reduction in project scope.