Senegal - Fourth and Fifth Highway Projects

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 9644 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL FOURTH AND FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 993/LOAN 1810-SE AND CREDIT 1448/SPECIAL FUND CREDIT SF-15-SE) JUNE 10, 1991 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS CURRENCY UNIT - CFAFranc (CFAF) 1980 US$1.00 - CFAF 210 1984 US$1.00 - CFAF 373 ABBREVIATIONS CEREEQ Centre Experimental de Recherches et d'Etudes pour 1'Equipement (National Soils Laboratory) DSP Directorate of Studies and Programming ERR Economic Rate of Return OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (Japan) OED Operations Evaluation Department PCR Project Completion Report PPAR Project Performance Audit Report SAR Staff Appraisal Report vpd vehicles per day FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 THE WORLD BANK FOR OMICIAL USE ONLY Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director*General Operations Ivaluatin June 10, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on Senegal Fourth and Fifth Highway Projects (Credit 993/Loan 1810-SE and Credit 1448/Special Fund Credit SF-15-SE) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report on "Senegal Fourth and Fifth Highway Projects (Credit 993/Loan 1810-SE and Credit 1448/Special Fund Credit SF-15-SE)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their offcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL FOURTH AND FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 993/LOAN 1810-SE AND CDIT 1448/SPECIAL FUND CREDIT SF-15-SEI TABLE OF CONTENTS Paste No. Preface......................... . . . . Basic Data Sheets. . ............... . . . . . . . . Evaluation Summary.............. ....... . . . .vii I. INTRODUCTION................. ..... . . . 1 II. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Project Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Project Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Government Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 III. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS. ........ . . . . . 3 Axle Load Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Training . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . o.. 5 Assistance to the National Soils Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . 6 The Road Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 The Road Maintenance Program under the Fifth Highway Project . ...... . . .8 Results................. ....... . . . . 9 IV. FINDINGS AND LESSONS.................. . . . . .10 Map IBRD 11900R2 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL FOURTH AND FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 993/LOAN 1810-SE AND CREDIT 1448/SPECIAL FUND CREDIT SF-15-SE) PREFACE This is the Project Performance Report (PPAR) for the Fourth and Fifth Highway Projects in Senegal. Highways IV was financed by an IDA Credit of US$28.0 million and a Loan of US$10.0 million. The Credit and Loan were approved on April 2, 1980 and closed on June 30, 1986, two years after the original closing date. They were co-financed in the amount of US$12.9 million by the OECF (Japan) and fully disbursed. Highways V was financed by an IDA Credit of US$10.75 million and a Special Fund Credit of US$10.75 million. The Credits were approved on June 22, 1984 and closed on December 31, 1988, one year after the original closing date. US$280,000 was cancelled. The PPAR is based on the Project Completion Report (PCR), prepared by the Africa Regional Office, and issued in November 1989,1 the Staff Appraisal Reports, the President's Reports, the Credit and Loan Documents, the transcripts of the Executive Directors' meetings at which the projects were considered, a review of the project files, and discussions with Bank staff. An OED mission visited Senegal in November 1990 to discuss the effectiveness of the Bank's assistance with officials of the Ministry of Equipment, the General Directorate of Public Works, the Directorate of Road Maintenance and Equipment, the Directorate of Infrastructure and the Directorate of Planning of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The PCR covers, in a concise format, adequately most of the issues arising from implementing the two projects. The PPAR comments on some of these issues and highlights certain salient aspects of the project experience. Following standard OED procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to the Government and the executing agencies on March 22, 1991, for their review and comment by May 7, 1991, but none was received. 1 SENEGAL, Fourth Highway Project (Credit 993'Loan 1810-SE) and Fifth Highway Project (Credit 1448 and Special Fund Credit SF-15-SE), Report No. 8171, November 11, 1989. - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 993/LOAN 1810-SE) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA ACTUAL OR IXEM ORIGINAL PLAN CURRENT ESTIMATE Total Project Cost (US$ million) 59.5 59.5 Financing (US$ million) Government 8.6 8.6 OECF (Japan) (US$ million) 12.9 12.9 IBRD: Credit (US$ million) 28.0 28.0 Loan (US$ million) 10.0 10.0 Completion date 12/83 6/86 Economic Rate of Return 30% 38% CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENT (US$ Million) M EY82 Y8 8 Y8 Y8a Appraisal Estimate 6.0 16.0 27.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 Actual 6.8 17.1 23.6 26.3 34.6 38.0 Actual as % of Estimate 113 107 87 69 91 100 PROJECT DATES ACTUAL OR ORIGINAL PLAN CURRENT ESTIMATE First Mention in Files 11/75 Appraisal 12/78 Negotiations Board Approval 7/79 3/80 Effectiveness 7/80 9/80 Closing 6/84 6/86 - iv - MISSIO DATA Mission Type MonghLYear No. Persons StAff-22eks Identification 12/77 2 2.0 Preparation 7/78 2 2.0 Appraisal 12/78 3 3.0 Post Appraisal 3/79 1 1.0 Pre-Negotiations 6/79 2 1.5 Supervision 4/80 1 0.5 2/81 1 0.5 5/81 1 0.5 9/81 1 2.0 3/82 1 0.5 7/82 1 0.5 9/82 2 1.0 11/82 1 1.0 1/83 1 1.0 6/83 1 0.8 7/83 1 2.0 10/83 2 4.0 11/83 1 0.2 11/83 1 1.0 4/84 1 1.0 6/84 1 0.5 9/84 1 0.5 10/84 1 1.0 2/85 1 1.0 2/85 1 0.2 6/85 4 10.0 10/85 4 10.0 2/86 1 0.5 " 6/86 3 3.0 9/C6 1 1.0 OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower: Republic of Senegal Executing Agency: Ministry of Equipment Follow-on Project: Fifth Highway Project * V . PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1448/SPECIAL FUND CREDIT SF-15-SE) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA ACTUAL OR J.fr.9 ORIGINAL PLAN CMA ESTIME Total Project Cost (US$ million) 40.3 34.4 Financing (US$ million) Government (US$ million) 19.8 11.0 IBRD IDA Crediti (US$ million) 10.75 11.58 Special Fund Credit2, (US$ million) 10.75 11.79 million) Completion Date 12/87 12/88 Economic Rate of Return >100% 65% CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (US$ Million) Appraisal Estimate 2.0 13.3 18.0 21.5 21.5 21.5 Actual 0.0 4.2 11.4 17.6 19.8 21.3 Actual as % of Estimate 0 32 66 82 92 99 PROJECT DATES ACTUAL OR ORIGINAL P1AN g E TM First Mention in Files 5/82 Appraisal 9/82 Negotiations 1/83 8/83 Board Approval 2/83 3/84 Effectiveness 7/83 8/84 Closing 12/87 12/88 1 Disbursed in SDRs (8DR 224,900 vas canceled). Disbursed in SDRs. * vi MISSION DT Mission 2:yRe Month/Year No. Pcesons Staff-weeks Appraisal 9/82 2 2.0 Post Appraisal 1/83 1 0.5 Negotiations 8/83 3 3.0 Post Negotiations 7/83 1 1.0 Post Negotiations 10/83 2 1.0 Post Negotiations 11/83 1 2.0 Supervision 2/84 1 1.0 6/84 1 1.0 7/84 1 0.2 7/84 2 3.0 9/84 1 1.0 10/84 1 0.2 2/85 1 0.2 2/85 1 0.2 2/85 1 1.0 2/85 1 1.0 6/85 4 7.0 10/85 4 4.0 2/86 1 1.0 "6/86 3 3.0 "9/86 1 1.0 10/87 2 2.0 1/88 2 2.0 OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower: Republic of Senegal Executing Agency: Ministry of Equipment Follow-on Project: Transport Sector Adjustment Project (proposed) - vii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL FOURTH AND FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 993/LOAN 1810-SE AND CREDIT 1448/SPECIAL FUND CREDIT SF-15-SE) EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Introduction IDA and Special Fund Credit in the amount of US$21.5 million. This When the Bank became project consisted of the financing involved in the highway sector in of a time-slice of the Government's Senegal in 1970, the country already maintenance program, since it had had a relatively well developed road become clear, during the implementa- network concentrated in the more tion of the fourth project, that heavily populated coastal regions insufficient financing was available and groundnut-producing areas. Bank for road maintenance. supported highway projects from the start emphasized improvement rather The two projects are thus than expansion of the network, closely interlinked. The Fifth through road rehabilitation and Highway project overlapped the maintenance. Fourth by two years and both were focussed on what was rightly This review concerns the perceived as the highest priority Fourth and Fifth Highway Project. issue: preserving the existing road The three earlier projects were only network. partially successful in dealing with the road deterioration problem, and 2. Project Objectives at the time of the approval of the Fourth Highway Project in 1980, road Road maintenance was the maintenance was still the main prob- focus of the two projects under re- lem affecting the sector (SAR para. view. Efforts to improve the plan- 2.11). ning and execution of road mainte- nance and strengthen and The Fourth Highway Project, rehabilitate some of the more a combination Loan and Credit in the heavily trafficked roads had been amount of US$ 38.0 million, focussed initiated under the first three entirely on road rehabilitation and highway projects, but much remained maintenance, except for the to be done. Highways IV aimed to inclusion in the project of the construction of the Louga-Dahra continue to increase the road, for which the OECF of Japan Government's capacity to keep provided the financing. The project the road system in adequate was approved in February 1980 and condition, was supplemented, in 1984, by the Fifth Highway Project, a combined * viii - -- reduce the acute shortage of planning and supervision of road trained technicians and other maintenance operations skilled workers andpavement strengthening pro- gram (pares. 3.12 and 3.13) -- improve the Government's capacity to plan road mainte- re-directing the Road Fund to be nance and strengthening and used exclusively for the financ- rehabilitation works in the most ing of road maintenance (para. economical way and 3.15); and, -- rehabilitate 200 km of heavily Under H&gh=g V trafficked roads. --the financing by the Bank of a Highways V provided "time- four year time slice of the en- slice" financing to enable the Gov- tire road maintenance program of ernment to carry out the agreed the Goverment. (para. 3.17) maintenance program, when it became evident that sufficient financing The experience with these was not available (paras. 2.01- instruments of project 2.03). implementation has been disappointing. 3. Imlementation Experience and Results Axle lcad control was de facto abandoned as a means of The principal instruments helping to preserve the road employed under the Fourth and Fifth network. Instead of enforcing a highway projects to help achieve the legal limit of 10 tons per axle, the objective of improving the condition Goverment, yielding to the of the road network and the capacity Transporters Union resistance, had, of the Government to improve and shortly before appraisal of the maintain it were: Fourth Highway Project, raised the limit to 13 tons. But this limit was Under HiShways IV not enforced either and weighing scales procured in 1976 under the -- enforcing axle load limits and second highway project are still not restricting the importation of In operation. In spite of the fact vehicles to those that fall that enforcement was considered a within the legal limits (para. sine qua non for the Fourth Highway 3.04) Project at its inception in 1980, the strong Impression prevails that -- a three year training program to the Bank had given up on the ax-le provide the personnel needed to load control issue (paras. 3.02- carry out the maintenance 3.06). program (para. 3.08) The training program has -- granting the National Soils largely been a failure. Lack of Laboratory (CEREEQ) sufficient statutory and budgetary authority financial autonomy to operate for the training center, combined efficiently and expanding its with interminable conflicts between activities to assist in the the training center's management and ix * the training consultatts, and problems resulted In the percentage difficulties with motivating of Bank financing remaining at 65% counterparts and trainees, has left and the time-slice being reduced the training effort with minimal from four to less than three years. impact and barely functional. (para. 3.18). (paras. 3.07-3.11) The disappointing physical Assistance to the National accomplishments of the road mainte- Soils Laboratory (CEREEQ) was more nance progan under the fifth highway successful. CEREEQ expanded its project reflect the chronic activities to assisting the financial shortfalls in the Directorate of Road Maintenance and maintenance program. The Equipment in the planning and Improvement in the condition of the supervision of road maintenance paved roads that was to reault from operations and contributed to the the maintenance program was not only success of a study, carried out by not achieved but their condition consultants, to develop a systematic actually worsened. For unpaved approach to road maintenance. It roads, there was some Improvement, did not receive the financial but it fell far short of what was autonomy envisaged under the project expected. The ERR, although not as and its operations remained severely high as estimated at appraisal hampered by its inability to operate (O0P, remained high (65%), con- as a business (paras. 3.12-3.14). firming the high priority of the maintenance effort. The project The Road Fund was re-orga- had, however, clearly fallen well nized to be used exclusively for the short of its goals. (para. 3.20). financing of maintenance activities, but the funds provided to it by the The physical components of Government fell far short of the the Fourth Highway Project wc-e gen- agreed amounts. Quite sizeable ir- erally carried out satisfactorily, regularities, involving the misuse albeit with changes, shortfalls and of fuel and spares, further reduced delays. The re-estimated ERR is 38% the funds actually spent on as compared with 30% at the time of maintenance. (paras. 3.15-3.16). appraisal.(para. 3.23). Under the Fifth Highway In spite of these results project, an attempt was made by the and the substantial amount of Bank to avoid a rapid deterioration financing provided, however, the of the road network because of the road maintenance backlog increased, lack of funds for maintenance. The the road network is in wora shape project provided financing for 43% than before the project and the of all expenditures made through the country remains heavily dependent on Road Fund for the 1984 through 1987 external financing for road road maintenance program. The fi- maintenance. The Institutional nancing was to be provided on a de- support and associated policy- clining percentage s'ale, from 65% Initiatives Incorporated in the to 25%, to induce the Government to projects and designed to Increase shoulder gradually a larger share of the Government's capacity to keep the financial burden of road mainte- the road system in good condition, nance. As it turned out, budgetary largely failed to accomplish their objectives. The road maintenance 5. Findings Md Lessons department is somewhat better prepared for its task than at the The review suggests that start of the project. The National improvement in road maintenance and Soils Laboratory, though functional, in the condition of the road system is still hampered in its activities will not easily be achieved in Sene- by its inability to operate as a gal. In spite of the focus on main- business. Axle load and vehicle tenance issues and the financing of dimension control regulations are a large percentage of the not being enforced, the training maintenance program, by the two program is in a shambles and the projects, the maintenance backlog country is still not in a position actually increased. The audit to carry out its road maintenance suggests that future Bank program without outside technical involvement in highway maintenance assistance.(para. 3.23). in Senegal should take place in the framework of a broad agreement in 4. SustainabilI which infrastructure investment and maintenance funding priorities and Based on the benefits of allocations are clearly spelled out. the investments in road This might make it feasible to shift strengthening, rehabilitation and loans to the higher priority uses in construction, the re-estimated ERR times of budgetary stringency or if of the fourth highway project was the pre-requisites for effective 38%, but the realization of those road maintenance are not fulfilled benefits depends on continued (para. 4.01-4.03). maintenance (para. 3.23). Whether road maintenance will continue to be Even though at the time of carried out at a satisfactory level appraisal of Highways IV the (and for those roads) is not %:lear. enforcement of axle load regulations Important deficiencies in training, was considered a sine qua non for operational efficiency, enforcement the project, there is no evidence of vehicle weight regulations and that any serious attention was paid maintenance funding will need to be to the matter afterwards. In any overcome before adequate road case, ten years later weighing maintenance can be considered scales are still not in use and no assured. Sustainability of the in- enforcement is being attempted. vestments under the fourth highway This is not unique to this project project, in terms of producing an but symptomatic of many other Bank acceptable flow of net benefits, are financed highway projects. If the judged by the audit to be likely but Bank wants to preserve its by no means certain. credibility on this issue, the audit recommends that it consider The fifth highway project postponing lending until adequate which funded three years of the control mechanisms are in effect or, maintenance program has a re- alternatively, if appropriate estimated ERR of 65% (para. 3.20). control is not considered feasible, This reflects a high pay-off over a insisting on increased road design short period of time (1984-1989). standards to reflect expected usage The project has, in that sense, (para. 4.04). already proven its sustainability. * xi - In contrast to the Maintenance projects should seemingly indifferent attitude preferably be set in a 15 to 20 year toward axle load control, framework, gradually increasing cov- maintenance training received much erage and sophistication in step attention and repeated efforts were with the Borrower's development. made to make it work. The lack of Changing the attitude toward success should not lead to maintenance is a long term endeavor abandonment of the effort. As and a continued, broadly conceived pointed out in OED's 1988 Annual training program is essential to the Review of Project Performance effort (para. 4.05). Results in Transport, the development of maintenance capacity is a long term process. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL FOURTH AND FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 993/LWAN 1810-SE AND CREDIT 1448/SPECIAL FUND CREDIT SF-15-SE) I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 Senegal's road network is generally well developed and concentrated in the more heavily populated coastal regions and ground-nut producing areas. The Bank has been supporting the highway sector since 1970 with investments in feeder roads and in the strengthening and maintenance of the road network through a series of highway projects. This PPAR reviews the experience with the fourth and fifth highway projects, approved in 1980 and 1984 respectively. The first, second and third highway projects had focussed heavily on road rehabilitation and strengthening as well as efforts to improve Senegal's road maintenance capacity. These efforts had only been partially successful. 1.02 Under the first highway project, consultants had recommended the establishment of a centrally administered road maintenance system. Equipment and technical assistance in support of the maintenance effort were provided under the second and third highway projects, and 233 km of paved roads were rehabilitated and strengthened. Maintenance operations were, however, not yet satisfactory. The main problems faced at the time of appraisal of the fourth project were a cumbersome organizational set-up, a shortage of qualified road maintenance technicians and inadequate funds for road maintenance. II. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT Project Objectives 2.01 The focus of Highways IV and V was road maintenance. As noted in the Staff Appraisal Report of Highway IV, the main road network of Senegal was approaching a form which met the country's economic and social needs, but the roads had not been kept in good repair. The lack of regular maintenance on all roads and of timely strengthening of more heavily trafficked roads had meant that road pavements had deteriorated to the extent that vehicle operating costs had sharply increased. Under the three previous Bank highway projects, efforts had already begun to improve the planning and execution of road maintenance and to strengthen and rehabilitate some of the more heavily trafficked roads. The two projects under review continued those efforts. 2.02 The stated objectives of the fourth highway project were "to continue to increase the Government's capacity to keep the road system in adequate condition, particularly reducing the acute shortage of trained technicians and other skilled workers; to improve the Government's capacity to plan road maintenance and strengthening and rehabilitation works in the most economical - 2 - way; to rehabilitate 200 km of heavily trafficked roads; and provide for the construction of the Louga-Dahra road." 2.03 The fifth highway project, which overlapped the fourth by two years, provided financing for a four-year "time slice" of the Government's road maintenance program, as it became evident that insufficient financing was available for road maintenance. Its objective was to enable the Government to carry out the agreed maintenance program. It was hoped that through the Bank's financial involvement in the maintenance activities, the efficiency of the operations, the use of funds and the monitoring and control of the maintenance program would further improve. (SAR Highways V, para. 2.01). The objectives of both projects thus focussed on what was rightly perceived as the nighest priority issue: preserving the existing road network. Project Components 2.04 While the fifth highway project, as noted above, provided "time slice" financing for an agreed maintenance program, the fourth project included a set of specific components to help achieve the objective of increasing the Government's capacity to keep the road system in adequate condition. They consisted of: (a) the first three years of a training program, with classroom instruction and a training production brigade for road mainte- nance personnel, including procurement of materials and supplies and technical assistance and fellowships for local trainees and for training of consultant's counterparts abroad; (b) a two and a half year technical assistance program for execution of road maintenance; (c) procurement of equipment and construction of offices for the national soils laboratory (CEEREQ) to enable it to participate in the preparation of supervision of road maintenance programs; and (d) design of proper and systematic pavement maintenance programs through the introduction of appropriate technologies. The inclusion of the construction of the Louga-Dahra Road in the project seems somewhat of an anomaly given the focus of the project on maintenance, the more so since the road was expected to have a relatively low ERR of 15% as compared to the 40% estimated for the road strengthening and rehabilitation component. Although part of the project, the Louga-Dahra Road was financed by OECF (Japan) under a parallel co-financing arrangement. -3- Government Commitments 2.05 The Government, on its part, had taken a number of major steps. It had reorganized the road maintenance structure to make the regions responsible for maintenance, and it had decided to have contractors carry out periodic maintenance, while continuing to perform routine maintenance by force-account. It undertook to introduce training as a permanent institution within the General Directorat of Public Works. To protect past and future investments, it agreed to enforce axle load limits and restrict the importation of vehicles to those falling within the legal weights and dimensions. And it undertook to make adequate financing for road maintenance available through the Road Fund. 2.06 The objectives of the two projects were thus clearly focussed on the high priority road maintenance issue and were supported by an impressive set of project components and Government commitments. It is thus all the more disappointing that ten years after the start of Highways IV so little has been accomplished. In the following paragraphs, some of the salient features of the project and what became of them will be examined. III. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS 3.01 The PCR provides a comprehensive chronological account of project actions and events from the time of identification to the completion of project implementation. That account will not be repeated here, but the PPAR will examine the experience with the principal instruments designed to achieve the objectives of the two projects. It discusses the experience with axle load control, training, assistance to the National Soils Laboratory, the Road Fund and the "time slice" financing of the road maintenance program under the Fifth Highway Project. Axle Load Control 3.02 The Staff Appraisal Report for the Fourth Highway Project (1980) contains the following statement (underlining supplied): "Regulations limiting vehicle weights and dimensions are also satisfactory, with the maximum axle load having recently been increased to 13 tons. However, the regula- tions are not enforced. In a 1974 survey, from 30 to 40% (according to the road) of all trucks checked were overload- ed. This was particularly prevalent among phosphate trucks travelling from Taiba to Dakar and for sugar transport between Richard Toll and Dakar, and has resulted in consid- erable damage to these roads. Enforcement of 4xle-load regulations is considered a sine qua non for the proposed project if investments are tolast. Although a vehicle scale was provided under the Second Highway Project, it is still not operational. The Government has agreed to prepare an action program by December 1980 and take effective steps to enforce axle load limits and restrict the importation of vehicles to those that fall within the legal weight and dimensions. The DSP (Directorate of Studies and Program- ming), with technical assistance provided under the Third Highway Project, intends to investigate ways to assist and educate the domestic trucking industry in traffic laws and safety, as part of a comprehensive transport plan. This issue is being actively pursued in connection with the Third highway Project." 3.03 The strengthening and rehabilitation component of Highways IV covered 200 km of roads that were between 13 and 30 years old, carrying up to 10,000 vpd, with axle loads frequently exceeding the single axle load limit of 13 tons. 3.04 In view of this situation, the project included an undertaking by the Government to enforce axle load limits and restrict the importation of vehicles to those that fell within the legal weights and dimensions. Doubts concerning the commitment of the Government to such action would not have been misplaced. After all, it had taken four years for the weighing scales procured in 1976 under the Second Highway Project to be installed and made accessible to trucks. It was still not in operation. Instead of enforcing the earlier legal limit of 10 tons per axle, the Government had, shortly before appraisal of Highways IV, raised the legal limit to 13 tons, yielding to the Transporters Union continued resistance to enforcement of load limitations. In spite of all this, Bank staff remained surprisingly optimistic about the eventual outcome, as illustrated by the following short exchange on March 17, 1980 between an Executive Director and the staff before the presentation of Highways IV to the Board. Question: "Is there any reason to believe that weighing scales are going to be used under this project?" Answer: "There is no reason to doubt that the scales will be used." 3.05 As it turns out, ten years later the scales are still not being used. Project supervision reports dutifully record the non-compliance with the axle- load covenant as does the PCR, but there is no indication that anyone is particularly concerned. In the PCR, for example, the non-compliance is noted in a table listing the various covenants of the fourth highway project, but the issue is not commented on in the chapter on Institutional Performance, which reviews Government's compliance with the loan agreement.2 Not that the maivte- nance problem has been brought under control: the same chapter complains that the backlog of maintenance work has risen substantially in spite of the two projects. that 30Z of the paved network requires strengthening and that periodic maintenance is overdue on a similar proportion of the unpaved network. 3.06 The strong impression is created that the Bank had given up on the axle load control issue, in spite of the fact that enforcement was considered a sine qua non for the project at its inception in 1980. 2 The Credit Agreement of the Fifth Highway Project does not include an axle load limit covenant. -5- Training 3.07 The shortage of trained manpower was cited in the Staff Appraisal Report on Highways IV as one of the reasons why Senegal lacked well-maintained roads. On-the-job training of mechanics and operators and training of cost* accountants was provided for under the Second and Third Highway Projects. These projects also financed improvements to the training center of the General Directorate of Public Works. Highways IV was to reinforce this effort and introduce training as a permanent institution within the General Directorate. 3.08 The three year training program envisaged under the project was to provide the personnel needed to carry out road maintenance operations. During the program 360 existing employees would be retrained and another 360 recruited and trained. The program would combine classroom training with field training, with the emphasis on field training using a mechanized brigade. The training center would be headed and run by a Senegalese professional with the help of consultants. Senegalese instructors would receive on-the-job training in the center and additional training abroad. The training program would be reviewed every twelve months by the Government and the Bank. It was expected that at the end of the project, training would be carried on by the Senegalese. 3.09 The audit has found it difficult to determine what, if anything, was accomplished. The record shows that the training program was beset with all kinds of difficulties from the outset. The PCR chronicles the events as follows: "By the end of 1981, the improvement works for the Training Center had been completed and the equipment installed under funding from the Third Highway Project. The training consultant had begun to mobilize and the first batch of trainers were to arrive. By March 1982, most of the consultant's teams had mobilized, but no training had started because the Training Center had no official budget. The problem was resolved on an ad hoc basis. A Bank training advisor, who visited Senegal in November 1982 reported that progress on the training component was unsatisfactory due to poor performance on the part of the consultant. Their team leader was replaced a few months later and his successor was instructed to prepare the required programs in time for review by the next Bank mission. This mission found a commendable change in attitude on the part of the consultant, and a suitably prepared training program. The performance of the Senega- lese manager of the center was fully satisfactory. By mid 1983, progress on the project was noted as "on the whole satisfactory". However, the Training Center was operating below capacity because of the difficulty in identifying suitable trainees willing to forego field allowances to come to Dakar for training sessions. By the end of 1983, the date the project was to have been completed, the original physical components were largely finished. The main problem - 6 - continued to be the Training Center, where the training program was proceeding slowly. It finally appeared that a major problem in setting up the Training Center was that, due partly to the severe budgetary constraints experienced at the time, it did not receive a clear statutory and budgetary authority". 3.10 By October 1985, the training consultants had finally succeeded in designing and implementing a satisfactory training program. A Bank supervision mission accepted the program and agreed to extend the training consultants' contracts until the end of June 1986. In the first half of 1986, the US dollar declined with respect to the CFAF. Since a disbursement lag of some US$4 million equivalent had developed, and most of these funds had been committed in CFAF, the decline of the dollar turned what had been a slight surplus of funds in the loan account, into a shortfall of about US$250,000. This led to a reduction of the disbursement rate for civil works, the closing of the loan account by June 30, 1986, and the cessation of the training consulting services. 3.11 In the audit's discussions with Borrower and Bank staff familiar with the situation, a picture of failure emerged. The consultants' team leadir would not permit the manager of the Center to have any direct contact with the individual experts. The team leader ran his own show with the result that, when the consultants' contract ran out, they left nothing behind. The work with the counterparts had been ineffective, since they were perceived to be in a sabordinate position, not having the same status and means as the foreign experts. It is not clear how many persons were in fact trained and to what extent. What is clear is that more than ten years after the approval of the project, the training center does not have a "statutory and budgetary authority" and is barely functional. The mechanized brigade still exists but is used as a regular production unit rather than a vehicle for training. Assistance to the National Soils Laboratory 3.12 At the time of the approval of the Fourth Highway Project, the national soils laboratory, Centre Experimental de Recherche et d'Etudes pour 1'Equipement (CEREEQ) was carrying out, in a satisfactory manner, all soils studies for the design and construction supervision of all civil engineering structures, technological research, and testing of construction materials with the assistance of the French Centre d'Experimentation du Batiment et des Travaux Publics. It was considered to be financially sound, but had difficulty in carrying out its work in time since it depended on advances from the general treasury. To avoid such delays in the future, the Government agreed under Highways IV to grant CEREEQ sufficient financial autonomy to operate efficiently. 3.13 The Fourth Highway Project also envisaged the expansion of CEREEQ's activities to road maintenance. It would assist the Directorate of Road Maintenance and Equipment in the planning and supervision of road maintenance operations and pavement strengthening programs. For this purpose, the project included a study to develop a systematic approach to pavement maintenance and strengthening. The study would cover about 1, 600 km of the paved network, - 7 - including about 1,100 km of roads built in the 1960's and early 1970's, which were showing early signs of deterioration or pavement weakening. CEREEQ, which had been provided with soils testing equipment under the Third Highway Project, would receive pavement testing and soils exploration equipment to be housed in a new building to be constructed as part of the project to enable it to carry out its expanded responsibilities. 3.14 The study to develop a systematic approach to road maintenance was carried out by consultants and was well done. It laid a good basis for road maintenance planning by the Directorate of Road Maintenance and Equipment. CEREEQ expanded its responsibilities as planned and contributed to the success of the study. It did not receive the financial autonomy desired and its operations remained severely hampered by its inability to operate as a business. The Road Fund 3.15 The Road Fund was established in 1953 as a special account to receive an earmarked position of fuel taxes. The fund was used for road construction, while road maintenance was financed from the general budget. Road maintenance funds were thus subject to debate in the legislature, were often cut and were not made available until late in the maintenance season. Funds for new construction were not subject to this review process. This situation contributed to the problem of over-investment in new road construction and the inadequate funding of maintenance that was prevalent at the time the Fourth Highway Project was being appraised. To help redress this imbalance, it was agreed that in the future, the Road Fund would be used to finance road maintenance, while all new road construction would be financed out of the investment budget. From FY81 on, the road fund would be provided with CFAF 3.0 billion (US$14.3 million) annually which would be used for both routine and periodic maintenance, including road rehabilitation, road strengthening and equipment renewal. The yearly allocation would increase in relation to the growth of the road network and inflation. 3.16 The Government, however, did not keep to the agreement. The decree reorganizing the Road Fund was issued and published, but the provision of funds fell far short of the agreed amounts. The amounts actually made available were CFAF 2.5 billion in FY81, 1.0 billion in FY82, 1.8 billion in FY83 and 1.1 billion on FY84 for a total of CFAF 6.4 billion over the four year period. This compares to the CFAF 12 billion (before adjustments for inflation and the growth 3 of the network) that should have put in the Road Fund. To make matters worse, quite sizeable irregularities involving the misuse of fuel and spares further reduced what was actually spent on maintenance. The discovery of these Of interest in this respect is the question by an Executive Director prior to the presentation of the project to the Board, whether "the freeze of recurrent expenditures in real terms under the stabilization program would not impair the availability of local financing needed to enure the success of the project". The answer given by the Bank's staff was that: "The level of expenditure needed had been taken into account". - 8 - irregularities by the first audit of the Road Fund, in mid-1982, led to the dismissal of two senior staff of the Directorate of Road Maintenance and a tightening of the accounting system. On the other hand, the availability of funds from the Fourth Highway loan increased considerably because of the appreciation of the US dollar vis-a-vis the CFA Franc (210 CFAF/USDollar at appraisal in 1980 to 350 CFAF/US Dollar at end 1982). The additional funds were used for an expansion of the scope of the pavement strengthening works from 200 km to 370 km.' 3.17 The severe curtailment of the maintenance budget because of a prolonged and grave shortage of Government funds led the Bank to appraise a Fifth Highway Project in September 1982. The purpose of this project was to avoid that the road network would deteriorate for lack of timely maintenance and subsequently require rehabilitation at a far higher cost. The project also sought further improvements in physical operations, uses of funds and monitoring and control practices. 3.18 The project, which was approved in March 1984, after lengthy negotiations, consisted of a four-year time-slice of the road maintenance program, during which the Bank would finance a declining percentage of all road maintenance expenditures. The Bank undertook to finance 43% of all expenditures made through the Road Fund for the 1984 through 1987 road maintenance program. The percentage financed would start with 65% in FY84 and 85, decrease to 30% in FY86 and end with 25% in FY87. In fact the percentage remained at 65% and the length of the time-slice was reduced from four to less than three years (March 1984 - June 1986). The risk that something like this might happen was foreseen in the Staff Appraisal Report which stated: "There is, however, the possibility that Government's budgetary situation may not improve sufficiently over the coming years to allow it to assume an increasing share, and eventually the full burden, of financing the Road Fund. In such event, alternative solutions would be considered by Government and IDA during the proposed mid-term reviewn. The Road Maintenance Program under the Fifth-Highway Project 3.19 While Highways IV financed, as a project component, a specific program of road strengthening and rehabilitation, in Highways V the Bank participated in the entire road maintenance program of the Government by providing financing for a four year time slice through the Road Fund. As noted above, the Bank ended up financing 65% of the program over a two and a half year period, rather than the intended 43% of the four year program, as the Government was unable to increase the level of its participation. 3.20 Apart from this failure of the "declining percentage financing" by the Bank which was the device by which the Government was supposed gradually to take road maintenance in hand without excessive reliance on external financing, it is Most of this additional work (126 out of 170 km) was for the widening of the Trnas-Gambian road, rather than for continuing the previously identified strengthening works, at the request of the Government. - 9 - of interest to review what was accomplished physically. The SAR, in Annex 4-2, predicts, as part of the economic evaluation of the project, the average condition of the paved and unpaved roads that would result from the maintenance program in the form of indices.s The 1983 actuals and predicted averages were compared with the actuals in 1987 (Bank Supervision report, dated December 4, 1987). The results show that the average indices for paved roads not only did not reach the expected values, but that the indices in fact declined from what they were in 1983. For paved roads, instead of improving from 3.4 to 3.7 as predicted, the average index declined to 2.9. For unpaved roads, the average index was to have improved from 1.9 to 2.6 and improved only to 2.1. The ERR of the project estimated at >100% at appraisal was re-estimated in the PCR at 65% on the basis of actual traffic levels and maintenance expenditures, and the average road indices with and without the project. Although the ERR remained quite ratisfactory, the project clearly had fallen well short of its goals when reviewed at completion by the end of 187. Things have not improved since then. The PCR (1989) states: "As a result of the shortage of budgetary funds combined with higher than normal rainfall levels over the past years, the backlog of maintenance work has risen substantially. Thirty percent of the paved road network now requires strengthening and periodic maintenance is overdue on a similar proportion of the network. The rehabilitation and maintenance needs for the next five years are estimated at US$300 million". Results 3.21 In projects such as those under review that deal with improvements in road conditions, road maintenance capacity and Government commitment to the maintenance of its road network, success tends to be partial and shortlived. Lasting improvements are hard to achieve and setbacks are common. 3.22 The PPAM of the 2nd and 3rd Highway Projects had a rather upbeat tone,judging that while there were still major problems to be overcome in highway maintenance in Senegal, particularly in the operation and management of equipment, the country was now in a good position to make significant advances in this most difficult area of highway systems management. The author of "The World Bank and Senegal 1980-87" in discussing the highway sector, concurs with this view, saying: "The net result was that, at the end of the third project, maintenance was carried out successfully by the Senegalese with only minor assistance from outside consultants" and then goes on to say: "It would seem that the success of road maintenance improvements introduced under the third project rested on the fact that the system attacked an area usually neglected in maintenance projects: the improvement of administrative procedures and the introduction of efficiency - improving management techniques. This contrasts with the usual approach in many other projects where the emphasis is on the 5 Based on rating of 5 for excellent and 1 for very poor. - 10 - formulation of detailed work programs (which are seldom imilemented), increasing the numlbar of units of equipment (which are often not required) and pressing the Governr.ent for increased funding (which is usually hard to get)". 3.23 It was thus appropriate that the major objective. of the IVth Highway Project was to continue the efforts started under previous projects to increase the Government's capacity to keep the road system in adequate condition. The projects under review included institutional support and substantial financial assistance for acquisition of equipment and materials, new road construction, road rehabilitation and strengthening and routine and periodic maintenance. The physical components were generally carried out satisfactorily, albeit with changes, shortfalls and delays. The economic rate of return for the Lougha-Dahra Road is estimated at 30% as compared with the SAR estimate of 15% mostly because of lower construction costs. The pavement strengthening and rehabilitation program is estimated to have a rate of return of 40%, as foreseen at appraisal. Overall, the ERR of the project is re-estimated at 38% as compared to 30% at the time of appraisal. Both these estimates assume, however, that the roads will continue to be maintained. The ERR of the maintenance program financed under the Vth Highway Project estimated at >100% at appraisal was re-estimated in the PCR at 65%. In spite of these results and the substantial amount of financing provided, however, the road maintenance backlog increased, the road network is in worse shape than before the project and the country remains heavily dependent on external financing for road maintenance. The institutional support and associated policy-initiatives incorporated in the projects and designed to increase the Government's capacity to keep the road system in good condition, largely failed to accomplish their objectives. The road maintenance department is somewhat better prepared for its task than at the start of the project. The National Soils Laboratory, though functional, is still hampered in its activities by its inability to operate as a business. Axle load and vehicle dimension control regulations are not being enforced, the training program is in a shambles and the country is still not in a position to carry out its road maintenance program without outside technical assistance. IV. FINDINGS AND LESSONS 4.01 This review of the fourth and fifth highway projects suggests that improvement in road maintenance and in the condition of the road system will not easily be achieved in Senegal. In spite of the increasing focus of Bank highway operations on the maintenance issue since the first highway loan in 1970 and the financing of a large percentage of the maintenance program by the Bank, the maintenance backlog at the end of the fifth highway project had actually increased and was estimated at US$300 million over the next five year period. In addition to the problem of the chronic shortfall of budgetary allocations for the maintenance program from planned levels, maintenance training has been unsuccessful and no progress has been made on axle load control. 4.02 In view of the difficulty of assuring the availability of funds for maintenance, Bank involvement in highway maintenance in Senegal should preferably be in the framework of a broad agreement in which infrastructure investment and maintenance funding priorities and allocations are clearly spelled out. The - 11 - creation of a Road Fund dedicated to maintenance has proven not to be sufficient to guarantee the availability of funds, even when funding levels are agreed. 4.03 In times of severe economic problems, such as Senegal experienced during the execution of the two projects, no amount of planning and priority setting would assure the availability of funds. But a broad agreement might make it feasible to scale down the road maintenance program if the needs of higher priority projects dictated this and channel loan funds to those higher priority uses. Similarly, if needed and agreed action on such pre-requisites for effective road maintenance as axle load control and maintenance training is not forthcoming, loan funds could be diverted to other elements of the broader program that promise better results. 4.04 Even though at the time of appraisal of Highways IV the enforcement of axle load regulations was considered a sone qua non for the project, there is no evidence that any serious attention was paid to the matter afterwards. In any case, ten years later weighing scales are still not in use and no enforcement is being attempted. This is not unique to this project but symptomatic of many other Bank financed highway projects. If the Bank wants to preserve its credibility on this issue, the aud.t recommends that it consider postponing lending until adequate control mechanisms are in effect or, alternatively, if appropriate control is not considered feasible, insisting on increased road design standards to reflect expected usage. 4.05 In contrast to the seemingly indifferent atticude toward axle load control, maintenance training received much attention and repeated efforts were made to make it work. The lack of success should not lead to abandonment of the effort. As pointed out in OED's 1988 Annual Review of Project Performance Results in Transport, the development of maintenance capacity is a long term process. Maintenance projects should preferably be set in a 15 to 20 year framework, gradually increasing coverage and sophistication in step with the Borrower's development. Changing the attitude toward maintenance is a long term endeavor and a continued, broadly corceived training program is essential to the effort. 向