Morocco - Fifth Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 9387 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KINGDOM OF MOROCCO FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 2149-MOR) FEBRUARY 22, 1991 Population and Human Resources Operations Division Country Department II Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Dirham At Appraisal 04-1982 US$ 1 DH 5.30 Period Average 1981 US$ 1 = DH 5.12 1982 US$ 1 = DH 5.98 1983 US$ 1 = DH 7.11 1984 US$ I = DH 8.79 1985 US$ I = DH 9.96 1986 US$ 1 = DH 9.08 1987 US$ 1 = DH 8.32 1988 US$ 1 = DH 8.16 1989 US$ 1= DH 8.50 ABBREVIATIONS CNCRST = National Coordinating Center for Science and Technology Research DEUG = Diplome d'Etudes Universitaires G6n6rales DP = Directorate of Planning ENS = Higher-level teacher-training schools ESRP Education Sector Reform Program EST = Post-secundary institute of technology FY = Fiscal year ITA = Applied Technology Institutes MOE = Ministry of Education MOR = Kingdom of Morocco PIU = Project Implementation Unit WB = World Bank PRC = Project Completion Report FISCAL YEAR January - December  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, DC 20433 USA O#Ice of Direcge.GefieraI Opecatim% Ivakatton February 22, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project ompletion Report on the Kingdom of Morocco Fifth Education Prolect (Loan 2149-MOR) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on the Kingdom of Morocco - Fifth Education Project (Loan 2149-MOR)" prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KINGDOM OF MOROCCO FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 2149-MOR) Table of Contents Page No. Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evaluation Summary.iii 1. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identification and Key Information .1 B. Socioeconomic Background . C. Objectives and Description of the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 D. Project Design and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 E. Project Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 F. Major Results of the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 G. Project Sustainability .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 H. Performance of the World Bank .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 I. Summary of Borrower's Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 J. Government-Bank Relations during the Project ... . . . . . . . 10 K. Consulting Services .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 L. Documentation and Data Relating to the Project . . . . . . . . . . 11 Ll. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . 12 III. STATISTICAL INFORMTION .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A. Related Bank Loans .21 B. Project Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 C. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements .22 D. Project Costs and Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 E. Project Results .24 F. Status of Covenants .28 G. Use of Bank Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 ANNEXES Annex I Project Implementation Schedule .33 Annex II Evolution of the Exchange Rate .34 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KINGDOM OF MOROCCO FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 2149-MOR) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Fifth Education Project in Morocco, for which Loan 2149-MOR in the amount of US $50 million was approved on May 20, 1982. This amount was reduced to US $38 million on November 19, 1984 and to US $35.5 million on May 9, 1989. The loan was closed on March 31, 1989, one year behind schedule. The last payment was made on January 26, 1990. An undisbursed balance of US$ 0.6 million was cancelled at that time, thus reducing the loan amount to US$ 34.9 million. The PCR was jointly prepared by the Population and Human Resources Operations Division, CDII of the Europe, Middle East & North Africa Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III), and the Borrower (Part II). Preparation of this PCR was started during a mission in February 1989, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Loan Agreement; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and internal Bank memoranda.  - iii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT K NGDOM OF MOROCCO FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 2149-MOR) EVALUATION SUMMARY Obiectives 1. The project was designed to continue the Bank's support for the reorientation of the Moroccan education system to give greater emphasis to practical skills and to science, mathematics and applied technology in order to prepare school leavers more adequately for employment and to contribute to the country's socio-economic development efforts. The project aimed at increasing access to basic education in disadvantaged rural areas through the construction and equipment of 40 primary schools. It also sought to reduce educational wastage by increasing primary school teacher effectiveness through tne distribution of basic learning aids to primary schools and by supporting the introduction of more relevant curricula at the primary level. Finally it aimed at improving the training of upper secondary mathematics and science teachers through the construction and equipment of four teacher training schools and the development of new math and science curricula. Implementation Experience 2. The project experienced significant delays in construction and in equipping the various institutions: 20 of the 37 primary schools were finished on schedule, the other 17 were delivered with delays of 12 to 24 months; the four higher-level teacher-training schools (ENS's) were finished with an average delay of 24 months; the primary schools were equipped with teaching aids with an average delay of 36 months (para. 9). Most of the technical assistance component was eliminated from the project (para. 17). 3. The reasons for these delays fall into four categories: (i) the project management unit did not possess the manpower and material resources needed to plan and coordinate execution of the various components of the project and to maintain an overall accounting system for a project of this size and complexity (para. 10 and 12); (ii) the corintruct ion contracts were awarded to a small number of companies, which were unable to provide sufficient technical personnel on several work sites at the same time and also experienced significant delays from their own suppliers (para. 10);  - iv - (iii; the signing of the Government-UNICEF contract for primary school teaching aids was delayed for two years due to objections lodged by the Finance Ministry concerning the cost of insurance for these materials and the possibility of producing some of these materials locally (para. 10); and (iv) the Government decided to shorten the ENS training programs from four years to one year and to raise the admission level from baccalaur6at to licence, in order to absorb a greater portion of the growing number of university graduates whose main career prospect was teaching. This decision resulted in changes in the construction programs and equipment lists (para. 15). 4. The loan amount was reduced twice: from US$50 million to US$38 million in November 1984 and to US$35.5 million in September 1989. These reductions essentially reflect the favorable evolution of the U.S. dollar/Moroccan dirham exchange rate (para. 11) and, to a much lesser extent, the reduction in the technical assistance component (para. 17). Results 5. Quantitative results: At present, enrollment in the 37 primary schools is now approximately 9,200, or 115 percent of the projected enrollment, which would confirm that demand in rural areas is very strong. This compares to total primary enrollment in 1989/90 of 2.1 million, of which 0.8 million in rural areas. Analysis of the quantitative results of the ENS's has proven to be more complex, considering the many changes made as a result of the shortened training time: the ENS's now train lower and upper secondary, whereas their original function was to train upper secondary teachers only. Moreover, they train teachers in all subjects, whereas they were designed to train solely mathematics and science teachers. The 4 ENS's trained a total of 1148 teachers of which 208 second-cycle mathematics and science teachers, (as opposed to the 450 projected). The evaluation of teacher needs made at the time of project preparation was over- estimated and it is clear now that no ENS should have been built. 6. Qualitative results: The physical and quar.titative objectives were attained to some extent. The same cannot be said of the qualitative objectives. The project intended encouraging the introduction of practical hands-on activities at the primary level, a continuation of the program initiated under the Third Education Project (FY77). In light of encouraging initial results, the Government had decided to extend the program. The specialized classrooms and equipment provided for this purpose, however, are largely under-utilized, mainly due to the lack of supervisory staff and appropriate programs and curricula, but also because the small size of the schools (5 classrooms) does not permit full- time utilization of the workshops. In fact, in spite of positive preliminary results, experience gained by the end of implementation of the Third Education Project showed that separate workshops were not essential for the successful introduction of practical studies in primary schools (para. 16). Furthermore, the lists of educational materials were drawn up without consulting the future  - v - users, which diminished their pedagogical effectiveness (para. 13 and 16). Finally, the ENS's underwent such rapid changes that little effort was spent on formulating new programs (to reflect the new one-year training plan) and no comparative evaluation of tho various options was carried out (para. 17). Project Sustainability 7. Clearly, the primary schools built improved access (albeit on a small scale) to basic education for a number of children in underprivileged areas, who will also benefit from the teaching aids provided by the project tpara. 18). The future of the four ENS's financed by the project is less certain. One ENS has been converted into a post-secondary institute of technology (EST), and another ENS has been turned over to higher education and attached to an existing sciernce department. A study of the future of the various teacher-training institutions is planned within the context of an upcoming project to support basic education (FY91). Findings and Lessons 8. The piecemeal evolution of project design reflects the switch in the Bank's approach from support to technical and vocational secondary education to the emerging priority of increasing access to primary education, especially in disadvantaged rural areas. This evolution prevented the development of truly innovative pedagogical concepts and strategies. Project design was guided by the single objective of improving the quality and relevance of primary and secondary education, especially as regards mathematics, science and practical skills. However, once translated into project components, this objective proved to be too ambitious: the substantial difficulties experienced in implementing the construction and equipment components of the project (para. 3 above) overshadowed the technical assistance package which, in itself, might even have warranted a stand-alone technical assistance operation. While these physical components were correctly evaluated and executed, the qualitative aspects concerning curricula, training and monitoring were not accorded the amount of attention required (para. 16 and 22). Failure to give particular attention to the pedagogical aspects short-changed the only innovative aspect of this project, the introduction of new curricula and educational strategies at the primary level. A more sensible approach would have consisted in taking inventory of the experience gained with the primary schools financed under the Third Education Project and, on that basis, setting up a group of pilot schools to test new methods before disseminating them throughout the system. The project management unit's ability to implement an operation of such scope had been overestimated. The PIU had already experienced substantial difficulties in implementing the Fourth Education Project and, still under-staffed, found it beyond its capacity to monitor procurement and coordinate project execution. Finally, it also seems that, in the absence of equipment and materials, the small infirmaries that were built are not being used for the expected purpose. The Bank can be credited for appropriate caution and firmness during project decign against the creation of too many training institutions. But the lengthy preparation was not particularly conducive to continued focus on qualitative components and this lack of attention to pedagogical elements was also evident during Bank supervision. The lack of  - vi - balance between physical and qualitative components seems to be the conclusions of many education projects executed during the 1980's. This observation resulted in the increased emphasis the Bank has given to qualitative components in more recent operations starting with the Education Sector Reform Program (FY 86). The Bank now pays particular attention to the pedagogical elements of projects and focuses its effort during project design and implementation on components such as pre- and in-service teacher training, curriculum development and evaluation and improved planning and monitoring capacities in implementing agencies.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KINGDOM OF MOROCCO FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 2149-MOR) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Prolect Identity Project Name: Fifth Education Project Loan No.: 2149-MOR Borrower: Kingdom of Morocco Sector: Education Sub-sectors: Primary Education Post-secondary education for secondary-teacher training Amount of ioan: US$50 million - reduced to US$ 38 million in November 1984 and to US$35.5 million in May 19891" Board Approval: May 1982 Effective date: April 1983 Original closing date: March 31, 1988 Actual closing date: March 31, 1989 (The loan account was closed on December 31, 1989 to permit all disbursements for committed expenditures.) B. Socioeconomic Background 1. The Fifth Education Project was prepared, negotiated, and signed at a time of relatively favorable economic environment, although the rate of economic growth was less than that of the early 1970's. The 1981-1985 Development Plan set a GDP target growth rate of 6.5 percent in real terms, led primarily by increased exports of mining products and expansion of agriculture and fishing. These economic objectives required more technical and scientific manpower, and priority was given to training science and mathematics teachers and to education in technology at all levels. Particular emphasis was also placed on social development, and most particularly on wider and more equitable access to basic education. However, from the early 1980's, the economic situation became considerably less favorable, owing mainly to the fall of export prices, especially phosphates, and growth in military spending and debt service expenditures. The 1981-1985 Plan did not adequately anticipate this downturn. g Final payments were made on January 26, 1990, and an undisbursed amount of US$ 0.6 million was cancelled at that time, thus reducing the loan amount to US$ 34.9 million.  -2- This situation led the Moroccan Government to reduce public expenditures in most sectors, including social programs. 2. In this context, even though recurrent expenditures for education were increasing fast - from 13.9 percent of total Government operating expenditures in 1975 to 25.9 percent in 1982 - these increases did not allow the Government to reach its targets. In fact, the newly available resources were used to accommodate ever increasing student enrollment, most notably at the secondary and post-secondary levels, where per-student costs are highest, while complementary expenditures needed to maintain and upgrade the quality of education were neglected. This led the Government to take a number of practical measures aimed at increasing basic education enrollment within an improved cost-effectiveness context and at improving the quality of education being offered, by making effective teaching tools available to teachers, and by training ience and mathematics teachers. The Fifth Education Project was to assist the Government in implementing these measures. C. Obiectives and Description of the Prolect 3. Tl-e three components of the project had the common goal of improving the quality of education at the primary and secondary levels, particularly in science and mathematics, providing the students with a sufficiently solid foundation for them to be well prepared to pursue technical or occupational training, and to respond to the country's needs for mid- and upper-level managers. More specifically, the project aimed at increasing the possibilities for access to primary education, particularly in the most under-privileged rural areas, upgrading the efficiency of basic education while improving teacher training and making teaching aids available to teachers, and producing science and mathematics teachers in sufficient numbers and quality. 4. The project was to comprise: (a) constructing, furnishing, and equipping: (i) 40 primary schools, each capable of accommodating 200 pupils, including five classrooms, an infirmary, and a multipurpose room (workshop, equipment storage room, various activities); and (ii) four teacher training schools (ENS's) to train upper secondary science and mathematics teachers; (b) equipping 700 primary schools with teaching aids; and (c) technical assistance for: (i) preparation of a practical "hanas-on" activities program for primary education: 12 man-months; (ii) training of future ENS teachers and preparation of science and mathematics curricula: 212 man-months;  - 3 - (iii) training fellowships in connection with items a(i) and a(ii): 369 man-months; (iv) pre-investment studies for preparation of future projects in the area of education; and (v) strengthening the project management unit. D. Project Design and Organization 5. The Moroccan Government's initial request to obtain financing of a fifth education project involved continuation of the Fourth Education Project (FY79), that is, pursuing implementation of a uniform system of technical and occupational training with the Ministry of Labor. For this purpose, the Bank was requested to finance the construction and equipping of four Applied Technology Institutes (ITA's), the expansion of three existing ITA's, the creation or expansion of 20 vocational training centers, 40 apprenticeship centers and 15 mobile training units. A tight budgetary situation forced the Ministry of Labor to postpone a large portion of its expansion program. It was therefore decided to use the identified Bank loan to emphasize one of the essential aspects of the 1981-1985 Plan, that is, upgrading the quality of general education and particularly the quality of mathematics and science education. On that basis, two missions prepared a project in November 1979 and June 1980, comprising four essential components: construction and equipping of 40 primary schools, eight ENS's, a National Coordinating Center for Science and Technology Research (CNCRST), and four ITA's. Over the course of these missions, the Moroccan Government requested that equipping the primary schools with teaching aids and practical activities programs be added to the project. The justificatioL. for a construction program of 40 primary schools was never made. One can only assume that this number resulted from two components in previous operations: a similar number (47) of primary schools were financed under the Third Education Project (FY77). The Fourth Education Project included the preparation of pre-investment designs of 40 rural primary schools (again unclear why 40). Therefore, the 40 schools were included in the project more, it seems, as a ready candidate tor financing within the overall envelope than as the derived number of schools necessary to meet a certain enrollment objective. 6. Over the three years that elapsed between the initial preparation of the project in November 1979 and the signing of the Loan Agreement in November 1982, the Government and the Bank reassessed the importance of each component and several changes were made to project design. It was first decided to abandon two of the components: the four ITA's, which the Government decided to finance, to complement the ten others financed by the European Community, and the CNCRST, whose estimated cost of US$7.6 million - US$5.7 million (75 percent) in foreign currency - was considered too high by the Bank, taking into account the Government's budgetary constraints and the lack of clarity of its objectives. Second, the number of ENS's to be constructed was, despite the Government's insistence, lowered from eight to four. Bank staff's calculations demonstrated that with greater efficiency in each institution - reducing the drop-out rate of each class from 75 percent to around 10 percent between the first year of  .-4 - training and completion of the diploma - while increasing secondary class enrollment and the number of hours of instruction by each teacher, needs through the 1990's could easily be met with 4 ENS's. This reduction was all the more appropriate that it was unlikely that the pace of construction of new secondary schools, as projected by the Government, could be sustained. Finally, the question of equipping primary classes with teaching aids was settled. This was a matter of determining the number of schools to be equipped and the type of equipment to be provided. On the basis of the materials already furnished with funding from the Third Education Project, the Government would have preferred, on the one hand, to receive materials for practical work as well as some audio- visual equipment, such as a television for each school, and, on the other hand, to equip over a five-year period, as was provided in the 1981-1985 Plan, all the schools in the country (about 3000) at an estimated cost of US$2.2 million. UNICEF had initially considered making a significant contribution, but its own budgetary constraints forced it to limit its participation to one year's worth of materials, and to training primary school teachers in the use of the equipment. The Bank finally agreed to finance educational materials for 700 primary schools, to be supplied by UNICEF. At the same time, it was decided to purchase materials for practical work only for the 40 new schools to be constructed, each of which included a workshop for this activity. 7. The piecemeal evolution of project design reflects the switch in the Bank's approach from support to technical and vocational secondary education to the emerging priority of increasing access to primary education, especially in disadvantaged rural areas. It prevented the development of truly innovative pedagogical concepts and strategies. Curricula that had been implemented under the Third Education Project were applied in the primary schools without any changes, and a certain change of heart was observed, at the time of integration of the practical activities in these curricula, manifested by excessive caution in drawing up the lists of equipment for the 700 primary schools. Likewise, no specific teaching guidelines were recommended, and no training objectives were set for the four ENS's, except that they should train future teachers in four years following completion of the baccalaur6at. These training curricula were left to be developed entirely by future technical assistance, for which the terms of reference were not defined at that stage. It is undeniable that the pedagQgical aspects of the project should have been more carefully prepared. 8. Preparation of the project's physica: aspects was much more thorough. Construction sites were selected and approved well before negotiations, the list of the 700 schools to be equipped was drawn up, the equipment list was issued, and the drawings of the primary schools and the four ENS's were presented to and approved by the Bank. When the loan became effective in April 1983, the construction contracts had already been signed, and a contract with UNICEF for the purchase of equipment for the 700 schools was being negotiated. Over the course of this long project preparation, particular emphasis was placed on upgrading the efficiency of the project unit. Some serious management shortcomings in the Third and Fourth projects made it necessary to strengthen the project management unit by adding to it some staff specialized in preparation of construction plans and bidding documents, supervision of works, equipment procurement, and execution of educational programs. It seems, however, that the  -5- number of specialists to be hired was never specified, nor were their responsibilities. Consequently, the strengthening of the project unit did not achieve all the results expected. The numerous changes and delays experienced are discussed in the following paragraphs. E. Proiect Implementation 9. The loan closed one year late. Of the 40 primary schools, some 20 were completed by the target date, September 1985; 17 others were completed during 1986 and 1987; 3 were never built (see para. 13). The four ENS's were finished between mid-1987 and the end of 1988, 24 months late on average. Due to these significant delays, equipment was delivered to the newly constructed installations as soon as they were completed, but it had to be stored for extended periods, often under rather less than optimal conditions. Teaching aids were delivered to primary schools 30 to 36 months late, on average. As explained below, the technical assistance component was for the most part eliminated from the project. 10. The reasons for these delays fall into four categories. Firstly, the project management unit did not have sufficient manpower and material resources to elaborate plans, prepare bidding documents, audit contracts, supervise construction sites, draw up the equipment lists, organize and coordinate delivery of equipment to the primary schools, and maintain an overall accounting system for a project of this size and complexity. The under-staffing situation was worsened by the fact that the existing staff, even though assisted by an architect hired by UNESCO, did not prove to have adequate motivation to confront these overly ambitious duties. Secondly, awarding construction contracts for primary schools to a limited number of companies, each overseeing several sites (one of them even having had the responsibility of building 15 of the 40 schools) made it impossible for agreed schedules to be honored, due to supply delays or the difficulty of having trained technical staff on several sites at the same time. Thirdly, with regard to teaching aids, the Ministry of National Education (MEN) had expected to sign a contract with UNICEF, which had already contributed to the financing of a portion of these materials, had agreed to finance and provide teacher training in use of this equipment and had offered highly competitive prices. But the Ministry of Finance's concern with the high cost of insurance for this equipment, and their claim that several items could be produced locally, delayed the signing of the Government-UNICEF contract until August 1985, with final delivery to the schools around the end of 1986. Finally, significant delays occurred in construction of the ENS's due to the changes in objectives decided by the Government and approved by the Bank. These changes, which affected substantially the building program and equipment lists, are discussed below. 11. The favorable evolution of the U.S. dollar/Moroccan dirham exchange rate permitted reductions in the loan amount of US$12 million in November 1984 and US$2.5 million in September 1989. Further, during execution, significant savings were realized on project costs. First, construction of the Casablanca ENS boarding facilities was eliminated. Then, on account of the changes that occurred in the composition of the ENS's, the needs for furniture and equipment  - 6 - for these institutions were considerably reduced. Finally, since the training programs for which significant technical assistance had been envisaged were no longer necessary (para. 17), this part of the technical assistance component was eliminated. All this resulted in significant savings, lowering the total cost of the project from US$94.5 million (of which US$50.0 million or 53 percent was financed by the Bank) to only US$ 51.0 million (of which the Bank financed US$ 34.9 million, or 68 percent). In March 1988, the Loan Agreement, was amended to allow financing of part of the equipment for the Casablanca and Fes post- secondary technical schools, provided under the Fourth Education Project up to a total amount of US$8.0 million. The amount disbursed was about US$6.0 million. 12. Two risks had been anticipated by the appraisal mission: the weakness of the project management unit, and the difficulty of preparing training programs truly adapted to the requirements of mathematics and science teaching. As stated above, some of the delays are attributable to the slowness of execution of the project management unit, for which the project had not provided adequate operating resources. Only toward the end of the project did the MEN undertake an overall reorganization of that unit and created within the Directorate of Planning (DP), the Division for Financed Projects more and better staffed. The ENS training programs fell quite short of the objectives initially defined. Instead of training upper secondary teachers in four years following the baccalaur6at, the Government decided in August 1984 to implement in these ENS's the programs used in its other secondary teacher training institutions, namely one year of pedagogical training for holders of the licence. At the same time, the Government requested, and the Bank accepted, that three of the ENS's financed under the project also train lower secondary teachers, that training be provided for all topics, and not exclusively math and science, and that the Casablanca ENS concentrate solely on training physical education teachers. F. Malor Results of the Prolect 13. Construction and equipment results. The project objectives were mostly attained: 37 primary schools were built (the Government having decided to abandon the construction of three schools, a decision for which no reason can be found in the project files), as well as four secondary teacher training institutes, and 700 primary schools have received their teaching aids. Generally speaking, the buildings are of good quality and should pose no particular maintenance or durability problems. While the construction costs in dollars appear lower than estimated at the time of appraisal (US$130 per square meter as opposed to US$240 per square meter for the primary schools, and US$190 per square meter as opposed to US$310 per square meter for the ENS's), this is largely due to depreciation of the dirham. In fact, construction costs were deemed too high to be replicable on a national scale. With a view to keeping construction costs down, MEN decided to switch to pre-fabricated primary schools, financed under later projects, notably the Education Sector Reform Program (ESRP) (FY86) and the Rural Primary Education Project (FY89), in recognition of the quality of construction and the substantial savings the pre-fabricated process allowed. The actual cost per student place of the 37 primary schools built in this project is about US$ 1,200, to be compared with a cost of US$ 270 per student place estimated for the pre-fabricated schools built under the ESRP and the Rural  - 7 - Primary Education Project. The shift from masonry to pre-fabricated accounts for about half of the savings. The decision to no longer build separate workshops in primary schools accounts for the other half. Some costly errors were made in the drawing of equipment lists. Some of the materials purchased (test tubes. precision scales, various glassware for chemistry experiments) were not even used in primary schools. Furthermore, an equipment storage system adequate for a network of nucleus/satellite schools such as this one was not devised and resulted in under-utilization of equipment by satellite schools. In the ENS's, the excessively high estimate of 1,500 meals per day (while certain dormitory wings had been eliminated) led to orders for the dining halls and kitchen equipment surpassing by far the actual capacity of the institutions. 14. Quantitative results. According to the most recent statistics (1988-1989 school year) supplied by the DP, enrollment at the 37 schools built under the project was about 9,200 pupils or 115 percent of projected enrollment (compared to total primary enrollment in 1989/90 of 2.1 million, of which 0.8 million in rural areas). This tends to confirm that demand is very high and that the quantitative objectives of the project corresponded to real needs. One should note, however, that actual enrollments in the schools financed under the following operation, the ESRP, are below projected enrollments. It does not necessarily follow that demand was over estimated. A number of factors such as distance from the homes, quality of education and indirect costs will be analyzed during the preparation of the ESRP Completion Report, scheduled for mid 1990. The materials provided for the 700 schools should help upgrade the education offered to about 600 pupils per school, or a total of 420,000 children for a five-year period. 15. In light of the changes in the training duration, reduced to one year after attaining the licence for upper secondary teachers, and to one year after the Dipl6.e d'Etudes Universitaires G6n6rales (DEUG) for lower secondary teachers, the quantitative analysis of enrollments in ENS's proves to be more complex. In fact, if we consider the overall enrollment of the four ENS's (1870 students instead of the 3840 projected), the results are even less encouraging. The number of lower and upper secondary teachers coming out of these institutions in 1988-1989 was 516 upper and 632 lower secondary teachers for all disciplines. These numbers are to be used with caution, since the four ENS's were supposed to train only upper secondary mathematics and science teachers, and the number trained in these subjects was only 208, instead of the 460 expected. At the time this report was being prepared, the four ENS had not yet reached their full capacity. DP projections indicate that, when they are, capacity will still exceed the need for teachers in general, and math and science teachers in particular. The evaluation of teacher needs made at the time of project preparation was over-estimated and it is clear now that no ENS should have been built. 16. Qualitative results. The qualitative impact of an education project can only be measured over the long term, in our present case when the students have completed primary school and have worked with upgraded educational materials or, in secondary eduction, after having studied with teachers who have had access to improved training. Yet, certain observations can already be made. In primary  - 8 - education, the project envisaged encouraging introduction of practical "hands-on" activities in the school, and specialized rooms and equipment had been provided for this purpose. These resources are largely under-utilized principally because of the lack of supervisory staff and appropriate pedagogical programs (although adequate allocation of well-trained staff was part of project design), but also becavse the small size of the schools (5 classrooms) do not permit full time uti]ization of the workshops. In fact, experience gained under the Third Edtucation Project shows tl'-t separate workshops are not essential for the successful introduction of practical studies in primary schools. We encounter heare one of the major shortcomings of the project: the physical components were correctly appraised and executed, but aspects concerning programs, training and monitoring did not receive the attention they required. This observation is equally valid for the teaching aids. We stated above that more attention should have been paid when drawing up lists. Failure to give particular attention to the pedagogical aspects short-changed the only innovative aspect of this project, the introduction of new curricula and educational strategies at the primary level. A more sensible approach would have consisted of taking inventory of the experience gained from the primary schools financed under the Third Education Project and, on that basis, setting up a group of pilot schools to test new methods before disseminating them throughout the system. Finally, it seems also that, due to the absence of equipment and materials, the small infirmaries which were built are not being used as planned. 17. Raising the ENS entry level and shortening the length of ENS training was used by the Government as a means to absorb the ever-growing number of university graduates for whom teaching was the logical (or only) career path. The Government justified their decision on the basis of the seemingly successful experience of the Rabat ENS, which had been operating for some years on the one- year training system. This decision, however, had no pedagogical foundation and no comparative analysis of the value of one-year versus four-year training programs was carried out. Little effort was made to update the training programs. No further effort was made to specialize certain institutions in the training of science and math teachers, and others in liberal arts. A etudy might have demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this approach. The only exception is the Casablanca ENS, which is devoted entirely to the training of physical education teachers. Thus the issue of teacher training must not be considered closed upon conclusion of this project. The Government and the Bank are well aware of this unresolved issue and support for pre- and in-service teacher training programs is included in the Rural Primary Education Project and is being considered in the FY91 Basic Education Project under preparation. G. Prolect Sustainability. 18. It is clear that the primary schools built allow access to basic education to an ever growing number of children from areas previously not or poorly served with schools. Also, the project brought about the types of qualitative improvements that accompany the presence of new buildings and better-quality educational materials, though, as stated above, the curricula that they should support need to be improved. Accordingly, the project's effects should endure, and, if the Government devotes t,Le necessary funding, grow. The only foreseeable  risk for this part of the project is linked to budgetary issues. So far, it seems that the MEN has appropriately funded recurrent expenditures for these schools, but caution should be exercised so that the rapid increase in the number of schools will not create budgetary burdens that cannot be supported by the MEN, unless the growth of expenditures in other education sub-sectors (particularly, higher education) is curtailed. This is precisely the dilemma the ESRP was designed to resclve. 19. The durability of the effects of the ENS's built under the project is more difficult to foresee. We have already discussed the deviations from the initial objectives. The Agadir ENS has been converted into a post-secondary institute of technology (EST), and the Fez ENS has been turned over to higher education and attached to the Science Department. The future of the ENS network should be assessed in the context of the forthcoming Secondary Education Project. 20. It is worth noting that the project management unit, as it existed during implementation of this project, was not maintained. Rather than strengthening a cumbersome independent unit responsible for the entire administration of several projects being implemented simultaneously, the Bank gave greater support to existing planning, pedagogical, and organizational structures in the MEN. The MEN has reorganized the DP and has assigned the administrative aspects of new projects to the Division of Financed Projects, an innovation that seems to give good results. H. Performance of the World Bank. 21. The Bank can be credited for some of the project successes. Firstly, for the caution it used during the three years of preparation against excessively increasing the number of training institutions, a concern that later proved to be fully justified. The Bank also had a flexible attitude that facilitated an open and cordial dialogue. This flexibility was manifested on various occasions, for example at the time of the change in ENS programs, when technical assistance was partially eliminated, or when it became necessary to authorize financing for certain materials provided und-ir the Fourth Project. The quality of this dialogue later led the way for di.zussions of very delicate reform policy matters during preparation and appraisal of the ESRP. Finally, the firmness demonstrated by the Bank under certain ci.cumstances -- such as the refusal to include swimming pools and a sauna at the Casablanca physical education ENS (lower and upper secondqry schools do not have access to swimming as a sports activity), the revision of certain equipment lists, simplification of certain construction standards -- a position that led to substantial savings and greater cost- effectiveness of the results obtained. 22. Certain Bank weaknesses have already been mentioned. The most significant is the lack of innovation or application of international experiences in teaching methods or approaches in the project resulting from a lengthy, piece-meal project design not particularly conducive to continued focus on qualitative elements. This was, as we have seen, quite harmful to the results, and has doubtlessly led to the current lack of clarity about the future of certain of the ENS's. Generally speaking, the changes proposed in the training programs were too  - 10 - quickly accepted without concerns of pedagogical impact. In fact, these sudden changes could and should have been anticipated if the decision-makers had focussed greater attention on university enrollment figures. The magnitude of the number of university graduates could have been better predicted and it would have been easier to define an appropriate training program during preparation of the project. Moreover, the project was insufficiently supervised by educators. More generally speaking, the time devoted to supervision also seems to have been too limited (36.5 staff-weeks over 7 years or about 5 staff-weeks per year on average). Finally, the strengthening of the project management unit should have been more carefully planned by specifying its responsibilities and defining in detail the positions to be provided and resources needed. These weaknesses have been taken into account when later projects were put in place, particularly as concerns management and administration of the projects, the qualitative and institution-building contents of which are now substantial and well-defined. I. Summarv of Borrower's Actions. 23. It is undeniable that the Government's hesitations concerning its training program for secondary teachers had an unfortunate impact on the results obtained. The Government at first requested eight ENS's. Resolution of this issue delayed preparation. Later, changes in programs resulted in delays and cost increases, when it was necessary to modify the buildings to be constructed. The project also seems to have suffered from intermittent unavailability of counterpart funds, although this is not attributable to the MEN. To ensure adequate funding from the government budget, a core investment program and its twice yearly review were included in the FY88 Structural Adjustment Loan. Finally, the MEN should have taken the initiative to strengthen the project management unit as soon as it realized that the tasks discussed in paragraph 10 could not be performed appropriately. J. Government-Bank Relations during the Project. 24. The Government-Bank dialogue was constant, open, and direct. The fact that several projects were developed simultaneously makes it impossible to attribute solely to this project the benefit of the positive aspects of this dialogue. It is, however, the quality of the ongoing dialogue that enabled the preparation and implementation of other operations, (the ESRP and the Rural Primary Education Project) and others to follow. Excessive focus on physical components from both the Bank and the Borrower (partly because the project unit and the DP cannot affect curriculum policies) has, however, created long-run misperceptions about the Bank's commitment to the pedagogical content of projects. Donors already participating in the quantitative and qualitative improvement of eduction in Morocco could have been more involved in this dialogue. In this project, cooperation was limited to UNICEF, which assisted in an efficient and cost- effective fashion. Some contacts had taken place with Canada, but they were interrupted when the training programs were modified. Increased coordination among donors has resulted in the African Development Bank supporting the 1985 reform program through its own project and in its co-financing the Primary Rural Education Project and the forthcoming Basic Education Project.  - 11 - K. Consultants Services. 25. Construction. Design and construction of the four ENS's were awarded to four different companies, whereas the 37 schools were constructed by 17 companies. Preparation of architectural programs and drawings, and construction itself were supervised by a TJNESCO architect assigned to the project management unit. On the whole, quality of construction is good, but failure by the builders to meet tk_ agreed timetable (essentially for lack of sufficient technical staff to supervise the numerous work sites, but also because of delays from their own suppliers) substantially delayed the opening of several institutions. In the future, it would be preferable not to award too many construction contracts to a single firm. 26. Equipment. The equipment delivered was in accordance with the specifications. Equipment sometimes suffered from lengthy storage, but this is independent of suppliers' doing. UNICEF's performance in the delivery of educational materials for primary school should be applauded. 27. Technical assistance and fellowships. The technical assistance was only used to pay UNESCO for the salary of the project management unit architect and for extending the contract of the expert in charge of preparing the practical "hands-on" activities program for primary schools. All other technical assistance was cancelled when the decision was made to generalise one-year programs for ENS's. L. Documentation and Data Relating to the Proiect. 28. The project was implemented on the basis of the usual documents: Loan Agreement, Appraisal Report, and President's Report. The project would have benefitted from specific detailed working documents for each component. Such documentation was greatly wanting, in as much as it usually contains, in addition to the outline of the building program, the areas to be constructed, unit costs, equipment lists, the terms of reference of consultants to be hired, and above all the educational strategies to be followed. It would be desirable for such documents to be made available for future projects. Updating of working documents is similarly useful when objectives and scope of a project change over the course of execution, as well as, Bank supervision staff often changes. 29. Information needed for preparation of this Project Completion Report was available both to the DP and in the institutions themselves. It should be noted that the Bank's supervision reports available were quite brief and in many cases the documents referred as annexes were missing. The new format for forms 590 shotuld allow better definition of the evolution of the project in all its forms, and place greater emphasis on difficulties encountered, problems to be resolved, and results obtained.  - 13 - PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Prosect Identification Project name: Morocco Fifth Education Loan No.: 2149-MOR Borrower: Kingdom of Morocco Executing agency: Ministry of Education, Planning Department, Rabat, Morocco Date of signature: November 5, 1982 Project description: Construction and equipping of 40 primary schools and 4 higher-level teacher-training schools Total project cost: US$86.4 million 2. General The project targeted the development, strengthening and upgrading of teacher training in mathematics and science in order to meet the requirements for teachers resulting from an increase in enrollments at the secondary level. At the primary level, it was to lead to an upgrading of the quality of instruction and greater capacity in areas with low enrollment rates. 3. Prolect Objectives and Description Obiectives The project was designed to (i) support the Government's education policy, provide more appropriate primary education and respond more efficiently to the educational needs of rural children; (ii) assist the Government in providing primary schools with the basic teaching aids needed for improving the efficiency of instruction; and (iii) upgrade the quality of instruction in mathematics and science at the secondary level through the training of trainers, curriculum development and expansion of the Ministry's capacity for training teachers. Proiect description In its initial design, the project included the construction and equipping of 40 primary schools and four higher-level teacher training schools (ENS) and the provision of teaching aids to 700 schools. (i) The 40 primary schools The 40 primary schools were to be located in 36 provinces with low enrollment rates. Each school was to have five classrooms, an infirmary and a workshop that could be used after school hours by the community for health services and adult education. The workshop was to be used by boys for receiving rudiments of vocational training related to carpentry, metal work, etc. Courses in home economics and sewing were to be given to the girls. The schools were also to have staff lodging to encourage the teachers to settle in the area.  - 14 - (ii) The four higher-level teacher training s hools (ENS) These schools were to be located in Casablanca. Fez, Agadir and Marrakech, to train upper-secondary teachers in mathematics and science. (iii) Provision of teaching aids With a view to upgrading the quality of primary instruction, the project called for the provision of teaching aids in the form of standard packages to 700 existing schools. The packages included, among other items, maps, directional and drawing compasses, scales, etc. (iv) Technical assistance In order to ensure the success of training of upper-secondary teachers and attain the project's qualitative objectives, technical assistance of 212 man-months of experts and 360 man-months of fellowships was envisaged under the project. It also included technical assistance for the project unit, extension of the architect's contract (24 man-months) and consultant services (36 man-months). 4. Proiect Design and Organization The studies for the construction of the 40 primary schools were financed under the Fourth Project. There were three problems related to project design for those schools. First, it appears that particular regional circumstances were not reflected. The idea of introducing a workshop into the physical structure of the schools, as innovative and interesting as it was, did not have the desired effect. The workshops should have been first built on a trial basis in several regions before being added to all 40 primary schools. The workshops are not yet being used. Second, the area set aside for the infirmary in the schools would have benefited from input from the Ministry of Health so that the facility could fulfill its assigned function. Third, the selection of school sites did not take into account water supply and electricity, which meant that some had to operate without either. Regarding the ENS, the requirements for teachers in the scientific disciplines were correctly assessed. Although the physical works did not undergo any modification, the targeted number of those to be trained (bacheliers) was changed. DEUG (two years of training) and licence (one year of training) graduates were recruited with a view to making training one-year long in general. The pedagogical impact of the teaching aids distributed is difficult to evaluate. No study was undertaken in this regard. The contribution of the items to the overall impact of the project is difficult to assess. Moreover, the project was hampered by the fact that during project design there was no identification of the profile of the project management team.  - 15 - Project results Despite the problems outlined above and the many changes made to the original design, the project results are positive overall. However, the project was less successful in view of the delays in execution caused by several factors combined: (i) flaws in project design; (ii) flaws in project management and monitoring; and (iii) changes to the finality of project objectives, particularly in relation to the ENS. 5. Project Execution Proiect achievements Of the 40 primary schools planned under the project, 30 were completed, seven are under way at different stages and three have been abandoned. ENS construction is completed for the most part. However, some areas of those schools have been used for purposes other than those envisaged under the project. The Agadir ENS houses a 1,300-student high school and may be used for higher education as a technology EST. The Marrakech ENS houses three entities: (i) a lower secondary teacher training school, which provides one-year training for DEUG graduates; (ii) preparatory classes for the grandes 6coles; and (iii) the ENS offering two-year training for licence holders working toward their agr6gation degree. The Fez ENS has been turned over to higher education and attached to the faculty of beience. The Casablanca ENS was converted into an ENS for physical education. The schools were equipped in accordance with the usual procedure. Prior to the opening of calls for bids, a commission consisting of officials from the Planning Department established specifications and sent the bidding documents for approval and comments to the World Bank. Procurement of the teaching aids for the 700 schools was carried out under an agreement between the Ministry of Education and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The agreement took the form of a reimbursab'le purchase by UNICEF on behalf of the Ministry of Education. Under that agreement, UNICEF agreed to purchase the teaching aids and have them transported on behalf of the Ministry of Education. The technical assistance envisaged under the project in the form of expert services was little used (less than 50% of the amount initially set aside was disbursed at July 31, 1989), whereas that for fellowships was not utilized at all. 6. Accounts Situation at July 31. 1989 Table 1 below shows the accounts situation at July 31, 1989 by category of expenditure. The delays in civil works and conversions of both the ENS and certain primary schools partially explain the amounts still available at that  - 16 - date and which should be fully disbursed before December 31, 1989. Significantly, out of a loan agreement amount of US$50 million, 14.5 million have been cancelled. 7. Gaps between Desipn and Prolect Execution (i) Delays in construction of primary schools Primary-school construction ran into significant delays, averaging more than 28 months in relation to the contractual timetable. Table 2 in Part 2 of this report shows the delay for each contract, calculated as the difference between the notification date, date of provisional acceptance and execution period given in the apecial conditions of contract. The delays had repercussions from both the financial and pedagogical standpoints. From the financial standpoint, they meant substantial increases in construction costs, representing for the most part between 20% and 30% of the total cost of the project. From the pedagogical standpoint, the opportunity cost meant considerable difficulties in satisfying school demand and overburdening of existing classrooms. (ii) Non-utilization of workshops and infirmaries in the primary schools The workshops for manual training planned under the project are not being used, owing primarily to a lack of supervision. This has undermined the innovative aspect of the project and limited its return. As a result, the return on the schools was not maximized insofar as the students did not gain the manual skills they could have acquired and which would have enabled them to continue with vocational training should they drop out of school. Regarding the non-utilization of the infirmary, the lack of any first-aid equipment and the difficulties in replacing it prompted the users to allocate infirmary premises to other uses (prayer room in some schools, for example). (iii) Delays in ENS construction There were significant delays in ENS construction, averaging 54 months in relation to the special conditions of contract and considerably pushing up costs. Contingencies and price escalation reached 38% of the total cost and 60% of the original contract in the case of the Casablanca ENS, where major changes were necessary in order to convert it for the training of physical education teachers. (iv) ChanRes in ENS curricula and non-utilization of the Premises for the purposes envisaged under the prolect The ENS curricula were partially changed for several reasons.  - 17 - Firstly, because the labor force had an availability of holders of licences in sciences in general and mathematics in particular, it was decided to recruit from the ENS. Second, between the time of design of the ENS and their commissioning, the educational targets underwent many modifications. The changes in ENS curricula and orientation sparked significant changes in the construction costs of the schools. The changes in the schools' orientation and utilization of the ENS built under the project may make it impossible to generate a return on major investments. A cost-benefit analysis should be made before a definitive decision is taken on the allocation of the schools. (v) Lack of coordination between distribution of equipment and school construction The significant construction delays hampered the timely distribution of equipment. Nevertheless, there were very few delays in equipment delivery for either the primary schools or the ENS. The equipment remained in storage under unsatisfactory conditions (e.g. kitchen equipment for the ENS). (vi, Conformity of equipment to needs Greater participation by the officials of the schools receiving the equipment in identifying requirements and their receipt and assessments of conformity of the equipment provided by the firms would result in a better fit of equipment to needs. For the ENS, the equipment and construction of the dining halls and kitchens far exceeded the real capacity of the schools. The base estimate of 1,500 meals per school was too high, especially since some dormitory wings were eliminated. At the present time the teaching aids provided to the 700 primary schools are not being used and are being stored in some of the schools. The directors of the schools and teachers should be made aware of the imnportance of using those items. (vii) Low enrollments Total enrollments in the ENS are clearly below initial project projections, owing in part to the fact that some of the new schools have not been commissioned, others were realloated (Agadir and Fez), and three of the four ENS are still housed in old quarters that should be used solely on a temporary basis.  - 18 - (viii) Cancellation of part of the loan The cancellation of US$ 14.5 million of the loan is limiting the scope of the project and undermining a number of project activities. 8. Partial Explanation of Gaps between Project Design and Achievements The gaps described above are partially responsible for the difficulties with the construction firms. Those that were awarded several contracts did not have sufficient working capital to meet their commitments, (for example, a company was awarded five of the 12 construction contracts for the primary schools, which involved the construction of 15 of the 40 schools; only one single contract was carried out within schedule). Consequently, the firms either resorted to repetitive procurement or frequent shutdown of the work sites. In order to prevent such a situation from recurring, the number of contracts awarded to a given firm should be limited and the administrative documents that need to be provided when the bid is submitted must include the financial statements for the last three fiscal years (balance sheet, operating account, profits and loss statements, etc.). The exact means of such actions should be studied in depth. The two main factors nevertheless seem to have been as follows: (i) The project management unit was not prepared to manage a project of this size and complexity. Within the project unit, the motivation of the personnel responsible for project monitoring was very limited and the number of manager-level staff very insufficient. Throughout the construction period, outside of brief inspections made by the project leader, no visits were made by the technicians (one architect). The number of mid-level managers in the unit should be increased and visits to the schools more frequent. In addition, physical means should be made available to the unit in order to enhance project management (e.g. computer equipment and vehicles). Outside the work-site reports submitted at least once a month to the project unit, monthly meetings should be held with the company heads and directors of consulting firms to ensure that their work conforms to the extent possible with the instructions from the Ministry. Those meetings should be attended by many officials and make it possible to monitor execution and deal with contingencies. Thus far, MOE has delegated project monitoring to the consulting firms. (ii) Poor planning of items financed. This would refer to the high cost of primary-school construction and impossibility of using a standard design throughout the country. The cost per classroom including workshop and infirmary is prohibitive and does not reflect the country's level of development, resources or needs.  - 19 - 9. Performance of the Donor and Borrower Performance of the borrower The mere fact of having completed this project with the human and physical means at the disposal of the project unit is proof of MOE's resolve to carry out the project successfully. The project unit's weak management capacity prompted MOE to reorganize it, raising it to division level with three offices: project identification, accounting, and construction and equipment. The division's manager-level staff was also increased and it now has three inspectors, three planning advisors, six accountants, one architect and one economist. This effort could be supplemented by courses in project management, computer literacy and seminars relating to seminars organized under future projects. Performance of the donor The World Bank's major weakness regarding the project was apparently rooted in the little importance accorded to pinpointing the needs in physical and human means that the borrower required for project management. Moreover, Bank missions were not sufficiently timely fLr project monitoring. 10. Results Physical results of the proiect Although the project is not yet completed, most of the schools planned have been built. An evaluation of the design and quality of ths buildings as well as the quality of equipment and maintenance is now under war,. Quantitative results For the project's 40 primary schools, the quantitative results in terms of enrollments have already been exceeded. Thus, the project Q. 'nned for 8,000 new places and total enrollments in the schools built and it -peration for the 1988/89 school year was 9,199. For the ENS, the quantitative results are much less enco it: ging. While the project called for 3,840 new places for the training of matheiatics and science teachers, enrollment for the 1988/89 school year was 1,467 and only a -mall proportion of that total is majoring in mathematics and science. Qualitative results For primary education, the qualitative effects were to be generated by the distribution and utilization of teaching aids in 700 schools and the impact of the new primary schools in their regions on pushing up and satisfying the demand for education.  - 20 - For the ENS, it is clear that the requirements for teachers in all areas need to be satisfied. It is however unfortunate that the major efforts targeted under the project for the training of mathematics and science teachers did not become a reality. Overall evaluation The project can be considered a success for the 40 primary schools and provision of teaching aids to the 700 schools. For the ENS, although the project deviated from its original objective, the physical achievements are still very considerable and should therefore be used properly to help satisfy the dictates of the new education policy followed by MOE since 1985.  - 21 - Table 1 Accounts Situation at July 31. 1989 in US$ DISBURSED AVAILABLE ALLOCATED UNALLOCATED EXPENSE CATEGORY AMOUNT AMOUNT AMOUNT AMOUNT Front end fee 738,916 0 0 0 Special account 4,897,474 -4,897,474 0 -4,897,474 Unallocated 0 761,084 0 761,084 Construction 19,133,280 866,720 0 866,7zO Equipment 7,790,264 6,609,735 0 6,609,735 Technical Assistance 863,075 -63,075 0 -63,075 Experts' services 81,596 118,404 0 118,404 Fellowships 0 100,000 0 100,000 Pre-investment Studies 0 1,000,000 0 1,000,000 TOTAL 33,504.605 4,495,394 0 4,495,394 Loan amount 50,000,000 Cancellation 12,000,000 Undisbursed as of 7/31/89 4,495,394 Source: Monthly Disbursement Summary, Loan 2149-MOR, IBRD  - 23 - PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION A. Related Bank Loans Consistent with Government needs and priorities, Bank lending in education and training has evolved from reinforcement of general primary and secondary education (First to Fifth Education Projects, FY65 to FY82) - with the exception of direct support through small project components for manpower training in the sectors of forestry (Second Education Project, FY71). and health, tourism and rural development (Third Education Project, FY76) - to its current emphasis on reinforcing employment-oriented skill training (First and Second Vocational Training Projects, FY86 and FY87), and on introducing structural reforms to improve the efficiency, financial viability, and employment orientation of education at all levels (Education Sector Reform Program and Rural Primary Education Project, FY86 and FY89). B. Proiect Timetable Actual Phases in Project Development Planned Date Date 1. Identification 1978 2. Preparation 1979 3. Appraisal Mission May 80 4. Loan Negotiations Mar 82 5. Board Approval May 82 6. Loan Effectiveness 26 Apr 83 7. Loan Closing 31 Mar 88 31 Mar 89 8. Loan Disb. Completion 30 Sep 88 26 Jan 91k1 a Date of final payment and cancelation of undisbursed amount of US$ 0.6 million. The disbursement grace period was extended to allow for full disbursement of all comnitted funds.  - 24 - C. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (dollars in millions) Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Appraisal Estimate 0.7 4.7 21.5 34.3 46.9 50.0 - - - Actual - 2.5 8.7 8.7 17.2 25.0 29.1 34.5 34.9 Actual as % of Estimate 1% 9Z 17% - - - - - - Actual as 2 of revised loan amount'/ 23Z 452 66% 71% 97% 98% */ Loan amount reduced to $38 million in November 1984 and to $35.5 million in September 1989. US$ 0.6 million was canceled at final disbursement (January 1990), thus reducing loan amount to US$ 34.9 million.  - 25 - D. Project Costs and Financing (US$ million) 1. Project Costs Appraisal Estimate Actual Foreign Foreign Local Exchange Total Local Exchange Total Category: Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs Construction 37.6 26.7 64.3 16.6 18.0 34.6 Equip. & Furn. 2.6 15.4 18.0 2.5 12.0 14.5 Engineering Services 2.7 0.5 3.2 0.2 0.9 1.1 Experts' svs & Fellowships 1.6 6.7 8.3 - 0.1 0.1 Front end Fee - 0.7 0.7 - 0.7 0.7 Total 44.5 50.0 94.5 19.3 31.7 51.0 2. Project Financing Original Actual a. IBRD Z of Z of % of % of Category: US $ M IBRD Total US $ M IBRD Total Construction 26.7 53% 20.7 59% Equip. & Furn. 15.4 31Z 12.5 36% Engineering Services 0.5 1% 0.9 3% Experts' svs & Fellowships 6.7 13% 0.1 0% Front End Fee 0.7 1% 0.7 2% Total IBRD 50.0 100% 53% 34.9 100% 68% b. Government 44.5 47% 16.1 32% TOTAL (1+2) 94.5 1002 51.0 100%  - 26 - E. Proiect Results 1. The 40 Rural Primary Schools Estimates at At Closing Indicators Appraisal Date New places 8,000 9,200 Staff houses 240 n.a. Beneficiaries 16,000 18,400 Z of female teachers Not specified 23.5 % of girls Not specified 38.3P! 2. The Four ENS's/CPR's The following tables give data on numbers of student-teachers and their estimated output in the ENS/CPR institutions nation-wide and within the project by specialty, institution and overall: (i) ENROLLMENT AND OUTPUT IN THE PJECTOS FOR ENS/CPR AND _ATIONUIDE BY SPECIALIZATION - SCHOOL YEAR 1988/89 Enrollments Output Subject ALL Project ALL Project ALl Proj. All Proj. ENS's ENS's CPR's CPR's ENS's ENS's CPR's CPR's Arabic 119 60 908 182 114 57 863 173 Islamic Instruction 79 51 549 72 75 49 522 69 History/Geography 99 60 438 25 94 57 416 24 Frinch 224 850 106 213 - 622 63 Natural Science 72 20 336 82 58 19 319 78 Physics/Chemistry 69 19 28 - 66 18 27 - Mathematics 314 169 376 85 298 161 219 64 Physical Education 262 262 589 150 110 110 275 143 Artistic Education - - 220 19 - 112 18 Female Culture - - 60 - 29 - English 207 - - 144 - - Computer Science 87 47 - - 83 45 - Total 1,532 688 4,354 721 1,255 516 3,404 632 Against an average of 31.3% for rural girls in provinces where the schools are located.  - 27 - (ii) ENROLLMENTS OF STUDENT-TEACHERS BY LOCATION AND LEVEL EnroLlmentr Training for Training for Upper Secondary Lower Secondary Total Comments School Teachers Teachers (ENS) (CPR) _ Marrakech 141 369 510 Casablerca 320 150 470 Agadir- 40 177 217 Water, electric. not connected Fes 187 486 673 Handed over to higher educat. Sub-total 688 1,182 1,870 Rabat 492 295 787 Tetouan 125 175 300 Meknes 227 347 574 oujdaMI' 228 328 Lack of water and electricity Sub-totaL 844 1,145 1,989 Grand TotaL 1.532 2,327 3,859 (lii) ENROLLMENTS. OUTPUT All INTERNAL EFFICIENCY FOR THE PROJECT ENS's/CPR's COPARED TO THE TOTALITY OF INSTITUTIONS TRAINING SECODMARY TEACHERS (1988/89) Training Institutions Enrollment of Output Ratio Graduates/ Student Teachers Student Teachers ALL ENS's 1,532 1,255 81.9% Total of ENS's of Fifth Educ. Proj. 501 376 75.0% Proportion 32.7X 30% All CPR's 4,354 3,404 78.2% Total of CPR's of Fifth Educ. Proj. 235 206 87.7% Proportion 5.4X 6.1X Total All ENS's/CPR's 5,886 4,659 79.1% TotaL ENS's/CPR's of Fifth Educ. Proj. 736 582 81.5% Proportion 12.5X 12.7% Source: Directorate of Planning, MOE. V Training is provided at present in the CPR near Agadir.  - 28 - (iv) A weekly timetable for the students in the one-year post-graduate course in the fields of biology-geology is given below: Hours/week Didactics (theoretical and experimental) 4 Psycho-pedagogy 4 Experimental pedagogy 1 Practical training (class observation, workshops, aptitude testing, etc.) 4 Audio-visual technic 1 School legislation 1 History of science 1 Complementary training 8 Research paper 2 Computer science 1.5 Language courses 3 Source: Directorate of Planning, MOE and Director of ENS/CPR Casablanca.  - 29 - Statistical Data on the Teacher-Trainers at ENS and CPR levels (for 1987/88) ENS level About 15Z are non-Moroccan teaching staff, but the proportion is higher for French (72%), physical education (50%), biology (21%), administrative technic (33%) and mechanics (25%). 0verall 10% are highly qualified but one can say that 53% are well qualified, the remaining being mostly assistant teachers and upper secondary school teachers. For the foreign teaching corps, nearly 30% are highly qualified but 60% can be considered well qualified, with the remaining being assistant teachers and upper secondary school teachers. CPR level There is about 20% of foreign teaching staff, but the proportion is much higher for French (57%), mathematics (30%) and physical education (51%). Overall 322 are highly qualified, but if one includes the teacher-trainers qualified for upper secondary school teaching, the percentage of well qualified staff reaches 95%. For the foreign teaching force, 68% are highly qualified and 97% well qualified, whereas for the Moroccan staff these figures are respectively 16% and nearly 95%. It is interesting to note the statistics for the same year, concerning the teaching force at the uRper secondary school level. Overall 82% of the teaching force is fully qualified but for some subjects the percentage is much lower: for physical education only 27% are qualified, for English 46%, and for drawing 57%. For the production of teachers for physical education/sports in ENS/CPR Casablanca, there are several training patterns: Bac + 4 years, DEUG (or in Morocco CUES) + 2 years and licence + 1 year. For all other specialties of upper-secondary teachers, the scheme would be limited to licence + 1 year.  - 30 - P. Status of Covenants Description of Covenants Source Discussion The Borrower shalls 1. i) not later than July 1, Loan 8greement 3.02 (a) and 1983 or such later date as March 2, 1983 cable from may be agreed with the Bank, Bank to Government employ educational experts to assist the Borrower in carrying out of part D (1)(a) of the project. ii) not later than July 1, no technical assistance was 1983. or such later date as u s ed (experts and may be agreed with the Bank, fellowships) within the employ educational experts project but assistance has to a3qtst the Borrower in been provided through Unicef the carrying out of part program in manual activities D(1) (c) of the project instructor training. iii) employ as and when contemplated pre-investment needed, consultants to studies which were suggested assist in the carrying out by the Education Reform of Part D(3) of the project; Program (Ln 2664-MOR) have and been financed by the fourth education project (Ln 1681- MOR). iv) cause the Project Unit to employ a senior architect and senior engineers by July 1, 1983, respectively, or by such later dates as the Bank may agree. to assist in the carrying-out of part D(2) of the Project.  - 31 - Description of Covenants Source Discussion 2. The Borrower shall, by Loan agreement 3.03 (a) and A national fellowship July 1, 1983 or such later March 2. 1983 cable from program has been implemented date as the Bank may agree, Bank to Government by sending a number of submit for approval a list Moroccans abroad (France, of candidates, including the Belgium, Canada, etc.) candidates' qualifications, financed by bilateral aid. study programs, place of However, the changes in study and duration of curriculum (agreed by the studies, for all fellowships Bank) in the Higher Teacher included in Part D(1) (b) Training Colleges reduced and (c) of the Project. practically the need for specific fellowships to nil. Furthermore, there were provisions for fellowsh4os in the Education Sec.or Reform Program. 3. The Borrower shall Loan agreement 3.04 (a) and Provided for in Unicef establish by Jan. 1, 1983, March 2,1983 cable from Bank contract for the procurement or such later date as the to Government of educational materials. Bank may agree, a system satisfactory to the Bank for the distribution, storage and maintenance of the educational teaching and learning aids included in Part B of the project. 4. The Borrower shall Loan Agreement 3.05 (a) and TA was received for the submit to the Bank for march 2, 1983 cable from purpose from various approval t h e j ob Bank to Government bilateral aid programs. descriptions for the teacher training staff to be assigned to the institutes included in part C of the Project and shall recruit by July 1, 1983. or such later date as the Bank may agree, said staff on the basis of the approved job descriptions.  - 32 - Description of Covenants Source Discussion 5. The Borrower shall Loan agreement 3.05 (b) The programs (BAC+4 years) submit to the Bank for were found satisfactory by review and comment by Sept. WB. The programs now in 1, 1984, or such later date operation (licence +1 year) as the Bank may agree the were also considered draft teacher training appropriate by WB. programs referred to in part Technical assistance to be D(1) (a) of the Project. financed by the project (whether covering expertise or fellowships) have been financed instead by bilateral aid. 6. The Borrower shall, by Loan agreement 3.05 (c) July 1, 1983. or such later date as the Bank may agree. submit to the Bank for approval the draft tender documents for the equipment to be procured for the institutes included in Part C of the Project. 7. The Borrower shall: a) Loan agreement Section 4.03 have the accounts referred to in Section 4.02 for each fiscal year audited by the Borrower's Ministry responsible for finance; (b) furnish to the Bank, as soon as available but in no case not later than six months after the end of each year (i) certified copies of the Piu accounts for such year as so audited; (ii) the report of such audit by such Ministry.  - 33 - G. Use of Bank Resourcee A. Staff Inputs (Staff weeks) Stage of cycle Proiect Cycle FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 Total To Appraisal Departure 68.4 68.4 Appraisal through Board Approval 28.3 39.0 67.3 Board Approval through Effectiveness 12.7 12.7 Supervision .- - 10.4 7.1 2.2 1.5 5.2 3.2 6.8 36.5 TOTAL 68.4 28.3 51.7 10.4 7.1 2.2 1.5 5.2 3.2 6.8 184.9  - 34 - 3. BANK MISSIONS Stagm of M_w N. of 5lW spedalisUon Perfonnance (CYie Year Staff Wee__ Rating Identification to appraisal 1/79 3 )TE 10/79 3 ) 15 CH, LO Sub-total 15 Appraisal through Board Presentation 1/80 2 ) AC, TE 5/80 5 ) 53.3 AC, TE, GE, EC 1/81 2 ) AC, GE 5/81 2 ) 28.3 GE, PL Sub-total 81.6 Board Approval through Effectiveness 12/82 3 51.7 TE, EC 2 TM Sub-total 51.7 Supervision 3/83 4 ) TE, EC, GE 2 TM 7/83 3) 10 AC, GE, CH 2 TM 4/84 3) AC, EC, PL 2 TM 6/84 2 ) 6.3 AC, PL 2 10/84 3) EC, PL, TE 2 TM 5/85 3 2.2 EC, PL, TE 2 TM 2/86 2) TE 11/86 2 ) 1.5 GE, TE 3-4/87 3 ) CH, TE, PL 11/88 1 ) 5.2 PL 11/88 1 3.8 PL Sub-total 29.0 Grand total 178.5 Key to symbols: EC: Economist TE: Technical Educator GE: General Educator AC: Architect PL: Planner LO: Loan Officer CH: Division Chief or Deputy Chief 2: Moderate Problems T: Technical Problems M: Management Problems  - 35 - Annex I PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE (ORIGINAL AND ACTUAL) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 ARCHITECTURAL DRAWINGS ..... AND BID DOCUMENTS CONSTRUCTION BIDDING PROCESS = CONSTRUCTION PS PERIOD +++++ +++++ ++++ TT . ..... ..... .. FURNITURE & EQUIPMENT ..... LIST AND BID DOCUMENTS --- FURNTITURE & PS EQUIPMENT BIDDING _ PROCESS TT ... FURNITURE & PS ..... ..... .. EQUIPMENT FACTORY/DELIVERY TT..... === =++ *+++++ TECHNICAL Fellowship ..... ..... .... ASSISTANCE Experts ..... ..... PROJECT ADMINISTRATION ......... ..OriginaL Activities as Planned in SAR. PS: Primary Schools ======== Actual Main Activities TT: Teacher Training College +++++++++ Actual Minor Activities  - 36 - ANNEX II Evolution of the Exchange Rate At Appraisal 04-1982 US$ 1 - DH 5.30 Period Average 1981 US$ 1 - DH 5.12 1982 US$ 1 - DH 5.98 1983 US$ 1 - DH 7.11 1984 US$ 1 - DH 8.79 1985 US$ 1 - DH 9.96 1986 US$ 1 - DH 9.08 1987 US$ 1 - DH 8.32 1988 US$ 1 - DH 8.16 1989 US$ 1 - DH 8.50