Senegal - Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project

r) Document of The World Bank FOR OMlCIAL USE ONTY A1 ; 1tt)1' 1 t ' } 1 f1 i t }] T Report No. 10178 }.' 1")'l.i] i : ; -,.i.. ;: .I PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT NOS. 1458-SE AND SF-13) DECEMBER 5, 1991 Infrastructure Operations Division Sahelian ')epartment Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used bY recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  EXCHANGE, MUT Monetary unit - CFA franc (CFAF) US$1 - CFAF 325 WEIGHTS AND HEASUREMENTS Metric system FISCAL YEA States and local governments -- July 1-June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BC/MEQ Bureau de Circulation, Ministere de l'Equipement Traffic Bureau, Ministry of Equipment BHS Banque de l'Habitat du Senegal Housing Bank of Senegal BOM/SGPR Bureau Organisation et M6thodes, SG Presidence de la Republique Organization and Methods Office, General Secretariat of the Office of the President of the Republic CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CUD Communaute Urbaine de Dakar City of Dakar DCH/MUH Direction de la Construction et de l'Habitat/MUH Housing and Construction Department/MUH DCL/MINT Direction des Collectivit6s Locales, Ministere de l'Interieur Local Government Department, Ministry of the Interior DEP/MEQ Direction des Etudes et de la Programmation/MEQ Studies and Programming Debarment/MEQ DEPS/MPC Direction des Etudes et de la Programmation Sectorielle/MPC Studies and Sectoral Programming Department/MPC DGPB/M1UH Direction Gestion du Patrimoine BAti/MUH State-Owned Properties Management Department/MUH DUA/MUH Direction de l'Urbanisme et de l'Architecture/MUH Urban Development and Architecture Department/MUH FAC Fonds d'Am6nagement [sic) et de Cooperation FAHU Fonds pour l'Amelioration de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme Housing and Urban Development Fund FECL Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivites Locales Municipal Infrastructure Fund GTZ German Cooperation Agency IDA International Development Association MEF Ministry of the Economy and Finance MEQ Ministry of Equipment MINT Ministry of the Interior MPC Ministry of Planning and Cooperation MUH Ministry of Urban Development and Housing OHLM Low-Cost Housing Office PATREU Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project PDES Economic and Social Development Plan PDU/Dakar Urban Development Master Plan for the Dakar Region PIC Plan d'Investissement Communal Community Investment Plai. PTIP Three-Year Public Investment Plan SDE Secretariat d'Etat A la Decentralisation State Secretariat for Decentralization SENELEC Soci:te Nationale d'Electricite National Electric Power Company SGPR Secretariat General de la Pr6sidence de la R6publique General Secretariat of the Office of the Pr'-ident of the Republic SICAP Societe Immobiliere du Cap-Vert Cap Vert Real Estate Company SNHLM4 Societe Nationale d'Habitations a Loyers Moderes National Lnw-Cost Housing Company SONEES Societe Nationale d'Exploitation des Eaux du Senegal National Water Company of Senegal STCUD Services Techniques de la Communaut6 Urbaine de Dakar Technical Department of the City of Dakar TG/Dakar Controller General of Dakar/HEF UMDP Urban Management and Development Project UNDP United Nations Development Programme  THE WORLD BANK FOR OFmFCIAL USE ONLY Wash.r,gton. D.C. 20433 U.S.A Office of Directm.Cenieal Opetatumis Evaluation December 10, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Senegal Urbau Mana'ement and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project (Credit Nos. 1458-SE and SF-13) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Senegal - Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project (Credit Nos. 1458-SE and SF-13)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office with Part II contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by .ecipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT NOS. 1458-SE AND SF^13) TABLE OF CONTENTS PROJECT REVIEW PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 A. Project Identity .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 B. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . 1 C. Project Identification and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 D. Project Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 E. Project Description ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 F. Project Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 G. Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 H. Project Results ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 I. Project Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 J. Bank Performance ...................... . 12 K. Borrower Performance ... . . . . . . ..........................13 L. Relationship Between the Borrower and the Bank ... . . . . . 14 M. Consulting Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 N. Project Docsmentation ................... 15 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . 16 A. Overview .. . 16 B. The World Bank and Senegal ................. . 16 C. The Project Unit and Problems of Coordination . . . . . . . . . 17 D. The Steering Committee ................... . 18 E. The Monitoring Committee .................. . 18 F. The Technical Director ................... . 18 G. The Planning Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 H. DCH (Construction and Housing Department) . . . . . . . . . . . 19 I. Urban Development and Architecture Department . . . . . ... . . 20 J. Strengthening of the DGPB (State-Owned Properties Management Department) ........................ ... .. 20 K. SICAP (Socidtf Immobiliere du Cap-Vert) and SNHLM (Societ6 Nationale des Habitations A Loyers Mod6ros) . . . . . . . . . . 20 L. SCAT-URBAN (Central Land Development Agency) ... . . . . . .. 2i M. The Traffic Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 N. Local Government Department . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 21 0. CUD (City of Dakar) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 P. CIDA (Canadian International Development Association) . . . . . 23 PART III: Statistical Information (not dictated yet) PART IV: Annex Annex 1: Detailed Analysis of Project Implementation This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT NOS. 1458-SE AND SF13) Preface 1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project which on July 20, 1984 was accorded two IDA Credits totaling US$6 million and equivalent respectively to US$3.048 million (1458-SE) and US$2.952 million (SF-13-SE). The Credits were closed on December 31, 1989 (originally scheduled completion date: December 1988) and the funds fully disbursed. 2. The current project follows the 1972 Sites and Services Project (Credit 336-SE) and the 1980 Urban Sector Study (1061-SE) and is the Bank's third sectoral undertaking in Senegal. The project also received support from CIDA, in an amount equivalent to US$0.213 million, disbursed fully by the closing date of the Credit. 3. Parts I and III of the PCR were prepared by the Sahelian Infrastructure Division of the Africa Regional Office. They are based, inter alia, on the President's Report, Credit Agreements, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, analysis of the main background documentation for the project and interviews with those involved in identification and implementation. Part II was prepared by the Borrower in February 1991.  - ii. - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT NOS. 1458-SE AND SF-13) Evaluation Summary A. Background 1. With the limited resources of the agriculture sector a constraint to steady growth, Senegal opted for diversification of its economy and growth of export-oriented light industry. As the success of that strategy depended on numerous factors, including the existence and maintenance of urban infrastructure, the Bank decided to provide support in the form of financing of a management and rehabilitation program. Owing to its key role and the limited potential of medium-term development in the regional poles, efforts were concentrated initially in the Dakar region. B. Project Objectives 2. Undertaken as a pilot project, the operation aimed both to clarify issues relating to the macroeconomic environment of the urban sector and to improve management in Dakar as regards both housing and public services. The long-term objective was to improve the country's economic performance by (i) stimulating public savings and (ii) improving administrative efficiency. The short-term objectives were (i) better allocation of resources through efficient investment planning; (ii) formulation of a housing and development policy that is more costly to the public coffers: and (iii) maintenance of the current level of urban services and redeployment of local responsibilities. C. Project Implementation 3. With implementation overseen by the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, the project involved several ministerial departments in carrying out complex tasks that required extensive expertise. To a large extent it used the services of outside specialists, involving a real transfer of technology and the active supervision of a Steering Committee ensuring liaison and the compatibility of activities. 4. At the start of the project, the partial implementation of the action program envisaged by the Credit Agreements resulted in an acute shortage of precise guidelines partially responsible. for the emergence of conflicts and sectoral interests. In addition to these adverse effects, there were the consequences of a deterioration in the technical and financial operations of public services. These two aspects slowed down project progress. Lastly, the scarcity or reduced availability of human resources prevented the objectives as a whole from being achieved within the expected timeframes. D. Proiect Results 5. Despite the difficulties, the results of the project are satisfactory. There is no doubt that the more comprehensive approach to urban problems, rehabilitation of municipal management and formulation of a new housing policy helped restore local budget equilibria and restart the decentralization process. They lastly made possible the identification of an  - iii - urban management development project which, as a logical extension of the current project, is extending its effects and consolidating its achievements. 6. Enhanced intersectoral relations and the gradual adoption by the public entities of the concepts and methodologies tested by the project constitute solid bases for building on the first results. Their management by personnel with redefined missions and tools should not be subject to any major challenge. They still are nevertheless highly contingent upon (i) any deterioration in public finances and (ii) the introduction of institutional reforms. E. Bank Performance 7. In general, the Bank's involvement in the preparation, appraisal and supervision of the project was significant in helping to improve the urban sector and municipal management. However, the overestimation of results of the economic recovery program during identification, reduction in supervision (as compared to projections) and the premature intermingling of activities with the identification of a subsequent urban project had negative effects on the rate of implementation and the achievement of the initial objectives. F. Borrower Performance 8. The performance of the project beneficiary is satisfactory as a whole, especially given the ambitious nature of the undertaking and the context of financial belt-tightening that significantly increased the risks. Nevertheless, the delays in establishing the conditions for implementation, lack of a coordinating body and prolonged vacancy in technical management prevented the Borrower from meeting all of its commitments. G. Main Lessons 9. The main lessons to be learned from the project are as follows, the first three relating to the Bank and the others to the Borrower: (a) Ongoing and regular supervision are apparently both key to the success of a project in a sensitive sector; (b) As regards the resolution of matters linked-to policy and the formulation of basic approaches, more realistic timeframes should be planned, as early as the identification phase; (c) The multisectoral dimension of certain projects and large number of parties involved require procedures and regular assessments based on prior contractual commitments and sanctioned by the gradual disbursement of credit proceeds; (d) In order to avoid any risk of misunderstanding or overlapping of jurisdiction, the use of a team approach to management must be accompanied by preliminary in-depth consultations that result in terms of reference detailing the prerogatives of each party;  - iv - (e! As early as the identification phase, the technical executing agencies must be involved in project formulation. To that end, they must strengthen their design capability and streamline administrative procedures; (f) The provision of counterpart funds for minimal operation of the services involved in a project is the best guarantee for satisfactory preparation and implementation.  SENEGAL URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABIlITTION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDITS 1458-SE & SF413) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity Title: Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project Credit Nos.: 1458-SE and SF-13 Sector: Urban Development Borrower: Republic of Senegal Executing Agency: Ministry of Planning and Cooperation Cumulative Amount of IDA Credits: US$6 million Government input: US$0.65 million B. Introduction 1. Like other developing countries, Senegal is undergoing rapid urbanization and, despite a population that is still for the most part rural, the primary sector now accounts for only 30% of GDP. Moreover, its limited resources will not allow it to maintain satisfactory and sustained growth. 2. In order to correct this adverse situation, Senegal opted for diversification of its economy and the development of an export-oriented light industry. Dependent on numerous factors, the success of this strategy is also contingent upon the existence of infrastructure and the efficient provision of basic services such as communications, transportation, housing, water supply and sanitation. Consequently, although the revitalization of agriculture is a priority in the country's recovery, the efficient management of the urban areas vital to a healthy economy has become a major factor in the adjustment process under way. 3. In 1984 the Dakar region alone accounted for 90% of industrial operations, 87% of jobs in the modern sector and most of the road networks and skilled labor in the country. It furthermore was home to 60% of its urban dwellers, whose increase was estimated at 6% per year and associated with a significant shift toward relatively undeveloped areas lying beyond the urban periphery. Lastly, it accounted for 60% of the country's wealth.  2- 4. Given its key role in the national economy and the limi.ted development potential of the regional poles over the medium run, the State initially decided to mobilize the resources necessary for industrial expansion, to concentrate its efforts on the rehabilitation of Dakar and to seek better management of available resources, Their growing scarcity over several years' time had resulted in a steady decline in per capita urban investment (under the Sixth Plan reaching only 54% of its previous level) and keener intersectoral competition, reflected in a chronic infrastructure deficit. The lack of a Llear-cut strategy and definition of responsibilities, poor labor and management relations and inappropriate action had simultaneously exacerbated the dysfunctions of the urban system. 5. Acting against this background, the main government bodies responsible fc'r urban development and housing encountered the same difficulties as the public sector as a whole regarding performance in management, technical expertise, productivity and the setting of priorities. The Borrower's strategy, which gave priority to prestige programs, proved to be ineffective and the operations of its agencies, whose production never met more than 10% of needs, were sharply curtailed. This collapse, although due in part to the fact that especially advantageous financing conditions were no longer available, led in particular in a normative and unrealistic infrastructure policy given affordable demand. There was also sharp deterioration of the banking system and, despite promising savings, a cutback in the operations of the Banque de l'Habitat (BHS). 6. Lastly, Senegal's economic and financial crisis threw municipal institutions into disarray, particularly in Dakar. The reform of the Municipal Code, transferring the bulk of the responsibility for maintaining infrastructure and services to the local communities, was not accompanied by significantly increased resources or authority. At the same time, faster demographic growth, intensive or inappropriate use of insufficient and unevenly distributed infrastructure as well as a shortage of expertise for the technical and financial implementation of newly identified tasks, largely exacerbated the deterioration in services and poor municipal management. C. Project Identification and Preparation 7. The Bank's involvement in the study and resolution of urban problems began in 1972 with Credit 336-SE to finance a first Sites and Services Project in Dakar. From the outset, the Bank was concerned with the appropriateness of its efforts in an essentially agricultural country where the economic envircnment was hardly receptive to innovative urban policies. It nevertheless entered into an agreement with the Government to produce 14,000 serviced lots in Dakar, 1,200 in Thies and to seek (i) withdrawal of the Borrower from the direct financing of housing and greater access to free- hold housing; (ii) increase in diversified supply and expansion of demand; and (iii) replicability of sites and services projects and the establishment of institutions able to manage their development. The October 1983 Completion Report concluded that despite difficult circumstances, the project, closed in 1981, had been implemented successfully, the numerous urban policy problems yet to be resolved notwithstanding.  R. To that end senegal had in 1980 obtained assistance from h \ to study the urban sector and identify the main problems. Following an identification mission in 1982, a memorandum on the urban sector confirmed the key role of Dakar within thp export-oriented industrial apparatus that Senegal was seeking to develop and established the maintenance and then growth of basic urban services as prerequisites and factors in the success of that policy. In conclusion, it stressed the importance and necessity of structural change and reforms to rehabilitate the urban sector gradually and achieve the objectives. With the support of IDA (Credit 1061-SE) and to clarify the thrusts of its recovery strategy, the Government -- through the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation -- asked a Steering Committee assisted by a consultant to finalize the objectives of the Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project and identify the means for its implementation, 9. Undertaken on a pilot basis, the project was to simultaneously clarify matters relating to the macroeconomic environment of the sector as a whole and improve management in Dakar as regards both housing and public services. The studies and works aimed at grappling with the region's most pressing problems as well as enabling the Government to take sectoral action more consistent with the ongoing adjustment process. Appraised in July 1983, the Project was the subject of a Bank President's Report in March 1984 and Credit Agreements 1458-SE and SF-13 were approved on April 17 of that year. Several rounds of negotiations were opened to mobilize cofinancing for the project. They were however unsuccessful, with the exception of the CIDA contribution to the road traffic component (Can$250,000) and GTZ financing of a supplementary urban rehabilitation project (Dalifort Project). D. Project Objectives 10. The long-term objective of the project was to support improvements to Senegal's economic performance by stimulating public savings and improving the efficiency of public entities responsible for the provision and maintenance of urban services and housing. The short-term objectives involved (i) allocation of scarce public resources to urban areas, through efficient investment planning; (ii) formulation of an urban development and housing policy based on the appropriate utilization of those resources; (iii) maintenance at the current level of existing urban services in Dakar; enabling the local authorities to better plan maintenance and rehabilitation operations and increase the mobilization of potential resources with a view to improving the services rendered. E. Project Description 11. The Project involved numerous public, parapublic and private parties in often complex tasks and ambitious objectives. In order to facilitate execution but without jeopardizing their high degree of interdependence, it included the following components:  4 - Part A: 6L,an investment planning and programming: (1) Monitoring Committee: technical assistance to the Steering Committee responsible for (i) preparation, (ii) start-up of the Project and (iii) technical monitoring over the life of the Project; (2) Seventh Plan: preparation of the urban sector investment program of the Seventh Plan based on (i) the carrying out of a methodological study to formulate guidelines for appraisal and selection of projects and for monitoring their physical and financial implementation; (ii) completion of the Dakar Region Urban Development Master Plan and identification of urban development and rehabilitation projects to be included in the Plan; and (iii) completion of the Cap Vert transportation plan and planning of sector investments. Part B: Housing and Urban Policy (1) liousi g Finance, based on (i) affordability analysis (including calculation of costs and prices of subsidized housing) and existing mechanisms of resource mobilization and low-cost housing finance (of which BHS policy and procedures) and (ii) formulation of recommendations aimed at improving resource mobilization and utilization and at increasing private sector participation in the financing of low-cost housing; (2) Management of State-Owned Properties through (i) analysis State-owned properties and related charges and (ii) formulation of recommendations on means to reduce subsidies and to increase rent collection by parapublic housing companies and the central government; (3) Rehabilitation of OHLM and SICAP based on (i) a diagnostic study; (ii) recommendations and (iii) a timetable for implementing the recommended actions aimed at improving the financial and managerial performance of the companies and at redirecting their activities to more clearly defined commercial targets; (4) Land Development Agency: feasibility study for the establishment of a parapublic enterprise for the servicing of urban land with infrastructure for residential, commercial and industrial use; (5) Design Alternatives for Land Development: study of alternative designs for land development at different service levels and formulation of recommendations on standards and pricing policies designed to make service land affordable to the target population; and (6) Preparation of Pilot Projects, to be planned as part of the establishment of a land development agency based on (i) a feasibility land development study for one or two sites in Dakar  -5- and (ii) detailed design and engineering of an infrastructure rehabilitation plan for part of central Pikine. Part C: Municipal Policy (1) Municipal Organization and Management centered around (i) analysis of relationships between the Borrower's central government and the communities in the Dakar region and the allocation of authority with respect to the delivery of land development services; (ii) identification and implementation of actions to improve municipal administrative and fi.nancial management; (iii) identi- fication of new financial resources and local tax collection, in particular property taxes and (iv) analysis of the operating procedures of the Borrower's Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivit6s Locales and its suitability as a financing in.strument for municipal works projects; (2) Maintenance and technical services with (i) identification of rehabilitation and maintenance works and equipment required to maintain and modernize infrastructure in Dakar; (ii) establishment of a system to plan and program the maintenance of infrastructure services equipment, in particular the purchasing of equipment and spare parts; and (iii) establishment of a cost accounting and annual budgeting system for Dakar's Technical Department; (3) Traffic management: after the establishment of a traffic bureau within the Ministry of Equipment the Project called for (i) preparation of a priority action program for traffic management to improve circulation for pedestrians, vehicles and buses as well as access to and circulation within central Pikine and (ii) implementation and monitoring during the first year of a traffic management program for Dakar, including the surfacing of footpaths and paving of roads to simple design standards to allow bus access, junction improvements and provision of traffic signals and traffic control measures; (4) Training piogram: (i) identification of technical and administrative personnel (in Dakar) and establishment of a priority training program and (ii) training of municipal personnel through short-term traineeships, seminars and workshops. F. Project Organization 12. The Borrower entrusted project oversight to the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation and in virtue of Side Letter No. 4. to the Credit Agreements involved the following entities in the implementation of the various components: A. Urban investment planning and programming (1) Consulting service MPC Monitoring committee (2) Methodological study MPC DEPS  (3) Urban development plan completion MUH DUH (4) Transportation plan completion ME DEP B. Housing and urban policy (1) Housing finance MUH, MEF, DCH, BHS (2) State-owned properties management MUH, DGPB (3) OHLM/SICAP rehabilitation SGPR, MEG, MUH, DUA, DCH (4) Land development agency SGPR, MEG, MUH, DUA, DCH (5) SDEU pilot operations MUH, SDEU, DCH C. Municipal policy (1) Finance and oiganization MEF, SDE, TG Dakar, DCL (2) Maintenance and technical services MEF, SDE, CUD, ME, DCL (3) Traffic bureau ME, BC (4) Training of municipal staff SDE, CUD, DCL This list of tasks and the diversity of entities involved fully reflect the institutional complexity and wide range of expertise required for project implementation. 13. In sectors where the Borrower was experienced (formulation of master urban development and transportation plans and formulation of a housing policy), brief technical assistance was provided to improve existing techniques. In areas where the Government was less experienced and procedures no longer suited the rehabilitation strategy advocated by the Government (investment programming, municipal management and maintenance, traffic management, establishment of a development agency), resident specialists were called in. Particular attention was paid to the selection of consultants (individual meetings), identification and additional training of counterpart staff for the efficient transfer of technology and, once the project was completed, a continuation of the activities by the Government. This approach and the number and nature of agencies involved required that the technical assistance be provided at different levels of intensity; for the Technical Department, varied expertise and for the Steering Committee constant availability for supervision and decision-making. 14. A key element, the Steering Committee included a representative from each entity involved in execution. It was responsible for an analysis of implementation reports and studies as well as the formulation of recommendations to the ministries and agencies involved in the actions to be undertaken to improve urban management. Supported by a consulting firm (EPEVRY) for the monitoring and supervision of all project components as a whole, in conjunction with the technical and administrative departments it was to develop indicators that would show what progress had been made and to issue the quarterly progress reports. Its success depended in large part on the acceptance by the public services of the theoretical underpinnings of the project and incorporation of measures proposed for the running of the Government.  -7- G. Eroiect Implementation 15. The expected benefits of the project resided primarily in an improvement in investment planning, formulation of urban policy and institutional performance, as prerequisites for better management in the Cap Vert region. The introduction of these measures was not to incur any additional expenditures over the short run but was to generate additional resources and better employment of public funds. Initially, in order to ensure the development of an appropriate institutional and policy framework, improve government performance and facilitate implementation of the various components, the Project was to integrate the activities of the Borrower's offices with the technical assistance provided by outside consultants and supervision by the Steering Committee. 16. Despite the specifics of each component, implementation can be broken down into three major phases: (a) The first phase (1985 and 1986) was devoted primarily to the study of measures that would improve urban management and the formulation of specific proposals for the implementation of the Borrower's policy; (b) The second phase (1986 and 1987) essentially involved the identification of priority projects aimed at achieving the foregoing objectives and that could be implemented as part of a Bank-supported urban project; (c) Phase three (1987 to 1988) was centered on the design of the necessary additional studies, resolution of institutional or technical/financial prerequisites of the Project and consolidation of previous progress. 17. The Credit Agreements (Side Letter No. 6) called for a 10-point action plan to finalize the taking of necessary decisions for the start-up of technical assistance and to measure general project performance as regards implementation. In June 1985, the date of the first supervision mission, the degree of compliance with the plan was deemed to be very low, with the exception of (i) the audit of the OHLM accounts; (ii) formal establishment of the traffic bureau; (ii) [sic: ? iii] the interim report on the Cap Vert traffic plan; and (iv) the interim report on the Dakar urban development master plan. The planned actions ran into major implementation delays that could not be totally attributed to the postponed implementation of the project. 18. Moreover, since the identification phase the operating technical and financial conditions of the public entities had deteriorated significantly, primarily because of the measures adopted regarding restrictions on public operating expenses as well as poor resource utilization. This had led to a critical shortage of funds and a virtual total lack of means. Even if it had wanted to, the Government was not able to honor in full its commitments with regard to the physical implementation of the project and effective mobilization of resources. This was true primarily for  - 8 - the transportation and municipal components and, to a lesser extent, investment programming, housing policy and project unit. During implementation, they all ran into significant shortages with regard to logistics (facilities and/or technical means) and marked financial difficulties regarding counterpart funds (operating of services and cofinancing of priority actions). 19. As regards human resources, in several sectors the project faced a shortage or limited availability of personnel (transportation, municipal and investment programming components). In this respect, the newness of the concept, introduction of a project structure within the normal operations of the Government and the very modest compensation in view of the professional profiles required, led to disaffectation on the part of local counterparts and slow Government involvement. In addition, a lack of familiarity with the Senegalese context on the part of certain consultants, the fact that previous sectoral approaches were only partially taken into account and the specific nature of a public sector in a developing country occasionally prevented a satisfactory level of integration of technical assistance within the planned timeframe. In view of this experience, the necessary correlation between the means implemented and expected results was not made. At least, it does not seem to have been reflected in practice. Remedial measures would nevertheless have permitted greater participation and rigor on the part of the administrative and technical departments. The major efforts made in this regard by project management during a seminar (June 1985) concluding the start-up phase did not produce the expected effects. H. Project Results 20. In general, the results of the project can be considered satisfactory in relation to its objectives. Owing to its extensive scope and the diversity of studies (five main components and 30 subcomponents), only the major achievements will be mentioned briefly. Physical progress and the detailed sectoral results are given in Annex 1. 21. It is premature to assess the project's impact on economic performance, as numerous macroeconomic aspects have not been evaluated. Nevertheless, the more comprehensive approach to urban problems, better municipal management and formulation of a new housing policy clearly have been beneficial in restoring local budget equilibria and restarting the decentralization process. These improvements, resulting in part from a comprehensive strategy and more consistent investment, were made possible only by defining the urban sector itself and its hinterland. The comprehensive approach and analysis of inter- and subsectoral relationships have produced, in addition to modeling attached to the national planning system, a more balanced approach to the sector and the start of a fertile dialogue among ministerial departments. The changes in the master plans (urban development, transportation, sanitation, etc., plans) bear witness to the progress made. It is nevertheless unfortunate that the involvement of the local governments in the design of central services is still limited. 22. Because of previous reservations, decentralization and return to the local governments of the full exercise of their powers required the  elimination of many institutional, financial and technical requirements. From the institutional standpoint, an exhaustive analysis of the relationships between the local governments and the State, city of Dakar and public utilities led to a reformulation of the prerogatives and role of each party. Conducted jointly with the financial and technical research, the approach was characterized by considerable concern for feasibility. Several of the ensuing recommendations were taken into account (deconcentration, cooperation between local governments and central services), while others (local taxation, inter- community solidarity, etc.) that were more complex to implement were examined by the DC.. 23. The role of that supervisory body was redefined and its mission adapted to the objectives of more decentralized management. In that respect, its involvement in the identification and later implementation of recovery strategies for the 12 communities in the interior heralded the start of a practice involving more design and coordination than control. Moreover, the role of the DCL in meeting the requirements for establishing municipal credit attests to that new approach and the gradual move toward financial autonomy for the local authorities. 24. In view of those new local responsibilities, the prolonged deterioration and ultimately sudden collapse of municipal finances, the only alternative was drastic rehabilitation. The project permitted the implementation of effective rehabilitation measures. Based on more realistic management and monitoring tools, the preparation of truly balanced budgets and realistic priority-setting with regard to operating expenditures are two significant results from the financial standpoint. 25. Control of the charges induced by the Technical Department, in particular through employment quotas (15% reduction in the number of CUD staffers) was accompanied by greater mobilization of local resources, as well as the communities' own receipts received directly (market tax, advertising, fiscal minimum), along with property taxes and retail licenses. The establishment of a Receipts Division, better information to the public at large and introduction of computerization permitting the monitoring of taxpayers was also beneficial. Thus, Dakar, which in 1984 had a budget of CFAF 4 billion, was able in 1987 to balance more than CFAF 8 billion in expenditures. This good performance nevertheless is partially due to the offsetting of public debts and gradual depreciation (at the rate of CFAF 300 million per year) of the former Dakar commune. 26. As regards the services rendered to the population, changes in the budget enabled the Technical Deparzment to replace obsolete and inoperative municipal services, and resume the urban services programming and management process. Supported by project expertise, that gradual resumption in activity was physically reflected in the rehabilitation, maintenance and cleaning of roads and partial rehabilitation of State-owned properties. Following a diagnostic study of all insufficiencies, this was made possible only through a sweeping reorganization and implementation of a two-year priority action plan involving regulatory and budget as well as technical issues.  - 10 - 27. Although recovery was limited by a shortage of means, gaining control of the operating budget nevertheless made it possible to resume the financing of vital investments. Far from responding to real needs, operating expenditures from 1984 to 1988 increased slowly but steadily from CFAF 235 million to CFAF 561 million. This modest result which is highly dependent on overall equilibrium is nevertheless still considerable. 28. Lastly, the new vitality in Dakar's public services led, following the eventual transfer of technology, to the involvement of local officials in traffic and transportation policies managed by a Traffic Bureau. Receiving support from CIDA, with vital expertise and tools, the project made it possible to update the traffic plan, ensure its management and prepare the priority actions. Gradually incorporated within the Government, the new structure is today managing urban traffic. 29. In order to ensure their sustainability, the foregoing objectives included a major component for "human resources management and training." Although that component was fully implemented for staff of the Traffic Bureau, the accompanying recasting and reorganization of municipal services was only modest. Delays in the identification of personnel and needs, late adoption of priority actions for the medium run and the reduced operating capability of the municipal unit were responsible for the very partial implementation of programs. The results from the standpoint of training can be considered weak. 30. Despite the establishment of an Urban Development Division, the slow deployment of municipal services and decision to use sectoral supervision for the project undermined involvement of the local authorities in implementing the housing policy and urban development components. This is regrettable, as local officials often need to ensure in full or in part the financing of infrastructure and support the recurrent maintenance charges. 31. As part of the new housing policy, the housing finance analysis was the first overall look in Senegal at the sector and remains a point of reference for any sectoral research. It largely helped formulate the production system for low-cost housing, evaluate affordable demand, means of financing and mechanisms for mobilizing resources and savings. The proposals (technical and financial standards, construction price series, self- construction assistance) helped reduce certain constraints on the sector and prompted the BHS to develop new products for both utilization and resources. 32. To safeguard fragile budget equilibria and reduce or reallocate its resources, the State took measures to improve the management of its properties and the public real estate companies. In the first case, the partial implementation of a decade-long program based on improved management, elimination of the convention system and a refocusing of activity on its property resulted in savings of CFAF 1.5 billion per year. In the second case, the diagnostic study of dysfunctions and formulation of several management scenarios finally led the companies to recovery measures (SICAP) or to finalize a contrat-plan (SNHLM) with the State. Nevertheless, the mounting delays and the persistence of behavior that ran counter to the objectives of the urban policy delayed the impact of that component.  - 11 - 33. As regards land development, the establishment of an urban development company (under private law) and the resolution of the requirements governing its activity are positive results of the project. That mixed company responds to the dual need to increase the offer of lots free of taxes on publicly-owned land and to ensure the integration of the various urban functions. Acting on behalf of the State, its role is to carry out and promote priority actions under Dakar's urban development plan. To that end, it uses the principles of incremental development on the basis of infrastructure grids leading to subsequent improvement at less cost. The project also helped carry out the prefeasibility studies for the 10-year activity program that would make it possible to satisfy 25% of affordable demand each year. The technical studies of a first 100-ha operation and access to BHS financing ensure that it will be immediately operational. This result was nevertheless obtained only at the cost of a partial trade-off of the project's social objectives and a general raising of infrastructure levels. 34. The findings of those studies lastly made it possible to identify and prepare an Urban Management and Development Project receiving assistance from the Bank. A logical extension of the Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project, it is consolidating its achievements and prolonging the effects. I. Proiect Sustainability 35. The Bank's macroeconomic and long-term concerns, which were more institutional than physical, did not fully satisfy the aspirations of the Borrower. Moreover, the project and its changes cannot reasonably be expected to be fully effective solely during implementation. To ensure greater sustainability, the Bank had recommended that a National Urban Development Committee be established with extensive jurisdiction and decision-making power. That body, which was not established, could have both capitalized on the experience of the project and unified future sectoral strategies. 36. However, the enhanced intersectoral relationships, taking into account the needs of urban development and decentralization as well as the gradual adoption by government offices of the concepts and methodologies tested under the project, are solid bases that can ensure maintenance and in some cases an improvement of the results already reaped. In general, these involve (i) better municipal management; (ii) the ongoing reorganization of public services and the urban transportation policy; and (iii) more appropriate mechanisms for housing programming and finance. There should be no major challenge to their management by personnel with refined tools for more clear-cut tasks. 37. The continuing nature of the actions taken was also strengthened by the project, although it is highly contingent on the following conditions, whose emergence or worsening would be very detrimental: (a) further deterioration in public finances, undermining -- owing to the negative effects on local budgets -- the ability to provide  - 12- services. In this respect, the sharp budget cuts (40%) may have a negative effect in FY90-91; (b) overlapping of institutional (establishment of new local governments) and administrative (organization of ministerial powers) reforms could result in disorganization and prevent the attainment of the medium- and long-term management objectives; (c) testing by the civil service of a voluntary departure policy, which, despite its positive effects on the wage bill, could ultimately deprive the State and local communities of some of their most experienced higher-level staff. J. Bank Performance 38. The Bank's involvement in the preparation, appraisal and supervision of the project largely helped improve the urban sector and municipal management in the Dakar region. In addition, IDA's help in setting up the project and its implementation clearly led to a more fruitful dialogue between parties who often had sectoral and hence narrow outlooks. 39. In general, the Bank's efforts were satisfactory and project design good. Following two urban projects, the Bank was seeking to consolidate the achievements and carry out a more ambitious pilot project involving a greater number of parties and executing agencies. Owing to the high risk of such an undertaking, the Bank had recommended supervision of 70 weeks, which is substantial for a project normally implemented over 30 months. In fact, the reduction in supervision (in relation to appraisal projections) and very limited use of expertise significantly undermined the quality of monitoring. 40. The intermingling beginning in April 1986 of supervision tasks with the identification of a subsequent urban project also interfered with the time spent on meeting the first objective. To meet all performance targets under the project, it would have clearly been more advisable to plan preparation and then the effectiveness of the new credit agreement in accordance with a timetable that safeguarded the completion of the current project. Moreover, the turnover of project officials, in the wake of internal reorganization, a lengthy interruption in 1988 and a lack of regular analyses of general project performance also weakened the effects of supervision. 41. More fundamentally, it appears that the Bank allowed, without a true objective basis, the project to be based on overestimated results from the Senegalese economic recovery program. In this respect, the limited number of effectiveness requirements and conditions is significant. Although it made it possible to shorten the duration of preparation and facilitated negotiations, this merely postponed the emergence of certain problems. The first supervision missions found progress on certain actions decided between the parties to be poor. Subsequently, the Bank seems to have demonstrated optimism that did not take into account the real conditions surrounding project implementation. Closer supervision would have unquestionably helped  - 13 - correct the gaps and led to prompter decisions more consistent with the Credit Agreements. 42. On the basis of this experience, the Bank can draw three main lessons from its involvement. First, it appears that the ongoing nature and regularity of supervision are two key conditions for the success of a project in a sensitive sector. Secondly, as regards the resolution of policy-related issues and the formulation of basic orientations, the timeframes must be more realistic than those planned in the initial timetable. Thirdly, the multisectoral dimension and greater number of administrative entities involved require specific procedures and regular assessments based on prior contractual commitments that are sanctioned by the gradual disbursement of the credit proceeds. K. Borrower Performance 43. Overall, the performance of project beneficiaries can be considered satisfactory, especially given the fact that a delicate approach was used. Project risks lay primarily in maintaining government commitments to manage urban growth efficiently, in the smooth running of the Steering Committee to ensure liaison between the authorities or government offices involved in urban management and lastly in the real compliance of public agencies with the comprehensive policy adopted. In a context of economic and financial belt-tightening and a worsening of resource constraints, these risks did materialize in part during implementation. 44. In this respect, despite the concern for efficiency demonstrated by project management, the prolonged vacancy in the technical department did not enable the Borrower to (i) ensure regular accounting of the actions undertaken and the quality of studies carried out; (ii) meet its commitments with regard to technical and financial progress reports (quarterly and six- monthly); or (iii) develop indicators to assess project performance in relation to its environment. 45. From the standpoint of economic analysis, the Borrower largely overestimated the achievements of the medium-term recovery plan (PALM). In point of fact, the critical situation (both structural and financial) of the public entities involved in the project was not reflected in realistic projections. This error led to an underestimation of the difficulties encountered in meeting the political, institutional and financial conditions required for smooth implementation. 46. Moreover, implementation of the short-term plan called for by the Credit Agreements based on 10 priority action3 was late and limited. With the exception of several technical measures, the implementation of that plan was such that it was not possible to finalize the decisions vital for making best use of the technical assistance or to measure the general performance of the project through its implementation. This general situation, exacerbating the deficient decision-making in municipal management and sharing of responsi- bilities in urban and transportation policy, caused a significant lack of precise guidelines from the outset, triggering conflicts of jurisdiction and often holding the project back. On this last point, the extent to which the  - 14 - executing agencies agreed with project design and their commitment to the requirements and objectives must be questioned. 47. The Borrower could draw three main lessons from its involvement: (a) The use of a team approach to management and consultation bodies must be accompanied, to avoid any misunderstanding or overlapping of jurisdiction, by in-depth preliminary dialogue that produces terms of reference detailing the prerogatives of each entity; (b) The technical executing agencies must be involved in project formulation starting with the identification stage. To that end, they must strengthen their design capability and streamline administrative procedures; and (c) The provision of counterpart funds for minimal operations of the technical entities of a project ensures good physical preparation, efficient implementation and satisfactory results. L. Relationship Between the Borrower and the Bank 48. The President's Report bears witness to the particular attention paid by both parties to project preparation, as they wished to avoid the difficulties encountered under the Sites and Services Project. To that end, the formulation of macroeconomic and sectoral objectives, the expected benefits, roles and responsibilities of the management bodies, executing agencies and technical assistance were first examined by in-depth studies, resulting in lasting dialogue between the Bank and the Borrower. 49. Moreover, project monitoring and the frequency and nature of financial and technical reports kept the Borrower sufficiently involved in the process as a whole. With the exception of specific contradictions inherent in policy management, the objectives were viewed similarly by the two parties. 50. The innovative concept and establishment of good relations with the Borrower made possible a fruitful undertaking in the urban sector. Often perceived as an intermediary between prerogatives and sectoral interests, the Bank demonstrated adaptability and flexibility in resolving complex issues. In most instances, the necessary compromises were found. M. Consulting Services 51. The project relied on technical assistance from outside experts. Depending on the extent of the Borrower's sectoral experience, that technical assistance took the form of short-term missions, advisory assistance or the involvement of resident specialists. In the case of studies and management, the services to be provided had institutional, technical and financial aspects. 52. During the first quarter of 1985 (February), five study contracts were given to the consultants responsible for technical assistance, relating to the following project components and groups:  -15 - - Project steering EPEVRY - Urban investment programming CEGIR - Urban development and housing policy OTUI - Municipal policy BCEOM - Transportation policy LAFERRIERE 53. For the project as a whole, the expert services were found by the Borrower to be good and of a high professional level. For the most part they were provided in a timely manner, although those involving (i) investment programming; (ii) the feasibility of development operations; and (iii) the training plan experienced delayed implementation because of the approval procedures. The preparation of a subsequent urban project and extension of the project's mission in certain cases prompted the Borrower to strengthen and prolong the missions. This was particularly true for the housing, municipal policy and transportation components. 54. The transfer of technology was real and of a satisfactory quality for the components as a whole. Cooperation between consultants and beneficiaries was often fruitful and well integrated. Exceptions would be the "investment programming" and "project steering" components, the first never having truly been integrated into the Planning Department and the second having prematurely ended. N. Project Documentation 55. As an appraisal report was not issued for the project, the President's Report was the basic document used in implementing the operations by component and for supervision. It became evident during implementation that a more detailed document highlighting the major focuses would have provided a better understanding of approaches and helped the supervision missions. 56. Moreover, despite their regularity, the supervision reports were often incomplete and gave limited data on general project performance. That situation was particularly problematic as the Borrower did not carry out the planned technical evaluations.  16 - REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN MANAGEMENT ANI. EHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSIT1.NCE PROJECT (CREDITS 1458-SE AND SF-13) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE A. Overview 57. On July 20, 1984, the Senegalese Government and the World Bank signed two Credit Agreements totaling about CFAF 2.6 billion to finance the Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project (Second Urban Project), as a follow-up to the Bank's initial activities in the urban sector related to sites and services. 58. The project was an integrated operation consisting of four components, with activities concentrated in the Dakar region, which encompasses the city of Dakar and the adjacent communes. Such a project might seem to pose complex problems as regards the coordination of the various components and sector policies, and this was in fact the case. It entailed a wide range of issues, from macroeconomic analysis to municipal finance, and spanning urban development, housing finance, transportation planning, and traffic management. 59. The studies performed as part of the project provided the necessary framework for developing an overall urban strategy, and addressed the most urgent problems facing the capital. The Project also included an action plan based on proposed courses of action to be adopted by the authorities for improving the context for the implementation of a new urban policy. B. The World Bank and Senegal 60. Attention was drawn to the need for possible World Bank action in the urban sector as a result of a meeting held on January 18, 1983 at the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation to discuss the institutional and financial aspects of the Cap Vert Urban Development Master Plan. 61. In July 1983, after a second World Bank mission, agreement was reached on an analysis of urban sector problems and the terms of reference for studies and other activities, to be part of an urban project financed by the World Bank. The Bank's first mission (for identifying an appropriate sphere of activities in the urban sector) took place in February 1983. 62. After signature of the Credit Agreements, the World Bank sent only two missions exclusively for the purposes of supervision. These were in June 1985 and January 1986. This was because the terms of reference for the various studies and services had been clearly defined by the parties. From  - 17 then on (i.e. from the May 1986 supervision mission), identification of the Urban Management and Development Project was easy. 63. By the end of the supervision mission by Messrs. F. Pechon and P. Blanchet (November 21-29, 1988), all components of the Project had been completed, aside from the preparation of designs for SCATTURBAM and a study of SICAP. At each stage, the supervision missions and the harmonious relationship between Senegalese and World Bank staff enabled progress on the components to be assessed and the necessary guidelines and instructions to be issued. In fact, the views of the World Bank and the Senegalese Government were identical throughout project implementation. C. The Project Unit and Problems of Coordination 64. The project unit was accommodated in the Ministry of Planning. It successfully supervised all the project components, in accordance with the Credit Agreements and World Bank guidelines and in line with Senegalese legislation. The project unit was the main interlocutor for the World Bank. The technical executing agencies were responsible for ensuring the proper implementation of sector policies in the various components, in cooperation with the consulting firms. 65. Although overall the project objectives of preparing studies and undertaking activities leading to the identification and implementation of the Urban Management and Rehabilitation Project were achieved, the Project did suffer from the following shortcomings: (a) There was no clear definition in any terms of refsrence of the operational relationship between the project unit and the technical executing agencies, and this often led to conflicts regarding their respective jurisdictions. (b) In the first year of implementation, the staff of the project unit had not been trained in the procurement and accounting procedures prescribed by the World Bank and the Senegalese Government. The technical assistance provided by EPEVRY was not very effective. (c) There was a clear need for a project monitoring and supervision agency at national level, similar to the Steering Committee that had successfully overseen the negotiations. 66. This is to be regretted, because there were undeniable links among the various components: (a) It is impossible to establish a fiscal cadastre without first drawing up and implementing an urban development plan. (b) The design and implementation of the transportation and traffic plan and the urban development plans are inextricably linked. (c) Municipal capital investment is an integral part of urban development plans, and must be coordinated with them.  18 - Consequently, the links among the various modules should have been coordinated. D. The Steering Committee 67. In February 1983, a Steering Committee consisting of representatives of all the ministries concerned with the urban sector was established. Discussions between the World Bank and the Steering Committee led to an agreement in March 1983 on the terms of reference for a preliminary study. 68. That preliminary study, supervised by the Steering Committee, was prepared by a team of Senegalese specialists from the public and parapublic sectors and French staff from EPEVRY. The interim report produced by the team in Match 1983 and the final report in July 1983 provided a basis for discussions between the Senegalese Government and the World Bank. E. The Monitoring Committee 69. The Monitoring Committee for the project was really a continuation of the Steering Committee. It was established in February 19C3 to serve as an interlocutor for the World Bank. It included representatives from all of the technical executing agencies for the various components, and from the other offices involved in the Project. 70. The Monitoring Committee was therefore established, chaired by the Planning Director of the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, and composed of representatives of the Ministries of Decentralization, Planning and Cooperation, Urban Development and Housing, Equipment, Economy and Finance, and the Interior, together with representatives of SOTRAC, SONEES, SENELEC, and the city of Dakar. It was to examine project studies and reports and recommend the appropriate measures for achieving project objectives. Unfortunately, the Committee met only twice, at the beginning of the Project, and the components were simultaneously implemented by the various agencies without any contacts or intercommunication among the various parties. F. The Technical Director 71. The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing was to assist the Ministry of Planning in coordinating the Project. It therefore appointed a senior official to be the Technical Director of the project unit. However, the Technical Director was almost never available, and this, combined with the high turnover of appointees, was detrimental to consistency and progress. G. The Planning Department 72. It is only recently that the Planning Deparcment has begun to address the urban sector explicitly, as a resuit of the Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project (second phase). The studies undertaken in this component provided a clearer view of the sector, and improved overall and regional planning. The data produced for the studies of  - 19 - urban centers meet the needs of planning specialists dealing with the preparation, selection and prioritization of investment projects. 73. In addition, the information in the studies provides an opportunity for refining the assessment of community needs and the production apparatus, and can thus facilitate the formulation of urban policy. Nevertheless, a number of problems arose and affected the development and coordination of the component. Technical assistance -- planned to last two years -- was delayed. so that achievement of the various objectives was uncoordinated. In particular, computerization became the final step in the process, and the planned transfer of technology was not possible. 74. In addition, action on this component was sometimes indecisive, so much so that it was very difficult to provide even a minimum of satisfactory working conditions when technical assistance was introduced. In practice, informal contacts proved more important than the formal relationships, particularly because none of the planned coordinating mechanisms really worked. 75. Because of this problem and the imminent end of the technical assistance contract period for this component, the Planning Department, in cooperation with the two project experts, prepared a further project entitled Am6lioration de 1'Inc=gration de la Planification Nationale et Urbaine (Enhanced Integration of National and Urban Planning), the purpose being to consolidate the achievements of the component and properly integrate the functions and results of urban capital investment planning into the overall planning system. In August 1988, the project documentation was submitted to CIDA, together with an application for financing. H. DCH (Construction and Housing Department) 76. Under the "housing policy" component, a price series for construction was prepared and technical assistance provided for the DCH. A support program was formulated for the Department, so that this instrument could be made permanent and disseminated. It consisted of the following: (a) introduction of the necessary provisions for periodically updating prices; (b) management and dissemination of the series within the construction sector; (c) development of the series, in particular by incorporating building rehabilitation and plot servicing; (d) establishment and management of the BNPC (National Bureau of Construction Prices). 77, There was no follow-up to the proposal, and it can therefore be considered that so far the study has not had the effect it deserved, in light of the importance of the work and the advantages it would provide for establishing standards in the construction sector.  - 20 - I. Urban Development and Architecture Department 78. The study on the preparation of infrastructure standards had a real impact on the approach adopted by the Urban Development and Architecture Department. The study had direct effects on the planning of SCAT-URBAM land development operations. More generally -- and although the direct impact cannot be quantified -- consultations with the offices responsible for urban development most certainly contributed toward bringing about the following changes: (a) The inclusion of the concept of incremental plot servicing in the new Urban Development Code. (b) The infrastructure grids previously adopted for urban development plans (i.e. for Dakar) have now been adjusted in light of the need for savings. (c) Infrastructure costs are taken into account in detailed urban development studies. (d) Methods are being sought for recovering development costs, even in the case of publicly-owned plots. J. Strengthening of the DGPB (State-Owned Properties Management Departmentl 79. So far, this program, which required a commitment of CFAF 4.3 billion over four years, has not been established. Nevertheless, a number of related projects have been launched. First, measures have been adopted for preventing further renting and making housing no longer subject to special agreements. This has produced budget savings of about CFAF 1.5 billion. Another important item is the FAC-supported Projet d'Assistance a la Gestion du Patrimoine BAti (State-Owned Properties Management Assistance Project), providing for the establishment and computerization of management, together with a maintenance plan. K. SICAP (Socift6 Immobiliere du Cap-Vert) and SNHLM (Societ6 Nationale des Habitations a Loyers Moderes) 80. The identification of measures for increasing the efficiency of the planned housing policy included action involving SICAP and the former OHLM. Various scenarios for the future of those enterprises were proposed, including decreasing the government share in their management or developing them further, with -- in the case of SICAP -- some form of privatization. Consideration of these scenarios served to assist the two agencies in the preparation of recovery plans. 81. SICAP and SNHLM are currently implementing strategic recovery planE. In any case, the studies prepared in connection with this component of the project have been very profitable, and have produced positive effects for recovery in this sector of housing production. Nevertheless, since the entire system of housing finance is now geared toward ownership, these agencies now  21 - depend for their survival on the development of promotion activities. However, over the long term their stock of rental properties may disappear. L. SCAT-URBAM (Central Land Development Aaencyl 82. It was unanimously acknowledged that the system of housing production was facing a bottleneck with regard to the servicing of plots that would be affordable to all segments of housing demand, particularly plots for self-construction. It was therefore decided to establish an agency for developing sites "that could attract a major part of the land market by being offered in significant numbers at competitive prices and with considerably better conditions as regards title and infrastructure" than the existing market. 83. The preparation mission for the establishment of the Agency took place within the framework of the project unit for the Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project. SCAT-URBAM was established in June 1988 to provide builders (i.e. public and private promoters), cooperatives and individuals with standardized plots that had been serviced and rationalized from the viewpoint of land use and the inclusion of the necessary elements for an urban center (i.e. productive activities, schools and other community facilities). (a) As regards the first point, the procedures for establishing the agency were not easy, particularly with respect to the capital stock contributed by private stockholders. This explains the delay in the establishment of SCAT-URBAM, which was in June 1988, a full year after the end of the preparation mission. (b) As regards the second point relating to the land development operations, the orders declaring such operations to be in the public interest and approving detailed Urban Development Plans were issued within the normal timeframe, but were sometimes considered extreme. M. The Traffic Bureau 84. The Traffic Bureau was established in April 1985 and is accommodated in premises rehabilitated by the project unit, which provided it with the necessary equipment for start-up. Although there have been missteps in staff hiring, the Bureau now obviously has competent staff for performing its functions. It consists of two units: the information and data management unit and the studies and monitoring unit. Since being established, the Bureau has undertaken various important activities, but a regular budget allocation must be provided to enable it to continue operating. N. Local Government Department 85. The following proposals submitted by consultants have been implemented:  - 22 (a) The ministry's ex-ante supervision now means that the communes prepare realistic budgets based on properly rationalized items. (b) The establishment of municipal income units has improved the control of directly collected municipal revenues (i.e. from real estate sales and property income). (c) As a result of the computerization of municipal revenue collection in Dakar, recoveries and the positions of taxpayers in arrears can now be more satisfactorily monitored. (d) A number of problems are hindering the repayment by CUD of the debts owed by the former Dakar commune (identified in another report), because CUD is having to meet other expenditures. 86. The terms of reference for technical assistance provided for the following two items, which have been produced: (a) a diagnostic study of the Department with respect to its organization and the application of effective mechanisms, methods and procedures; (d)[sic] a study on the introduction of municipal credit. Some technical assistance activities could not be properly performed, particularly those relating to training and to increasing the efficiency of tax collection. 0. CUD (City of Dakar) 87. The proposal that the membership of the CUD Committee be increased was implemented, and the 1990 reform expanded the number of commune delegates to CUD from 10 to 15 (i.e. 5 for Dakar, 3 for Pikine, 3 for Guediawaye, 2 for Rufisque and 2 for Bargny). 88. The proposal to re-establish the maintenance of certain urban services relating to safety continues to be important. CUD is responsible for maintaining street lighting and public toilets. 89. The lighting system has recently been extended to the road leading to the airport, the highway, and the eastern Corniche. CUD's Technical Services Department is currently discussing an appropriate system for managing public toilets. 90. It has been proposed that a system be introduced for preventing wastage of drinking water from standpipes, since these involve great expense to the communes. A start has been made on this proposal with the development of individual connections and the idea of introducing payment for the use of standpipes. Other proposals regarding the collection of household waste and the supervision of public utilities (i.e. SENELEC, SONEES, SONATEL and SIAS) continue to be very important.  - 23 - 91. Technical assistance made it possible to perform an in-depth diagnostic study of STCUD (CUD's Technical Services), which were lamentably underequipped and overstaffed. Loans made under the Project have made it possible to repair the equipment that could be salvaged and to acquire other essential items. Although the personnel did not receive the training that was originally platned, over this period CUD management hired STCUD staff of a high standard. P. CIDA (Canadian International Development Association) 92. Cofinancing from CIDA consisted of a grant of Can$250,000 to cover the final activities of the consulting firm providing technical assistance for the Traffic Bureau.  - 24 - PART m: STATISTICAL INFQRMATION A. Bank Lending to the Urban Sector Table 1: Bank Lending to the Urban Sector Credit Title Year Approved Amount 336-SE Sites and Services 1972 US$8 M 1061-SN Urban Sector 1980 US$5.3 M SF-13-SE UMRTAP 1984 SDR 2.8 M 1458-SE UMRTAP 1984 SDR 2.9 M 1884-SE UMDP 1988 SDR 32.5 M 2075-SE AGETIP/PWEP 1989 US$20 M 93. The Goverment of Senegal asked IDA to help it solve the various problems encountered in shifting from State-controlled urban development and housing to a more decentralized policy open to the private sector. In that context, Credit(s) 1458-SE and SF-13 essentially mark the start of a new role for the State; the Credits helped in implementing the new policy and reducing the drain of urban development on the public coffers. In that respect, the project largely contributed to the birth of the Urban Management and Development Project.  - 25 - B. Er.Qim akh Table 2: Principal Dates in the Life of the Project Item Programming Revision Actual First mention of the project 1982 _ 02/83 Project appraisal 07/83 07/83 10/04/83 Negotiations 11/83 11/83 03/03/84 IDA President's Report - 03/27/84 Board Approval 01/84 02/84 04/17/84 Signature of Credit Agreements 03/84 03/84 06/20/84 Effectiveness of Agreements 07/84 07/84 11/19/84 Closing date 12/31/87 12/31/88 12/31/89 End of operations 12/31/89 06/30/90 06/30/90 Comments on oroiect management timetable 94. The project was appraised in October 1983. Negotiations were held in Paris in the first week of March 1984 and the IDA Board approved the operation on April 17, 1984. Despite this rapid succession of the various phases of project preparation, there were subsequent delays. Thus, despite the urgency that the Government stated it accorded the operations, project signature took place three months late and effectiveness five months after the initially scheduled date. The possible reasons for these delays are linked primarily to the newness of the undertaking, gaining familiarity of Bank procedures as well as administrative red tape in satisfying the conditions for effectiveness. The closing date was extended by one year and a second request made for a further extension. The Bank refused to extend the closing date a second time, but authorized disbursements on operations already committed for an additional period of six months. Because of that measure, the last activities (involving assistance to the land development agency) could be completed on June 30, 1990.  -26 - Table 3: Technical Assistance Timetable Project Component Projected Actual Duration Urban Investment Programming 09/85 to 07/87 01/86 to 10/88 15 months Housing and Urban Development Policy 03/85 to 10/87 03/85 to 06/89 20 months Transportation Policy 04/85 to 04/87 06/85 to 11/88 19 months Municipal Policy 03/85 to 03/87 03/85 to 12/87 09 months Project Oversight/ Management 03/85 to 10/87 03/85 to 01/86 N/A Comments on the physical implementation timetable of the proiect 95. A comparison of the planned and actual dates of physical implementation shows, on average for the main components of the project, a delay of more than one year. The lag for the urban development component alone (regarding land development) was in excess of two years. Although planned from January 1985 to December 1987, the project was actually executed from March 1985 to December 1988, when virtually all tasks identified by the terms of reference had been completed. The studies or actions yet to be completed or undertaken were finished in June 1990, i.e., 30 months after the date set by identification or 18 months beyond the initially scheduled closing date set in the Credit Agreements (December 31, 1988). These last works were completed in tandem with the effectiveness of the Agreement for the Urban Management and Development Project (November 3, 1988). C. Credit Disbursements (in thousands of USS) Table 4: Schedule of IDA Disbursements under Credits 1458-SE & SF-13 Am,. - . _ ,Cumulative Expenditu Acal IDA Fiscal Ycar Appraial Commimded % Appmial Expenditure % 1984 - 105.40 1.5% 105.40 1.5% 1985 1,500.00 2,476 33% 1.500 2,582 34.5% 1986 1,500.00 1,914 25% 3,000 4,495 60% 1987 2,000.00 1,713 23% 5000 6.209 82.5% 1988 1 ,000.00 741 10% 6,000 6,951 93% 1989 5 541 7% - 7,493 100% UWOWW~~~~~  -27 - Table 5: Consolidated situation (in thousands of US$) Fisca Year Appmial Revixion Expendiures Disburanwm % Cornunittd Disbursed 1984 .105 105 1.26% 1985 1,330.00 1,330.00 2,585 1,422 17.10% 1986 1,660.00 1,660.00 2,135 1,011 12.10% 1987 1,660.00 1,960.00 2,020 2,489 29.90% 1988 1,330.00 1,565.00 930 2,307 27.70% 1989 670.00 808.86 556 644 7.70% 1990 . 354 4.20% TarAL 6,650.00 7,323.86 8,333 8,333 100% Comments on disbursements 96. All proceeds of Credits 1458-SE and SF-13 were disbursed under the projects. The credits were utilized rapidly, as in year one 34% of the funds were used. During the second year 25% was used and the pace was sustained in the third year (23%). 82.5% of the funds under the two credits were disbursed by the end of the third year. D. Proiect implementation Table 6: Utilization of credit proceeds (in thousands of US$) SUMMARY OF THE UTILIZATION OF IDA FUNDS BY COMPONENT Ref. COMPONENT 1985 18 1987 198t 1989 TOTAL a Invec4nen Progamnming 179 183 134 11 - 509 b Urban and Housing Policy 938 573 634 350 350 2,847 c Trnaportton 404 353 488 332 167 I,747 d Municipal Policy 798 739 353 21 23 1,937 e Projet Unit 260 64 I10 25 452 Total 2,582 1,914 .713 741 541 7,493 _~--  -28 - (a) UTLIZATION OF CREDfT SF-13 BY COMPONENT Ref. COMPONENr 1985 1986 1987 198 1989| TOrAL CR.SPF13 a Invtment Progrmniing 145 183 134 11 . 475 b Urbn and Housing Policy 61 _ 350 311 722 c Tmanportion 294 345 477 332 167 1 618 d Municipal Policy . 320 164 21 11 518 c Project Unit 131 11 143 Total 571 921 776 716 491 3 478 (b) UTILIZATION OF IDA CREDIT 1448 BY COMPONENT Ref. COMPONENT 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TOTAL CR. 1458 a Invcument Progrmmning 33 - . 33 b Urban and Housing Policy 938 512 634 . 39 2 124 c TMportaion 110 7 11 129 d Municipal Policy 798 419 189 . 11 1 418 o Project Unit 128 52 102 25 . 308 Total 2 010 992 936 25 50 4 015 Table 7: Rate of Credit Utilization by Component (a) Annual utilization Ref. COMPONENT 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 a Inveutmett 9.59% 7.83% 1.60% - Progmmming 6.96% b Urban and Housing 36.36% 29.96% 37.02% 47.21% 64.72% Policy c Transportation 15.68% 18.44% 28.53% 44.88% 30.98% d Municipal Policy 30.94% 38.64% 20.65% 2.88% 4.28% e Project Unit 10.07% 3.37% 5.97% 3.41% 0.02% Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  - 29 - (b) Rate of utilization throughout the life of the project Ref. COMPONENT 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TOTAL a Inve1amt Progrnming 3526% 36.04% 26.36% 2.34% . 100% b Urban and Housing Policy 32.97% 20.15% 22.27% 12.30% 12.32% 100% c Txnportation 23. 16% 20.21% 27.97% 19.05% 9.61% 100% d Municipal Policy 41.24% 38.19% 18.27% 1.10% 1.20% 100% o Project Unit 57.51% 14.26% 22.61% 5.60% 0.03% 100% Cogments on credit utilization 97. During the first two years of the project, efforts focused on formulating the housing policy and technical assistance to the municipalities (technical services and financial management). During the second half of the project, the 'housing" portion of the component received even greater attention, whereas the "transportation" part was fully developed. E. rgiect costs Table 8: Item (in millions of USS) Appraisal Revision Actual Total project cost (USS million) 6.650 7,323.86 8,333 Overrun or reduction (in %) __ 11% 24.8% Amount of credits (US$ million) 6.000 6,000 7,493 Disbursed _ 8,333 Canceled ___ Utilization 100% Economic rate of return N/A Financial performance _ good Comments on the variation in project costS 98. Financial commitments were greater than the amount of the initial credits. Essentially, this was due to the magnitude of fluctuations in the exchange rates and a lack of forward-looking management of commitments and regular monitoring of accounts. Other factors included, in particular:  - 30 - * the original orders, which had neither been properly evaluated or delivered on time; e additional project activities, with the Bank's approval; * the belated taking into account of the consequences of revaluing and revising the costs of the services provided by the various consulting firms, especially in view of the fact that project implementation continued far beyond the initial timeframe. F. Project financdin Table 9: Origin and Distribution of Resources (in thousands of USS) Gap Source Credit Appraisal Revision Disbursement (+ or-) I Credits SE 13 3,048.00 3,048.00 4,015 967 IDA SF 1458 2,952.00 2,952.00 3,478 526 2 Local Senegal 650.00 650.00 623 -27 3 Cofinancing CIDA 213.86 213.86 TOTAL 6,650.00 6,863.86 8,333 1,466 Credits on the origin of funds 99. The gap between the approved and revised amount results from an additional CIDA funding (Credit 2437-SE) entitled a "bridge credit" for Can$250,000 (Agreement of October 28, 1987). The projected financing plan for the project was revised to allow time for the additional works necessary for the completion of the various components. In addition, because of a first contribution from CIDA the transportation portion could be extended, with counterpart funds making it possible to cover the amounts committed. The gap in disbursements and identified costs is about 25%, essentially attributable to wide swings in the value of the SDR during project implementation.  - 31 - Table 10: Breakdown of Credits by Category (in thousands of USS) SUMMARY OF THE ALLOCATION OF IDA PROCEEDS BY CATEGORY OF EXPENDITURE Ref. CATEGORY OF EXPENDITJUR 1985 1986 1987 i988 1989 TOTAL I CivilWorik s . 320 - 28 349 2 Equipment, Matrials and Supplies 59 437 236 148 S0 932 3 Three Consulting Service. 2,465 1,435 1,063 593 462 6,019 4 Taining 21 41 6 . . 130 S Micellaneous 36 25 - - 62 Total 2,582 1,914 1,713 741 541 7,493 (a) ALLOCATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF IDA CREDfT SF-13 BY CATEGORY OF EXPENDITURE Ref. CATEGORY OF EXPENDITURE 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TOTAL Cr. SF 13 1 Civil Works . 320 . 28 349 2 Equipmet, Mteriab and Supplies = 415 115 124 = 655 3 Three Consulting Services 571 506 340 591 462 2473 4 Trining .- - - 5 Miscellaneous . . . - Totwl 571 921 776 716 491 3 478 (b) ALLOCATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF CREDIT 1458 BY CATEGORY OF EXPENDITURE . .... _._- inn-m* Ref. CATEGORY OF EXPENDITURE 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TOTAL Cr. 1458 1 Civil Work . - - 2 Equipmcnt, Materials and Supplies 59 22 120 23 50 277 3 Three Consulting Sevices 1,893 928 722 1 3,545 4 Training 24 41 68 | 130 5 Miscllaneous 36 25 * - 62 | Total 2,010 992 935 24 50 4,015  - 32 v Table 11: Annual credit utilization by category Rat CATEGORY OP EXPENDiTURE 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1 Civil Works _ 18.70% 5.28% 2 Equipment, Mearials and Supplies 2.30% 22.87% 13.79% 19.99% 9.35% 3 Consulting Service 95.47% 74.95% 62.05% 80.01% 85.38% 4 Tmining 1.30% 2.14% 3.90% ._ _ 5 Micellmncoua 0.80% 1.50% __ _ ToWa 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Comments on allocations by category 100. Project funds were largely (more than 80%) allocated to cover expenditures associated with technical assistance experts. The equipment acquired by the project was for the most part rolling stock for the city of Dakar.  - 33 - G. Con=aual Qsmimnla Table 12: Commit in Side Letter No. 6 to the Credit Agreexents Reference Nature of the Commitment Status A - (I) a OHLM Audit before 30/0911984 Satisfied 05/15/1985 A - (1) b Notification by September 30, 1984 of measures taken or to be taken to inprove the urvey of clainm on plots nd the etablishment of housing loasu Satisfied 0511511985 A - (2) Notifation by Septemb4r 30, 1984 of meamire taken or to be taken to improve the mnobiizaion of municipal resours Satisfied 11/30/1984 B - (1) EsAblishmnt of the Traffic Bueau by Septenber satisfied by 11/30/1984 30, 1984 _ B - (2) Decision of the Government by December 12, 1984 regarding the split of responsibilities between the centrml govenumcnt and Dakar for infrsuctur management and mintAennce Decision not taken B - (3) Dei ion of the Government regarding the Decision not taken trunsportation plan before December 31, 1984 B - (4) Amendment prior to December 31, 1984 of BHS Satisfied, but the ttutes were not matet to allow for loans to non-wage ermers amended to achieve the project objectives B - (5) Decision of the Goverment on the detailed Urban Development M"ter Plan pnior to March 31, Deciuon not taken 1985 B- (6) Recommendations prior to June 30, 1985 on ways to reduce subsidies to State-owned propeities and MTimprve rent coUoction Satisfied by 7/30/1985 B- (7) Propoal of the Govenmwent on the FECL prior to June 30, 1985 Satiosied in June 1987 B - (8) Establishment of an urban land development agency prior to March 31, 1986 Satisfid by May 28, 1988 Comments on contractlal commitments 101. Few conditions were set for credit effectiveness and these presented .o real difficulties. This situation had been designed so as not to delay project implementation. Nevertheless, it became apparent that the lack of consideration or underestimating of institutional, financial and technical prerequisites ultimately only postponed the emergence of true problems. The following table shows that important decisions from the regarding the general urban policy remain unresolved, primarily in terms of the allocation of responsibilities and guidelines for the Transportation and Urban Development Plans.  - 34 - H. Resources allocated to the Eroject Table 13: Utilization of Human Resources (in number of weeks) Project Cycle Estimated Revised Actual Prior to appraisal 12 12 12 From appraisal to Board approval 20 27.4 27.4 Froli Board approval to effectiveness 3 3.6 3.6 During supervision ____________ ____________35 43* 43 TOTAL 70 86 86 D During supervision, of the 43 weeks recorded, 28 weeks were used for missions.  - 35 - Table 14: Missions Misnion Month/year No. Weeks No. Persona No. Man-weeks Date of Report (i) Project Prpaation _ Identification 01/83 1 1 1 02/15/83 Prpation 3/83 1 2 2 03/18/83 Appraiml 07/83 2 2 4 07/29/83 Negotiaion 03/84 1 2 2 03/04/83 TOTAL 15 7 9 1 (ii) Project Supervision Supervision 1 06/85 1.5 2 3 07/01/85 Supervision 2 01/86 1.5 2 3 02/07/86 Supervision 3 05/86 2 2 3 06/18/86 Supervision 4 01/87 1.5 2 2 02/09/87 Supervision 5 05/87 1 1 1 05/09/87 Supervision 6 06/87 1 1 1 07/07/87 Supervision 7 11/87 1 1 1 11/06/87 Supervision 8 04/88 1.5 1 1 05/07/88 Supervision 9 06/88 2 2 3 07/06/88 Supervision 10 11/88 1 2 2 11/29/88 Supervision 11 10/89 1.5 1 1.5 10/27/89 Supervision 12 02/90 2 2 4 03/06/90 Supervision 13 06/90 1 1 1 06/22/90 Supervision 14 10/90 1 1 1 10/15/90 TOTAL 19.5 28 Comments on supervision missions 102. The supervision missions, beginning in May 1986, were for both the current project and also for the identification of the UMDP. Beginning in November 1988, the missions were concerned primarily with implementation of the UMDP and secondarily the completion of the current project.  -36 - I. Proie studi