China - Three Ports Project

Dooum "'i , rt N.Fif FOR OFFICIAl Report No. 9695 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THREE PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 2207-CHA) JUNE 10, 1991 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Currency Units - Yuan (Y) Year Exchange Rates 1981 (Appraisal Year) US$1 - Y1.75 1982 Y1.92 1983 Y1.98 1984 Y2.42 1985 Y2.97 1986 Y3.46 1987 Y3.72 1988 (Completion Year) Y3.72 ABBREVIATIONS CNMIED - Shanghai Manufacturing Plant CPS - Central Projects Staff (World Bank) CTRI - Comprehensive Transport Research Institute (of the State Economic Commission) ERR - Economic Rate of Return ICB - International Competitive Bidding MOC - Ministry of Communications MOR - Ministry of Railways OED - Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank) PAS - Project Advisory Staff (World Bank) PCR - Project Completion Report PPAR - Project Performance Audit Report PR - President's Report SAR - Staff Appraisal Report TOR - Terms of Reference FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 THE WORLD BANK FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Offce of Director-Geneal Operatians Ivakatman June 10, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on China Three Porte Project (Loan 2207-CHA) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report on China Three Ports Project (Loan 2207-CHA)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THREE PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 2207-CHA) TABLE OF Page No. Preface .................................................. Basic Data Sheet ........................................... 111 Evaluation Summary ........................................ vii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT I. BACKGROUND ......................................... 1 Genesis of the Project ............................. 1 Project Preparation, Appraisal and Negotiations .... 1 Board Presentation ................................. 3 II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ............................. 4 Construction of Terminals........................... 4 Procurement of Equipment ........................... 4 Training ........................................... 5 Studies and PCR .................................... 5 Supervision Missions ............................... 8 Table I Supervision Missions ............................... 9 III. RESULTS ............................................ 10 Container and Coal Terminals ....................... 10 Long Term Port Strategy ............................ 11 Studies and PCR .................................... 12 IV. FINDINGS AND ISSUFi ............................... 12 Overall Assessment ................................. 12 Sustainability ..................................... 13 Lessons Learned .................................... 13 Recommendations .................................... 14 ANgg A Chronology on Equipment Procurement from the Bank's Files ...................................... 17 1. IBRD Map No. 15512R3, China Railways, Ports and Airports 2. IBRD Map No. 15813R, Tianjin Container Terminal 3. IBRD Map No. 15815R, Shanghai Container Terminal 4. IBRD Map No. 15845R, Huangpu Port, Container Terminal 5. IBRD Map No. 15817R, Huangpu Port, Coal Terminal This document has a restricted distribution and may be; used by recipients only in th! performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THREE PORTS PROJECT (.......JLOAN 207- CH4) PRFACE 1. This is the Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) of the Three Ports Project, involving a Bank loan in the amount of US$124 million to the People's Republic of China with the objective to meet the short-term traffic requirements of the three most important ports in China (Tianjin, Shanghai and Huangpu) while government evolved a long-term strategy for meeting the country's requirements for port facilities through the remainder of the century. The loan was approved on November 2, 1982, and became effective on February 2, 1983. The closing date of June 30, 1987 was extended to June 30, 1988. Final disbursement was made on March 23, 1989. The balance of the loan, US$56 million, was cancelled in two stages: US$55 million in 1984 and US$1 million in 1989. 2. The PPAR is based on the Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Asia Regional Office and issued in 1989,1/ the President's Report, the loan documents, the transcript of the Executive Director's meeting at which the project was considered, a study of the Bank's files, and discussions with Bank staff. An OED mission visited China in July/August 1990, and discussed the effectiveness of the Bank's assistance with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Communications (MOC), and the three ports. Thei: kind cooperation and valuable assistance in the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged. 3. Tha PCR provides a detailed account and assessment of the project experience and discusses the performance of the Bank and the three ports. This Audit Report supplements the PCR and highlights aspects such as the Bank's dialogue with the borrower, the Bank's supervision effort, and the issues of procurement and performance of the Chinese equipment financed by the Bank under the project. Based on its review of the project experience this audit offers three recommendations for consideration and possible follow-up. 4. Following standard OED procedures, copies of the d:aft PPAR were sent, for comment, to the Government and the three ports. MOC and MOF expressed their full agreement with the PPAR and indicated that they had nothing to add. 1/ Project Completion Report, People's Republic of China - Three Ports Project (Loan 2207-CHA), Report No. 8085, October 6, 1989. - ift - PROJECT PEP1=Q3C AUDIT REMOR CHINA THREE PORTS PROJECT (WAN 2207-CHA) BASIC DATA SHEET Appraisal Actual or SAAEpAAtion Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 427.4 266.15 La Total Project Cost (Y million) 748.2 651.74 Cost Underrun (%) in US$ terms - 37.70 Cost Underrun (%) in Yuan terms 12.80 Loan Amount (US$ Aillion) 124.0 67.97 1n Disbursed as of March 23, 1989 124.0 67.97 LA Cancelled - 56.03 /a Repaid 67.94 Outstanding as o- November 30, 1990 .03 Project Completion Date 12/31/86 12/31/88 Proportion Completed by Above Date 96 100 Overall Economic Rate of Return (%) 29 Zh 34 /q Financial Performance Good Institutional Performance Good CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (US$ million) F'84 Z'M.1 rY8 3123/89 Appraisal Estimate 24.50 60.50 105.00 124.00 124.00 124.00 Appraisal as Revised LA 13.40 33.19 57.82 67.97 67.97 67.97 Actual 3.50 21.80 48.00 60.50 67.20 67.97 Actual as % of Revised Appraisal 25.7 64.9 81.8 87.7 97.4 100.0 ,& Lower project cost is due to very low prices for equipment procured under ICB. Consequently US$55.0 million equivalent were cancelled on May 10, 1984 at Government request thus reducing the loan to US$69.0 million equivalent. An additional US$1.03 million equivalent were cancelled on October 27, 1987. k Tianjin: 21%; Shanghai: 23%; Huangpu: 39% La Tianjin: 24%; Shanghai: 48%; Huangpu: 37% * -V - STAFF INPUT (staff weeks) EM8 E.= 8M HSA 18 .IA E12 EQTAL Preappraisal 25 - - - - - - - - 25 Appraisal - 65 - - - - - 65 Negotiation - 32 - - - - - - - 32 Supervision - - 32 15 15 15 10 2 22 l1 Subtotal 2. 2z 22 12 21 1Q 2 Zg lZ MISSION RA LA No. of Mission , Staff Zd Ll Type of It=m do-Zlea Persons Coposiri2n Weks /_ Rating Jgn Problem J Preparation 10/80 3 E,F,P 4.0 Preappraisal 03/81 3 E,F,P 4.5 Appraisal 07/81 3 E,F,P 3.5 Supervision 1 11/82 2 E,P 1.5 Supervision 2 03/83 4 E,F,P,O 1.5 2 1 M'O Supervision 3 11/83 3 F,P,0 1.5 1 1 - Supervision 4 11/84 2 F,P 3.0 1 2 - Supervision 5 10/85 3 E,F,P 2.5 1 1 - Supervision 6 11/86 2 F,P 2.5 1 1 - Comfletion 01/89 2 E,P 3.5 L& Excludes brief visits for which supervision reports were not prepared. L E - Transport Economist; F - Financial Analyst; P - Port Engineer; and 0 - Port Operations Specialist Lc_ Adjusted to reflect time spent on this project; most missions involved work on other projects. 41 - problem free or minor problems, 2 - moderate problems, 3 - major problems. /e I - improving, 2 - stationary, 3 - deteriorating ,f M - managerial, 0 - others -V PROJECT DATES U Diginal Plan Actua1 First Mention in Files 6/80 Government Application Negotiations 1/82 2-9/82 Board Approval 2/82 11/2/S2 Loan Agreement Date 3/82 11/16/82 Effectiveness Date 2/16/83 2/2/83 Closing Date 6/30/87 6/30/88 OTHER EROJECT DATA Borrower The People's Republic of China Executing Agency Ministry of Communications Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 FOLIW-ON PROJECTS Loan/Credit Amount Date of Project Number (maillion) Arement Tianjin Port L2689-CHA US$130.0 10/16/86 Huangpu Port L2877-CHA/ US$63.0 & C1845-CHA SDR 19.8 6/22/88 Dalian Por- L2907-CHA/ US$71.0 & C1875-CHA SDR 18.2 7/15/88 Ningbo and Shanghai Ports L3006-CHA US$76.4 2/13/89 Xiamen Port L3007-CHA US$36.0 9/8/89 - vii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THREE PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 2207-0HA) EVALUATION SUMR 1. Iatroduction remainder of the century" (para. 12). . The Three Ports project was the In addition, during Board Bank's first transport lending presentation a third objective was operation in the People's Republic of indicated: to establish a dialogue China. with the borrower on the basis of three studies included in the project Its primary aim was to create (para. 19). additional port capacity to avoid congestion. Total project cost was 3. Implementation Experience estimated at US$427 million to be financed by the World Bank (US$124 Construction of four terminals. million, for equipment) and the (three for containers and one for borrower (the remainder, for civil coal). This was financed by the works and training). government and the work was done Othe ais o theproect as competently and on time (para. 20). Other aims of the project, as stated in the Staff Appraisal Report EquiRwnt for the four and by staff during Board terminals. This was financed by the presentation, were that during Bank and procured in accordance with project implementation (i) the the Bank's Procurement Guidelines for government would evolve a long-term International Competitive Bidding national port strategy, and (ii) the (para. 21). Procurement took place Bank would develop a "strategic on schedule and at prices some 60% dialogue" with the borrower on the below the appraisal estimates. From basis of three studies included in the savings additional port equipment the project. was procured while part of the loan was canceled (para. 28). The World Bank loan was signed in November 1982 and the account was The Bank was aware of quality * closed June 30, 1988, a year behind control problems and formulated schedule. specific safeguards against any unwarranted contract award to Chinese * 2. Objectives suppliers (Annex 1). When the borrower in his bid evaluation The objectives of te project recommended procurement of equipment were "to meet short-term traffic from three local manufacturers and requirements in the three most strongly pressed for it, the Bank important ports of China (Tianjin, acquiesced, setting aside the Shanghai, Huangpu) while government safeguards it had formulated before. evolved a long-term strategy for The locally-made equipment indeed meeting the country's requirements turned out to be of inferior quality for port facilities through the (para. 70). - viLi - - Training. This was financed by the project is estimated at 34% as the government and was well compared with 29% at appraisal. The implemented (para. 29). financial outcome of the project is also good, and better than - Three studies and PCR anticipated at appraisal (para. 60). gregaratio. Only one study, (on containerization), was completed. The government did not "evolve The Bank, very effectively, organized a long-term strategy for meeting the a study tour in reparation of the country's requirements for port study (para. 37). But the Bank's facilities through the remainder of subsequent supervision efforts with the century" (para. 61) though work respect to the preparation and has been initiated subsequently. follow-up of the study, were Preparation by the borrower of the inadequate (paras. 38-42). The three studies and the PCR was second study, (on operating costs), disappointing (in the case of the was postponed to a follow-up project. containerization study, paras. 63 and The Bank's supervision effort related 64), or did not take place (in the to this study was inadequate (paras. other three cases, paras. 65-67). 43-47). The third, (the economic impact study), is not referred to 5. Sustainability either in the Bank's files covering the implementation period of the Given the good operating and project, or in the PCR. The audit maintenance performance of the three understands, from MOC, that no impact ports, their sound economic and study was submitted to the Bank financial condition, as well as the (para. 48). Finally, though the expected continued growth of traffic, borrower was expected to prepare the this audit believes that the project PCR, it was eventually done by the is fully sustainable (para. 74). Bank with the assistance of a consultant (paras. 49 and 50). 6. Findings. Lessons and Recommendations - Supervision missions. During project implementation the Bank sent This audit's principal six project supervision missions to findings are: China. Both frequency, once a year, and staff continuity, were low - The short-term and principal (paras. 51-55). objective of the proloct, to create additional port capacizy and prevent 4. ResUlts port congestion, was accomplished fully and on time. Both from an The implementation of the economic and financial perspective, container and coal terminals - except the project was a success (para. 68). for the procurement of the Chinese container handling equipment - was - In spite of an unambiguous done competently, without major decision on vquipment procurement problems, and on time. Upon not to award equipment contracts to construction completion, as usual, Chinese manufacturers (para. 22) - some minor problems surfaced but they which was taken following the Bank's have been addressed (paras. 56 and standard decision making procedures - 57). Operation and maintenance of the Bank subsequently approved the the terminals is efficient (para. award of contracts to three Chinese 58). The economic rate of return of manufacturers (para. 24 and Annex 1). - ix - As a result of that approval, a (a) That the Bank xeview and substantial part of the container compare in detail, if possible in handling equipment procured under the close collaboration with MOC, the project is of inferior quality (para. performance experience of all Chinese 25). The atuit feels that the Bank's and foreign container handling decision to approve these contract equipment procured under the Three awards was not in the best interest Ports project; of the borrower (para. 71) or of the Bank (para. 72). (b) that recommendations be formulated regarding procurement - Long term objectives - to procedures f,r Chinese-made equipment create a port strategy to the year under ongoing and future Bank 2000 (para. 12) and develop a projects, as well as specific strategic dialogue between the Bank suggestions as to how the performance and the borrower (para. 19) - were of Chinese equipment manufacturers not achieved. The government did not could be improved in the future, develop a satisfactory long-term port possibly with assistance from the strategy and the Bank failed to use Bank; and the opportunities offered by the three studies, or the PCR, to (c) that a concise report be cultivate a substantive dialogue prepared on the foregoing, which (para. 73). Audit understands, would serve as a basis for an however, that an initiative to exchange of vi%ws between the Bank develop a long term port strategy is and the appropriate Chinese underway. Ministries and agencies, and possible further follow-up. Principal lessons are: - The Bank should have taken a Recommendatiga_Z: On Project consistent position on contract award Supervision and Dialogue with the involving Chinese container handling Borrower (para. 78) equipment. It had anticipated problems, formulated adequate That steps be taken to strengthen safeguards, and should have followed supervision processes and procedures through (para. 75(i)). (for example, supervision frequency, continuity and skills mix of staff - Bank supervision should have involved, mission preparation and devoted more and systematic attention reporting), taking into account the * to the three studies and the PCR. relative priority of the supervision This audit feels that the Bank's effort vis & vis other tasks to be supervision was inadequate in this accomplished and the objective of . respect and as a result missed the making the supervision effort more opportunity to develop a better effective in particul.r with respect dialogue with the borrower (para. to the development of L serious 75(11)). dialogue with the borrower (see also paras. 79 and 80). The audit offers three recommendations. Recommendation 3: On Further Strengthening the Computer Operations Recommendation 1:On Procurement and of the Three Ports (para. 81) Performance of Chinese Equipment (para. 77) That each of the three ports arrange In addition to the transfer of a visit of, say, three months by, knowledge, experience and ideas, say, two key computer operators from relevant computer software from the selected foreign ports to work side foreign ports involved by aide with their Chinese appropriately adjusted - could be counterpartI. transferred as wella d o strengthen the present software capability of the three ports (para. 82; see also para.83). PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT CHINA THREE PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 2207-CHA.) I.BAKL Genesis of the Project 1. In 1980, the People's Republic of China became a Memtir Country of the World Bank. In July of the same year, during a visit of the Bank's Regional Vice President to China, it was agreed that the Bank would send a mission to rhina to prepare a project focussing on the three main ports: rianjin, Shanghai and Huangpu (see map). This was to be the Bank's first project in the transport sector. groiect Preparation. Appraisal and Negotiations 2. The project preparation mission visited China for four weeks in October 1980. This was followed, in 1981, by a preappraisal (March), an appraisal (July), and a post appraisal mission (November). 3. The draft Staff Appraisal Report (SAR; green cover draft), one of the principal documents for the subsequent negotiations with the borrower, was completed the following month (December 11, 1981). 4. The draft SAR indicated that the objective of the project was "to meet short term traffic requirements in the three most important ports of China while government evolves a long-term strategy for meeting the country's requirements for port facilities through the remainder of the century." 5. The project included a) construction of and equipment for a container terminal in each of the three ports and a coal terminal in Huangpu; b) training of operating staff of these four terminals; and c) three studies: (i) long term master plans for each of the three ports, (ii) a containerization study to complement the port master plans, focussing on the complementary efforts required to arrive at a balanced hinterland development and accommodation of container traffic (rail, road, and container freight stations, inter alia) in sync with the future development of the three ports, and (iii) estuary studies for the three ports. 6. The total cost of the project was estimated at US$441 million. The World Bank was to finance the foreign exchange component of the equipment for the terminals, some US$135 million (31%); the Chinese government was to finance the rest. - 2 - 7. Protracted negotiations took place during 1982, starting with a prenegotiation mission to Beijing in February and followed by negotiations in Washington in March. The Chinese team, after inconclusive discussions with the Bank, returned to Beijing for consultations. 8. Following subsequent high level discussions in Beijing between China and the Bank, a team from the Bank visited Beijing in May to continue negotiations but concluded that it had been unable to make sufficient progress in the discussions to resume formal negotiations ["...36 working days have now been spent on negotiations..."]. 9. In July further high level negotiations took place in Beijing and agreement was reached on the main sticking points, as follows: tho port master plan and the estuarial studies were removed from the project and the Bank's future access to information on the three ports would be sharply curtailed. These discussions were followed by an exchange of telexes with redrafts of the loan documents and more discussions by Bank staff in Beijing. 10. Finally, in September, a Chinese negotiation team visited Washington, agreement was quickly reached, and negotiations were completed on September 11, 1982, seven months after they had started. 11. During negotiations the Bank modified its initial position as outlined in the draft SAR - gradually in the beginning and more precipitously toward the end - and, as a result, agreement was reached. The audit believes that important factors contributing to the Bank's change in position were borrower persistence during negotiations, in combination with the Bank's desire to break the deadlock and thereby the transport project logjam.1 12. The revised and final SAR, reflecting the agreements reached during negotiations, was issued on October 14, 1982. The project objective remained the same as in the pre-negotiation draft (see para. 4 above): "to meet short term traffic requirements in the three most important ports of China while government evolves a long-term strategy for meeting the country's requirements for port facilities through the remainder of the century". 13. Project description underwent some changes. The project now included a) the three container plus one coal terminal (construction and equipment), as before, b) training of operating staff for these terminals, as before, and c) three studies: (i) the contrinerization study, as before, (ii) an economic impact study, a new study agreed upon during negotiation, and (iii) an operating cost study, also a new 1/ At the time, five transport projects were under consideration by the Bank. -3- study. The undertaking of the port master plan for the three ports and the estuarial studies (see para. 5 above) were dropped from the project. 14. It was also agreed during negotiations that the financial and operational information to be provided by the borrower during project implementation would be limited to the four terminals. The Bank, in line with normal practice, had expected to receive information covering the entire ports, not just the few berths for which it assisted in financing the equipment. The Government indicated that for the appraisal of the project it had given the Bank access to information about the operations and finance of the whole of the three ports but that because of internal political developments it could not continue to give the Bank such broad access to information about matters not directly related to project investments. In this context the Government explained that they were not trying to keep the Bank uneducated about their problems or plans or how their system worked and that they valued the Bank's growing understanding and the relevance of the Bank's technical and economic advice. 15. The updated total cost of the projeml was estimated at US$427 million of which the Bank would finance US$124 million (29%), the foreign exchange component of the equipment, and the Chinese government the remainder. 16. During negotiation it became clear that the borrower had a rather narrow perception of what the Bank's role should be: As a source of finance for specific projects components and of advice on project related - mostly technical - aspects. 17. On the other hand, the Bank, in this context, emphasized that - as a development institution - it had a broader role to play. That it was also concerned with the broader and longer term sectoral policies and development and that it would like to engage the borrower in a constructive dialogue of these aspects. Board Presentation 18. When the project was proposed to the Board (November 2, 1982), the Board observed that this project might be viewed as buying time through "debottlenecking investments" in some of the more congested ports. It stressed, however, that this time be used to develop a more comprehensive port strategy. 19. The staff observed that the objective of this first project had been to establish a dialogue and that inclusion in the project of the following three studies indicated that a basis for developing such a dialogue had been laid: (i) the containerization study; (ii) the operating cost study; and (iii) the economic impact study - this in addition to the normal Project Completion Report (PCR) - to be undertaken in the first and fourth year after project completion. -4 Construction of Terminals 20. Construction under the project was financed by the government. Implementation of all civil works was done competently and on time. Procurement of Eauipment 21. Equipment under the project was financed by the World Bank. Procurement took place in accordance with the Bank's procurement guidelines for International Competitive Bidding (ICB). 22. During project appraisal the Bank mission had concluded that Chinese equipment manufacturers did not have appropriate management expertise or quality control. The mission recommended that Chinese manufacturers not be permitted to be the main supplier but that as sub-contractors, under direction of a foreign manufacturer, they could undertake some of the manufacture and execution of plant. This recommendation was included in the mission's Issues Paper, accepted in the Decision Meeting which discussed the Issues Paper, and cleared with the Bank's Central Projects Staff (CPS). 23. In addition, the Bank's first (November 1982) and second (March 1983) supervision mission both recommended that if the Shanghai Manufacturing Plant (CNMIED Shanghai) were to be nominated for Awed of an equipment contract the Bank ought to send an expert to look at their plant and production techniques to make sure they could perform. 24. However, when a Chinese delegation visited Washington in August/September 1983 to discuss their bid evaluation report on the port equipment, and to exert strong pressure in favor of the award of certain contracts to Chinese manufacturers, the Bank ignored the appraisal mission recommendation and waived the recommendation of the first and second supervision mission. The Bank agreed to the award of contracts totalling US$31 million for container handling equipment, of which US$10 million to three Chinese manufacturers, including the Shanghai Manufacturing Plant. See Annex 1 for a chronology of the events. 25. How did the Chinese equipment perform? The managers of the three ports reported that the container cranes, the transtainers, and the forklifts - accounting for some 90% of the US$10 million awarded to Chinese manufacturers - proved to be inferior to those procured from abroad (PCR, para. 7.3). -5- 26. How did Shanghai Manufacturing compare with the foreign competition? This may be answered as follows. Following the award, in September 19PI, of the US$31 million in contracts for container handling equipment, the port of Shanghai received, inter alia, four quay container cranes - two from Japan and two from Shanghai Manufacturing - costing about US$1.3 million each, plus nine transtainers (rubber-tired container movers) - six from Japan and three from Shanghai Manufacturing - costing about US$.5 million each. 27. The Japanese equipment performed well but the Chinese did not. The two Chinese quay cranes, at the time of the audit's visit to Shanghai, in spite of serious efforts by the port and the manufacturer to get them to function properly, had been idle for a long period of time. As for the three Chinese transtainers, they were only used during day light and with a utilization of 100 hours per transtainer-month compared with 260 hours per transtainer-month for the Japanese equipment, 28. Procurement of the equipment under the project took place on schedule and at prices some 60% below the appraisal estimates. From the resulting savings additional port equipment was procured wnile part of the Bank's loan was cancelled (see PCR, para. 3.3 for further details). Training 29. Training under the project was financed by the government. Training was well done and focussed on the technical and operational staff of the ports. The audit agrees with the PCR that in future projects the focus be broadened to include financial managers and economic planners as well (PCR, para. 3.6). 30. As to the computer operators, they were trained in Japan and their training was completed by the end of 1986. The audit feels that their experience and the computer operations of the three ports may be further strengthened if the ports were to arrange visits of, say, three months to each of the ports by, say, two key computer operators from selected foreign ports to work side by side with their Chinese a counterparts. 31. In addition to the transfer of knowledge, experience and ideas through direct day-to-day personal interaction between the foreign and local operators, relevant computer software from the foreign ports involved - appropriately adjusted to suit the specific local conditions and requirements - could also be transferred to further strengthen the present software capability of the three ports. Studies and PCR 32. Under the project the Borrower had agreed to carry out three studies and prepare a PCR. -6- 33. (M) Containerization Study. To reap the full benefits from the container facilities at the three ports, the Comprehensive Transport Research Institute of the State Economic Commission (CTRI) would carry out a study of the complementary facilities and arrangements needed to handle the inland flow of containerized cargo transported to and from the three ports. CTRI was to prepare draft Terms of Reference (TOR) for the study and discus them with the Bank before it would begin the study. CTRI would also, from time to time, exchange views with the Bank on the progress and findings of the study. The study was to be completed by the end of 1984. 34. The Bank's first supervision mission, which visited China for seven days in November/December 1982, exchanged views with CTRI on the scope and content of the study and CTRI outlined the main tasks to be carried out. 35. The following month CTRI sent the Bank the draft TOR for the study (three pages, double-spaced), for comment. The Bank files do not indicate that these TOR were subsequently reviewed by the Bank, discussed with CTRI, or revised by CTRI. 36. The Bank's second supervision mission, which visited China for four days in May 1983, did not have discussions with officials from CTRI according to the "list of officials met" by the mission. In its Back-to-Office report the mission did report that CTRI, upon completion of their study tour to a few foreign ports, would want to exchange views with the Bank on the details of its study program. 37. The Bank, at the request of CTRI, very effectively organized a six-week study tour in August/September 1983 for eight Chinese officials: four from CTRI and four from the Ministry of Railways and the Institutes of Water and Road Transport of MOC, to Germany and the Philippines, to study containerization issues. 38. The Bank's third supervision mission, which visited China for three days in October 1983, did not meet with anyone from CTRI according to the list of officials met in the mission's Back-to-Office report. The Bank's economist, who had handled the study thus far and who had been on the previous two supervision missions, did not participate in the third supervision mission. Nor did subsequent supervision missions have an economist on board. 39. The Bank's fourth supervision mission, consisting of one Bank staff (financial analyst) and one consultant (engineer), both new to the project, visited China for 13 days in November 1984, more than a year after the preceding mission. According to the list of officials met in their Back-to-Office report, the mission did not meet with officials from CTRI. The mission did report, however, that CTRI would complete their draft report by the scheduled date of December 31, 1984. It would then be reviewed by MOC, MOR and local port authorities before being sent to the Bank. CTRI also would like to -7- discuss the report with the Bank at an appropriate time and discuss how to implement its recommendations. 40. In March 1985 the Bank received the container study. The study, covering the hinterland of each of the three ports, in translation, counted 60 pages, double-spaced. The covering letter indicated that the study was "... an exploratory attempt and inevitably inadequate in certain areas". The draft SAR, in 1981, had estimated the cost of the study at over US$2.0 million. 41. The TOR of the Bank's fifth supervision mission of October 1985, did not refer to the containerization study and the mission did not meet with staff from CTRI. Also, the Back-to-Office report does not refer to the study. 42. The TOR of the Bank's sixth and last supervision mission, of November 1986, did instruct the mission to pay particular attention to, inter alia, the implementation of the containerization study completed by CTRI. But the mission's Back-to-Office report, Aide Mdmoire, and letter to the Borrower upon completion of the mission, make no reference to the topic. Nor did the mission meet with anyone from CTRI according to the list of officials met by the mission. /- 43. (ii) Oterating Cost Study. The borrower had agreed to carry out a study of the annual operating costs incurred by each of the project Cargo Handling Corporations (CHC) during at least the first full year of operation of their facilities constructed under the project and exchange views with the Bank on the terms of reference and findings of each such study. 2 44. The purpose of this exercise was to generate the unit cost information of individual port services necessary to establish cost- based tariffs as no costing system was in existence.3 Cost-based tariffs were considered particularly important as their introduction - through the price mechanism - would help improve the intermodal coordination which was weak as planning was weak and fragmented.4 45. In October 1985 the Bank's fifth supervision mission visited China for 12 days. The terms of reference of the mission specifically 2/ Loan Agreement, Section 4.06; Staff Appraisal Report, paras. 5.12 and 6.01(d). 1/ Staff Appraisal Report, paras. 2.46 and 2.47. _k/ World Bank, China. Socialist Economic Develooment, Volume II, Annex F, Transport Sector, June 1, 1981, paras. 57 to 60. ±/ The Region observes that discussion of the study's results was carried out during the preparation of subsequent projects. - 8 - stated that it should review the arrangements being made for the operating cost study. The mission's Aide Mdmoire, Back-to-Office report, and follow-up letter to MOC, are silent on the topic. 46. One year later, in November 1986, the Bank's sixth supervision mission, consisting of two consultants, noted that the terms of reference for the operating cost study had not been prepared. The project CHCs said that they had not been aware of this requirement. The mission requested MOC to prepare and transmit to the Bank the terms of reference for the study within the first quarter of 1987. The Bank's telex announcing the mission and requesting approval from the borrower had not indicated any specific items the mission wanted to discuss or have prepared in advance. 47. There were no further supervision missions of the project and for more than a year the project files do not mention the operating cost study until January 1988 when MOC telexed the Bank requesting it to prepare and telex draft TOR for the operating cost study. In reply the Bank sent the draft TOR in a one-page telex. A further exchange of telexes followed. After further delays the operating cost study was included in the subsequent Ningbo and Shanghai Ports Project (Loan 3006-CHA) which became effective in May 1989. 48. (iii) Economic Impact Study. This study was to have been undertaken in the first and fourth year after completion of the project.5 The TOR and Back-to-Office reports of the fifth and sixth (last) supervision mission which took place at the end of 1985 and 1986, do not mention the economic impact study. More generally, the Fank's files covering the implementation period of the project, do not make mention of the study. Nor does the PCR. The audit understands, from MOC, that one of the three ports unsuccessfully tried its hand at the study and that no impact study was submitted to the Bank. L* 49. (iv) Preparation of PCR. The last (sixth) supervision mission, of November 1986, reported that the mission had explained and outlined the format and contents oi a PCR and that each of the ports would prepare a report by mid-1987 under the supervision of MOC. The Bank would receive the final report in August 1987. 50. This report was not forthcoming. In January 1989 the Bank sent a project completion mission to China which prepared the PCR. Supervision Hissions 51. Table 1 provides some detail on the Bank's project supervision missions. In total six missions took place from November 1982 through November 1986. Average mission size: 2.7 persons. 2/ SAR, para. 3.14 plus side letter No.5 to the Loan Agreement. 8/ The Region observes that this study was no longer needed in light of the work done during the preparation of subsequent projects at the same ports. TABLE I SUPERVISION MISSIONS Interval Between Missions /1 Mission Staffing 12 Port Mission Mission Mission Port Operations Financial Support Number Timini Duration Planned Actual Difference Stenpth Economist Engineers Specialists Analysts Staff (molyr) (days) (monthe) (persons) L2 ft l ii ia ii n a L A 1. 11/82 7 - - - 2 x - - - - - - - - - 2. 03183 4 - 4 - 4 1 -- * * - - - - - 3. 11183 3 6 8 +2 1 - 1 - - - X* 1 - - - 4. 11184 13 6 12 +6 2 - - X* - - - - - 5. 10185 12 6 11 +5 3 - - - X* - - - - - I 6. 11/86 24 6 13 +7 2 - - - K* - - - - - 1* - 11 In April 1983 the Bank informed the borrower that in keeping with Bank practice supervision missions would be sent twice a year to review project progress with the borrower. Subsequent Back-to-Office reports of supervision missions also recommended an interval of six months between missions. The coeresponding (average) actual interval was 11 months. 12 * refers to consultant. - 10 - 52. Freauenc oL Mission. Though the intended and recommended frequency of missions was twice a year, (see Table 1, first footnote), except for 1983, one mission per year took place. 53. LZrngth of Missions. This varied considerably. The first three missions lasted some five days on average; the last three took more than three times as much. This may have had something to do with the fact that on the first three missions one or two key miscion members (economist and engineer) were Bank staff intimately familiar with the project through their previous involvement in the preparation, appraisal and negotiation of the project. 54. The last three missions were staffed by a consultant in the key position (port engineer) supported by financial analysts, all of them without previous involvement in the project. 55. Staff Continuty on Missions. On the first two missions, the economist and engineer both had been intimately involved in the project before. From then on continuity deteriorated rapidly as the Bank's emphasis and staff resources shifted towards preparation of follow-up projects: no longer an economist on any mission thereafter, only one more mission with the original engineer while subsequent missions were staffed with two different engineers (consultants). Similarly, four different financial analysts were used in the last five missions. The last supervision mission (24 days) was staffed by two consultants. III. ESULTS Container and Coal Terminals 56. Berths were competently constructed, as designed, without major problems, without delays, and at about 90% of the costs originally envisaged. As usual, upon completion, minor unanticipated shortcomings surfaced. For example, the coal terminal's storage capacity in practice turned out to be somewhat lower than designed. Similarly, berthing space for barges was not accounted for in the design of one of the terminals, causing some inconvenience. Both shortcomings, however, are minor and have been addressed. 57. Equipment was procured on schedule at prices considerably below the appraisal estimates. From the resulting savings some additional equipment was procured while part of the Bank's loan was cancelled.6 The equipment made in China proved to be inferior to that procured from abroad (paras. 21-28). j/ For further details, see PCR, para. 3.3. - 11 - 58. Operation and maintenance of the terminals is efficient. With further gradual improvements in operation the throughput of the terminals could be further increased beyond the original design capacity. 59. The proJect responded well to the primary objective of meeting the short-term traffic requirements in China's three most important ports (para. 12). The necessary additional capacity was efficiently created through investment in infrastructure and equipment and through training of staff. 60. The PCR estimates the economic rate of return (ERR) of the projects in each of the ports as follows 7 (in parenthesis the ERR estimated at appraisal): (%) Tianjin 24 (21) Shanghai 48 (23) Huangpu 37 (39) overall 34 (29) This audit concurs with the orders of magnitude involved. Similarly, the financial outcome of the project was good, and better than anticipated at appraisal.8 Long Term Port Stratey 61. As to the government evolving a long-term strategy for meeting the country's requirements for port facilities through the remainder of the century (para. 12), this was not accomplished. For example, an international panel of experts, assessing the current status of the master planning process of the port of Shanghai, recently (March 1990) concluded that "the information in the master plan of the port of Shanghai does not advance the planning process sufficiently to constitute a satisfactory Master Plan". ,/ Z/ PCR, pages 18 to 22 and Tables 5.1 to 5.3. IV PCR, Annex 3 and Tables 6.1 to 6.8. 1 The Region observes that a long-term national port strategy was not part of the project description, it was left in the description of project objectives to keep the door open for a continued dialogue on the subject. The strategy, in broad terms, was discussed in preparation of the five port projects that followed, and some major studies are under implementation at the moment (1991). - 12 - Studies and PCR 62. Preparation by the borrower of the three studies and the PCR, as agreed under the project (paras. 19, 32 to 50), was disappointing or did not take place. 63. Containerization Study. The Bank did a jood job in arranging the container study tour (para. 37) and the containerization study was undertaken on schedule. However, the Bank's itteraction with the borrower on the TOR, during preparation of the stud, and in the review and follow-up of the study, was inadequate (paras. 33-42). 64. The study was the first of its kind in China and was "exploratory (para. 40). It lacked sufficient detail and depth and without a follow-up phase II, providing considerable additional information and analysis, the audit feels that its significance was negligible. 65. Operating Cost Study. This study offered the Bank an opportunity to develop a serious dialogue, but the opportunity was missed and the study was not undertaken under the project (paras. 43- 47). 66. Economic Impact Study. The same (see previous para.) applies to this study. Neither the Bank's files, covering the project's implementation period, nor the PCR, make reference to this study (para. 48). 67. PCR. Here too the Bank missed an opportunity to engage the borrower in a dialogue. The Bank, rather than preparing the PCR for the borrower (para. 50) with the assistance of a consultant, should, with its own staff, have advised and assisted the borrower in his preparation of the PCR. IV. FINDINGS AND ISIUES Overall Assessment 68. The short term and Rrincipal objective of the project - to create additional port capacity and prevent port congestion - was accomplished fully and on time. Both from an economic and financial perspective, the project was a success. 69. As to the procurement of equipment under the project, a substantial part of the Bank-financed container handling equipment is of inferior quality. 70. Though the Bank was well aware of the quality control problems of Chinese manufacturers and had formulated specific safeguards against an unwarrarted award of contracts to Chinese suppliers, when the borrower in his bid evaluation recommended - 13 - procurement of equipment from three local manufacturers and strongly pressed for it, the Bank approved the borrower's recommendation setting aside the safeguards it had formulated before. Not surprisingly, the locally made equipment did indeed turn out to be of inferior quality compared with foreign equipment procured under the project. 71. From the borrower's perspective, to ensure equipment orders for his own indu.-try may seem an obvious and logical objective and clearly in the national interest. And it normally is. But in the case of substandard quality equipment, it is not. This because the subsequent direct and indirect costs plus benefits foregone caused by the substandard or non-performance of the equipment, very likely outweigh by far such benefits as the equipment industry may have reaped. 72. As to the Bank's role in the procurement process, the Bank's excessive flexibilit- might well be perceived as pandering to the borrower's wishes and jeopardizes the Bank's prime asset: its reputation for sound, imparttal and professional judgement and integrity. And this, in turn, would send the wrong signals to the Bank's owxi staff and to the outside world. 73. Long Term Obiectives - to create a port strategy to the year 2000 (para. 12) and develop a strategic dialogue between the Bank and the borrower (para. 19) - were not realized. The government did not develop a satisfactory long-term port strategy (para. 61) and the Bank failed to use the opportunities offered by the three studies included under the project (paras. 63-66), or the preparation of the PCR (para. 67), to develop a serious dialogue with the borrower. Sustainability 74. Given the good operating and maintenance performance of the three ports, their sound economic and financial condition, as well as the expected continued growth of traffic, this audit believes that the project is fully sustainable. Lessons Learned 75. The primary lessons learned from the project experience are: (i) The Bank should have taken a consistent position on contract award involving Chinese container handling equipment. It had anticipated the issue, formulated adequate safeguards, and should have followed throuph. (ii) The Bank, in its supervision effort, should have devoted systematic attention to the three studies and the PCR and should have devoted sufficient - 14 - ataff resources to assist the borrower in their preparation and follow-up. This audit feels that the Bank's supervision was inadequate in this respect and as a result missed the opportunity to develop the dialogue with the borrever referred to during Board presentation of the project in 1982. Recommendations 76. Flowing from the project experience this audit offers three recommendations. 77. Recommendation 1: On Procurement and Performance of Chinese Equipment (a) That the Bank review and compare in detail, if possible in close collaboration with MOC, the performance experience 9 of all Chinese and foreign container handling equipment procured under the Three Ports project; (b) that recommendations be formulated regarding procurement procedures for Chinese-made equipment under ongoing and future Bank projects, as well as specific suggestions as to how the performance of Chinese equipment manufacturers could be improved in the future, possibly with assistance from the Bank; and (c; that a concise report be prepared on the foregoing which would serve as a basis for an exchange of views between the Bank and the appropriate Chinese Ministr4es and agencies, and possible further follow- 0. 78. Recommendation_2: On Project Supervision and Dialogue with the Borrower That steps be taken to strengthen supervision processes and procedures (for example, supervision frequency, continuity and sills mix of staff involved, mission preparation and reporting), taking into account the relative priority of the supervision effort vis A via other tasks to be accomplished and the objective of making the supervision effort more effective in particular 9/ By type of equipment anti by individual suppliers in terms of availability, reliability, productivity, operating and maintenance costs, and durability (length of life). - 15 - with respect to the development of a serious dialogue with the borrower (see also paras. 79 and 80). 79. Aspects which come to mind for such a review are: minimal frequency and timing flexibility of supervision missions; staffing of supervision missions (professional and diplomatic skills, staff continuity); length of supervision missions and flexibility when in the field to extend the mission; - involvement of supervision mission staff in providing advice and any other assistance including working with their local counterparts on specific issues which crop up; - specificity of TOR of supervision missions; - providing the borrower well in advance with appropriate details on the specific purposes of supervision missions, what is to be discussed and with whom, and what is to be prepared in advance of the mission; - appropriate feedback during and after the mission (Aide Mdmoire, Back-to-Office report, letter to the Borrower); - sustained follow-up on outstanding issues; - possibility of ad hoc missions to respond to specific issues, e.g. assistance in drafting TOR for studies, review and discussion of interim drafts of studies, assistance in resolving specific wethodological and data problems which have developed in the preparation of a study; and - budgetary flexibillty to hire short-term consultants to assist the supervisio?. staff in resolving issues which have arisen or to present a seminar or roundtable on a topical issue. 80. In addition, the review could usefully consider the budgetary implications in terms of possi.le increases in Bank staff time, consultants time and travel which might be required to strengthen the Bank's effort at developing a sound dialogue. It is well to keep in mind that, on the one hand, the additional cost involved is small while, on the other hand, the value to the borrower of better communication with the Bank, is inestimable. 81. Recommendation 3: On Further Strengthening the Computer Operations of the Three Ports That each of the three ports arrange a visit of, say, three months by, say, two key computer operators from selected foreign ports to work side by side with their Chinese counterparts (para. 30). - 16 - 82. In addition to the transfer of knowledge, experience and ideas, relevant computer softwar. from the foreign ports irrolved - appropriately adjusted - could be transferred as well to strengthen the present software capability of the three ports (para. 31). 83. Bilateral or multilateral financing - on a grant basis - for the visits of the computer operators could no doubt be arranged by the borrower. - 17 - ANNEX I Page 1 of 2 A CHRONOLOGY ON EQUIPNENT PROCUREMENT: FROM THE BANK'S FILES (i) 08/22/81 - Issues Paper, August 22, 1981, para.6(a)(ii): "The Government have expressed an interest in local bidding for equipment contracts under some form of joint venture arrangement with a foreign wanufacturer," ... "Based upon the (appraisal] mission's inspection of two manufacturing plants and one precast concrete plant, Chinese firms do not currently have appropriate management expertise or quality control to be the lead partner in such a consortium. The mission considers they could undertake some of the manufacture and erection of plant under acceptable direction in th., capacity of subcontractor." (ii) 09/14/81 - Decision Meeting, September 14, 1981: "Issues Paper, para.6(a) Procurement - items (i and ii). No comments were made on the mission's recommendations." (iii) 12/02/81 - Memo to Files, cleared by Central Project Staff, December 2, 1981: "... the (appraisal] mission's recommendation is that (the Chinese manufacturers] cannot be permitted to be the main suppliers." (iv) 10/14/82 - The President's Report (PR), October 14, 1982, para. 58: "China's attempts to develop a domestic capability for manufacturing port container equipment have encountered problems and some of the equipment at major ports remain inoperative." (v) 12/16/82 - Back-to-Office report by two Bank staff, December 16, 1982: "Post qualification (of equipment manufacturers] might develop into an issue. Should the Shanghai crane manufacturer be aualified and nominated for award for an item. we recommend that the Bank send an eloert to resort on their caRabilities. and an industrial crane costing ex2ert should examine the grice for possible subsidies." (Underlining added). - 18 - Page 2 of 2 (vi) 06/09/83 - Back-to-Office report by another Bank staff, June 9, 1983: A Bank staff member has just visited the Shanghai plant and reports his findings. s... the Shanghai Manufacturing Plant is a jumble of old rusting parts, ill-organized workshops, cluttered floor spaces, and it causes me to wonder whether very substantial improvements could not be realized with better production control, work flow and factory management. Comparing sheet metal fabrication and structural welding done in the (Shanghai plant and the Electric Locomotive Manufacturing Plant in Zhuzhou), I was also struck by the crudeness of welds, metal cuts, and design techniques used in Shanghai. Their production to date has the appearance of prototypes, rather roughly done at that. In the event that the Shanghai plant is a low bidder for any eauiment items. we will have to be sure to et a good industrial enaineer to look at their plant and oroduction techniques to make sure they can perform." (Underlining added). (vii) 09/07/83 - Memo by Bank staff, cleared by Project Advisory Staff, September 7, 1983: A Chinese delegation visited Washington late August/early September 1983. Agreement was reached with the Bank on their bid evaluation report on the port equipment and the Shanghai plant was awarded a contract. "As you will remember (se underlined portion of two previous quotes], we were thinking of sending a mission to review the competence of Shanghai Crane Manufacturing Plant should they be awarded a contract. I propose that this review mission be waived. They have by now the experience of building 5 quay container cranes (2 in Tianjin, 2 in Huangpu and 1 in Shanghai) and 5 rubber tyred gantry cranes. At the beginning they had some difficulty with the hydraulic and electronic systems. Later, they made agreements to import these two systems from West Germany and Switzerland, and now the cranes seem to be functioning well". ----―一一－－一→一－－一－一－-----------------------~-~~~~~～→～~~~~~~．→→→”～→～→•→→間．→→→••→→••開■••■■■■ ，中＿__ C H l N A THE THREE PORTS PROJE 41b wstrit TIANJIN CONTAINER TERMIP roeiroad yard BERTHS NO 27, 28, 29 eqv.P.0.,1 %hed PLANNED PROJECT EXISTING \_U.Pour stol,o. and bl ment Structures Equipmen, .-Bollar room Container Equ,prinent repair siation repo-r yard Return , s, pump,0 Roillroads Qowic ge pump stotion sta,..: st room ___j Return watorit) Air comp pump loorn ;ýExhou Reserved for container storage Roadways [F= Confoiner check and repoir station Container wash.rig snop , 1, \ Fences Swirch room FJling stOnon F "/ light tower, Pånglirous cargo C.Y. l heck ond If l <Iepa,r yard Container ashIng vård cob.n X6. 7 Bievciv shed Ca, parkrig Truc lg. Truck parking spac-c Emptv C-Y. 49ht Dri,,sfo,nij, Station No 11 idges G:lrooä looiing office C F. S. of bighway Cont',ne, gate CY.S of r8ilroad Container träJtor and Adminisvat on Container I(acto, and chOS515 parking spacc chass,s Pa,krig space Reefer C Y General Cargo Yard Reefe, C. Y Transfolme, Station No Ret fet C Y JIT-' 1~ zý4 -ý-4 4 H r c 0 ýT A I N E R y A R-D Rubber tyred gan" crane Mess haill Worker's rest room o i 00m, o container 0.8y Cirarie Tiranstauie, er,~ CONTAINER WHARF yard -wo BERTH No. 28 BIERTH No.29 Container Quay Cr e 60 National cop,tol 0 mcio. porl$ BASIN NO. 3 Witåter depth 12 m P,roý /DP R fo;nýe bo.ndor,es ngkovI-' OF --------- not-ona[ boundory i KOREA ý\S.clo slopa of cut 60;nhucingdoo BEIJ I NGM ODoflan 1,1 Piiicfflioniin REP0 ntoi 0 F oroa cýtil K REA PI E IR N 3 OQ-ngdoo *Ljontrungong C H IN A Shonghoi TIA ,Ningbo BEITANG 0 Xiamen 0 2ýO 300 Gucingzhov MET . ERS TANGGU Oshontou 'HS CFViHONG KONG, U.K. Mo.n rocids VIET PoRT. Rod,ocids NAM 0 Zhanjicing Haikou T" map has b~ Prolasred by The World 8~ stag exc~ for the conven~ of worerways 0 the readers ond o exc~ fy för Ifte internsf use of The World Bank and ~ åriternationat DAGUý pfoj Dongfon 0 500 Fnenco Corporafton The used and Vw bo~ nes ~vm on du map do not lp ýO 3? 40 50 Bre 90 0 KILOMETERS P111ILIPPIN111 ~ _ an ilfte ~ 0, rM World 8~ and Me *?tornat~ Financo Corporation, any judgintent KILOMETERS yaxion on " kiget status of eny temtcmy or erdo~ f or &~ n~ of ~ bouriMtios L 一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一ー :BRD 15815R ) -―■■■■■■■国■■■■■■■■■■国■■■■■曲日目■園日園国■日湖日■■■■■■■園d口■■hdh山 PROJECT EXISTING CHINA Il i nr-15tructures 80ijing@ THE THREE PORTS PROJECT Container yards HUANGPU CONTAINER TERMINAL Railroads ý-TRANSFORME R No 2 TERMINAL, BERTH NO 7 AND NO. 8 Roodways CONTAiNER CHECK C H l N A Rubber tyred gantry REPAIR YARD crone a na trocks 0 50 100 150 -mý Fences METERS m lioht towers GuangzhNH, -k.. OUTSIDE PORT PUBLIC ROAD NA GATE FUELING WEIGH- Container Tracter and STATION BRIDGE WAITING ROOM Chasvs Parking ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE TRUCK RESERVED PARKING FOR GUARD POST FUTURE USE HIGHWAY C.F.S. RAILWAY C.F.S. WEIGHIN'3 SCALE CONTAINER LOADING BAYS Rail Gar TRANSFORMER STATION-,, TRANSFORMER STATION--ý] Container quay crane SHI LOADER TRACKS BERTH NO.6 BERTH NO.7 B E R T H NO-8 This mop has bean pr«~ by The Worid Bank daff exc~ taf con~ ot ~ mad~ met is axch~ for the inf~l use ol Thc Vi~ ayt* sW " kve~tk~ F~nce Cor~abon The d~natwæ used and the bo~~ shown on ~ ~ do not ~. on the pøft 01 The WOM 8~ and ~ Amfarna~1 F~nce Corpord~. ~ flid~ STEEL BERTH WATER DEPTH 11 M. CONTAINER BERTHS WATER DEPTH 12 M. on~~ slafti3 Of SnY fwd" Of &W ~&~ Or aceWlanm of stsch bow~ Zhu Jiang ýpearl River) IBRD 1 5 CHINA X THE THREE PORTS PROJECT HUANGPU COAL TERMINAL Ecoming Rodtood ond o, 2 TERMINAL, BERTH No. 9 and No.10 /so'''° '°' 'o"''" t"° 't"" Winch .-tx-- EXISTING- -oom - -- srructures PROJECT . - Struc tures wOSt, ---a~~ri wote, ,µ t~o 01 tRoilroad W..rerrs ) 4o-- ro,od yeovlo oh Roodways wso wate c~o~~y1oom P Conveyors pump roo light towers c2 L - Siope protecticon~ Underwater excavation slope - FUTURE: RESERVED FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT r.,, Railroad 0 20 40 60 80 100 Wo,tin /rost room1 METERS fFor .g i ihift --Disp.tching b.,iilding Garag - 4 Tolll -. oveo roI(i5 C-Y STAK SoTACK00 (1 Coneyo rom (.4 stcke Relaier Co veyo r room ( 14 l- - Conveyor ro-mlT-10N 5.pre Part COAL STACK .ar-(-31 c O A S TA CK stacke atlie Conveyot L- oy P al oh 100 t'/ h, bla Norml d.t.. wa 1 ly (B 1. B 2) Dr- on d .I'Rl oGo-' (103.35m elevohio o - - .o o orlo n(0-) .-' pomto of tIi a sgn) Baouordre _,- _l Belimg] i . BERH 19o.10 - Consond hiplooder rock9K UERT- N.9 p00000000n0prepared by - COASTER LOAPIN0G 1 m.. . CHi N A en nbwl or. xi - - 0000m0on 0000n\ce Woter dopkb 12.5 meters Orto bOrätt shown0 0map00o0not 000000 on i.-- - o00p0rw00Rt 00 0an --o emtoovoO r - - - - oolE