Tunisia - Small-scale Industry Development Project

Docuenat of The World Bank FOR OmCIAL USE ONLY Rprx No. 8817 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TUNISIA SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES I (LOAN 1969-TUN) JUNE 28, 1990 Industry and Energy Division Country Department II Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region This document has a resticd distibuo and Wmay be used by reipibs ody inhe performane of thidr ofikud dutis Its cotens may not otherwise be disdosed widtout World Bank autborization|  ACRONYMS AND ABBREYIATIONS API Investment Promotion Agency POPRODI Government fund providing reimbursable capital contributions and subsidized loans to entrepreneurs SAR Staff Appraisal RepoLt SAL Structural Adjustment Loan SSI Small-Scale Industry TA Technical Assistance UTICA Association of Tunisian Industrialists CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS US$1 0.40 Dinars (at time of appraisal, March 1981)  W BOR OFFICILU USE ONLY 1''. WORLD SANK Wa, iston. 0 C 20433 U.S A. Oplat,w d 0t"v4i June 28, 1990 MEMORANDUM to THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Tunibia Small Scale Industries I (Loan 1969-TUN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled *Project Completion Report on Tunisia Small Scale Industries I (Loan 1969-TUN)" prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region. No audit of this project has been made by the'Gperations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment Thw document has a restncted distribution and may be used by recilpents only in the performance of their official duties. its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authonzation  FOR OWCAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TUNISIA SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES I (LOAN 1969-TUN) TABLE OF CONTENTS Pag,e No. Preface ......... .............. ............ ........ i Evaluation Summary ........................................... :il PART I: REPORT OF THE BANK I. Project Identity ...................................... 1 I,. Background . 1 III. Project Objectives .......................*.............. 2 IV. Project Design and Organization ........................ 3 V. Project Implementation .............................. 4 VT. Project Results ............. ................*......... 6 VII. Project Sustainability .......................... ..... . . 7 VIII. Bank and Borrower Performance .......................... 8 IX. Project Documentation and Data ......................... 8 PART IIIs STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits ...................... 9 2. Project Timetable ..... ............... .............. 10 3. Loan Disbursements and Commitments ..................... 11 4. Project Costs and Financing ............................. 12 S. Project Results .................. ........ .......... 13 6. Use of Bank Resources ........e....................... 14 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfomancer of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclksed without World Bank authofrastion.  - i - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TUNISIA SMALL-SCALE INDUVtRIES I (LOAN 1969-TUN) PREFACE The Small-Scale Industries I Project in Tunisia, Loan 1969-TUN, was approved by the Bank in April 1981, for the amount of US$30 million. The loan closed in December 1988, aZter two extensions of the original closing date (December 1986). The Bank disbursed a total of US$27.4 million and cancelled the remaining US$2.6 million. This PCR was prepared by the Bank's Industry and Energy Division, Country Department II, Europe, Middle East and North Africa Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and iII). On April 11, 1990, the Bank sent the Borrower Parts I and III with the request to prepare Part II by May 16, 1990, but none was received. The preparation of Parts I and III is based on the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the Pre3ident's Report, the Loan, Guarantee and Project Agreements, Bank supervision reports and other documents available in Bank files related to the Project.  - iii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TUNISIA SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES I (LOAN 1969-TUN) EVALUATION SUMMARY Policy Context 1. At the time of the SSI I Project's appraisal, the Tunisian Govern- ment was emphasizing the development of manufacturing through increased reliance on the private sector, for investments to expand employment and exports. The Government recognized, in particular, the importance of devel- oping small-scale industries (SSIs), which accounted for 652 of Tunisia's manufacturing firms, employed 192 of the labor force and accounted for 132 of the manufacturing sector's total valued along with 11 of its total investments. SSIs faced two sets of constraints to their development: (a) internal problems such as limited access to financing, deficiencies in their production, accounting and marketing management, poor product design and quality, etc. and (b) inadequate Government attention to investment incen- tives and institutional needs of the subsector (paras. 4 and 5). Recognizing these constraints, the Government launched a program of support for SSIs consisting of improved fAnancing, technical assistance, a system of incen- tives and administrative support (para. 9). Proiect Obiectives 2. he main objectives of the SSI I Project were to support the Government's efforts in establishing a comprehensive assistance program to help SSIs expand employment, generate industrial managers and technicians, reduce regional imbalances, and increase the responsiveness of institutional and administrative structures to SSI needs. The Bank made a US$30 million Project loan to the Government and of this total, US$29.35 million was designated for small enterpreneurs through a line of credit to participating banks, with the balance of US$0.65 million intended for strengthening the subproject appraisal capacity of the API (Investment Promotion Agency), operating under the aegis of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Proiect Implementation and Results 3. The Project experienced significant delays in loan commitments and disbursements (para. 15). There were several reasons for these delays. First of all, participating banks were reluctant to become involved in the Project because of the inherent riskiness of SSI investment, cheaper alternative financing sources, and the cumbersome nature of administrative procedures (paras. 15, 16, 18 axL4 20). Secondly, there was a 14-month delay between loan signing and effectiveness and the unanticipated inflation that occurred significantly lowered the maximum investment size and investment  - iv - cost per job. Thus, a number of potential borrower2, eligible at the time of appraisal, subsequently became ineligible. Hovs.ver, the Bank amended eligibility criteria a number of times and the pace of commitments and disbursements eventually improved (para. 17). The overall economic climate also hindered the Project -- during the latter part of its implementation, the Project faced economic recession, investment demand saturation in certain subsectors, a foreign exchange shortage and devaluation of the dinar. 4. Actual disbursements were US$27.4 million. This amount partially financed some 170 subprojects costing about US$46.35 million and assisted in the creation of an estimated 4,100 new jobs (para. 21). Project super- vision has indicated positive results, including better inter-industry integration, increased emphasis on labor-intensive investments and more willingness of participating banks to finance SSIs. However, despite the TA provided to API under the Project, there were serious shortcomings in API's ability to provide subproject supervision and follow-up, the ability of staff to offer valuable consulting services, etc. (para. 22). Project Sustainabilaty 5. There are good prospects for the sustainability of the SSI I Project, as discussed in paras. 27-29. The interactive relationship between the Bank and the Borrower was successful; most difficulties were diagnosed early and the Project objectives were achieved (see paras. 30-31). The SSI I Project was followed by an SSI II Project (Loan 2911-TUN) in the amount of US$28 million of which US$0.5 million was allocated for technical assistance to API as a follow-up component to the TA component of the first loan. The success of the follow-up SSI II loan should be enhanced by improvements in Tunisia's financial sector (para. 29) and transformation of API into an agency primarily responsible for providing technical assistance to investors. The SSI II loan also included a further TA component for UTICA, an organization which has a close relationship with small-scale entrepreneurs and the private sector. Lessons Learned 6. There were two main lessons learned in the Project. First, there is a need, during the appraisal process, to give more attention to the various factors affecting the participating banks' motivation for engaging in SSI financing. Some of these factors were addressed during the Project, i.e. changing subproject eligibility criterie in order to accelerate the pace of commitments and disbursements and simplifying administrative procedures. Project implementation also could be improved by indexing the subproject eligibility criteria to inflation. With such improvements, and the financial reforms established subsequent to SSI, the attractiveness of SSI investment has been enhanced. The second lesson is the importance of providing appro- priate institutional support in the design and follow-up of subprojects. This lesson was incorporated into the SSI II Project which included a follow- up TA component to make API an agency primarily responsible for giving TA to investors and TA to strengthen UTICA's capability to provide additional assistance to entrepreneurs.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TUNISIA SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES I (LOAN 1969-TUN) PART T. REPORT OF THE BANK I. Proiect Identity Project Name: Small Scale Industries I Loan Numbert 1969-TUN RVP Unit: EMENA Country: Tunisia Sector: Industry II. Background 1. The Tunisian Government's emphasis on the manufacturing sector dates back to the early 1970s. The basic policy thrust was an increased reliance on (i) the private sector; (ii) labor intensive investments; and (iii) export oriented investments. In response to incentives geared toward such objec-tives the industrial sector grew at a real rate of IOX during the seventies (compared with 6.4Z in the sixties). Further indicators of manu- facturir.g growth included a 2OX growth in manufacturing gross fixed capital formation during 1980, a rapidly growing private sector which accounted for about 602 of total manufacturing investment in the second half of the seven- ties, a 45Z increase of jobs in the manufacturing sector in the seventies, and a share of manufacturing exports in total non-oil exports at 432. 2. As of the early 1980s, the manuf'^cturing sector operated under a complex system of administrative controls impacting on investment, wage and price setting, and encompassing tariff protection and import quotas as well as weak incentive schemes with respect to new employment creation inter- industrial linkages, and decentralization of industrial activities. Conse- quently, the manufacturing sector's employment generation and its export capabilities were lower than anticipated by the Fifth Five Year Plan (1977- 1981). 3. The importance of Small-Scale Industries (SSIs) in employment crea- tion. development of the private sector, and industrial decentralization and integration was strongly recognized by the Tunisian Government. As of 1978, 850 SSIs represented 652 of Tunisia's manufacturing firme. They employed 192 of the labor force, accounted for 132 of its value added and 112 of its total investments. Over the 1973-1978 period, the performance of the SSIs was below the manufacturing sector's average, in that their value added was stagnant, their labor force growing at 7Z, and investment growing at about 92 in real terms. The investment cost per job in an SSI, however, was about 402 lower than the corresponding cost in the manufacturing sector as a whole.  - 2 - 4. The SSIs faced two sets of constraints hampering their development. First, internal problems, of which the major ones were their limited access to financing, deficiencies in their production, accounting and marketing management poor product design and quality, and frequent shortages of raw materials. S. The second set of constraints faced by the SSIs stemmed from the Government policies towards them. In24estment incentives were generally unfavorable to them (e.g.. as these favored large investments, employment creation, value of exports, etc.). Moreover, there was no unified agency responsible for SSIs; the administrative maze was a hurdle for their development. Also, there was little institutional financing for SSIs. 6. The relatively lagging performance of SSIs led the Government to devise new policies to boost the development of this important part of the manufacturing sector. The program to support this development was detailed in Tunisia's Sixth Five Year Plan (1981-1986), and is described in para. 9. The project under review derived its conceptual foundation from this support program. III. Project Obiectives and Design 7. The First Small-Scale Industries project (the Project) was appraised in April 1980. It aimed at supporting the Government's efforts to establish a comprehensive assistance program for SSIs to help them reach their potential to generate employment, develop intersectoral linkages, generate industrial managers and technicians, and reduce regional imbalances. institutional and administrative structures and procedures were to be adapted to become more responsive to the needs of SSIs, and the framework for finan- cial and technical assistance was to be strengthened. S. The Project itself was to support the Government's program to promote the development of SSIs; through technical and financial assistance. The Loan (US$30 million), was made to the Government (which assumed the foreign exchange risk)l and was to be administered by the Central Bank. Of the total, US$29.35 million was to be made available to small entrepreneurs through a line of credit to participating banks, while the balance (US$0.65 million) was intended to strengthen the appraisal capacity of the Investment Promotion Agency (API), then operating under the aegis of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 1 As proposed by the Bank's 1988 SAL, the Tunisian Government is introducing modifIcations to its foreign erchange risk coverage scheme. Under the new system, option and 7orward funds for the purchase of foreign exchange are to be intrcduced. Premiums under the new system reflect the difference between the domestic and international cost of funds. The Project under review, having been made before the introduction of the new scheme, does not qualify for this coverage.  IV. Prot*ect Design and Organization 9. In response to the development constraints faced by SSIs (par&. 4-5), the Government launched in the early 1980s a program of support for SSIs vhich was comprised of four elements: (1) Improved Financkig: This was to be achieved through a fund financing SSIs through personal equity loans andlor eoft loans directed to SSI projects. Furthermore, all commerciai banks in Tunisia were required to allocate L81 of t4eir deposits to medium term financing of projects; however, and due to the perceived riskiness of SSI projects, most of these loans were made to larger investments. (ii) Technical Assistance: This assistance was to be provided by the three public investment promotion agencies, and by Tunisia's association of industrialists (UTICA), with the objective of helping SSIs identify and appraise projects, carry out the investment, and in their day-to-day opera- tions (technology, accounting, production, and marketing management). This assistance was to be carried through customized assistance andlor through general training seminars; (iii) Systems of Incentivess These incent4ves were to take into consideration the entrepreneur's 8 xperience, and sectoral and regional priorities; and (iv) Administrative Support: A department, created in 1980 in the Ministry of Economy was made responsible f-r coordi- nating the various agencies dealing with SS' 10. To better assess the effectiveness of the program's elements and define the exogenous factors, the Bank initiated in 1979 a Pilot loan of US$5 million. The Project under review benefited from this experience, particu- larly in providing the necessary conditions to increase participation by financial intermediated in the Project. This was done by increasing the commissions to banks, increasing the Government's share of risk takinR, and allowing participating banks to increase their rediscount quotas with the Central Bank. 11. Beeides increasing the availability of funds to SSIs and the anticipated creation of an estimated 5200 new jobs, the benefits expected from the Project included the strengthening of the agencies dealing with SSIs, demonstrating to participating commercial banks the attractiveness of lending to SSIs, and improving their appraisal and follow-up procedures. 12. As noted in the appraisal report, the Tunisian institutions were to take an active part in the Project's implementation. The Project gave  - 4 - specific support to institutional strengthening. The breakdown of responsibility among Tunisian institutions was to be the followings (M) The Central Bank: The loan was to be administered by the Central Bank, who woald submit periodically to the Bank applications for withdrawal and pass the Bank funds to the participating banks according to disbursements procedures agreed upon with the Bank; (ii) The Participating Banks: All Tunisian commercial banks had access to the Loan. Participating banks were responsible for subproject appraisals, disbursement and collection. They were required to finance out of their own resources at least 20Z of the subproject cost and bear part of the credit risk; and (iii) Investment Promotion Agency (API): Its role was to assist the participating banks in appraising the sub- projects as to their economic, financial and technical viability, and establishing the eligibility of sub- projects for Pank financing. Approvals by API and the Bank were required before committing funds for a sub- project. 13. The breakdown of responsibilities and procedures, relatively complex and cumbersome, was intended to strengthen the capabilities of the relevant institutions dealing the SSIs which often had had little experience with investment financing. As a result, however, several banks (which initially at least could not deal with the procedures) were not keen to participate in th' Project. As explained below (para. 16) this was one of the reasons for the slow pace of Loan commitment and disbursement. 14. Over its implementation period, the Project had to undergo a series of amendments to its original design. These changes were: (a) increasing the maximum cost per job created, for a subproject to be eligible; (b) increasing the maximum investment cost per subproject; (c) creating a revolving fund with the Central Bank to deal with delays between subproject approval and disbursement. Such amendments were less a deficiency in the Project design than a reflection of the Project's experimental nature. The Project design could be faulted, however, for not indexing the subproject eligibility criteria for inflation, especially given the acknowledged risk of project implementation delay. V. Project Implementation 15. The Project suffered from significant and perennial delays in commitments and disbursements. The Commitment Date was postponed three times, from the appraisal estimate of June 30, 1984 to June 30, 1988. As a result, the Closing Date was postponed from December 31, 1986 to December 31, 1988.  16. There are a number of reasons for the slow commitments and dis- bursements. First, commercial banks were reluctant, to participate in the loan since they considered SSI investment risky and alternative and cheaper sources of financing for such investments were available. Furthermore, the banks considered the administrative, appraisal, etc. procedures cumbersome and lifficult to follow, and a few failed to understand the potential bene- fits (to them and the subborrowers) of the Project. The result was that nine banks, fewer than expected, participated; of these, the most active were the small and medium sized banks. 17. A second reason for che slow pace of project implementation was the set of eligibility criteria adopted. The 14-month delay between loan signature and effectivrness, and the unanticipated inflation rates, made the maximum invertment cost per job and the maximum investment size too low. A number of potential subborrowers, eligible at the time of the appraisal, sub- sequently became ineligible as result. Another reason was the underestima- tion of the average foreign exchange cost of a subproject to be financed. In response to these probleme, the Bank amended these criteria a number of times, with the result of commitments and disbursements picking up eventually. 1L. The third reason was the lengthiness of administrative procedures. It took about five to seven weeks to get a subproject, submitted by a participating bank, approved by API and the Wcrld Bank. It took another 90 days from the authorih.tion of withdrawal by the Bank to the participating banks receiving the funds. Since most banks were reluctant to pre-finance the subloans, implementation of the subprojects was delayed. As a solution, a revolving fund was established in the Central Bank for the purpose of pre- financing, and the Central Bank was invited to apply more frequently for withdrawal authorizations. 19. Finally, the overall economic climate in the country had a detri- mental effect on the Project. Ir the latter part of its implementation, a recession led to further delays in commitments and disbursements. TIe economic slowdown, coupled with investment saturation of certain SSI subsectors led to a slowdown in investment demand. Furthermore, in 1985, Tunisia faced a severe foreign exchange shortage that resulted in import controls being instituted in 1986 (they were removed a year later). In parallel, the Tunisian Dinar was devalued, with the consequence of Bank disbursements decreasing against expenditures in local currencies. 20. In retrospect, the Bank appraisal report, though mentioning it as a risk, failed to fully realize the potential reluctance of commercial banks to participate in the Project. The cumbersomeness of the Project procedures and the extensive documentation required from all the parties involved had much to do with such reluctance. The supervision missions took account of these issues and simpler procedures were adopted in the second SSI loan. Indexation of the eligibility criteria on inflation would have had a positive effect on the implementation of the project. Finally, the economic slowdown was not anticipated.  -6- VI. Project Results 21. As of August 1988, commitments totalled US$29.3 million (or 96Z of the original amount envisaged by the SAR). This smount partially financed 170 subprojects (302 more than estimated by the SAR) with an estimated total cost of US$46.35 million. These subprojects created an estimated 4100 new jobs (21X below the SAR estimate) and are distributed as follows: 24.1K in the electro-mechanic industries, 19.3? in textile and leather, 15.2S in construction material, 13.3Z in food processing, 13.52 in wood, paper and plastic, and 82 in miscellaneous sectors. Of all the subprojects, 42K had a total investment cost below DT 250,000, while the rest ranged between DT 25k0,000 and DT 500,000. Most subprojects were creations while only 5? were extensions of existing ventures. 22. It is too early to judge the financial and economic results of these subprojects since most have only recently started commercial operation. The assessment of Bank missions, however, based on the records and field visits to subborrowers, has been positive in this regard. This reflects the overall quality of subproject preparation. General observations also indi- cate a better inter-industry integration, an increased emphasis on labor intensive investments, and a positive impact on the banks willingness to finance SSIs. Serious shortcomings however, remain as regard API'a ability to provide subproject supervision and follow-up, and the ability of its staff to offer valuable consulting services to SSIs regarding operational, financial and marketing management. 23. As indicated in para. 21, the Project's employment generation has been somewhat below expectations. This is explained by the SAR underestima- tion of the ave'age investment cost per new job. Furthermore, Tunisia witnessed several substantial wage increases that discouraged labor intensive projects. Finally, the Bank raised the maximum overall cost and cost per job for eligible subprojects, and increased its share of financing from 50? to 56?, the estimated average foreign exchange cost component of subprojects. An ex-post calculation indicated that these nominal changes reflected real- term increased, with the possible adverse consequence of encouraging rela- tively capital intensive subprojects. These differences with expectations remain overall small and as a result, thi employment objective of the project has been satisfactory. 24. The dist-ribution of the subprojects by subsector and investment cost size was also satisfactory. As exDected, most of the subprojects were in subsectors which traditionall- comprise small enterprises and are relatively labor-intensive. Furthermore, nearly half of the subprojects had investments below DT 250,000 reflecting the success of the Government's efforts to improve the access of SSIs to institutional finance (para. 5)2. 2 75Z of the subprojects were partially financed by FOPRODI, a Government fund that provides incentives in the form of reimbursable capital contributions and subsidized loans to entrepreneurs starting a new industrial activity and lacking personal assets.  The SAR estimated that 501 of the sDbprojects would fall within that investment-size category, and this was effectively confirmed. 25. The objective of the Project's technical assistance component was the institutional strengthening of the capabilities of API. The Bank financed two foreign experts (industrial and fina"'ial) to help API in its roles (see para. 9). Both API and the Bank j ,id their contributions valuable as reflected by the former's increased involvement in subprojects appraisal and technological advice. As the majority of subprojects neared the stage of operatf of: maturity, API should have become more involved in operational and m-;geral assistance. For API to be effective in this regard, more train i.i its staff would have been required. The result of API assistance to r_.,a .cial banks for preparing feasibility studies was not as satisfactory. 'ihough API sponsored several training seminars for the banks, it is recognized that much more should have been done in this regard. 26. In spite of the benefits derived from the TA component, API con- tinued to be too much of an administrative/technocratic body to effectively serve SSIs. API's staff had little experience relevant to SSI operations; they were regarded by the SSI beneficiaries as too close to the administra- tion. As a result, and while monitoring API's restructuring efforts, the decision was made that part of the technical assistance and advice to SSIs in the Bank's subsequent operation, would be better provided through an entity closer to small scale entrepreneurs and to the private sector: UTICA, the national entrepreneurs' association. VII. Proiect Sustainability 27. The Project was followed by a second SSI loan (Loan 2911-TUN, that became effective in February 1989), in the amount of US$28 million. Half a million dollars of this loan was earmarked for technical assistance to API as a follow up to the TA component of the first loan. Within the SSI II loan, a technical assistance program for UTICA was also designed, and external financing was arranged. 28. The Project is clearly seen as sustainable. SSIs continue to be regarded by the Tunisians and the Bank as an essential element in the growth and equi'librium of the manufacturing sector, and the Goverranent is still strongly committed to their development. Their cost as regards job creation is still less than that associated with larger investments, and SSIs play a pivotal role in creating inter-industrial integration and assisting the economic and regional decentralization. 29. Tunisia has been undergoing a fundamental restructuring of its financial sector. Interest rates have been partially liberalized, prior investment approvals are no longer required, measures have been enacted to improve banking competition, and the Money Market has been vitaltzed. Moreover, API is being transformed into an agency responsible primarily for industrial promotion and for providing technical assistance to investors. The success of these efforts would have a direct bearing on SSI financing. The changes underway (supported by several Bank adjustment loans) are all  giving positive support to the development of the SSI sector. Given the Government's strong commitment to these programs, there is little risk that the second-SSI project would face the difficulties of the first. VIII. Bank and Borrower Performauce 30. For this Project, an interactive relationship was established between the Bank and the Borrower form Project identification onwards. The Project consisted in implementing the Government's strategic plan regarding SSIs. This plan itself was a result of the dialogue between the Project implementation were diagnosed early through meetings between the various parties participating in the Project and the Bank missions. Solutions adopted often reflected discussions between the Bank missions and the local authorities. As a result, the ProJect's objectives were achieved. 31. The problems encountered by the Project were mainly exogenous, reflecting economic circumstances beyond the Bank's or the relevant government authorities' control. The other problems (cumbersome procedures and documentation requirements, long delays between commitments and disbursements, poor dissemination of information, weak incentives to banks participation, etc.) were promptly dealt with, inter alia through amendments to the loan agreement. The significant number of these amendments reflects the fact the the Project was still experimental and, as such, was very useful for arriving at arrangements operationally adapted for promoting and assist- ing the development of SSIs. The second SSI loan took into account the shortcomings identified under the first loan. Overall, this project has been successful. IX. Project Documentation and Data 32. The SAR served as useful framework of reference to both the Bank and the Borrower during implementation. Even though more amendments were introduced to the eligibility criteria, the Project objectives and procedures never parted from the guidelines set in the SAR. 33. The data base for this project is not fully satisfactory. The huge and complex documentation requirements created a challenge to the unit responsible for compiling and recording the data; this resulted in signifi- cant gaps in the documentation. The Project also experienced a number of changes in task managers, with minor adverse effects on the uniformity of the data base.  -9- PART III. STATISTICAL INFOMIATION Table ls Related Bank Loans and/or Credits Year of Loan/Credit Title Purpose Approval Status