Turkey - Erzurum Rural Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY Report No. 11410 PROJECT COHPLETION REPORT TURKEY ERZURUM RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2094-TU) DECEMBER 7, 1992 Agriculture Operations Division Country Department I Europe & Central Asia Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Turkish Lire (TL) US$ 1.00 (at Appraisal - May 1981) = TL 100 US$ 1.00 (at Closing - April 1990) = TL 2,310 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.20 pounds I metric ton 1,000 kilograms 1 metric ton = 0.98 long ton ABBREVIATIONS Al Artificial Insemination CP FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program ERDP Erzurum Rural Development Project ERR Economic Rate of Return ESC Erzurum Steering and Co-ordination Committee FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations GDPI General Directorate of Project and Implementation (Renamed in August GDPD 1991 as General Directorate of Agricultural Production and Development [GDPD]) GDRA General Directorate of Rural Affairs of MAFRA GNP Gross National Product GOT Government of Turkey IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development KOYD Less Developed Regions Department MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry MAFRA Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Village Affairs MVA Ministry of Village Affairs PCC Project Coordinating Committee PCR Project Completion Report PDA Provincial Directorate for Agriculture of MAFRA PDRA Provincial Directorate for Rural Affairs of MAFRA PMU Project Management Unit SAR Staff Appraisal Report SPO State Planning Office TCZB Agricultural Bank of Turkey TOPRAKSU Land and Water Development Agency of MVA VGT Village Group Technician WB The World Bank WUA Water Users' Association YSE General Directorate for Rural Affairs of MVA FISCAL YEARS Government of Turkey - January 1 to December 31 TCZB - January 1 to December 31 World Bank - July 1 to June 30  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Oifice of Director-General Operations Evaluation December 7, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Turkey Erzurum Rural Development Project (Loan 2094-TU) Attached, for information, is a copy of the report entitled "Project Completion Report on Turkey - Erzurum Rural Development Project (Loan 2094-TU)" prepared by the FAOfWorld Bank cooperative Program and the Europe and Central Asia Regional Office with Part II contributed by the Borrower. The project achieved most of its physical targets and improved agricultural and livestock services in a remote area. The project outcome is rated satisfactory. However, sustainability is uncertain because of difficulty in staff retention, high recurrent costs, non- functional water users associations, and low quality infrastructure. The PCR is of good quality except for the economic evaluation which excludes a re-estimation of the rate of return. An audit is planned, focusing on the economic impact and sustainability of project achievements. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY ERZURUM RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2094-TU) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ............. EVALUATION SUMMARY .......................................... iii-vi PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ..................... 1 1. Project Identity ................................................. 1 2. Background ................................................... 1 3. Project Objectives and Description ..................................... 3 4. Project Design and Organization ...................................... 4 5. Project Implementation ............................................ 5 6. Project Results and Impact .......................................... 8 7. Sustainability .................................................. 11 8. Bank Performance ............................................... 12 9. Borrower Performance ............................................. 12 10. Lessons .......................... ............................ 13 11. Project Relationships ..................... ........................ 14 12. Consulting Services ...................... ........................ 14 13. Project Documentation and Data ...... .......... ...................... 14 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTVE ................ 15 1. World Bank's Performance .......................................... 15 2. IFAD's Performance .............................................. 16 3. Borrower's Performance - GDPI of MAFRA .............................. 17 4. Borrower's Performance - Organization in Project Area ........................ 18 5. Conclusions and Lessons Leamed ...................................... 22 PART m: STATISTICAL INFORMATION ................................. 26 1. Related Bank Loans .............................................. 26 2. Project Timetable ............................................... 27 3. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Loan Disbursements ........................ 28 4. Project Implementation ............................................ 29 5. Project Costs and Financing ......................................... 30 6. Project Results ................................................. 31 7. Status of Covenants .............................................. 32 8A. Use of Bank Resources: Staff Inputs .............. ..................... 34 8B. Use of Bank Resources: Missions ............... .. .................... 35 ANNEX: Crop and Livestock Activities in Erzurum Province ...................... 37 MAP: IBRD 15986R This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   - i - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY ERZURUM RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2094-TU) PREFACE This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Erzurum Rural Development Project in Turkey, for which IBRD Loan 2094-TU, in the amount of US$40 million equivalent, was approved on March 5, 1982. The project was co-financed by IFAD by Loan 96-TU in the amount of US$20 million which was approved on August 3, 1982. The loans closed on December 31, 1989, almost three years behind schedule. US$9 million of the IBRD Loan and US$4.5 million of the IFAD Loan were cancelled. This PCR was prepared by the staff of the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme (FAO/CP) (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). It was modified by the Agriculture Operations Division of Europe and Central Asia Regional Office, as necessary to reflect the comments from reviewers and the Government of Turkey (GOT). GOT has prepared its own assessment of the project which is contained in Part II of the PCR. It has also confirmed that there are no comments to Parts I and III of the PCR. The report is based inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Loan and Project agreements; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; internal Bank memoranda; and information gathered by the FAO/CP mission which visited Turkey in July 1991.   - 1i1 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY ERZURUM RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2094-TU) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives 1. Although Turkey had developed a large, modem and urbanized sector by the end of the seventies, and had experienced rapid economic growth and rising income levels during the preceding two decades, a large rural-urban gap in incomes and standards of living persisted and urban drift continued to gather momentum as more people, particularly the young and educated, left the depressed rural areas in search of better life in the cities. Government was concerned about the potential for social and political instability which could arise if the above disparities were not addressed. It therefore moved to tackle the particular development needs of the poorest regions, particularly in the fields of agriculture, which despite industrialization remained crucial to the economy, contributing about 25 percent of GNP, employing nearly 65 percent of the labor force, supplying much of the raw materials for industry and providing for about 60 percent of export earnings. Government decided that from the perspective of rural development, Erzurum Province in Eastern Anatolia, where the majority of the population was extremely poor, needed the most urgent attention. 2. This project was therefore formulated with the main objectives of raising income and employment levels in Erzurum through agro-related activities and the quality of life through improved rural infrastructure. Implementation 3. The loan became effective in December 1982 after a five-month delay to enable Government to comply with all the conditions for loan effectiveness. 4. Project implementation was initially slow because of lack of a full-time project manager for about two years, a severe earthquake which hit the project area in autumn 1983 disrupting activities for more than one year, and later, a ministerial merger and reorganization  - iv - of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs (MAFRA), which resulted in staff and institutional changes affecting the project. Many of the project's infrastructural targets were attained by the end of 1986 and exceeded by the time the project closed at the end of December 1990. Within the limits imposed by staff availability, quality and mobility constraints, agricultural and livestock programs were undertaken and both farmer and staff training were intensified. After a disappointing start caused by disagreements between MAFRA and the Agricultural Bank of Turkey (TCZB) over their respective roles, and World Bank restriction on sub-loan beneficiaries, credit targets were met and far exceeded by the end of the project. 5. The slow start of the project meant that loan disbursements were extremely low in the first two years with only US$8 million or 20% of the Bank loan disbursed by June 1984 vis- a-vis the appraisal estimate of US$22.5 million or 56%. The project closing date was extended thrice involving a period of about 3 years to enable project activities to gain ground lost in the initial years. 6. Actual project costs are estimated at US$94 million or 69% of SAR estimate of which the World Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) respectively contributed US$31 million and US$15.5 million or 49% of total costs while Government, TCZB and the sub-borrowers contributed US$47.5 million, or 51 % of total costs. Because of the over- estimation of project costs, the low rate of disbursements in the first few years of the project, and the sharp devaluation of the Turkish Lira (TL) vis-a-vis the major world currencies, US$9 million of the World Bank loan and US$4.5 million of the IFAD loan were unutilized and therefore cancelled. Results 7. An ex-post survey commissioned by MAFRA to measure the farm impact of Erzurum Rural Development Project (ERDP) was completed but not adequately analyzed and interpreted. Upon request by the Bank, this task has now resumed and results are expected to be available for the project audit. However, from other sources such as field visits, interviews with the target group and local administrators, it can be seen that much was achieved. The most impressive results and more visible impact of the project were in the infrastructure component where the project constructed or rehabilitated 197 irrigation schemes covering an area of 13,315 hectares; undertook soil conservation works over an area of 1,775 hectares; constructed 519 km of new road and 1,341 bridges; stabilized 814 km of existing roads and put in place 218 village water supply schemes. The above results substantially exceeded appraisal targets. 8. In agricultural production, the project improved and expanded extension services and made- commendable efforts to strengthen research/extension linkages. These, along with improved irrigation facilities and easier access to farm credit, led to a noticeable improvement in farming practices particularly in the use of inputs such as fertilizers and herbicides and fallow reduction. However, these improvements do not appear to have resulted in a sustained increase  in crop yields except for potatoes, for which yields increased by 22% between 1982 and 1990. Increased crop production has been largely due to more area planted to crops. 9. In animal health and breeding, the project demonstrated to the farmers the benefits of using vaccines and parasite control chemicals. For example, a MAFRA survey shows that the mortality rate among animals due to disease decreased from 8.5% in 1982 to only 1.8% in 1990 for bovines and from 9.8% to 3.4% for ovines. Efforts to improve animal breeds were less successful because of conservative beliefs by the farmers who did not accept the artificial insemination breeding method. 10. As regards institutional support, the project contributed to the strengthening of Provincial Directorate for Agriculture of MAFRA (PDA) and other co-operating agencies through the provision of office buildings and living quarters, vehicles, and improvement of skills through training. However, many people trained under the project did not always stay with the project after completing their courses. They transferred to more attractive and less remote parts of the country leaving the project and Erzurum province short of skills which ERDP had funded. The project failed, however, in attaining one of its important aims, namely to help farmers in irrigated areas organize themselves into Water Users Associations (WUA) so that they, and not the Government, would be responsible for the management and maintenance of the completed irrigation schemes. 11. It has not been possible to estimate the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) which the project is expected to achieve. Data collected by the MAFRA ex-post survey for this purpose were not sufficiently analyzed to permit such calculation. However, given the substantial cost- savings particularly in the infrastructure component and the absolute increments in crop and livestock production as a result of substantial reductions in fallow areas brought about by the project, it is reasonable to expect that the project has attained or exceeded the SAR estimated economic rate of return. No adequate data is available to indicate the project impact on farm incomes but the emigration of young people to other parts of the country has slowed down. In addition, the project had considerable intangible benefits particularly in the infrastructure component. Sustainabilitv 12. Although the project made commendable efforts to improve the rural infrastructure, the works were not of as high a quality as would be desired and some are already in need of repair. A carefully supervised maintenance program of the physical facilities is therefore necessary if they are to last their full economic life. The survival and expansion of agricultural and livestock activities started by the project are threatened by lack of adequate numbers of Village Group Technicians (VGTs), many having vacated their postings since the project ended. Without them, the extension efforts will not continue unless some other alternative medium is devised. Regarding farm credit, TCZB has continued, after the end of the project, to lend to  - vi - the farmers from its own internal resources and from funds of the on-going Bank-assisted Third Agricultural Credit project. However, the expansion and sustainability of the credit program could in the long run be undermined by the high level of defaults if not brought under control. Perhaps the most crucial key in the sustainability of the activities and programs started by the project will be the continuity of adequate budget allocations from Government. ERDP initiated activities with a substantial recurrent expenditure requirement. Given Government's financial constraints, and competing demands, ways and means should be devised to ease its financial burden, for example by encouraging the resource users, such as those using the irrigation schemes, to take on the responsibility for the management and maintenance of the facilities. Government would then only give them logistical and technical support. This was the system expected at project appraisal. However, with the merger of the former implementing agency Land and Water Development Agency of MVA (TOPRAKSU) into MAFRA, the staff who formerly organized such water users associations were transferred to other responsibilities and little progress was made in forming such associations. Govemment is now committed to renew its efforts to establish more water users associations under other projects, e.g., the forthcoming Eastem Anatolia Watershed Rehabilitation Project. With regard to extension service operations and demonstrations, the Government budgeted funds for such operations under the investment budget (even though they were entirely funded by the Govemment and not from the loans). As a result, there was a sharp drop in funding upon project completion. The following year, funding for such services was restored through MAFRA introduction of a new investment project under which such funding could be included. While this was a pragmatic short-term solution, ways must be found to gradually obtain required recurrent funding for improved extension operations into the regular budget. Findings and Lessons Learned 13. First, the project demonstrated that even in comparatively less developed areas like Erzurum, farmers readily respond to a well-mixed development package. In ERDP, a package which brought together extension services, credit and improved infrastructure facilitated the farmers' favorable response and participation in the project. Secondly, the project highlighted the need for the project preparation team to consult adequately with the beneficiaries and the key people in the project area so that they and the people over whom they have influence can identify themselves better with the project. Project preparation would also then be able to take account of local cultures and preferences (religious beliefs, diet biases, etc.). Finally, the project demonstrated the advantages of decentralization of project management for quick decision-making and to facilitate coordination. But it also showed that the Project Manager in a decentralized operation should be given adequate decision-making authority over the people and resources for which he is responsible.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY ERZURUM RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2094-TU) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identitv Project Name Erzurum Rural Development Project IBRD Loan No. 2094-TU IFAD Loan No. 96-TU RVP Unit Europe & Central Asia Region Country : Turkey Sector : Agriculture Subsector Area Development 2. Background Genera 2.1 The Erzurum Rural Development Project (ERDP) was the second Bank-assisted rural development intervention in Turkey. The project had its origins in the Government's increasing awareness of the need to reduce regional income disparities and especially to promote the development of the least developed provinces in Eastern Anatolia. The then Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) engaged a local consulting firm to study development possibilities in that area. This was followed by project preparation assistance from the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program (CP) in 1976-77 who submitted a provisional preparation report in August 1977. After the change of Government in early 1978, the Turkish authorities expressed dissatisfaction with the project concepts and design and asked MAF to prepare a new version of the project for Bank consideration. Since the project activities involved several ministries, the State Planning Office (SPO) assumed responsibility for the final project preparation and coordination in late 1979 and eventually produced a report which formed the  - 2 - basis on which the project was appraised by the World Bank in May 1981. The loan was approved by the Board in February 1982. 2.2 The project was scheduled to be completed on December 31, 1986 and the loan closed by June 30, 1987. However, project progress in the early period was slowed by lack of a project manager for about two years, a severe earthquake which hit the project area in autumn 1983, and the re-organization of MAFRA which resulted in staff and institutional changes affecting the project. Therefore, to enable the project attain its objectives, it became necessary to extend its closing date several times. The project was eventually completed in December 1989 and the loan closed in April 1990 about three years behind the original schedule. Sector Development Objectives and Strategy 2.3 At appraisal, although Turkey had a large, modem and urbanized sector, 54 percent of the people still lived in rural areas and the rural population was growing at about 1.6 percent per annum. Despite economic growth and rising income levels during the preceding two decades, a large rural-urban gap in income and levels of living persisted and urban drift continued to gather momentum as more people, particularly the young and educated, left the depressed rural areas in search of better life in the cities. 2.4 Government was concerned about the potential for social and political instability which could arise if the above disparities were not addressed. Therefore, in order to tackle the particular development needs of the poorest regions, the Government established the Less Developed Regions Department (KOYD) within the SPO. KOYD identified the structure of settlement patterns throughout Turkey, and ranked the economic status and potential of all villages and settlements. From KOYD's point of view, and from the perspective of rural development, Eastern Anatolia, where the majority of the population was extremely poor, needed the most urgent attention. 2.5 Although successive Governments had put increased emphasis on dispersing industrialization to less developed areas as a tool of development, by the end of the 1970s, agriculture still remained crucial to the economy contributing about 25 percent of GNP, employing nearly 65 percent of the labor force, supplying much of the raw materials for industry and providing for about 60 percent of export earnings. The Corum-Cankiri Rural Development Project assisted by the Bank (Loan 1 130-TU) had proved that effective extension services backed by credit can significantly improve the productivity of agriculture. An increased volume of investment in agriculture, along with institutional and other reforms, was therefore needed to absorb the increasing population in rural areas, and more importantly to check the drift of the rural under-employed to over-crowded urban centers, and to realize the considerable agricultural potential of disadvantaged areas like East Anatolia.  - 3- 3. Project Objectives and Description Project Objectives 3.1 The project's main objectives were: (i) to improve the income and employment levels in the project area, through increased agricultural and livestock production; and (ii) to raise the quality of life by providing essential infrastructure such as roads and water supply. Project Description 3.2 The project's objectives were to be achieved through implementation of the following six components over a four and three quarter year period: (i) Agricultural Services - consisting of expansion and reorientation of agricultural extension and plant protection services, the equipping of the regional agricultural research station, and improved linkages between research and extension; (ii) Animal Health and Breeding Services - consisting of expansion and reorientation of animal health services; and expansion of artificial insemination services for cattle and sheep on a pilot demonstration basis; (iii) Investment and Production Credits - for purchase of agricultural machinery and implements, inputs, barn and feed storage renovation and feeds, beekeeping, and milk collection centers; (iv) Rural Infrastructure - consisting of improvement and expansion of small-scale irrigation works, soil conservation works, the upgrading and some new construction of rural roads, and provision of protected drinking water systems; (v) Project Management - consisting of establishment and staffing of a project office within the office of the provincial governor, consulting services, surveys and studies for monitoring and evaluation; and (vi) Training - consisting of in-service and overseas staff training. 3.3 Total project costs were estimated at US$137 million equivalent. The World Bank and IFAD would contribute 44% of total financing requirements by respectively providing US$40 million and US$20 million by way of loans. The remaining US$77 million or 56% of total costs  - 4 - was to be raised locally by the Government (US$65 million); TCZB (US$7 million) and the sub- borrowers (US$5 million). 4. Project Design and Organization Design 4.1 The original design of the project was heavily influenced by political considerations. This led to a lengthy and expensive preparation process as senior government officials changed and, with them, the project ideas changed. However, after a lot of fine-tuning between the Bank and SPO, a fairly well-designed project finally emerged. One of the draw backs by the project, perhaps inevitable under the circumstances, was that it aimed to do too many things in a rather limited time. Had it not been for the considerable diplomatic skills of the project manager and the subsequent re-organization of MAFRA whereby most of the cooperating agencies were put under one Ministry, the project, as designed, would have encountered serious co-ordination and organizational problems. The project also did not put adequate emphasis on the livestock activities which form the back-bone of the economic life in the area. In retrospect, there seems to have been inadequate consultation with the regional MAFRA officials and administrative chiefs. Had these been adequately consulted, perhaps errors of judgement like introducing a variety of wheat unsuitable for local tastes and pursuing artificial insemination in a deeply religious and conservative community could have been avoided. Organization 4.2 The project was organized along the then current Turkish administrative practice with each agency responsible for the execution of its relevant com-ponent. For example, TCZB was responsible for agricultural credit; the Land and Water Development Agency (TOPRAKSU) and the General Directorate of Rural Infra-structure (YSE) were responsible for the rural infrastructure aspects; while the respective Directorates of MAFRA were responsible for the agricultural and livestock activities of the project. To ensure co-ordination, an Erzurum Steering and Co-ordination Committee (ESC) consisting of central level representatives of participating agencies and the Ministry of Finance was set up in Ankara while a counterpart outfit in the form of a Provincial Coordinating Committee (PCC) was set up in Erzurum. Project execution was put directly under the authority of the Governor. A small Project Management Unit (PMU) was set up in Erzurum to assist the Governor in the day-to-day management of the project. This decentralization of project management was perhaps the most innovative aspect of the project and helped a lot towards its success. The management would however have been strengthened if the project manager had been given more line authority over the people and resources for which he was responsible. However, for the longer term sustainability of project improvements and extension to other areas, it was decided to maintain responsibility within the line agencies who would be in charge of provision of services after project completion.  -5- 5. Project Implementation General 5.1 The loan became effective in November 1982 after a five-month delay to enable Government to comply with all the conditions for loan effectiveness particularly those relating to subsidiary loan agreements, inter-agency protocols, the staffing of the PMU and the cross- effectiveness conditions relating to the IFAD loan. 5.2 The early period of project implementation was slowed by lack of a full-time project manager (the first two project managers quit shortly after appointment) for about two years. The situation was aggravated by a severe earthquake which hit the project area in autumn 1983, disrupting activities for more than one year. In reality, therefore, project activities did not take off till sometime in 1984. After that, project implementation went smoothly except for the 1985 ministerial restructuring which merged the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and the Ministry of Village Affairs (MVA) to form MAFRA. This resulted in staff and institutional changes affecting the project. Many of the project's infrastructural targets were attained by the end of 1986. Within the limits imposed by mobility constraints, extension visits were carried out to most parts of the province and both farmer and staff training were intensified. After a disappointing start, credit targets were met and far exceeded by the end of the project. 5.3 As shown in Table 5(a), actual project costs are estimated at US$ 94 million or 69% of SAR estimate of which the World Bank and IFAD contributed US$ 31 million and US$ 15.5 million respectively or 49% of total costs while Government, TCZB and the sub-borrowers contributed US$ 47.5 million or 51 % of total costs. Because of the over-estimation of project costs, the low rate of disbursements in the first few years of the project, and the sharp devaluation of the Turkish Lira (TL) vis-a-vis the major world currencies, US$ 9 million of the World Bank loan and US$ 4.5 million of the IFAD loan were unutilized and therefore cancelled. 5.4 The key project implementation indicators are set out in Table 4. The implementation of individual components is briefly evaluated in the following paragraphs. Agricultural Services 5.5 Although statistical data regarding field crop demonstrations at the end of the project is not readily available, the project did intensify extension services through visits and demonstrations to farmers. A recently completed baseline survey carried out in Erzurum by MAFRA shows that Village Group Technicians (VGT) visited and delivered extension services to 74% of the villages by the end of the project compared with 48% of the villages visited before the project started. The survey also shows that more than 50% of the villages were  - 6 - visited more than 3 times a year by the extension agents. It is most likely that more extension visits would have been carried out had it not been for the perennial mobility problem caused by lack of adequate numbers of drivers. The technical quality, number and frequency of visits by VGTs to the farmers were further constrained by lack of adequate numbers of properly trained and competent subject matter specialists willing to spend more time in the field transferring knowledge to the VGTs and the farmers. Furthermore, at the end of the project, many VGTs vacated their postings or got transferred to other parts of the country with the result that currently most villages have only half the number of VGTs they need. Animal Health and Breeding 5.6 The planned program for vaccinations of animals went smoothly with appraisal targets being exceeded substantially. For example, vaccinations against enterotoxemia exceeded the SAR target by 23% while that against foot-and-mouth disease exceeded the appraisal target by 62%. On average about 50% of the villages vaccinated their livestock under the project as compared to just over 19% without the project. The parasite control program went very well with the appraisal targets being exceeded by 225% in the case of sheep and 160% in the case of cattle. However, the artificial insemination (Al) activity had a mixed reception. Whereas the SAR target of Al for cattle was met and slightly exceeded, that for sheep, which is by far the locally preferred type of meat was a total failure and had to be abandoned after 1986. The local farmers are very conservative and did not favor the Al method of improving animal breeds. Because of constraints already alluded to in the preceding paragraph, only 1,510 farms had animal husbandry demonstrations vis-a-vis the appraisal target of 3,900. Investment and Production Credit 5.7 In the early years of the project, credit delivery was hampered by disputes between MAFRA and TCZB over their respective roles. In particular they disagreed as to who should assist the intending borrower to prepare farm plans and estimations of their credit requirements. Credit disbursements were also constrained by the project concept which restricted credit access to nucleus groups only. Therefore, at the end of 1984 only US$2.7 million had been disbursed as against a target of US$4.3 million by that date. However, the above bottlenecks were resolved by the end of 1984. MAFRA and TCZB worked out an agreeable system to process project credits and the World Bank agreed to lift the restrictions on target beneficiaries, so that all the farmers in the province became eligible for credit under the project. The above improved credit demand and disbursements substantially to the extent that by the end of 1986, all credit allocated under the project had been utilized and funds had to be re-allocated from other project categories so as to meet credit requirements for the period 1987 to 1989. 5.8 Cumulative credit disbursements by the project amounted to about US$61 million which is 76% more than the appraisal estimate. Over 56,000 sub-loans were made which is 56%  higher than the SAR target. The bulk of the loans (87% of total) went to short-term production requirements. Although interest rates were negative in real terms, they were sufficiently high to discourage farmers from taldng medium and long term loans. Overall, the credit program was beset by a high rate of defaulters, particularly in the livestock sector where at the end of 1989 the default rate was as high as 38%. However, TCZB says the situation is now improving. Rural Infrastructure 5.9 Construction progress was initially held up due to the difficulty of mobilizing sufficient staff to serve in Erzurum, the 1983 earthquake, and the diversion of construction equipment to projects in other provinces. 5.10 In spite of the early problems, by 1986 the greater part of the Rural Infrastructure program had been completed. In fact, cost savings were such that the targets were exceeded and the opportunity was taken to repair the low standard of workmanship that had occurred on some schemes. By the end of 1989, when the project was completed, all the SAR targets, with the notable exception of construction of box culverts, had been exceeded by far. Project Management 5.11 A PMU consisting of 13 people headed by a Project Manager (PM) was set up in Erzurum under the office of the Governor. There were however problems in attracting qualified staff to Erzurum from the other more prosperous and more attractive duty stations. The PMU therefore did not have a full time PM for the first 2 years of the project and it took a considerable length of time to find translators. In spite of not having adequate authority to execute their duties and occasional shortfalls of operating funds, the PMU did a commendable job in supervising and coordinating project activities. At the end of the project, the PMU was dissolved and project activities left entirely in the hands of the respective line agencies. Training 5.12 The project carried out three types of training: in-service training within Turkey; overseas training on short-term tours and long-term courses; and farmers training mainly at the village centers constructed by the project. In-service training totalling 15,600 staff-days was offered to professional and technician staff at Ataturk University and at other training centers of MAFRA all over the country. Overseas training was carried out using loan funds administered under a contract with FAO. Staff involving 379 man-months (SAR target 300 man- months) attended various short and long term courses in the fields of irrigation, agronomy, animal husbandry, credit and monitoring and evaluation. Although many participants found the courses useful, lack of adequate knowledge of the foreign languages in which the courses were conducted was a considerable handicap to most. Statistics are not readily available, but many farmers repeatedly received training from VGTs and subject matter specialists. Project funds were also used to take a group of 10 people from the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture and  - 8 - Rural Affairs to Pakistan on a study tour on Water Users Associations in a Bank-financed irrigation project. 6. Proiect Results and Impact General 6.1 In 1990, MAFRA commissioned a consultant to carry out an ex-post survey of ERDP to help determine the project achievements and impact. Collection and preliminary analysis of the data was undertaken by June 1991 by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the Directorate of Externally Funded Projects (TDPI) in MAFRA with the assistance of the same consultant. However, final analysis of the data including ERR calculation was not completed because the consultant's contract expired before the work could be completed. It was therefore difficult to measure accurately the farm impact of the project at the time when this report was prepared. The data collected in the household survey on key project aspects like production yields, input use, prices, farm sizes, family incomes, number of jobs created, etc, were not sufficiently analyzed to permit a ERR calculation. The Bank has expressed its disappointment to the Govemment about this state of affairs and accordingly MAFRA has rehired in May 1992 the original consultant to complete the survey analysis and to calculate the project ERR. The results are expected to be available by the end of 1992. However, judging from other sources, it is generally agreed that ERDP was a worthwhile intervention which has helped substantially to uplift the quality of rural life in Erzurum province. The discernible results and impact are discussed below. Agricultural Production 6.2 The project improved and expanded extension services and made commendable efforts to strengthen research/extension linkages. These, along with improved irrigation facilities and easier access to farm credit, led to a noticeable improvement in farming practices particularly in the use of inputs such as fertilizers and herbicides and fallow reduction. However, based on official provincial statistics, these improvements do not appear to have resulted in a sustained increase in crop yields. For example, excluding 1989 which was a drought year, the yields of wheat and barley increased from 1.2 and 1.5 tons respectively in 1982 to 1.5 and 2.1 tons per hectare in 1986 but have since declined to 1.4 tons and 1.8 tons respectively in 1990 (see Part III, Annex I). The variety of wheat introduced by the project was not readily adapted because it did not suit local tastes. The yields of alfalfa were below their 1982 levels throughout the project period declining from 7.6 tons per hectare to 7.4 tons per hectare in 1990. The yields of sugar beat also declined during the project period. Among the important crops in the area, it is only the potatoes, which, thanks to improved seed varieties, showed sustained yield increases, rising from 17.3 tons per ha in 1982 to 21.0 tons in 1990. Again, the final analysis  - 9 - of the household survey data will provide more precise information on crop yields of project beneficiaries. Livestock Production 6.3 About 35% of all farm families benefitted from the project's livestock activities. The project demonstrated to the farmers the benefits of using vaccines and parasite control chemicals. Although the ex-post baseline survey carried out by MAFRA does not have any definitive statistics on animal population, it shows an improvement in animal health. For example the mortality rate among animals dying because of disease has decreased from 8.5 % in 1982 to only 1.8% in 1990 for bovines and from 9.8% to 3.4% for ovines. However, average carcass weight which had been estimated to increase by 54 % and 42 % for cattle and sheep respectively, did not materialize and remained at about the same levels as before the project. Efforts to improve animal breeds were less successful because of conservative beliefs by the farmers. Most did not accept the artificial insemination breeding method. But a change of mind is slowly coming. According to the MAFRA survey, the average number of households (per village) practicing artificial insemination for their animals almost doubled from 3 before the project to about 6 at the end of the project. Rural Infrastructure 6.4 The project constructed or rehabilitated 197 irrigation schemes covering an area of 13,315 hectares; undertook soil conservation works over an area of 1,775 hectares; constructed 519 km of new road; stabilized 814 km of existing roads and put in place 218 village water supply schemes. The above results exceeded appraisal targets by 33% in the case of the irrigated area; 37% in the case of soil conservation; 452% in the case of new road construction; 5 % in the case of roads stabilized; and 54 % in the case of water supply schemes. Four villages with populations in excess of 750 which had access to central ground water and electricity were able to receive individual metered house water connections. The project also constructed 1,341 bridges or 95% in excess of SAR estimate and built culverts. Additionally, office and living quarters for VGTS were built. It also availed facilities which assisted in clearing an average 2,320 km of snow-covered roads per year. 6.5 As can be seen from the above, the project significantly transformed the infrastructural landscape of Erzurum. The quality of village life was improved. Better roads improved accessibility to both social services and markets while improved irrigation facilities have laid a foundation for increased farm incomes. Increased and improved water supply facilities have given a significant portion of the population easier access to potable water essential to good health while office and residential accommodation built by the project have greatly improved the living and working environment of the Government officials concerned.  - 10- Investment and Production Credit 6.6 The project facilitated easier access to farm credit to a wider population. This in turn made it possible for the farmers to acquire the necessary implements and inputs to improve and expand their crop and livestock activities. About 50,000 farmers benefitted vis-a-vis the appraisal estimate of 30,000. Institutional Support 6.7 The project contributed to the strengthening of PDA and other co-operating agencies through the provision of office buildings and living quarters, vehicles, and improvement of skills through training. However, many people trained by the project did not always stay with the project after completing their courses. They transferred to more attractive and less remote parts of the country leaving the project and Erzurum province short of skills which ERDP had funded. 6.8 The project failed in attaining one of its important aims, namely to help farmers in irrigated areas to form themselves into Water Users Associations (WUA) so that they, and not the Government, would be responsible for the management and maintenance of the completed irrigation schemes. After several fruitless starts, only a small number of WUAs had been formed by the time the project ended. No WUA in the hill villages had passed beyond the basic stage of initial establishment and farmers closer to the source of water are still using it in a profligate fashion to the detriment of those in the lower expansion areas. The reasons for this unsatisfactory performance are not well understood. It appears to have been important, however, that the system introduced by TOPRAKSU for establishing waters users associations was not adequately pursued when the responsibility for establishing such associations was transferred to GDRA but most of the staff experienced in such matters chose to stay with TOPRAKSU. Economic Rate of Return 6.9 The SAR estimated Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was 14.2%. In view of the data shortcomings (para 6.1), it has not yet been possible to estimate the ERR which the project is now expected to achieve. However, given the substantial cost-savings particularly in the infrastructure component, the higher than anticipated number of roads built and stabilized and of water supply schemes constructed, and the absolute increments in crop and livestock production (the increase in crop production mainly achieved through fallow reduction), it is reasonable to expect that the project has attained or exceeded the SAR economic rate of return. In addition, the project had considerable non-quantifiable benefits, particularly in the infrastructure component, where the construction of roads and water facilities improved accessibility. No reliable data is available to show the project impact on employment and farm  - 11 - incomes. However, it is generally agreed that the quality of rural life has significantly improved and the migration of young people to cities has reportedly declined. 7. Sustainability 7.1 During the project, commendable efforts were made to stimulate crop and livestock production through intensive extension efforts and farm credit. However, in the long ru! ,the survival and sustainability of the extension efforts started under the project are threatened by l.ack of adequate numbers of VGTs, many having vacated their postings since the project ended. Regarding farm credit, TCZB has continued, after the end of the project, to lend to the farmers from its own internal resources and from funds of the on-going Bank-assisted Third Agricultural Credit project. However, the expansion and sustainability of the credit program could in the long run be undermined by the high level of defaults if not brought under control. 7.2 Although the project attained and in some cases exceeded its targets for infrastructure development, the facilities constructed were not of the high quality that would have been desired. Where contractors have failed to meet adequate construction standards, the life of canal lining will be short and maintenance will be a continuous drain on scarce funds. The intakes serving those canals are also likely to suffer more frequent damage than would have occurred if construction standards had been higher. Some are already in need of repair and may not be able to serve their optimum economic life. 7.3 Perhaps the most crucial key in the sustainability of the activities and programs started by the project will be the continuity of adequate budget allocations from Government. ERDP initiated activities with a substantial recurrent expenditure requirement. Now that the project funding is over, Government has taken on the full burden of financing all recurrent expenditures. Given Government's financial constraints, and competing demands, it will be important that it maintains firm commitment and adequate financial allocations to the relevant line agencies to which the ERDP activities have been handed. To ease the financial burden on Government, efforts should be continued to design ways and means by which the resource users, such as those using the irrigation schemes, are given the responsibility for the management and maintenance. Government would then only give them logistical and technical support. This was the system expected at project appraisal. However, with the merger of the former implementing agency (TOPRAKSU) into MAFRA, the staff who formerly organized such water users associations were transferred to other responsibilities and little progress was made in forming such associations. GOT has now agreed to renew its efforts to establish more water users associations in the framework of the forthcoming Eastern Anatolia Watershed Rehabilitation Project. The Irrigation Investment Review undertaken by the Bank on request of GOT will also contain the recommendation to put more emphasis on the formation of water users associations. With regard to extension service operations and demonstrations, the Government budgeted funds for such operations under the investment budget (even though they were entirely funded by the Government and not from the loans). As a result, there was a sharp drop in funding upon  - 12 - project completion. The following year, funding for such services was restored through MAFRA introduction of a new investment project under which such funding could be included. While this was a pragmatic short term solution, ways must be found to gradually obtain required recurrent funding for improved extension operations into the regular budget. 8. Bank Performance 8.1 The Bank's decision to support ERDP was appropriate given the Bank's target group and Bank's commitment to assist in poverty alleviation wherever possible. Although the project as appraised had more components than would now normally be desirable, it fitted into the "integrated rural development" philosophy espoused at the time. Bank intervention during the preparation and pre-appraisal stages helped in appropriately focusing project design. Perhaps one drawback was the timing of the initial project preparation process which appeared to have been premature. Almost 6 years elapsed between project identification (October 1976) and appraisal (May 1982). During that period, far-reaching social, political and economic changes were taking place necessitating constant revision of the project concept and design. In retrospect, the Bank could have shortened the project preparation process by providing firmer and more consistent guidance as to the types of components likely to be acceptable and should have resisted political pressures during project processing to include that many components. 8.2 As shown in Table 8, ten supervision missions visited Turkey during project life to monitor implementation progress. Their input was found useful by the implementing agencies and contributed substantially to the successful implementation of the project by highlighting operational weakness and suggesting possible remedies. However, there should have been more use of livestock specialists in the supervision missions to monitor the animal health and breeding component. The final supervision mission should have reviewed the terms of reference for the consultants engaged to do the post-project baseline survey to ensure that the data gathered would be useful in assessing the project impact. 9. Borrower Performance 9.1 In the early steps of project preparation, Government's proposals were largely dictated by the political considerations of the individual key players. Naturally, these shifted as the players changed thus necessitating constant revision of project design. In the end this resulted in a very lengthy and expensive project preparation. Things moved quickly only after responsibility for project preparation was handed to SPO at the end of 1979. SPO, with World Bank assistance, duly prepared a project document which was suitable as a basis for appraisal in early 1981. 9.2 When the project started, there were lengthy delays in staffing and equipping the Project Management Unit. But delays in recruitment of staff were largely due to reluctance of people  - 13 - to transfer to work in Erzurum rather than ineffectiveness of Government. However, once the PMU was well staffed, they did a very commendable work in supervising and coordinating project activities. The only major lapse was in project monitoring and evaluation, where, partly due the staff constraints in Ankara, little appears to have been done. 9.3 The borrower generally showed continuous commitment to the project throughout the implementation period. The borrower ensured that the required protocols between the various cooperating agencies were executed, coordination committees set up, and usually adequate budget allocation was made to the project. As shown in Table 7, the Borrower complied with most covenants of the Loan and Project Agreements. However, there were frequent delays in meeting reporting, deadlines and no semi-annual reports were submitted after 1987. 10. Lessons 10.1 The project demonstrated several important lessons in rural development: (i) Even in comparatively less developed areas like Erzurum, farmers readily respond to a well-mixed development package. In ERDP, a package which brought together extension services, credit and improved infrastructure facilitated the farmers' favorable response and participation in the project. (ii) At project preparation, the beneficiaries and the key people in the project area such as the Imam (Religious Head) and the Muhtar (Village Head) should be consulted so that they and the people over whom they have influence can identify themselves better with the project. (iii) Local cultures and preferences (religious beliefs, diet biases, etc.) should be taken into account. For example, the introduction of a new variety of wheat by the project failed because it was unsuitable to local taste and the artificial insemination of sheep was abandoned when it met stiff cultural opposition. (iv) Although decentralization of project management to the Provincial Governorate was a positive decision and minimized coordination problems, the Project Manager should have been given adequate decision-making authority over the people and resources he was responsible to manage as long as this did not undermine the authority of the line agencies implementing the project. (v) In difficult project areas like Erzurum, where the terrain is difficult, farming activities dispersed and the weather inhospitable, 5 years is too short to implement a complex rural development project. 7 years seems more optimal.  - 14 - (vi) To attract and maintain qualified and competent staff in a comparatively disadvantaged region like Erzurum, it may be necessary to give staff adequate extra job-related incentives and benefits so as to attract them to work in the area. (vii) Government needs to maintain firm commitment and adequate financial allocations to the line agencies. The resource users should be given the responsibility for the management and maintenance of project works. 11. Project Relationships 11.1 The Bank and the borrower as well as the cooperating agencies had good relationships. Although the borrower was unhappy that the Bank refused to extend the project for a fourth time, both sides were otherwise willing to accommodate each other's wishes when project revisions and reallocation of project funds became necessary. 12. Consulting Services 12.1 The recruitment of consultants, planning and over-seeing their work was sub-contracted to FAO by Government. Originally it was planned that 87 man-months would be required but later the scope of consulting services was widened both in terms of professional content and duration. By the end of the project 125 man-months was used involving 14 disciplines as against 7 envisaged at appraisal. Major fields covered included range management agricultural extension, animal husbandry, irrigation, and project management. 12.2 Although lack of knowledge of Turkish posed some problems, the consultants' contribution to the success of the project was invaluable. Besides day-to-day transfer of knowledge to their respective counterparts, they generated useful reports including the widely acclaimed FAO-funded study of plants of the East Anatolian Meadows which has been published into a book. 13. Project Documentation and Data 13.1 Although no conventional preparation report was compiled, the SAR was of a good quality and a useful tool to project management. The Loan and Project agreements were well- understood by all parties concerned while the various subsidiary agreements and protocols between the cooperating institutions adequately set out relationships and responsibilities under the project. At the PMU or MAFRA, however, systems were not put in place to document, monitor and evaluate project progress at all stages in order to gauge the financial and economic impact of the project.  - 15 - PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE"' 1. World Bank's Performance 1.01 Increase in US dollar value during the preparation and implementation periods of the project has been very high. While the dollar was equivalent to TL 100 at the time of preparation, it was TL 2,310 to US$ 1 on December 31, 1989 which was the completion date of the project. Such an enormous increase could not be estimated at any phase of the project. 1.02 Prior to 1980, 75 % of the farmers' income was realized from livestock. This rate remained constant in 1989-90 which was the completion date of the project. Of 87 m/m consultancy services under the project, 33 m/m services (38%) were allocated for livestock activities. As regards the overseas training, of 300 m/m total program, 87 m/m (29%) were allocated for livestock. With some changes made at the end of the project, foreign specialist employment was increased to 125.1 m/m. Of this amount, 66 m/m were used for livestock (veterinary, meadow-grassland, artificial insemination and animal feeding). In this way, the share of livestock has been 52%. The share of livestock for both training and consultant employment should have been higher than the said amount. 1.03 At the beginning, no consultant employment was planned for potato seed, but 1.9 m/m of employment was realized. However, the studies for the employment of foreign specialists could have recognized this need. 1.04 The project envisaged employment of a foreign specialist for a period of two years for marketing activities, but without the provision of necessary investment. The World Bank did not sympathize with the proposals for construction of marketing places where the producers and consumers would meet directly. The project targets for milk collecting centers and honey packing facilities did not work due to wrong design. The Agricultural Bank of Turkey (TCZB) which received the money at 7-8% interest wanted to provide it with high interest rates (20-30%) for these activities. If TCZB had provided TSEK with the credit in accordance with the interest rates given to TCZB, the component of establishing milk collecting centers could have worked. On the other hand, if .the TKV (Turkish Development Foundation) had been considered for honey packing and marketing facilities, positive work could have been done under the project. The Government of Turkey has prepared its own assessment of the project in this section.  - 16 - 1.05 The danger of confining access to credit to nucleus groups and leaving other farmers outside the project had been seen in a short time and the World Bank agreed to make the necessary changes. This caused a great explosion in credit distribution. 1.06 After reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs, the project coordination responsibility of SPO was stopped. However, it had been envisaged (at the time of loan signature) that the Department of Less Developed Regions of SPO would contribute to the project management in all its activities. This had never been possible and the World Bank missions did not recognize this. 1.07 Some changes were made in the departments of the World Bank responsible for Erzurum Rural Development Project during the implementation period of the project. The staff members of the World Bank who contributed to the preparation of the project were absent at controls during the project implementation and at the completion of the project. This caused a little bit of difficulty in communication. 1.08 Very good dialogues were established when there were technicians (who were familiar with Turkey) in the World Bank missions, especially the World Bank missions whose member know the project from the beginning made successful studies and contributed a lot to the project. 1.09 The project management was not established with an effective, authorized and independent budget. The role of the World Bank and missions in this matter was of great importance since they did not make the necessary efforts. If the World Bank wanted, more effective project management could have been established. 1.10 The World Bank was open for any views and took quick decisions for procurement procedures. However, the changes proposed in the project components were not accepted and this created disappointment. It is not possible every time to have a well-planned project file and an ideal project. There could be some mistakes due to various reasons but these mistakes could be minimized by the amendments to be made later. If some amendments had been made in 1985 for the construction of production roads, for establishment of marketing places where the consumers congregated, for the encouragement of feeding and health activities and courses for increasing sldlls of village girls, more successful results could have been obtained. 2. IFAD's Performance 2.01 The authorities from IFAD, which was the other organization financing the project externally, had attended most of the missions visiting the project and the evaluation symposium in 1987. Through the experiences gained from this they started to undertake the financing of  - 17 - a lot of projects and arranged a comprehensive international evaluation meeting in Turkey in Autumn of 1989 and staff from IFAD-financed projects in Middle East and Africa attended this meeting. 3. Borrower's Performance - GDPI of MAFRA 3.01 Since the Project and Implementation General Directorate of MAFRA took over the coordination of project from SPO in 1985, three General Directors have changed during the project implementation period. The activities have been carried out by the Externally Financed Projects Department and Erzurum Rural Development Project Coordination Unit in the body of the said General Directorate. Since a lot of projects financed externally have been implemented by the same General Directorate and thus the number of staff members for translation works were not sufficient, some delays have occurred in translation works. 3.02 Procurement activities of the project have been carried out by the Externally Financed Projects Department. In 1984-1985, procurement activities were realized very rapidly. All tools and equipment required for rural infrastructure and also purchase of vehicles for livestock services have been completed. But, during 1986-1989, purchases could not be realized. Purchases of extension and information materials, agricultural tools and equipment and laboratory materials were realized in 1989-1990 with considerable delays. 3.03 Semi-annual reports could not be written and published after 1987. 3.04 The necessary budget allocations for the project have been reduced from time to time and sent with some delays. It is natural to take savings measures in a developing country and this should be accepted as a normal procedure. However, the project activities were hindered by these procedures. 3.05 Because of the reorganizations made in MAFRA in 1985, the project directorate could not be established with an effective and authorized budget and full staff members. Although Project and Implementation General Directorate has used all their possibilities for solving these bottleneck problems, a sound and active project directorate could not be established in the field due to the hindrance of regulations. After 1987, Project Directorate has acted as a unit for organizing the activities for the foreign specialists and coordination of meetings and it has been a unit which can only receive information about the project activities but cannot take any initiative. 3.06 Overseas and local training programs have been planned and applied carefully and they have reached their targets. However, specialization training could not be realized in the desired way.  - 18 - 3.07 Good coordination with the Treasury & Foreign Trade Undersecretariat, General Directorate of Rural Services, and Agricultural Bank of Turkey has been ensured. Also, the activities have been carried out, establishing good dialogue with the main units of the Ministry viz. General Directorate of Protection and Control and General Directorate of Organization and Support. 3.08 The staff of the General Directorate of Project and Implementation visited frequently the Project area at General Director, Department Head and Project Coordinator levels and paid very much attention to supervising the project activities on the spot. 4. Borrower's Performance - Organizations in Project Area Provincial Directorate of Agriculture 4.01 Agricultural and Livestock component of the Project was carried out by this organization. Three Provincial Directors changed during the project implementation period. All the Provincial Directors were Veterinarians. Although the project terminated at the end of 1989, purchase of materials and the training component continued in 1990 and in the mean time the third director was changed. This director was an Agricultural Engineer. Section Directors of the Provincial Directorate, especially the farmer training section director who carried out main services of the project, were not changed frequently during the project implementation period. Animal Health and Project and Statistics Directors were changed only once. 4.02 The number of technicians in the Province Center was great. They could not be sent to the counties because they were university students. As regards the counties, the number of staff members was very high in the county centers and staff members could not be sent to the village groups. Even, there were no staff members in some village groups from time to time. 4.03 VGT offices could never be provided with a vehicle. Also VGT buildings could not be equipped at the desired level. 4.04 Both farmer training and in-service training activities were applied in accordance with the programs prepared according to the climate conditions. 4.05 Desired dialogue for credit distribution could not be established between TCZB and Provincial Directorate of Agriculture. The Bank did not accept the preparation of the projects by the Provincial Directorate as they had their own engineering posts.  - 19 - 4.06 Sending and utilization of vehicles for agricultural and livestock services were realized with difficulty. 4.07 Provincial Directorate of Agriculture carries out its services in four different places. These units could not be arranged as a collective campus. This in turn caused some difficulties in coordination between the units. 4.08 Provincial Directorate of Agriculture established good dialogues with the Agricultural Faculty during the project implementation period and also it carried out the services in close cooperation with the research institutions. Research Institutes 4.09 Rural Services Research Institute attached to the General Directorate of Rural Services and Eastern Anatolia Research Institute of the Ministry worked in Erzurum Rural Development Project and they completed their establishment during the project implementation period. These institutions which had very bad conditions at the beginning of the project reached a very good level in all respects. 4.10 Three directors were changed in Agricultural Research Institute during the project implementation period while no director was changed in Rural Services Research Institute. 4.11 Qualified technical staff members' insufficiency was minimized in 1989. Very much attention was paid to the doctorate studies of the staff members. Staff members attended the long-term overseas training programs within the bounds of possibility. 4.12 Research Institutions made great contributions to the training of technical staff members working in Extension Units. 4.13 Although the relations with the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture were not at the desired level, the research institutes have tried to strengthen these relations. Agricultural Faculty of Ataturk University 4.14 Agricultural Faculty of Ataturk University carried out its duties in the best way for training of technical staff members under the in-service training component of the project.  - 20 - Lecturers of the Faculty took part in the training programs arranged in Erzurum and outside Erzurum by our Ministry. 4.15 Considerable investments were made for zootechnology services in the body of the Faculty under the project but these services could not be improved as much as desired. 4.16 Also, Agricultural Faculty played an active role in bee keeping, meadow-grassland, forage crops and animal feeding demonstrations carried out by the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture. Agricultural Bank of Turkey 4.17 The policies applied for the lending component of the project are Government policies. High interest, low official prices for land and not having registration for most of the lands created important problems during the project implementation period. However, branch directorates of TCZB which was executing agency in the project area could not do anything about these problems. 4.18 Also, establishment of honey packaging and marketing units and milk collecting centers could not be realized but this was no fault of the units of the bank. 4.19 Most of the directors of the bank were from Erzurum and this caused some problems. 4.20 Inadequacy of vehicles had been a hindrance for meeting the credit requirements and carrying out of control services. Rural Services Provincial Directorate 4.21 It was a great achievement to reach the targets envisaged for infrastructure services during normal implementation period of the project. 4.22 At the beginning of the project some of the machinery and equipment purchased internationally for infrastructure services were not sent to the project area. With the insistence of the World Bank and Project Directorate, all of the machines and equipment were brought to the project area in 1986. There had been a spare parts bottleneck, especially for large machines and equipment, after 1986. The efforts made for solving these problems had been insufficient and 2 million dollars of allocation was not used and it was cancelled.  - 21 - 4.23 Laboratory materials purchased for Rural Services Research Institute under the project were transferred to the areas outside the project. After the facilities of the said institute were completed in 1987, all laboratory equipment could be realized again. 4.24 Constructions of irrigation canals and industrial manufacturing constructions on the roads did not have the required quality due to the severe winter conditions and lack of qualified contractors and lack of foreman employment and these constructions were renovated in 1989-90. This matter was accepted as a reason for the extension of the project Closing Date for the second time. 4.25 Employment of workers for greasing of heavy machines and foremen for the constructions was not ensured adequately. But this could have been realized through creation of permanent posts. 4.26 Efforts were not made for enumeration of vehicles on the road envisaged in the project. There had been some delays in realization of training and studies for pump drinking water projects. 4.27 Starting coating of the stabilized roads before completion of art manufactures hindered the construction of good quality road coating. Lack of qualified contractors and lack of demands for art manufacturing works caused the delays in constructions. 4.28 Mixing the concrete directly on the floor caused low quality in concrete constructions. However, later on, mixing processes were done on iron plate. As it is known quality of concrete depends on mixing process. 4.29 During the first years of reorganization, payments were made late and sometimes with treasury bonds and this in turn caused the delays. Project OffleS 4.30 The project office could not be established with full authority and deficiency of this was felt from the beginning of the project. Bureaucracy and relevant organizations did not show the required interest and consequently an unauthorized and unequipped project office tried to carry out the activities. 4.31 All requirements of the project office were met by the executing agencies particularly by the Governor's office. Therefore, the necessary authority for supervision of the relevant organizations could not be established.  - 22 - 4.32 The activities were carried out only by good dialogues and achievement was obtained. After 1987, the project office was informed of the events only for information and the General Directorate of Project and Implementation carried out the project, directly contacting the executing organizations. 4.33 Project office played active role in the symposium arranged under the Project on Nutrition and Health and Evaluation of Rural Development Project as well as in the studies made on health and nutrition jointly by the Hacetepe University and Erzurum Governor's Office and in herb studies for meadow and grassland plants. 4.34 Training activities oriented to the women and young girls in villages were made frequently by the project directorate under the coordination of Erzurum Governor's Office. Female doctors, dentists, veterinarians and zoo- technicians took part in these studies. The results obtained from these studies were presented for the information of World Bank missions as well as the ministries. 4.35 The project director worked without any change between July 1, 1984-August 5, 1990. Also two Agricultural Engineers and five translators worked in the project during the implementation period of the project. However, they did not work together at the same time. 5. Conclusions and Lessons Learned 5.01 In general, the Erzurum Rural Development Project was successful. Targets in the project were achieved or at least high realization percentages were obtained. Maybe, an ideal application could not be done but it was done as best it could be done. 5.02 It was understood from this project that a five-year implementation period was not sufficient for East Anatolia Region. Minimum of seven years implementation period is required for this kind or project. The project could be completed in seven years. Foreign exchange of 14 million dollars could not be utilized. If the third Closing Date extension proposal had been accepted by the World Bank, the amount of the cancellation could have been reduced. At least, the spare parts for the equipment and machines used for infrastructure activities could have been purchased. 5.03 As of the end of September, foreign exchange utilization was realized as 77% of the loan amount according to the agreement between the Treasury and Foreign Trade Undersecretariat and our Ministry. Amount of foreign exchange cancelled is over 14 million dollars. The reason for this was that the project was designed when the dollar was TL 100 and at the completion date of the project it was TL 2,310. Also, in 1989 when the dollar rate was very high,  - 23 - considerable amount of purchases had been realized. In addition, savings measures of the government affected these utilizations. As is known, unless the local sources are used, the dollar transfer is not possible. 5.04 The proposals of government for increasing physical targets of the project were not accepted by the World Bank during the project implementation period. 5.05 Also, the proposals of the government for adding new components to the project were not accepted by the World Bank. It was felt that it was a great deficiency not including the following activities into the project: nutrition and health, establishment of marketing places, carpet making and weaving courses on the basis of villages, afforestation works in forest areas and weed control with herbicides in sugar beet areas. 5.06 Executing agencies were strengthened under the project in respect of building, vehicles, tools and equipment, workshops and laboratories. 5.07 Knowledge, experiences and viewpoints of a lot of staff members changed through the overseas training. 5.08 Employment of foreign specialists made a great contribution to the training of technical staff members and accelerated the technological information exchange. 5.09 The Agricultural Bank and also technical personnel had been familiar with the project studies through the 'Project Credit System Applied for the Agricultural credits. 5.10 The farmers could make comparisons through the demonstrations and the ones who had the resources started to apply personally the things they learned from demonstrations. 5.11 Animal Health Services were carried out according to the program and successful results were obtained. 5.12 Since the land registration and ownership studies were not sufficient, government values for the lands were low, and the interest rates were very high and changed frequently, the credit component could not work soundly and in conformity with its purpose. Lessons Learned 5.13 Application of Rural Development Projects will continue especially in the less developed regions. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has experienced technical staff members.  - 24 - In order to develop the less developed regions and raise the living standards, this kind of projects are necessary. The following suggestions can be made for the applications of future Rural Development Projects in the light of experiences gained from Corum-Cankiri and Erzurum Rural Development Projects: (i) At preparation phases of the projects, a detailed survey and research should be made. The design of the project should be made in implementation area. Local technicians should be given duties in the projects. (ii) Integrated projects will be very beneficial. However, it will be very difficult to carry out such an application through the present organization. (a) The project directorate should be established with full authority, independent budget and all required posts at the beginning of the project. (b) The Governors in the implementation area should be given full authority. (c) Monitoring and evaluation of the project should be done in time, continuously, in coordination both in headquarters and the implementation area. (d) Nutrition and health, marketing skill courses and forestry activities should be included in the project. (iii) Specialization studies should be given importance in overseas training programs and it should be ensured that the technical staff members who attended short term and long term overseas training programs be required to remain for obligatory services in the project area. (iv) The budget allocation should be sent on time and without deduction. (v) In the less developed areas, the yield and living standards are low. New methods should be used for procurement of agricultural inputs and interest rates to be applied in these areas. (vi) The procurement of tools and equipment and materials envisaged in the project should be made on time without delay. In procurement, tools and equipment and materials which are popular and have spare parts and service units in the country should be preferred. Also, these goods should be present in large scale in the machinery and material park of the implementing agencies. (vii) Extension units should be established for irrigation in Rural Services Organizations. (viii) The annual programs and budget should be made by the executing units in project area and the project management and revised by the headquarters later on. (ix) In-service training programs should be given importance in order to benefit from home economists in training of village women.  - 25 - (x) Animal health technicians should be employed in VGT offices established in accordance with the Training and Visit system. (xi) Rural Services Organization should give importance to the employment of foremen in the construction and control of buildings and ensure the establishment of Irrigation Unions or Cooperatives. (xii) Great efforts should be made for adoption of artificial insemination by the villages. If this is not possible, attention should be paid to natural breeding.  - 26 - Table 1 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION Related Bank Loans Project Loan/Credit Amount Status No. (US$M) Grain Silos Loan 270-TU 3.9 Completed Seyhan Irrigation I Loan 63-TU 25.2 Completed Seyhan Irrigation I Credit 38-TU 20.0 Completed Seyhan Irrigation III Credit 143-TU 12.0 Completed Seyhan irrigation II Loan 587-TU 12.0 Completed Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Export Loan 762-TU 10.0 Completed Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Export Credit 257-TU 15.0 Completed Intensive Dairy Production (Livestock I) Credit 236-TU 4.5 Completed Irrigation Rehabilitation Completion Credit 281-TU 18.0 Completed Second Livestock Development Credit 330-TU 16.0 Completed Ceyhan Aslantas Multipurpose Loan 883-TU 44.0 Completed Ceyhan Aslantas Multipurpose Credit 360-TU 30.0 Completed Corum-Cankiri Rural Development Loan 1130-TU 75.0 Completed Agricultural Credit and Agro-Industries Loan 1248-TU 63.0 Completed Third Livestock Development Loan 1265-TU 21.5 Completed Fourth Livestock Development Loan 1586-TU 24.0 Completed Grain Storage Loan 1742-TU 85.0 Completed Fifth Livestock Development Loan 1862-TU 51.0 Completed Second Fruit and Vegetables Loan 1967-TU 40.0 Completed Second Agricultural Credit Loan 2318-TU 150.4 Completed Extension and Applied Research Loan 2405-TU 72.2 On-going Third Agricultural Credit Loan 3090-TU 250.0 On-going  - 27 - Table 2 Project Timetable Activity Date Planned Revised Date | Actual Date Identification October 1976 October 1976 Preparation (Interim) January 1977 January 1977 Preparation (Final) September 1978 September 1978 Pre-Appraisal March 1981 March 1981 Appraisal May 1981 May 1981 Negotiations January 1982 January 1982 Board Approval February 1982 February 1982 Loan Signature March 1982 March 1982 Loan Effectiveness July 1982 September 1982 November 1982 Project Completion December 1986 December 1987 December 1988 December 1989 December 1989 Loan Closing June 1987 June 1988 June 1989 December 1989 December 1989 Source: World Bank Project Files.  - 28 - Table Cumulative Estimated and Actual Loan Disbursements IBRD I IFAD | TOTAL Appraisal Estimate (US$ million)l' 40.0 20.0 60.0 Actual Disbursements (US$ million)Z 31.0 15.5 46.5 Actual as % of Appraisal Estimate 78 78 78 Date of Final Disbursement 04/20/90 N/A Comment: Because of over-estimation of project costs, the sharp devaluation of the Turkish Lira against other currencies and the slow rate of disbursements in the early years of the project, US$9.0 million of the IBRD Loan and US$4.5 of the IFAD Loan were cancelled. !' Per SAR and Loan Agreements. v' Per WB disbursement records.  - 29 - Table 4 Project Implementation Appraisal Actual or PCR Actual as % Indicator Estimate EstimateZ of SAR I/ 1986 | 1989 Estimate Field Crop Demonstrations (No. of Farms) - Wheat 8,500 3,468 N/A N/A - Pastures 87 41 N/A N/A Animal Husbandry Demonstrations (No. of Farms) 3,900 N/A 1,510 39 Livestock Vaccination & Parasite Control (000' annually) - Enterotoxemia 950 805 1,172 123 - Foot and Mouth 200 228 324 162 Artificial Insemination (No. of Animals) - Cattle 8,370 5,593 8,666 104 - Sheep 38,000 1,345 1,345 4 Investment & Production Credit - Borrowers (Number) 30,000 36,000 50,000 167 - Loans (Number) 36,000 N/A 56,300 156 Infiastructure - Roads (Km) 898 750 1,360 151 - Water Supply Schemes (Number) 142 135 218 154 - Small Scale Irrigation Schemes (Number) 56 N/A 197 352 - Small Scale Irrigation (Ha) 10,000 9,189 13,315 133 - Soil Conservation Schemes (Number) 8 N/A N/A N/A - Soil Conservation (Ha) 1,300 1,528 1,775 137 Technical Assistance (man-months) 87 N/A 125 143 Overseas Trining (man-months) 300 134 379 126 1' Per SAR. Per DPA, GDRA Erzurum and Government PCR.  - 30 - Table 5 A & B Project Costs and Financing A. Project Costs (US$M equivalent) Component Appraisal Estimate Actual Local I Forex I Total Local Forex Total Costs Costs Costsv Costs Agricultural Servicca 21.7 5.0 26.7 N/A Animal Health and Breeding 3.3 2.4 5.7 N/A Investment and Production Credit 12.3 22.2 34.5 39.0 21.6 Rural Infrastructure 38.7 29.4 68.1 N/A 17.4 Project Management 0.7 0.6 1.3 N/A 1.2 Trmining 0.3 0.4 0.7 N/A 1.9 Total 77.0 60.0 137.0 47.5 46.5 94.0 B. Project F rancing (US$M equivalent) [3RD ErADTTOTAL [I3RD [PFAD TOTAL A.IBRD and [FAD 1. (a) Coaaructo & Maintennce Equipment 10.95 5.47 16.42 7.51 3.75 11.26 (b) Equipment, Mateials & Agrcultaral Inputs 2.33 1.42 4.25 2.93 1.47 4.40 2. Overam Traing 0.15 0.07 0.22 1.27 0.63 1.90 3. Civi Works 5.92 2.96 S.S8 4.09 2.05 6.14 4. Consulat Services 0.35 0.17 052 0.79 0.39 1.18 5. SublJoaus 7.95 3.98 11.93 2.68 134 4.02 6. Sub-os 2.20 1.10 330 11.44 5.72 17.16 7. Subloans 1.65 0.33 2.48 0.27 0.14 0.41 3. UnaBocated 3.00 4.00 12.00 - - - SUDTOTAL 40AI 20.00 "SM 31 15A9 46.47 B. Govern t 64.70 3.S0 C. TCZB 7.40 23.00 D. Sub-borrower. 4.90 11.00 TOTAL 137.0 937 Sounuc SAR, World Bank disburseent records; PDA Erzurum; and Governmet PCR. 1 Breakdown by component not available.  - 31 - Table 6 A&B Nred R_ ir DizPct uA I _ 1 4 - j?CRffAmdS Total Number of Benefciares (People) 2S3,400 353,000 Incremental Employment (Jobs) 1,500 N/A B. Eemamic Lupac Ad I I MR Ei1aActd Economic Rate of Retum (ERR) 14.2% N/A NB: Because of substantial gaps in the data collected by MAFRA's ex-post survey, and the inadequacy of the data available to the PCR mission, it is not possible to estimate the economic rate of return which the project is now expected to achieve. However, given the substantial cost-savings particularly in the infrastructure component and the absolute increments in crop and lvestock production it is reasonable to assume that the project has attained or even exceeded the SAR economic rate of return. In addition, the project had considerable intangible benefits particularty in the infrastructure component. MAFRA intends to review the impact analysis.  - 32 - Table 7 Page 1 of 2 Sats or Coyemaus Subject S lt A. Leam Auaimnt~ C.- 1. Section 4.01 (a) The Borrower to maintain ESC, PCC and the Complied but project office not given Project Ofrice as administrative entities with adequate line authority. powers and functions sufficient to carry out their respective responsibilities under the Project. 2. Section 4.01 (c) The Borrower to allocate in its budget each fiscal Complied on budgetary Covenant but year until completion of the Project al funds only partial compliance with reporting required to meet operating and capital Covenant. expenditures under Parts B through F of the Project; and provide the Bank before the beginning of each such fiscal year with an estimate of such expenditures. 3. Section 4.02 The Borrower to ensure coordination for carrying Complied. out of aDl parts of the Project by causing the implementing agencies to enter into protocols with each other. 4. Section 4.03 The Borrower to implement a staffing plan for the Complied although a permanent project Project acceptable to the Bank including the manager was appointed almost two years appointment of a project manager and late. appropriate staff, all with qualifications and terms of reference satisfactory to the Bank. 5. Section 4.04 In order to assist the Borrower in implementation Complied. of the Project, the Borrower shall employ, not later than September 15, 1982, or such other date as the Bank may agree, such consultants as shall be agreed with the Bank. 6. Section 4.08 The Borrower will take appropriate steps to pass Complied as regards agricultural inputs. on the ful costs of agricultural inputs provided to The other parts of the covenant were not end users in the Project area once demonstration fulfilled. relating to such inputs is completed, including: (a) rangeland management services; (b) seed treatment, chemicals and equipment for crop spraying; (c) materials and services for parasite control and artificial insemination; and (d) irrigation, other than capital improvements. 7. Section 4.10 Prior to commencing construction on each new Not complied with. water system under the Project, the Borrower shall obtain assurances from the village water users of such system that such users shal be responsible for operating and maintaining such system, including payment of pumping energy charges. 8. Section 4.11 (d) Each semester, the borrower to prepare progress Partial compliance. and evaluation reports dealing with ali Parts of the Project and furnish such reports the Bank and the Fund within two months after the end of each semester. 9. Section 4.11 (e) Promptly after completion of the Project, but in Complied. Government prepared a good any event not later than six months after the quality PCR. Closing Date the Borrower to prepare and submit to the Bank a Project Completion Report.  - 33 - Table 7 Page 2 of 2 Sct~ed SbWu 10. Section 5.02 The Borrower shall maintain or cause to be Reports were submitted late most of the maintained records adequate to reflect in time. accordance with consistently maintained sound accounting practices the operations, resources and expenditures, in respect of the Project. The accounts of the Project for each fiscal year should be audited, in accordance with appropriate auditing principles consistently applied, by independent auditors and a certified copy of the auditors' report should be submitted to the Bank and IFAD not later than six months after the end of the respective fiscal year. B. Proet 4tme_t Section 2.01 (c) TCZB to enter into arrangements with GDMA, to Complied. define in detail the responsibilities, functions and administrative procedures of TCZB and GDAA for the carrying out of Part A of the Project. Section 4.01 (d) TCZB to submit to the Bank and the Fund, on a Complied. semestral basis a summary of project accounts within a two-month period after the end of the semester. Section 4.01 (e) TCZB to furnish to the Bank and the Fund with Complied with although reports annual audited project accounts in the English sometimes submitted late. language, as soon as available, but in any case not later than six months after the end of TCZB's fiscal year. Section 4.02 TCZB to deposit in a revolving fund amounts Not complied with. received by TCZB on account of repayment of under Part A of the Project. Source: Loan Agreements, Supervision Reports and GDPI.  - 34 - Table 8A Use of Bank Resources: A. Staff Inputs PREP. & PREAPPR. APPR. NEGOT. SUPERV. PCR. TOTAL FY75 0.3 0.3 FY76 0.0 FY77 59.6 59.6 FY78 38.8 38.8 FY79 90.0 5.7 = 95.7 FY80 7.8 7.8 FY81 21.8 41.5 63.3 FY82 88.5 8.4 1.3 98.2 FY83 10.4 10.4 FY84 21.1 21.1 FY85 10.1 10.1 FY86 28.9 28.9 FY87 27.1 27.1 FY88 22.0 22.0 FY89 16.9 16.9 FY90 4.5 4.5 FY91 0.1 0.7 0.8 FY92 I _ 11.6 11.6 TOTAL 224.0 130.0 8.4 142.4 12.3 517.1  Use of Bank Resources: B. Missions Stage of Projet Cycle Sent by MoonthlYear No. of Persons Period in Field Specilizatiom Perform-ace Types of (weeks) Represeted' Rating2 problals' Identification FAO/CP 10/1976 4 3 L,P,E.A - - Interim Preparation FAO/CP 01/1977 2 2 L,X - - Interim Prepartion FAO/CP 05/1977 3 2 A,L,IE - - Fuil Peparation FAO/CP 09/1978 4 4 A,IE,RE,E - - Pro-Appraisal World Bank 03/1981 3 3 Appraial World Bank 05/1081 6 4 A.E,L,C,IE,PA - - Supervision 1 World Bank 12/1982 3 2 A,E,IE 2 M,O Supcrvision 2 World Bank 04/1984 3 3 A,IE,L 2 M,O Supervision 3 World Bank 10/1984 1 0.5 A 2 M,T tfn Supervision 4 World Bank 06/1985 2 2 A,IE 2 M,T Supervision S World Bank 11/1985 3 3 E,RE,L - Supervision 6 World Bank 0611986 2 1.5 A - - Supervision 7 World Bank 10/1986 1 1 A - - Supervision 8 World Bank 06/1987 4 2 A,IE,E,L - - Supervision 9 World Bank 05/1988 2 2 A,E - - Supervision 10 World Bank 05/1989 2 3 A,IE - - PCR Prparation FAO/CP 07/1991 2 2 E.TE - - Source: World Ioject File. 1/ A - Agriculture; C - Credit; E - Economi-t/Financial; IE - Irrigation Engineer; L - Livestock; P - Project Analyst; PA Poultry and Apiculture; RE - Roads Engineer; X - Extansian Specialist. I I - Minor Problms; 2 - Mod-rate Problems; 3 - Major Problems. No comparative rating is available after June 1985 because the World Bank changed tho supervision reporting format. M - Manasarial; 0 - Others; T - Technicel. No comparative rating is available after Jun. 1985 becauso the World Bank cbanged th, supervision reportina format.   Crop and Livestock Activities in Erzuruin Province 1982 1983 198 18 1 |6 1987 1988 1989 A. Tletds of Major Crops (Ton/h1a)' Uheat 1.19 1.15 1.18 1.27 1.51 1.11 1.37 0.69 - larley 1.52 1.52 1.S1 1.55 2.07 1.59 1.76 0.53 - Aifalfa 7.60 4.76 3.92 4.11 5.70 6.25 6.64 3.68 - sugar beet 28.40 26.22 26.95 26.33 23.96 23.40 27.38 19.29 - potmtoea 17.26 18.04 18.94 20.87 21.76 18.39 22.20 12.68 - eans 0.a9 1.00 1.11 1.29 0.98 1.09 1.09 0.80 8. Livestock Activities ' without Uith SAR project Project Estimate Number of vitlages visited by 81 85 N/A Veterinerlans/Anilel Health Techniclans(X) Production w Uool (Tons) 2.2 12.1 N/A Hides (NM) N/A 1,544 N/A . Eggs (N-) N/A 120,400 M/A .Horey (Tons) N/A 11.4 N/A Cheese (Tons) N/A 65.7 N/A Butter (Tons) N/A 44.7 N/A Cow and sheep m11k (Tons) 199.8 N/A 201.9 Beef (Carcass) (Tons) 10.8 N/A 4.9 Hutton (Tons) 8.2 N/A 9.4 CdAM.d fierri topmduction UgWae, in Gev*wnr PCR. MOA [-postf Bos.IIr. Survey and BAR.   _____ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~IBRD 15986R 1<-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 -. ~~~~~~~~~TUPKEY ~~~~~~ ~~URE ~~~~~~AkAh i. / ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~Potc oet,t... 5** REP n ' / ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rietcnenrto aes.t / S.-'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~eetdvlaegrusfritnW * ~~ "-... --- - ---- DiPrijct cnentersto ra Provime cacetratlnaes,t District boundaries ow - - ~~~~~~Province boundary Rivers a ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- zrmA, I, center CSflees AA subcenters to be improved r. 7- 2, ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__~A...ol health teamns lo be established A Agricultural extersiion distrct centers Karayozi ~~~~~~~~to be constructed Koras'ozi ~~~~~~~~Es.sting facilities: A Agr.culurol e.tension distr.ct centers * M.lk plant / Meat packing plant and slaughterhos k X ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Regionol agricultural research center YOI ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Reg.onol so.[ and eater researh center ~J Agricultural secondary school O&SU.~~~~~~ ~~"11* Sugar beet foctory Agr.cultural machinery factory A Atoturk University MILES 0 0 20