India - Subernarekha Irrigation Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USEONLY Report No. 8535 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA SUBERNAREKHA IRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1289-IN) APRIL 18, 1990 Agriculture Operations Division Country Department IV Asia Regional Office Thi document has a restcted n ad may be usd by rei$dPe only in de permane of dte offaie duIes. 1t cotens may ot othewse be dicosed w0b Wodd abnk astulz"tX;  Currency Bquivalents Currency Unit - Rupee, Rupees (Rs) US$ 1.00 - Rs 9.00 at appraisal USS 1.00 - Rs 16.40 on July 1, 1989 Weights and Measures Metric System (In part II, the Borrower used also English units) Glossary CAD Command Area Development CCA Cultivable Command Area CES Consulting Engineering Services Ltd. (New Delhi) CWC Central Water Comission DRP Dam (Safety) Review Panel ERR Economic rate of return FAO/CP FAO Cooperative Program GOB Government of Bihar GOI Government of India GOO Government of Orissa ha hectare lAS Indian Administrative Service LCB Local competitive bidding M&I Municipal & industrial (water) MDS Micro distribution system MIS Management Information System O&M Operation & Maintenance R&R Resettlement and Rehabilitation SAR Staff Appraisal Report SDP State domestic product SIS Subernarekha Irrigation System WALMI Water and Land Management Institute WAPCOS Water and Power Consultant Services Ltd.(New Delhi) Fiscal Year of Borrower Government of India: April 1 to March 31  T1* WORW BANK 101 OWFICIL USE ONLY THE WOL SANKemuu Washigton. O.C. 0433 US.A. O0c of Od CUW4GmnSi 0_ratiwo EIuwm April 18, 1990 UN TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Subernarekha Irrixation Proiect (Credit 1289-IN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled 'Project Completion Report on India - Subernarekha Irrigation Project (Credit 1289-IN)" prepared by the Asia Regional Office with Part II contributed by the Borroer. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a rsuled dbutIon ad may be und b_, r F P1 only In th perfomanc of thei ofcl dut Its tSntata may no othewie be dsckoed wthou Wo Dak authultls  FOR OMCAL Use ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT iUIGAUON PROJECT CRDIT 1289-Il TABE OF CONTS Page Preface ....... .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . . . . . . i Evaluation Summary ....................... ... ii PART I PROJECT REVIEW nROIM BANK'S PESPECTVm ............. Project Identity .......................... Background ...... .. . .. .. 1 Project Objectives and Description .... . . . . . . . . . .. 2 Project Design and Organization ................ ... 4 Project Implementation ..... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6 Project Results ....... . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . . .. 9 Project Sustainability ...................... . 10 Bank Performance ......................... . 10 Borrower Performance ....................... . 11 Project Relationship ....................... . 12 Consulting Services ........................ . 12 Project Documentation and Data .................. . 12 PART II PROJECT REVIEW nOM BORROWER'S PERSPECTVE . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Couments on Bank's Review Contained in Part I .... . . . . . . . . 14 Evaluation of Bank's Performance ................. . 22 Evaluation of Borrower's Performance ............... . 31 Assessment of Effectiveness of Borrower-Bank Relationship . . . . . . 38 PART III STATISTICAL INFORMATION ................... . 39 Related Bank Loans and Credits (Table 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Project Timetable (Table 2) ..... . . . ..... . . . . . . . . 42 Schedule of Disbursements (Table 3) .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Project Implementation (Table 4) .... . . ....... . . . . . . 44 Project Cost (Table 5) ..... . .. ....... . . . . . . . . 49 Project Financing (Table 6) ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 53 Direct Benefits (Table 7) ..5.4................... . 54 Economic Impact (Table 8) ..5.5.......... . SS Studies (Table 9) ..5.6.......... ............. . 56 Status of Covenants (Table 10) ..5.9......... . 59 Staff Inputs (Table 11) ..... . .. . ..... . . . . . . . . . 63 Missions (Table 12) ........................ . 64 MAP IBRD 16235 - India Subernarekha Irrigation Project (April 1982) This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by tecipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wihout World Bank authoization.  i PROJECT COXPLETIOB REPORT iNIA 8 U'IklRSAM DIGMATION PROJCT (CREDIT 1289-I") PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Subernarekha Irrigation Project In India, for which Credit 1289-IN in the amount of SDR 116.3 million was approved on August 17, 1982. The Credit was closed on April 30, 1989, (US$ 127.0 million equivalent) 25 months behind schedule. It was fully disbursed, and the last disbursement was made on August 18, 1989. The PCR ias jointly prepared by the Agriculture Operations Division, Country Department IV of the Asia Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III), and the Goverament of Bihar for the Borrower (Part II). Preparation of the PCR was started during the Bank's final supervision mission of the project in February 1989, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Development Credit and Project Agreements; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; data made available by the Borrower for preparation of this report, and internal Bank memoranda.  ii PROJICT COMPLETION REPORT INDI A BBRINAMRE DBIXGhTION PROJECT (CRUDIT 1289-IN) EVALUATION SUIOARY Oblectives 1. The project was to fund a time slice of the larger, multi-purpose Subernarekha Irrigation System (SIS). The objectives of the SIS itself are to increase agricultural production through irrigation of an area of about 255,000 ha in the states of Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal, to provide municipal and industrial water supply, mainly to the city of Jamshedpur in Bihar and to the industries in and around the city, and to provide flood moderation on the river in West Bengal and Orissa. The objectives of the project itself were to achieve certain physical construction targets for selected facilities of the SIS in Bihar, to establish an institutional framework and build up the Bihar Irrigation Department's establishment for implementation of the works, and to carry out studies and investigations for the preparation of subsequent phases (Part I of PCR, par:as 6-9). Implementation Experience 2. The project was implemented at a slower pace than projected, mainly because of problems with initial staffing, procurement, site investigations, flood studies, designs for major canal structures, and slow planning and design of the irrigation distribution systems. Funding was a bottleneck only temporarily. Resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons were less than adequately planned and managed, and turned out to be a severe problem when the time of relocation approached. Economic rehabilitation of displaced people proved to be even more difficult than physical relocation, mainly due to inadequate policies and shortage of allottable land. 3. The project achieved or even exceeded major physical targets, but implementation was characterized throughout by an imbalance between progress of major works (dams and main canals) on one hand, and of irrigation distribution systems, preparation for water management and agricultural extension and training on the other. This, and the occurrence of large cost overruns, is not uncommon in other irrigation projects in India as well (Part I, paras 15-24). 4. The Bank provided a heavy technical assistance input during implementation, often substituting for consultants that should have been hired by the implementing agency (Part I, para 32). Some major deviations from appraisal planning and design assumptions occurred, including changes to the flood hydrology and thus to designs of the two major dams (Part I, para 16). The implementation of the rural roads component was disappointing, perhaps because it was not funded under the Credit, or because its implementation was outside the control of the main implementing agency (Irrigation Department of Bihar). 5. The several studies and investigations included in the project proceeded, with some exceptions, in an unsatisfactory way. Major delays or inadequacies occurred notably in the planning of operation and maintenance in the Bihar part, in the systems improvement studies (which should have been completed before appraisal, not during  iii implementation), and in the drafting of a master plan for the Orissa irrigation component. The experience with water management pilot operations was largely disappointing, although such pilots were meant to give important results for the further design and operation of the irrigation distribution system (Part I, paras 19 and 20). Results 5. Project objectives in terms of physical construction targets were achieved for major components, but not for others. As a result, there are no benefits forthcoming at completion of the project, not even on the 21,000 ha of irrigation area to be built to "various stages of completion". Principal planning and design parameters for the irrigation systems have been developed and determined during the course of the project, but some major system planning issues remained unresolved, such as a decision on the need for the 'Rharkai' barrage and on how best to serve the municipal and industrial water users over the next 20 to 30 years. Inhabitants of a first group of displaced villages have been resettled at various sites, but their economic future is unclear for at least a good part of the families. C. The institution building objectives of the project have been achieved in part. The Bihar Irrigation Department created, over time, an adequate establishment for implementation of the project, headed by capable civil service administrators. Many lessons were learned by the staff associated with the project in terms of planning, design and construction of large facilities for such multi-purpose project. There remain weaknesses in areas such as multi-purpose system planning, basin operations, and irrigation water management where further technical assistance and training are needed. 7. As a result of large cost overruns, delays in benefits, and an intervening drop in projected international commodity prices, the economic rate of return of the SIS (including sunk costs) has been re-calculated at only about 7a, ompared to 17S at appraisal (Part I, para 28). Sustainability 8. The SIS remains incomplete at this stage (as foreseen at appraisal). Further planning, design and construction tasks would appear to require further assistance, which as already been requested by the Governments of India, Bihar and Orissa. The Bank remains cautious about certain planning and operations issues which would appear crucial to a sustained level of benefits from the SIS. Follow-up Bank projects are recommended to support the completion of the SIS and its initial operations Part I, para 30). F_ndings and Lessons Learned 9. Given the size and complexity of the multi-purpose SIS, many planning and design details were left for subsequent study during implementation. This approach (oflexiplanning') is now considered less appropriate. Important investigations, planning and design studies should be completed before appraisal, as they may later hinder progress of design and construction, or preclude certain options for system services and operations, or lead to protracted disputes between Bank and Borrower during implementation (Part I, para 13). 10. The provision of technical assistance to Borrower agencies by the Bank has been very, and probably too extensive in this (and other) projects. Not only can the Bank not sustain such level of technical assistance with limited supervision  iv resources, but the use of Bank-employed consultants or extensive advice by Bank staff may lead to itstances where the Bank is (directly or indirectly) blamed for the result of such advice (Part I, para 32). 11. Many procurement and construction quality problems could be solved by proper design and sizing of bid packages (Part I, para 17). Terms of reference for important studies should be discussed and agreed at appraisal (Part I, para 19). 12. There is a danger in not funding under a loanlcredit certain project components such as roads or agricultural extensions. Project agreements with a state government do not automaticelly lead to satisfactory implementation by all concerned agencies of that government. 13. Resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons must be much better planned beforehand and pLofessionally managed, as it represents a complex 'social engineering" task in which project staff may not be experienced or skilled (Part I, paras 13 (h) and 22.)  PROJECT COXPLETION REPORT INDIA SU EBN^BSKtX IREIGATIO PROJECT (CREDIT 1289-IN) PART Is REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Project Identity Proiect Namet Subernarekha Irrigation Project Credit Nr.: 1289-IN Credit Amount: SDR 116.3 M (USS 127.OM equivalent) Board Approval: Aug;st 17, 1982 RVP Unit: Asia Region (South Asia at Board approval) Country: India Sector/ Subsector: Agriculture / Irrigation Background 1. The population of India in 1981 was about 700 M, growing at an annual rate of 2.22 per year. Agriculture was and remains the dominant sector in the Tndian economy, employing about 70? of the work force, providing about 452 of India's exports, and contributing about 402 to GNP. It had been Government of India (GOI) policy since Independence to expand agricultural production to reduce its dependence on imports, and to raise the living standards of the rural poor. As a means to increase production through intensification of land use and to stabilize production in the face of the vagaries of the Indian monsoon climate, GOI and the Indian states strived to expand irrigation. By 1980, some 53 M ha of irrigation existed, compared with 25 M ha at Independence, accounting for about 60? of agricultural output. 2. Although irrigation development had proceeded rapidly, it became increasingly apparent that most schemes were performing much below their potential. This was due mainly to poor planning and design of facilities, inadequate operation and maintenance (O&M), unreliable water delivery and scheduling, and inequitable distribution to the farmers. To attempt to improve project efficiency, GOI introduced Comnand Area Development (CAD) Authorities, to assist farmers with construction of on-farm improvements, to cooreinate between irrigation and agriculture departments, and to ensure the provision of agricultural support services. CAD was not entirely effective in curing the shortcomiLgs of irrigation systems, however, and it was soon concluded that the efficiency and reliability of irrigation services delivered by the main conveyance systems was as important to allow efficient irrigated agriculture as improvements at the lower end of the system. It was recommended that the government system should be extended down towards the farm gates, to a level where turnouts served about 5-8 ha units. Improved 'water management' practices, both at the irrigation system and at the farm level were to be tried out and introduced. For new projects, a more thorough analysis of water supply and demand was called for, and the results of the analysis, as well as new operational requirements, were to be incorporated into the design of projects. The Bank supported this strategy through various projects, starting in the late Seventies.  2 3. The State of Bihar is one of the least developed in India. Although rich in minerals, its economy is highly dependent on agriculture, which contributed about 72Z of state domestic product (SDP), and employed about 83? of the working population. The state has a larger proportion of tribals than many other states. By 1980, only 4.9 M ha out of a potential 12.4 M ha had been developed for irrigation, and this mainly in the Gangetic plain. Little irrigation had reached the most backward, hilly areas in the southern part of the state where the tribal population was concentrated. Similarly, Orissa state has a large percentage of tribal population and is much less developed than other Indian states. It has vast forest reserves and mineral deposits. Agriculture contributed 692 of SDP, and employed about 792 of the working population. In 1980, only 1.1 M ha had been developed for irrigation out of an irrigation potential of over 5 M ha. 4. Both ! har and Orissa place the highest priority on the rapid development of their irrigation potential, and the interstate Subernarekha Irrigation System (SIS) is a major component of this development. It is located in predominantly tribal areas where living standards are below state averages. In Bihar, the SIS will also supply municipal and industrial (M&I) water to Jamshedpur town and the large industrial complexes in its environs. 5. The Subernarekha river is an interstate river originating in Bihar and Orissa, passing through West Bengal and back into Orissa on its way to the Bay of Bengal. Some 70? of its catchment area of 18,950 km2 is in Bihar. It is prone to frequent flooding of large areas in the lower reaches in West Bengal and Orissa. Proposals for an interstate Subernarekha Irrigation System (SIS) date from 1973, but plans could -nly be finalized once the three riparian states had reached a Tripartite Agreement' in 1978, which allocated the river waters (at 75? dependable flows) among the three states, stipulated sizes and allocation of storage facilities and arrangements for flood moderation, made provisions for the order of execution of various components and institutional arrangements for joint operation of the facilities, and defined the sharing of joint costs. Project Obiectives and Description. 6. The project was to support a four-year time slice of the SIS. The objectives of the SIS as a whole are: a) increased agricultural production through irrigation of some 255,000 ha in all three states; b) water supply to industries and municipalities (mainly in Bihar); and c) reduction of flood damage in West Bengal and Orissa. 7. The specific objectives of the project as funded by IDA weres a) to achieve physical construction targets in the time-slice; b) to establish an institutional framework and to build up the irrigation department establishment required for implementation of works in Bihar; c) to carry out studies and investigations in preparation of subsequent phases. 8. The SIS general layout is shown in Map IBRD 16235. Water will be supplied from the Subernarekha river and its tributary Sanjay, both arising in Bihar, and from the Rharkal tributary with catcbment partly in Orissa. They unite to form the main Subernarekha upstream of Jamshedpur. Water will be stored by Chandil dam on the Subernarekha, and Icbha dam on the Kharkai. The former will also maintain a flood custhion to protect downstream interests.  3 9. The major components of SIS in Bihar are: a) Chandil dam and ita canal system commanding 75,400 ha; b) Ichha dam and its canal system commanding directly 60,800 ha, and indirectly 15,800 ha (Kharkai system); c) Kharkai barrage, which if constructed would supply the Kharkai system and M & I water to ACityapur industrial complex; d) Galudih barrage comuanding about 8,800 ha in Bihar, but principally providing water control to the Galudih Right Main Canal acting as a feeder to the Orissa component; and e) Supply of M & I water to the industrial and mineral complexes in the area. In Orissa a total of some 90,000 ha would be irrigated, through direct supply from Galudih Barrage (about 34,500 ha), through enlargement of Haldia dam (4200 ha), and through construction of Jambhira and Baura dams (51,300 ha). In .ddition there would be flood control and drainage works. In West Bengal, the SIS wold provide for about 5000 ha irrigation. The total SI3 irrigation potential would thus be about 255,000 ha, 160,000 ha in Bihar, 90,000 ha in Orissa and 5,000 ha in West Bengal. The estimated total cost of SIS at 1982 prices was Rs. 7360 H (US $ 817.8 M). It was planned to complete the entire scheme by 1994. The overall economic rate of return (ERR) was estimated at 17.3Z. 10. The project components during the time slice in Bihar weres a) Partial construction of Chandil dam (50Z) and its left main canal (301); b) partial construction of Ichha dam (20X) and Icbha left and right main canals (202); c) Partial construction of Galudih barrage (361) and 149 right main canal (222); d) Construction of three distributaries in the Kharkai barrage command; e) Partial construction of 21,000 ha of micro distributici system (MDS); f) Establishment of a Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI); g) Establishment of an irrigation research station; h) Establishment of pilot irrigation areas (250 ha); h) Various studies, including a base line socio-economic survey, system improvement investigations, a system O&M study, and evaluation of ongoing rehabilitation of displaced persons; and i) introduction of a water pollution control program. In Orissa, the following project components were to be implementeds a) Master plan of the Orissa SIS component; b) Establishment of a Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI); and c) Construction of a pilot water management study over about 250 ha. No project components were contemplated for West Bengal. The project was to be carried out by the Irrigation Departments of Bihar and Orissa, respectively, under separate Project Agreements. Details of target achievements for project components are given in Part III, Table 4. 11. The project as defined above was estimated to cost Rs 1637 H (US$ 181.9 M) at 1982 prices (see Part III, Table 5). The timeslice activities were scheduled to be completed by March 1987. Two further components were defined but not to be financed by IDA. A rural road component comprising about 100 km of construction and  4 uprating in the Bihar project area at a cost of Rs 68.6 M was t0 be funded from the Tribal Sub-plan budget, and an agricultural extension improvement component for the Bihar area was to be financed from IDA Credit 761-IN. Pro1ect Design and Organization 12. The ovet--- incept of a multi-purpose water resource development scheme in the backward areas of Bihar and Orissa, with a first time slice to be funded under an IDA Credit, was and remains sound. The objectives of the SIS and the project itself were well established and shared by all concerned parties. Considerable efforts were made in planning the overall SIS before appraisal of the project, with water operations and water requirement studies receiving the greatest attention. Project preparation by Water and Power Consultancy Services Ltd. (WAPCOS) and FAO/CP was thorough for the time slice in Bihar and fully documented, culminating in a very detailed Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). WAPCOS was and still is involved in master planning and feasibility studies, giiing consistency of approach. Yet many aspects of the overall SIS planning and design were, intentionally or othetwise, left for-. future study and decision. The SAR exulicitly advocated such "flexibility in project design"3. While flexibility built Into a water supply system in the face of uncertainty about future needs (agricultural, human and industrial) has its merits, the concept of "flexiplannings then en vogue within the Bank actually called for taking only a minimum of decisions and postponing those perceived to be less urgent until such time as more information was available to take them. Some of the design and operations aspects mentioned in the SAR as requiring further study were justifiably delayed and were in fact resolved during project implementation. 13. In retrospect, more detailed and nore comprehensive planning and design should have been done before appraisal, notably with regard to the following aspects of the SIS (and the project), which would have afferted design and construction during the project: a) Formulation of detailed basin and project operation rules and procedures, both for flood and normal operation was omitted. The rules contained in the Tripartite Agreement are too broad to permit full planning of certain components and the framing of operation plans and real-time operation procedures for project facilities such as reservoirs, main conveyance canals and structures and water distribution systems. This aspect was addressed during supervision, but is not yet resolved. b) The long-term requirements for municipal and industrial (tAl) water in the Jamshedpur area, well beyond the year 2000, and the available sources of supply to meet them. These needs are of the highest economic importance for the area, but have been insufficiently identified and alternative means to satisfy them have not been adequately analyzed, in spite of "system improvement studies" undertaken during the project (and rejected by the Bank). The matter of cost recovery for M&I water remains unaddressed so far. c) The phasing of various components of the SIS was addressed by the SM, but was perhaps not sufficiently analyzed, and in some aspects was left open for further study. There were certainly legal constraints imposed by the provisions of the Tripartite Agreement that had to be taken as given, short of opening the interstate discussions that led to the agreement again. It is now felt that the project attempted to start too many SIS components at 3 P&r6graph 2.04 of SAR  5 the same time, and that the time to completion was severely underestimated (with funding having been identified as the main determinant of project progress, which turned out not to be the case). Greater emphasis should have been placed on the completion of the Chandil irrigation system to provide early benefits, with considerably more conveyance, distribution and micro- distribution systems to be completed, while the Ichha system should have been limited to dam deaign and site investigations instead of initiating its construction at an early stage of SIS development. Also Galudih barrage and its right main canal should have been targeted for completion within the time slice to permit Orissa to derive earlier benefits. Kharkai barrage and its canals are mentioned as components of the SIS in the SAR, with the implication that they would be included in a future phase. Timing for their construction was to be studied during the project. Subsequent analysis by FAO/CP indicated that such inclusion would be inappropriate, and engineering considerations suggested that the Adityapur industrial complex and copper installation planned to be supplied by the Murakati distributary from Kharkai barrage might be more appropriately served by pumping. Preparation and appraisal should have analyzed the Kharkai complex in the light of alternatives for serving its potential customers, and the Bank should have unequivocally stated its position on the issue in the SAR. The issue became controversial in 1986, and has not been resolved satisfactorily 4. d) The concept for SIS should have included plans for a hydrometeorological network in the basin, not only to enable proper operation of reservoirs in case of floods, but also for normal supply operations. A design study for such system was finally couissioned by GOB in 1988, at the insistence of Bank staff. e) The inclusion of an O&M study both for Bihar and Orissa under the project was appropriate. The SAR recognized that such study had important implications for the design of project facilities, and a covenant stipulated early completion of the study. In retrospect, certain important decisions regarding O&M should have been taken before any designs and construction proceeded, i.e., by appraisal, the detailed basin and project operation rules should have been formulated before the O&M study was begun, and at least certain parts of the study should have been prepared for Bihar and Orissa jointly, as they affected operations for both states. Regrettably, the study was commissioned only in 1988. The terms of reference of the studies should have been settled by appraisal. f) Site surveys and investigations for major structures, such as Ichha dam, and Chandil left main canal tunnel and cut and cover sections should have been to normal engineering standards. All were of little more than reconnaissance level of detail, with tae result that during construction major and costly changes in design and alignment were made. g) The preparation of the Orissa irrigation component of the SIS to feasi- bility level should have been concurrent with the project; instead, only a 'master plan" was specified. As a result, this important project for the development of Orissa is delayed by several years while the study is completed. 4 GM has cOMented extensively on this mtter, se Part I! (b).  6 h) The need for a large and complex resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) operation associated with Chandil and Ichha dams was well known at appraisal. Little planning for this large task was, however, undertaken, either before appraisal or after. The SAR limited itself to a statement of GOB policies for resettlement and to possible solutions to rehabilitation. While the condition of the Project Agreement that GOB and Government of Orissa (GOO) formulate R&R plans two years ahead of submergence may have been deemed sufficient at the time, it has become clear that neither government had the experience and institutional ability to work out such plans, and that plans actually drawn up since had serious shortcomings with regard to the economic rehabilitation aspect. The SAR stated that GOB had formulated a general policy on R & R; but the policy alone could not substitute for planning, and the statement turned out not to be correct. The identification of relocation villages, their layouts, the preparation of a detailed logistic plan for relocation and more specific plans for economic rehabilitation should have been insisted upon, and the legal documents should have been suitably worded. The institutional arrangements for R&R -were also deficient in that planning and implementation was largely left to the project management which was more oriented towards engineering and land acquisition aspects and procedures, and involved the administration of Singbhum district, which should have been properly concerned with this task, less than adequately. 14. The project was not really innovative, but introduced several concepts to planning, design and operation of irrigation systems that were new at least in the context of Bihar and Orissa. A new feature for a Bank project in India was the multi-purpose nature of the SIS. The SIS presented a level of complexity not encountered in prior projects. It is noteworthy that no power generation was foreseen at the large dams at appraisal (it is not known whether this was considered during initial planning). The inclusion of power facilities at Chandil dam, albeit as an 'afterthought', was strongly suggested by Bank supervision missions, and a canal head power plant was eventually included in the design, although Bank staff continue to believe that a power plant at Chandil should make use of flows other than those diverted into the Chandil left canal. Project Implementation 15. After a slow start following Credit effectiveness, the project proceeded at a modest rate in spite of shortages of staff, non-release of forest land by GOI, and quality control problems. However, in late 1985 the project deteriorated significantly, due to inadequate funding, poor quality control, and material shortages in addition to the impediments noted above. Required studies for 0 & M planning were much overdue. A mid-term review mission visited the project in January 1986, and as a result of its analysis of the problems and Bank representations to GOB, the project progressively improved. Work on Chandil dam proceeded on time throughout the project. Two one year extensions were granted to give a revised closing date of April 30, 1989. While the project took two years longer than scheduled, most physical construction targets were either achieved or exceeded, with the important exception of canal structures and minorlmicro distribution systems. 16. The following major physical variations occurred in the Bihar component: a) On the Chandil left main canal, cut and cover ducts were proposed at appraisal, but following more detailed site investigations and technical assistance of a Bank consultant, designs for these structures were converted to tunnels. GOB informs that further investigations call now again for cut  7 and cover ducts as the tunnel solution was found to be unfeasible (see Part II). b) Following revised flood studies for Chandil and Ichha dams by consultants to GOB, the Dam Review Panel (DRP) recommended the addition of one overflow section (from 12 to 13) and a parapet wall on the earth section for Chandil dam, as well as an increase in the height of Ichha dam by one meter. c) Although the proposed Kharkai barrage and its right main canal were not included under the project, the Bank agreed to a request from GOB to construct a section of the Rharkai main canal from km 17 to km 29 in order to convey water from Ichha dam (via a link canal) to the three Kharkai distributaries. d) At appraisal, the three Kharkai distributaries were estimated to cost Rs 35.1 M. Due to a realignment of the Murakati distributary from the flood plain into the neighboring hills due to objections from mining interests, the cost of the three distributaries rose to Rs 45.8 M during the time slice, and to Rs 50.9 M at completion.5 The FAO/CP economic review mission of January 1986 examined costs and benefits of this distributary, and considered it to be highly uneconomic. Engineering problems were also formidable. As a result, the Bank declined to finance this distributary. e) A hydro-electric plant was added to the design of the Chandil left main canal head to utilize canal flows for power generation. With more detailed site investigations, flood studies, system optimization studies and layout planning at preparation, these changes could have been avoided. 17. Some difficulties were encountered with LCB procurement procedures and contractors' response which led to delays, particularly of canal construction, due to the fact that both the GOB Irrigation Department and local contractors were unaccustomed to the procedures and provisions. Several contracts were let on the same reach of a canal for different types of work (earthwork, lining, structures). As a result, quality and integrity of construction for such reaches suffered. Larger bid packages, comprising complete construction of an entire section, would have led to more responsive bids and better construction quality, including use of proper machinery by contractors. Construction quality improved after Bank insistence on better quality control procedures. 18. Major dam safety issues arose in the project. A Bank mission examined records and calculations available at Jamshedpur in January 1986, and found that flood estimates for Chandil and Icbha dam made by the consultants (CWC) had not been updated since 1978 in the case of Chandil and 1974 in the case of Ichha. Of more concern was the disagreement by WAPCOS (the consultants that had prepared the project) with CWC estimates. The DRP, at that time, made no recommendations on the matter. The Bank raised its concern with GOB; as a result, independent Indian experts carried out an updating of the flood estimates, which proved to be significantly higher than those of CWC, and the DRP eventually recommended the modifications to the dams noted above. 19. The implementation of studies was less satisfactory (see Part III, Table 9), except for the socio-economic baseline survey. The rural roads studies were 5 i09 Informs that the reson for the rel Ignasot of Murakrtt distributary towards the hil a*s du. to the desire to Include an additional Irrigation ara* of 10,000 ha, and that th, afignmnt now goes directly through the mining areas. (See Part II).  8 completed satisfactorily only following persistent Bank requests, and the system O&M study was only recently awarded to consultants after several attempts by the Bank to obtain mutual agreement on Terms of Reference. The system improvement study was to determine the best location, design and timing for Kharkai barrage and two major canals. It was completed in 1986, but the consultant's report is not useful due to lack of data and thorough analysis. 20. A major shortcoming was GOB's failure to seriously attend to water management matters which are important if predicted benefits are to derive from the project. The pilot water management area in the Palna tank command is incorrectly designed, installed and operated, permitting two-season paddy irrigation in the upper reaches and minimal irrigation at the tail. The pilot is of little use for decisions on design and operation of the minor/micro distribution systems. The WALMI at Patna is only in the preliminary stages of construction, although GOB has conducted some 23 WALMI courses in other facilities. The WALMI in Orissa is well advanced and conducting an active training program. 21. The Bank requested, from 1986 on, that further studies be made which were not specified in the SAR, but were considered essential for further implementation of the project and for a possible follow-up project). Such studies referred to projection of M&I water demand, a re-appraisal of the proposed Kharkai facilities and alternatives, to computer requirements in support of project management and to planning and design of a hydro-meteorological network. Only the two last studies were started under the project. 22. The R&R activities under the project were perceived to proceed, at least initially, in an acceptable way. R&R evaluation studies by consultants (Bihar Institute for Rural Development) were and are being competently executed and were of significant assistance in monitoring R&R progress and problems. However, in February 1988 the Bank noted a deterioration in R & R, at a time when actual relocation became necessary. A more detailed review in mid 1988 found such adverse conditions, in view of a threat of flooding of the first villages, that the Bank suspended disbursements in October 1988. After a Bank mission in February 1989 and the presentation of a revised implementation plan by GOB in March 1989, the Bank reinstated disbursements. R&R problems are mainly attributed to insufficient planning, inadequate policies, insufficient management attention, and staff that was not always properly motivated and trained. 23. The few minor components included under the project for Orissa were severely delayed. After many Bank representations, preparation of a master plan study (now actually a full feasibility study) and a water management pilot are now in satisfactory progress. An 0 & M study was considered premature and not yet started. 24. The roads component and agricultural development activities were unsatisfactory. Progress in the former was one of the key Bank conditions for the first closing date extension. Although GOB took steps to minimally meet this condition, little subsequent activity has occurred. While some tentative moves have been made to establish the agricultural research station at Gatsilah, extension services have shown little improvement in staffing and facilities, in spite of persistent Bank representations. Had both roads and agricultural extension components been funded from the Credit, performance would likely have been better. The main reason for the delay in roads and extension components may simply be that these are the responsibility of GOB departments other than the Irrigation Department.  9 Project Results 25. The project (time slice) was not to produce significant benefits during this first phase of construction. Instead, SAR targets were expressed as percentages of physical completion of components. The project achieved, and for some elements exceeded the time slice targets, although aftet a two year extension (see Part III, Table 4.) Generally, targets for major works (dams and main canals) were exceeded, but major structures on Chandil left main canal (railway crossing, tunnels, cut and cover ducts), and especially distribution and micro-distribution systems were seriously delayed. Due to these delays, it is doubtful that more than token benefits will be obtained, even when Chandil dam impounds water in 1990. Major reasons for the delays in irrigation benefits are ti) slow planning, design and procurement for major canal structures, distribution micro distribution systems; and (ii) delays in land acquisition by GOB and release of forest land by GOI. In spite of the long delay until project benefits can commence, the project has made a significant start to the overall SIS which calls for prompt completion. 26. GOB's low interest in the conduct of the water management pilot, in the development of an adequate rural road network and in a strong extension service were disappointing. The latter will be vital for project success in view of the largely traditional type of agriculture practiced by mainly tribal farmers without experience in irrigated agriculture. 27. The estimate of Rs 4067 M (US$ 257.4 M) for the final cost of the project exceeds the appraisal estimate by 150Z in Rupee terms, and by 412 in terms of US dollars. The large cost overrun in local currency is due to low estimates, additional vork quantities and higher local price escalation than foreseen at appraisal. The Dollar cost overrun would also appear larger had the exchange rate not been assumed as constant at appraisal (a practice then prevalent, but now changed). The SAR exchange rate was Rs 9.0lUS$, whereas the Rupee in fact devalued by almost one half by the end of the period (Rs 16.4/US$ in July 1989). Disbursements are shown in Part III, Table 3. The Credit was fully disbursed by August 18, 1989, in spite of a substantial devaluation of the Rupee against the SDR. 28. A re-assessment of likely project benefits (see Part III, Tables 7 and 8) indicate that benefits in physical terms would be largely unchanged from SAR estimates (with the possible exception of M&I water supply, but see GOB's comment in Part II), but would be substantially less in (economic) value terms. This is due to the steep reduction in projected world market prices for major crops, notably rice, after appraisal. It is noteworthy that the SAR contains a footnote (on p.60) mentioning new commodity price forecasts issued after the SAR was finalized, which would have caused a drop in the ERR from 17S to 14.5Z, had they been used. Combined with the cost overrun and delays in benefit accrual, this has unfavorable implications for the economic viability of the project (including sunk cost). The recalculated ERRs (Table 8) indicate a severe reduction for all components of the SIS. The overall ERR for the SIS as a whole dropped from 171 to 7Z. 29. The project has improved GOB's ability to plan, design and construct large irrigation projects to a certain extent, both through experience gained by management and staff, and through considerable Bank technical assistance, although much more institution building romains to be done. GOB's contributions to this report are evidence of a greater awareness of planning and design problems, a continued resistance to addressing some crucial planning issues notwithstanding. The Bank's insistence on more carefully planned and implemented R & R, together with the formulation of a state R&R policy (now in process) has provided a precedent for future R & R activities in Bihar. GOB's insistence on entrusting new flood studies  10 to private consultants (against opposition by the CWC), the positive role of the DRP, and the resulting modification of dam designs have set a major example of dam safety assurance methodology and awareness in India. Proiect Sustainability 30. The project was not designed to create a sustainable scheme at completion, as only initial phases of construction were to be completed. Lessons learned by government staff with regard to thoroughness of investigations, need for comprehensive planning and quality assurance in construction can be expected to be applied to the next phase of the SIS. The failure to properly implement the water management pilot scheme, the reluctance to revisit and address certain planning and basin operation aspects and the mixed performance !.n R&R, however, raise concerns. If irrigation system management fails to lead to reliable and equitable distribution of water (as was the case with the Bihar pilot project), chances to achieve the economic benefits from irrigation are greatly diminished. GOB and GOO will have to induce farmers to follow more or less the design crop pattern, allowing no paddy cultivation in the dry season when applicable. If this does not occur (see the Palna pilot project results), inadequate water would be available in the tail reaches, resulting in inequity. A further risk perceived by some is related to the reluctance of tribal farmers to grow more than only one crop (rainfed)crop. With project economic viability based on an assumption of 551 intensity in the dry and 22? in the hot season, it will be important that farmers' attitudes adapt to the year-round availability of water, which makes the extension service very important. Also, changes in attitude of the departmental staff towards irrigation management are needed. Further Bank involvement, through a follow-up project already requested, is recommended and justified to assist with completion of what was begun and in the crucial phase of starting irrigation. Bank Performance 31. Subject to the qualifications stated in paragraph 13 above, the appraisal was well documented but not sufficiently detailed. It should have been delayed to allow for resolution of some crucial planning and design questions, and might have put less emphasis on the "flexiplanning' approach then en vogue. 32. The Bank can take credit for the more or less successful completion of the time slice of the project. Large technical inputs were made at the Bank expense, including aspects such as canal operations, water management, hydraulic structures, tunnels/cut and cover ducts, 0 & H, hydro-meteorology, agricultural research and extension, dam safety, training, and R & R. Table 8B in Part III indicates a very high Bank supervision input (44 large and small missions, 258 staff-weeks), perhaps more than could and should be sustained in the long run for such project. Such assistance should have been provided by consultants to GOB, both domestic and foreign, financed under the Credit, and future projects should adopt such approach. Use of consultants not employed by the Bank would also help avoid situations where blame may be put later on a consultant employed by the Bank, and thus indirectly on the Bank. This issue concerns, however, not only this but all projects in the water resource sector in India. At the mid-term review in January 1986, the project was qualified as problem project, but the review mission aptly diagnosed the shortcomings and the Bank followed up with an intensive technical assistance program, which together with GOB's cooperation brought the project back to satisfactory implementation. There were, admittedly, certain frictions and disagreements among the Bank staff associated with supervision in the field office and at headquarters, which has led understandably to some confusion on the part of GOB. It is possible thAt these problems could have been avoided through a more detailed SAR and better  11 comnunications between the Bank Headquarters and Field Staff. It is felt, however, that the contribution of all supervision staff and consultants, temporary frictions notwithstanding, has ultimately greatly helped the planning and implementation of the project. Borrower Performance 33. Planning and design of this complex, multipurpose scheme were of higher caliber than customary before, yet not fully comprehensive and thorough. GOB used the most experienced consultants then available in India (WAPCOS), but early use of international expertise for such tasks would have greatly improved the planning. GOB's performance throughout the project has been variable. In the aspects of design, construction standards, dam safety and quality control, GOB acted positively to correct deficiencies pointed out by the Bank. Apart from a brief period in 1985, funding was generally adequate. In other aspects, such as R & R, water management, roads, training and agriculture, GOB often failed to respond to Bank's requests for improvement. Project top management was generally strong with high calibre and dynamic administrators (from the Indian Administrative Service), with the notable exception of managing R&R. Installation and use of a comprehensive management information system, with a stringent and state-of-the-art project scheduling and monitoring mechanism, would have helped to keep the project better on track. 34. GOO performed well with respect to water and land management training, and the WALII is making excellent progress. The studies, however, were subject to delay and confusion for much of the project period, but they are now proceed;.ng well. GOO has given the highest priority to the preparation of the Orissa irrigation component, and their consultants are making good progress. 35. The relationship of GOB with the CWC led to some confusion and delays. CUC is accepted by the states as the apex technical body in water resource development in India, and CWC's judgement is often accepted as the last word in controversial engineering matters. This has led to reluctance to employ other consultants, and to occasional conflict with the role of dam safety panels (which should be independent), and with CWC's own role of a "consultant", albeit without any formal assignment, contract or accountability. Also, CWC may have assumed more of a lead role in matters of basin water resources management and operations. A problem with GOI resulted from GOI's delay in granting approval for use of forest land for project purposes, which would appear to be in violation of the Credit Agreement. Project Relationships 36. The project throughout its implementation has been marked by most cordial relationships between Bank and GOB and GOO. In the case of the former, on technical issues there was generally good coordination. Only with respect to the 'Kharkail question, to R & R, roads and agriculture have there been serious confrontations. The inadequacies of GOB in executing the R & R program for Chandil dam were the cause of the suspension of disbursements, leading to a temporary cooling of these good relations, but with a constructive attitude on both sides and with GOB's commitment to corrective measure, the situation has normalized. The Bank had also informal relations with non-governmental organizations involved in R&R, and benefitted to a certain extent from these. Consulting Services 37. GOB has demonstrated willingness to use consultants, perhaps more than many other Indian states. They were used for socio-economic survey, dam safety studies,  12 O & M criteria preparation, computerized MIS, structure design, system studies, and hydro-meteorology. GOO retained consultants to assist in the preparation of the Orissa component. H.wever, all consultants employed were Indian individuale or institutions, considered appropriate in several fields, but not all. Except for the System Improvement Studies found inadequate by the Bank, consultant inputs for studies were satisfactory, but not truly innovative. The CVC acting as consultants to GOB provided a positive service with respect to Chandil but not for Ichha dam; Bank missions reported adversely on site investigations for the latter structure. Proiect Documentation and Data 38. The SAR gave adequate guidance to the executing staff and Bank supervision missions. Much data and computational details included provided good background information but were not necessary for supervision. The legal documents were adequate except in the case of R & R, where they are particularly weak. 39. Data required for preparation of this report were readily available due to their prompt preparation following Credit closing. GOB gave good assistance to the Bank team, and demonstrated a sincere commitment in its Part II contribution. GOO, with considerably less input, also cooperated fully.  13 PART It PROJECT REVIEW FOM BORROWJ'RS PERSPECTIVE  14 COMMENTS ON BANK'S REVIEW CONTAINED IN PART I Para 10. Proiect Componentss (a & b) The Subernarekha Multipurpose Project as envisaged, comprised essentially of four units viz. Chandil Dam and LBC System, Icha Dam and Right and Left Bank Canal System. Mharkai Barrage 7 Right and Left Bank Canals, Galudih Barrage and Right and Left Canal Systems. The aforesaid four units are independent in themselves and were capable of providing partial benefits to their respective comamnd areas as and when the Headvork and portion of canal systems got completed. Moreover, for a Multipurpose project of the dimensions of Subernarekha Project, it is expedient that construction of major Headwork and Canal Systems should be taken up simultaneously as far as possible, because with the passage of time, the element of price escalation would have come into play, resulting in inordinate increases in the cost of the integral Project. Besides, if the major components of the Project were taken up one by one, this would have resulted in time-run and the incidental delay in realization of overall benefits from the Project. In fact, with this end in view, the execution of Icha Dam and canals were envisaged to commence side by side with Chandil dam and canal systems, but due to suggestions of the World Bank for further hydrological investigation related to determination of PMF of Icha Dam and further geological investigation, the procurement actions for the main Icha dam were substantially delayed. Thus, the basic planning by the Project authorities for creation of early irrigation potential from Icha dam suffered.1 (c) As regards, Galudih Barrage Right Bank Canal ex-Galudih Barrage, it may be pointed out that works have been progressing generally according to originally set targets. The Barrage will be completed including installation of gates by Dec. '90 and canal will be completed by Dec. '91. It may be observed in this context that even if the Galudih RBC could have been completed earlier, no tangible benefits would have accrued, since the Government of Orissa has yet to make headway in the supporting irrigation infrastructures in their territory.2 (d) As per guidelines and approved norms for formulation of estimates for Multipurpose Project in the country, the cost of development of roads in the command areas is not included. However, if the World Bank could have agreed on its funding in the first time slice credit assistance, this could have been incorporated in the Project estimate. Funding of the road component may be considered by the World BAnk when the proposal for Phase-II Credit Assistance is submitted to the World Bank. I It is not correct that the (sub)systems mentioned above are independent in themselves. At least the Galudih sub-system (and with it the Orissa sub- system) cannot function without a major reservoir upstream. The reason for simultaneous uptake of almost all sub-systems was more political than rational. Price escalation due to delayed start of some sub-systems does not (necessarily) affect the economic viability and choice between different schedules, as it impacts on nominal, not necessarily real prices. 2 The argument that there is no irrigation command to be served yet from Galudih barrage is correct; but earlier completion of Galudih might have induced Orissa to take up at least the planning and design of its sub-system earlier.  15 The construction of Rharkai Barrage and Kharkai Right Bank and Left Bank Canals was agreed in principle by the World Br- even at the time of executing the Credit Agreement, and only the question of iptimal time for taking up the construction of the Barrage was left to be decided subsequently, based on System Improvement Studies to be carried out by consultants. The World Bank had observed then that in the first phase of the Projedt, there would be ample water available from Chandil and Icha dam and hence the construction of Xharkai System Barrage and head reach of the Rharkai Right Main Canal might be deferred to a subsequent stage. The Terms of Reference for System Improvement Investigations were prepared in consultation with the World Bank and the aforesaid study was awarded to M/s Consulting Engineering Services, New Delhi. The consultants submitted their final Report on the studies in Oct. 1986. The consultants have given their considered recommendations as unders It will be more beneficial to complete Kharkai Barrage by May, 1990 and meet the requirements of Kharkai L B C and Kharkai R B C to the extent possible from run of the river supplies rather than defer its completion to coincide with that to Icha dam in 1993.' The World Bank commented that the Studies carried out by the aforesaid consultants were deficient and need to be revised with additional data analyses to make the same more meaningful in accordance with the requirements stated in the Staff Appraisal Report and Terms of Reference. It may be noted that the aforesaid studies were carried out by the consultants in conformity with TOR, earlier agreed by the World Bank. As regards the suggestion that studies should conform to the requirements of the SAR, it may be observed that the picture as visualized in the SAR in respect to construction scheduling of Icha dam has substantially changed in the present context. As per the SAR, the construction of Icha dam was to commence from Oct. '94, but the event has been overtaken and now this could be possible only from April '89. The World Bank is well aware of the State Government's preference to the execution of Kharkai Barrage System, which is planned to be completed in two years time, thus providing early benefits in shape of water supply to the ever- growing complex of Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority, besides Kharif irrigation to 12,000 ha. On the other hand, the alternative arrangement for catering to the area through the Icha canal system is not going to take less that four year, as the construction of Icha dam has been taken up only this year after April '89. However, the Icha dam will not be in position to support on long term basis, the requirement of Rharkai customers. It may be noted that out of 6.8 Lakh acre ft. of live storage provided in Icha dam, 1.5 lakh acre ft. have been specifically earmarked for Orissa and the balance storage of 5 lakh acre ft. has been assessed adequate enough only to meet the irrigation demands of Icha RBC and Icha LBC command area, beside the H & I requirements of the region. The department has also thought over the pumping options recomended by FAO/CP. It is not secret that the state is very much short of power and the position is not expected to change in the near future. In face of dismal power position, the pumping options do not appear to be attractive. The report on economic evaluation of the Kharkai complex by the FAO/CP Team has also been examined at this end. The Team appears to have gone by feeling that Rharkai complex could not be completed before the completion of Icha dam in 1993. This assumption itself is primafacie incorrect. Further, the team has complained of lack of data and on this consideration, not much of reliance need to be attached  16 to this report. Incidentally, the pre-feasibility level study of pumping options to meet the M & I requirements of the Rharkai customers was worked out at this end. In view of high dynamic and static head, the capacity of the pumping installation worked out to be as high as about 3,500 H.P. to meet the M & I requirements. As the life of pump and motors can be hardly five years (30,000 running hrs.), the number of replenishment will be 19 to bring the same level with the life of a gravity scheme, which is normally taken as 100 years. Besides, even the annual energy cost of the pumping plant works out to the tune of about Rs. 11 Million. The annual cost of the pumping plant works out as much higher compared to the gravity system through Kharkai barrage and Kharkai RBC, the annual benefit being the same in either case. In view of the facts stated above, the State Government feels strongly that the construction of Rharkai barrage and canals from 0 to 17.2 KM is the best alternative and would provide early irrigation benefits, sizeable irrigation to the predominantly tribal population in this region. Also, the need for early completion of the Kharkai LBC needs hardly be overemphasized, because it would be the actual source of supplying water for M & I usages to the vastly growing Adityapur Industrial Compleses. There is already acute shortage of water in this region. It is hoped that the Bank will appreciate the above viewpoint and will reconsider their stands for any further study regarding execution of Kharkai Barrage. In case, however, the Bank still feels otherwise, the matter would be referred to the Central Water Commission for carrying out further techno-economic evaluation of the alternative proposals.3 Para 13: The Government of Bihar have been considering various parameters of economic rehabilitation based on other Projects in India. After the policy parameters have been decided, a comprehensive R&R Plan including the action plan for economic rehabilitation of the oustees from the two reservoirs of the Project shall be formulated. The plan would also show the identification of the various resettlements sites, their layouts, the program for completing the balance infrastructural development works at the resettlement sites and also the detailed logistic plan in a given time-frame for relocation of the various oustees. Proiect Implementations Para 16: a) Chandil LMC: According to investigation carried out by the World Bank consultants and CWC Officials in consultation with the Resident Geologist, a tunnel was proposed at KM 16.25. However, because of non-availability of good rock cover for the portal sites, the tunnel proposition could not be feasible. In the given situation, it has now been decided to construct an RCC cut and cover duct in place of the original proposal of a tunnel. There will not be much cost implication as the same executing agency has agreed to do the work for the common items and agreed rates and only for new items, rates are to be decided 3 The Bank remains unconvinced of the need for the Kharkai barrage, but is willing to reconsider its position on the basis of a proper, comprehensive and thorough feasibility study particularly in view of any new investigations that GOB may have carried out.  17 under the clause of 'extra item' of the operating contract.4 d) During the appraisal study of the Project, the World Bank Mission had suggested to extend the original command of Kharkai RBC System by detouring through the existing hilly range. The reconnaissance level study had revealed then that a very good stretch of irrigable area of about 10,000 ha. (gross) was available beyond the hilly range. It was considered desirable to include this patch of command also even if the cost would have been more because of the increase in length of the distributary and also because o' negotiating diffic-:.t terrain in its alignment. Accordingly, the Merakati distributary was envisaged so as to include the extended command of the system. The estimated cost of Murakati distributary along the original alignment worked out to Rs. 509 Million. However, the construction of the distributary could not be taken up due to Bank objections regarding its alignment in very difficult terrain and consequent increase in the cost. As advised by the Bank, further survey and investigations were carried out for alternative alignment even with some reduction in the command area with a view to minimizing the cost of the distributary. According to this proposal, the Murakati distributary has been planned to be taken in trough over the built up area of Uranium Complex and Rakha mines. The rough estimated cost of this proposal works out to Rs. 320 Million only. The revised investigation report and detailed cost estimate is under finalization and will be incorporated in the Phase-II of the Project. Para 17: The flow of construction drawings of Chandil dam from CWC was in keeping with the construction schedules of the dam components and the construction works never suffered any set-back for want of drawings from the CWC.5 As regards to quality control works also, it may be mentioned that necessary tests were being carried out during the period under report (late 1989). The shortcomings were that in the case of quality control test for the canal structures, proper records were not maintained at the respective sites. These shortcomings were rectified and on the lines of suggestions of CWC, checklists were circulated to the field officers for maintaining proper records of quality control test results at the respective sites. As regards to 0 & M studies, the procurement action was delayed because the terms of Reference for these specialized studies were prepared a number of times in consultation with World Bank and finally the same was substantially recast by the World Bank in June, '88. Subsequent'y, the procurement action for the aforesaid study was finalized and work allotted in Sept. '88. Para 20: As regards to Walmi, although the procurement infrastructures for the Institute have not been completed, the Walmi has performed reasonably well by conducting 14 nos of long term and 9 nos. of short term planning, design and execution courses in MDS works and water management. Such courses, imparted to the Engineers engaged in the execution of the Project, have been very beneficial.6 4 This information has been incorporated in the revised Part I. S An earlier comment about delays in delivery of drawings has been deleted from the PCR, as the fact could not be re-checked. 6 Noted and incorporated in Part 1.  18 Para 24s It has been observed that if road development in the comand and agricultural extension components could have been included under direct financing of the Project, better results would have been achieved. As per prevalent guidelines for formulation of water resources Projects, these components are not included in the Project Estimate. If, however, the World Bank agrees to include the aforesaid components for disbursement in Phaee-Il Repeater Scheme for this Project, proposed to be induced shortly for World Bank Credit Assistant, the inclusion of the aforesaid components under the Project estimate could be considered. As regards to development of Extension Service in the command area, although the senior level Extension officers have joined, there has been some difficulty in posting adequate nos. of VLEWs. Steps have been titken recently to recruit adequate nos of VLEKs for the Project and when they join, the position would substantially improve. As regards to the execution of MDS works, it is fact that initially it lacked adequate tempo, because of poor responses from the agencies in bidding for MDS works. The primary reason has been that the MDS works are essentially of scattered nature, spread in far-flung area. But now steps have been taken to induce the agencies and the construction of MDS works has made a headway. This has also been possible since the major procurement works of the main canal systems have been now completed, so the bidders have now to flock over the MDS works only. Para 25: It is fact that partial irrigation potentials from the Project could not be created by the year 1989 as earlier planned, but by the years 1990 to 1991, the extent of creation of potential would be substantial (10,000 ha by June 1990 aud 25,000 ha by June 1991), from Chandil LBC will also be completed substantially in stretch up to 88 Km.7 Creation of irrigation potential to additional areas would have been possible by June, 1990, had the Kharkai Barrage and head reach of Kharkai RBC been constructed earlier, as was planned by Government of Bihar. The completion of Kharkai LBC along with Rharkai Barrage would also have created adequate potential for meeting the ever growing demands of M & I water supply of Industrial Development Authority, Adityapur. Proiect Results: Para 26: As regards to water management in the Palna Pilot Irrigation command, it may be stated that paddy is traditionally the predominant crop being cultivated by the farmers of this region. Double cropping is a rare scenario for this region and the very fact that in the initial year, they have taken to second crop, i.e. summer paddy should be considered as an instant achievement. However, constant pursuasions is being done through agricultural extension services and it is hoped, the farmers will soon adopt to more lucrative cropping patterns, as envisages for the Project at large. In switching over from traditional to changed cropping patterns and improved agricultural practices, there is normally some time lag and such inherent deficiencies would be rectified soon. 7 The creation of 'irrigation potential' falls much short of the ability to provide a reliable and equitable water supply, as it excludes construction and commissioning of (micro) distribution systems. This argument is thus not convincing.  19 Para 28s As regards to the estimate of increase in M & I water supply at full deveiopment, it .s pointed out that the annual utilization will be 740 MC and not 607 MCM as mentioned in Table 6A - Direct Benefits. This take into account the existing utilization by Tisco through Dimna Lake, which resources are now quickly depleting. While working out the EU for M & I water supply, it is not known as to what water rate has been considered. It may be stated that the issue of fization of water rate to be levied to the customer of M & I water demand has still not been settled by Government of Bihar.8 Para 30s The Government of Bihar is committed to introduce the lucrative cropping pattern envisaged for the Project by introducing a very effective extension service in the command area. One year's cropping pattern actually adopted in the Palna Pilot command she-ild not be considered as a forerunner for the Project as a whole. Bank Performance: Para 31: During appraisal by the World Bank and subsequent preparation of SAR. very detailed studies have been carried out first by the consultant WAPCOS and then by the World Bank on various aspects concerning design and planning of the project. The studies includet i) analysis of hydrological data and computations of yield and design floods. ii) formulating of demand including study of crop water requirement, effective rainfall and canal losses. iii) cropping intensities, canal capacity and flexibility factor. iv) Integrated reservoir operation. v) Method of operation of canal and water distribution. vi) Design and planning of Minor Distribution System. These studies had also been carried out previously by the project engineers for clearance of the project by CWC. But the studies carried out by the VAPCOS and the World Bank for appraisal of the project have been of much significance and have helped in refining the previous studies and have also helped in improving the technical understanding and capability of the project engineers. 8 The statement is noted, although it is not clear why the Dimna lake water resource is 'depleting". At any rate, it was the incremental supply that was estimated. The issue of payment by the users for new M&I water, and thus of allocation of construction costs to this purpose and cost recovery, has indeed been sorely neglected so far, including the SAR.  20 However, there have been certain deficiencies, lack of proper understanding and conceptual mistakes, in the studies carried out by WAPCOS, which formed the basis for the preparation of SAR by the World Bank. Some of them are as follows: i) Calculation of ETo (Potential Evapo-transpiration) has been done for each calendar month of each year 1954-78. Based on this, the demand has been formulated for each calendar month for each year and the same have been used in reservoir operation for appraisal of the Project. But no study has been done for selection of ETo value for planning based on frequency distribution study, likely range of conditions and on assessment of tolerable risk of not meeting crop water demands. ii) Study of Effective Rainfall, which has significant impact on total demand, has not received due importance. The Rainfall effectivity co-efficient have been calculated on the basis of water balance study only for four years. iii) The results of detailed agro-soil survey have not been properly utilized in the initial planning of cropping pattern and delivery rate at turn-out, although the report of detailed agro-soil survey of the entire command of Chandil Left Main Canal had been made available by that time. iv) While determining the canal capac'ty flexibility factor (varying from 1OX for main canal to 252 for minors) has been introduced, but the design factor has not been considered although rotation water supply below minors (channels of 50 cusecs capacity) has been profuse. v) Due to conceptional mistake and lack of proper understanding by WAPCOS in allocation of cost of various components, Kharkai Barrage was judge to be the costliest component of the project. And consequently, it was not recommended by the World Bank for inclusion in the first time slice for implementation. This has resulted in the following serious complications: (a) Water supply to Adityapur Industrial Complex, which is facing acute scarcity at present, has been considerably delayed. The alternative arrangement for supply from Chandil Right Canal has also been kept in abeyance for the present. (b) Accrual of irrigation benefits to a predominantly tribal area, in the command of Right Bank Canal Ex Kharkai Barrage has been delayed considerable although a very big canal requiring wide strip of land has already been completed in the area. This may become a cause for public discontent leading to agitation. Borrower Performances Para 33: Steps are being taken to make up the deficiencies pointed out in the areas of R & R, water management, roads, training and agriculture. These  21 issues have been discussed in the foregoing paras. Consulting Services: Para 37s System Support Studies were carried out as per Terms of Reference agreed with the World Bank. Nevertheless, the findings of the consultants are being reviewed by the CWC and further investigations, if called for, would be carried out. As regards to indulgence of the consultant, CWC on the design aspects of Icha dam, it may be noted that since the procurement action for this dam was inordinately delayed, the CWC did not include the same under priority category. Had the works of main dam started earlier, the CWC, during the course of preparation of detailed construction drawings, would have called for carrying out some of the left out geological investigations, which the Bank has suggested. As regards to Icha dikes, the CWC have furnished timely all the construction drawings needed for the execution of the works.  22 EVALUATION OF BANK'S PERFORMANCE DURING THE EVALUATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS O! LESSONS LEARNT THAT HAY BE RELEVANT FOR THE FUTURE. 1.0 Project Appraisal: 1.1 The World Bank played a very positive role during the preparation of the Feasibility Report of the project by initiating a number of group discussions between the consultant WAPCOS, Bank and Project Officials. During these discussions, multidisciplinary experts were also associated. The discussions were held at various levels so that the base level officers could also participate and feel deeply associated with the job. Their participation enthused them to take keen initiative in different aspects of Project formulation and implementation. 1.2 As indicated under 'Bank Performance - para 31' of the preceding section, the additional studies carried out by the Bank were benefited implementation and understanding of project. 1.3 With regard to the Kharkai Barrage and Kharkai Right Bank and Left Bank Canals, their construction was agreed in principle by the World Bank even at the time of executing the Credit Agreement and only the question of optimal time for taking up the construction of the Barrage was left to be decided subsequently, based on System Improvement Studies to be carried out by Consultants.1 The World Bank had observed then that in the first phase of the Project, there would be ample water available from Chandil and Icha dam and hence the construction of Kharkai Barrage and head reach of the Kharkai Rightr Main Canal might be deferred to a subsequent stage. The terms of reference for System Improvement Investigations were prepared in consultation with the World Bank and the aoresaid study was awarded to MIS Consulting Engineering Services, New Delhi. the Consultants submitted their Final Report on the Studies in Oct., 1986. 1.4 The consultants have given their considered recommendations as under: n It will be more beneficial to complete Kharkai Barrage by May, 1990 and meet the requirements of Kharkai LBC and Kharkai RBC to the extent possible from run-off of the river supplies rather than defer its completion to coincide with that to Icha dam in 1993.' 1.5 The World Bank commented that the Studies carried out by the aforesaid consultants were deficient and need to be revised with additional analysis to 1 The SAR did indeed not question the justification for Xharkai barrage at some future date; it even stated that the barrge was necessary for Bihar to draw its full share of Subernarekha waters. the timing for the construction of the barrage was left to investigations to be carried out during project implementation. The Bank's view on the need for and justification of this structure changed substantially later on. This departure from SAR assumptions remains jusjtified, but led to a controversy between GOB and the Bank, which is not resolved to date. (See GOB's comments under Section A of Part II).  23 make the same more meaningful in accordance with the requirements stated in the Staff Appraisal Report and Terms of Reference. It may be noted that the aforesaid studies were carried out by the consultants in conformity of TOR, earlier agreed by the World Bank.2 As regards the suggestion that studies should conform to the requirements of the SAR, it may be observed that the picture, as visualized in the SAR in respect to the construction scheduling of Icha dam has substantially changed in the present context. As per SAR, the construction of Icha dam was to commence from Oct, 84, but the events have overtaken and this could be possible only from April, 89. The other factors justifying the execution of Xharkai Barrage and canals promptly have been indicated in detail vide department's comments on Para 13 of Part I of PCR prepared by the World Bank. Despite all the strong points, some of which involve sensitive issues which could not be financially quantifiable, the World Bank did not include Rharkai Barrage and head reach of Kharkai Barrage canals in its first time slice Project. 2.0 Delay in executiou of certain Project Components: 2.1 The specification drawings of Icha main dam and spillway were received from CWC by December, 86, based on PNF value tentatively decided by Chief Engineer, Icha-Galudih Complex and the estimate was sanctioned. Notice for ICB tenders was sent to the World Bank for publication in International Development Form. But the tender for the main dam could not be floated, because the World Bank put overriding conditions of updating of hydrological studies and also for carrying out further geological investigations at the dam site. This resulted in further delay in floating tenders for Icha dam. This could have been avoided, had the World Bank given clearance for floating pre-qualification bid, while updating the studies of hydrology/geological investigation were simultaneously in progress. It may be noted in this context that the tender formats have sufficient flexibility to accommodate deviation of quantity, which might have become necessary due to some changes in the design on the basis of updated hydrology. This delay caused considerable upset in the construction schedule of Icha dam and the consequent delay in creation of partial irrigation potential from Icha Right Bank Canal, which has been substantially completed. The work of main Icha dam could be allotted in March, 89 only, which means that any creation of potential could be possible only after Jun, 92. As per SAR procurement schedule, the work of Icha dam was to be allotted as early as Oct. 84. In fact the delay in construction scheduling of Icha dam also defeated the very idea mooted out by the World Bank, according to which water was to te provided from Icha dam for irrigation in Kharkai RBC command (reach from KM 17 to 29.83) through Edal distributary of Icha RBC. 2.2 The construction of Murakati distributary could not be taken up due to objection of Bank regarding its alignment traversing through very difficult 2 The study by CES was found deficient by the Bank mainly in that it failed to present all pertinent data and to consider alternative options to provide water to the industrial and mining facilities in the Jamshedpur area to relatively small irrigation areas at the end of the proposed Kharkai right bank system. The study focused only on optimal timing for Kharkai barrage. The Terms of Reference, as approved by the Bank, were, in retrospect, indeed not adequate as they did not request the investigation of alternatives.  24 terrain and consequent increase in cost. As advised by the Bank, further survey and investigations were carried out for alternative alipgments even with some reduction in the coammand area with a view to minimizing the cost of the distributary. As per revised proposal, the cost of distributary come down to Rs 320 million from the original estimated cost of Re 509 million, although there was some reduction in the conuand area. The Bank however, did not advise to go ahead for procurement action on the revised option. 3.0 Bank's Supervision of Project Implementations: 3.1 The Bank's performance in the supervision of this project during the various stages of implementation has been commendable. A happy note of the implementation phase was the observation and considered views given by the experts and consultants engaged by the World Bank on different aspects relating to design and construction techniques for structures like tunnels, cut and cover ducts, major canal structures, land and water management etc. This not only enhanced the technical capability of the project organizations but also went a long way in creating confidence in the project engineers, engaged in the execution of these specific structures. However, it was felt that the visits of the Bank experts /consultants could have been more frequent to cover different stages of construction. 4.0 Technical Inputs for Basic Studies: 4*1 Very large technical inputs were provided by the Bank in finalizing the terms of reference for the various basic studies required to be performed as per stipulations of the Credit Agreement. Special mention may be made of the System Operation and Maintenance Studies in which case the World Bank's experts devoted considerable time in drafting the comprehensive terms of reference. for this specialized Study, taking into consideration the three fol owing development phases for the project. a) Initial phase, when irrigation and M & I demands would be partly developed in Bihar. b) Second phase, when irrigation and M & I demands would be fully developed in Bihar. c) Third phase, when the project components in Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal are fully developed. On practical considerations, it was decided that manual control would be utilized as the medium term of the system operation, but with the facility to convert to semi-automatic and automatic or remote control in the longer term. 4.2 As regards System Improvement Studies and Base line Socio-Economic Studies for the project, the terms of reference were also vetoed by the World Bank. The finalization of the terms of reference for the various Studies of the Project in consultation with the World Bank helped the Project engineers in assimilating a lot of ideas and information related to the Water Resources Development, which were beneficial not only for this Project but also for other projects in the State. Special mention may be made of the operation and maintenance studies, which in the ultimate analysis would draw up detailed operating rules and  25 procedures for the project Head works and main conveyance system with a view to ensuring reliable, predictable and equitable supply of water to all the farmers in the command and efficient operation of the system to avoid wastage and economize on management cost. The other important study viz System Improvement Study of Subernarekha Project was completed quite some time back. Although the results of the Studies are not fully acceptable to the Bank and they have suggested some further changes in the scope of the studies, but the Bank has admitted that if the studies be revised, it would be quite useful for the planners for formulating phase-II of the Project for including the left out components into the pipeline for World Bank credit assistance.3 4.3 The Bank also took initiative in employment of consultants on design of complicated structures and various Studies, as were required to be carried out in accordance with provisions of the Credit Agreement. The results of the Studies carried by the consultants were sent to the Bank for their review and comments. However, it was felt that in certain cases, the Bank laid overemphasis on adopting recommendations of a particular consultant. A case in point was the PMP Studies for Chandil and Icha dam carried out separately by a Consultant and Central Water Commission, Government of India, acting as the project consultants. The technical stature of CWC, being the premier Institution in the field of water resources development not only in the country but also reputed at international levels should not have been compared with a part time consultant's technical capability. Besides, CWC, being the apex technical body of GOI for scrutinizing all the major water resources projects of the country, are very much concerned about the technical competence and adequacy of the design parameters of the dams including fixing of PMF, keeping in foremost consideration the fool-proof safety of the dams.4 A case in contrast could also be quoted, whick is in regard to System Improvement Studies carried out by a consulting firm. Although the aforesaid firm did carry out the studies in accordance with the terms of reference agreed by the World Bank, the recommendations were not accepted by the Bank relating to Kharkai Barrage. The Bank in this case insisted that the studies be repeated, showing more data and analysis and also introduced additional scope of examining pumping option in 3 While GOB executed the system improvement studies called for in the SAR, further system studies were strongly requested by the Bank in 1987, at the time the Credit closing date was to be extended. These referred to the framing of detailed, joint operation rules for all the basin facilities (in more detail that provided for in the Tripartie Agreement), projection of likly demand for M&I water in the basin to the year 2020 and identification of all possible sources to meet such demand, and design and installation of a hydrometeorological forecasting system (for flood and normal basin operations). Only the last mentioned item has been taken up so far. 4 The Bank's concern with the quality of and disagreement between earlier flood studies was justified. The Bank's role was merely to raise this concern with GOB and to move GOB to put the matter before the DRP. The DRP took the final decision. Any judgement on the quality of consultants employed in the process appears moot, given the decision by the DRP. It would, however, have been appropriate to the Bank to scrutinize this aspect more closely during appraisal. This would have avoided delays of Icha dam.  26 lieu of Rharkai Barrage in the aforesid study.5 This has resulted not only in inordinate delay in execution of Rharkai Barrage, but also has embarrassed the project authorities and GOB. In fact, before the inception of the project into World Bank time slice Credit Agreement, the component of Kharkai Barrage was given first priority by GOB. But the position as it obtains now is that its execution has been dragged behind by more than seven years. 4.4 The role of Dam Safety Review Panel, constituted in accordance to covenants of the Credit Agreement has been very effective in solving the various technical problems encountered during the construction of Chandil dam, for Icha dikes and on the aspects of additional investigations, carried out for Icha dam. The aplomb and expertise with which the Panel handled the technical matters have been commendable. 5.0 Road Develo2ment Plans 5.1 The Bank experts provided a considerable technical input in formulating a comprehensive road development plan for the entire project area in Bihar. The road component construction wing has been benefitted from the frequent discussions with the World Bank experts on the planning and implementation aspect of the plan. This will be of great use during the phase-II of the project. However it would not be out of context to highlight one serious shortcoming of the first time slice of the Credit Agreement on this score. The Agreement did not provide for disbursement by the Bank on account of expenditures incurred against works on road development plan. The result was that it became very difficult for the GOB to mobilize funds separately for the road development plan, as this was not included in the project estimate. Should the second phase come into consideration for World Bank Credit Assistance, the bank may consider this also within purview of disbursement so as to ensure time bound implementation of the road development plan. 6.0 R & R Plan & Activities: 6.1 The R & R activities under the project, supported by an overall plan, were for much of the project period, acceptable to the Bank. However, the Bank reported adversely in mid 1988 about the R & R performance in the project, especially for oustees of Chandil reservoir area. After discussions with the Bank Missions visiting the Project and in light of some additional policy decision by GOB, a revised detailed implementation plan was submitted to the Bank in March, 89 which was accepted as satisfactory for the first phase. 6.2 The main deficiencies pointed out by the Bank with regard to R & R plan, which will be an essential prerequisite for phase-II project, pertain to grant of more liberal benefits on the scores of economic rehabilitation of the S The study by CES was found deficient by the Bank mainly in that it failed to present all pertinent data and to consider alternative options to provide water to the industrial and mining facilities in the Jamshedput area and to relatively small irrigation areas at the end of the proposed Kharkai right bank sys.em. The study focused only on optimal timing for kharkai barrage. Ther Terms of Reference, as approved by the Bank, were, in retrospect, indeed not adequate as they did not request the investigation of alternatives.  27 oustees, especially those who have been deprived of their minimum subsistence level land holding. The additional norms for economic rehabilitation are under serious considerarion of GOB. However, in this context, it is strongly felt that the World Bank should consider the issue of disbursing the expenditure to be incurred on economic rehabilitation, as it has become an integral part of project implementatioan. If such a consideration is made by the Bank, the GOB will gain a solid financial support to boost up the norms for economic rehabilitation for phase-II of the project.6 7.0 Procurement Procedures: 7.1 Before commencement of the execution of the project as well as in the implementation stage, the Bark deputed Missions and organized workshop on procurement actions, which helped a lot in streamlining the procurement procedure and in correctly understanding the implications of the various provisions of the LCB/ICB documents, postulated by the World Bank. However during the process of finalization of the various procurement cases, a number of pertinent issues were encountered which need to be deliberated and suitable changes effected for adoption in Phase-II, should the same materialize. Some of the important issues are highlighted as under: i) After the execution of the Project made a headway, the contractors working in the project developed in a coherent fashion, a growing tendency of submitting bids generally much higher than the estimated cost of the works at the prevalent schedule of rates.7 Since the LCB/ICB format of tender documents do not stipulate any provision for negotiation from the first lowest bidder, the project had to undergo heavy financial burdens. Cancellation of such tenders did not also help the matter, since on retendering the position was to get further aggravated. Competitive bids should normally not cause any concern for taking resort to negotiation, but if the contractors as a class do not observe the fair rules of competitive price bidding, it will only lead to undue financial burden on the State Exchequer. It is therefore strongly felt that negotiations with the bidders should be allowed in such cases, where the quoted priced bids are substantially higher than the estimated cost of the works. The limit for the high price bids could be judiciously fixed in due consideration of operating contracts for similar works in the region. ii) As per provisions of LCB/ICB documents, conditional bids, especially involving financial implications, are to be rejected outright. This also created difficult situations at times. There were instances when the first 6 The suggestion is valid and should be seriously considered in a possible follow-up project. While the Bank does not normally fund land acquisition costs of a project (which make up a large proportion of R&R costs), there may be other R&R costs items that may be funded by the Bank to lend support to the implementation of better RDR policies. 7 The fault for 'high bids' appears to be with the 'Schedule of Rates' system of cost estimating, not with the procurement process. Schedules of Rates are often out of date at the time of estimating.  28 lowest bidder incorporated certain conditions with their bids, which resulted in the outright rejection of their bids. Since there was no scope of negotiations, the second lowest responsive bidder had to be considered for award of work, even though his price bid might have been substantially higher than the first lowest price bid.8 iii) As regards to procurement procedures, those have been almost uniform except for some changes, which were introduced subsequently due to certain apprehension regarding malpractice of the contracting agencies. However, certain changes like change in proportion of security deposit and in the method of submission of guarantees against machine advance created difficulties. For example, imposition of both hypothetication of machines and at the same time its coverage by Bank Guarantee also made the machine advance less useful, as a considerable amount was to be deposited by the agency to get Bank Guarantee. Such changes need further deliberations. It was also felt during the implementation of the project that some of the provisions of the contract, like those concerning mobilization advance, bidding on joint ventureship did not work quite to 'che benefit of the project. In certain cases, it was observed that the contracting firms used a considerable part of the secured advances in purchasing luxury cars and buildings and in diverting the fund to other works. The very purpose of mobilization advance against the particular contract gets defeated. Similarly, the provision on joint venture was abused. In certain cases by some petty firms. Such firms used to form joint venture with reputed firms having enormous turnover and experience. It was well known that the participation of major firms would be nominal in actual practice and it would be only the petty firm that will be doing the work as the lead firm. Still it was difficult to eliminate such bids from the competition, as required proportions of capabilities of the lead firm were not defined in the standard format of the tender document. These issues need careful deliberations, keeping in view that such provisions while giving legitimate benefits to qualified bidders might not hit the Department through defaults by the firms. iv) On technical front at certain occasions, the project felt somewhat embarrassed in accepting the suggestion of the World Bank, as the same were not supported by reasons. For example in case of tender documents, for lining of canal, even after repeated explanation from the Project Engineers that rates of doing machine lining and manual lining would be much different, the World Bank insisted that the option for doing the lining by machine or manually should be left to the bidders. This did not provide a common datum for evaluation of the 8 The instructions to bidders spelled out the rules for bidding. The fact that some bidders did not observe the rules does not diminish the justification for such rules. Besides, it is possible to allow variations in bidding conditions, if such conditions are clearly specified in the instructions to the bidders. Such variations can then be taken into account at bid evaluation, but not through negotiations with a bidder.  29 bids.9 8.0 Hmannsn of Supervision Missions 8.1 Quite frequently there were changes in the officials manning the Technical Supervision Missions visiting the project. This, at times, used to create problems, especially when the view and suggestions of the various specialists lacked anonymity in retrospect on certain issues. The element of continuity in such matters could have been more conducive for the time-bound implementation of time slice project.10 A case in point could be cited with regard to review and updating of PHF for Chandil and Icha dam. This issue was raised quite late in Jan, 86 with the result that procurement action of Icha dam was delayed inordinately. Had this issue been raised earlier, the studies could have been prepared and execution of Icha dam could have been commenced much earlier. Even the execution of Chandil dam. which was in full swing, had to be slowed down pending the decision on the revision of PMF value. Similarly in the case of formats for progress reporting, physical and financial key indicators, there vere confusions due to the number of chan-sg introduced by the supervision missions as and when their manning changed. XFurther in the beginning, the Bank explicitly indicated that the Status Reports for the project in the prescribed format were required to be submitted to the Bank on half yearly basis, one pertained to the period ending March and the other ending September. However, later on practically every Supervision Mission used to insist on preparation of such detailed Status Reports on the eve of their visits to the Project. 9 The Bank's intention was to recommend that the technical specifications be written so that completed works would have to comply with specific criteria (performance specs), rather than prescribing a certain construction method by which such specifications should be achieved. The common datum is the finished product adhering to the stated specifications. Variations in time to completion would be taken into account with usual accepted evaluation criteria. 10 The point is well taken, but continuity of Bank supervision staff over prolonged periods of project implementation is not always possible. In this case, a detailed assessment of the technical studies supporting the flood hydrology may have been made at appraisal. However, there is always a possibility that new information or the detection of errors and omissions in an analysis leads to new assessments. 11 This point is also well taken. Format and content of progress report should preferably be discussed in detail and agreed at appraisal.  30 EVALUATION OF BORROWER'S OWN PERFORMANCE DURING THE EVALUATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OP THE PROJECT, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON LESSONS LEARNED THAT MAY BE RELEVANT FOR THE FUTURE. 1.0 The Organization has been very much responsive and diligent to the requirements of the Credit Agreement during the procurement and execution stages of the Project. Right from the appraisal stage of the Project, the Project Engineers actively participated in the deliberations held with the various World Bank teams visiting the Project and placed their ideas on the various issues related with the formulation of the Feasibility Report by the WAPCOS and SAR by the World Bank. The performance of the Project on the aspects of design, construction standards, dam safety and quality control had been generally up to the mark and prompt actions were taken to rectify certain perceived deficiencies in some area. It would be relevant to mention some of the significant points related to the Survey and Investigation, procurement and execution of the some the important works of the Project. 2.0 Project Report & Estimate: 2.1 One of the inherent problems of major water resources development projects is their long period of gestation and the Subernarekha could be no exception. Though the Subernarekha Multi-purpose Project for an estimated cost of Rs 129 crores had been sent to CWC in 1974 for clearance, comments and counter-comments were going on till 1980. The matter was taken up seriously and replies to all pending comments along with a revised estimate of Rs 397 chores were sent to CWC in October 1980. After that, the matter was followed up vigorously by personal contacts in the various quarters. More comments were received which were again replied after study and collection of data. Finally, after repeated visits of the officers of the Project to CWC and discussions with the various directorates of CWC (Hydrology, Earth dam design, Masonry dam design, Barrage and canal design, Irrigation, Rates and cost, construction plant and machinery) and Water Management Division, Finance and Budget Division and after getting several meetings convened at the level of Member (P & P), the CWC ultimately finalized the Project for an estimated cost of Rs 480.90 chores in October 1981. 2.2 Subsequently, Planning Commission suggested that the estimate of Subernarekha Multi-purpose Project be revised, based on agreement, cost of works completed/under execution and for balance works the estimate should be framed on prevalent schedule of rates. Accordingly, the Revised Estimate amounting to Rs 983.20 crore was framed and sent to CWC in March 1988 for clearance. The CWC after detailed examination of the aforesaid estimate was further recast in the light of the comments of CWC and sent to CWC in August 1989. The estimate now stands at 1270 chores. The increase from the earlier revised estimate has been mainly due to increased provision of land acquisition and rehabilitation as also due to increase in the cost of two main components of the project, viz Icha dam and Kharkai barrage in which case the procurement actions were quite delayed. 3.0 Feasibility Report by WAPCOS. 3.1 Water and Power Consultancy Service (WAPCOS) is a consultancy organization established as a Government of India undertaking. WAPCOS is recognized by the World Bank as a reputed consultant. The task of preparation of a Feasibility  31 Report of Subernarekha Multipurpose Project was therefore entrusted to WVAPCOS in late 1979. Preparation of an Identification Report and subsequently a Feasibility Report by WAPCOS was yet another enormous task. The Project had to feed voluminous data and furnish numerous details, many of which had to be collected and compiled from various quarters of the Governments of Orissa/West Bengal and Government of India. An Identification Report was brought out by WAPCOS in August 1980 and presented to World Bank through Government of India. The Feasibility Report in three volumes was finally submitted by WAPCOS in August 1981. Getting WAPCOS to give shape to the Feasibility Report required a good lot of efforts and studies on the part of the Project Officers and can definitely be classified as the second significant achievement of the Project. 4.0 Appraisal of Project by World Bank & Execution of Credit A8reement: 4.1 The World Bank, in the first instance, was inducted to visit the Project in 1978. Several teams kept on visiting the Project thereafter. The number of visits of the World Bank teams comprising of two to seven members on different occasions had been twelve in all. The visits used to be for a duration of three to eight days. The formal pre-appraisal mission of thi' Bank, however came in NovlDec 1981 about a couple of months after receipt of the Feasibility Report. The World Bank teams used to consist of experts in different fields and careful co-ordination had to be done with different departments for joint discussion. It was yet another herculean task of the Project officers to satisfy the Bank missions regarding the technical and economic soundness of the Project. The Mission members used to go in minutest details and the Project Officers had to be on their toes during the missions field visits and discussions. The formal post-appraisal mission of the Bank came in the end of April 1982. Finally, the Indian delegation was called to Washington on 30th June, 1982 and the draft Agreement was finalized by 8th July, 1982 stipulating an IDA Credit of SDR 116.30 million equivalent to US $ 127 million during the first four year time- slice from 1982-83 to 1985-86. This was a significant mile-stone for the project. The IDA was also persuaded to agree to provide US $ 6 million for reimbursement of expenditure between December, 1981 when the pre-appraisal mission visited the Project) and the date of signing the Agreement. 5.0 Procurement Scheduless 5.1 The procurement schedules, showing the key events for the various important works included in the implementation programme of the Credit Agreement were finalized by the World Bank in light of discussions held with the Project Officers. The procurement schedules and the implementation programme (financial) for the time-slice project were incorporated in the SAR prepared by the Bank. As regards physical part of the implementation schedule for the various works, only percentage projections were indicated. This proved to be rather a tentative exercise, as later analysis indicated that the progressive financial outlays on the works were not commensurate with the corresponding percentage of rhysical completion of works, as were projected in the SAR. It is felt that physical implementation schedule should also have been drawn more comprehensively, quantifying the physical progress of important items  32 of works year-wise.12 5.2 The procurement schedules for the various works included in the time slice were prepared in rather ambitious manner, expecting ideal conditions of competitive responsible bidding for the works in the projects. But in actual practice, there was considerable slippage in the schedules, especially in the case of LCB tenders for canals. This was primarily because of the fact that for contractors of this region, the special conditions and provisions incorporated in the LCBIICB documents appeared to be somewhat new and they took quite some time to adopt to the same. A case in point may be mentioned about the habit of the tenderers of always assigning some conditions in their bids, which created complications, delays and many times even rejection of the tenders. Nevertheless, one important land mark of the procurement worth mentioning was the finalization by Jan, 1983 of the ICB procurement case of Chandil dam costing about Rs 400 million, which took less than six month's time in completing the procurement case. In fact, there was very keen competition in the bidding and the work was allotted at a price slightly lesser ttan the sanctioned estimate of the work. The disposal of LCB procurement cases for the canal excavations and structures also got expedited after the initial gestation period. 5.3 After completion of LCB procurement cases for canal excavations, it was observed that the attendance of bidders in pre-bid conferences started thinning out and in many cases no bidders used to turn up. This was rather discouraging. In this context, it was felt that the prescribed tendering time for LCB tenders could have been suitably reduced to gain more time for execution of work. This pin-points review of the tendering periods, specially for LCB procurement cases in future. Further in case of tenders, review of the tender documents by the Bank may not be considered necessary, as it will entail to some saving of precious time for execution of works.13 Incidentally, it may also be pointed out that in later stages of procurement cases, the Bank took a stand that the procurement cases should be sent to Bank through postage and not by deputing concerned officials to the Bank. This also resulted in consuming much time through correspondences. The practice of visiting of officer in the Bank was quite useful fo: expeditious disposal of the cases, as the officers used to readily furnish the incidental clarifications arising during the course of scrutiny of the tender papers by the Bank.14 12 Fully agreed. The preparation of detailed schedules, in the framework of a management information system using the PERT or CPH methods, should be considered an obligatory part of project preparation, particularly, but not only for a project of such complexity. It is understood that GOB has hired a consultant firm to devise c omputerized scheduling and monitoring system for use during the remainder of project implementation. 13 In as far as agreed standard bidding documents are used, Bank review is usually prompt and not a significant factor of delay. 14 This rule was intended to reduce visitor traffic in the World Bank New Delhi Office, which became too heavy considering the large number of Bank projects and procurement actions to be handled by NDO's procurement staff.  33 6.0 Canalss It is felt that for projects in the future, while preparing the investigation reports of main canals, detailed design of major water conductor system should also be incorporated, based on detailed engineering and geolog'cal investigations for the sites for identifying feasible and economical options. Similarl>, for canals traversing difficult terrain involving deep cuttings and high embankments, soil classification surveys through sizeable number of drillings along the alignment for cutting reaches and extensive borrow area survey for filling zones should be got completed and incorporated in the Investigation Reports/Estimates of the canals to avoid major problems during the execution stage. 7.0 Quality Control: 7.1 The quality control Manual prepared for the project was appreciated by the Bank during the Appraisal stage. Extensive quality control tests in conformity with the provisions of the aforesaid Manual were carried out for concreting/masonry works/eartbwork in embankment and on quality of construction materials to be used for works in respect of Chandil dam, Galudih barrage, earthwork in canal construction and canal structures. Certain perceived deficiencies, as pointed out from time to time by the Bank Mission were promptly attended to and measures taken to rectify the deficiencies. In certain areas of construction of Chandil concrete dam, non-destructive tests were also carried out be employing teams of the Central soil and Material Research Station of CWC, New Delhi, who sent specialized equipment for the purpose. At the insistence of World Bank, a check list was also prepared in standardized proforma and kept at the major canal structure sites for inspection by the inspecting officers. 8.0 Land Acquisitions: 8.1 The pace of land acquisition was somewhat slow during the first two years of the time slice mainly because of inadequate strength of the Project Land Acquisition Wing. Subsequently, with the positioning of 4 to 6 Special Land Acquisition Officers in the Project, the progress of land acquisition was considerably accelerated. Nevertheless, it is felt that for such a project, Land Acquisition should be given top priority right from the inception of pre- construction activities in the Project. 9.0 Environmental Clearance and Transfer of Forest Lands 9.1 The compilation and collation of all the related data of the Project required for environmental clearance were completed expeditiously by the project and the same were sent to the Department of Environment, GOI in standard prescribed proforma. Thereafter, field inspections were done by the Environmental teams in which Project Officials and State Forest Department Officials participated. Eventually, the clearance of the Project was accorded from environmental angle in June, 1985 subject to certain safeguards. Previously, the Ministry of Forest had indicated that the proposal for transfer of forest land of 2875 hectares for the Project will be accepted after the clearance of the project from environmental angle is obtained. But even after environmental clearance of the project, the transfer of required forest land has  34 been effected till now by the Ministry of Forest and Environment, though the matter has been vigorously pursued by the project and GOB at all levels. After furnishing cost-benefit analyses and other additional information required from time to time, the Forest Department has now taken a stand that the lands proposed on the banks of canals/distributaries for compensatory forestation are not acceptable to them, as they will not have full ownership over the same. Search has now been completed to make available balance land needed for compensatory forestation and it is hoped that in the near future, the matter will be settled with Ministry of Forest. 9.2 Non-transfer of forest land for long created considerable bottlenecks in the progress of works and the forest departmental officials have created legal embarrassment in certain places, where initially some works were executed in forest land in good faith in anticipation of formal handing over of the forest land. It will be advisable that in future, no works in Projects should be started before completing the formal handing over of forest lands needed for the execution of the Project. 10.0 R & R Plan & Action Plan: 10.1 The R & R activities under the Project, supported by an overall plan, were for much of the project period, acceptable to the Bank. However, with regard to the Action Plan for Economic Rehabilitation of the oustees of Chandil reservoir Phase-I, the project could not make the desired stride. This is mainly because of the fact that the concept of economic rehabilitation is rather new to the State and the GOB has to deliberate in depth for involving policy decisions on the various norms that could be adopted for this Project. These norms would be sorted out shortly by GOB in consultation with the World Bank and it is resolved to assign the execution of the acceptable R & R Plan top priority during the Phase-II implementation of the Project. 10.2 It is also felt in this cuntext, that in order to handle the R & R Plan on such a gigantic scale as that of this project, a full fledged Rehabilitation and Land Acquisition Directorate with complimentary strength of officers and staff should be positioned with the project. Such a wing would be in a position to produce the desired thrust to ensure time bound implementation of the R & R Plan of the Project. 11.0 Creation of Irrigation Potential from the Proiect: 11.1 Originally, it was envisaged to create annual irrigation potential of 20,000 hectares by June, 1988, which would have progressively increased year to year. Because of slippage in the first two years of time slice, mainly due to non-availability of land and inadequate project organization, the various works of the project could not progress as per schedule. A revised implementation was prepared in December, 1985 which was agreed with the Bank as progress of works were accelerated. Because of certain inherent deficiencies in the execution of the R & R program for the first phase submergence of Chandil reservoir, the Chandil dam could not be raised up to its crest level till now. In addition, there are some major structures of Chandil LBC in its head reach, e.g. Railway crossing at Km. 7.23 and tunnels and cut and cover ducts at Km. 16.35, Km. 25.30, Km. 37.64 and Km. 39,86, which could not be completed as per plan. The result was that no irrigation potential could be created even by June, 1989.  35 However, the works program for the year 1989-90 has been suitably re-oriented and concerted efforts are being undertaken to complete the works lying in the critical path of implementation, so as to create an irrigation potential of about 10,000 hectares by June, 1990. Since the Chandil LBC will be completed up to Km. 88 by end of June, 1991. The creation of annual irrigation potential will substantially increase by June 1991. The total annual irrigation potential from the project would be about 25,000 hectares by June, 1991. This includes irrigation from Galudih RBC and Saraikella distributary Ex-Icha left main canal. 11.2 The other serious constraint in creation of irrigation potential was due to unavoidable curtailment of about Rs. 180 million in the budget allotment of the project during the last quarter of the financial year 1988-89. This seriously impeded the construction tempo of the project, not only during 1988- 89, but also had a lingering impact in the first quarter of the current financial year. The various executing agencies, because of non-payment against works executed by them had slowed down the pace of construction and there was quite some time lag in restoring to the desired level of mobilization on their part.15 12.0 Project Monitoring: 12.1 Management and Reporting on project implementation through the various stages have been considered to be quite up to the mark, as also observed by the World Bank. But the follow-up actions to make up the deficiencies should have been more expeditiously disposed by the field officers of the project. For Phase-II of the project, the tasks of management, reporting and follow-up actions are proposed to be vastly improved through services of computers. 13.0 ProJect Organization: 13.1 Selection of departmental personnel for the project Engineering Organization was also, of late, not left with the project Administration with the result that services of more capable and dedicated officers could not be utilized for the project. Besides, there have been frequent transfers of experienced officers of the project, who had developed in depth knowledge of the intricate construction problems of the major structures. Routine transfers of senior officers engaged on design and execution of major structures are not conducive for the smooth implementation of the project. 13.2 The jurisdiction of some of the Divisions, specially those engaged in canal works should have been more compact and work load tailored according to 15 The creation of 'irrigation potential" was not the objective, as mere creation of 'potential, (creation of storage and major conveyance facilities) does not generate benefits. The SAR called for construction of irrigation blocks, including minor canals and water courses down to the 5-8 ha level, and drainage works, in an area of 21,000 ha, "at various stages of completion". The design and construction of the micro distribution and drainage system itself is severely delayed; only about 200 ha were actually implemented on completion. The creation of further *potential", as indicated, will not by itself correct this imbalance in implementation.  36 standard norms. This measure would not only have resulted in speedy construction, but also more thorough supervision of works at all levels. 14.0 Disbursement of Credit Amount by the Banks 14.1 The total expenditure incurred on the Project up to April 30, 1989 i.e. the closing date of credit Agreement is Rs 4025.50 million. Out of this, the amount spent on non-reimbursable component comprising land acquisition and establishment were Rs. 675.50 million and Rs 297.50 million respectively. There was progressive appreciation in the value of SDR vis-a-vis Rupee value. The present going rate is about Rs 20.00 per SDR against about Rs 9.00 per SDR when the credit Agreement was executed in November 1982. The World Bank has disbursed the full credit amount of SDR 116.30 million out of reimbursement claims submitted against expenditure incurred up to April 1989. 15.0 DatalInformation for Preparation of PCR Part-IIl by Bank: 15.1 The financial and physical key indicators of the Project implementation, as also other relevant datalinformation required for preparation of various tables, in part III prepared by the Bank were furnished by the Project during the course of visit of Task team of the Bank for preparation of Project Completion Report.  37 ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BANK AND BORROWER DURING THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT. Right from the stage of appraisal of the project to the implementation of the time slice project, a very cordial relationship was maintained between the Bank, project officials and GOB. The various Bank Missions visiting the project had frank and in-depth discussions on the related issues, which were well taken by the project officials and full co-operation was given in meeting to Bank's viewpoints. The project officials, also on their part, received utmost cooperation from the Bank side while ventilating their viewpoints on various issues, arising from time to time. On the various technical issues, there was throughout the fullest coordination. There was, however, one single occasion arising when deficiencies were pointed out by the Bank in executing of the R & R program for Chandil dam, which virtually led to temporary suspension of the Credit disbursement. But his was taken in construction stride and in good faith by the GOB, appreciating fully the stand of the Bank taken in anguish over perceived lack of satisfactory input in the execution of the R & R plan. The embarrassing situation, however, was diffused by ensuring prompt action by the GOB to rectify the deficiencies. In essence, the project implementation has been marked by a most cordial relationship between the Bank and GOB.  38 PART III STATISTICAL INFORMAITION  INDIA SUBERNARERHA IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1289-IN) Table 1 Related Bank Loans and Credits Loan/Credit title Purpose Year of Status Comments 1. Credit 440-IN: To increase 1973 Project closed on 3131180 Typical investments Bihar Agricultural agricultural following 27 month extension were financially and Credit Project (US$ production through economically viable, 32.0 M) loans for interior but loan recovery (see PCRIPPAR irrigation performance of the no. 3704) investments Land Development Bank was poor. 2. Credit 761-INs To provide a sound 1977 Project closed on 3/21/85 The results of the Bihar Agricultural foundation for the following two year extension. project were Extension and long term development disappointing, with Research Project of extension services targets only (US$ 8.0 M) and adaptive research partially met. Some in Bihar State. US$ 3.8 M of the Credit were cancelled. oQ.  3. Credit 855-IN To strengthen zonal 1978 Project closed on 3131/86 after a The project was National agricultural research three year extension. mainly concerned with Agricultural in India through the establishing Research Project I state agricultural infrastructure, and (USS 27.0 M) universities, and to the output was assist ICAR in disappointing. Only training and US$ 19.5 M of the monitoring. credit was utilized. 4. Credit 1631 IN: To strengthen the 1986 The credit is expected to close in The project is making National state agricultural 12194 after a two year extension. slow progress with Agricultural universities to staffing, monitoring Research Project II conduct location and disbursement (US$ 72.0 M) specific agricultural problems. research, and the continued assistance to ICAR project management. 5. Credit 1754 IN: To introduce the T&V 1987 The project became effective in A Bihar sub-project National system and to 1188, and is expected to close in was appraised and Agricultural strengthen 3194. approved for Extension Project institutions with inclusion in April III (US4 85.0 M) provision of 1989. This will accommodation and continue to support equipment. the Subernarekha Irrigation Project. 0 I1 )  41 Table 2 SUBE RNAR1 EMA IRRIGATION PROJ=C {(Cit 1289-lN Prolect Timetable etem DatePlanned Date Revisdl / DateActual - IdentifIcation (EPS) - Preparation 9178-1l81 - Appmisa ssion 12181 - Credit Negodations 7/82 - BoardApprv 8117/82 - Credit Signing 1IJ/182 - Credit Effecdveness 1/10/83 - Credit Completion 3V31/86 3131/88 4/30/89 - Credit Closing 3/31/87 3131/88 4/30/89 Note A/ At mid-term review 1/86  42 T-BLs 3 ____}U___ IUIGATION PROJBCT (Credit 1289-IN) Schedule of Disbursement IDA FY and Cumulative Disbursements X Actual to Quarter Appraisal Revised Actual SAR/Revised Projection Projection Projection -------------------- SDR M----------------- tS) 1983 1st 2nd - _ _ 3rd 4.6 3.5 76 4th 8.2 3.5 42 1984 1st 11.9 5.2 42 2nd 16.5 5.2 39 3rd 21.1 6.0 29 4th 25.6 8.6 34 1985 1st 31.1 10.2 33 2nd 36.6 11.1 32 3rd 44.0 14.2 31 4th 51.3 15.7 33 1986 1st 60.4 20.1 33 2nd 69.6 23.4 34 3rd 78.8 30.1 38 4th 87.9 33.6 38 1987 1st 96.2 40.6 42 2nd 104.4 52.2 40.6 42 3rd 116.3 61.4 48.4 79 4th 73.3 57.1 78 1988 1st 83.3 69.9 84 2nd 95.2 75.5 79 3rd 1/ 82.4 80.4 98 4th 88.8 92.0 104 1989 1st 96.2 105.6 110 2nd 102.6 109.8 107 3rd 109.0 109.8 101 4th 116.3 1990 1st 2/ 116.3 116.3 100 Notes: 1/ From this date assumes Credit will be extended to March 31, 1989. 2/ Credit fully disbursed on August 18, 1989.  INDIA SUBERNAREKHA IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1289-IN) Project Implementation4' Appraisal Revised Final Actual Indicator Unit esdtmate estimate estimate achievement (1/86) (12188) (4/89) (Oty) (%)1/ IQty) (%)1l ~~(Qtyl (%)1 (Ot) )/ 1. CHANDIL COMPLEX a) Chandil Dam unit 1 50 1 62 1 65 1 64 - earthwork Th.cu.m 1090 1812 2012 1975 - masonry/concrete Th.cu.m 220 270 400 437 - gates No. 6 6 6 nil b) Left Main Canal km 78.54 30 88.40 45 88.40 68 88.40 58 - earthwork Th.cu.m 9400 11,700 17,500 14,575 - lining Th.sq.m. 600 295 315 nil - structures No. 60 20 80 35 - Kitanaladam unit 50 100 95 93 c) Distribution System - earthwork km 10 5 10 6 - lining km 10 5 5 nil - stuctures No. 30 14 14 nil d) MDS ha 14,8752V 68002/ 68002/ 2002/ , ..  Appraisal Revised Final Acal Indicator Unit estimate esdmate estimate achievement (1186) (12/88) (4/89). 2. 1(CHA OPE a)IchaDam unit 1 20 1 25 1 30 1 25 - earthwork Th.cu.m 1380 1440 2000 1640 - masonry/concrete Th.cu.rn 40 35 40 nil - gates No. nil nil nil nil b) Right Main Canal km 19.2 20 19.2 48 19.2 54 19.2 48 - earthwork Th.cu.m 2200 3725 4060 3631 - lining Th.sq.m. 200 240 110 nil structures No. 20 34 60 57 c)LeftMainCanal km 17 20 17 15 17 38 17 26 - eathwork Th.cu.m 1089 600 2250 1844 - lining Th.sq.m. 30 30 65 nil -structures No. 5 5 S nil d) Distribution System (RMC) -earthwork kn 25 55 110 15 -lning kn 25 35 10 nil -structures No. 125 75 10 nil e) Distribution System - eathwork kan 8 2 5 3 -lning Ian 8 nil nil nilQ 0 - stuctures No. 20 5 5 i f) MDS (LMC) ha 28442/ 16002/ 2282/ il  Appraisal Revised Final Actual Indicator unit estimate estimate estimate achievement (1/86) (12/88) (4/89) 3. GLUDIH COMPLEX a) Barrage unit 1 36 1 72 1 90 1 86 - earthwork Th.cu.m 310 410 770 825 - masonry/concrete Th.cu.m 50 116 159 159 - gates No. 2 5 8 nil b) Right Main Canal kn 60 22 60 50 60 70 60 62 - earthwork Th.cu.m 2300 5690 9100 8770 -lining Th.sq.m. 300 630 630 nil -stucs No. 10 20 30 32 c) Distribution Systm - earthwork km nil nil nil nil - lining Ian nil nil nil ni - stuctus No. nil nil nil nil d)MDS ha nil 6502/ 6502 nil 4.KHARKAICOME a) Right Main Canal kan 29 0 29 35 29 48 29 40 - earthwork Th.cu.m nil 750 1600 1004 - lining Th.sq.m. nil 30 30 nil - stnictures No. nil 5 10 nil b) Distribution System * I - earthwork kan 2 17 17 15 i - lining kn 0 12 12 nil o - structures No. 10 35 35 4 c) MDS ha 32812' 3502/ 3502/ nil  Appraisal Revised Final Acnual Indicator Unit esdmate estimate estimate achievement (1/86) (12/88) (4/89) 5. MMON WOKS a) Buildings No. 1600 2760 2500 2045 b) Roads - new consmuction km 24 24 24 21 - improve existng kn 76 76 50 10 roads c) Pilot pigadon Areas - Bihar area ha 250 250 250 250 - Orssaarea ha 250 250 250 180 6. COMM ONEI rE SUPPORTING ,SERVICES a) Agdculture ^-JrrigationResearch unit 1 100 1 100 1 50 1 15 Centre, Ghatsila -Extension Services 31 3/ 3/ 3/ strengthening 1. Perentages refer to a quantity estimte eg. Chandil left main canal-target at appraisal 23.56 kml target at revised esdmate 1/86 35.34 kn.  2. MDS (Micro Distribution System) target at appraisal was 21,000 ha at "partial development " (in various stages of construction). Revised entries on basis of completed installations ie. creation of potential subject to delivery of water. 3. It is stated in SAR # 6.12 that Agriculture Deparment (AD) is responsible for reorganising the extension services in the project area to the T&V system. In # 6.32 the vehicle to support this is stated to be the Bihar Extension Project Credit 761-IN. No funds have been allocated to the agricultural extension component under the project. 4. Time lice project target. 5. Abbreviations ni - not included. I lb tD er in{ U'  SUBERNAREKHA IRR16ATION PROJECT ICredit 1289-IN) Project Costs 4i Appraisal Estimate Revised Estimate 1/06 Final Estimate 4189 Atual 4189 Iteo Local FE Total Total TOTAL Local FE Total (uss hI Li (US$ 11 2' 1us$ f 31 1US$ hl 3. 1. Cbandil Comules - Chandil das 30.1 6.6 36.7 28.7 34.0 - - 33.2 - Chandil lett 20.4 5.3 25.7 32.7 39.7 - - 4J.S main canal - distribution ) 0.2 i.2 - - 0.3 system 1.9 0.3 2.1 - "DS I 7.3 7.6 - - 3.3 Sub-Total 52,3 12.2 64.5 68.6 52.5 - - 84.1 2. lcha CODmIex - Icha dam 11.2 3.7 14.8 11.2 16.4 - - 4.8 - right main ) 11.9 14.2 - - 8.9 canal 1 8.5 1.8 10.4 - left main I 1.8 4,0 - - 2.2 canal - distribution I 2.0 5.6 - - 3., D system Ileft I '-o and right I -+ commands) I I 0.3 0.0 0.3 - "DS lleft 1 2.4 4.3 - - 0.4 and right I commands Sub-Total 20.0 5.5 25.5 29.3 44.5 - - 19.5  Appraisal Estimate Revised Estimate 1186 Final Estimate 4/89 Actual 4/89 It". Lotal FE Total Total TOTAL Local FE Total (USS M) L/ IUSS N) O (mU ) 3f (US( N) n 3. MaludiM Complex - barrage 6.0 1.4 7.4 11.4 13.6 - - 6.7 - right main 11.2 2.8 13.9 21.2 26.7 - 19.3 canal - distribution ni ni ni nii syste. - WDS ni ni ni ni 2.0 - - 0.2 Sub-Total 17.2 4.2 21.4 33.3 42.3 - - 28.2 4. Kharkai Comolex - right gain ni ni ni 2.4 4.1 - - 2.9 UD canal - distribution 3.0 0.9 3.9 2.7 2.9 - - 1.8 system - "DS 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.3 - - nil Sub-Total 3.0 1.0 4.8 5.4 7.3 - - 4.7 5. Common Project Norks - buildings Ds ns ns 10.2 9.6 - - 11.7 - rural roads ns Os us / ni ni - - 1.0 bl Sub-Total 0 0 0 10.2 9.6 - - 12.7 0 6. Establishment 16.4 0 16.4 20.5 20.6 - - 18.h 7. Studies, 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 - - 0.1 Nonitoring  Appraisal Estimate Revised Estimate 1186 Final Estimate 4/89 Actual 41/9 Item Local FE Total Total TOTAL Local FE Total (US$ "I it (US$ N) / (US$ O) 1/ (US$ N) 3/ B. kricultural SUDDort - research 0.2 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 - - 0.1 - extension _I n ni i nI ni ni - - ni Sub-Total 0.2 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 - 0.1 9. Pilot Irrigation 0.4 0.1 0.S 0.3 0.3 - - 0.1 areas 10.VAL1I, training 1.4 0.3 1.7 1.0 1.0 - - 0.5 ll.Pollution control 0.1 0 0.1 0.4 0.3 - - 0.1 12.Equipnent ns ns ns 3.5 2.7 - - 3.5 13.Land acquisition ns ns ns I 148.9 135.3 - - 51.1 14.MM9 ni ni ni 1 1 15. niscellaneogs Ai ni ni 13.3 10.7 - - 32.3 Total Base Cost 12.0 23.4 135.4 234.9 257.4 - - 255.0 Physical 12.1 2.8 14.9 nii ni contingencies IV H Price 5.2 31.6 16.5 ni ni ni contingencies 0 L and escallation Total Project 1'0.5 31.4 181.9 235.1 257.4 - - 255.B Cost (1S1 N) Total ProJect 1353.7 203.6 1637.3 2845.0 4067.3 4041.2 Cost lb N)  Abbreviations as - not specified ni - not Included LI exchange rate U1S 1.00 Rs. 9.o ji exchange rate US$ 1.00 Rs. 12.1 I/ etchange rate U5 1.00 : as. 15.0 4I for tice slice project It Ro cost allocation was made in the SAN cost summary table on page 34. However, in Annex 8, StW table 1, a cost breakdown is given as follows: - civil works Rs. 41.5 R - engineering and administration Rs. 10.4f - equipmnt h. 12.0 N - buildings Rs. 4.7 H Total Rs. 6b.6n it Financied under Tribal Sub-plan 7j Financied under 100 Credit 761-lI *. . O tn , F0  52 Table 6 DIA IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1289-IN) Project Financing Source Planned in Credit Agreement Final at 8118/89 (US$ '000) 11 (SDRS '000) 21 1. IDA Expenditure Categories (1) Civil Works (a) Chandil dam and left canal 55,474 70,671 (b) Galudih barrage and canals 20,966 20,252 (c) Icha dam and canals 22,495 16,238 (d) Kharkai canals 4,040 3,452 ge) Minor distribution systems 4,040 2,350 (2) Equipment, material and 10,046 1,363 vehicles (3) Pilot areas, research, studies 984 424 monitoring and evaluation (4) Training, including infra- 1,966 1,550 structural facilities (5) Unallocated 6,989 Total 127,000 116,300 2. Cofinancing Institutions nil nil 3. Other External Sources nil nil 4. Domestic (GOBIGOO) 54,900 31 Total (US$ '000) 181,900 246,400 4/ Total (Rs M) 1,637 4041.2 Notes. 1/ US$ 1.00-Ru. 9.0; US$ 1.0 - SDR 0.916 2/ US$ 1.00-Rs.16.4; US$ 1.0 - SDR 0.78 at July 1, 1989. 31 SDR equivalent of GOBIGOO contribution not available. 4/ Not true indicator of apportioning of cost, as credit proceeds disbursed at differing values of SDR and USS to the rupee.  53 Table 7 INDIA SUBERIIAREIK IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1289-IN) Direct Benefits Appraisal 11 Closing date Estimate at Indicator estimate estimate full development 1. Directly benefitting 130,000 0 232,000 farm families (No) 2. Increased irrigated area 255,000 0 255,055 (ha) 3. Increased foodgrain 700 0 700 production ('OOOtlyear) 4. Increased M&I water 700 0 740 supply (MCM/year) 5. Moderation to flood 18.5 21.2 2/ 21.2 damage (Rs M/year) 6. Generated farm employment 138,000 0 190,000 (jobs) 7. Generated non-farm 24,800 27,715 3/ 39,300 employment (jobs) 8. Value added in agriculture 1,485 0 2,254 (Rs M/year) 9. Reduction in farm families 53 42 4/ 58 below poverty line (X) Notes: 1/ Pertains to entire scheme when complete in Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal 2! On completion of Chandil dam scheduled for 1990. 3/ Pertains to project construction employment only. 4/ Due to project construction works only.  54 Table a INDIA SUBERNAREKRA IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1289-IN) Economic Imiact Economic Rate of Return Assumption Appraisal Revised 1/ Current 2/ estimate estimate estimate (1186) (5189) _____________________ (2) --------------------- 1. Overall composite project 17.3 10.1 7.2 2. Chandil system 16.7 9.1 7.4 3. Icha system 18.1 10.3 7.1 4. Irrigation 31 18.0 - 8.3 5. Flood moderation 12.7 1.3 6. M&I water supply 4| 18.2 - 4.0 7. Bihar composite project 17.8 10.6 8.6 8. Orissa composite project 16.3 9.0 4.6 Notes: 1/ By FAOICP mid term review mission; includes Kharkai barrage and Murakati: distributary. 2/ World Bank estimates. All cost included. 3/ On the basis of per hectare crop budget furnished by project in combination with Agriculture Department and Extension Offices. 4/ Water rates needs not known.  Ikm ZZEKHRNORHMIRRIIATON POB (Crt 1289-IN SAsn Pwpose as ddRd By whom Refaence liiof Study ataa l cariedout inSAR status Impac of Study A.B 1. Pilot Toigaxo Toexambie,m d_ and evalte GOB Irigation and 0 4.02 Two existing tank in the As designed, and operaed the sludies #"emsofmicro. Are 4.13 command atea been study is misleading and it sbuld distuton layouts. developedfr MCS (Plna benrectifed. and Lgap). The layoutat Palna only has ben installed. This is incoiect, and opaton isbsch thatb only head-end famners receive wat. 2. Systm Todetmdnete tmlocan, Consultants Mer #4.18 Completed in 1985, but not Corectly done, study will enable im_WOVMO dsnand timing srconfor: CBS Ltd under accepabl to the Bank the planesfrsagel todecd stid i)5&iwbg dhSeclin of lIigation owing to i edsam w tedie are b) cawndlDepwimecnalt and analsssen viable. n fowbOtmn and c)O prOvidJ.ank has insised design most appropri that itberpaed and impovd Thisis6saidtobe in pogress but evidenceDL 3. Rural oads study To (ti) e a roads plan in the PWD, #4.21 The pl have been The roads Coo consrcion has Bihar proJecz area f _ GOB Annex 8 sat y comptd in benefluedfromthesty. Atphase during the prqject, and (n) to te 1987. pep o this will be of gat use. a plan for ultimate development in the project MCa 010 o1!  Purpose as defimed By whom Referene Tile of Study at appraisal cared out inSAR Status Impwt of Study 4. Rbflin To mess the 8!5quaYof R&R plans Consutants BIRD. # 620 Study still inprogress. Of signiicant etoBank evadaon study and measu res to suggest und ditecon of terunmeepos in and GOB in ng R&R cmTecdvemeanm . SPU, SIP. competely u progress andprle S. Systemoperation Todevel O&M pocednles Consutants Messrs # 627 Study in pogres Wi assist SIP to adquately plma and e and org for the projiect CES L unde instaL, eq, staff and opeate the study. coain Biaw. direcdon of SPU, poct SIP. 6. Socio-econom_ c To provide datare pr Consultants Mesas # 629 Study coipenly canied W lpin impact base-line study. projectcendidons zopenit CES Ltd under out and completed. sudisat iervs mthe tu subsequent Impact studies. direcidon of SPU, SIP. 7. Xbaik faclities To deminethe technica and Consultants Not TORs drafted by GOB not WM pm Bank appraisa em for alernaive study. economic advantae of a barage specified a ble to Bank. Has a possible second project to assew comparedwithwotherpossible inSAR been widawn from this thealivesto haiBauge. slutions to provide M&l supplies, prject, but will be essendial part of peparaion for a possie seoMd poject 8. M&l warsupply To detOnmine ll M&I demands for Consultants Not d as one of Will pennit GOB and Bank demandi beyond the medium ten fuure wthinBihar specified o for credit appraisal team toplan opmum use year 2000 study. to be spplied from SIP soes. in SAR tnsi, but subsey of project watr resources to satisfy widramL Wil be dem of all semrs ats essemial pert of p of possble soond projet. for a possle seond project. 9. Hydro-mtr Toexaminehydrmetstadon Consultants wi be Not TOR's agreed with Bank. Wi m tprojectp rne_to logia dies. rsthe car s of retainedunder sped Conltantsbeing hnited to acoay monitor srface noff, Icha and Chadil dat, and On the direct of SPU, in S propose. and to opeate Ianand SsXay and to dahve SIP. dans curcty i times of bigh _ d flood fosdng ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~floods for dam safel and down procedwes for dam safety. ste flood pupses. 0Je  Purpose as defmied By whom Referenoce Ttlde of Study atapais carried out in SAR Status Impact of Study 10. Coputer To advise GOB on the selection of the Mss. ACME Not Studvin ft ings wstudy. motpupaa dwrm under specified seM:dnreceived. diwcdon of Irrigadon in SAR. l1. Flood stludies for To check the PMP and PMF in order Dr.T.Prasad, Pam Not Studies saif rily Bodarnsmodified tonime ca and Chandil to update flood etimates Eg CoUege, and specified con2plet their safety after reew by Damn dams. Dr.OMDhar, IITM, in SAR. Safety Panel. Pane. B. 12. Pilot irigadon To examn em and evaluate OO Irigation and # 4.02 Pilot project sudis were The experience gained will as sMdies diffmssyms of micro Agtme # 4.13 conrewed, but were found 000 to design and oeate SIP in distribution layots . to be Inpp_pria. Bank Orissa watmanageane consultant has reviewed and assted 000 to revise layouts and operton. Now preedig satistItorily. 13. P_Vmuio of an Tolpennk we candered layout of ConsuMats Mes #4.17 Study in progress. Has G have presented SIP Orbsa to inii and SIPOrissan WAPCOSunde been viewed by Bank, and the Bank for financing. The study db mastier dheco of ID, GOO. stoming now being wi assist the Bank at appraisal. phmielrSinh corrected. 00 is in advaced stage ofplning SIP Orissa and has commened consructon. 14.Sysem operation To devop o&M p pcedurs, ndres Consultants #6.27 TOR's have been drafted by Will assist OO tO adqUatlyplYDanl, ndm - - ard 8snihnmfbr tbe poject CGO, and have been instal, equip, stand opeae the studv. comain Orssa. bmittedto Bank for projct. rview. However, until finat conf Onf SIP, could not bef It Shxlld tllls be traserred to the prpsdSIP, Orissa 10$ 0 1h PF ~~~~~~~w1  58 Table 10 Pa5e 1 of 4 SUBERNAREKHA IRIGATION PROJCT (CREDff 1289INI Status of Covenants Covenant reference Subject Status Section 2.01 (a) Bihar and Orissa shall cary out a) Bihar has in geneal adhered certain defined works and studies in weil to these conditions, with the their respective teitmries with notable excepion of development of appropniate administrative, financial, agricultural support services which engineering and agricultural practices, have been neglected. and both states shal provide propty funads and servies thereore. b) Orissa was in default of pacular covenants pertining to aser planning and water management pilot project for much of le project life. Only in mid 1988 did it bring both into compliance Section 2.04(d)(e) Bihar shall submit a project Fully couplied with. completion report aided by Orissa, to the Bank within six months of project closure. Section 2.06 Bihar shall, by December 31. 1982 Fully complied with. establish, staff and maintain a Subernarekha Research Cell, a SubMrnea Monitoring Unit including a Planning ad Monitoring Cell and a Minor Distribution System Planning and Design Cell  59 ~~~~~~Table 10 Page 2 of 4 Covenant reference Subject Status Section 2.07 Bihar and Orissa shall, by (i) a) Plans vee submitted and 31. 1982 submit to the agreed Fully complied with. Bank detailed plans to establish tring faciltes (WALMI), and (ii) b) While Orissa has dynamically by 30S 1993 should have devoped training inrasrctne by estabished such facildes the development of a WALML Bihar has been very dilauty and at the close of the project the WALMI is still operaung in tempomry a..ommodaton. Construction is in progress. Section 2.08 (i) Bihar and Orissa shal1 indepenently a) TOR's for Bihar study were by I)ember 31.1982 submit draft not finalised unt niid 1988, and then terms of ence to the Bank for only after the Bank had provied a rigadon operation and mduenance consultant to assist Previous siudies. dialogue between Bank and GOB was confused. b) The Orissa study is premature, and the covenant should be deleted. Section 2.08 (ii) Bihar and Orissa shall independently a) Bihar has awarded the study by December 31. 1983. canry out the to consultants in September 1988. said studies. b) The Orissa study is preme, and the covenant should be deleted. Section 2.09 Bihar shall, by December 31. 1983 The System Improvement Study was comple a Sytem completed by October 1986, but the Sy, and by Deeember31. 1984 a Bank was not able to accept its Socio-Econormc Baseline Survey for findings relating to Kharkai Barrage, the project area in Bihar. and requested that it be repeated showing moe data and analysis. Thus this section of the covenant is in partial complianlce. The Baseline Survey has been comwpleted and is acceptatable. Section 2.10 BTh shae (i) by Deembe 31. 1983 Me covenant has been complied establish and thereaft maintain a with. pollution control and moniting progamme for the projet area in Bihar, and (ii) introduce mandatr requrements for the State Water Pollutin Board to supply industries from project facilities.  Table I0 60 Page3 of 4 Covenant reference Subject Status Section 2.11 (a) Bihar sball (i) by D rbe 31- 1982 Fully cmpled. The Panel has been constitute and maintain a conrctly and continues to be active, and has staffed Dam Safety Panel, and (ii) resolved many problems posed to it cause the Panel to cafry out periodic reviews of design and construction of the project dams. Section 2.11 (b) Biwar shall propose apprprate arangements fora areview by I)A of safety arrangements for each dam not late than one year before completion. Section 2.12 Orisa shaU, by Decernber31. 198, prpae an irigation and drainage master plan for that part of the project in Orissa. Section 3.01 Bihar shall (i) by Tber 31. 19 The plans were finally prepared after prpa a road development plan for delays. The impkleentation of the the project period, and (ii) execute mad programme during the project that plan, and (iii) by Decernber 31, period has staed, albeit very 128 prepare a comhensive road delayed, and progress is satsfctory. development plan for the endre project aea in Bihar. Section 3.02 Bihar shall (i) by December 31. 1983 Part (i) is essentially in compliance. commeneu an evaluation of Pan (u) is now in partial compliance rehabilitaion activities, and (u) not only following B submission to less than two years before mDAofaplan i late Marh 1989. submergnce of land in Bibar Thne Creit was suspended in October formulate a detailed implementation 1988 due tO non-compliance with this plan. covenant, but was reinsated in April 1989 following submission of the plan. Section 3.04 Bihar shall, by Asl 1. 1984 In non-compliance. GOB has implement a Training and Visit rstenty faied to take any action to agrultural exmenion system in the mve inadequate state of the pject area in Bihar. extension services in the proj area. In April 1989 it was proposed that this should fail under NAEP II  61 ~~~~~~Table 7 0 61 Page 46of 4 Covenant reference Subject Status Section 3.05 Orissa shal not less than two yeas (1) Complied with. befoe land is submerged by project (ii) Not yet due. dams in Orissa (i) consdtme a rduhbiltatio committ, and (ii) formulate a sadsfactoy R&R planned schedule. Section 4.01 Bihar and Orissa shall (i) mntain Part (i) in co e,plia. sep ate fln&Acial records for the Part (ii) late submision in several pr~ect, and (ii) shall funish to IDA years. projectaccounts duly certified by an dependent audior not mnx-c than nine months after the end of the subject period. Section 4.02 Blhar and Orissa shall (i) have In compliance. financial accounts and staements audited by independent auditors; (ii) fumnisn these audit repors to IDA, and (iii) fuish all other information peahining to accounts et to IIDA following its reques  SUBERNARER8A IRRGATION pQE World Bank Staff Inputs 3/ huts (manl mekls) Sge Of Prjct Cycle HQ-I/ BL HLS Farignp Local FAWC Totals Staff Cotants Ca 1. Uptoappra 103.9 2. Appisal to Board apprval 116.8 3. Board approval to effecdvene 9.4 4. Supvsion and PCR preparaion 44.9 124.8 - 71.8 16.2 257.7 Totals 487.8 Notes: J/ includes expiate stff based in Washdngton and NDO 21 HLLS -higerlevdelocalstaff y daa bfm effctvens not avaab  INDIA SUBERNAREMsA UtRIGArrO-N PROJECr (CR13Dff 1289-IN Mfissions State of Project Month/ Number of Days in Specialisations Performance Types of Comments41 Cycle Year persons field represented 1I rating2/ problems3 1. Beore Aprs 9118 Preparation 11178 3 EN Peparatdon 5179 2 EN/IEC Prpartion 10-11179 3 EN/ECIAG FAO/CP Prep-aron 2/80 6 EN/EC/AGIEYD BanlcFAO/CP Pre tionto 2/80 2 EN/EC Pparation 9/81 2 6 EN Preparadon 2. i l11-1281 9 14 EN/EC/AG/PROC Appraisal 2/82 3 5 EN/BNV Polluton review 3/82 1 3 EN Post appisal 3/82 1 3 EC Post appraisal 4/82 3 5 ENIHYD Dam safety/design 4/82 3 2 EN/EC Post appisal 3. Board Aonxwal m Effeedvenm 10/82 2 5 EN 12 M Fssupension 2 * 11/82 2 3 PROCtPOI Pc nnance