Colombia - 500 KV Interconnection Project

_ocomat of The World Bank FM OFMTC- UtS ONLY MICROFICHE COPY Report No. 10241-CO Type: (PCR) RPmNO 10241 MAUPRIVEZ,/ X31709 / T9 069/ OEDD3 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA 500 KV INTERCONNECTION PROJECT (LOAN1 1583-CO) DECEMBER 27, 1991 Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division Country Department III Latin America and the Caribbean Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performauoce of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authotization.  CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE Name of Currency Peso Colombiano (Col$) Exchange Rate At year-end At Appraisal (1977) 36.99 1978 41.00 1979 44.00 1980 50.92 1981 59.07 1982 70.29 1983 88.77 1984 113.89 1985 172.20 1986 219.00 1987 263.70 ACRONYMS CHEC Central Hidroelectrica de Caldas CHIDRAL Central Hidroelectrica del Rio Achicaya S.A. CORELCA Corporaci6n ElEctrica de la Costa Atlantica cVC Corporaci6n Autonoma Regional del Cauca DNP Departamento Nacional de Planificaci6n EEEB Empresa de Energia Electrica de Bogota EMCALI Empresas Municipales de Cali EPM Empresas P6blicas de Medellin IFEN Financiera Electrica Nacional ICEL Instituto Colombiano de Energia El6ctrica INCOMEX Instituto Nacional de Comercio Exterior ISA Interconexi6n Electrica S.A. JINT Junta Nacional de Tarifas KfW Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau LEBRIJA Central Hidroelectrica del Rio Lebrija MME Hinisterio de Minas y Energia SAR Staff Appraisal Report  THE WORLD BANK FO om US ONL Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Ohic@ of Dimictot.Gnai Ope.atmm Evakotwn December 31, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Colombia 500 RV Interconnection Project (Loan 1583-CO) Attached, for information, is a copy of a- report entitled "Project Completion Report on Colombia - 500 KV Interconnection Project (Loan 1583-CO)" prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Region Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their omcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COHPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA 500 KV INTERCONNECTION PROJECT (LOAN 1583-CO) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface i Basic Data Sheet ii Highlights v CHAPTER I: Background 1 1.1 Bank Lending to the Sector ............. 1 1.2 Power Sector Organization ................. 2 1.3 Power Demand ............................. 3 CHAPTER II: Project Preparation and Appraisal 3 2.1 Origin and Rationale for the Project ............... 3 2.2 Project Preparation and Appraisal ................. 4 2.3 Negotiations, Board Presentation and Effectiveness .... 5 2.4 Major Covenants of the Loan Agreement ............. 6 CHAPTER III: Project Execution and Cost 6 3.1 Initiation of the Project ...... ................ 6 3.2 Timetable and Changes in the Project .............. 6 3.3 Technical Problems During the Construction and Operation of the Line .......................... 8 3.4 Restrictions in the Utilization of the Line .......... 9 3.5 Project Costs ........................................ 10 3.6 Changes in Closing Date, Allocation of Loan Proceeds, and Timing of Disbursements .......................... 10 3.7 Performarce of Consultants and Contractors ........... 10 CHAPTER IV: Proiect Justification 10 4.1 Need to Interconnect the Atlantic and Central Systems 10 4.2 Rate of Return on Investment ...... ................... 11 CHAPTER Vs Financial Performance 12 5.1 Comparison -f Actual and Forecast Data .. ............. 12 5.2 Tariffs .............................................. 12 5.3 Accounts Receivable .......................... ....... 12 5.4 Finiances of ISA's Shareholders .... ................... 13 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Table of Contents (Cont.) CHAPTER VI: Institutional Performance 13 6.1 ISA ................................................. 13 6.2 The Government . . .14 6.3 The Bank ... 14 CHAPTER VIIs Lessons to be Learned 14 ANNEXES Annex 1.1 Summary of Bank Lending to the Sector. 16 2.1 Major Covenants of the Loan and Project Agreements.. 18 3.1 Key Completion Dates of the Project .20 3.2 Statistics of Operation of the 500 kV Interconnection Line (1985-1987) .21 3.3 Appraisal and Actual Project Costs .22 3.4 Actual and Forecast Accumulated Disbursements. 23 3.5 Forecast and Actual Loan Allocation . .24 4.1 Purchase and Sales of CORELCA to the Interconnected System .25 4.2 Sector Installed Capacity (MW) .26 4.3 Internal Rate of Return on Investment. 27 5.1 Comparison of Forecast and Actual Income Statements (1977-1986) ............................... 28 5.2 Comparison of Forecast and Actual Sources and Applications of Funds (1977-1986) ...... .............. 29 5.3 Comparison of Forecast and Actual Balance Sheets (1977-1986) ..... ...................... 30 5.4 Comparison of Forecast and Actual Key Performance Indicators (1977-1986) ...... ......................... 31 5.5 Balance of Accounts Receivable at Year-end .32 5.6 ISA's Shareholders, Annual Level of Performance (1977-1986) ............. ............................. 33 ATTACIMENTS 1. Comments from the Borrower dated May 24, 1991 ......... 35 2. Comments from Executing Agency dated May 17, 1991 ..... 34 MAP IBRD 1769OR  COLOMBIA INTERCONEXION ELECTRICA S.A. (ISA) PROJECT CONPLF.TION REPORT 500 KV INTERCONNECTION PROJECT (LOAN 1583-CO) Preface This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the 500 kV Interconnection Project (Ln. 1583-CO). The loan amounted to US$50 million and was signed July 14, 1978, became effective on October 17, 1978 and was closed on December 31, 1986. The total amount disbursed was US$49.7 million. The Borrower was the Republic of Colombia and the executing agency the Interconexion Electrica S.A. (ISA). The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure and Energy Division, Country Department III, of the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, based on informatior. in the Bank files, a final report prepared by the ISA, a mission to the field and discussions with Bank and ISA staff. Following standard procedures, OED sent copies of the Draft PCR to the Borrower and the executing agency for comments. Comments received have been attached to the Report.  ii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COL>IA 500 RV INTERCONNECTION PROJECT (LOAN 1583-CO) BASIC DATA SHEET REY PROJECT DATA Total Project Cost Appraisal Actual (US$ million equivalent) (Excluding finance charges) 167.20 143.22 Cost overrun (or underrun) (24.0) Loan Amount (US million equivalent) Disbursed (as of March 31, 1988) 50.0 49.72 Cancelled (as of March 31, 1988) None 0.28 Repaid (as of March 31, 1988) 23.10 23.10 Outetsnding (as March 31, 1988) 26.90 33.30 1 Date Physical Components Completed 4/81 11/85 Return on Investment 35.0O 30.0Z Institutional Performance Good Good CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (US$ Million) As of June 30, 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 (i) Appraisal Estimate 20.0 41.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 (ii) Actual 1.5 21.3 34.2 36.3 38.8 38.9 39.9 40.2 48.4 49.7 (iii) (ii) as Z of (i) 8 52 68 73 78 78 80 80 97 99 2 1/ Increased results from exchange adjustment of US$ 6.68 million. 2/ About US$ 0.3 million were cancelled from the Loan account.  - iii - STAFF INPUT (Staff Weeks) Bonk FY 1974-77 1978 1979 1980 1981 1962 1988 1984 1986 1988 1987 1988 Total Pr.appralal 77.a 6 I - - Appraisal 11.2 16.6 27.8 Neotiations 3.9 3.9 Supervislons 0.2 6.2 2.4 2.2 9.9 2.7 3.8 3.0 3.9 4.1 2.6 40.9 Tota I g X 2 . 4 Z . 2 7 3-r .T MISSION DATA Month/ No. of No. of Staff Date of Type of Mission Year Weeks Persons Weeks Report Project Preparation 8/75 2 2 4 9/16/75 Project Preparation 11/75 1 2 2 12/24/75 Project Preparation 3/76 2 5/20/76 Project Preparation 8/76 1 1 1 9/15/76 Project Preparation 1/77 1 1 1 3/30/77 Project Preparation 1/77 2 2 4 2/23/77 Project Preparation 3/77 1 1 1 4/13/77 Appraisal 5/77 3 3 9 12/30/77 1 Post-Appraisal 8/77 1 2 2 8/30/77 Post-Appraisal 9/77 1 1 1 10/07/77 Supervision I 9/78 0.4 1 0.4 9/15/78 Supervision II 4/79 2 1 2 5/14/79 Supervision III 5/79 1 1 1 6/18/79 Supervision IV 9/79 1 0.6 0.6 10/02/79 Supervision V 10/79 1 2 2 10/19/79 Supervision VI 6/80 1 3 3 8/05/80 Supervision VII 9/81 2 2 4 12/10/81 Supervision VIII 11/81 1 1 1 1/18/82 Supervision IX 11/81 1 2.4 2.4 1/22/82 Supervision X 5/82 1 2.4 2.4 6/22/82 Supervision XI 11/82 1 2 2 1/20/83 Supervision XII 9/83 1 3.8 3.8 11/14/83 Supervision XIII 5/84 1 3 3 6/11/84 Supervision XIV 3/85 1 1.6 1.6 4/30/85 Supervision XV 9/85 3 1.8 5.4 11/07/85 Supervision XVI 9/86 2 1 2 11/14/86 Supervision XVII 11/87 2 1 2 12/11/87 Total 63.6 1/ Yellow Cover issuance.  - iv - OTHER PROJECT DATA Item Original Revision Actual First mention in files 1O/14/74 Negotiation 3/10-17/78 Board Approval date 5/30/78 Loan Agreement date 7/14/78 Effectiveness date 9/17/78 10/17/78 Closing Date 6/30/82 12/31/84 12/31/86 Borrower: Republic of Colombia Executing Agency: Interconexion Electrica S.A. Fiscal Year of Borrower Calendar Follow-on Project (Loan 1725-CO) San Carlos II Hydro Power Project  v PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLONBIA 500 RV INTERCONNECTION PROJECT (LOAN 1583-CO) HIGHLIGHTS 1. The loan 1583-CO (US$50 million equivalent) helped to finance the construction of the 523 km 500 kV line San Carlos - Cerromatoso- Sabanalarga, which interconnected the Central and the Atlantic power systems. The Project was successful in meeting its objectives oft (a) decreasing the proportion of thermal generation in the Atlantic power system from 1002 ex.sting prior to the interconnection to about 79Z in 1986; (b) supwoort4:ag the central system in the dry season beginning in 1982, when the line was provisionally energized at 230 kV; and (c) reducing the investment in the new generating plants in CORELCA's system (paras. 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). 2. The Project was completed in November 1985, about four and a half years later than the target completion date.1 The main cause of delay is attributed to the failure to complete the US$40 million cofinancing arrangement with KfW for the foreign exchange costs of the substations component. The withdrawal of KfW from financing that project component was due to a disagreement between ISA and KfW over the awarding of the contract for the circuit-breakers (para. 3.2.2). This obliged the Government and ISA to look for other sources of financing; however, even though they managed to accomplish this expeditiously, the contract signing took some time to materialize (para. 3.2.3). 3. The financial performance of ISA during the period of project implementation was adequate, though the company experienced some financial constraints due to the high amount of the shareholders arrears in electricity purchases and capital contributions, higher inflation than expected at appraisal, and ISA's commitment to the sector's ambitious investment program, under which it participated simultaneously in the construction of San Carlos, Jaguas, Guavio, and Betania hydroelectric projects (para 5.1.1). 1/ The line was provisionally put into operation at 230 kV in February 1982, or 10 months later than forecast at appraisal.  - 1 - PROJECT COIPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA 500 KV INTERCONNECTION PROJECT (LOAN 1583-CO) I. BACKGL J 1.1 Bank LendinR to the Sector 1.1.1 Since 1950, the Bank has made 31 loans to the Colombian Power Sector, totalling US$2.2 billion (Annex 1.1). 1.1.2 At the start of Bank lending, in the 1950s, the Bank's lending to the sector was to individual utilities (CHIDRAL, CHEC, LEBRIJA, EPH and EEEB). The objective was to expand the coverage of the electric service at minimum cost in the area of each individual utility. However, the most economical and large hydro potential sites were beyond the needs and investment capacity of isolated systems; hence, interconnection and pooled investments became a major objective in the second half of the 1960s. To this end, the Bank strongly supported the creation of ISA (Interconexi6n Eldctrica S.A.). ISA was created with the purpose of interconnecting the regional power systems, defining the expansion program for the Interconnected System, and developing large hydro sites. The Bank subsequently made four loans to ISA. The first loan (575-CO), amounting to US$18 million, helped to finance the 230 kV interconnection lines La Mesa- Esmeralda-Yumbo and Esmeralda-Guatape, and the corresponding substations. The second loan (681-CO), in the amount of US$52 million, helped to finance the construction at Chivor I hydroelectric plant (500 MW). The third and fourth loans (1582/1725-CO), amounting to US$126 million and US$72 million, respectively, helped finance the construction of San Carlos I and II hydroelectric plant (1240 MW). All facilities are operating satisfactorily. Loan 1583-CO in the amount of US$50 million, which is the subject of this report, was made to the Government of Colombia, which transfe-r,d the proceeds of the loan to ISA to help finance the construction of the 500 kV line, San Carlos-Cerromatoso-Chinu-Sabanalarga, which would interconnect the Central and the Atlantic Systems. The service of this loan would be made by the Government. In the early 1980s, the Bank supported the creation of Financiera El4ctrica Nacional (FEN) to assist the sector in tapping the domestic and external capital markets to fund its heavy financing needs. At present, in the context of the Power Sector Adjustment Loan (US$300 million) made in 1987, the Bank is focusing its efforts on improving the efficiency of the weaker utilities in the power sector, strengthening sector finances and providing reliable electric service at minimum cost to the country.  2- 1.2 Power Sector Organization 1.2.1 Six main utilities currently dominate the power subsector: Empresa de Energia Electrica de Bogota (EEEB), Empresas Pdblicas de Medellin (EPM). and Corporaci6n Aut6noma Regional del Cauca (CVC) are strong, independent utilities serving the major markets (Bogot4, Medellin, and Call). Instituto ColombiRno de Energia Electrica (ICEL) is the main shareholder of thirteen smaller utilities; Corporaci6n Electrica de Costa Atlantica (CORELCA) is the main shareholder of nine utilities; and Interconexi6n Electrica, S.A. (ISA) is a generation and transmission utility. Five other smaller utilities play a minor role. 1.2.2 EEEB is a large utility (800,000 customers, 3,800 employees) serving the city of Bogota. It is fully owned by the municipality of Bogota. EPM is fully owned by the municipality of Medellin, Colombia's second largest city. It operates power, water, sewerage and telephone services. It is responsible for serving about 10 of the customers and represents 2z02 of total national electricity sales in the country. CVC is a regional development corporation whose main function in the sector is to sell bulk power to the integrated system, mainly to the distribution company serving Cali (EMCALI). CORELCA and ICEL are fully owned by the Government and together account for about 502 of the customers and 352 of electricity sales. Both companies serve generally poorer and isolated market areas. ISA is a utility owned by EPM, CORELCA, ICEL, CVC, EEEB and CHEC. It has the responsibility for generation, interconnection of regicnal systems, operation of the integrated system, and sector planning. 1.2.3 ISA was established in 1967 as a corporation whose shares were owned by the regional and municipal utilities. The Bank played an important role in ISA's establishment, which reflected a concern dating from the early 1960s with the fragmentation of decision-making power among increasingly autonomous utilities. Initially, the Government was not represented on ISA's Board. This changed in 1985 when ISA's by-laws were amended to allow Government non-voting representation on the Board. The lack of direct Government representation between 1967 and 1985 was an important impediment which prevented the Government from taking effective action to ensure that power sector policies were fully in line with macro- economic programs. Initially ISA had the responsibility for building all major generating plants. However, this task as well as its role in the critical area of overall sector planning has been seriously constrained by the strong pressures from individual region-based utilities to develop their own generation facilities and their general resistance to intervention. In 1979, at the insistence of the regional utilities which were facing the threat of electricity rationing, the Government agreed to permit the regional utilities to initiate their own generation projects. However, it was agreed by the Government and ISA's shareholders that ISA would operate the trunk transmission lines, act as national dispatch agency and, in the long run, own at least one-third of the total generation capacity in the sector. In retrospect, the decision to allow the regional utilities to own and to construct large generation projects was not sound, since it led to competition among them for projects in their respective areas without due consideration of national interests. This weakened ISA's ability to ensure that the investment program constituted the national  least-cost solution and to adjust programs to changing circumstances. Once projects were included in the investment programs of the municipal or regional utilities, ISA lacked the authority to adjust the pace of execution to take into account changes in demand. To solve these problems, under the Sector Adjustment Loan, the Government agreed that in order to achievs a harmonious development of the power sector and guarantee the execution of the least-cost plans, all generating plants with an installed capacity of more than 100 MW will be owned by ISA (with the exception of Urra I Project). 1.2.4 The Ministerio de Minas y Energia (MME) plays an important policy and regulatory function in the power sector and, specifically, is responsible for issuing regulations on the provision of electricity and on technical standards. The tariff board, JNT (Junta Nacional de Tarifas) which is under the Departamento Nacional de Planificaci6n (DNP), is empowered under Decree 201 of 1974 and Decree 149 of 1976 to set electricity tariffs. Since 1986, the Government has established clearly, in policy directions and by law, that JNT sets the actual tariffs to be charged, and the utilities generally have been complying with the JNT's tariff resolutions. 1.2.5 Another sector institution is FEN (Financiera Eldctrica Nacional), a financial intermediary set up by the Colombian Government in 1982 to help finance the investment programs of the power sector, oversee the sector's finances, and coordinate the sector's financing strategies. FEN's shareholders are the National Government (95Z) and the sector utilities (5?). FEN has recently begun to act as advisor to the Government on financial issues facing the sector. 1.3 Power Demand Electricity use is extensive in Colombia and is increasing at rates higher than those for total energy consumption. About 58? of Colombia's population of 28.4 million had access to electricity in 1985. Electrification is higher in urban areas (about 95? in Bogota, Medellin and Cali), but large areas of the country still lack electricity service. Electric power provided 28? of total commercial energy in 1985, which compares with 24? in 1980. The increasing share of electric power in total energy consumption is largely the result of gradual substitution of oil products and nontraditional fuels by electricity, mainly in the residential sector. II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 2.1 Origin and Rationale for the Project 2.1.1 The 500 kV Interconnection Project had its origin in discussions held in October 1974 between ISA and the Bank staff during the supervision of Loans 575/681-CO. Initially CORELCA, in cooperation with ICEL, was authorized by the Government to build the project. However, the Bank was opposed to this scheme because it considered that the Project could more  -4- suitably be built by ISA, which was the Colombian utility charged with the interconnection responsibilities. ISA at that time was facing some financial constraints and, perhaps forced by this situation, preferred that the project be built by CORELCA. Under this circumstance, the Bank was willing to go along with the project provided thats a) the loan be made to CORELCA and ISA, b) CORELCA become ISA's shareholder, and c) the line be transferred to -- and operated by -- ISA, once it was completed. CORELCA becoming ISA's shareholder became an issue because of the amount of CORELCA's share of capital stock and the need for CORELCA to adopt ISA's expansion program. Later on these problems were resolved and CORELCA became a shareholder of ISA (para. 2.2.3). 2.1.2 The objectives of the project weres (a) to link the Atlantic Coast and Centra.l systems which at that time were totally thermal and predominantly hydro, respectively; (b) to substitute some hydro for thermal generation; and (c) to obtain savings on equipment through reduced capacity reserve requirements. 2.2 Project Preparation and Appraisal 2.2.1 The feasibility study for the project was prepared by a Colombian and an American consultant hired by ISA and CORELCA. The detailed engineering and the preparation of bidding documents was done by the Colombian consultant, assisted by a British consultant. 2.2.2 During project preparation, the Bank had the opportun.ty to comment on the feasibility study prepared by the consultants; those comments were taken into account in the final version of the study. 2.2.3 The Bank sent seven preparation missions between October 1974 and project appraisal in May 1977. Although the feasibility atudy was ready in March 1975, it was necessary for the Bank to postpone the departure of the appraisal mission several times as there were issues that took time to solve, particularly the incorporation of CORELCA as a shareholder of ISA, the ownership of the line, definition. of the borrower, and improvement in the finances of the power companies. After lengthy discussions the Bank, MME, ISA and CORELCA, agreed that CORELCA would be incorporated into ISA, the interconnection line would be built by and would belong to ISA, the Borrower would be the Government and tariff increases would take place before negotiations. The other element that delayed project appraisal of the interconnection line was that ISA at the same time was also processing the loan for the San Carlos I Hydroelectric Project (which became Loan 1582-CO). The parties involved agreed that it would be more efficient to have only one appraisal report covering both projects. 2.2.4 The appraisal took place in May 1977. The mission found that ISA and the Government had made substantial progress toward the solution of the main issues and recommended that a loan amounting to US$50 million be processed. It was agreed that before negotiations ISA and the Government would do the following: (a) ISA would confirm that it would change its by- laws giving CORELCA full status as ISA's shareholder, indicating explicitly that all future major system expansions would be owned by ISA -- and other changes to give ISA more flexibility for an efficient administration and operation of the company; (b) the Government would introduce tariff  -5- increases of 20? for ISA and its shareholders, effective July 1, 1977, except for EEEB for which the increase would be 1OZ; (c) ISA would confirm its acceptance of the principle that it should earn a 9? rate of return on existing transmission facilities; (d) the Government would propose a program for increasing the prices of petroleum and natural gas for use in electricity generation (para. 3.4.2); and (e) ISA would prepare the financial projections of ISA and its shareholders, incorporating full asset revaluation and tariff increases. 2.2.5 The interconnection project consisted of the following components: (a) a single-circuit 500-kV transmission line, 523 km long, between San Carlos in the central region and the Sabanalarga substation in the Atlantic (Northern) region; (b) two 500/230/34.5-kV terminal substations, each with an initial capacity of 450 MVA, one at San Carlos and the other at Sabanalarga; (c) two intermediate 500/115/34.5-kV substations, each with an individual capacity of 150 MVA, one at Cerromatoso and one at Chin*; and (d) a shunt-reactive power compensation system with a capacity of 500 MVAr. 2.2.6 The appraisal mission estimated the cost of the project at US$167.2 million (excluding interest during construction), with foreign and local costs estimated at US$100.0 and US$67.2 million, respectively. The project was estimated to be financed as follows: Millions US$ IBRD 50.0 KfW 40.0 Suppliers' Credit 10.0 Government 67.2 167.2 IBRD would finance foreign currency requirements for the transmission line and its engineering costs; KfW would finance the foreign components of the substations; the suppliers' credit would finance the remaining foreign costs, and the Government would finance the local costs and the interest during construction of any loan or credit. 2.3 Negotiations, Board Presentation and Effectiveness 2.3.1 Negotiations took place during the period of March 10-17, 1978, 10 months after appraisal. It was necessary to undertake a post-appraisal mission in September 1977 in addition to two missions by the Loan Officer for Colombia. The delay was caused partly by the slow way in which tariff adjustments were approved as well as the slow preparation of financial projections by ISA's shareholders. The biggest delay was created by the  - 6 - approval of changes in ISA's bylaws to incorporate: (a) CORELCA as a full shareholder; (b) the principle of reasonable rate of return on assets in service; (c) the principle of least-cost development programs in ISA's planning (the regions wanted to exclude some projects from the options to be analyzed on the ground that those projects had already been assigned to them); and (d) the rule that ISA would build and operate the future major expansion. The Bank and the Colombians made a tremendous effort to fulfill the conditions agreed to be resolved prior to negotiations. Even though the Bank demonstrated flexibility by accepting a tariff adjustment lower than envisaged at appraisal, and made a dated covenant the elimination of the subsidy of fuel prices for CORELCA (see Annex 2.1, iii), there was irritation caused by the delay. The Colombians formed the opinion that the Bank's requirements seemed to be endless. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that the main reason for delay was the lack of preparation of substantial elements of the project at the time of appraisal. Moreover, financial projections and the changes in ISA's bylaws should have been ready at the time of appraisal. 2.3.2 Negotiation of the loan was substantially completed during the meeting held in Washington on March 10-17, 1978; however, there was one issue that required still more time to be resolved. This was a covenant for ensuring that ICEL, CORELCA and CVC --three of ISA's sihareholders in which the Government had majority ownership-- would have '.;e necessary funds for the sector projects they had been committed to rinance in part. This point was solved satisfactorily and the Board approved the loan on May 30, 1978. Representatives of the Bank, ISA, and the Government signed the Loan and Project Agreements on July 14, 1978. The Loan amounted to US$50 million; the term was 17 years, including 3.5 years of grace. The interest rate was 7.5Z. April 1981 was set as the project completion date and June 30, 1982 for loan closing date. 2.3.3 The Bank declared the loan effective on October 17, 1978, one month later than forecast at appraisal. 2.4 Major Covenants of the Loan Agreement 2.4.1 Annex 2.1 includes the major covenants of the Loan and Project Agreements. The Colombian Government and ISA complied with their respective major covenants, except regarding the rate of return and debt- service coverage ratio, as explained in detail in Chapter V. III. PROJECT EXECUTION AND COST 3.1 Initiation of the Prolect 3.1.1 Even though there was substantial delay between the appraisal mission and Board approval, this did not affect the initiation of the project, as ISA continued preparing the detailed engineering and bidding documents for the project. The Bank also reviewed and approved some of these documents at this time. 3.2 Timetable and Changes in the Project 3.2.1 Implementation of the Project ended in November 1985, or about four and a half years later than the original completion date. It is  important to point out that the 500 kV line was completed in February 1982 and energized provisionally at 230 kV (para. 3.2.4). Annex 3.1 shows the detailed works components and a comparison between the actual and forecast completion dates. All the project facilities are working satisfactorily at present. 3.2.2 The main cause of delay was the failure to complete the cofinancing arrangements with KfW, which was going to fund approximately US$40 million for the foreign exchange costs of the substation component. The reason for this was the disagreement between ISA and KfW over the awarding of the contract for circuit-breakers to a French supplier because, according to the German development financial institution, the contract was awarded to a bidder that did not meet the requirement of two years experience, and this involved a technical risk, which was a deviation from the tender terms established in the bidding documents. ISA, on the other hand, presented a different view, arguing that: (a) the French supplier had adequate experience, (b) KfW had accepted it as qualified bidder during the bidding process; and (c) KfW raised its objection to the experience of the bidder for the first time when it was analyzing the evaluation report. The final decision of KfW not to sign the proposed Loan Agreement with the Government of Colombia was communicated in December 1980. The Bank could find no substantive objections to the contract award, but it did not try early and hard enough to convince KfW of its position, even though the Bank had known about this problem earlier as a result of project supervision. 3.2.3 The failure to sign the Loan Agreement with KfW obliged the Government and ISA to look for alternative sources of financing. In the meantime, ISA had to suspend the shipment and fabrication of some of the substation equipment that was being manufactured by a Japanese supplier. Even though there was a surplus of about US$8.2 million in the Bank loan, the Bank did not propose that ISA use it to finance part of the substation components. After some delay, the Government solved the financing problem bys (a) entering into contracts with Export-Import Bank of Japan to finance the contract for the transformers and reactors (this contract had been awarded to a Japanese supplier and KfW had already accepted it for financing); and (b) negotiating a loan with PARIBAS amounting to FF 113 million to finance the contract with a French supplier for the circuit- breakers and ancillary equipment. Suppliers subsequently submitted claims resulting from delay in the execution of the contracts, which were accepted by ISA. As of December 1987, the balance of these claims represented about US$4.0 million. These debts would be settled with funds that ISA would receive from the government budget in 1988. 3.2.4 The transmission line, which was the component of the Project financed by the Bank, was finished February 2, 1982, 10 months later than forecast at appraisal. Because of the delay that already had been anticipated in the completion of the 500 kV substations, ISA decided to put the line into provisional operation at 230 kV using borrowed and rented terminal and substation equipment. The cost of this additional work was about US$0.5 million. The line operated at this voltage level between February 1982 and November 1985.  -8- 3.2.5 As there was some surplus of the Bank loan, due to savings obtalned in the construction of the line, ISA presented to the Bank in August 1983, a request to use the balance of the loan of about US$8.2 million to duplicate the 500 kV transformer capacity at San Carlos and Sabanalarga (to 450 MVA), to add spare transformer capacity (150 MVA) at Chinu substation and to install all the respective connections, protection and control equipment. The Bank agreed to this financing in February 1985 after voluminous correspondence and a delay of about one and a half years. The processing of ISA's request took many phases. First, the Bank informed ISA in August 1984 that it did not agree to finance additional transformer capacity, since it was not Bank policy to finance components which were not included in the original project, and that the completion of this work would require the extension of the closing date three years beyond the original date, also not in keeping with Bank's normal practice. The Bank proposed ISA to cancel the balance of the loan, retroactively to the date of ISA's request, in order to avoid financial charges. Secondly, due to the fact that the Bank could not finance the expansion in transformer capacity, ISA requested in September 1984 that the Bank finance local costs of the project. The Bank considered the request, but no final decision was reached. Thirdly, the Bank finally agreed in February 1985 to ISA's initial request to finance the expansion in transformer capacity. In retrospect, it seems that the Bank might have done better to offer ISA financing for part of the substation component of the Project when KfW withdrew from financing it (para. 3.2.3), which had higher priority than the expansion in the transformer capacity that will be fully utilized only when a second 500 kV circuit comes into operation in early 1992. 3.3 Technical Problems During the Construction and Operation of the Line 3.3.1 The main problems found during construction and operation of the line weres (a) construction of the foundation to support the towers was difficult because of the instability of the soil in some parts of the San Carlos - Cerrowatoso section, which crosses mountainous areas. During construction, this problem was solved by increasing the size of the foundations and/or making minor variations in the route of the line. During the operation of the line, ISA has been actively monitoring the stability of the towers and has taken adequate measures to ensure their safety, such as cleaning and improving drainages and building protection works. Though slides have occurred on slopes close to the foundation of some towers, ISA has been able to repair them promptly; (b) corrosion of the grounded structure was detected in the project construction in the Carmen de Bolivar-Sabanalarga section, which is located in the coastal area; and even though the tower bases were coated with anticorrosive paint, the problem has continued. ISA is presently studying ways to permanently solve this problem, and (c) about 902 of the insulators of the shield cable were burned in a relatively short time of operation of the line, which was designed to have total insulation between the shield cable and the tower. After studying the problem, the solution found was to ground the shield cable in each tower. This scheme has been working satisfactorily. As regards the substations, the main problem detected was the damage suffered to one of the autotransfonmers at San Carlos Substation at the time of testing. Even though it was not clearly established that the failure was due to imperfection of the equipment, the supplier agreed to repair it  under the supervision of its staff. Judging by statistics of operation of the line, this has worked satisfactorily. 3.4 Restrictions in the Utilization of the Line 3.4.1 Annex 3.2 presents statistics of the operation of the line in the period 1985-1987. The percentage of availability of the line for operation is adequate. Forced outages are within acceptable levels and are due basically to errors in operations, lightning and other natural phenomena. Programmed outages seem to be rather high, but they are justified due to the need to complete the installation of equipment and line maintenance. Although the availability of the line is adequate, CORELCA does not use it to its full capacity because there is a technical restriction imposed by CORELCA system, which allows a maximum power inflow equal to the compensating capacity of CORELCA through its generating plants, which at the time is approximately 350 MW. The rationale for this criteria is to avoid the collapse of the CORELCA system when the 500 kV line is disconnected due to a line fault, because with an inflow of power larger than 350 MW the system becomes unstable and may collapse if there is a line fault. The operational reestablishment of the system is lengthy and costly, which CORELCA is trying to minimize. This situation, which prevents the use of the line to its full design capacity of 450 MW,l will be corrected with the increase in reliability when the second 500 kV circuit comes into operation, which is expected for February 1992. It is noteworthy that the technical restrictions in the operation of the line were not addressed in the SAR, probably because the second 500 kV circuit was originally planned to operate one year after the first one. In retrospect, the SAR should have analyzed the risk of a substantial delay in the construction of the second circuit of the interconnection lines and its effect on the overall project effectiveness. 3.4.2 The utilization of the line is also restricted, to some extent, by financial considerations. This is due to the fact that the price that ISA charged for the power sold to CORELCA is generally higher than the cost of generating it by the latter. In 1987 the average cost of the energy bought from ISA was COL$ 2.77/kWh, compared to COL$ 0.77/kWh which represented the fuel generating costs of CORELCA plants. This low cost is influenced by the heavy subsidy that exists on fuel.2 If this subsidy were removed, CORELCA would have additional incentive to buy power from ISA. The Loan Agreement included a covenant that indirectly called for the reduction/ elimination of the subsidy, because it established that the energy generated by CORELCA would be more expensive than the energy bought from ISA when the line was put into operation (Annex 2.1, iii). The Government did not comply with the covenant and the Bank did not press the Government to fulfill its commitment, perhaps on the basis that the utilization of the line has been adequate, and that it is the technical restriction (para. 3.4.1), not the financial one, which puts major limitation on the use of the line. The issue of the fuel subsidy has been addressed again in the context of the Power Sector Adjustment Loan. 1/ This is given by the transformer capacity at Sabanalarga substation. 2/ At present, the cost of gas for CORELCA is US$ 0.35/MBTU compared to a commercial price of about US$ 0.84/MBTU.  - 10 - 3.5 Project Costs 3.5.1 Annex 3.3 shows actual and forecast costs. Excluding interest during construction, the final Project cost was US$153.86 million (in current prices) as compared with the appraisal forecast of US$167.2 million, or a cost underrun of 13.42. A more meaningful comparison is between the project components that were planned and executed, which gives an actual cost of US$143.22 million, or a cost underrun of 24Z. Savings were obtained mainly in equipment and materials due to favorable prices obtained through international competitive bidding. 3.6 Changes in Closing Date, Allocation of Loan Proceeds and Timing of Disbursements 3.6.1 The closing date was postponed to December 31, 19e6, or 4-1/2 years later than the covenanted date. This was due to the fact that the Bank honored ISA's request to employ the unutilized part of the loan for works not included in the original project (para. 3.2.5). Annexes 3.4 and 3.5 compare actual and forecast data on disbursements and allocation of loan proceeds by categories. 3.7 Performance of Consultants and Contractors 3.7.1 The feasibility studies were done by a Colombian and an American consultant hired by ISA and CORELCA. The detailed design of the line and substations was done by a Colombian consultant. ISA also employed an English consultant to assist the principal consultant in the engineering design, the preparation of bidding documents and in the bid evaluations. The English consultant also assisted in the supervision and testing of equipment and materials constructed abroad. A German consultant was hired to perform a similar job regarding the equipment and materials for substations. Due to the problem with the KfW loan (para. 3.2.2) this contract was cancelled, and the work was completed by the English consultant. ISA hired a Colombian consultant to perform the supervision of the works. According to ISA and the Bank staff who supervised the project, the performance of the consultants was satisfactory. 3.7.2 The principal contractor for the line work was a Brazilian- Colombian-Venezuelan consortium responsible for fabrication, installation and construction of the line. IV. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION 4.1 Need to Interconnect the Atlantic and the Central Systems 4.1.1 The main objective of the Project wes to interconnect the Atlantic Coast and the Central System, which before the construction of the line, were isolated. This would result in more economical development and operation of the national power system, by substituting some hydro for thermal generation, by supporting the Central System in the dry season and  - 11 - by obtaining substantial saving in new plant installation due to reduced capacity reserve requirements. The project would also strengthen ISA's role as dispatch agency in the interconnected system. 4.1.2 The Project was successful in meeting its objectives by: a) decreasing the thermal generation in the CORELCA system from 1002 existing previous to the interconnection to 79Z in 1986, b) supporting the Central System in the dry season beginning in 1982, when the line was provisionally energized at 230 kV -- which was particularly important with the occurrence of poor hydrological years, such as 1983 -- and c) reducing the investment in new generating plants in the CORELCA system. Annex 4.1 shows the evolution of the interchange of energy between the two systems for the period 1982-1987 and Annex 4.2 presents the total installed capacity until 1980 and details of the different plants added through 1987, specifying the year of commissioning. 4.2 Rate of Return on Investment 4.2.1 The appraisal included an estimated rate of return of 352 including in the cost stream the investment in the 500 kV line and associated substations, the operation and maintenance costs and the costs of the energy transferred to the Central System. On the benefits side, the appraisal included the value of the energy transferred to CORELCA and the estimation of the capital that would be saved due to the operation of the line. In the reestimation of the rate of return presented in this report (Annex 4.3), two minor changes have been introduced in the methodology of estimation: i) the electricity transferred to the Central System has been divided into normal transfer and emergency transfer. The electricity transferred in emergency circumstances is included in the benefits side, valued at outage cost or the average costs that for the economy represent the rationing of electricity, and ii) the estimate has been prepared at market prices (adjusted for transfer payments), instead of at border prices used in the SAR.3 With these minor changes in methodology, the rate of return is estimated at 302, which is close to the SAR estimate of 35X. If, as in the SAR, the value of electricity transferred in emergencies were not taken into account, the rate of return would be approximately 26?, which is higher than the opportunity cost of capital in Colombia of about 12?. 4.2.2 There was no information available to estimate the capital savings due to reduction in capacity requirement in a conventional way. In this report the estimate of capital savings consists of a thermal plant of 205 MW, which would be necessary for CORELCA to build to produce 1441 GWh (amount purchased by CORELCA from the Central System in 1986 and forecasted for the period of life of the interconnection line) if the line did not exist. But the interconnection line would be justified even if this capital savings were not taken into account in the calculation. In this case, the rate of return would be approximately 16Z. 3/ The rate of return calculated restating the data of the SAR in market prices is 34?, which is similar to the one calculated using border prices. This is so because the border prices in the SAR were calculated for the investment in the project and the capital savings for the reduction in capacity requirement produced by the interconnection, which being of similar magnitude, offset each other.  - 12 - V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 5.1 Comparison of Actual and Forecast Data 5.1.1 Annexes 5.1 through 5.4 compare the actual and appraisal forecast income statements, sources and applications of funds, balance sheets and key performance indicators for the period 1977-1986. ISA's financial performance during that period was adequate, though it experienced financial constraints due to the arrears of shareholders in their accounts with ISA, higher inflation than expected at appraisal and ISA's commitment to the sector's ambitious expansion program, under which it participated simultaneously in the construction of San Carlos, Jaguas, Guavio and the Betania hydroelectric projects. The financial indicators presented in Annex 5.4 show tnat the rate of :eturn was somewhat lower than covenanted.4 The contribution to expansion was lower than that expected at appraisal, ranging from 35.4Z in 1978 to 18.7Z in 1986. The lowest value was 1.12 in 1985. The debt-equity ratio and debt-service coverage ratios were generally satisfactory, but deteriorated significantly in the period, 1983-86. 5.2 Tariffs 5.2.1 Average tariff, in current prices, increased from Col$ 0.361/kWh in 1977 to Col$ 3.135 in 1986, or around 800%. In end-1976 prices, this represents an average annual increase of about 3.1Z. The policy followed by ISA and other power utilities in Colombia has been to make small monthly adjustments in the tariff, which has allowed real increases. Preliminary estimates made by ISA indicate that the average tariff of 1986 was about 502 of the long-run marginal cost (LRMC). This heavily subsidized tariff affected ISA's finances and sent a wrong price signal to sector companies. Under the Power Sector Adjustment Loan, approved in December 1987, the Government agreed to continue the gradual adjustment in tariffs, having the LRMC as a benchmark. 5.3 Accounts Receivable 5.3.1 The level of accounts receivable on electricity sales as a percentage of annual sales revenues increased from 36.12 in 1977 to 68.82 in 1986, compared with 16.72 established as a performance indicator. The level of this ratio was extremely high during all the years covered by this report (1977-1986), and was one of the main reasons for ISA's financial difficulties. Annex 5.5 shows the accounts receivable by shareholder for years 1980, 1984 and 1987. Expressed in current US dollars, ISA's claims against its shareholders were 77, 227 and 199 millions, respectively. The accounts receivable, which consist mainly of amounts overdue from ISA's shareholders for electricity sales and capital contributions, were concentrated in EEEB, CVC, CORELCA and ICEL, companies that have 4/ The shortfall in operating income to fulfill the covenanted rate of return was about ColS 10,490 million (US$65 million) for the period 1981-87.  - 13 - experienced financial difficulties during the period. Partly due to this situation, ISA had to negotiate loans with the Fondo de Moneda Extranjera (FODEM) and the Government to cover the debt service. The Bank, during the supervision of the project, pressed ISA and the Government to solve the problem of overdue accounts receivable, without success, even though measures were adopted, such as an increase in the rate of interest for overdue balances and arrangement for payment of the overdue balances by installments. This problem was also addressed in the context of the Power Sector Adjustment Loan. It was agreed with ISA and the Government that all past debt from its shareholders should be settled by end-1988. 5.4 Finances of ISA's Shareholders 5.4.1 Annex 5.6 presents the appraisal and actual annual level of performance for the period 1978-1986 for EEEB, EPM, CVC and CORELCA, the shareholders included in the SAR. Energy sales, debt service coverage and self-financing ratios were lower than established at appraisal. This is consistent with the financial difficulties experienced by the utilities, with CORELCA and CVC the most adversely affected.5 The reduction in sales was caused by the economic recession from which the country suffered during the period; also, but to a lesser extent, to the occurrence of dry years that made it necessary to ration electricitv. The debt service coverage and self-financing ratios were affected by: (a) decrease in sales, (b) low tariff adjustment, (c) high devaluation which took place which increased substantially the outstanding debt and the debt service; and (d) substantial increase in power sector energy lcsses, which increased from 17.7? in 1977 to 23.8? in 1986. To solve the sector's financing problems for the period 1988-90, the Government negotiated the Power Sector Adjustment Loan (US$300 million) to which a cofinancing package of about US$1,030 million will be added. This loan also includes actions that would be taken to improve the operational efficiency and financial conditions of power sector utilities. VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 6.1 ISA 6.1.1 ISA is a well-managed utility with high quality staff. It operates the interconnected system with modern technical standards. 6.1.2 Though the Project suffered from financial problems that delayed its commissioning by about about four years, caused by the withdrawal of KfW financing for the substation components, ISA acted satisfactorily under the circumstances in the solution of the problem. However, Bank staff who supervised the Project complained that ISA did not keep the Bank informed of the problems that it was having with the KfW financing; and that had the Bank known sooner, it would have had more opportunity to try to persuade the German agency not to renounce the original agreement. 5/ No performance indicator was included in the SAR for ICEL, which probably would also show inadequate performance indicators.  - 14 - 6.1.3 The prompt action that ISA took to develop an emergency plan in order to provisionally energize the line at 230 kV made it possible to begin the utilization of the line before the remaining project components were completed. 6.2 The Government 6.2.1 Throughout Project implementation, the Government performed, for the most part, satisfactorily, except in the area of financial support to CORELCA and ICEL to the extent that these utilities needed to maintain their accounts for energy purchases and capital contributions to ISA on a current basis. The arrears of these utilities, as well of ISA's other shareholders, was one of the main issues during the period of implementation of the Project. The problem continues and is being addressed in the context of the Power Sector Adjustment Loan. The Government was slow in providing the funds or authorizing ISA to obtain additional financing to cover the claims of contractors and suppliers, and in persuading its agency (INCOMEX) to authorize expeditiously the licenses to import equipment and material for the Project. 6.3 The Bank 6.3.1 The Bank's staff dedicated considerable time and energy toward supervision of the Project and was generally responsive to ISA's requests. Nevertheless, when the loan from KfW failed to materialize, the Bank should have recognized that the financing of the substation's equipment was critical, and should have proposed, early-on, that ISA use saving from the loan of about US$8.2 million for this purpose. Even though this idea was explored briefly within the Bank, it was abandoned on the grounds that the Bank could not finance this equipment because it was not included in the components of Project to be financed by the loan. Contrary to this criterion, later in project implementation, the Bank agreed to finance transformer equipment for the second 500 kV circuit between the Central and the Atlantic Coast, to be in operation in early 1992. The Bank's agreement to finance part of the substation's equipment, once KfW's withdrawal from cofinancing of the Project was known, would have helped to speed up Project execution. VII. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 7.1.1 In retrospect, it seems that the Bank should have devoted more time to helping solve the problem created with the cofinancing. Although the Bank was aware early on that ISA was facing some difficulties in arriving at a final settlement with KfW, it failed to assist in the matter promptly. When the cofinancing arrangement did not materialize, the Bank should have proposed that ISA use the loan savings to fund part of the substation's component.  - 15 - 7.1.2 As mentioned in this report, one of the main problems causing ISA's financial constraints was that their shareholders accumulated substantial arrears in payments to ISA for electricity sales and capital contributions. The Bank did not press the shareholders hard enough to keep their accounts with ISA current, even though there were specific covenants under other Bank loan agreements with the shareholders that entitled the Bank to take a strong position on the matter. Failure to do this made the Bank lose credibility.  -16 - ANNEX 1.1 Page 1 of 2 Sum ry of Oank Lendino to the Sector Borrowers and Year of Loan Account Loan No. Agreoeent Prolect Descriptlon (MUSt _ Government ISIS-Co 1973 60t-kV Interconnection Central System/ 60.00 60.00 Atlantic System FEN 2401-CO 1984 Power Devolopment Finance Project 170.00 Power Development Finance Project (Cotinancing) 28.20 2B89-CO 1987 Power Sector Adjustment 300.00 496.20 ISA 57C-CO 1906 Central System Interconnection (2380 kV transmission linos and substation) 18.00 OIl-Co 1970 Chivor I project (4 x 126 MW hydro) 62.80 1562-CO 1978 San Carlos I (4 x 156 MW hydro) 126.09 1725-CO 1978 San Carlos II (4 x 165 MW hydro) 72.00 263.80 EEEB 246-CO 1969 Laguneta unit 4 (1 x 16.9 MW hydro) 17.60 Salto 11 units 1 and 2 (2 x 88.0 W hydro) Zipaquira unit 1 (1 x 83.0 MW thermal) 31B-CO 1962 Zipaquira unit 2 (1 x 87.5 MW thermal 60.00 El Cologio units 1, 2 and B (8 x 50.0 MW hydro) 637-CO 1966 El Cologio units 4, 6 and 6 (B x 60.0 MW hydro) 13.00 Canoes Project (1 x 60.0 MW hydro) 1628-CO 1976 Mesita* Hydro (El Parasio 8 x 9W MW; La Guaca 8 x 100 MW; pumping 8 x 10 MHP; Sequile dam strengthening) 84.00 1607-Co 1989 Bogota distribution 87.00 2008-CO 1962 Guavio Hydro (5 x 200 MU) 359.00 2684-CO 196 Bogota Distribution II 1.00 786.6  - 17 - Annox 1.1 Page 2 of 2 Borrawors and Year of Loan Account Loan No. Agreoont Prolect Description (MUSS) EPM 225-CO 1959 Troneras unit 1 (1 x 18.9 MW hydro) 12.00 Guadalupe III units 1 and 2 (2 x 46.0 MW hydro) 282-CO 1961 Troneras unit 2 (1 x 18.0 MW hydro) 22.00 Guadalupe III units 8, 4 and 6 (3 x 46.0 MW hydro) ao9-co 1964 Gustape I units 1 and 2 (2 x 66.0 MW hydo) !/ 45.00 874-CO 1978 Guatapa II units 1, 2, 8 and 4 (4 x 70 MW hydro) 66.00 INS-CO 1989 Guadalupe IC Hydro (8 x 71 MW) 126.00 1958-CO 1981 Playas Hydro ( 3 x 67 MW) 65.00 2449-CO 1984 Rio Grand. Hydro (8 x 100 MW) and water supply 164.60 599.560 CVC/CHIDRAL ao-co 1956 Anchicaya units 1 and 2 (2 x 12.0 MW hydro) 8.58 us8-CO 1955 Anchicaya unite 8 (1 x 20.0 MW hydro) 4.69 Yuebo unit 1 (1 x 10.0 MW thermal) 216-CO 1958 Yumbo unit 2 (1 x 10.0 MW thermal) 2.80 265-CO 1906 Yumbo unit 8 (1 x 83.0 MW thermal) 25.60 Calima units 1 and 2 (2 x 88.9 MW hydro) 889-CO l968 Calima units 8 and 4 (2 x 30.0 VW hydro) 8.80 44.68 CiEC 89-CO 1965 La Insula units 1 end 2 (2 x 10.0 MW hydro) 2.60 217-CO 1969 La Emeralda units 1 and 2 (2 x 18.8 MW hydro) 4.l0 7.20 LEDRIJA 54-CO 1951 Palmsa units 1 and 2 (2 x 4.4 W hydro) 2.40 2.40 ELECTRIPOL 347-CO 1968 Cospique units 2 and a (2 X 12.6 MW thermal) 5.99 6.0 CORELCA 1990-CO 29m Atlantic Coast Village Electrification 86.00 8 O6.6 Tot l Loan Amounts 2,207.88 */ Subsequently lncrmas.d to 4 x 70 WM  - 18 - ANNEX 2.1 Page 1 of 2 Maior Covenants of the Loan and Project Agreements Performance of ISA and the Government under the major covenants of the Loan and Project Agreements of the 500 kV Interconnection Project was generally satisfactory, except as noted: Loan Agreement i) Section 3.01 (b) required the Government to make available to ISA the proceeds of the loan and an additional US$50 million for the financing of foreign exchange and US$64 millionl for the financing of the local costs of the Project. ii) Section 4.02 required the Government to grant all necessary authorization, import licenses, foreign exchange permits and approvals to ensure the timely procurement of the goods and services required for the Project. Part of the delay in the project execution was due to the slow action of INCOMEX to issue the import permits required to release goods from customs. iii) Section 4.03 required the Government to increase the prices for the fuel purchased by CORELCA, so that from the year 1982 it would be more costly to generate electricity in its own thermal plants than to purchase it from ISA. Project Agreement iv) Sections 2.01 and 3.01 required ISA to carry out the Project and manage its affairs with due diligence and efficiency and in conformity with appropriate administrative, financial, engineering and public utility practices and under the supervision of experienced and competent staff. v) Section 2.02 required ISA to employ consultants satisfactory to the Bank to prepare the project design, to supervise the carrying out of the Project and to inspect and test the equipment for the Project. 1/ This is the amount established in the Loan Agreement. However, the SAR estimation was US$67 million.  - 19 - ANNEX 2.1 Page 2 of 2 vi) Section 2.07 (c) required ISA to prepare quarterly reports on the carrying out of the Project, including detailed information of the payments to ISA from the Borrower and furnish to the Bank such reports promptly after completion. vii) Section 3.04 required ISA to prepare a program for the training of its staff responsible for the operation and maintenance of the facilities included in the Project, furnish it for Bank comments and carry out such program. viii) Section 4.02 required ISA to audit its accounts and financial statements by independent auditors acceptable to the Bank and furnish to the Bank a certified copy of such statements not later than four months after the end of each fiscal year. ix) Section 4.03 (a) required ISA to inform the Bank and give it the opportunity to comment on any proposal for increasing its power generating capacity by more than 200 MW, and not commit itself to projects like that unless they were economically and financially justified. ISA was also committed to obtain the Bank agreement if capital expenditures, other than the ones agreed for projects financed with Bank participation, exceeded 2.52 of the net current value of ISA's fixed assets in operation. x) Section 4.04 (a) and (b) required ISA to maintain tariffs that generate a rate of return of at least 5.5Z in 1978, 8Z in 1979, 9Z in 1980, 11 in 1981, 9Z for 1982 and thereafter, on the average net current value of its fixed assets in operation (excluding the assets of the Project).2 ISA was also committed to maintain tariffs that generate a rate of return of at least 32 in 1982, 22 in 1983, 2.52 in 1984, 42 in 1985, 62 in 1986, 9Z in 1987 and thereafter, on the average net current value of the assets of the project once it came into operation. The covenant also provided that the rate of return would be calculated in each calendar quarter for the twelve monthp period beginning with such quarter and the twelve months period immediately preceding, and that any shortfall or overrun in the rate of return in the historical period would be carried forward. Tariff would be adjusted accordingly if there were a shortfall in the covenanted rate of return. ISA's actual rate of return was somewhat lower than that covenanted (para. 5.1.1 and Annex 5.4). xi) Section 4.05 required ISA to seek Bank agreement prior to contracting new long-term debt, if its future debt service coverage ratio is less than 1.5. 2/ Under Loan 1725-CO (1979), it was agreed to have a common rate of return for all ISA's assets. The covenanted rates, for 1979 and thereafter, were the same as stated above.  - 20 - ANNEX 3.1 Key Completion Dates of the Proiect -__________ Dates ------------- Difference Original Actual Months 1. Effectiveness of Loans IBRD 9/78 10/78 1 KfW 9/78 --- Other financing 9/78 2. Access Land acquisition for substation 12/78 Right of way acquisition 6/79 3. Procurement 3.1 Transmission line (main contract) Call for bids 7/77 6/77 --- Award contract 4/78 6/78 2 3.2 Substations a) Transformer/Reactors - call for bids 2/78 2/78 --- - award of contract 10/78 5/79 7 b) Circuit breakers/anciliary Equipment 7/79 - call for bids 2178 7/79 a/ 17 c) Land movement, drainage & fences Cerromotoso, Chinu & Sabanalarga substations - call for bids 2/78 5/78 3 - award of contract 10/78 8/78 San Carlos substation - call for bids 2/78 5/78 3 - award of contract 4/78 10/78 6 d) Construction - call for bids 2/78 12/78 10 - award of contract 10/78 8/79 10 4. Project Execution Line Completion 4/81 2/82 b 10 Substation Completion 4/81 11/85 55 a/ This is a new call for bids. The first one was made on 2/78 but was declared non-responsive. b/ Between February 1982 and November 1985 the line was energized at 230 kV.  Stati.tics of Operation of the 600 kV Interconn.ction Line (198S-1987) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- - lss- - e- ------- - - - - -- - -- - -- - San Carlos Cerromatoso Chinu-Saba- Son Carlos Cerromatoso Chinu-Saba- SOn Carlos Corromatoso Chinu-Saba- Cerromatoso China nalarga Cerromtoso Chinu nalarga Corroatoso Chinu nalarga Hours In tho period 2016 1682 1080 8760 8760 8760 8760 8760 8780 Hours In service 1i3S 1218.1 1074 8613.8 8683.59 9638.48 8839.32 8712 8888.2 Units I/ 0.40 0.25 0.12 2.1 1.36 1.79 2.1 1.35 1.79 Fore d Disconnection. no Hours out of service 9.4 10.9 8.5 66.28 3.56 7.85 31.18 7.02 11.68 No. of disconnectlon 9 5 2 5 5 7 18 a 4 Ni 2/ 13.75 12.0 16.7 2.4 4.4 3.9 8.6 4.4 2.2 Di S/ 1.04 3.63 1.75 13.06 0.69 1.12 1.78 1.17 2.92 Programed disconnection Hours out of service 373.5 403 2.1 80.92 72.87 113.67 89.5 40.98 60.12 No. of disconnectlon 6 7 2 12 11 13 22 18 9 Ni 2/ 12.6 28.0 16.7 6.7 8.1 7.8 lo0S 13.3 5.0 Dl 3/ 62.25 67.67 1.05 6.74 6.62 8.74 4.C7 2.28 6.68 Availability for Operation 81.0 74.6 99.4 98.3 99.1 96.6 988 99.5 99.2 1/ Line I*neh/lO km. For 1985 it asn adjusted according to the fraction of the year that the line was In service. 2/ Avrage frequency of descoanections: No. of desconnectlon/hundreda of km. of line. t/ Avera"e tim_ of deoconmection: hours out of c rvice/ No. of desconnections. 4/ Hours In sewice/ hours In the period.  - 22 - ANNEX 3.3 Appraisal and Actual Project Costs (in million of curront US$) --------Approisal----- ------Actual-- I -- X Differeneo Local Foreign Total Local Foroign Total from Appraisal 1. TRANSMISSION LINE Engineoring 8.56 2.32 8.68 12.09 0.62 12.71 3.83 Land and rights of way 2.73 0.00 2.78 0.68 0.00 0.66 -2.07 Equipment and materials 18.94 40.26 69.19 0.00 39.33 39.83 -19.86 Civil works and erection 20.77 7.2Z 26.00 26.50 0.38 26.83 -1.17 ______ _____ . ____-______ ______-______ Total Line Costa 49.00 49.80 98.80 39.26 40.28 79.53 -19.27 2. Substations Enginoering 4.51 1.92 6.48 7.01 0.86 7.38 0.93 Land and right of way 0.36 0.00 0.86 0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.29 Equipment one materiasis 9.66 46.48 66.08 3.76 27.21 30.96 -25.07 Civil works and erection 8.78 1.80 6.58 26.80 0.00 25.30 19.72 -- -- - --- Total Substation Costs 1/ 2/ 16.20 60.20 68.40 36.13 27.56 68.69 -4.71 TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 67.20 100.00 167.20 76.88 67.64 148.22 -23.98 Works added to the Projeet Additional --- WA In Trans- formr capacity 2.23 8.40 10.68 10.68 TOTAL PROJECT COSTS (Including works added to the Project) 67.20 100.00 167.20 77.61 76.24 16.865 -1B.J5 1/ Excluding Interest during construction. 2/ Price and physical contingencios in the SAR have been distributed on pro-rata basis.  - 23 - ANNEX 3.4 Actual and Forecast Accumulated Disbursements (In Millions of US$) Actual Actual Disbursement as a IBRD Total percentage of Appraisal Fiscal Year Disburse- Appraisal Estimate (up to latest and Semester ments Estimate semester) 1978/79 December 31, 1978 --- 10.4 0 June 30, 1979 1.5 20.0 8 1979180 December 31. 1979 10.9 31.3 35 June 30, 1980 21.3 41.0 52 1980/81 December 31, 1980 30.6 47.4 65 June 30, 1981 34.2 50.0 68 1981/82 December 31, 1981 35.2 70 June 30, 1982 36.3 73 1982/83 December 31, 1982 38.5 77 June 30, 1983 38.8 78 1983/84 December 31, 1983 38.8 78 June 30, 1984 38.9 78 1984/85 December 31, 1984 39.2 78 June 30, 1985 39.9 80 1985/86 December 31, 1985 39.9 80 June 30, 1986 40.2 80 1986/87 December 31, 1986 40.5 81 June 30, 1987 48.4 97 1987/88 December 31, 1987 49.7 1/ 99 1/ About US$0.3 million of the Loan was cancelled.  - 24 - ANNEX 3.5 Forecast and Actual Loan Allocation (in USS) Categorv Forecast Actual (1) Civil Works and Erection Services for Part A of the Project 6,700,000 2,226,458.70 (2) Equipment and Materials for Part A of the Project 36,000,000 37,969,494.04 (3) Consult Services 1,800,000 1,137,721.29 (4) Unallocated 5,500,000 (5) Equipment and Material for Transformer 8,399,451.79 50,000,000 49,733,125.82 1/ _/ The balance of $276,874.18 was cancelled.  - 25 - ANNEX 4.1 Purchaoses and Selo* of CORELCA to the Interconnoctod System (kWh) Purchaans Sal*$ 1982 132196 0OO086 1968 8760 340160 1984 378680 257860 1986 520896 201886 1966 965158 17814 1987 1440883 120478  - 26 - ANNEX 4.2 Sector Installed Capacity (MW) Year of Com i - As of December 81, 1977 sioning Hydro Thermal Total EEEB 6ea 136 719 EPM 729 0 729 CVC-CHIDRAL 540 56 698 ICEL - CHEC S38 203 56s CORELCA 0 440 440 ISA 500 0 SOO Total as of Docember S1,1977 2715 887 3562 Plant Additions -_Meetas 1986 200 200 -Mesitas 1987 400 400 EPM -Quatape II 1979 280 280 -Ayura 1988 l 16 -Guadalupe IV 1986 213 218 -Playae 1987 200 200 CVC - CHIDRAL -Selvajina 1985 270 270 ICEL - CHEC -Sarranca III 1978 55 56 -Irsula 1979 18 18 -Paipa III 1982 75 76 -Pal,nque V 1962 22 22 -Barranca IV 1988 82 82 -Taseaero 1986 160 10 CORELCA -3allenos 1978 81 a1 -Torso-Barranquilla 1980 142 142 -Trmo-Cartajena III 1980 71 71 -Termo-Guajlrr I 1988 160 16O -Salones 1984 31 31 -Torso-Guj ira II 1987 170 170 ISA -Tersoalpa IV 1981 66 66 -Turbogan-Chinu 1982 188 188 -Chivor II 1982 500 600 -San Carlos I 194 620 620 -Termeoips V 1986 66 66 -San Carlos II 1987 620 620 -Jaguas 1907 170 170 -Colderas 1987 18 18 ICEL-ISA -Betania 1987 500 500 Total Plants Additions 1978-87 4026 1204 6229 Total Installed Capacity 6740 2041 8761 - _ui  - 27 - ANNEX 4.3 Internal Rato of Return on Investment a/ (millions of US8 as of mid-1977) Cost of Lino A Thermal Emergency Transf. Fuol Coner- Savings in Plant Substa- Energy TOTAL ---- Capital ation Sub- Substitu- TOTAL NET Year Lifo tions 0 A M Transfer. COSTS oWh Valuo Saving stituted (GWh tion BENEFITS BENEFITS b/ c/ d/ */ c/ 1977 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1978 1.3 1.3 0.0 -1.8 1979 15.4 15.4 0.0 -16.4 1980 27.5 27.5 0.0 -27.6 1981 1 16.9 0.1 17.0 0.0 -17.0 1982 2 9.7 0.3 10.0 0.0 -10.0 1983 3 8.5 0.4 8.9 20.1 20.1 11.2 1984 4 8.6 0.6 9.1 78.2 78.2 64.1 1986 6 1.8 0.6 3.1 6.6 6.0 2.7 60.2 620.0 8.0 60.6 65.8 1986 6 1.0 0.8 0.3 2.1 17.0 7.6 962.0 14.6 22.1 20.0 1987 7 7.6 0.8 2.0 10.3 129.0 67.1 1441.0 22.0 79.2 88.9 1983 8 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1989 9 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1990 10 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1991 11 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1992 12 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1993 18 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1994 14 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1996 15 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1996 16 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1997 17 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1998 18 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 1999 19 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2000 20 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2001 21 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2002 22 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2008 28 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2004 24 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2006 26 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2006 26 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2007 27 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2008 28 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2009 29 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 2010 30 0.8 0.8 1441.0 22.0 22.0 21.2 Rato of Return 30 a/ Tho reestimetion of the rate of return In this table has been made using market priceu pricou (adjusted for transfer payments).Rate of Roturn In SAR was estimatod at 85X using bordor prices; using market prices (adjusted for transfor payments),the rate of return would be close or 34X. b/ Energy transfored: 1984, 201 OWh; 1986, 17 OWh and 1986, 129 CtiH. c/ The thermal energy substituted and the cost of the energy transfored to the Central System has been valued at average cost of fuel of US 2.08 cents/kWh at end-1986 price., expressed In prices of *nd-1978 (US 1.58 cents/kWF). d/ The emrgoncy transfer of energy has been value at outages cost, estimated at US 0.44 cents/kWh at mid-1977 pricoe. */ Thermal Plant of 205 MW, value at US2700/kW (pars. 4.2.2).  Cup;rion of Forae sad Actual Inc_ Statent (177- ) (.111k. ot current Col 6) ----1977----- --7 --- --l ------ ----- 19 60----- -----1981------- -----611629------ -----9------ -----19 gm Ac-tul SM Acrul SAR Actual sM Actual SM Aectal SR Actul SN Actua SMt Actual Actal Acual *frera 1140.0 1800.0 1996.0 S337.0 2996.0 363.0 861.0 4867.0 4158.0 4183.0 3832.0 5S4.0 1250.0 5770 9631.0 279.0 9977.0 10317.0 Tharl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 125.0 454.0 186.0 7.0 1140.0 1100.0 1996.0 8367.0 2996.0 636.0 86I.0 4667.0 4264.0 4183.0 4216.0 56*46.0 7406.0 5770.0 903.00 67.0 0977.0 10317.0 A-arog Turiff "a kWh la Cole"is" poe 0.461 0.361 0.621 0.407 0.64 0.607 0.610 0.746 1.118 1.079 1.333 1.354 1.223 1.682 1.312 2.364 2.7S4 3.135 0e'stins Ifta.sau Sales r__ 825.6 649.0 1240.3 I650.0 1990.7 2206.0 2979.6 3630.0 4787.6 4513.0 5713.6 7917.0 9057.2 10650.0 12906.1 19572.0 2772 0 32344.0 Cuntribut le 1/ 295.2 223.0 861.1 896.0 486.0 461.0 4".1 668.0 637.1 792.0 901.6 640.0 1114.2 497 0 1436.9 115.0 0.0 0.0 Total Opeatile Raves.. 621.0 672.0 1637.4 2043.0 2446.7 267.0 3478.9 4195.0 5624.7 530S.0 6615.2 757.0 10171.4 11355.0 14345.0 19487.0 27772.0 3244.0 taratiag Cat.c Paul 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.0 0.0 5010.0 0.0 684.0 0.0 701.0 0.0 0.0 I bwrg purdhaa.d from a*aruholder 0.0 296.0 0.0 JI1.0 0.0 320.0 0.0 7.0 201.6 1001.0 66.3 2024.0 357.2 2"2.0 19.6 4349.0 6026.0 2562.0 eouratiu 37.6 18.0 ".7 60.0 74.1 139.0 104.0 141.0 117.9 262.0 129.4 656.0 203.6 06.0 274.4 1663.0 2427.0 3717.0 Transmlsion 8Y.6 79.0 64.8 80.0 78.7 120.0 83.4 193.0 63.6 219.0 89.3 168.0 94.9 104.0 101.6 236.0 219.0 565.0 Trsaa.2al.n 500kv 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 75-. 0.0 62.9 43.0 91.3 65.0 99.9 85.0 I64.0 216 0 DOpreciation 136.4 244.0 250.4 455.0 260.6 571.0 304.1 727.0 22.4 972.0 682.4 132.0 1034.6 20'4.0 2069.0 3517.0 4645.0 6745.0 Toal Operatin Con.t 229.5 624.0 384.4 730.0 412.4 1156.0 572.4 2068.0 1001.0 2659.0 1869.S 4711.0 1791.6 6755.0 2594.5 10573.0 13785.0 13837.0 erating Income 591.5 230.0 12.0 1313.0 2054.3 1509.0 2906.5 2150.0 4625.7 2646.0 4795.9 4046.0 6369.6 4620 0 11750.5 9114.0 13907.0 16507.0 hnn-o ;ratin I_mea 0.0 4.0 0.0 22.0 0.0 122.0 0.0 514.0 0.0 1571.0 0.0 1694.0 0.0 196.0 0.0 427.0 -2477.0 -911.0 Total OttWr IR_N* 0.0 4.0 0.0 22.0 0.0 122.0 0.0 514.0 0.0 1371.0 0.0 1694.0 0.0 196.0 0.0 427.0 -2477.0 -611.0 nIt Incose kufra Inters 691.5 242.0 1253.0 2M5.0 2024.3 1651.0 290t6. 264.0 462S.7 4017.0 4795.9 6940.0 639.6 4616.0 11760.5 9541.0 11S10.0 17596.0 Total Interest 672.0 626.0 1225.8 799.0 1647.2 1722.0 2530.7 1708.0 3969.6 2918.0 6533.5 4052.0 20079.1 5139.0 14030.1 6595.0 11505.0 17274 0 Lao.: Intaerst during canatructian 392.4 399.o 459.4 109.0 938.1 517.0 164.5 1034.0 2691.7 2111.0 6272.7 2557.0 7926.6 3837.0 6658.6 4946.0 5028.0 7442.0 I tuwr.a aaid to Iuma0 279.6 227.0 766.4 611.0 712.1 705.0 662.2 674.0 1296.1 607.0 1260.8 I(95.0 2150.8 602.0 6871.3 3649.0 un.0 632.0 NO$ incas. 311.9 15.0 486.6 724.0 1522.2 929.0 222i4. 1970.0 3325.0 3210.0 3535.1 4445.0 6.3 a214.0 379.2 5692.0 503.0 7764.0 IA ------a--------a-a-a-- 1/ Sh.r.lidra* contributiona for the uaf et ehe intorcasactlon eys.ta. Thin contitution *saw minua*ted with thu cumiaianirn of San Carlos.  Caqwariam of r'aracaat .d Actual Surce. sod DApl Icationo of Fmada (197-1966) (.11lone of ourreat Coo 6) -1977------ ---1976----- --1979----- -1960----- -1961----- ---1462---- ---1968----- ----1964-----1965 la" Soft Actual SM Actual us Actual WA Actual so Actual sm Actual SM Actual SAM Actual Actual Actual Internal Camb O.aaralla not Incoeh.f.. gas.,.., 651.8 242.0 12551.0 133.0 2084.8 1631.0 2900.5 264.0 4023.7 4017.0 47951.9 594.0 026.6 4616.0 11750.8 91541.0 11810.0 1789.0 Depreciation 8361.4 8414.0 90.4 4151.0 360.6 871.0 41164.1i 18.0 M.4 912.0 616.4 118631.0 364.46 2094.0 3099.0 517.0 4945.0 8745.0 Amortizatio of dlf.nad dablt. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4742.0 1796.0 gum., Ibm-Ca. Espauses 3.0 9.0 5.6 46.0 6.8 36.0 12.7 84.0 15.7 71.0 23.0 61.0 36.4 199.0 60.2 57.0 181.0 160.0 Oroes latuinul Coash Ouma..elc 73.9 496.0 181011.9 1836.0 2308.2 2256.0 9808.8- 145.0 5164.6 506.0 843.2 7344.0 459.6 7109.0 136991.7 18145.0 21166.0 2116265.0 D.b% Service hin..lzation 182.0 1611.0 540. 1 476.0 859.5 8315.0 793.0 761.3 1912.7 1126.0 2M6.7 2106.0 4260.0 4614.0 68Q6.0 65.0 is"0. 0 12970.0 Intres, Chars" f4 laces. 279.5 21V.0 7661.4 511.0 712.1 705.0 662.2 674A0 129. 3 607.0 126.6 14961.0 23110.3 18008.0 &M7.5 66419.0 64M.0 636011 Total 441.6 395.0 1S0.$ 1067.0 1271.0 1240.0 1478.2 1425.0 8210.6 1985.0 3880.3 21191.0 9410.8 6410.0 111377.8 10471.0 2466.0 28608.0 Iowa Intereal C&ad Genaration 290.3 100.0 202.4 749.0 1031.6 996.0 1620.1 2000.0 1954.0 3126.0 1901.7 8663.0 8049.6 693. 2022.4 2674.0 -6655.0 8454.0 Soad. A Cael too Cantrlhetiana 109.5 740.0 1418.4 677.0 578.0 189.0 4129.1 2497.0 696117.1 4410.0 122116.9 3172.0 18421.8 4264.0 2122. 1 4216.0 4011.0 1o690 Total Ea. CoAal CeolAIta contrib. 186.6 04.0 1517.6 1428.0 M6O.6 2598. 5957.2 4497.0 8414.1. 7835.0 14190.6 466.0 1640. 4917.0 21304.5 669.0 486.0 iau5.0 Morrevago 1637.5 186.0 2574.5 1791.0 83061.7 3163.0 727. 1 4164.0 9490.6 7136.0 1636.4 9980.0 206.8. 149162.0 216W37. 2042.0 3663.0 19847.0 0 Gov. Cant ibutian (latwarmnat.) 105.0 10.0 1412.2 1616.0, 251.6 751.0 23316.5 1968.0 428.0 171.8.0 0.0 126.0 0.0 41364.0 0.0 1403.0 283.0 261.0 Gar. Cashihtlam (Mthr) 8641.? 387.0 88.6 066.0 112.* 915.0 1871. 1146.0 S06.6 292.0 4629.8 80610.0 6076.4 81996.0. 8791.8 3264.0 2574.0 84,12.0 Toal Equity 4640.8 16.0 1951.6 M9.0 UN3.6 1666.0 4209.6 8149.0 3812.4 463.0 462.4 8340.0 S07.4 489.0 5791.0 4747.0 2907.0 8749.0 0th., Soerca. 0.0 103.0 0.0 19.0 0.0 692. 0 0.0 734.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8518.0 0.0 749.0 0.0 863.0 606. 120.0 TOTAL 381RM 6d76.6 2711.0 6144.1 40:18.4 T1162. 1 6314.0 17442.9 36144.0 219644. 32.0 3836111.6 2686.0 45112.0 1280.0 803.6, 34442.0 40310.0 2663.0 Obaa..etlaa ~~~~~~~~2836.0 105.0 4024.5 1915.0 656.5 566.0 12654.4 77M.0 1730.4 120.0 2665.4 15718.0 8407.3 1I30.0 396149.0 1468.0 131416.0 94916.0 latarca.aactl.. ~~~~~~~106.64 0.0 31412. 664.0 51813.6 941.0 336.6 20461.0 451.5 162.0 0.0 384.0 0.0 346611.0 0.0 1961.0 3497.0 6166.0 664m4l.. mad Oumaral Plait 14.8 17.0 36.0 217.0 449.8 271.0 621.7 11111.. 4218.7 770.0 410.9 9613.0 590.1 a 6.0 469.6 487.0 417.0 810.0 1.641 C.aatrectla. progrmi 241.90 1129.0 0672.6 2161.0 1133.4