India - Second Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY Repwt No. 11493 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA SECOND UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (CREDIT 1332-IN) DECEMBER 30, 1992 Agriculture Operations Division Country Department II South Asia Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS At appraisal (February 1983) US$1.00 = Rupees (Rs.) 9.50 (For exchange rates throughout implementation, see Attachment, Table 1) FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER GOI; GOUP - April 1 to March 31 ABBREVIATIONS ADW Agricultural Development Wing CCA Cultivable Command Area DOA Department of Agriculture ERR Economic Rate of Retum GOI Govemment of India GOUP Government of Uttar Pradesh ID'IW Irrigation Department Tubewell Wing IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IST Improved Standard Tubewell M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NIA Net Irrigable Area O&M Operation and Maintenance OST Old Standard Tubewell PCR Project Completion Report R&D Research and Development SAR Staff Appraisal Report SCF Standard Conversion Factor UP Uttar Pradesh UPDESCO Uttar Pradesh Development Systems Corporation UPSEB Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board GLOSSARY Kharif Wet season (June to October) Rabi Dry season (November to February) Zaid Hot weather season (March to May)  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation December 30, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Second Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Proiect (Credit 1 332-IN) Attached is a copy of the report entitled "Project Completion Report on India - Second Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project (Credit 1 332-IN)" prepared by the FAO/CP and the South Asia Regional Office, with Part 11 contributed by the Borrower. The report is informative and comprehensive but it presents two sharply different perspectives about the achievements and the likely development impact of the project. There is no disagreement about the successful introduction and the large scale application of a highly innovative groundwater distribution technology that had been developed in an earlier pilot project. Part I of the PCR argues, however, that implementation delays, erratic power supply, insufficient extension, lack of suitable water management training, weak operation and maintenance arrangements, lower than planned irrigation efficiencies and intensities, and higher than expected administrative and engineering costs and lower than projected output prices imply a reestimated rate of return of only 1 percent. Part 11, on the other hand, uses higher production estimates and displays a highly favorable rate of return for a project which it considers to have been "a boon" to the agriculture economy of Uttar Pradesh. An audit is planned to ascertain the outcome and sustainability of the project and its implications for groundwater development in India. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA SECOND UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (Credit 1332-IN) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ............................................... i EVALUATION SUMMARY .......................................... iii PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ...................... 1 1. Project Identity .............................................. 1 2. Background ................ .......1....... 3. Project Objectives and Description . ..................................... 2 4. Project Design and Organization ........................................ 2 5. Project Implementation ............................................. 3 6. Project Results ............................................... 6 7. Project Sustainability .............................................. 7 8. Bank Performance .............................................. 8 9. Borrower Performance ............................................ 10 10. Project Relationship .............................................. 12 1 1. Consulting Services .............................................. 12 12. Project Documentation and Data .................. .................... 12 PART II BORROWER'S COMMENTS ON PARTS I AND III ..................... 13 1. Preface ......................... 13 2. Summary of Comments on Project Completion Report......................... 15 3. Comments on Part I .............................................. 20 4. Comments on PartH ............................................. 36 PART HI STATISTICAL TABLES 1. RelatedBankCredits ............................................. 64 2. Project Timetable .............................................. 64 3. Credit Disbursements ............................................. 65 4. Project Implementation. ........ II I............... I I II I .... 66 5. Project Cost and Financing .......................................... 67 6. Project Results .............................................. 69 7. Status of Covenants .............................................. 71 8. Use of Bank Resources ............................................ 72 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  ATrACHMENT 1 Economic and Financial Analysis ........................ 74 Tables: 1. Inflation Factors and Exchange Rates ................................ 81 2. Financial Prices of Crops and Inputs at Farm-Gate .82 3. Economic Values of Crops and Inputs at Farm-Gate .83 4. Performance of Improved Standard Tubewell (ST).. 84 5 Pre-Project Crop Production in Three Model Areas .85 6. Production Summary per 100 HA CCA Tubewell .86 7. Net Irrigable Area Created by the Project .............. 87 8. Production Build-up of Paddy, Maize and Wheat .88 9. Crop Production Costs Per Ha and Per Ton With Project At Full Development .89 10. Project Costs by Year .90 11. Costs and Benefit Streams ....................................... 91 12. Costs and Benefit Streams for Representative Models . ...................... 92 MAP IBRD 16540 R  i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA SECOND UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (Credit 1332-IN) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Second Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewell Project for which a credit of SDR91.6 million (Credit 1332-IN) was approved on March 15, 1983. The project was co-financed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD Loan 124-IN) in the amount SDR32.0 million. The credit closed on March 31, 1991, three years behind schedule. The final disbursement from the credit was made on June 17, 1991, at which time the credit was also fully disbursed. The undisbursed balance of SDR4.7 million from the IFAD loan was cancelled in September 1991. Parts I (Project Review from Bank's Perspective) and III (Statistical Infolmation) of this report were prepared by an FAO/CP project completion mission which visited India in February/March 1991. The Government of Uttar Pradesh's (GOUP) comments on Parts I and III are attached to this report. GOUP's Irrigation Department also prepared subsequently a separate PCR dated May 1992. IFAD have not responded to our request for comments on the report. The preparation of this PCR was based inter alia on the Staff Appraisal Report, the legal documents, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, internal Bank memoranda, relevant Bank reports on the sector, and discussions with Bank project staff in the New Delhi Office.   iii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA SECOND UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (Credit 1332-IN) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objective and Main Features The project objectives were to alleviate poverty and create rural employment through improved agricultural production resulting from development of public tubewells. The project was to finance a four-year time slice of GOUP's development program in the public groundwater sector. It was based on the concept that a reliable, timely and equitable irrigation service can only be provided from a public tubewell if conveyance losses are minimized and the power supply is able to match design assumptions. The main project components were: (i) construction of about 2,200 improved tubewell irrigation systems; (ii) connection to the separate 1 lkV feeder lines of about 650 old standard tubewell systems and (iii) modernization of about 100 old standard tubewells (para. 3.1). Implementation Experience During its initial stage, implementation was hampered by insufficient advance planning in construction and procurement and by poor coordination between the implementing agencies. These initial delays and lower than expected unit costs affected disbursement and by June 1987, i.e. at the end of the originally planned implementation peiiod, credit disbursement was only half of the appraisal estimate. Following the central and the state governments' request to utilize fully project funds, including those that resulted from the increase in dollar/SDR and rupee/dollar exchange rates, changes in project scope were introduced which consisted mainly in the financing of more new improved standard tubewells (IST) and more "modernization of existing public tubewells". After three extensions, the credit closed on March 31, 1991 (paras. 5.1-5.2). Tubewell Size. While the 150 m3/hour capacity IST proved to be the most universal size tubewell under the conditions in the project areas, there was less scope than anticipated for the 300 m3/hour capacity IST. Site selection for clusters and individual ISTs were critical planning steps which had been thoroughly addressed at appraisal but which were not always handled entirely satisfactorily where political pressure or poweiful interests succeeded in biasing technical considerations. Ouality standards were difficult to maintain due to the large number of simultaneously implemented ISTs on widely dispersed sites and with a limited number of qualified staff. Tubewell energization was seriously delayed during the first three to four years of implementation due to delayed funding arTangements and subsequent material shortages. During the latter half of the project, conditions improved significantly (paras. 5.3-5.6). The large scale introduction of IST was to be accompanied by an appropriate water charging system based on volumetric pricing instead of using "flat rates". Relevant covenants had been agreed upon during credit negotiations but, apart from a new water charging proposal, little progress has been made. Agricultural development was hampered by an exceptionally slow staff build-up and denial by GOUP of adequate transport as proposed in the SAR. There is little evidence that training of extension workers in on-fai-m soil and water management was pursued systematically. Field demonstrations mainly stressed the use of inputs while soil and water management aspects were given little attention. As a result water use efficiency has remained veiy low (paras. 5.7-5.12).  iv Results As designed, the success of the project depended on. its ability to provide reliable, timely and equitable irrigation services. To minimize the risk of underutilization of project wells, a comprehensive agricultural development component was included and the effectiveness of the agricultural development services was to be closely monitored to assure that the expected transformation of agriculture took place. Available data and mission observations indicate a wide divergence in tubewell performance. In areas where fatmers had some prior expelience with irrigation, where the social structure was fairly homogenous and where operation and maintenance (O&M) and electricity supply turned out to be efficient and reliable, production performance was excellent and the economic rate of return (ERR) for such wells is reestimated at 23%. By contrast, in areas where erratic power supply was coupled with insufficient extension and water management training, with poor O&M services and shortcomings in initial planning, the benefits from public tubewells did not materialize as anticipated and the ERR is negative. Overall, net incremental benefits remained far below levels anticipated and at completion the ERR for the project as a whole is estimated at 1%. Apart from the problems encountered during implementation, the main factors contributing to the unfavorable result include: (i) the irrigation efficiency (both, system and field application efficiency) is generally below design standard with correspondingly higher cost per unit of water pumped; (ii) the irrigation intensity, estimated at only 82%, is much below the appraisal estimate of 97%; (iii) there were considerable time lags between tubewell construction and commissioning; (iv) cost for administration and engineering, estimated at appraisal at 5% of project base cost, increased to 20%; (v) world market prices for foodgrains, particularly for rice, did not reach the levels projected in the early 1980s (paras. 6.1- 6.8). Despite these shortcomings the project's main quantitative objectives were met. The three extensions of the credit closing date greatly helped to achieve and even exceed some appraisal targets. At completion, there were 3,200 operational ISTs with 150 m3/h capacity or 160% of the appraisal target and 450 old standard tubewells (OST), as against a planned 100, had been modernized. All project ISTs and modernized OSTs were connected to dedicated feeder lines and more regular power supply with less voltage fluctuations was provided. The increase in irrigable area is 385,000 ha, more than 60% of what was foreseen. The number of benefitting farm families could reach 660,000 or 50% more than targeted at appraisal. Expressed in 1990/91 Rs, the average per capita income from farming with project is estimated to have increased by Rs.328 (US$18) or by 290%. This compares with an increase of 206% anticipated at appraisal (Pailt III, 4 and 6, and Attachment 1). Sustainahilitv The availability of sufficient and timely power supply and well functioning O&M services will remain crucial to sustained tubewell performance. The superior technology does not imply that the systems are less vulnerable to deterioration due to wear and tear, material quality defects, design faults, and theft. In addition, reliance on publicly employed tubewell operators requires a high level of competence and vigilance from such staff and does not resolve the need for farmers to cooperate together as a group in sharing and monitoring water usage and maintenance of channels below the outlets. O&M services provided by the government will always be vulnerable to problems of poor delivery of such services, whether due to funding constraints or the difficulties inherent in servicing widely dispersed equipment and facilities and operating within the budget and other constraints inherent in government departments. Various measures can be taken to improve the prospects for high quality deliveiy of government services. Introduction of water charging system to cover the costs of delivery of electricity would relieve financial  v constraints on the State Electricity Board and the need for payments to the Board by the Iirigation Department. Similarly, water charges need to cover the costs of government operation and maintenance costs, or perpetual reliance on availability of government funds is maintained. Further training can be provided to tubewell operators, and the managements of all concerned agencies can place emphasis on supervising and monitoring. the tubewells in all required aspects: operations, maintenance, provision of electricity, and agricultural extension. Such measures, however, require complex coordination, and a shortfall in any one function or in availability of funds would affect performance; indeed, halting it in case of a tubewell's operational breakdown or lengthy rupture of power supply. The sustainability of these investments is thus questionable unless measures are taken to make them financially independent and manageiially-self reliant. Findings and Lessons A major achievement of the project was its large scale application of a highly innovative technology that had been jointly developed by the Bank and GOUP and tested in the UP I pilot project. The disappointing reestimated ERR of the project demonstrates that even with improved technology adopted, investment in public tubewell development on a large scale is not necessarily economically viable. Sustainability of such investments under the present government management approach is vulnerable to present and any future shortfalls in the services provided. Public involvement in tubewell development should therefore be reassessed. As concerns the existing public tubewells, an option that should be considered is the handover of ownership and management to farmer groups, village panchayats, or even private farmers or entrepreneurs. Initial experience with this approach has been encouraging in West Bengal and in Bangladesh and should be considered in Uttar Pradesh. Project design appears to have relied heavily on the attractiveness of technical innovations, the assumption being that the availability of low-cost and more reliable irTigation systems by themselves would provide enough incentives for farmers to adopt irrigation. However, experience with this project suggests that such linkages did not generally exist. The main obstacle appears to have been the considerable caution, if not resistance, of subsistence farmers towards a change from low-cost input rainfed farming to i-rigated agriculture. Although adequate provisions had been made for the establishment of an agricultural development component that could concentrate fully on supporting irrigated farming in tubewell command areas, due to lack of support from within the Department of Agricultulre (DOA) and funding and coordination problems within the Irrigation Department Tubewell Wing (IDTW) the Agiicultural Development Wing (ADW) never gained the required strength. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the project failed to play the intended role of providing project management with the performance indicators necessary for both advance planning and rectification of deficiencies in tubewell functioning, power supply, illrigation water management and agricultural perfolmance (paras. 5.8-5.9, 9.6-9.7). Economically viable and sustainable groundwater development requires a substantial degree of interaction between engineers, agronomists and farmers which can best be achieved through active participation of the DOA in project implementation. Adequate budget provision is required for extension, demonstration and training in tubewell command areas. Since the success of a public tubewells project depends on the performance of all participating Government agencies, the importance of close coordination cannot be stressed enough. In UP II which covered the entire State, the existence of many scattered sites created additional logistic challenges which neither project management nor monitoring and evaluation or Bank supervision missions were able to effectively cope with. For future development of groundwater irrigation, small shallow tubewells privately owned and operated by individual farmers or small groups of farmers appear to offer the more attractive alternative to large tubewells. This development has demonstrated viability and  vi sustainability, as discussed in a separate report (Uttar Pradesh Groundwater Development, Issues and Options; India Agriculture Operations Division, World Bank, February 1991), and in the India Irrigation Sector Review (India Agriculture Operations Division, World Bank, December 20, 1991, Report Number. 9518-IN). The development of such wells has been a major success story in Uttar Pradesh and has been supported through agricultural credit and the free boring program. Except where aquifer features are suitable for deep tubewells and not suitable for small shallow tubewells, this appears the most promising future groundwater development option to pursue (para. 7.3).  1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA SECOND UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (Credit 1332-IN) PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity Project Name Second Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project Credit No. Credit 1332-IN RVP Unit South Asia Region Country India Sector : Agliculture Sub-sector Irrigation 2. Background 2.1 Although the average per capita income in India had increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s, growth had been too slow to bring about more than a gradual reduction in the incidence of poverty. Accordingly, GOI's development plans gave priority to alleviating poverty and creating employment, especially in rural areas. To support agricultural growth, the Government of India (GOI) accelerated irrigation development through modernization of existing schemes, and construction of new schemes and improved agricultural supporting services to optimize the use of land and water resources. 2.2 In the State of Uttar Pradesh (UP), the state-wide extraction of groundwater at that time was estimated at only about one-half of the total resources and the Government of Uttar Pradesh (GOUP) gave priority to groundwater development. The Bank Group had been involved in the financing of both private and public tubewells in UP, with the public tubewells normally constructed in areas where gravity irrigation is not feasible and where the potential for construction of shallow tubewells is limited due to the depth of the aquifer or because landholdings are too small to allow this type of development. The weakest elements of the farming population were found to depend on the public sector if their land and groundwater resources were to be effectively and efficiently utilized, and GOUP considered that there needed to be a continuing and substantial investment in the public groundwater sector in those areas where conditions were appropriate to complement the private sector development. 2.3 To assist the State in overcoming the basic shortcomings in their public tubewell program, the Bank supported the Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewell Project (Cr.1004-IN), later referred to as UP I, which had been formulated as a two-year (1980/81-1981/82) pilot operation.  2 The primary objective of this first-stage project had been to test and demonstrate improved tubewell technology through the construction of about 500 public tubewells, before GOUP undertook a major investment in the new tubewell concept. The scope of the Second UP Public Tubewells Project (later referred to as UP II) had been cleared by GOI. It reflected the annual funding available for public sector groundwater development. Consideration had been given to transition requirements from the first-stage project, so that the existing implementation momentum would be maintained by the Irrigation Department and other agencies involved. 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.1 The project objectives were to alleviate poverty and create rural employment through improved agricultural production resulting from development of public tubewells. The project was to finance a four-year (1983/84-1986/87) program incorporating the following elements of the GOUP development program in the public groundwater sector: (i) construction of about 2,200 improved tubewell irrigation systems with the wells to be located in clusters of about 25 units and connected to the power supply system by separate ('dedicated') 11 kV feeder lines serving only public tubewells; (ii) connection to the separate 11 kV feeder lines of about 650 old standard tubewell systems located in the proximity of the new clusters of improved tubewells; (iii) modernization of about 100 old standard tubewells located in the proximity of the new clusters; (iv) vehicles, equipment and buildings to be used by project construction, and operation and maintenance staff; (v) research and development to test advanced technologies for public tubewells; (vi) project monitoring and evaluation; (vii) training of project staff; and (viii) staff, vehicles, farm demonstration plots and buildings for agricultural development in the command areas of project tubewells. In addition, the project was to support GOI's Project Preparation Fund for financing of consultants, incremental staff, equipment and special studies for the planning and preparation of irrigation and multi-purpose water resources projects in UP and other States. 3.2. Total project costs were estimated at US$192 million equivalent. The credit, Cr.1332-IN (SDR91.6 million [US$101.0 million equivalent]), co-financed by IFAD Loan 124-IN (SDR32.0 million [US$35.3 million equivalent]), was to finance all the foreign exchange costs (about 6% of total project costs) and about 70% of local costs. Overall responsibility for project implementation was with GOUP's Secretary for Irrigation and Power. Two agencies under his jurisdiction (the Irrigation Department's Tubewell Wing [IDTW] and the Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board [UPSEB]) would implement the project, with the Department of Agriculture (DOA) being responsible for the agricultural development activities to be provided once the project tubewells were commissioned. The agricultural impact of the project was to be largely in terms of an increase in foodgrain production. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.1 The availability of groundwater resources in large tracts of UP, and the fact that a large proportion of small and marginal farmers were still excluded from participation in the utilization of this resource, provided the basis for Bank support to public groundwater development. The state tubewells of old design (OSTs) were generally so poor in their operational performance that, without major technological improvements, further developments would not have been feasible. UP I was therefore mainly designed to develop and test an innovative technology that would overcome all major deficiencies experienced with the old systems. In this it partially succeeded. 4.2 While lessons from UP I were applied in UP II, e.g. the provision of dedicated electricity supply to clusters of wells in order to overcome notorious power supply problems, UP I,  3 because of its short duration and emphasis on technical innovations, did not lend itself to a reliable assessment of the impact of the new technology on production, and adequate arrangements for project sustainability. 4.3 It was recognized, however, that a strong participation by the Department of Agriculture, in the form of providing extension and farmer training in irrigated agriculture, is essential to project success. Consequently, UP II made provisions for a distinct agricultural project component to work exclusively for the introduction of effective agriculture in the project tubewell command areas. However, the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) was unclear about the Irrigation Department's and the Department of Agriculture's respective roles in the formation of water users' groups, water scheduling and farmer training in efficient water use. It appears both agencies were given the same responsibility in this regard, which caused confusion and passivity. 4.4 The appraisal mission underestimated the constraints imposed on institution-building by existing GOUP policies and procedures regarding sanctioning of additional posts, transport means and office equipment. GOUP has commented that a year should realistically have been added to enable the institutional build-up and arrangements to be effected. In retrospect, it could be said that the project was too large for a four-year implementation period, as by the end of that period, credit disbursement was only half of the appraisal estimate. It would appear that if six years had been scheduled, the project would essentially have been on target. 5. Project Implementation 5.1 General. What may have appeared to be a fairly straightforward project at appraisal stage -- the concept of new public tubewells being the same as the first phase projectl and the construction of improved tubewell irrigation systems representing over 80% of project base costs -- turned out to be a more complex undertaking than expected. Particularly during its initial stage, implementation was hampered by insufficient advance planning in construction and procurement and by poor coordination between the Irrigation and Agricultural Departments, as well as between the Irrigation Department and the State Electricity Board. These initial delays and lower than expected unit costs affected disbursement. Moreover, additional funds resulted from the increase in dollar/SDR and rupee/dollar exchange rates, and by June 1987, i.e. at the end of the originally planned implementation period, credit disbursements stood at only SDR46.5 million, or 51% of appraisal estimates. 5.2 Following the Central and the State's governments request to utilize fully project funds, changes in project scope were introduced which consisted mainly in the financing of a further 1,000 improved public tubewells, in addition to the 2,200 foreseen at appraisal. In recognition of a significantly improved implementation capacity, and considering the further decline in the value of the rupee, the original credit closing date of March 31, 1988 was extended three times to the final date of March 31, 1991. By that date, about SDR90.1 million had been disbursed from the credit and the original targets were exceeded. The credit was fully disbursed in June 1991. 5.3 Tubewell Size. While the 150 m3/hour capacity improved standard tubewell (IST )proved to be the most universal size tubewell under the conditions of the project areas, there was less scope than anticipated for the 300 m3/hour capacity IST, serving 200 ha per well. This size of 1 The UP Tubewells I Project was fonnulated as a two-year (1980/81-1981/82) program to test and demonstrate improved tubewell technology through construction of about 500 tubewells.  4 IST required four instead of two distribution pipe loops, for which fewer suitable sites than expected could be identified. Additionally, IDTW found that strata and site conditions were seldom suitable for the larger wells, the discharge was too great to be easily handled by farmers, the management capacity of tubewell operators was overstretched, and equipment and spares were less easily interchangeable for such larger wells. The substantial increase in modernized OSTs from 100 to 450 units was the result of poor actual operating condition of OSTs that were within the range of the dedicated feeder lines to the planned clusters. Consequently more OSTs than anticipated were modernized/rehabilitated, in view of GOUP's finding that yields of OSTs could be substantially improved through modernization. 5.4 Site selection for clusters and individual ISTs were critical planning steps which had been thoroughly addressed in the SAR but which were not always handled entirely satisfactorily where political pressure or powerful interests succeeded in biasing technical considerations.2 Frequently, essential planning aids such as soil maps were omitted. Generally, the layouts for individual ISTs were correct, but pressures imposed by construction targets often led to insufficient consultation and involvement of farmers in system planning, especially the location of outlet valves along the distribution loops. 5.5 Ouality standards were difficult to maintain due to the large number of simultaneously implemented ISTs on widely dispersed sites. The existing qualified and experienced staff were overstretched by the large number of works being implemented simultaneously. This has affected tubewell design, drilling and installation as well as pipe distribution systems where leakage became a common problem. This was often detected too late since, at the appropriate time for testing of the pipe loops, the pump sets were often not yet energized to provide the flow and pressure necessary to allow for testing for loosened joints. 5.6 Energization and Power Supply. Tubewell energization was seriously delayed during the first three to four years of implementaion, due to the time needed to create a separate tubewells wing within the UPSEB, delayed funding arrangements, and subsequent material shortages. However, during the second half of the project, conditions improved significantly. Insufficient data processing capacity so far has precluded a reliable quantification of power availability vis-a-vis demand. Partial evaluations, however, indicate a range of power supply from 10 to 22 hours per day over a 10-month period, with an average of about 15 hours. While the latter is close to the appraisal expectation of 16 hours, the variance of supply among the clusters of wells is excessive. Also, much of the supply appears to have been available at night when demand is low. Another factor was that the power supply of a cluster of tubewells was connected to one feeder with a single circuit breaker; hydel breakdown of any of the tubewells could render all the wells in the cluster inoperative. The power supply has also been hampered by occasional theft of conductors and transformers and by excessive power fluctuations. Frequent failures of electronic hour meters which have affected readings and accounting are also reported. 5.7 The large-scale introduction of ISTs was to be accompanied by an appropriate water charging system based on volumetric pricing instead of using 'flat rates', so as to encourage efficient water use, introducing some element of accountability in the Irrigation Department and UPSEB in respect to quality of irrigation services, and reducing the very high levels of subsidy of public tubewell irrigation. Relevant agreements were included in project covenants but apart from a study by the Uttar Pradesh Development Systems Corporation (UPDESCO) and a new 2 This observation is not agreed with by IDIW who feel that technical considerations in site selection were paramount. Similarly, IDTW have commented that, while soil maps were not provided, soil classifications were used. Finaly, IDTW have commented that farmer involvement was sought in siting and layout planning of ISTs.  5 water charging proposal, which was made with six years delay, little progress has been made. 5.8 The agricultural development component was hampered by an exceptionally slow staff build-up and denial by GOUP of adequate transport as proposed in the appraisal report. By September 1985, the Agricultural Development Wing was still 70% short of staff requirements estimated at appraisal, and, by September 1989, little more than half of the targeted staff strength had been reached. Ahready in 1990, the Agricultural Development Wing was dissolved and extension responsibilities handed over to regular Department of Agriculture units or to the new World Bank-supported extension project. Out of an estimated requirement at appraisal of 104 transport vehicles, only 44 were procured and of these, 35 in Year 4 of the project. The impact of the program therefore was limited. By 1989, only 16 of 42 districts were included in the Agricultural Development Wing's project activities. In the districts covered, the extension program, including multiple cropping demonstrations, introduction of high yielding variety seed, and fertilizer distribution was reasonably successful, but extension workers were poorly trained, affecting the adequacy of their recommendations. 5.9 The project provided agricultural service centers in a total of 34 clusters of tubewells, as against a target of about 220. The centers were originally to include a meeting hall, staff housing, seed store, and grain store. The latter was omitted as GOUP established the purchase of grain at fixed prices. 5.10 Irrigation Water and Soil management. There is little evidence that either IDTW or the Agricultural Development Wing systematically pursued training of extension workers in on-farm soil and water management. Likewise, field demonstrations mainly stressed the use of inputs while soil and water management and cropping calendar were given little attention. As one consequence, water use efficiency has remained very low. From available operators' records for several thousand ISTs, it is evident that in the majority of command areas, consistently too few irrigations with too high water depths have been applied.3 It is also reported that a section of farmers could not handle the standard farm stream of water supply of about 20 Vs for which the ISTs are designed. This resulted in the use of flood irrigation even for upland crops, where border strip or furrow irrigation might have been the more appropriate method. 5.11 The project left land levelling to the discretion of water users, assuming that it would not be required extensively. However, there are numerous cluster areas which need some land levelling, but advice and assistance to farmers in coping with this problem were not provided under the project, although referrals were made during implementation of the need for land levelling to the concerned government department. Another deficiency frequently encountered in IST command areas was ignorance in seizing the opportunity provided by irrigation to optimize planting dates, in order to increase yields, especially of paddy and wheat. 5.12 In summary, implementation had been adequately planned at the outset but initial procurement delays and other start-up problems, together with the subsequent changes in project scope, led to an increase in civil works to the extent that quality suffered and accompanying 3 An analysis of 805 (kharif 1988) and 898 (rabi 1988/89) ISTs showed an average gross watering depdh of 24 and 17 cm respectively per irrigation, with an average of only two irrigations per season.  6 actions to provide the required 'software' failed to keep pace.4 6. Project Results 6.1 Available data and mission observations indicate a wide divergence in tubewell perforrnance. In areas where farmers had some prior experience with irrigation, where the social structure was fairly homogenous and where operation and maintenance and electricity supply turned out to be efficient and reliable, production performance was excellent. By contrast, in areas where erratic power supply was coupled with insufficient extension and water management training, with poor operation and maintenance services, and shortcomings in initial planning, the benefits from public tubewells did not materialize as anticipated. It would appear that the adjustments required in changing from rainfed to irrigated farming had been underestimated at appraisal and that therefore the need for farmers' training in irrigated agriculture did not receive the necessary attention. The intended strengthening of the Department of Agriculture to accomplish this task remained far below expectations, as did coordination with the Irrigation Department. 6.2 Crop production was to increase through irrigation over a total cultivable command area (CCA) of about 240,000 ha, with a rise in cropping intensity from 120 to 145% and the creation of an irrigation intensity of 97% at full development. Although field data, mainly through the Tubewell Wing operator registers, are available from all ISTs, only partial evaluations, which usually contain data from different stages of irrigation development, have so far been made. The matter is further confused by survey data since reported by the Department of Agriculture based on the 1990-91 season. Results, which have not been subject to field verifications in the project completion exercise, have been reported to yield average irrigation intensities ranging from 88% (western zone) to 80% (eastern zone) on 2904 operating tubewells. It has not been possible to comment on these results or the sampling and measurement techniques used. Field observations indicate substantial variability and indicate cautious use of field data until monitoring and evaluation techniques have been well established, a matter that has lagged under the project (paras. 9.6-9.7). To cater to these uncertainties, the economic rate of return (ERR) has been calculated on the basis of three models enveloping the assessed ranged of typical performances found. 6.3 The limited data base and diversity within the total sample of wells has been accommodated in an analysis via three basic tubewell-cum-production models as described in Attachment 1, Tables 4-6. For these models, the weighted average irrigation intensity at full development has been estimated at 82%. This is considerably higher than actually achieved average intensities5 but represents full development and assumes adequate operation and maintenance standards at costs which are considerably above current allocations. 4 In relation to paragraphs 5.6 to 5.12, GOUP have commented that a matter not sufficiently allowed for at appraisal was the tine needed to create the organizational setup in UPSEB, the Department of Agriculture, and (partially) in the Irrigation Department, before the program could get underway at full pace. GOUP have also commented that switching over from traditional to more advanced agricultural techniques takes tirne in traditional rural communities, and that a start has been made with positive results observable from survey data. 5 A sample of 805 (kharif 1988) and 898 (rabi 1988/89) number of wells gave an intensity of 56%, reflecting a stage several years before full development of most wells included. Note, however, the results reported for the 1990-91 season as commented on in para. 6.2.  7 6.4 Yields for three major crops are expected to reach the following full development levels (weighted mean of three models-t/ha).6 Paddy Maize Wheat SAR Without Project 1.1 0.8 1.1 With Project 2.7 1.8 2.1 PCR Without Project 1.1 0.8 1.1 With Project 2.6 1.8 2.5 6.5 From wells that have been under operation for five to six years, it has been estimated that an average build-up of four years is required to reach full production levels. The build-up in input use follows the assumption made on yield development, i.e. 60% in year 1, 80% in year 2, 90% in year 3 and 100% in year 4 after well commissioning. 6.6 The aggregate of incremental production from all project-financed ISTs is based on the weighted mean of the above three models. Since incremental net benefits which follow the build-up of ISTs in operation remained far below the levels anticipated at appraisal, the ERR at completion estimated for the project as a whole is only 1%. For the large majority of ISTs (Models 2 and 3) the ERR is negative and only Model 1 wells (20% of the total) meet appraisal expectations. Their ERR is estimated at 23%. This result is a reflection of several negative factors, including low irrigation efficiency with correspondingly higher unit cost per unit of water pumped, lower than anticipated irrigation intensity, the occurrence of considerable time lags between tubewell construction and commissioning, as well as commodity prices lower than projected at the time of appraisal. 6.7 In analyzing the economic feasibility of the project, no account could be taken of the insurance value of the tubewells against droughts due to the lack of data. However, comparison of rainfall data with hours pumped and area irrigated, shows a considerable correlation. In years with good rainfall, less water was pumped during kharif and vice versa. The insurance role of ISTs should encourage farmers to risk higher inputs and would thus increase yields even on those lands of the tubewell commands which are not officially registered as irrigated areas. Monitoring over a number of years would be required before a valuation of such benefits could be attempted. 6.8 A socio-economic study conducted in project areas by UPDESCO revealed a considerable positive impact of the project on farmer mobility (market access) and living standards (village electrification), in the wake of the construction of access roads to tubewell sites and of electricity transmission lines to clusters of tubewells. 7. Project Sustainability 7.1 Although the IST technology is operationally much superior to that of the OST, this does not imply that ISTs are less vulnerable to deterioration due to wear and tear, vandalism, design faults, and material quality defects, etc. Operation and maintenance provisions therefore are 6 No distinction has been made between the three original project regions, as their difference is minor compared to other factors affecting yields and production.  8 equally important. The SAR had foreseen this and linked the project to drastic reform of the then applied cost recovery system, including the abolition of the flat rate electricity tariff and replacement by metered consumption. Little progress has so far been made. Much will depend on the successful introduction of an improved water charging system along the lines developed under the project, which would generate enough revenue to enable GOUP to finance operation and maintenance at required levels of about Rs.50,000 per IST per year. The present high subsidy on public tubewell irrigation will eventually have to be reduced, with consequent benefit in more economical use of water. 7.2 More effort in terms of training, supervision and accountability needs to be invested to improve the performance of tubewell operators. The availability of sufficient and timely power supply will remain crucial to sustained tubewell performance. The project-induced linkage between the Irrigation Department and UPSEB has so far secured a relatively trouble-free operation through an almost 'preferential' treatment of IST clusters. Maintaining this relationship would be an important factor in the sustained returns from project investments. 7.3 While efforts can be made to improve and to sustain the quality of government services in maintenance, repair of wells, provision of electricity and agricultural services, public sector dependent groundwater irrigation development and exploitation will always be vulnerable to weaknesses in any of these services, and their dependence on subsidies and the availability of government funds to cover the costs of the services. Whereas agricultural support and electricity supply are likely to require continued government support, construction, operation and maintenance of tubewells need not be in the public domain, as effectively demonstrated in the case of the spectacular growth of privately owned shallow tubewells in Uttar Pradesh over, in particular, the last decade. Promotion of private shallow tubewells was considered the more attractive development option in two -recent World Bank reports (Uttar Pradesh Groundwater Development, Issues and Options, India Agriculture Operations Division, February 1991); and India Irrigation Sector Review, India Agriculture Operations Division, December 20, 1991, Report Number 9518-IN). For existing public tubewells such as those constructed under the project, alternatives to government maintenance, operation and ownership of the wells were also discussed in these reports. Efforts to transfer ownership and management are being undertaken in West Bengal and in Bangladesh, and to date have met with encouraging results in terms of productivity, better maintenance, and farmer contributions to operation and maintenance costs. Based on these commnentaries and initial results, this would seem the appropriate direction to take for the existing public tubewells. 8. Bank Perforrnance 8.1 Through the project the Bank played an active role not only in developing the largely underutilized groundwater resources of the State of Uttar Pradesh, but also in making these resources available to the poorer sections of the farm community who so far had little or no access to groundwater for irrigation. The significance of the project was its large-scale application of a highly innovative technology, specifically developed in a joint effort between the Bank and GOUP, and tested in the UP Tubewells I pilot project. The new technology replaced the old-style 'fishbone'-shaped open channel networks by loops of buried plastic pipe, designed to permit simple volumetric water delivery to outlet valves, each serving 5 to 8 ha only. The other substantive improvement over the old State tubewells was the formation of clusters of tubewells which were power-connected to dedicated feeder lines. Both factors have significantly raised the potential quality of irrigation service to water users. 8.2 The Bank had anticipated the key role of monitoring and evaluation in this type of project  9 and made adequate provisions. However, despite repeated Bank interventions, including special consultant visits, the results of monitoring and evaluation activities did not meet requirements (para 9.6 - 9.7).7 8.3 Although Bank supervision missions repeatedly expressed concern over the slow utilization of the irrigation potential created by the project, they did little to direct the project towards rectifying this deficiency. Not until the January 1989 supervision mission was a serious effort made to address agricultural performance with sufficient vigor. Likewise, no attempt appears to have been made to identify causes and propose remedies for the extremely poor irrigation water management which became apparent from tubewell performance records as early as 1985. The appraisal report was ambiguous in the assignment of responsibility for training in soil and water management (para 4.3). 8.4 The Bank created a growing awareness in GOUP about the importance of electric power as an input to groundwater development and was instrumental in introducing a measure of accountability of the Irrigation Department and UPSEB in respect to the quality of service they provide. 8.5 Lessons Learned. Project design appears to have relied strongly on the technical innovations provided vis-a-vis the old State tubewells, while presuming that the availability of a low-cost and more reliable irrigation system, by itself, would give enough incentive to farmers to adopt irrigation. However, such linkage did not generally exist. The main obstacle appears to have been the considerable caution, if not resistance, of subsistence farmers towards a change from low-input rainfed farming to irrigated farming. In order to achieve this transition, the project would have had to invest with greater determination in assisting farmers to organize themselves, in extension, in farmer training, and possibly, credit support. 8.6 In addition, it appears that in the wake of pressures to meet construction targets and pressures from political interest groups, the important task of selecting suitable sites for clusters and individual wells was increasingly compromised as the project developed.8 The many scattered sites created formidable logistic challenges which neither the project management nor Bank supervision missions were able to effectively cope with. It could thus be argued that the project was too large and covered too many districts (45) for a four-year implementation period. This is confirmed by the disbursement of only 51% of the credit by the original project closing date. 8.7 Heavy reliance was also placed on the proper functioning of water distribution below the 5 to 8 ha outlet (alfalfa valve) on the basis of farmer consensus. However, it appears that this assumption was too optimistic. With a total of some 48,000 outlets, the establishment of an equal number of outlet committees ("area day committees") and the provision of farmer training required a staff strength at least three times that provided by the Agricultural Development Wing (ADW). Few committees are reported to be active and control of outlet supplies by powerful farmers is reported to be widely practiced. 7 Progress in establishing monitoring and evaluation systems accelerated in the last year of the projecL IDTW have commented that monitoring of results should be continued by the Department of Agriculture after project closure, a matter that would be helpful to assess the progressive impact over time on agricultural productivity. s As noted earlier (footnote comment to para. 5.4) this assessment is disputed by IDTW.  10 8.8. Future IST designs may consider reducing the area served by each outlet, i.e. increasing the density of outlets, while simultaneously arranging for a greater spread of the outlets within the command. This could be achieved by substituting the 'straight' loop by a zig-zag pattern consisting of straight lines of pipe between outlets. In addition, the discharge per outlet (farm stream) should be reduced from presently 20 liters per second to 15 liters per second or less, since small farmers have had difficulty in handling the discharges delivered by the ISTs, resulting in water wastage. In order not to give up the 'area day' principle (one outlet per day per loop receiving water), a smaller pump discharge and a smaller cultivable command area per IST may have to be adopted. The possibility of serving two consecutive outlets per loop simultaneously should also be investigated. 8.9 Project experience shows that leakages from the buried pipe systems are much greater than anticipated. This has far-reaching consequences since a leaking loop system looses comparatively more water than a leaking conventional ('fishbone') distribution system, because for each irrigation turn, the entire loop has to be refilled between irrigations. This deficiency is amplified by frequent pumping interruptions caused by power cuts or equipment failure. As a consequence, future ISTs must be designed and built leak-proof or a major advantage of the loop technology (peripheral system) over the fishbone-type network (radial system) will be lost. 9. Borrower Performance 9.1 Lessons learned from the UP Tubewells I pilot project which had been incorporated in the formulation of UP Tubewells II (SAR, para 3.07) emphasized the need for: (i) improved energization/adequate power supply; (ii) simplified operation and maintenance of tubewells; (iii) improved tubewell development planning; (iv) improved agricultural services for tubewell commands; and (v) improved cost recovery and tariff levels to reflect standard of irrigation service. 9.2 The project succeeded in fully implementing the physical provisions made for adequate power supply, i.e. all project ISTs and modernized OSTs were connected to dedicated feeder lines. The potential operational benefits resulting from this improved energization, i.e. more regular power supply with less voltage fluctuations, were largely achieved, although in absolute terms, power supply lagged behind expectations. This was due to a continued shortfall in UP's overall energy supply, currently about 13% but planned to be completely made up within about two years. 9.3 Energy charges continue to be calculated using a subsidized tariff structure. The agreement that UPSEB would charge the Irrigation Department for electricity on a metered basis that reflects actual power consumption and costs has thus not been met. Farmer payments of water charges are substantially below the costs of government provisions of electricity. 9.4 The system of operation and maintenance in ISTs, largely due to pump automation, simplified accounting of water consumed (hour meter) and water distribution has been vastly improved as compared to the traditional OSTs. However, although the latter were heavily dependent on the integrity of the tubewell operator, even the new technology leaves scope for mismanagement and manipulation of records. Consequently, violation of the operator's code of conduct has been widely observed. More vigilance by responsible operation and maintenance staff and provision for preventative and/or punitive action needs to be introduced. 9.5 Although adequate provisions had been made for the establishment of an agricultural development component that could concentrate fully on optimizing irrigated farming in tubewell  11 command areas, the resulting ADW, due to lack of support from within DOA, as well as funding and coordination problems with IDTW, never reached the required strength and impact (para 5.8). This has had a very damaging effect on project performance. ADW's weakness is reflected in lower than expected irrigation intensities, low water use efficiency, low yields and even in the lack of proper agricultural performance evaluations. Because of lack of support from within its own department, as well as apparent indifference from IDTW, the ADW did not identify itself with the project and thus itself became indifferent. This was probably stimulated by the prospect for staff that the ADW would be dissolved at project closure. In fact, it ceased to exist even before. 9.6 Despite a very detailed specification of objectives, scope, range of activities, and adequate finance, the monitoring and evaluation performance of the project failed to provide project management with the performance indicators necessary for both advance planning and rectification of deficiencies. This was despite well organized and consistent recording of field data. It is unfortunate that GOUP failed to provide the two Monitoring and Evaluation units (in IDTW and ADW) with adequate facilities to handle a daily data flow from several thousand tubewells. Already in 1985, it had become clear that the computer facilities available in the Irrigation Department would not accommodate the very large computer processing requirements of the project. Consequently, a Bank supervision mission in 1985 proposed that IDTW and ADW should establish their own computer processing capability. However, although project management went through lengthy application processes, the sanctioning of equipment and staff was delayed. 9.7 A further attempt to rectify the unsatisfactory monitoring and evaluation performance was made by a Bank mission in 1988, which recommended the procurement of several desk-top and portable mini-computers, as well as two data entry terminals linked to the existing mainframe computers at the Irrigation Department and UPDESCO. Although this proposal was followed up to some extent by the time of project closure, only one desk-top computer had been put into operation. Meanwhile, the raw data from the field reached substantial proportions, although progress picked up in 1991, and processing is expected to require several years. The opportunity lost by leaving this wealth of information almost unused is immense. It has not only affected project performance, but also impeded forward planning including a decision on the future course of action in tubewell development in Uttar Pradesh. 9.8 Lessons Learned. Since success or failure of a public tubewells project such as UP II depends on the performnance of several Government agencies (ID, DOA, UPSEB), of which no single one can be made accountable alone, the only way to secure overall project success is close coordination of all aspects of implementation between the agencies concerned. For maximum production impact, the site selection of public tubewells should be based on technical and economical considerations and the interest expressed by farmers to group together to manage such an investment, while political considerations should rank low. 9.9 Despite public tubewell water being comparatively inexpensive at farm level the irrigation intensity in project ISTs has remained lower than expected. Two likely causes appear to be: (a) incorrect siting of outlets, leaving certain areas out of command; and (b) the incompleteness of the field channel system below the outlet. Both causes may reduce the effective command area of tubewells by up to 30%. The matter should be studied in detail and deficiencies eliminated. 9.10 The estimated low rate of return of the project demonstrates that even with the improved tubewell technology adopted, investment in public tubewell development is not necessarily economically viable. Public involvement in further tubewell development therefore should be  12 reassessed, while at the same time improving the performance of existing public tubewells, in particular the more than 4,000 ISTs installed under UP I and H. The aim should be both to improve productivity and to reduce the recurrent financial burden to GOUP. The possibility of handing over ISTs to village panchayats appears to hold potentials for resolving most of the problems now encountered and should be implemented on a trial basis as soon as possible. Simultaneously, extension efforts should be continued. Operation and maintenance services need to be put on a sustainable basis through adoption of the improved cost recovery system conceived under the project. Monitoring and evaluation of tubewell and agricultural performance data should be given high priority as a vital tool for corrective intervention and sustained use of the irrigation potential created. 10. Project Relationship 10.1 The Bank maintained good relationships with GOI and GOUP through its resident mission. This was of particular significance when the borrower faced severe budget constraints. The Bank responded positively to Government's request to increase the Bank's share in the financing of civil works and of equipment and materials and, as of 1 July 1987, the Bank's share was increased from the original 55% to 70%. IFAD, who co-financed the credit, participated in one of the supervision missions. 11. Consulting Services 11.1 Consulting services were not foreseen at appraisal. However the study agreed upon to be carried out by GOUP was undertaken by UPDES CO, a semi-govemmental institution. 12. Pject Documentation and Da 12.1 The SAR, including its supplementary data volume, provided an excellent framework for project implementation. The provisions of the legal agreements were generally observed (Part III, 7). 12.2 In para 4.20, the SAR quotes an agreement reached with GOUP that UPSEB would "energize each project tubewell system within two months of its completion". It appears that this has been interpreted (incorrectly) as meaning that energization should only be done after a tubewell system, including the distribution system, has been completed. This has generally had the negative effect that energization came too late to enable testing of the pipe distribution system immediately after its assembly and before backfilling the trenches for the buried pipe system, because the regular pump set could not be used at that time.  13 PART II. BORROWER'S COMMENTS ON PARTS I AND III OF THE PCR SECOND UP PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (Credit 1332-IN/IFAD LoanT 124-IN) Comments On Project Completion Report PREFACE A draft P-roject Completion Report (PCR) Parts I and Ill, prepared by an FAO/CP mission based on its visit to India ln Feb/March 1991, was forwarded to DOI, GOUP for its comments. The mission. in its evaluation summary. has opined that despite 'shortcomings the project's main quantitative objectives were met". It has also estimated that the number of benefitted farmer families were 6.6 lacs i.e. 50% more than SAR value, the increase in irrigable area was 3.85 lac hectare i.e. more than 60% of SAR estimates and expressed in 1990/91 Rupees, the average per capita income from farming with project has increased by Rs.328 or by 290% whi,ch compared well with an anticipated figure of 206% in the SAR. The SAR had estimated an Economic Rate of Return ( ERR) of 32% which took interest on capital and depreciation into account. Although feeling handicapped by a paucity of data, the PCR, Taevertheless, calculates this ERR as just 1%. The estimate of ERR in the project report by GOUP was 51.73% excluding interest on capital and depreciation but providing for a depreciation reserve fund. Ba4ed on similar lines'an analysis presented in this document, calculates ERR as 48.7%. This analysis uses a much wider database of tubewells than the PCR did. On the ba.s4 s of this wider database the main performance indicators have been evaluated. The department of Agriculture (DOA) has surveyed almost the entire project area and has arrived at a figure of 86% overall for the irriaation intensity which has been worked out by PCR as 82% against an estimated 97% by SAR. Cropping intensity was estimated by SAR to reach 160% in the western and central zone and 140% in the  14 eastern zone. PCR has worked this out as 152% overall while based on its survey, the LOA has estimated these as 1.61%. 143% and 150% respectively for these zones and overall 153%. Productivity of wheat was targeted in the SAR as 2.6 t/ha. PCR has worked this out as 2.5 t/ha. DOA has also estimated it as 2.5 t/ha. Similarly Productivity of paddy was envisaged In the SAR as 2.8 t/ha. PCR and DOA have estimated it to be 2.6 t/ha and 2.86 t/ha respectively. The low assessment of ERR in the PCR can rightly be attributed to the limited database and the very attempt of Project evaluation without providing for a reasonable buiLd up period for the tubewell system, which was necessary as per missions view itself. An attempt, however, has been made here to wipe out these handicaps by making use of a wider database of tubewells that had run for longer period, in order to be nearer the truth. (A hoka Kumnar ) Chief ngineer,Tubewells (World Bank / Indo Dutch) Irrigation Department,U.P. Lucknow.  15 SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON PROJECT COMPLETION REPOR 1T INTRODUCTION A Project Completion Report (PCR)-Part-t.and 111, prepared by an FAO/CF mission based on a visit to India in February/March, 1991 and review of Bank records has been received by DOI, GOUP for comments. The parawise comments have been prepared. These comments have been summarised below. OBJECTIVES AND MAIN FEATURES The objective of the project was to alleviate poverty and create rural employment. This was to be done by (i) construction of about 2,200 improved tubewell irrigation systems which was successfully tried and tested on a pilot basis under a similar project called UPI, (ii) connection of about 650 old Standard Tubewell systems to 'dedicated" feeders and (iii) modernization of about 100 old Standard Tubewells. With these features certain targets of cropping intensity, irrigation Intensity, productivity, use of improved variety of seeds and other agriculture inputs etc were aimed at in the SAR by way of impact evaluation parameters. Tables attached with the main set of comments show that these targets have been adequately met with. In the background of this project was the imperative need to exploit ground -water in the State in view of the diminishing scope of surface water utilization, successful implementation of UPI, and the view of SAR that public tubewell development might offer considerable savings to UPSEB as compared to private tubewell development in terms of capital investments and running costs. The success of UPI can be attributed to its improved technology and efficiency in management due to i-ts small size; district level coordination between DO1 and DOA staff on deputation to DOI; and utilisation of existing district level set up of UPSEB. The present project put the lessons learnt from UPI to good use but introduction of the concept of separate wings within DOA and UPSEB was a new one. The creation of these wings  16 took time. During this build up period there were initial delays in energiz-ation buYfthe-backlog was made good with higher pace in the latter part of -the project implementation. The efiect on DOA is discussed late-r on. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANISATION The SAR had thoroughly analyzed UPI and assessed it to have n substantially fulfilled". The PCR on the other hand, has labelled it as having "partially succeeded". Reasons for this change of view have not beeh elaborated in the PCR. IMPLEMEtNTATION EXPERIENCE The initial delays in energization were not because there was not enough advance planning but rather on account of the inadequate provision of time for organisational build up in UPSES although the effect of these delays was more then neutralised subsequently by effective .percolation o.f top level coordination between UPSEB and DOI to the grass root level through multilevel periodical meetings. Full effect of a similar top level coordination could not reach the field level in respect of agriculture work but even then the achievement on. this front was satisfactory as will be seen in the tables showing the agricultural parameters, thanks perhaps to the effect of regular extension services of DOA through its existing network. Technical parameters were paramount in selection of tubewelis/clusters. There was- full involvement of command farmers'^ at all stages of finalisatlon of outlets. The performance of ISTs when compared to OSTs and the deep study of prospective areas before they were taken up for consideration as, clusters, prompted! the change in the number of OSTs taken up for modernization.'i ? Another change was in the number of ISTs of 300 M-3 per hour. This was more due to lesser availability than expected in SAR, of sites and strata among other things. Quality control was strictly maintained but a small, statistically insignificant, percentage of leakages could not be ruled out specially during initial running. The performance of UPSES in energization of ISTs reached satisfactory levels after a couple of earlier years. The advent of dedicated feeders some times made available more than  17 16 hours of electricity per day on some tubewells. There was a disadvantage too. There being no provision of circuit breakers on the Tee-of fs. in- the feeder, any breakdown in any part of the feeder rendered all the tubewells on the feeder Powerless. Inspite of the slow build up of staff in the DOA. it has been possible to achieve estimated figures of cropping intensity, productivity, use of fertili_ers etc by proper field training and persuasion of farmers by extension workers of the ADW of the project. More needs to be done as the figures of water depth are still high. This will be reduced with better agricultural practices l'ikely to be adopted with the passage of time. PROJECT RESULTS The mission appraisal is based on the assessment of Performance of 42e ISTs only which were operative by 3/86. The number is not only too small to enable anyone to arrive at a fair and reasonable conclusion but the time of study also appears to be cuite early as compared to the time span of 6 to 8 years required for complete build up of the system as envisaged in the SAR and hence felt reasonable for assessment of the full impact of the Project. The mission, while appreciating this point of view in the Para 6.7 of the evaluation report, has for obvious reasons ventured into this exercise on the basis of such a meagre database. The project results, when analyzed over a wider database of 2904 tubewells spread over the entire project area, for the year 1990-91 i.e. after providing another couple of years for the necessary buildup of the system, depict entirely different and quite. encouraging results. As evident from the detailed commentary on the evaluation report in the ensuing paragraphs, despite the wide range of varying performance of the individual ISTs with respect to- time and place-depending upon numerous variables, such as qualitative and quantitative difference in power supply, regional and periodical Imbalance in the occurrence of rains, variance in the cropping pattern and degree of adaptability of innovative agricultural practices depending upon varying socda-economic conditions etc-the  18 agricultural impact, as expres.sed in terms. of increa-se in food grain production, has been enormous. The cropping intensity has increased from 130.37% to 173.9% as against estimated average figures of 160%,160% and 140% respectively for the' we'stern, central and eastern zones as per figures of the baseline survey by the DOA.Ac.cord-ing to the report of the evaluation survey the figures achieved for the three zones are 161.3%,143.3% and 150.2% respectively. Likewise Irrigation intensity in these three zones has also gone upto 88%,87% and 79.6% respectively against the project targets of 97%. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 0 & M provisions have been increased. Two part tariff is being charged by UPSEB. The revision of water rates based on an independent study by UPDESCO is under active consideration of GOUP. The preferential treatment to ISTs by UPSEB has continued. The tubewell operators are being trained regularly and have also been made accountable. Punitive action has been taken against delinquent operators. BANK PERFORMANCE AND LESSONS LEARNED No comments have been offered on Bank performance. Computers have been Installed in DOI and DOA, for monitoring and evaluation. Bank support may be needed by DOA for continued * monitoring and evaluation of the exploitation of the potential created by'the project. With the passage of time the reliability of *ISTs has been accepted and results are coming'up.' As 'already stressed earlier, technical 'considerations have always been paramount in site se1ectI-on and nothing including aI'leged'political'pressure, was allowed to override these. The implementation of the project has been satisfactory and it was never felt too large a project because of DIO's long experience in handling 'projects of this size. Each area day committee was an independent entity and was fully effective in managing the aftairs related with water sharing by 5 to 15 farmer families. The possibility of reducing  19 the command per outlet can be considered in future JST design. The r deft-rtb&-reaka-ges-are only at the time of initial running of tubewells (Para 5.51 BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE .Energy char,ges are levied by UPSEB on ISTs on a 'two-part' tariff basis. Hourmeters keep a check on tubewell operators. In case of tubewells without hourmeters, local enquiry method is used for accounting of irrigation done by the tubewell. Coordination at all levels no doubt is required for successful completion of a project. Monitoring of daily data flow was manually done at field levels 'with abstracted data being submitted to top management for evaluation and control which resulted in faster implementation in later years. The inadequacy of Computer facility with D10 was removed with the installation of more computers lest it be lost. The old data is now being fed gradually into Computers alongwith the latest data. A tubewell monitoring system has been developed. To receive daily data of tubewells, transmission through satellite network is underway. Irrigation intensities have been reasonably achieved (para 6.2 and 6.3). An analysis over a larger database than used by the mission, has given an ERR of 48%. This analysis, however. ignores interest and life of tubewell system but provides for a depreciation reserve fund. The running hours for Kharif and Rabi are well over the respective critical values as assessed in SAR. Handing over of tubewells to panchayat is to be tried on a few tubewells first before it can be implemented on majority of tubewells.  2Q Pro iec C cm 1 et i om r Cmor t Part I I Proiect Identity Needs no comments. 2 Back Groun4d 2.1 Indian ec=nomv is primarily agricultural. Any effort towards economic uplift or poverty alleviation obviously depends on -the growth of agriculture sector. It has been the aim of GOI to enccourage this growth by giving full governmental support which includes various subsidies inter alia , to agricultural sector as this sector is a "high risk low return' activity. A primary cause of the risk aspect is the dependence of agriculture on rains. Irrigation. therefore. ls a crucial input and is on high priority with GOI. 2.2 UP state is very rich in surface water as well as groundwater resource. There is lesser scope. however, for further develooment in use of surface water irrigation. In addition to the reasons mentioned by mission report. the bank group had agreed to finance the development of public tubewell system on following grounds:' 2.2.1 Land holdings of average farmers of UP was 0.6 ha and so the major group of farmers came under the category of small and marginal farmers I.e. below the level of poverty. They were unable to improve their cultivation and could ill afford their own means of irrigation and were dependent on state owned tubewells. 2.2.2 UP had only 50% irrigated area and balance cultivation., was dependent on rains only. Irrigated crops- or crops of, high yie4lding variety couLd not be sown by smalL., and. marginal farmer in these rainfed areas nor could they think of using modern agriculture practices till state owned public tubewells were installed. 2.2.3 As per study conducted by World Bank ( refer SAR supplementary data volume annexure 8/page 7. 8) it was revealed that " public tubewell development may offer considerable savings to UPSEB as compared to private tubewell development in terms of capltal investments and  21 running costs as detailed below":-- (a) Connection cost would be Rs 700 per hectare for a 150 m-3._ per_hour. ..public _tubaweli and Rs 2470 to 3088 per hectare for private tubewell. (b) A cluster of 25 ISTs and dedicated feeder line would have an (1) average power demand of 375 kVA and would serve 2500 hectare. while if the cluster area is replaced fully by private tubewells. the connected load would be 3300 kVA. (c) The current drawn by private tubewells irrigating 100 hectare would be about nine times more than the current drawn by one public tubewell during the same peak period for OO hectare. (d) Wire to water efficiency is in the range of 50-60% in case of IST and 20 to 30 % in case of private tubewell." 2.2.4 The OSTs were not economically viable due to many shortcomings in the system and management. The IST of improved technology and management system installed in UP Public T.W. Project Phase 1. had proved to be a good system to go with ( as per SAR para 3.06 page 15 ) 2.3 UP-I which was a pilot project. proved to be a good success in respect of its planing implementation and operation due to the following reasons: (a) It was a small project to manage and to have proper monitoring, planning and quality control. (b) Agricultural staff such as agricultural officers and agricultural supervisors, were taken on deputation from.DOA. and placed with operation and maintenances staff under the control of executive engineer 'O&M' to. have regular day to day coordination'between irrigation and agr.icultural-staff thus facilitating implementation of programme to increase -the agricultural growth. The SAR . however, mentions that there were difficulties in "securing dedicated staff on deputation from the DQA to ID " ( para 5.23 of SAR page 39). (c) UPSES was energizing public tubewells by the then existing district level set up. resulting in higher efficiency both in quality as well as in quantity.  22 3 Prolect obiectives and descriotions 3.1 Needs no comments. 3 . 2 In addition to the-comments of the repor-t, the k2ank h-as- -- specifically emphasised to setup separate wings for these public tubewells with in the UPSEB and DOA to be headed by chief engineer and joint director agricultural resp4ctively. A project coordination committee headed by E-in-chief (irrigation), to meet once a month, had been set up to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the project implementation. As the quantum of work of UPSEB and agriculture was smaller, one unit each from both UPSES and agriculture ( a division and an agriculture officer respectively ) had to plan, supervise and control'the work for five to six district at a time. It is important to note that the pilot project of UP-Il named as UP-I was a successful model. But the bank, while setting the guideline for UP-II. made two important deviation in respect of arrangemeint for energization and supplementing agriculture extensions. This has affected the implementation and performance of the project. 3.3 The sole objective of the project was, and it could not be otherwise, to alleviate poverty and to create rural employment ( ref. para 1.06 page 2 SAR). 4 Project design and organization 4.1.1 UP I had shown a. remarkable impact on agricultural development-and production due to the follow-ing, elements.:- (a) Technical improvement of the system , (b) Part time tubewell operator being present: in the village itself,-_runnirrg the tubewelis and recording irrigation data. (c) New water management systems. (d) On-farm training of farmers through demonstrations exhibitions, faLrs and film shows organised with mutual coordination of irrigatIon and agricultural field staff at divisional level itself. (e) The provision of dedicated feeder lines, which was not there in the initial stages of phase I project.  23 This concept of providing a reliable power supply with dedicated feeder, line came after the expiry of approximately two years of UP I. 4.1.2 It is not clear as to what made the bank to change its earlier assessment of UP-I from having substantially fulfilledc its primary objective. (Refer para 3.06 page 15 of SAR) to having "partially succeeded". It is worthwhile to recall that the majority of project beneficiaries are small and marginal farmers. 4.2 Needs no comments. 4.3 While there was least confusion about DOls clear domain over the role of formation of water users' groups and water scheduling a separate wing was created with in DOA for better and effective agriculture extension service, which includes farmer training in efficient water use, but the coordination of irrigation and agricultural planning and implementation had been removed from field level, a most effective component of substantial success of phase I, and shifted to central coordinating committee, but some how this top level co-operation could not percolate effectively to the field level, causing a delinking of day to day co- ,ordination there, which affected the training of farmers for the optimum use of the water and other inputs. 4.4 It is agreed that some initial period of say at least one year, should have been provided in the project for new organizational build upAin UPSEB and DOA as well as in irrigation department. It may be taken as a lesson learnt for future. 5. Project implementation 5.1 As -,stated '"above the project implementation, and consequently disbursement was *affected in the initial stages due to the following- (a) Creation and building up of a separate UPSEB and agricultural wing naturally took some time. (b) Lack of day to day coordination between irrigation and agricultural staff at field level.  24 (c) Bigger jurLsdiction of executing officers of UPSEB and DOA rendering project' monitoring and implementation difficult. 5.2 Needs no comments. 5.3.1 The IST of 300 m^3 per hour had been reduced due to the following reasons:- (a) Against expectations, thre strata conditions were not found suitable to deliver 300 m^3 por hour as anticipated. (b) Availability of fewer sites conforming to technical parameters and economic configuration of distribution system. (c) Difficulty in handli'ng and distribution of 300 m^3 per hour discharge during the low demand period, which occurs quite often. (d) One tubewell operator was inadequate to operate and manage 200 hectare command and outlets of four loop system. (e) Less inter-changeability of equipments and spares. S.3.2 Modernization of 100 OSTs only was proposed initially on an experimental basis on the general survey of OSTs in order to put them at par with ISTs. The difference between the performance of the ISTs vis-a-vis OSTs was' so pronounced that during executlon of the project, a' larger number of OSTs had to be taken up for modernization due to their inadequate and dilapidated distribution system, a line of thought which has continued in the.. framing of Illrd UP Public Tubewell Project. 5.4 It in not correct to say _tthat powerful interest or. political pressure, biased *technical "consideration In e selection of clusters. Looking to the needs of farmers, the public representatives recommended certain areas for construction of public tubewell clusters in order to provide them with irrigation facilities. The clusters in these cases, were sited only after survey and selection under the laid technical parameters. There was no specific provision of soil maps as an essential technical planning aid for site selections, however, classification of soil,  *25 its fertility and land class has always been given due consideration for selection of PTW clusters. Consultation and involvement of farmers had been ensured at various stages as mentioned below:- (a) At the time of proposing the outlets by survey staff in field. * (.b) At the time of spot checking of outlets by the divisional officers (c) Objections of farmers. if still left, were being heard and decided at the time of execution and laying of pipe * ' line. (d) when the tubewell came in operation, any field reported to be unirrigated by the system, was given the facility of additional outlet or field channel in consultation with farmers. Such cases occurred on account of passive response by a few farmers who did not pay any attention at the time of (aY, (b) & tc) above but the tubewell was handed over to 0 & M division only after ensuring that water reached each and every field within the command of -the tubewell by gravity flow. The pressure of construction target, how-so-ever strong it might have been, was never allowed to by pass the steps mentioned above. 5.5 Quality standards DOI of GOUP'htas already an experience of more than half century ,in tubewell design, drilling, installation and.,maintenance- In fact it can be said to be the 'pioneer' in this field in the country and so.it is.not fair ,to say .that,there,was a.-,dearth of qualifIed staff or there was any.,.difficulty on,jthi.sv.account..in ma.inta.ning. quality standards on simultaneously, executed work.on-.w.idel.y. dispersed sites. The leakages noticed initially cannot be termed as deficiencies in quality. As obvious 'consequence of water thrust on a pipe line, some of the joints getting loose, is not unexpected at the time of initial run of water through  26 * p pe -y3tem. Such leakages, howev!r. were repaired in due course. These are part of teething problem only. These could be detected only after energisation of'the.tubewell. 5.6 Ener2ization and Power suoolv-AS stated earlier, the creation of a separate wing within UPSE9 as per recommenda-tion of World''ank, which took nearly one year to establish it self. did hamper the progress.of energi_ation in tne initial stages and the back-log, so created, was no match to the material arranged resulting in further delay for the subsequent few years. But in the later part of the project, the progress of energization was very much in tune with the programme. In fact the power supplied to various dedicated feeders was above the scheduled 16 hours a day. But as all the tubewells of a cluster are connected to one feeder with just a circuit breaker at the substation. the hydel breakdown of any of these tubewells could render all the tubewells on the feeder non functional, thereby reducing the average power supply per day in that particular fortnight. More over, in order to attend hydel defect of-any tubewell, shutdown has to be taken for whole of the cluster, causing reduction in the average hours of power supply. This is the main cause of variance in power supply observed by the mission. It is not correct to say that the power supply had been hampered due to excessive power fluctuations. Studies and corrective steps are being taken to minimise the failure of hourmeters but adequate checks have always been exercised to prevent any adverse effect of the same in recording irrigation. 5.7 A 'detailed study had been got done by UPDESCO for the revision of water rates and the same is under active- consideration of GOUP. 5.8 It is agreed that agricultural wing could not be buIlt up with the desired speed , but Annexure 5 to 12 show increase in the cropping intensity, cro.p production, use.of fertilizers, improved variety of seeds, insecticides & pesticides, and the number of watering with reduction In water depth which would not have been attained otherwise,  21 than witnh proper field training and persua-iion of farmers by extenslon workers of AD.W of the proj-rt over Fha ore- project ground work done by the existing network of the DOA. 5.9 Needs'no comments. 5. 10 As stated above, the extension workers .thr.ough frequent demonstrations and persuasion emphasised the economics-of water management and cropping pattern to the farmers which caused reduction in water depth per watering and upcoming of zaid crops and vegetables, pulses and oilseeds on ISTs as evident from annexure 5. 9 & 21. Even then the water depth continued to be high because the soil which was being deprived of irrigation and fertilizer earlier, was lighter (sandy) and undulated in nature. The condition of the soil will definitely change with passage of time as a consequence of irrigation facilities provided now and thus the water depth shall be reduced to desired level. 5.11 There was no provision of land levelling In the project as it was left to the discretion of the water user.- It is important to note, however, that wherever site conditions required the matter was referred to the concern'sd department which took up tho job. The farmers were told about the optimum.period of sowing of various crops while demonstrating the HYV seeds to them but the traditionalism which Is a dominant factor in the minds of illiterate farmers- a fact recognised by the mission report itself- would not permit them to adopt the same. The adoption of now agricultural. techniques and its econ vy by the farmers shall take place with a passage of at least six to seven years. It is worthwhile to quote from the report of UPDESCO on "socia- economic evaluation of Public Tubewell Phase 11 - page-13 "SocLal Customs. Attitudes and the Human factor:" The social values, motivations, attitudes and other human qualities play an important role in the process of economic change. though these defy statistical  28 quantification. In the irrigation systems, as in other development *aspects.. these piay important, role. The importance of these factors in Indian economic developme_nt. has been described effectively by Kusum Nair who found 'that the peasant communities differ not only in their attitude to manual work, but also in respect of other traits and aptitudes like thrift, industry, mobility & readiness to exploit economic opportunity. These vary greatly from one community to the next, within groups In the same region and even locality otherwise enjoying in all respects equal resource and opportunities' 5.12 The main factor was the lack of allowance for 'time required for building up of the organisational setup in UPSEB, DOA and partially in DOI before the programme could get into full swing. As stated by the mission in the foregoing paragraphs the SAR did not fully realise the effect of creating separate wings in DOA and UPSEB for implementation of the project which resulted in longer built up time and lack of coordination at grassroots level. 6 Project Results 6.1 It is agreed that there is a wide variation in the performance of different tubewell in a particular year and further more in the performance of a particular tubewell from year to year. There are so many reasons for the same, such as dependence on power, which varies from'cluster to cluster and year to year; periodical and regional imbalance In the'occurrence of rains; diversity in eating habits of farmers in various regions; traditionalism, orthodoxism-and illiteracy prevaiting in rural areas-restrltin'in variance in the cropping pattern;''Such'varying performance should not have formed the basis for evaluation of benefits or the outcome of the project. As stated in the para 3.2 of the mission's report, the agricultural impact of the project was to be largely In terms of an increase in food grain production which has increased substantially as per  29 . annexure 8 & 12. The increase in production has been worked o4t on the basis of baseline study cbnducted by DOA c2oupled with the performance of tubewell during 1990-91. 6.2 Cropping intensity has risen form 130.37% to 173.97% as against project estimates of 160%. 160% and 140% for western.-central and eastern zone respectively and the irrigation intensity has risen to 88%. 87% & 79.6% respectivvly for these zones against the project target of 97%. This is based on data collected for 2904 tubewells, running in 1990-91. 6.3 The cropping intensity in various crops computed from the wider data base available now have been found to be remarkably good as shown in annexure-19. 6.4 Needs no comment. 6.5 By March '86 only 428 ISTs were operative that had completed five to six years by the time of mission's visit. This figure is too small to come to any conclusion, so far as the project benefits are concerned. Further the four year build up period as foreseen in SAR is also too small a period for full development of tubewell command areas as the Indian farmers are most reluctant to change their- cropping pattern etc due to their traditionalism, orthodoxism and diversity in eating habits in different regions. These factors do change with passage of time and building up of confidence in farmers due to their economic development and it can be safely guessed that in the- present Indian conditions a period of 6-8 years is necessary for realizing the full impact of the project, which would have been most opportunate time to assess the ultimate benefit of the project. 6.6 We do not agree with the assessment made by mission on the basis of three models which are based on data of very few ISTs. The data of 2904 1ST have been collected and processed for economic analysis as presented in part Ilil of these comments. The incremental net benefit has been worked out in Annexure 6 & 12 for Kharif & Rabi separately.  30 6. 7 Tha insurance role of the IST's i.e. protective irrigation. hasbeen well appreciated by the mission . [t is interesting--to note-that the mission has also appreciated that " Monitoring over a number of years would be required before valuation of such benefits could be attempted" a view which supports ours (para 6.6 above) 6.8 Needs no comments. 7 Protect Sustainability. 7.1 Since the preparation of SAR the 0 & M provisions have been increased,, metered consumption along with flat rate power tariff has been adopted for the ISTs. Revision of water rates based on an independent study by UPDESCO Is under active consideration of GOUP. It is evident from above that considerable work has been done to ensure the sustainablity of the project. 7.2 Tubewel I' operators are being trained by irrigation and agricultural officers individually at the tubewell .nd often collectively at cluster building, before they are put on the job as well as during their service period. UPSEB has been giving priority to the monitoring of power supplied to the IST feeders and will continue to do so. 8. Bank Performance 8.1 Needs no comments. 8.2 A computerised mo.nitoring and evaluation system has since been established. in DOI. In the DOA, the evaluation had been done in the first instance upto 88-89 only for 33 tubewells representing 33 cluster spread over, the entire project area. Subsequently data for 103 clusters in all. have been processed. It Is recommended that the bank should, consider the continued evaluation of ISTs of Phase II by DOA till the maturity period of the project i.e. six years from the completion of the project by DOI(June 1991). 8.3 Needs no comments. 8.4 Needs no comments. 8.5 Lessons learned: The farmers were sceptical in the initial y-ars about the reliabillty of IST in view of their long experience  31 with OSTs. But with the passage of time. the reliability an the system was accepted and the results are appearing in the form cf changes in aqri-cu+tural- practices and-- incremental return' are coming up. Continued extension services may need further bank support (para 8.2 above). 8.6.1 If the initial one year is taken as an organisational buil-d up period for DOI, DOA & UPSEB. the number of. tub.weIls in overation at the end of fifth year i.e. 1988- 89 was 2025 as against a total target of 2200 new ISTs. This indicates that the short fall in terms of disbursements was mainly on account of exchange rate. 8.6.2 The technical feasibility and selection of tubewell clusters were never set aside to compromise political pressure. No case has been mentioned by the mission. The performance of a few clusters might not have come upto expectations on account of their'soil, region, cropping intensity & pattern and other local social reasons only. 8.7 Area day committee, which should not be misunderstood as an outlet committee, were constituted to distribute the water among the farmers who were suooosed to share water on a fixed day according to their need which again may not have any connection with consensus among the farmers. In order to assess the success of water management by these committees, it must be viewed with a different perspective. Each area day comm-ittee was'independent of the other area day committee. It is important to' note- that area day committee generally had only 5 to 15 farmers' families''in it , which is a very small number and their-individual problems related -to -water distrib'ution could' very effectively'be managed by a three member committee which had a fairly representative character. The quest'i'on of powerful farmers dominating the area day does not arise. The strength of ADW staff will not look that much inadequate if viewed with respect to the tubewells having come in operation at the time of review as the ADW activities in fact. commence after the tubewells become operational. It is again recommended that ADW activity  32 should be revived Ln order to fully benefit the project till the and of the envisaged maturity period. - s8-. - -The- suggestions, put forth by the mission regarding increasing the density of outlets, though appreciable, can be adopted only atter the development of a more efticient. Iess fragile and more tamper-proof valve outlet suitable for th- present field conditions. The-farmer's difficulty in handling the present outlet discharge of 20 1/s which is the most economically manageable water stream for irrigatLon purposes, is only a temporary problem which will be automatically overcome in due course with the farmers getting acquainted with the farm economics and soil texture changing from lighter to medium after regular use of irrigation. 8. 9 As explained in para 5.5. pipe line leakages are part of teething troubles and have nothing to do with the design of the system. The suggestions, however, have been noted. 9. Borrowers Performance 9.1 Needs no comments. 9.2 Needs no comments. 9.3 The energy charges are levied on ISTs on a two part tariff basis i.e. f.ixed charges along with cost of metered unit of power supplied on dedicated feeder. 9. 4 No technique is immune from pilferage, however, the alleged manipulations and. mismanagem-nt. of recordst.Is possible only where hourmeters; are. defec.tive-.. For .such tubewells there is, a backup system of.checking irrigation- through local enquiry.,by 0-k M sta-ff. Stray Cases- may be-; missed but whenever ,tubewol.l operators _h&ve:,,enn jound to have indulged in wrong practices, punitive action, including dismissal from services has been. taken against the delinquent staff. 9.5 As explained in para 3.2, 4.1.4 and 4.3 at length. top level coordination activities related to planning and implementation of agricultural development work in DOI & DOA did not percolate to grassroots level with desired  33 extent. Nevertheless. the ficures of performance parameters as- assessed by DOA indicate that there has considerable achievement. There may be.positive contributions from the spade work already done by the existing -agriculture extension services net work of the state. 9.6 While it is true that initially the computer facility with the DOI was not adequate to handle daily data flow. adequate monitoring of both construction as well as 0 & M activities was being processed, albeit manually, at several divisLons/subdivisions simultaneously. Even evaluation at the, highest levels, using abstracted data from all the manual processing (4as quite adequate. The effect of this control can be seen in the faster pace of working in the later part of the project. What has not been possible was the retrieval of this data at a later stage. Computer centres have now been installed both in DOI as well as DOA to tackle this problem. The DOA has used this facility for making its evaluation of the project for the year 1989-90 in its study of 103 clusters. 9.7 The proposal of UPDESCO was accepted by GOUP and one AT-386 with two terminals and three PC-XTs have been installed. The PC- XTs double as data entry machines too. The software for management information system has also been successfully developed and is in use since Kharif '91. This software called Tubewell Monitoring System.(TMS) is now being put to use for all the state tubewells. Data collection is proposed to b- done through satellite network as during. the implementation of TMS.on ISTs it&was.rea}ised that-the time taken for primary data. to.reachr thef computers was much more than the time taken by abstracted information reaching top management using manual processing. This was so because the primary data under manual processing was being processed simultaneously at all the 0 & M units. In tact once this concept is understood It would' be easy to realise that the "wealth of data" has not been lost. These data are now being gradually fed into computer for use in * future.  34 9.8 While there is no denying the fact that the onlY Qav to secure overall project success is close coordination over all aspects of implementation between the agencies concerned but it should be at all levels - the policy framing at top, the planning at middle and the implementation at grassroots. As experienced from UPI, the best results were achieved with the DOA experts assisting the DOI officers at various levels. - 9.9 The mission while trying to find out the likely causes for the low irrigation intensity, had failed to appreciate that the very fact of public tubewell water being comparatively inexpensive could have tempted the farmer to use more water causing higher depth and low intensity, a phenomenon which is bound to occur in initial stages. So it is premature to arrive at this sort of conclusion till the end of build up period. Due care has been taken to rectify field channel system before handing the tubewell over to the 0 & M division by construction division. It may be pointed out that irrigation intensity can not be labelled as low ( para 6.2 and 6.3 above ). 9.10 The assessment of the mission as to the investment in public tubewell development not necessarily being economically viable is not well founded due to the following reasons:- 9.10.1 The data collected by mission were not sufficiently large enough to arrive at any firm opinion. This has been accepted by the mission itself ( para 6.3 of PCR ). 9.10.2 The tubewells constructed have been studied prior to the completion of its stipulated build up period of six to eight years after commissioning ( which too perhaps is inadequate in view of present farming condition as stated. in para 6.5 above).  35 9.10.3 As stated in para 2.2.3 of these comments, which mentions the comment of SAR. the private tubeweil development is a costly proposition from the view point of power economics in comparison to public tubewells. 9.10.4 As stated by the mission ( para 4.1 of PCR and SAR). the sole purpose of the. public tubewell project was to provide irrigation facility by making use of available ground water resources of the state, to the large population of small and marginal farmers which was economically too weak to afford its private means of irrigation. Further, contrary to the finding of the mission based on an assessment of only a limited numbers of tubewells. the ERR of the project comes to 48.68% as assessed from the performance of 2904 tubewells for the year 1990-91 ( Part IlIl of these comments ) The possibility of handing over the ISTs to village panchayat shall hoId good in case the villagers become literate and are able to manage the tubewell system and distribution of water among farmers. But under the present condition of illiteracy, this can not hold good. An attempt, however, is under way to try this on some selected tubewells. 9.10.5 The World Bank in his report ( SAR para 8.10 ) has specifically reported the project as viable even if the tubewell runs for 1073 Hrs in Rabi and 537 Hours in Kharit that is 1610 hours in total. The average hours, however, under study during 1990- 91 have come out as 1127 hours in Rabi as 720 hours in Kharlf which are more than the critical hours for project viability. 10 ProJect RelationshiP Needs no commentt. 11 Consultincy Services Needs no comments. 12 Prolect Documentation and Data Needs no comments.  36 PROJECT C O M1 P E T r I O." R EPOR F TR Part- I II Economic Analysis To analyze the economics of public tubewells constructed under J.P. II project. followine data are needed- 1. Performance of ISTs in terms of hours run durIng 1990-9L. 2. Inc:emental aaricultural 6roduction. 3. Working expenses. Performance of ISTs:- As per SAR annexure 2 page 5 which is mentioned below the buildup period for crop yield economics sholuld have been six year from the year of operation. In view of this, study of economics of public tub-wells by mission at this stage is too early to obtain a clear cut picture. The project results when analyzed over a wider database of 2904 tubewells spread over the entire project area for the year 1990-91, i.e after providing another coucle of years for the necessary build up of the systems, depict entirely different and quite encouraging results. These results are nearer the truth. (a) Yields.Inputs and Economic prices A six year build up period for present to future improved cropping practices has been assumed. For simplicity, the same period has been taken for the build-up of crop yields and inputs, as well as for the effect of changing economic prices on net returns per ha of each crop. The assumed pattern for each year after the start of irrigation is presented below. (b) Crooping Intensities Experience from other irrigation projects suggests that increases in cropping intensity to the full development level fiould be faster than increases in yields. A period of four years was assumed for the transition from present to projected intensities. The rate is shown below: -, . Yield3.inp,jts.sconomi s20 50 70 as 95 100 Croopins intensities 130 65 es 100 loo 100 . , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. I__________ ,__________ ,_________________________  37 The transition of agriculture pra-ctices in old standard tubewell commands that would be modernized under the project was assumed to take half the time expected for the new improved tubewells since the farmers are more likely to practice irrigated agriculture in the "pro- project" situation." (SAR-Annex2-page5) Again it is worthwhile to quote that th- SAR ( annexure-2 page 10) mentions. "The likely increase, in crop yields would be about 10% assuming present cultural practices for irrigated agriculture do not change. The ERR for this modification to standard improved tub-well design would be about 32%. However, it is recommended that such a provision be considered only when the demand for water by the majority of farmers in a command reaches the increased level. This is unlikely to happen for at least a decade when it will be anyway necessary to replace the tubewell pump units." The world bank had been correct in its analysis that the ERR of this modified system which was calculated as 23% would be achieved in a period of atleast ten years. The tubewells which were declared operational in various years during the project are as follows:- Progress Number of Tubewells declared operational Year of upto 150m^3/hour 300m-3/hour Total actual operation 3/85 143 _ 143 85-56 3/86 412 16 428 86-87 3/87 1299 37 1336 87-88 3/88 2025 62 2087 88-89 3/89 2403 66 2469 88-89 3/90 2918 70 2988 90-9t 3/91 2918 70 2988 91-92 I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  * . 38 Each *tubowal Ieven whsn declared uuarational. undergoes a period of three to six months. which may be termed as teething period. before it becomes fully stabilized and capable of irrigation Ln full swing. Only 143 tubewel Is have completed six years. from the date of operation at the time of analysis made by the department. None of the tubewell had reached to its maturity as per schedule of SAR at the time of study conducted li World Bank mission. The conclusion made by the mission should be taken keeping this in view. Irrigation performance of 1984 ISTs during KhariL 1990-91 and 2563 ISTs during Rabi i990-91 were analyzed out of which 503 and 129 ISTs were laft out as being under the teething period (running hours below 200 hrs). Thus the tubewelis under study were 1477 in kharif and 1466 in Rabi. All the tubewells were assumed as that of 150m^3/hour capacity for simplicity. The tubewells were grouped in various slabs having a difference of 200 hours that is 200-400, 400-600 . upto 3000-3200, (refer ANNEX 1 & 2). These figure have again been tabulated in ANNEX .3 showing the % of tubewelis in various slabs. The proposed hours for the public tubewells are as follows- RABI - 1938 KHARIF - 1285 As per SAR critical hours for viability of the project are- % OF PROPOSED HOURS AS ABOVE RABI - 1073 55% KHARIF - 537 55% TOTAL - 1610 55 % The average hours run of the tubewells under study for 1990-91 are- % OF PROPOSED HOURS AS ABOVE RAB I 1127 58% KHARIF = 720 56% This is very much with in the viability limits of the project.  39 TIho rt.itiiI of the project c n be 3s e sed an the basis of ,._em.ent 9Jar iCI lt ur aI r,roducticn in th- com!n and of Public t bewei!s Two studies were conducted by the DOA for evaluation of the performance of this project. The first was in 1988-89 as base line survey on 33 tubewells randomlv distributed over various districts. It covered almost all the parameters for evaluation and data pertaining to cropping intensity. use of fertilizer and chemical inputs and economic return from this study has 'been used in the present analysis. The second was evaluation the results of agricultural extension works for the year 1989-90 in the command of 316 tubewells of the present project selected by stratified two stage random sampling design. from 103 clusters. Rise in croppine intensity As depicted in annexure 20 based on the first study, the cropping intensity has risen over all from 130.37% to 173.97%. The details shown in annexure 19 are based on the second study. The net cropping intensity is tabulated below:- SL.NO |REGION CROPPING INTENSITY Target as per SAR 'Achievement in 89-90 1. Western 149 |161.3 2 Central 147 143.3 .3 Eastern 131 150.5 It is very much evident that except for central region where the net cropping intensity has not reached the target of SAR. in other two regions the achievement* is more than satisfactory. In central region, the Irrigated crops such as wheat, ollseeds. pulses, potato were sown beyond target figure but sugarcane and paddy sowing did not match expectations. It can be seen that the cropped area under rain fed or unirrigated category have been reduced. This shows a remarkably successful aspect of the project.  40 I rrl lofl I6tens -v According to the survey -conducred by DOA for 103 Public tubewell clusters for the year 1989-90 the irrigation intensity in commanded area of Public tubewell clusters has been fairly close to the SAR target of 97% as shown in the table below:- SL.NO REGION IRRIGATION INTENSITY DURING 1989-90 1 Western ad% - 2 Central 87% * 3 Eastern 97% Average for 88x Icommanded area Economic Evaluation Formulation- There are two parameters available to evaluate the projects. (i) The hours run o.f IST during 1990-91, the latest, for Rabi and Kharif (ii) The cropped area and the farm earning per hectare for pre- project and for the year 1988-89 during Rabi. Kharif and Zaid crop as per study conducted by ADW of DOA. As the cropped area and farm earning would certainly have increased during 1990-91 as compared to the data available during 198S-89, the evaluation of the project for 1990-91 is being done based on the available data of 88-89. It is certain that the project will not be over assessed. The tubewells have'been categorised into slabs of 200 hours of running to provide a range of models for better and a realistic evaluation (annex 1, 2 and 3). The irrigation performance of 22 out of 33 base line study tubewells have been used, as the performance of remaining 11 tubewells was not readly available (annexure 4). These tubewells have been placed in the slabs devised, in accordance with their performance during 1990-91 under Rabi and Kharif separately. It is presumed that the agricultural performance of the base line study tubewell shall represent the performance of all those tubewells coming under that model. The agricultural performance of various models in respect to (i) Cropping intensity and crop production. (ii)Use of  41 fertilisers. Improved variety of seeds and insecticides and pesticides (iii) Farm economics of the tubewell and (v) Cost benefit of the project have been tabuLated in ANNEX. 5 to ANNEX. 12 for Kharif and Rabi crops separately. The increase in profit with respect to pre-project values come out to Rs 3490.51 lacs for 1477 tubewells in Kharif and Rs 5542.74 lacs for 2466 tubewells in Rabi, which is the indirect benefit only and not just the ultimate out come of the project. This benefit has been a remarkable achievement but is not unexpected due to the quite satisfactory levels of the following factors of the project (a) rise in cropping intensity, (b) rise in crop productivity, (c) rise in use of improved variety of seed. (d) safety of crop from insects, pests by use of chemicals (e) rise in use of fertilizers. Financial review i The establishment cost for the 0 & M division has been calculated on 1990-91 rate and comes out to Rs 11814 per tubewell. One "O & M" division covers about 350 Public tubewells. 2. The project expenditures upto 1990-91 has been tabulated in ANNEX.14. The work expenditure could not be separated between various categories of tubewells, that is 150m^3/hour to 300m-3/hour, modernization of OST and connection of OST to dedicated feeder. The tubewells which were constructed under the project have been converted to weighted number of 150m^3/hour IST in accordance to their estimated cost provided in the project (see ANNEX.16). The work expenditure has been calculated on unit tubewell. Direct Revenue The average discharge of a tubewell is taken as 33000 GPH irrespective to their capacity. The. average hours runs for Rabi and Kharif 1990-91 were 1127 and 720 per tubewell as mentioned before. The revenue per tubewell has been calculated as Rs 11777 (as per ANNEX.15). The working expenses (Refer ANNEX.17) comes out to. Rs 69409 per tubewell. The financial analysis of tubewell under the project has been made without taking the interest on capital involved and with overall depreciation, rather than taking it on individual components ANNEX 18.)  42 The benefit to cost ratio has been arrived at as 2.61 instead of 2.7 as worked out in the project. The economic ratio of return excluding interest and life of tubewell system but including a depreciation reserve fund provision comes out to 48.7%-.in place of 51.3% as assessed in the project. This then is the outcome of the project even when the study has been conducted quite before the maturity period of all the tubewells involved. There cannot be two opinions that this project has proved a boon to the U.P. state.  43 ANNEXURE-1 SECOND U.F. FUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT NUMBER OF TUBEWELLS IN VARIOUS SLABS OF RUNNING HOURS iKHARiIF 1990.-91 'SL. SLAB :NO OF TUBEWELLS : :NO : 1 2200-400 i 422 2 400-6(00 386 : z : 6(0-8(:() 247 1 4 : EBO- 1 00 a 167 5 10(0- 1200 97 6 1200-14C00 57 7 14(0-168 20 8 1680-18 00 22 : 9 18 00-2000: i 27 1 1: 2000-220o 18 i 2.200-2240C 7 12 2 :2400-2600 :s - 13 : 2600-28ec) : 14 2: 00-3:000.) C1 SOURCE :MASTER DATA BASE PHASE-II Anne:. - C/FCR - FEB '92 'AGE 36  44 ANNEXURE-2 SECOND U.F. FUBLIC TUBEWELLS FROJECl NUMBER OF TUBEWELLS IN VARIOUS SLABS OF RUNNING HOURS --4 A, -1 -4 -4 -4,~~~~~~ ,~~ ~A A , %'% A. % A , A, A,.~% %~ ". '~ N 'N. _A A, 'N. A, 'N 'N _ N. A.'N 'N A, , RABI 199C)-91 :SL. SLAB :NO OF TUBEWELLS' :NO 1 ()C)-40(< 1)! 2 4(0C()-6CC) 37.25 3z , 6oi)j_euj 3 '95 4 B (:i(-1 C?()o; C Z 5 5 1 o(x-1 vt 12()0 6 12700- I 40C 2 6 -, 7 1400)1-160) 199 a 1600-1t C:! o 144 9 , 80(0-2 t (: 95 *1 C3 2c) ()J(i( -22c_( )( 78 11 '22'(0 -.24 0 4 7 1 12 '2 '4 0 -'26(C0 29 13 2 60-20 e o 2C-0 4 14 4 1 -300 2 t 15 , 1 * 12 ' . 3 - -4 0 SOURCE MA1ASTER DATA BASE F'HASE -II Annex. - C/PCR - FEB '92 Paoe .z7  ANNEXURE-3 SECOND U. P. FUBLIC TUBEWELLL PROJECT PERFORMANCE OF TUBEWELLS IN TERMS OF RUNNING HOURS ______ _____ ______ _____ ______ _____--- ____ - - -- --------____--- - - -_----_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ IRANGE OF : KHARIF-90 : KHARIF-91 RABI-90 RABI-91 :HOURS : : SLAB :NO TO TWS :- OF TOTAL NO TO TWS 7- OF TOTAL NO TO TWS OF TOTAL :NG TO TWS OF TOTAL IN THE RANGE :IN THE RANGE :IN THE RANGE :IN THE RANGE : : ,200-400 _ 220 28.42 422 1 2e.57 28 11.46 201 B.15 :400-600 219 15.45 : 388 26.27 29Z 16.14 329 : 1S.34 :600-800 1B6 6 16.52 247 16.72 406 22.37 4C60 16.22 :80C-IOOb 117 i 10.3S9 i67 11.51 i 252 1-5.8E 1 339 : 1_.75 : 1000-1200: 6 1: 7,.4 : 97 : 6.57 18 a 10. 3- 326 1 .22 : * 1200-1400: 6o 5.t ; 57 2.E6 141i 7.77 294 11.52 : .1400-16C10I . 45 4.00 20 1.- 115 6.-4 : 200 1 8 S.11 :160o-i80: c 2.2: 2-- i.49 77 4.24 114 : 4.62: .I800-20C1: 2')0 1.G78 7 13 63 1 3.47 96 3.89 i 2000-2200i 2) 1.7E I e . 21 26; 1.43 : 78 3.16 :2200-2400: o.ec, 7 0. 47 24 1.32 47 1 1.91 :2400-26001 6 0.5 1 5 O.34 15 0z.83 29 : 1.18 :2600-2840:O 4 0.3G6 O : . : 0.28e1 20 0.61 : :2800-,000 2 .18 1 : 0.)0 2 Ci0.1 : 2 : 0. 08 3t0)0-320t 1 . : o. o : 0i 0*. 0 0 1 0. 0 'i 1 6 .04 1 :3200-340.-01 0.) 1 0. :) : 1. 0. 0 0 : 1 C. 00 1 1:. Oo :TOTAL : 1126 : 1477 : 1815 1 : 2466 SOURCE MASTER DATA BASE PHASE-I! Annex. - C/PCR - FEB '92 Page 38  0F5A1L OF IRIE~GATION&2JU2 IUMII &LW 22 = AIMNE flhia)L * 4 flE~~~1J. tCTAILS S---: (----- -- Ml2 OSTAIb ----.E ETA ~i :=TSER :DIs1~2Ta :PNhaE ntegm-f 1FAff~ :CATS ti(R :XTML AREA :Aflft MFA WAiER228: 2WA1E3226: AMt8Zl TU1122 PUB JlXM NA IACIJAL. Wi1 kUTERI?S WETRIU: 2822) 1 2AMIN226N *ar- aF m: *ma !NEW rd: #AM2h- ; MI26ATEt' 2IkUM.TED ARE C NM1W WAV A2Li- I IFi26ATE0 :2IRRGAED 2 FrA Ri'N WDM '1.5 BILITYs :8 1m 1i5XIB8iTEP ia~~ I :IL i iSATi :MISATO I :53-90 9C-92 1e1-90 i94 :1 F-9%91- 91 19-0 1 :29-90 " :9-9 :2-9 I991 oon5 :541 t9s IS :2 Ml:1.9 2I 0 1 14! 2')1 1 21.5 288 2075 I 9 10: 50 127 2 LI25 2 129 .0077 52 ta 2i S 1 N 2 6l12 0 1 112 t73 2P3 M:. 1 144,9 1142 12420 1 84 1 72 17In 1 44 I OO0 I 952 .010? 1:1 It. SE MT 21 2 47 ir a 5.1 i; 407 1 5%j ? 364 i .z a 89 L. 1225 12015 1 902 02I051 .( 08 116 222 221 1243, i l 198 21c a 0 1 21.0 U34 9 231 12119 1 411 2 44 1r30 1 905 .8 05 O 2101 MG3 :2:22210 lie2 2ie 152 i I. LI LE02 1 761. 3489 : 32 lei 3221 :252 12692 I 1328 .0101 12 1215 12a f6 WT21 22 1 22 2B 470 1 41. 12404 1 2551 1351. 121 1617 11.92 59 1 2181 1 1952 .0042 125 1 841 SE Hi 22 24421 84 1 29 i12021 23- i 642 822al 1 22 1 2 1 MT i VT H T 1 22 NY .0214 I121i12 5. Hs 12 22 2 21 1 219 1721 348 442 1 17 19 1 5.6 1 :2091 408 2 1 1 1 211 .00219 023 (, 35 No ::2 1 26132 : 0 72" 1 21. 1 12570 1 H222 in LIT11 22 N 1 221 1 MT MT22 1 .0031 18212011i A6 m 2 MO228 154 1 223 22- 3914 I 2U5 1 2774 1 22 M2 1 T 221N M T I MT 2 V .00M 8 :24:221 21 0 12N215321 135 . 1. 336"A 2 2445 205 I(_ Vrt I9 1 I? 204 1 1 I 890 1 52 .0028 . 24 271 ES 1212 N2 MT lT iN to I 22 Jr,n 1 MT MT !:5 1 .5 296I 220 9521 671. .0000 1 :12 084 K&S :2 2 I222251 229 92 . 251 lit &1.2 fi .1 1 100 I CA.3 1 424 4 : 33 i 540 1 252 .012 1 0:0O4: 6 I 2:2 NJ1I091 15 1 90 1 145 1 155 o101.0 I2'- Jr, 1 22 n I n I V I MTVTm M T :011 70:1012 :2t8 1 2 212-0921 141. 128 A24 1 1 142-5 20201 22 2 1 22r1M N V : 22 M7V I MI 01(9 132:136. S6 2 Ni 2 1 22 2 721 24 20 9! O199 125 : 2932 105 i 90: 21.0 1120 1251.21 1224 .0202) 90121.7 0 1222 M2 MT 89 1 23 271 1129 1 943. i 1250 1772 I I I 1 2 1 243 1208 .005 :50 IT5 I50 :2 12 NJ2076. VTI NT WnI hi M V i.i :24151 :8 2 1 9 1 24 1 9 .0042 :24 15 9 66 1 2:2 WI12021 45 1.4 1 55 1 9 28 1257 inV NT22 M T 1 Li 1 VT : Ti I i .0637 : 21 (U51 W, :2:2 N2 2745 1 95 IL9 1 15 1295 Do80 1230 hiT 41. : 35 77 5275 1.075 : 284 .017? 2325 I292:8 121 I22 26401 7 17 223 .215 1 7( 1 i MTi ! 977 xiV 122 N I MT 1 T2 1 i .0131 1 21. 0421 FV 1 21 Ml21261.4 209 213 1240 1235 I VT M T :3498 NT 1 104: VTN 1230 I VT 2 V kOT E- i: NOT 13W.ATE SOUCE.1 oara DAAN wa k=x. 1 FM! '9Pa 3  I~?OES~RNMVIEDWSATIM: btM OF SOIL DEIN0 UNWDITY fl1811IG OITUIECT. I I a 1l~~~~~~~~~~~:AIEi:I34IM1F:R8I: M0TAL MPDY :AT :P MS.S/CMNW6ETLE :FTATO I 11204.400 1 941 :31UV : :fl -0 : .8 75.7:67.5: 147: 21.4: 18.5: 6.5: 230 35: 50: 1 8K0 L ~ 9 : 86.8:80.7: 173.5: 31.6:1.25 8.3: 320: 40: 230:. 2 4200-400 44 :i 3/87 : PFI :3.8 7.3.67.5: 147: 21.4: 18.5: 6.5: 230 25 50I am~: :83-89 6: eL.8:8. 7: 17.5 3.6:2.7.25: 8.3: .32-0 40: 2301 3140C-Lo0 1 44 :E 3/97 3 ~ :.e: 7'3.767.5: 147: 21.4: 1,5: .6.5:230 35: 501 * I2~~~~A : : :88-8~~Ot9 :6: 84.8:88.7: Ir..5:31.1. 27.25 8.3:3 20: 40: 2301 410-9000 1 445 FS 0/86 L.r.. :FRE 71 74.5 176.51 18 14.051 16 7.01 5.5I 90: 31. 5 :rM~~~s~Eai3 : : 10~~E?-P~9 122.31 93.3: iso 215.41 IE.I125.441 7. 7:5501 1001i I-IV 1:-lo 27 1 :FRE 11. i3360.5: 104.41 211 191 121 37. * a a a ~ ~~~~~~~~~ 10-59 119.21 59. 4 1.4 1541 1 2 2511I.1- 43.31 L :1000-1200 1 -s if Oz I$. III.' iZ4.4 1 .1 1140.8 2N.5 1 2&3 L .3 1 250 a 140 a a a . 184~~~~~~~~~~~~B-E9 117.4 UA7. :7!.4: 160.4 5 41 32 17.3 1400 a 50 7112W 1 400 1 1011 PS 3/87 I 9~1 1 7.41IC.?a a/ 15.4: 3617.31 50 a aWYOl0*Ft111 : 113~~~~~~~:2-09 1 1016:71.4 : 177.41 401 361 81450a a :5 8:1 400--1600 1 1011 IS 3/87 1 !FiE11 '. L 49.21 al. :34 12.1 L 7.3: Zaa a .~~~~fII*4'1f1 I ~~~~~~1E 689 la 1( 71.42 117.41 401 361 I8 4501 20 -4! 9:1600- 1800 I 1011 3/8V7 1 Ki 1 97.6149.21 EF* 15.4: 12.61 7.31 5a I 18439 1 1014471.41 177.41 40 41 81450. I1011800-2000 115$ Ks 12/86 iHi~ I 79.5160.2: .29.7 21.4 :21.3215.43 360 a 75 I Om I E189 11.1 112'. 5 174.4: 20M 73 26. 24 16.7 1370 1 110 II:200-2200 1153 Ks 12/86 1 FfE 1 79.5:160.21 139.7: 21.4 1?.03 5.61, 3401 751 a a a~~~~O a a 9 11.11 *n.5 1.4 23:7.52621 ', .12M20-201 VIE1286 44 79.5 160.2-1 L39.7 121.4 121.03 5.634361W7I * a (Di a E-89 11.11 129.3 1574.41 205 127.35 134.24:I6.7 1370 1 110 1 13 :2400-260 : 1154 :6 12/86 1 iFOi 1 79.5160.2 1 39.7 21.4 1I.0315.63.i O 36: 5: I a n(G I .8-69 11.11 129. 574.4:1 205127.35 26.241 4.7: 3701 :io 14 12802800 1154 K6 12/861 !PSE 1 1 79.5160.21 139.7 121.4 1?.0315.631 3601 751 I ID 1 1 18-89 1.Il1 129.5 :74.41 205 127.25 :26.241 6.7 1370 1 110 a 5124280300 115 Is 1 12/86:ff 1 1 79.5164.21 I `1397 21.4 21.0315.631 3601 751 i a -. (G~~~DM I 2-1-9 :1.1: 129. 5:74.41 205 :7. M 12. 241I6.71 3701 1101 a 16 13000-32A 1154 K 1 12/86 I Fri 1 71.51LO. 2 131.71 21.4 21.03I5. 3: 3601 751 DIN3 :H-f1i-6 :1.11 129.5174.41 205127.35 26.2414.7 3701 110: 17 130-3400-U I 1154 KS 12/8 :F14E 1 79. IV 60.21 1319.71 21.4 12 . 4315.3 3601 75: 1 E 1.4-9 11.11 i 24.5 74.4 : N 2052. T3:2t 4 i .71 3701 1101 MxRE: O . 8aaE~LtajP SRlFr El-  SEra( L.F. hm&.!C TifN!)LLS PfWJ-M AG!CLLTIM. ,LuTIN3 flIE&L ca~wa ;ABL :HM5 RWEU;Si~IATIGN: waT3LIM LEE IOTL/h-7) I RIEE IN USE OF I~WkED Ea0 32 RISE FFM 2EAS YIN 1E tr O 1k P :8 :PADD0YIIET EASOM 11PEA W,Pl SESD~E I SOL : 1:200-400 I 948 KS :P :5.50: 7.70 1 1.40 20.00 MOM00 4.00 30.00 20-0.001 130.0: .30 400.00: 700.00: Kf E-e St. 80: 36.701 9.30: 2'.4(-6M 94 8 :9_ 3M-50 7.70: t .40 250.00 :50.00 4.00 30.00I 20 0. 00 100.00 : -2. 3 0400.00: 700.00: * a , J2~~~~151 E9-9 %1.0128.70 1 9.3 i :31600-B00 ?44 PS :! ~ 67.10 :2L6 w:7.00: * a a ~~~CNfga 8K :-8 900 U.325 I 12.00 :100.00 160.oo0 :100.00 11ioo.o& :100.00 I 100.00 66.60 too 100.00 :4:M0-10 : 2106 :F :70. OD i ss.o:21.001 i : * . ~~~~MI liFaU le~--El 184.00 :40.00 28.0: 17.00:100.00 : S. 00IO.00:10.DOo 2DO. so0.oo: 5w l00.00 i :51200-1200: -7 HSt *K Le. 60:29013.30:I * a 3t~~~~~oiSWt :E:-Ea t90.60 3.7slo 130.00 100.00 66.7 3OO.0 h00.0 10D. :30.00 31 00.00 44.40 . 15u .0 :1I2OC-1400 I1033HS :F9E I 1.001 34.00 9.001 1 1. * a ~~~~~GINSORMWFJ :8989 3.00 45.O0 29.00 50.00 1350.00 50.00 150.00D 1 300.00 93S1.00 100.00 931.00 . 7:140(-1600 IDI MG :F9i 831.0034.00: 9.001 I 8(Wf3 r-89 3HE.0 451.00 i29.00 .150.00 :3w.00 50.00 i 50.00 300.00 i 93.00 :300.00 93-00 O B1:36W00O1900 MG IF3 183.00:34.00: 9.00: a .6V6m*Aa:8-59 :eOO: i C.00: 20.00: so.00 ;350.00 50.oO: , 50.00: 100.003 i 5.00:300.00: 9s. o: :9 390-00: KS 11M~ 5.0o: 1.203 3 a a ~~~~~~amO 1ES-E9 -1 4.00 212.10 1 604.00) :50.00 :350.00 3 :230.00 :200. 00 : 727.00 1 2700.00 :237.00 211.00 It0:2200-2200: 335 KS WRE 5.001 32 : i I a a a W~~~~~i :ss-ey ~~t1. 6300 212.30 1 604.00 :150.00 :350.00 1 230.00 32-0. 00 1 727.00 : 200.00D :237.00 211.00 1 233.1a2400: 115S OFII 1!.0 3.201 i a a a ~~~~~(EN i"-8 1 l(40 3 21.10 1M60.00 :350.00 :15.00 2304.00 :200O0 1 77.00 M 0. 00 1217.00 213.00 SOX gmso ON bMilE gAc-Y DM~~~~~~~~~~~a a a a a aa knm - :~~~~~~~~::7% : 1 a a- a a a a a4  ANNEXURE-7 SECOKrL U.-. PUBLIC TUBEWELLS FRu3ECT ECONOMICS OF TUBEWELLS K H A R I F :MODEL:HOURS RANGE:REPRESENTATION: YEAR ECONOMICS OF TWS. IBENIFITS : T.W & GROUP :