Senegal - Third Education Project

Doc The Wo MCR ICH COPY FOR OFFICI Report No. 10044- SE Ty pe: (F'F R) BARIWERO, / X21757 / T901!-1/ OEDDI Report No. 10044 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 908-SE AND SAC 11-SE) OCTOBER 31, 1991 Operaticns Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of currency Franc communaut6 financibre africaine (FCFA) Exchange rates Appraisal year - US$1 - FCFA220 Intervening years - US$1 - FCFA346 Completion year - US$1 - FCFA305 FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER July 1 - June 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Directo.Ceneal .Opeatons Evaluation October 31, 1991 SORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on Uruguay Third Education Prziert (Credit 908-SE and SAC 11-SE) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report on Senegal - Third Education Project (Credit 908-SE and SAC 11-SE)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ABBREVIATIONS BPE - Bureau des projets 6ducation (Education project unit) CCCE - Caisse centrale de coop6ration 6conomique (Economic cooperation fund - France) CEAO - Communaut6 6conomique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (West African Economic Community) CENT - Collbge d'enseignement moyen technique (Lower Secondary Technical School) CESAG - Centre africain d'6tudes sup6rieures en gestion (African Higher Center for Training in Management) CFPP - Centre de formation et de perfectionnement permanent (Vocational training and upgrading center) CNQP - Centre national de qualification professionnelle (National center for vocational training) CQID - Czntre de qualification industrielle de Dakar (Pre-employment vocational training center) DERP - Direction des 6tudes, des ressources humaines et de la planification (Department of Research, Human Resources and Planning) DSGE - Dipl6me sup6rieur de gestion d'entreprises (Master's degree in business administration) EEC - Communaut6 6conomique europ6en (European economic community) ENCR - Ecole nationale des cadres ruraux (National School for Rural Training) ENR - Ecole normale r6gionale (Regional teacher training college) ENSETP - Ecole normale sup6rieure d'enseignement technique et professionnel, autrefois ENSET (Technical teacher training college) ENSUT - Ecole nationale sup6rieure universitaire de technologie, autrefois IUT (National University School of Technology) ESGE - Ecole sup6rieure de gestion des entreprises (Management Training Institute) FAC - Fonde d'aide et de coop6ration (French bilateral aid agency) INDR - Institut national de d6veloppement rural (National College of Agriculture) INEADE - Institut national d'6tude et d'action pour la d6veloppement (National Institute of Education) LT - Lyc6e technique (Technical high school) MDR - Minist6re du d6veloppement rural (Ministry of Rural Development) MEN - Minist4re de 16ducation nationale (Min. of National Education) MEQ - Minist&re de l'6quipement (Ministry of Public Works) MES - Minist6re de l'enseignement sup6rieur (Min.of Higher Education) OED - Operations Evaluation Department ONFP - Office national de formation professionnelle (National Vocational Training office) PCR - Project Completion Report PPAR - Project Performance Audit Report SAC - Special Action Credit SAR - Staff Appraisal Report SEPH - Seardtariat d'6tat & la promotion humaine (Secretariat for Human Resources Development) This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL THIRD EDUCATION PAOJECT (CREDITS 908-SE AND SAC 11-SE) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface 0 . . . . . ... Basic Data Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Evaluation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....vii I. PROJECT GENERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 A. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 B. Previous IDA Assistance to Education . . . . 1 . . . . . 1 C. Project Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 D. Original and Revised Objectives and Content . . . . . . 2 E. Finance Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 F. Implementation Arrangements . . . . ...... . . . . 3 II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 A. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 4 B. Implementation Issues . . . . . . . ..... 5 C. Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ....7 D. Project Management and Borrower Performance. 7 E. IDA Performance . . . . . . . . . . . 8 III. PROJECT OUTCOMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A. Achievement of Objectives . . . . . . . 9 B. Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .16 C. Impact on Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 IV. FINDINGS AND ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , * * 17 B. Lessons . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 ATTACHMENTS 1. Comments from the Minister of National Education, Senegal 21 2. Comments from the Minister of Economy, Finance and Planning, Senegal . . . . . . . . . . .. * 22 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDITS 908-b2 AND SAC 11-SE) PREFACE This is a Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) on the Third Education Project in Senegal (Credits 908-SE and SAC 11-SE), for which Credits of US$22 million (908-SE) and US$4.5 million (SAC 11-SE) equivalent were approved on May 23, 1979. Although the account was officially closed on December 31, 1986, disbursements continued until June 30, 1987, at which time undisbursed balances of US$748,382.55 (908-SE) and US$472,749.15 (SAC 11-SE) were canceled. The Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) was prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and is based on: (a) material in the files of the International Development Association (IDA) including the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) Report No. 2270a-SE, dated May 1, 1979; Minutes of the Meeting of Executive Directors when the Project was presented to the Board; the Development Credit Agreement, dated May 23, 1979; and the Supervision correspondence pertaining to the project; (b) the Project Completion Report (PCR- -OED Repor- No. 7242) dated May 10, 1988; (c) discussions with IDA staff formerly associated with the project; and (d) an Audit Mission to Senegal in February 1991, during which project sites were visited and discussions held with Government officials. The PCR contains a considerable amount of detailed and useful project information. The Audit Mission visited Senegal nearly four years after the Completion Mission and found that some project-assisted institutions were more firmly established than at the time of the PCR. The PPAR therefore updates the conclusions of the PCR in the light of more recent developments and adds further comaents and conclusions on various aspects of project implementation and impact. The OED acknowledges the assistance given to the audit mission by staff of the Ministry of National Education and other project and related institutions. Following customary OED procedures, copies of the draft audit report were sent to the Government and its agencies for commentf,. The Borrower's telexed replies are reproduced in English as Attachments 1 and 2. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDITS 908-SE AND SAC 11-SE) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Apraisal Actual Total project cost (FCFA million) 7,282 10,098 over-run 38.7 Total project cost (US$ million) 33.1 29.3 under-run 11.5 Credit amount 908-SE (US$ million) 22.0 Disbursed 21.3 Cancelled 0.7 Repaid 0.3 Outstanding at 2.19.91 21.3 Credit amount SAC 11-SE (US$ million) 4.5 Disbursed 3.1 1/ Cancelled 0.5 1/ Repaid 0.0 Outstanding at 2.19.91 3.1 Date physical components completed 9/82 5/87 Proportion completed by above date (%) 95 Months since credit signature 40 96 Time over-run (%) 140 Date overall project completed 6/84 5/87 Proportion completed by above date (%) 97 Months since credit signature 61 96 Time over-run (%) 57 1/ Discrepancy between credit (US$4.5 million) and total of disbursements and cancelled (US$3.6 million) is due to exchange rate changes between US$ and the currencies of the SAC credit. - iv - CUMUATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (USS MILLION) zY 80 81 82 83 84 85 66 87 908-SE Appraisal Estimate 1.95 8.05 17.45 20.65 22.00 Actual 0.69 2.71 6.68 10.21 11.92 13.07 15.83 21.25 Actual as 2 of Appraisal (2) 35 34 38 so 54 59 72 97 SAC 11-SE Appraisal Estimate 2.25 4.50 Actual - - 0.80 1.86 1.89 1.96 2.04 3.09 A4tual as 2 of Appraisal (Z) - 18 41 42 44 45 87 OTHER PROJECT DATA Item Original Revisions Actual First mention in files November 1975 Government application No information Negotiations 4/9-12/79 Board approval 5/15/79 Credit agreement date 5/23/79 Effectiveness date 8/16/79 Project completion 6/30/84 5/31/87 Closing date 12/31/84 12/31/86 12/31/86 Final disbursement 6/30/87 Borrower Republic of Senegal Executing agency Ministry of Equipment/ Ministry of National Education Follow-on projects (i) (ii) Name Regional management Primary education school (CESAG) development project Credit number 1638-SE 1735-SE Amount(US$ million) 5.5 12.0 Credit agreement date 1/7/86 9/9/87 - v - MISSION DATA Mission Sent by Month/ No. of No. of Staff Date of yeai Weeks Persons Ka euort Sector Study UNESCO 10-11/76 4.0 6 (A,E,GE,TE, 24.0 6/77 2AE) Identification IDA 7/77 2.0 7 (A,2E,GE, 6.9 8/77 AE,TE, LO Ident./Prepa. IDA 10/77 2.3 4 (E,GE,TE, 7.1 11/77 AE) Prep./Appr. UNESCO/IDA 2/78 1.3 2 (A,E) 2.3 2/78 Pre-appraisal IDA 4/78 2.0 3 (AvE,TE) 6.0 5/78 Appraisal IDA 6/78 2.6 8 (2A,GE,HE, 18.0 5/79 AE,TE,E,LO) Post-appraisal IDA 11/78 2.1 3 (A,E,GE) 6.4 12/78 Pre-negotiat. IDA 2/79 1.4 1 (E) 1.4 2/79 Total 17.7 72.1 Supervision I IDA 6/79 1.6 2 (A,E) 3.1 8/79 Supervision II IDA 12/79 1.1 3 (A,E,GE) 3.4 1/80 Supervision III IDA 6-7/80 1.4 2 (A,GE) 2.9 9/80 Supervision IV IDA 10/80 0.9 1 (E) 0.9 11/80 Supervision V IDA 1/81 1.6 1 (E) 1.6 2/81 Supervision VI IDA 6-7/81 1.4 2 (AE,GE) 2.3 8/81 Supervision VII IDA 9-10/81 2.7 2 (A,E) 3.6 10/81 Supervision VIII IDA 4-5/82 2.4 5 (A,E,TE,GE, 2.0 6/82 HE) Supervision IX IDA 11/82 1.3 3 (A,E,AE) 2.9 1/83 Supervision X IDA 3/83 1.0 1 (E) 1.0 4/83 Supervision XI IDA 10/83 1.9 3 (A,E,GE) 2.3 11/83 Supervision XII IDA 3-4/84 2.4 2 (A,E) 0.7 4/84 Supervision XIII IDA 7/84 2.0 3 (2A,GE) 2.1 8/84 Supervision XIV IDA 1/85 2.4 5 (A,E,TE,GE, 3.4 2/85 AE) Supervision XV IDA 6-7/85 3.0 2 (A,E) 0.7 9/85 Supervision XVI IDA 11/85 0.9 1 (E) 0.7 12/85 Supervision XVII IDA 4/86 1.1 1 (A) 1.1 4/86 Supervision XVIII IDA 3/87 0.1 1 (A) 0.1 3/87 Total 27.3 32.9 Completion UNESCO 3/87 2.0 3 (A,2GE) 6.0 10/87 Code: A - architect E - economist AE - agricultural educator GE - general educator ME - management training specialist TE - technical educator LO - loan officer ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS (908-SE) (US$ million) Category Original Actual allocation disbursements 1A Civil works 4.2 5.0 18 Civil works 1.9 1.7 2 Professional fees 0.8 1.2 3 Furniture 0.6 0.6 4 Equipment 3.4 4.4 5 Technical assistance 6.1 8.1 6 Fellowships 0.5 0.1 7 Special account 0.4 0.1 8 Project preparation facility 0.2 0.1 9 Unallocated 3.9 - Canceled 0.7 Total 22.0 22.0 ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS (SAC 11-SE) (US$ million) Categom Origin Actual allocation disbursements 1 Civil works 2.7 2.5 2 Equipment and vehicles 0.9 0.5 3 Furniture 0.3 0.1 4 Unallocated 0.6 - Canceled 0.5 4.5 3.6 1/ I/ Discrepancy between credit (US$4.5 million) and total of disbursements and cancelled (US$3.6 million) is due to exchange rate changes between the USS and the currencies of the SAC credit. -vii - PROJECT PERFOLV1ANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDITS 908-SE AND SAC 11-SE) EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Introduction August of the same year. In In the late 1960s, the two addition, the French Caisse Centrale chief problems of the Senegalese de Coopdration Economique (CCCE) education system were identified as agreed to joint financing of the the weak relationship between the civil works for the National existing system and the needs of the Institute for Rural Development modern economy, and very low primary (INDR) and to parallel financing for enrollment rates, especially in rural other expenditures on this component, areas. The first IDA-supported a total of 51: of the component project (Cr. 253-SE, approved June costs. The Government agreed to 1971) financed improvements to the provide the equivalent of U$2.1 quality and capacity of technical and million or 6.3% of project costs. agricultural education. The second The total actual project cost at IDA-supported project (Cr. 530-SE, completion in US dollars was February 1975) provided assistance to estimated at US$29.3, an under-run of meet manpower needs in industy, 11.5%. In local currency terms the fisheries and tourism, to diversify actual cost was estimated to be secondary education, and to set up an FCFA10,098 million, an over-run of experimental low-cost rural education 38.7%. program. 2. Objectives The Third Education Project was identified in July 1977. After The project sought to build up preparation involving three missions, institutions as well as enhance the two from IDA (October 1977 and April quality and relevance of education 1978) and one from Unesco (February and training in a variety of areas. 1978), it was appraised in June 1978. Within this context, it had the The total project cost was estimated following main objectives: (a) at US$33.1 million, including a strengthening education research and foreign exchange component of US$20.9 planning, emphasizing the development million, or 63.1% of the total of cost reduction policies at the estimated cost. An IDA Credit of primary level; (b) improving primary US$22.0 million equivalent, and a teacher training and testing the use Credit of the Special Action Account of national languages in lower (established with ftxnds contributed primary schools; (c) improving the by the Member States of the European quality of technical teacher Economic Community) of US$4.5 m.Lllion training; (d) expanding and improving equivalent, were approved and signed vocational training; (e) providing in May 1979, and became effective in university level agricultural -viii- training; and (f) providing middle- was a reflection of the quality of and high-level management training. the staff concerned at particular An amendment to the Credit Agreement institutions. in November 1982 includedt development of a practice school at Toward the end of project and construction of primary implementation (1986), the project classrooms in the area of the teacher unit was transferred to the Ministry training college; renovations to the of National Education (MEN) where it vocational training center and the is implementing the Fourth Project technical schools; and additional and preparing a fifth project with facilities at INDR. apparent success. It is regrettable that 4Lts transfer took place so late 3. Implementation Experience in the implementation of the project under audit. The Project Implementation Unit (BPE), situated in the Ministry of IDA supervision missions Public Works (MEQ), had been visited Senegal about every 5 months responsible for implementing the throughout implementation. first two ptojects (both of which Continuity of both supervisory emphasized hardware) and was made personnel and project management responsible for implementation of the staff was excellent and contributed third. Its performance on this greatly to the reasonably smooth project was spotty. On the whole, implementation experience, although civil works components were well greater input by technical educators implemented and, although there was a and financial analysts was merited. considerable time over-run (about four and a half years or 140%), this 4. Results was largely caused by changes in the project description and inclusion of Judged in aggregate, project classrooms near the Kolda teacher outcomes were satisfactory overall. training college. Other project Judged separately, individual elements were less well managed owing component results were mixed. The to the remoteness of the BPE from the .rimary education component, which :-er ministries and the somewhat itself had several parts, was largely cumbersome administrative structure. successful. The Ministry of Most of the equipment was Education planning capacity was appropriate, with only a few minor strengthened as anticipated. A criticisms. Implementation of National Institute of Education technical assistance was mixed. It (INEADE) was 3et up and, although was quantitatively adequate for most initially affected by administrative components but better consultation problems, it has become effective. would have resulted in more During 1988/89 it organized 41 appropriate terms of reference and training courses, a total of 5,032 more effective use. The fellowships person days of training at a cost of were considerably under-utilized, FCFA9.3 million. By November 1990, apparently owing to communications it had produced 117 publications, problems, the fact that some staff including studies, reports and did not have the background primary school books written qualifications to qualify for them specifically for Senegal. The study and the substitution of bilateral of the use of national languages for aid. To a substantial extent, the the first two years of primary level of success in implementation education has been held up because of - ix- the lack of the necessary policy equipment, but, after nearly ten decisions, but action was expected to years, much of it is becoming be taken shortly. The primary obsolete. There were other problems teacher training college was as well. The per student cost of producing a steadily increasing this type of e&ucation is high-- number of trained teachers, although nearly three times as much as general the audit noted that the education. Moreover, it seems that staff/student ratio (1987/8) of 1 to very few graduates of the technical 9 was too high. The quality of its high schools actually go directly programs was strengthened through the into industry; the majority prefer to construction of the 82 (out of the 86 pursue higher education, where their intended) primary school classrooms. advantage over those from general schools is marginal. The vocational training Although the quality of its instituge was functioning very training is relevant to the sector effectively, with good links to and practical, the agricultural employers and a large measure of college has had many difficulties due self-financing for the in-service to management problems, and in training courses. The national particular, to the under-utilization office for coordination of vocational of facilities and consequent training did not benefit from the exorbitant per student costs. At the technical assistance and was in fact time of audit, the problem of excess established after project completion. capacity was being tackled by The delay in the establishment of introducing in-service training. this institution appears to have been Nevertheless, it remained a very due to technical and political expensive institution. controversy during the period of the project. By the time the audit mission 5. Sustainabilitvy was in the field, the manaagement training school had already been As with the results, the transformed under a subsequent Bank- sustainability of the project financed project into a highly elements varied from component to effective regional school, serving component. The National Institute almost all countries of francophone for Education, currently assist2d Africa. The quality of training was under the Fourth Project, occupies a excellent, the school partly self- key role in the development of financing, and the teaching staff was primary education, which has been heavily involved with consulting work afforded a high priority by the in addition to its teaching Government. Its future appears responsibilities. secure, especially if it continues to be productive. Since the demand for The technical education primary teachers is subetantial and component constructed a technical likely to remain so for some time, teacher training college and the teacher training college appears strengthened the existing university to have an equally assured role. technical institute, but these two schools have been insufficiently The successful vocational integrated. The two technical high training institute is moving toward a schools were assisted with better degree of self-financing which would give it a measure of independence occupy a key role in rural manpower from what is probably the most development. important constraint to educational development--the lack of recurrent funding. Similarly, the management 6. Findings and Lessons training school, though still anxious about recurrent funding, is This was an ambitious project fulfilling an increasingly important which started out with a large number international role, and with a of divergent objectives and ended up growing world movement emphasizing that way, adding even more components the importance of the private sector, during implementation. The scope of its role would appear to be even more the project was daunting, covering firmly assured than other project- five sub-sectors. The project financed institutions. included not only the hardy perennial of technical and vocational training, By contrast, the prevailing but also relative newcomers like emphasis on cost containment must primary education and management surely affect thinking about the role training. In addition to its broad of the technical schools, which and somewhat innovative scope, it currently constitute a very expensive required the promulgation of laws and way of preparing students for higher decrees establishing no less than education. If their role is to be four of the institutions it changed, this will in turn affect the supported. Although there were output of the technical teacher delays in finalizing these training college which serves them. arrangements, that the institutions Although there is fresh thinking were established at all was a major about the need for increased accomplishment. integration between this college and the higher technical institute (on With regard to administrative which it depends for much of its design, the fundamental error at practical facilities), its future appraisal was to place the project will have to be completely re- unit in the MEQ, where in fact, it fashioned in the event that technical had functioned reasonably well for schools undergo some sort of the previous two projects. What the transformation. appraisal team failed to realize was that, although civil works was still a substantial element, the clear The agricultural college, after intention of the project (with high a long period of managerial technical assistance and fellowship difficulties and considerable under- categories) was to become much more enrollment, is being sustained but involved with software than hitherto. not adequately utilized. This This being the case, the project unit institution needs to make strenuous would have been better placed in the efforts to adopt a wider role, MEN from the beginning. including broadening its range of training programs beyond the strictly After two projects which high level agronomist training emphasized assistance to the manpower currently offered. This could problems faced by the Senegalese include merging with an institute education system, it is rather offering lower level agricultural surprising that the appraisal mission training. If it succeeds in allocated only 23% of this project to broadening its mandate, it would the other major ?roblem namely low - xi - primary enrollment ratios. As The audit found that the amended to include the practice present arrangement between the school at Kolda and the 82 primary ENSETP and the ENSUT promoted classrooms, the project actually did administrative complexity and rather more for this subsector than inefficiency, and suggests thet was originally envisaged. consideration be given to integrating the two institutions. Consideration At the time of appraisal, a should also be given to the future middle level agricultural training role of the technical high schools college at Bambey (ENCR) was in supported under the project which do existence. The audit feels that an not seem to be serving their primary investment to upgrade and expand this purpose at present. school Vould have been much more prudent than the creation of an entirely new school, the principal problem of which at the time of the audit was its under-utilization. - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM SENEGAL THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDITS 908-SE AND SAC 11-SE) I. PROJECT GENERATION A. Back&round 1.01 In the late 1960s, the Bank Group identified the main weaknesses of the Senegalese educational system as being: (a) weak linkage between the system and the needs of the modern sector; and (b) low primary enrollment rates, especially in rural areas. In late 1976, Unesco carried out a sector study which showed that primary enrollments were 32% of the age-group and that serious shortages of trained manpower prevailed. Thus, the same problems had persisted. The Country Program Paper of 1978 identified a 'de facto low priority for education of the rural population..'. It may be deduced that the Bank was well aware of the problems of the system in which great emphasis on the upper levels of the system had been given with consequent insufficient priority to the primary subsector. 1.02 Responsibility for education was primarily distributed among three education ministries: National Education (or MEN, covering general, technical and vocational levels), Higher Education (or MES), and Human Resource Development (or SEPH, covering non-formal education). In addition, six other ministries conducted training in their particular fields. School construction was the sole responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works (MEQ, SAR para. 1.09), although a school building section was developed in the MEN in 1978. B. Previous IDA Assistance to Education 1.03 Apart from project-related training, IDA had assisted two projects in Senegal to develop the education system through: (a) expansion of educational opportunities at the primary level; (b) diversification of secondary education; and (c) technician training. The First Project (Cr.253-SE) supported agricultural and industrial technician training. 1 The Second Project (Cr.530- SE) concentrated on modern sector manpower needs through provision of technical and science facilities for secondary schools and vocational training for industry, fisheries and the hotel trade.!' One element in the Second Project also supported law cost rural youth training and a study of alternatives to primary education. Thus, IDA support was heavily biased toward the modern sector; only marginal assistance was given to develop primary education. if This project has been completed and audited. (See PPAR for Senegal: Technical and Agricultural Education Project; OED Report #2231, October 1978). it This project has been completed and audited. (See PPAR for Senegal: Second Education Projectl OED Report #6541, December 1986). -2- C. Project Generation 1.04 With this as the background, an Identification Mission went to Senegal in July 1977, with follow-up missions three and seven months later. The initial project proposal included items in five different fields: (a) four in technical education (of which three were eventually retained); (b) four in vocational training (of which two remained in the prc.ject, but one was not implemented); (c) two in agricultural education (of which one survived); (d) one in management training (which was retained); and (e) two non-formal items (both of which were dropped). Primary education was not specifically included, although it was considered as a possibility. 1.05 There wers five missions during the following year (i.e., between February 1978 and February 1979), including both appraisal and post-appraisal. During this time, project objectives and the number of components were refined to nine items in five major areas (primary, technical, vocational, agricultural and management). From its negligible beginning, support for primary education grew to become one of the most important components of the project. D. Oriainal and Revised Obiectives and Content 1.06 The overall aims of the project as stated at appraisal emphasized institution building and improving the quality and relevance of education and training (SAR para. 1.40). The specific project objectives were to: (a) expand research and planning capacity to improve cost effectiveness and expand institutional capacity, especially at primary level; (b) improve quality of primary education through better teacher training and the use of national languages; (c) expand and improve training of technical teachers; (d) expand and improve vocational training; (e) provide university level agricultural education; and (f) provide middle- and high-level management training. 1.07 In its final agreed form, the project included: (a) development of a National Institute of Education (INEADE) and support for educational planning; (b) development of a primary teacher training college (ENR) for 240 students at Kolda; (c) development of a technical teacher training college (ENSETP) adjacent to the existing higher technical college (ENSUT), together with some support for ENSUT; (d) equipment for two technical high schools (LTs); (e) improvement of the vocational training center (CNQP); (f) assistance for the national training office (ONFP); (g) development of an agricultural college (INDR); and (h) development of a management training institute.!' ENSETP was to be constructed adjacent to ENSUT to maximize coordination of programs between the two institutions. The in-service and pre-service vocational training institutes, located on adjacent campuses, would be fused. The Government gave assurances that the four new institutions to be established under the project would be legally constituted (SAR para. 6.01). A full description of project components is given in the SAR (para. 2.01) and the PCR (para. 1. 05). -3- E. Finance Plan 1.08 The project was eatimated to cost US$33.1 million. The financing arrangements were complex and involved a number of parties. In May 1979, the Board approved an IDA credit for US$22 million equivalent, or 66% of the total estimated cost, and concunrently approved a Special Action Account Credit (SAC) of US$4.5 million equivalent, about 14% of the total estimated cost. These latter funds had been contributed in the nine different currencies of the member states of the EEC, and were to support the primary and technical education components only. The French Caisse Centrale de Coop6ration Economique (CCCE) agreed to contribute US$4.5 million (another 14%) for joint financing of civil works and parallel financing for the other expenditures at the agricultural college, totalling roughly one half of the estimated total cost of this component. The Government contribution was the equivalent of US$2.1 million, or 6% of the total estimated cost. The project was expected to be completed by June 1984 and the Credit Account to be closed in December 1984. 1.09 At Board presentation, there were three principal areas of concern: recurrent costs, physical implementation problems and the use of local languages. The Board was concerned about the generation of high incremental recurrent costs as a result of unfavorable teacher/student ratios (especially in rural areas), the relatively high cost of primary teachers, and the costly use of expatriate teachers at upper secondary and tertiary levels. Previous projects had experienced physical problems causing delays in implementation. Interest was expressed in the proposed experiment in the use of local languages for primary education, though there was some reservation about the possible practical difficulties which might occur. The staff responsible for project development gave an assurance that these considerations had been taken into account in project generation. F. Implementation Arrangements 1.10 Implementation arrangements were as complex as the project design and the financing arrangements. The First and Second Education Projects had been implemented by the BPE, the project unit established in the MEQ, which was expected to be responsible for the administration and supervision of physical implementation of the Third Project as well (SAR para. 4.02). The ministries of education (MEN) and higher education (MES) were expected to designate a senior officer to act as sub-director to advise the MEQ project director on software issues, while the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR) was expected to provide assistance for the technical aspects of the agricultural college. The Special Action Account was established with funds contributed by the member states of the European Economic Community (EEC), with IDA acting as administrator. -4- II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION A. Overview 2.01 Since the project unit had been functioning for several years by the time the Third Project was approved, it was relatively well established and the start-up of the project was fairly smooth. The Credit became effective in August 1979, three months after it had been approved. Some delays were noted in the appointment of the procurement specialist and the accountant. 2.02 On the whole, the hardware components were efficiently administered, even with the expanded scope that the project acquired during implementation. Constructed areas at completion were an average of 34.1% in excess of appraisal estimates, and this was achieved at a cost about 16% less than appraised in terms of US dollars (see PCR, Annexes 3 and 8). Equipment and furniture were in most cases judged to be appropriate and cost 14% and 26% less, respectively, than anticipated. The software components were less efficiently administered. Although the amount of technical assistance used approximated appraisal estimates and cost about 8% less, the distribution of its use differed from what was planned. The project unit used 23% more, primary education 39% less, and technical education 100% less of specialist services than estimated at appraisal. The overall scholarship utilization was only 41% of appraisal expectation (PCR Annex 6). 2.03 Owing to the greatly increased value of the dollar in local currency terms, it became apparent fairly early in implementation that there would be surplus funds available from the Credits, allowing for a potential increase in project scope. The Government petitioned IDA, and amendments to the Credit Agreement were signed which altered project scope but did not alter project objectives. An amendment of November 16, 1982, allowed for: (a) development of a practice teaching school at the primary teacher training college at Rolda, using a partly built hostel no longer required for that purpose;l' and (b) construction of 66, and later 86, primary classrooms in the region of the Kolda institution to provide additional facilities for teaching practice. In a subsequent modification, three items were added: (a) for the agricultural college, a practice farm (which had been omitted from the project during preparation) was reinstated and boundary walls and other facil4ties were added; (b) additional construction at the two technical high schools (LTs); and (c) additional renovations at the vocational training center (CNQP). 2.04 Project completion was delayed two and a half years, in part because of the cumbersome project management arrangements--which were altered midway through the project--but mainly because of the items added to the project. The construction of the 86 classrooms in the area surrounding the ENR at Kolda took considerable time. Eventually, a total of 82 classrooms were constructed with IDA financing. The additional construction at the agricultural college and the two technical high schools was not started until 1984, and the additional A hostel for the teacher training college was under construction when the Government policy changed to preclude the provision of such facilities (PCR para. 3.06). -5- renovation at CNQP until 1985, so a delay in completion of the considerably expanded project was inevitable. B. Implementation Issues 2.05 Construction. Site acquisition for project institutions was not a problem, although the Kolda ENR was situated too far from the town and much time was wasted time in travelling once the hostel was eliminated. Architectural services were generally satisfactory, with the exception of one item (LT Delafosse, PCR para. 3.05). Although the design received international recognition and acclaim at the time, the audit questions whether the innovative type of construction used for the primary school classrooms was worthwhile, given the many problems it faced. Stabilized earth was used with a system of vaults and arches, with the objective of bringing down costs. Certainly, this much was achieved.!' However, the design proved inadequate and it was necessary to underpin the foundations. Furthermore, two of the sites intended for brickworks proved unsuitable, and so bricks had to be transported as much as 350km-- certainly at a higher unit cost for these facilities than intended or desirable. 2.06 The PCR reviews issues concerning construction (paras. 3.03 - 3.16), and the audit agrees with the PCR views. The PCR lists several shortcomings in construction from which important lessons can be learnt and which the audit would like to underscore. First, adequate supervision is essential if innovative construction methods are to succeed. Secondly, renovation work in existing institutions is better carried out during school vacations, although clearly this cannot always be achieved. Thirdly, air-conditioning at the technical teacher training college (ENSETP) and electrical fittings at the agricultural college were too sophisticated and difficult to maintain because of problems with spare parts. The ease of maintenance and the availability of spares or replacements should be a prime factor in selection of such fittings. In fact, all plans for construction should bear in mind the likely scarcity of maintenance funds. 2.07 Furniture and Equipment. Furniture (PCR para. 3.17) seen by the audit in institutions visited appeared to be still in good condition and appropriate to the needs of the users. The PCR (para. 3.20) summarized the shortcomings of the equipment purchased with project finance. The audit mission found institution directors and project staff in general agreement that the procurement specialist did a very good job and the equipment was suitable (subject to a few criticisms). 2.08 The audit mission noted that the perennial problem of adequate preventive maintenance was not properly addressed in the ex post period. The audit felt it was a three way issue--of adequate budgetary provision, training, and proper management. What seemed to be needed was to develop a comprehensive preventive maintenance plan, training and maintaining an effective cadre of maintenance technicians, and providing recurrent funds to enable the technicians Although primary school classrooms are among the simplest facilities (and certainly simpler than any other institutions included in the project), the audit noted that the cost of the primary clasroome was less than half the cost of any other project institution on a per square meter baais (PCR Annex 5). - 6 - to function. The audit noted that the agricultural college had made a start by developing a maintenance team. 2.09 At the time of the audit visit some of the equipment had been in place for nearly a decade. Even if well maintained, much of it was becoming obsolete. All technical training institutions face a double bind which is particularly serious in African countries. This is the very high per-pupil costs attendant upon the high instructional costs combined with the need to upgrade equipment periodically before it becomes ineffective as a teaching aid. 2.10 Specialist Assistance. The PCR estimates that out of a total of about 95 staff years of expatriate technical assistance included in the project, almost exactly the same amount (96 staff years) was used. This aggregate picture, however, does not portray the whole reality. In fact, the primary education component used much less than intended (about 6 out of the 34 staff years included). All other components used more than the appraised estimate, except for the technical education component, which used none of the 6 years allocated to it. One explanation for this under-utilization was the poor communication between the project unit and those responsible for the primary and technical education components. The quality of staff responsible for individual components may also have been an important factor. 2.11 Fellowships. The PCR (para. 3.21) estimates that, out of 77 staff years of fellowships, only 13 were used. It appears that fellowships were under- utilized for the same reason as specialist assistance. The National Institute of Education was particularly in need of fellowships at the time of the audit, and staff regretted having lost the opportunities. Additional reasons for under- utilization were the substitution of bilateral assistance, and the fact that many INEADE staff did not possess the necessary background qualifications. 2.12 Reporting and Auditing. The PCR (para. 2.04) draws attention to delays in submission of disbursement applications and of quarterly reports. The audit notes that a particularly important aspect of reporting which may not have been adequately monitored is the financial auditing, the covenant in the Credit Agreement notwithstanding. When the project unit moved into the MEN, accounts were so inadequate that certain information had to be brought from IDA headquarters. Even after project completion, the UNESCO completion mission had problems obtaining the financial information required. Both the Completion and audit missions received considerable help from the project unit and staff of other project institutions in sorting out project financing issues, but it was nearly impossible to reconstruct the financial picture fully at this time and distance from the project. The audit notes that the monitoring of financial accounts is in the interest of the Borrower, who needs such information to draw conclusions about the absolute cost of the project and the relative costs (and merits) of different investments. 2.13 Another area where Borrower participation could have been strengthened was completion reporting. It is very important that the Government play a major role in assessing the impact of the investment. This may not always be easy because Government personnel normally have very full work schedules; but active participation in the drawing of conclusions at the completion stage should be.regarded as a task equal in importance to project implementation. -7- C. Costs 2.14 The total projact cost was estimated at US$33.1 million, which was to be financed by IDA (US$22.0 million equivalent), the EEC Special Action Account (US$4.5 million equivalent), CCCE (US$4.5 million equivalent) and the Government (US$2.1 million). The actual project cost was estimated at US$29.3 million, an under-run of 11.5% in terms of US dollars.z/ In local currency terms, the cost was FCFA10,098 million, an over-run of 38.7%. 2.15 The reason for this apparent discrepancy was the fluctuation of the value of the FCFA in relation to the US dollar. The increase of the dollar against the FCFA was so significant that at one point the exchange rate was US$1 - FCFA346, an increase of 57% over the US$1 - FCFA220 rate at appraisal. 2.16 These fluctuations had a number of impacts on the project. On the one hand, the increasing dollar (accompanied by IDA's willingness to entertain a larger project) enabled the Government to considerably expand the scope and increase constructed area by 34% overall. On the other hand, monies from some other financing sources (including the Government) effectively purchased less. The SAC credit, for example, was made in a pool of 9 European currencies which at the time of signing was equivalent to US$4.5 million. While the Government gained from the rising value of the dollar in FCFA terms--as far as the IDA credit was concerned--the FCFA (which is linked to the French franc), remained more or less at par with the currencies in which the SAC credit was signed, resulting in a reduction in dollar terms of about US$0.9 million. (This explains the apparent discrepancy with the EEC funds.) The Government also had trouble meeting its financing requirement. Fortunately, the Government was able to obtain a loan from OPEC which made up for the shortfall (PCR para. 4.12). D. Project Manasement and Borrower Performance 2.17 The project unit remained in the Ministry of Public Works, with the Director of Public Works as Project Director, throughout most of the implementation period. Although the MEQ project unit was responsible for project administration (particularly civil works and bid preparation for equipment and furniture, but also administration of technical assistance and fellowships), implementation of educational aspects was delegated to sub-directors in MEN and MES. This arrangement did not work out well in practice. Between 1983-86, implementation of the technical and vocational education components fell under the office of the under-secretary for technical education, at which point that office was abolished and all responsibility absorbed into MEN in January 1986. As the PCR details, there was good continuity of staffing until 1985, at which time there was an almost complete change of staff.J This was occasioned at least in part because of the change in Ministry from MEQ to MEN at the end of 1985. 1 The PCR (paras. 4.01 - 4.14) discusses the project costs in more detail. i1 The PCR gives details of the tenure of project staff (PCR Annex 1). 2.18 The complex administrative structure, combined with the diversity of the project and its expanded scope, occasioned some delays in construction. But the major obstacle was that the Ministry of Public Works, which had a good understanding of construction, nonetheless had a poor understanding of the software needs of education. The network of sub-directore intended to overcome these problems was unable to do so. Specific shortcomings of the arrangements included insufficient consultation on: (a) terms of reference for and selection of technical assistants; and (b) the use of fellowships. The main problem was the implementation of the primary education component. Due to the administrative structure of the project and the lack of interest by project management in what was essentially a software component- -together with an apparent lack of realization on the part of the sub-director in charge of implementating this part of the project that he had to take the necessary action--this component was much delayed and accomplished very little until 1983 (PCR evaluation summary para. iv). Another factor of considerable importance in explaining the patchy implementation achievement was the variable quality of the staff responsible in the different institutions. 2.19 It is clear from the perspective of four years after project completion that leaving the project unit in the MEQ (where it had operated for two previous projects) was an error. At the time the project was prepared it was not fully appreciated that it had a much higher software content than its predecessors, where the views of the institutional educators would be essential to ensuring optimal project outcomes. Once this was realized, IDA supervision missions began to propose this change, and eventually the project unit was moved into MEN. Project outcomes might have been better if this had been accomplished at an earlier stage. E. IDA Performance 2.20 Concurring with the view of the PCR, the audit felt that the fundamental problems haunting the project throughout implementation had their roots in faulty project generation (PCR para. 5.01). There were three main shortcomings in project design over which IDA could have had some influence. The first stemmed from undertaking a project of considerable complexity despite the acknowledged difficulties experienced in two previous projects. The second arose from failing to recognize that the project as developed was heavily oriented toward software, while responsibility for its implementation remained with a ministry mainly concerned with hardware. The sub-directors of the relevant Ministries were appointed as intended, but in some cases they did not have sufficient influence on the activities of the MEQ, or did not appreciate the necessity to take action, and there was no one in the project unit in the MEQ responsible for educational aspects. Finally, several aspects of the project were not achieved and their inclusion may have been premature. The audit noted that: (a) a dozen years after Credit Signature the necessary fundamental policy decisions have not yet been made on national languages in primary education and (b) the national vocational training office (ONFP) did not benefit from technical assistance from the project because it did not come into being until a year after project completion. In the case of ONFP, all the decrees necessary for its creation were ready at the time of appraisal and it was reasonable to assume that early implementation would take place. After nearly a decade of controversy, the decision has now been made and the institution established. It is invariably -9- difficult to judge whether a component should or should not be included in a project when the final decision has not been made at a political lovel. 2.21 Supervision mi.ssions visited Senegal on an average every 5 months throughout the implementation period of the project, which was fairly frequent. Apart from a gap of 11 months between the last two missions prior to Completion, when most project activities had been completed except those introduced when the Credit Agreement was amended, the maximum interval between supervision missions was 7 months. Of the 18 IDA supervision miasions, 12 included an architect and 13 an economist. Eight missions had either a general or an agricultural educator on them; a technical educator participated in only two supervision missions, a fact that both the PCR and audit find contributed to the poor performance of that component. 2.22 Notwithstanding that additional participation of educators was merited, supervision from headquarters was generally satisfactory. After its establishment, tLe Bank Resident Mission also assumed an important fuuction in institutional development of the MEN. The audit feels that the structural problems related to project administration could have caused even more serious delays than those which did occur had it not been for the frequent and careful monitoring by IDA. III. PROJECT OUTCOMES A. Achievement of Objectives 3.01 Primary Education. At the earliest stages of project development-- when 13 other sub-components were under consideration--primary education was mentioned as an additional possibility. At some point during the preparation of this project it was recognized that insufficient attention had been devoted to reversing the low primary enrollment rates which had been in evidence since the 1960s and which the Bank itself had recognized as one of the main priorities in developing the sector. 3.02 The component which emerged had two main objectives, essentially improving educational research/planning and expanding/improving the primary system. These it set out to achieve through four sets of activities, each of which had its outcomes. Firstly, the National Institute of Education (INEADE) was expected to coordinate educational research and evaluation (SAR para. 2.01). INEADE got off to a slow start, but had improved considerably by the time of audit. The PCR correctly identifies the cause of its initial problems as stemming from: (a) organizational disputes within MEN arising from the fact that INEADE -had to coordinate functions previously carried out elsewhere, (b) low use of technical assistance and (c) non-use of fellowships (PCR para. 6.04). To this may be added the fact that this sub-component, with no construction, was probably of least interest to the project unit in the MEQ; and that educational policies were particularly fluid in the early 1980s. 3.03 At project completion in 1987, it appeared that INEADE had not been very action-oriented (PCR para. 6.06). By the time of the audit, however, the - 10 - achievements were substantial. With assistance from the Fourth Education Project, INEADE has begun to establish a lead role. In 1989, for example, 41 short training courses were conducted for 1,763 persons, a total of 5,032 person dys at a cost of FCFA9.3 million, well under US$10 per day per person. By November 1990, it had produced 117 publications, some of which were textbooks for use in primary schools. 3.04 Secondly, the assistance given to the research and planning directorate (which is outlined in the PCR in para. 6.07-6.10) helped to strengthen that body. At the time of the audit, the statistical and school mapping units set up at regional and departmental inspectorates were still fully operational. With continuing support provided under the Fourth Project, the educational planning and research structure seems well positioned to provide the planning support needed for the expansion of the primary system. 3.05 Thirdly, the study on the use of national languages in primary education did not have any immediate outcome because of policy uncertainties. A commission was set up in 1977, and a series of studies and ccmissions have continued to examine the issues. The audit mission was assured that the necessary decisions were expected shortly and INEADE would be involved in the implementation of these decisions. 3.06 Finally, the teacher training college at Kolda was exceeding appraisal expectations. Although the staff/student ratio was 1:9 at project completion (a rather high figure for such an institution), the number of students has now increased by 68%, so these ratios have improved. The addition of the practice school and the 82 classrooms in schools nearby enabled students to gain supervised teaching experience. All indications are that it is increasing its output and becoming a popular institution. By 1989/90, there were 237 students enrolled, very nearly its capacity of 240.Ai 3.07 The audit noted that, with the current period of structural adjustment, recruitment to the civil service has been halted with the exception of teachers. There is still a strong need for primary teachers, and--given the circumstances--a not surprising concomitant interest by persons wanting to take up that career. In order to meet a host of demands, urgent consideration is being given to the idea of opening the ENR course to those graduating from senior secondary (or "baccalaureate" programs) and giving them one year of additional training, which contrasts with the current practice of taking lower level "brevet" graduates (who have completed grade 10) and giving them four years at the ENR. As the total length of training would be the same, both groups would qualify for the same salary level. 3.08 If implemented, such a proposal could make full use of the project constructed facilities while meeting certain of the country's needs, but the The audit mission received descriptions of INEADE training and publication activities. This material has been retained in OED files. The audit mission was given considerable information regarding the output from the Kolda institution. This has been retained in OED files. - 11 - proposal deserves to be carefully considered in order to weigh the full implications of such a move. Other countries in similar circumstances (i.e., facing pressures of structural adjustment, shrinking civil service ranks, and unemployed college graduates) have tried changing teacher training courses to absorb excess graduates. The resulting output, it has been noted, does not necessarily make a better or more dedicated teacher cadre (the higher level of education notwithstanding), while the more abundant output poses problems of absorption. 3.09 It is important to note that, while primary education was not included in the original design of the project (para. 1.04 above), it became an important component which was considerably expanded and finally led to the development of the fourth project, Cr. 1735-SE (Primary Education Development). This success story can be at attributed least partly to the consistent emphasis placed by IDA supervisory missions on the importance of primary education development in the policy dialogue. 3.10 Technical Education. The technical education component had three parts. Assistance was given to the technical teacher training college (ENSETP); the neighboring higher technical college (ENSUT); and two technical high schools (LTs). The outcome of this component has been disappointing. Although partly due to problems with implementation, the main problems have been organizational and conceptual. 3.11 The audit mission found that the equipment supplied to the LTs was adequate, though the shortage of spare parts and adequate maintenance budgets continued to be a problem, as well as the fact that after some years the equipment was inevitably becoming obsolete. The staff/student ratio was an inefficient 1:6.6, almost exactly the same as at completion, and the proportion of expatriate teachers remained over 50% (PCR para. 6.20). The technical assistance (6 staff years) was not used, and the PCR rightly points out that supervision by a technical educator was insufficient- -only twice during implementation (para. 5.03). Finally, although according to the SAR (para. 1.27) the Government was planning to establish employment-oriented technician training programs, it appeared to the audit that this had never been done. 3.12 The main problem with the LTs have been their failure to achieve what the audit mission presumes was their primary objective (although the SAR was not clear on this), namely, the production of middle level technicians for industry (SAR paras. 1.16 and 1.27). The audit mission was told that less than 10% of those graduating from the LTs go directly into employment in industry. The remaining 90% apparently continue on to higher education--which they could have entered from a general high school without any disadvantage and at about one third of the cost to the country. There is a great need for tracer studies to ascertain whether the external productivity of the LTs is as low as it appeared to the audit mission. As apparently functioning at present, there is a legitimate concern whether this type of school serves any vital purpose in Senegal. 3.13 ENSETP had 184 students when the audit mission visited, making full use of the capacity of 180. The number of foreign students (10%) was not significant. The total output from ENSETP over a 9 year period was 313 (an - 12 - average of 35 per year), of whom 57 were non-Senegalese. With 53 staff, the student:staff ratio was 1: 3.5, which was extremely inefficient. The audit was also struck by the great diversity -..i specializations and the small enrollments in each. In one case (for teachers of horticulture) there were 5 students spread over a 3-year cycle.' 3.14 The neighboring higher technical college (ENSUT) provided much of the practical training for the technical teachers from ENSETP and had been supplied with some equipment by the project. The PCR found a high level of performance at this institution, with good links to industry (PCR para. 6.23). However, the present structure, in which ENSUT is a university institute, while ENSETP is attached to HEN, is not satisfactory. Staff salary differentials also cause problems under the present rather confused arrangement. A rationalization of the structure is merited and would have many advantages, particularly economies of administration and better use of facilities. Furthermore, if the role of the LTs is to be reconsidered, this could imply major changes in the training of teachers at ENSETP. 3.15 Vocational Training. The vocational training institute (CNQP) came into existence as a result of the fusing of two institutions on the same site-- one concerned with long courses (tbree years) and one with short courses (in- service training). The PCR gives a comprehensive description of the activities of CNQP. CNQP started in its present form in 1984. Seven years later, much of the equipment is becoming obsolete and worn out, particularly as it is heavily used.-L" Repairs to workshops carried out under the project were satisfactory at the time, but after several years, additional repairs have become necessary, and adequate recurrent funding for maintenance is lacking. 3.16 It appeared to the audit that this project-supported institution continued to function very effectively in the ex post period, subject to the constraints mentioned. Contacts with industry and the school's response to industry needs appeared to be continuing at a very satisfactory level.13 Nonetheless, CNQP has not yet been able to charge industries that benefit from the in-service training programs at a level that would allow them to replace the extremely expensive machines used for training. 3.17 The National Vocational Training Office (ONFP) was to have received technical assistance financed by the project, but there were considerable delays in its development and it did not in fact come into existence until after the project was completed. .,his delay appears to have been due to political and technical controversy which extended until the several ministries responsible for i' Information regarding ENSETP enrol.lment by course wao given to the audit mission and has been retained in OED files. l The audit mission was given considerable information regarding graduates from pre-service training programs, titles of short courses conducted, and enrollments in the short courses. Titles of the operational modules, designed to respond to the stated needs of industry, were also supplied. This material has been retained in OED files. _l A system of tracer studies had been initiated, but at the time of the audit no results were available. A copy of the tracer survey questionnaire has been retained in OED files. - 13 - different aspects of education were unified in the mid-eighties. Although the audit was given to understand that it was currently operating effectively and playing a very important role in the development of vocational training, in the final analysis it did not benefit from project assistance. 3.18 National Institute for Rural Development. Many problems inhibited the initial development of this agricultural college, including personality problems, delays in recruitment of technical assistance, poor utilization of fellowships, slow recruitment of teachers, delays in delivery of equipment, and problems in securing an adequate operating budget (PCR, para. 6.34). Another factor which contributed to the initial confusion was the involvement of several donor agencies. The INDR was the most costly single component of the project (27.1%). Slightly over half of the cost (51%) was covered by a single donor, the CCCE. In addition to IDA and CCCE, there was participation by Belgium, Canada and the French bilateral aid agency, FAC.L4i While the inputs of these donors were extremely positive and contributed greatly to the development of INDR, the efforts were insufficiently coordinated. 3.19 In retrospect, it is apparent that several important omissions were made in the initial plan for the INDR. Four IDA missions involved in project preparation included agricultural educators; it is not known why these staff allowed such omissions to persist. The most important of these was the farm, an oversight which was eventually redreseed through an amendment to the Credit Agreement (which established a crop area) and an intervention by the Belgian Government (who provided assistance for livestock). At the time of audit, both areas were being well used in the teaching and research programs of the INDR. Another omission was the lack of a lecture theater or other accommodation where groups larger than : class could meet. Houses for teaching staff were also not provided. It is ane opinion of the audit that, where the success of the institution depends largely upon recruitment of good quality staff, and where salary incentives are bureaucratically restricted, other incentives such as attractive housing can and typically do make an important contribution. Finally, there was no provision for sporting facilities apart from a small room in each hostel. 3.20 In general, however, facilities provided were of adequate quality and standard. They were functioning satisfactorily at the time of audit, although some minor inadequacies caused maintenance problems. Electrical fittings were over-sophisticated and difficult to replace, and the audit mission noticed that roofs leaked in several places, indicating a lack of maintenance. 3.21 The quality of education provided by the INDR was high. A great deal of work has been done in recent years to develop a practically oriented curriculum. From 30% practical in the first year, there was an increase to between 65 and 90% in the final year according to specialization. The content of the teaching was relevant and of an appropriate level. In view of its low The degree to which other donors (particularly the CCCE) also oversaw the Implementation of this component is not known. The audit mission was unable to determine their participation, if any, from file research at headquarters or from discussions during the audit mission to Senegal. - 14 - utilization, INDR was developing other activities including in-service training, training of entrepreneurs, seminars, and applied research. Contact has been made at official and unofficial level with a wide range of organizations, both in Senegal and overseas, concerned with rural development. Although no formal tracer studies had been done, it is known that all students except 2 have been employed by the Government, with which they were guaranteed employment. However, the Structural Adjustment Credit from the Bank has resulted in a freezing of recruitment, which implied that the future output from INDR would have to find employment in the private sector. 3.22 The most serious problem faced by the INDR at the time of the audit was its very marked under-utilization, resulting in extremely high unit costs. The SAR quotes a report which estimated that 40 graduates would be required annually. The size of the INDR reflected this, which has proven to be a gross over-estimate. L At the time of the audit the total enrollment in all five years was 31; the total number who had completed the training since the INDR was opened was 51. Enrollments never even reached 50% of the projected levels, although the institution acquired and retained a full complement of staff. The staff/student ratio at the time the PCR was prepared was 1:1.2, and the per student cost was estimated at US$17,670. At the time of the audit there were 9 Senegalese professors and 6 expatriates, which, together with 40 part-time teachers, totaled 55, or a staff:student ratio of 1:0.6. The cost in 1989 was over US$20,000 per student. 3.23 The audit assumes that initial proposals for IDA support to the INDR must have been controversial, and in retrospect, it is difficult to understand how IDA came to support the INDR at all. A note to files dated September 9, 1977, recommended a reduction in length of the course to five years, and a reduction in the number of specializations to five. It was also proposed that the INDR should be situated near Thi&s to facilitate contact with the Senegalese Agricultural Research Institute, which was also in the vicinity of Thi&s at Bambey. Paradoxically, the Ecole National des Cadres Ruraux (ENCR), an institution offering middle level training (Ing6nieur de Travaux) in a three year course, was already established at Bambey. One explanation for establishing an additional agricultural college could have been that there was a basic incompatibility between the two types of training. Indeed, this was suggested at one point by IDA (Supervision Report, January 1985). 3.24 In the view of the audit, no such fundamental incompatibility exists, and it would have been preferable to have combined the two types of training from the outset. In fact, the types of facilities required were very similar (with regard to staff, physical facilities, practice farm, and equipment). Furthermore, selecting the best students from the first level to proceed to higher levels is relatively easy in an integrated training program. The audit noted that two-tier institutions of this nature are found throughout the world, including Africa. Had the ENCR been expanded and upgraded (rather than establishing the INDR separately), there would have been both educational and The project was prepared at a time when the Bank was using manpower estimates based upon theoretical needs rather than actual absorptive capacity. It is very easy to be vise after the event and it might be said that at the time, 40 did not seem an unreasonable figure. - 15 - economic ac.antages. It would have provided an integrated set of courses.1 It would have been far cheaper in terms of recurrent costs. It would have reaped the maximum benefits by being in the proximity of the Agricultural Research Institute, thus facilitating closer cooperation. Finally, the Bank might have been prevailed upon to finance a limited amount of housing for academic staff, thus providing a non-salary incentive. 3.25 Management Training. The management training institute (ESGE) was established as a public institution in 1980 and started operation in 1982, initially administered by MEN and later by MES. Prior to completion of the project under audit, ESGE became the focus of further IDA funding under the Regional Management Training Institute Project, forwhich Cr.1638-SE was approved in November 1985. Under this project ESGE was transformed into the Regional Management School for the West African Economic Community (CESAG). The CESAG objectives and organization were very similar to those of the ESGE which it absorbed. In addition to long and short term training in various aspects of management, it offered consulting services (including providing in-plant training) and undertook applied research. The PCR, whose mission was in the field in March 1987, noted that the institution was in place and was functioning satisfactorily at that time, having made good use of the technical assistance supplied under the Third Project (paras. 6.43-49 and 7.12). 3.26 Given this overlap in institutional objectives and IDA assistance, as well as the passage of time since the completion of the Third Project, it was somewhat difficult to disaggregate the impact of the two projects. It was possible to say that the overall impact had been highly positive. The clear intention of ESGE/CESAG has been to provide a facility where management staff at middle and high levels can be trained. This it has certainly succeeded in doing. The Audit mission found the teaching facilities to be excellent, making maximum use of audio-visual aids. The lecture theater was well equipped by international standards. The hostels, dining facilities, staff office accommodation and so on, are all of a very high standard. It was apparent that the quality of training being offered was also of a high standard. 3.27 CESAG was one of a number of regional institutions developed by the West African Economic Community (CEAO) during the 1980s. Some of these institutions have been subject to administrative problems arising from their regional nature: continuing availability of recurrent funding, agreement among CEAO members on appointment of senior staff, acceptability of student quotas among states, staffing competence and continuity, pedagogical flexibility and so on. To date, CESAG seems to have avoided some of these problems. By charging for many of its training activities, consultant services and so on, CESAG covers much of its running costs. Moreover, after initial problems concerning appointment of the Director, appointments are now less problematical. Staff of high quality have been recruited. The institution is well established and offering relevant management training of good quality. In fact, the best artangement is where the students come in for 3 years and do their more practical type of course (Ing6nieur de Travaux) and then the brightest students--either straight away or after two or three years in the field--come in for a further two years, of possibly more theoretical work, and achieve degrne status (Ing6nieur de Conception). - 16 - 3.28 It could be questioned whether such a sophisticated level of facilities was justified. In view of the greater attention being devoted to developing the private sector by CEAO governments, the audit is of the opinion that management skills at all levels should be developed. If senior managers are to be offered training, both facilities and programs have to be of a very high calibre, in order to attract persons from senior positions as both staff and participants. The CESAG facility seems to be ready to serve this purpose. B. Sustainability 3.29 Prospects for susetainability were quite good for about half of the institutions assisted under this project, particularly those where additional IDA investmen. has been placed since the Third Project. The National Institute for Education (INEADE) has developed in stature since the end of the Third Project and is expected to play a vital role in the evolution of the education system. The teacher training college at Kolda is fully utilized. With the considerable and continuing need for primary teachers, its future seemed assured. The audit mission did not see the primary school classrooms constructed by the project but they seemed to make an important contribution to the development of primary schooling in the Kolda region, as well as to the quality of teacher training. 3.30 In the area of management training, CESAG, the heir of ESGE, appears to be firmly established and actively supported by the member governments. Its cost recovery system encourages relevance and responsiveness to client needs throughout the region, reduces dependence on public coffers, and promises a modicum of autonomy for institution managers. Although risks accrue to its regional status, so do advantages, and it appeared that CESAG was determined to maximize the latter. 3.31 Prospects for the sustainability of the remaining institutions supported under the project--chiefly vocational and technical institutions and the agricultural college--were mixed. To varying degrees they suffered from: inadequata recurrent budgets, inefficient staffing ratios, under-utilized capacity, overspecialization of courses, exorbitant per student costs, and overlap or duplication of functions among themselves. Some institutions also retained a high proportion of expatriates on their faculties. The vocational training center (CNQP) was among the more successful and had established a very important function in training for industry in the Dakar area. The structure of the center and its contact with employers were adequate, although cost recovery from them was not. The main sustainability issue at the time of audit seemed to be related to inadequate funding, particularly the creeping obsolescence of the equipment. 3.32 Technical education seemed on very shaky ground. The technical high schools were not serving the purpose intended and were not providing middle level personnel for industry. In fact, they appeared to function as uneconomical alternatives to general secondary education. The technical teacher training institutions (ENSETP and ENSUT) were unable to collaborate as effectively as desired, and if the role of the technical high schools is changed, ENSETP could become redundant. Consolidation of the two institutions should be considered whatever the fate of the technical high schools. - 17 - 3.33 Although the programs at the agricultural college were of high quality, drastic and early steps are needed to reduce the per student costs from their present unacceptable level. If the INDR and ENCR are combined--as they perhaps should have been at the outset--agricultural training at the two levels would be able to share facilities and the joint institution would be playing a vital part in agricultural development. C. Impact on Women 3.34 Many education Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs) in the 1970s did not place particular emphasis on the education of women. The SAR for the project under audit mentions the encouragement given by the Government to girls' education (SAR para.1.12), but does not elaborate or suggest how the project might build upon this. Similarly, the PCR does not discuss the issue or the impact of the project on women. In collecting data for this report, the audit mission gathered some information indicating that few women are enrolled in project institutions. For example, there were only 3 women students enrolled at the agricultural college at the time of the audit (less than 10%). The best performance in this regard was at ENSETP, where about 30% of those who have completed the technical teacher training course were women. IV. FINDINGS AND ISSUES A. Overview 4.01 In the late 1960s when the Bank Group first became involved with the education sector, low primary enrollment rates and a shortage of skilled manpower were the two most pressing issues identified. The first two education projects concentrated almost entirely on the second of these issues. At the time the Third Project was being discussed, about ten Senegal projects in sectors other than education contained project related training components, indicating that a shortage of skilled manpower was still a problem. 4.02 The project that eventually emerged straddled various sub-sectors, trying to be all things to all people. It was an amalgam of elements reflecting the continuing concern over manpower issues and the growing concern over education issues. From a start of no less than 14 possible sub-components in 6 fields, the project was reduced to 8 sub-components in 5 largely unrelated fields. In view of the difficulties experienced in implementation of the first two projects and the state of the economy at the time this project was appraised, this was a risky undertaking (PCR para. 5.01). On the other hand, when projects occur only at rather wide intervals, it may be justified to identify the most constraining aspects of the Pducation system, and invest in these to reduce the constraints. This was certainly the approach that prevailed in education lending in Africa at that time. 4.03 In the view of the audit, however, the project proved to be a risk worth taking, as outcomes were basically satisfactory. Of the five components, three were largely successful (primary, vocational and management training). The other two (agricultural and technical) finished with major organizational - 18 - probletas requiring concerted attention, but have nevertheless developed a useful infrastructure which could make an important contribution to the development of the country, provided that the necessary action is taken. Bearing in mind the sluggish economy, it would have been better to have developed technical and agricultural education to a much more limited extent and to have aimed at institutional rationalization/consolidation at the outset. 4.04 Viewed in the context of education lending to Senegal, the Third Project was in some ways a transitional project. It was the first to place some emphasis on the development of primary education and management education. The three subsequent projects (primary education development, regional management school and the proposed human resource development) have all to some extent sprung out of and built upon the components of the Third. 4.05 It is important to note that several aspects of the project were much improved at the time of the audit as compared with the status at completion. The National Institute of Education became firmly established with assistance from the Fourth Project. The issue raised at Board presentation concerning possible practical problems which might arise as a result of the use of local languages cannot yet be answered, but if it is soon addressed (as indicated to the audit mission) the contribution of the project towards decision-making could have been significant. The utilization of the ENR at Kolda was much better at the time of the audit. Also, the agricultural college appeared to be giving a good standard of training, albeit at far too high a cost. It also appeared that CESAG, another beneficiary of additional IDA assistance, was poised to make a vital contribution region-wide to the development of managerial skills. B. Lessons 4.06 Project Design. The project was very ambitious. The scope of the project was daunting, covering five sub-sectors. The project included not only the hardy perennial of technical and vocational training, but also relative newcomers like primary education and management training. In addition to its broad and somewhat innovative scope, the project required the promulgation of laws and decrees establishing four of the institutions to be assisted (INEADE, INDR, ENSETP and ESGE/CESAG). Although there were delays in finalizing these arrangements, that the institutions were established at all was a major accomplishment. On the other hand, it would appear that the inclusion in the project of elements intended to focus on the national languages and the national vocational training office (ONFP) were premature. 4.07 Administrative Design. The administrative structure of a project always has a major influence on the ease of implementation. In this case, it also had an impact on educational outcomes. The complex management structure involving a network of officials in ministries other than the MEQ failed to ensure the effective implementation of software aspects. Even though the project unit in the MEQ had acquired useful experience through the first two projects, it should have been recognized that the Third Project had a heavier bias toward software and that it should have been placed in the MEN from the beginning. It is likely that concerns about possible physical implementation problems, as expressed at Board presentation, influenced the decision to leave project implementation in the hands of MEQ. Although implementation by MEN might have - 19 - caused initial delays as experience was gained in handling hardware issues, the long term advantages would have outweighed short term costs. 4.08 Supervision. Although project supervision was effective in most respects, more oversight of actual project administration and certain educational aspects was merited. Problems arising from the lack of adequate financial information (especially notable when the project unit was transferred to MEN) could have been avoided had adequate records been kept from the outset--as required by the Credit Agreement--and if supervision teams had included a financial analyst at some early stage in the project. Furthermore, additional inputs from technical educators could have facilitated timely and pedagogically beneficial input for the technical components and possibly reduced the problems being faced today. Certainly, having the involvement of sector specialists proved useful for the primary education component. The sensitive monitoring of the ENR at Rolda allowed: (a) the unused hostel facilities to be put to good use as a practice teaching school and (b) the amendment of the Credit Agreement to allow construction of 82 classrooms where teaching practice could take place. 4.09 Technical Education. The overall purpose of the technical education component was nowhere stated, but was assumed to be the production of middle level technicians for industry. With 90% of their output going into higher education, the technical high schools (LTs) did not appear to be doing this. While the reasons for this were not entirely clear, they probably included: (a) inadequate direct contact with industry (for input into teaching programs and practical experience in industry for trainees); (b) excessive time spent on non- technical subjects; and (c) problems in responding to training needs of industry in a timely fashion. Their role was under review at the time of the audit. This experience is very much in line with experience in many other countries and tends to confirm the findings of recent Bank policy work in the area of technical and vocational education and training. 4.10 The audit found that the present arrangement between ENSETP and ENSUT promoted administrative complexity and inefficiency. The chief difficulty seemed to be that they fell under different administrative umbrellas. The audit suggests that consideration be given to seeking some way of integrating the two institutions--including fusing some specializations--with a view to strengthening administration and improving efficiency. 4.11 Agricultural Education. A critical examination of existing facilities for agricultural training and a less optimistic view of future needs might have helped avoid the existing problem of over-capacity at INDR. Certainly, the less chan expected development of the national economy over the past ten years has accentuated the prcblem, but it is questionable whether there was ever a genuine need for two institutions. The audit feels that merging the INDR and ENCR is a logical step toward reducing per capita costs and making best use of the available facilities. Experience elsewhere has shown that the merger of two different levels of training within one institution can be beneficial, and a study of this experience could help in formulating plans for the creation of a unified structure in Senegal. 4.12 In addition to this, INDR management needs to take a more entrepreneurial approach to the administration of the college. This could - 20 - include the following types of efforts: recruiting more students (including those from other countries in the region or other parts of francophone Africa); conducting more in-service training courses and seminars (of both short and long duration); undertaking contract research. All these could help the INDR become a more economically viable institution. 4.13 Recurrent Financing. The protection of the very substantial investment made in buildings and equipment must be regarded as a high priority for the Government. Yet the audit noted that recurrent funding continues to be a problem for most project institutions, to an extent justifying the fears expressed at Board presentation. Each institution needs a detailed plan for preventive maintenance, adequately qualified staff to carry out the maintenance required, and a budget to obtain the necessary materials. In addition to this, at technical, vocational and agricultural institutions consideration needs to be given on a regular basis to questions of obsolescence of equipment, especially where new technology is concerned. Without adequate funding to ensure that teaching equipment, whether it be lathes, computers or farm machinery, is as up- to-date as possible, the quality and relevance of instruction must deteriorate. - 21 - COMMENTS FROM THE BORROW-R ATTACRxlENT 1 WORLDBANK TMSS (TRANSLATED FROM FRENCH) OEDDI TELEX N0054/MEN/BPE SEPTEMBER 23, 1991 ATTN HR. GRAHAM DONALDSON, CHIEF AGRICULTURE & HUMAN DEVELOPHENT DIVISION OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT WORLD BANK, WASHINGTON TEXT SUBJECT: PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 908-SE AND SAC.11-SE) RE. YOUR LETTER OF AUGUST 20, 1991 WE ARE PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED THE PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ON THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT, TRANSMITTED WITH REFERENCED LETTER. WE INFORM YOU THAT WE HAVE NO COMMENT ON ABOVE REPORT. SINCERELY, STOP/END HR. ANDRE SONKO, MINISTER, NATIONAL EDUCATION, DAKAR, SENEGAL 248423 WORLDBANK WORLDBANK THSS - 22 - COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER ATTACH4ENT 2 WORLDBANK TMSS (TRANSLATED FROM FRENCH) OEDD1 DAKAR, SENEGAL, LE 26 SEPTEMBRE 1991 TO GRAHAM DONALDSON SUBJECT: EDUCATION PROJECT III (CREDIT 908-SE & SAC 11-SE) REFERENCE: YOUR LETTER OF 20 AUGUST 1991 SIR: FURTHER TO YOUR LETTER INDICATED ABOVE WITH WHICH YOU FORWARDED COPY OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT FOR EDUCATION PROJECT III, WE HEREBY INFORM YOU THAT MY DEPARTMENT HAS NO COMMENT ON THE REPORT. SINCERELY, FAMARA I. SAGNA MINISTER OF ECONOMY, FINANCE AND PLANNING 248423 WORLDBANK 21814 INBAFRAD WORLDBANK TMSS