Morocco - Fourth Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFnCIAL USE ONLY Report NO 886 3 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-MOR) JUNE 29, 1990 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performane of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. GLOSSARY DECS - School Equipment and Construction Division (in Ministry of National Education) ZIA - See ENSEM EMI - Mohammedia School of Engineering ENSEM - National Higher School of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering (formerly National Institute of Applied Engineering - ZIA) ENSET - Technical Teacher Training Institute EST - (Post-Secondary) Institute of Technology LT - Technical High School MEN - Ministry of National Education OFPPT - Vocational Training and Staff Training Office (in Ministry of Public Works, Vocational Training and Staff Training) PCR - Project Completion Report PIU - Project Implementation Unit R&D - Research and Development SAP - Special Action Program SAR - Staff Appraisal Report VAT - Value-added Tax Evolution of the Exchange Rates Dirham - US Dollar At Appraisal 09-1978 US$ I - DR4.10 Period Average 1979 US$ 1 - DM3.79 1980 US$ 1 - DH3.94 1981 US$ 1 - DH5.12 1982 US$ 1 - DM5.98 1983 US$ 1 - DM7.11 1984 US$ 1 - DH8.79 1985 US$ 1 - DR9.96 1986 US$ 1 - DH9.08 1987 US$ I = D98.32 1988 US$ 1 - DH8.16 THE WOR BANK FOR OFFICIa US ONLY Washington. D.C. 20433 US.A. Oe of Obeder.CaM Jua" 29, 1990 =M MTD UE MXECMTMVE RKq=R AND THE PEMIDEN SUBJECTs Project Performance Audit Reports Morocco - Fourth Education Project QLoan 16(11=|R) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Reports Morocco - Fourth Education- Project (Loan 1681-MOR)" prepared by the Operationa Evaluation Department. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their oficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authouization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-MOR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Pale No. Preface ...................s. ......................... i Basic Data ................. ............ ............ iii Evaluation Sumary ...........0....................... vii I. PROJECT BACKGROUND ..................................... 1 Project Formulation ................................... 1 Project Objectives and Content ......................... 2 II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ............................... 4 Design .........................4 Management ................*.***.*.........*............ 5 Bank Supervision ....................................... 5 Cost and Financing ......... ... ....... 6 III. RESULTS so ... s.. ... o ... ** .......... ........... 6 Lyc6es Techniques ...o.o.............................. 6 Higher Education Institutions .......................... 7 IV. FINDINGS .................... .................... 8 Project Content and Scope ..... ....0.04................. 8 Sustainability and Replicability *............ *........ 9 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. - I.- PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-OR) PREFACR This is a Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) on Morocco Fourth Education Project, involving an IBID loan (Loan 1681-MOR) in the amount of US$113 million to the Kingdom of Morocco, with the objective of developing technical education. The loan was approved on April 10, 1979, and became effective on October 16, 1979. US$25 million of the loan was cancelled on November 19, 1985, at the request of the Borrower, and another US$0.5 million on April 20, 1989. The Closing Date of December 31, 1984 was extended four times and ultimately to June 30, 1988. Final disbursement was made in April 1989. The PPAR is based on the Project Completion Report (PCR)II the Staff Appraisal and the President's Reports, the loan documents, the transcripts of the Executive Directors' meetings at which the project was considered, on a study of project files, and on discussions with Bank staff. An OED mission visited Morocco in November 1989, and discussed the effectiveness of the Bank's assistance with the Ministry of Education, including several project institutions. Their kind cooperation and valuable assistance in the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged. The PCR provides a satisfactory account and assessment of the project experience, and discusses the performances of the Bank and the project executing agencies. The PPAR elaborates on particular aspects such as details of implementation history and project results. Following standard ORD procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to the Borrower and its agencies for comment in April 1990. No comments have been received. 1/ The PCR jointly prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office and the Borrower was issued by OED as Report Mo. 8442 dated March 16, 1990. - iii - PROJECT ERQRMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-MOR) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Item Estimate Actual Total Project Cost (US$ million) 216.6 132.5 Underrun (2) - 39 Loan Amount (US$ million) 113.0 113.0 Disbursed 113.0 87.5 Cancelled 25.5 Repaid (as of 05/31/90) 36.2 Outstanding (as of 05/31/90) 51.3 Date Physical Components Completed 06/84 06/89 No. of Months since Loan Signature 62 122 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 100 95 Proportion of Time Overrun (2) 97 Institutional Performance Uneven CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENT (in US$ million) W 12Z 1980 1981 1982 198 1984 1985 1986 1987 J j 1989 Appraisal Estimate 0.2 4.9 29.2 84.4 110.0 113.0 - - - - - Actual 0.0 0.1 0.2 5.3 17.5 22.9 37.0 53.0 67.6 75.6 87.5 (b) Actual as I of Estimate - 02 01 61 16t 201 - - - - - Actual as I of revised loan amount - - - * - - 422 601 772 861 992 (a) Loan amount reduced to $88 million in November 1984. (b) $0.5 million were cancelled at the closing of the books in April 1989. - iv * STAFF IVPW (Staff weeke) Stage of To end Proiect Cycle IFY79(a) MYO rY81 M2 EIn FU4 PY85 I gg 111 (g8 I |gEM To Appraisal Departure 35.5 35.5 Appraisal through Board Approval 35.3 35.3 Board "roal Effectiveness 16.4 16.4 Supervision 2.3 J18 11.6 8-2 16.0 Ud I.2 .4 _ .5 8.6 29.0 TOTAL 89.3 11.8 11.6 8.2 16.0 11.7 11.9 3.4 6.0 4.5 8.6 183.2 (a) Data ptior to TY79 is no longer available by year. OTHBR PROJECT DATA Original item Plan Actal First Mention in Files (Identification) - 03177 Preparation - 06177 Appraisal Mission - 02/78 Negotiations - 09/78 Board Approval - 04110/79 Loan Agreement Date - 04/25/79 Effectiveness Date - 10/16/79 Closing Date 12/31/84 Al 06/30/88 Loan Disbursement Completion 06/30/85 04/30/89 Borrower Kingdom of Morocco Executing Agency Ministry of Education (MEN) Al The loan Closing Date was extended four times and an additional three monthe were added to the standard six month disbursement grace period, resulting in an overall project implementation overrun of 65%. k/ Closing of accounts. ALLOCATIO OF LOAN PROCEEDS (US$ million) A. Project Cooa Appraisal Estimate Actual Foreign Foreign Local Exchange Total Local Exchange Total Coats Go Costs Coats Costs Costs Construction 78.5 47.3 125.8 40.0 33.0 73.0 Equipment & Furniture 8.3 54.3 62.6 8.2 43.0 51.2 Professional Fees 9.6 1.7 11.3 5.0 1.1 6.1 Experts' Sve & Fellowships 0.0 1.8 1.8 .0 2.2 2.2 Unallocated 72 7*. 15.1 . - -*- Total 103.6 113.0 216.6 53.2 . 132.5 B. Proiect Financina Oritinal Actual Z of % of % of Z of Category USS 1BRD TOTAL s IBR TOTAL Construction 47.3 42% 39.1 45% Equip. & Furn. 54.3 48% 45.0 51% Professional Fees 1.7 2% 1.0 1% Experts' eve & Fellowships 1.8 2% 2.4 3% Unallocated .9 7% -. -a Total IBID 113.0 100% 52% RA 100% 6 2. Government 103.6 482 45.0 342 TOTAL (1+2) 216.6 100% 132.5 1002 Evolution of the Exchanae Rates Dirham - US Dollar At Appraisal 09-1978 US$ 1 - DM4.10 Period Average 1979 US$ 1 * DM3.79 1980 US$ 1 - DM3.94 1981 US$ 1 - DM5.12 1982 US$ 1 - DM5.98 1983 US$ 1 - DH7.11 1984 US$ 1 - DM8.79 1985 US$ 1 - DM9.96 1986 US$ 1 - DM9.08 1987 US$ 1 - DH8.32 1988 US$ 1 - DH8.16 - vi - MISSION DATA Stages of Month/ No of Days in Specialization Performance Prol. Cycle Month Persons field represented rating Identification 3/77 1 13 GE to Appraisal 5/77 2 7 EC, GE Appraisal through 2/78 4 25 EC, TE(2),AC Board Presentation 10/78 1 15 AC 1/79 1 9 AC Board Approval through Effectiveness 6/79 1 11 AC 2, M, T Supervision 10/79 1 10 AC 2, M, T 5/80 3 25 TE, AC, GE 2, M, T 2/81 2 18 AC, GE 2, M, T 6/81 4 18 AC, GE, FAC 2, M, T 12/81 3 16 AC, GE, EC 2, M 3/82 2 5 CH 6/83 4 15 TE(2),EC,GE 2, M 8/83 1 10 AC 2, M 4/84 3 15 EC, AC, PLN 2, M 8/84 2 5 EC, AC 2, M 11/84 3 10 EC, TE, PLN 2, M 5/85 3 10 EC, TE, PLN 2, M 1/86 2 14 TE(2) 2 1/87 1 6 TE 11/87 1 17 PLN 11/88 2 6 PLN,EC LEGEND: CH - Chief or Deputy Chief of Division, EC - Economist, GE - General Educator, TE - Technical Educator, AC - Architect, PLN - Planner. T - technical problems; M - management problems, 2 - moderate problems. NOTE: Time in field may include work on other projects. - vii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-MOR) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. A Loan of US$113 million (up to that point the largest in the education sector) in support of this project was approved in April 1979 and became effective in October of that year. The appraisal estimate of total project cost was about US$217 million the foreign exchange component of which corresponded to the Loan amount. Because of rate-of-exchange variations and some reductions in project scope (in the area of equipment purchases), actual cost came to about US$133 million. After cancellations, total disbursements came to US$87.5 million, 46 -ercent of project cost (compared to an appraisal estimate of 52 percent). Project Objectives and Content 2. The project aimed at expanding and improving technical education at secondary and higher levels to help meet the country's skilled manpower requirements. To this effect the construction and equipping of eleven secondary technical schools (lydes techniques) with slightly over 10,000 places (plus 6,000 boarding places) and of the establishment or expansion of five institutions for higher technical education (including one tech- nical teacher training college) with a total of over 4,200 new places (plus more than 2,000 boarding places) was foreseen. Implementation EIerience 3. Project implementation faced serious difficulties, stemming in part from the understaffed and inexperienced PIU for which a project of this size was an excessive load (the more so since the recruitment of key staff envisaged at appraisal did not materialize). Additional difficulties arose from complex administrative procedures, budgetary constraints and difficulties with contractors. When PIU performance did improve, the accumulated delays could not be made good. The Loan Closing Date even- tually needed four extensions totalling 3.5 years; two project institutions were completed only in 1989. The cancellation of part of the Loan funds (US$25 million) was made in response to favorable rate-of-exchange move- ments, but the trend later reversed itself, and it meant that there were not any longer sufficient Loan funds available to buy the full complement of workshop equipment. - viii - Results 4. With the exception of the before-mentioned equipment shortfall and the delays incurred, all project institutions were established. Rowever, space allocation turned out to have exceeded the standards agreed at appraisal. This problem is the more marked as the project institutions so far have only realized a portion of their anticipated enrollments (under 60 percent in the case of the lyc6es techniques, between 30 and 70 percent for the higher level institutions). In the latter case, a government decision to move the first two years of all five-year engineering courses into preparatory centers explains most of the discrepancy. It does not seem likely that the project institutions wili attain in the near future the enrollment levels forecast at appraisal. 5. While the higher education institutions play their envisaged role, the contributions of the lyc6es techniques differ markedly from appraisal expectations. Instead of 80 to 85 percent of the graduates seeking employ- ment, only a minority seems to do so, mcst graduates aiming at a place in higher education. The absence of a tracer system (which was to be set up under the Loan Agreement) makes it difficult to plan for the future devel- opment of these schools in the light of the needs of the economy. Sustainability 6. In a narrow technical sense, the project schools are sustainables given sufficient budget allocations for their operations, they will doubt- lessly continue to function. This, however, does not imply an economical use of resources, in view of the present excessive use of educational space and, for the lyc6es techniques, a satisfactory achievement of their olKjec- tive of external productivity as expressed at appraisal. The direct contributions of the lyc6es techniques are much less than expected, since graduates usually choose to pursue post-secondary studies. This all would suggest to judge the question of replicability with reservation. Findings 7. The main findings from this project experience are: (i) a project's scope and complexity should be kept proportional to the resources and capabilities of the PIU; (ii) the definition of the specific objectives of project institu- tions during preparation merits the greatest care; and (iii) the need for tracer studies (or suitable substitute informa- tion) should be given close attention. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-MOR) I. PROJECT BACKGROUND Proiect Formulation 1.01 After a period of rfther slow economic growth in the 1960s, a changed policy orientation emphasizing faster economic development and greater equity led to an acceleration of Morocco's GDP growth in the 1970's (although at the end of the decade, falling export prices, especially for phosphates, the major commodity, slowed down this development). 1.02 This period of more rapid economic growth had also brought about a sharper awareness of the country's narrow base of skills, particularly in technical fieldz. The Bank had assisted the Government's efforts to increase the supply of trained manpower through three previous projects in the educat:Lon sector, but these efforts had been on a modest scale: Education I (supported by Credit 79-MOR in the amount of US$11 million and approved in October 1965), was still focussing largely on general education: of the 21 original project schools, 15 were to offer, in their upper cycle, arts and sciences only, another two in addition to the general education program, technical subjects and one, commercial training; three agricultural schools were later deleted from the project. 1.03 The Second Project (Credit 266-MOR of 1971 over US$8.5 million) already had a stronger orientation towards specialized education: apart from an investment in teacher training and the establishing of science facilities in six secondary general schools (i.e., general education compo- nents), the project assisted ten existing secondary technical schools, thirteen existing secondary commercial schools, one post-secondary institu- tion each in veterinary medicine and forestry and two vocational training centers. During implementation the two vocational training centers and the faculty of veterinary medicine were deleted, the savings being used to increase dormitory capacities (a change from the original project design which had also occurred in the First Project, see OED Reports No. 1637, para. 19 and No. 4545, para. 4). 1.04 The Third Education Project (Loan 1220T-MOR over US$25 million of 1976) contained a broad array of disparate investments but again general education elements were prominent: 47 primary schools (with almost 300 staff houses) and five secondary schools, plus one secondary teacher train- ing center were complemented by specialized education facilities in tourism (five institutions), agriculture (one) and health (five). Subsequent curtailments were again at the expense of the specialized education com- ponents: three tourism and four health training facilities were deleted. For the first time, there was a major undisbursed balance (almost 30 per- cent of the Loan amount) which was cancelled. - 2- Project Objectives and Content 1.05 The Third Project also financed engineering designs for five secondary technical schools, a regional technical teachers' training center, and a school of engineering. These components were to form the core of the proposed Fourth Education Project, aimed at developing tech- nii.al education at secondary and higher levels. 1.06 The Bank's reconnaissance mission (June 1977) outlined a project composed of: (i) six secondary technical schools (lyc6es techniques), of which one was to serve as an application school for the second componentl (ii) a technical teacher training college (ENSET); (iii) a college for applied engineering (ENSEM); (iv) two post-secondary institutes of technology (EST); (v) expansion/renovation of the Mohammedia Engineering College (EMI); and (vi) a national center for scientific and technical research coordination and planning. 1.07 Additional training capacities to be created were 5,400 (6 x 900) for the lyc6es (plus 1,500 boarding places and staff housing); 400 places for the teacher training institute (plus staff housing); about 800 places for the applied engineering college; 1,600 places for the two technical colleges; and an additional 600 places for the Mohammedia College. Esti- mated total cost was US$70 million, with a foreign exchange component on the order of US$29 million. 1.08 A project request presented by the Government and discussed with a Government delegation in November 1977 raised a number of concerns, namely (i) the apparent orientation of the technical high schools towards academic subjects and subsequent entry into higher education; (ii) the very generous space and equipment allocations for the various educational institutions, exceeding Bank norms by 50 to 100 percent; (iii) the lack of an adequate economic justification for the proposed components; and (iv) the teacher supply question. 1.09 These concerns were addressed but not necessarily in a convincing way: the Government stated that (i) the technical high school graduates would be ready for immediate employment but that those who wished to con- tinue their studies could do so; (ii) the space and equipment standards were slightly reduced but the Government maintained the position that those norms were part of the standardization of educational facilities incor- porated in the 1978-1982 Five-Year Plan, and they could not be ignored - 3 - without good reason. The Bank in its first reaction to the Government request, suggested instead of a reduction of the investment program, an increase in planned capacities: from 560 to 1,152 for the two higher institutes of technology, from 420 to 720 for the teacher training insti- tute, and 1,100 to 2,000 places for the expansion of the Mohammedia Engineering College. These changes were made before any estimates of future manpower requirements were available, but (iii) it was hoped that the appraisal mission would be presented with the necessary data; and (iv) the Government was encouraged, and agreed to, employ foreign teachers provided by bilateral and multilateral assistance on a priority basis for this project. 1.10 The project grew in size during the subsequent stages: The issues paper (March 16, 1978) made already reference to eleven lyc6es techniques with almost 10,000 places, nearly twice the capacity increase originally envisaged; a teacher training college much increased in size (660 vs. 420 places), the two technical colleges with a reduced capacity (from 1,600 to about 1,150 places); a National Institute of Applied Engineering with an anticipated enrollment of 768 (about the same as before); and an expansion of the Mohammedia College by 2,200 places (almost four times the earlier plan of 600 additional places). Total project cost now stood at about US$170 million (with a foreign exchange component of about US$90 million, compared to a loan amount then set at US$65 million). The appraisal mission had excluded the boarding facilities (coated at US$43.5 million) in order to retain all proposed education facilities. 1.11 It is somewhat surprising that during the preparation of this project its very size (the eventual Loan amount was to be almost triple the Bank's actual lending in the previous three projects) did not assume great importance in the discussions. The technical staff did express concern about the availability of sufficient Education Projects Division staff to provide adequate supervision (memo dated December 1, 1977), but the imple- mentation capabilities of the PIU did not appear to have been a major concern (although understaffing and lack of experience had caused problems in the carrying out of the First Project--OED Report No. 1637, pars. 13, and PIU performance in the initial phase of the Second Project had been such that at one point IDA had considered disbursement suspension--0ED Report No. 4545, para. 8).1/ Eventually, the Loan Agreement stipulated the employment on or before July 15, 1979 of an architect and an electrical/ mechanical engineer "at least until completion of the Project" (Section 3.01(b) of the Loan Agreement), a staffing requirement which was not met. 1/ At one point the Government had requested Unesco's assistance in the preparation work for some project components; the Bank advised against it on the grounds that the responsible authorities were "fully capable of preparing the required materials and should do so in the furtherance of their own development experience" (memo June 13, 1977). 1.12 While the desire for a large project by the Borrower was understandable, the readiness of the Bank to undertake what was a quantum jump in education lending to Morocco was less so. An explanation may be gleaned from an expressed "concern over the attrition of the FY78 program" by the Programs Division (memo March 24, 1977). The same memo continued that a recent mission had just reported that "preparation of the Moroccan side is going ahead swiftly and efficiently" an assertion which was not born out by the Back-to-Office Report of that mission (April 7, 1977). 1.13 The project that was finally presented to the Board and approved on April 10, 1979, also included an allocation of US$25 million for a total of over 6,000 boarding places,j/ which had been deleted by the appraisal mission due to insufficiency of loan funds then available. This item had been reinstated during Loan Committee review, on the grounds of contribut- ing to greater educational equity (see also PCR, para. 7). This raised total estimated project cost to US$216.6 million, and the Loan amount to US$113 million, at that point the largest Bank operation in the education sector by far.31 II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Desigzn 2.01 The size of the project and its wide geographic dispersion militated against a smooth implementation, the more so since during the critical initial stages the PIU was understaffed and in particular lacked the expertise to supervise the necessary preparatory work by engineers and architects. The PIU had to delegate this work to "consulting firms, which sometimes abused the confidence that MENQ/ had placed in them," as the Government states in its Part II of the PCR (p. 18, IV A). In addition, these firms suffered from the same lack of relevant technical expertise the PIU was facing (PCR, ibidem). / In later years, the Bank became more cautious in its financing of boarding facilities, partly out of a concern for resource constraints, partly because of the heavy burden of boarding facilities on recurrent budgets. /] It seems that at least during the early phases of Bank lending to the education sector, the EMENA Region had a preference for large projects: prior to 1980, four of the largest five education projects (and seven of the largest ten) originated in this Region. 4/ MEN - Ministry of National Education. -5- Management 2.02 The report by a post-negotiations mission in January 1979 (dated February 1, 1979) already hinted at incipient problems in the PIU: while four young graduates (two architects and two engineers) had been recruited, the expatriate architect who was to provide the overall guidance, had resigned. The subsequent supervision missions commented repeatedly on the poor morale of the PIU which was seen as an obstacle to effective project management. The explanation for this was seen partly in the fact that the PIU staff received the same pay for more work than their peers in the civil service and partly in the (initial) refusal of the Ministry of Finance to provide them with the necessary vehicles (Supervision Report, July 2, 1980, Annex 3, p. 5). The delayed preparation of construction documents (which had already led to a postponement of Board presentation by five months) continued, exacerbated by belated payment of consultant fees for work already performed and a resulting reluctance to continue work, and by lack of the necessary follow-up by the PIU. At the end of 1980, 14 months after effectiveness, disbursements stood only at US$70,000 (instead of che appraisal estimate of US$4.9 million). 2.03 By June of 1981, the PIU performance was found to have improved. By that time, however, delays averaged already ten months, and implementa- tion was further hampered by lengthy administrative procedures in the Ministry of Finance and temporary lack of counterpart funds. Until July 1983, civil works on 14 out of 16 project institutions made good progress, but delays on the Mohammedia College of Engineering and the Kenitra Technical Lyc6e were such that an extension of the Closing Date (originally December 31, 1984) became inevitable. The first (12-month) extension was agreed in November 1984, combined with a cancellation of US$25 million of Loan funds, the second, also by 12 months, one year later. This was followed by a third extension (to December 31, 1987) and finally a fourth, to June 30, 1988. Actual closing of accounts took place on April 20, 1989, 50 months after the original Closing Date, when a remaining balance of US$0.5 million was canceled. Bank Supervision 2.04 Failing to have convinced the Government that a project of this scope was well beyond the implementation capabilities of the PIU existing at the time, the Bank's supervision missions could do little to help improve project implementation, the less since additional problems such as budgetary and administrative complications, compounded the difficulties (para. 2.03). It also seems that the large number of Bank staff and consultants being involved in project supervision at one time or another, may have militated against a more effective dialogue with the Government. Some of the comments made in Part II (e.g., the perception of the MEN that the lyces techniques have a capacity of 660 students each whereas the SAR states a total figure of 10,160 or about 924 per school, or the comments on disbursements (Part II, IA la and Part II, III, 2.2) suggest that communi- cations may have been insufficient at times. -6- Cost and Financin 2.05 Total project cost came to approximately US$133 million (PCR, Part III), of which about US$88 million was financed from Loan 1657. In retro- spect, the cancellation of US$25 million of Loan funds (para. 2.03) proved premature: the favorable US dollar/Dirham exchange rate development which had occasioned the cancellation, reversed itself during the additional years of project implementation, and the equipment complement could not be procured in its entirety. III. RESULT Lyc6es Techniques 3.01 The largest component of the project (counting for nearly 60 percent of total costs), these eleven project schools still have to find their proper role (see also PCR, para. 14). The Bank's assumption and the Government's assertion at appraisal that due to scholarship and study place limitations in higher education, only 10-15 percent of the graduates would continue their studies (SAR, para. 4.03) have failed to materialize. Although the tracer system called for at appraisal has not been estab- lished, the available piecemeal evidence from the schools visited suggests rather the contrary: the great majority of graduates wish to proceed to university, and while they are quite successful in their high school exams, their academic record at the next higher level is very much wanting, both absolutely and in comparison with their peers from general schools (see also PCR, para. 14). The MEN officials consulted felt that the tightness of the labor market forced the lyce technique graduates to continue their education. While the audit staff has only minimal knowledge of Morocco and her education system, his observations in other countries suggest a causal link in rather the opposite directions that only those graduates who fail to find a place in higher education enter the labor market reluctantly. One has to make one exception to this statement though: graduates from the commercial sections are more ready to take on jobs upon graduation, which may suggest a different attitude of graduates and perhaps also a greater practical relevance of their education compared to their peers in the technical sections. 3.02 Enrollments in 1988 stood at about 5,700, or 55 percent of envisaged capacities. This is an unacceptably low level of capacity utilization--it means in effect that the de facto teaching space per student is about 18.5 sq m vs. a planned figure of 10.0 sq m (SAR, Annex 1, Table 3.1). The reasons for this underenrollment are seen partly in the incomplete equipping of the mechanical engineering workshops, and until recently also in a shortage of commercial subject teachers. - 7 - 3.03 The schools contacted during the field visits made a good overall impression, with the previously mentioned proviso of excessive space allocation. One school visited has to be excepted from this statement: as a result of faulty soil analysis and inadequate foundations, the buildings are showing cracks of alarming proportions, exposing part of the expensive equipment to rain leaking through the roof in one workshop and forcing the partial evacuation of another, for fear of the students' safety. Similar problems were mentioned for a second school not visited. This is a belated--and heavy--price for the lack of suitably qualified personnel during the critical early stages of project implementation. Hiher Education Institutions 3.04 Generally speaking, the five institutions assisted under the project share with the lyc6es techniques the problems of underenrollment and overly generous space allocation. However, the reasons are different and the problems seem more amenable to a solution. Present utilization rates vary from about 30 to almost 70 percent (Technical Teacher Training College). The present low enrollment figure (271) of the ENSEM (the former National Institute of Applied Engineering) is explained by the policy deci- sion to move the two first (preparatory) years of all five-year engineering courses in the country to five regional centers. The eventual enrollment of this school is now seen on the order of 550 students (or slightly more than 70 percent of the appraisal figure of 768, which in turn would result in a teaching space allocation of 21 sq m per student). 3.05 The two higher institutes of technology (EST) enroll at present about 400 students (vs. 1,152 appraised). Like the ENSEM staff, their professors feel that the appraisal targets have been too high, and envisage an enrollment of 432 per school (75 percent of appraisal figures) as achievable. Their courses are in great demand, particularly by lyc6e technique graduates for whom these schools provide the obvious educational continuation. The EST staff reported that 80 percent of their July 1989 graduates had already found employment four months later, and that virtu- ally all in their previous cohort had a job. These schools are definitely terminal in character, as only the best three students (one from each section) are allowed to enter engineering schools. 3.06 The Mohammedia Engineering College has at present an enrollment of about 540; it graduated 110 engineers in 1989 and plans are to increase the annual output to about 300 by 1995 (75 percent of appraisal estimates). However, this target is still being blocked by insufficient equipment and by lack of dormitory facilities (the modeling of the EMI after the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris with its students in reserve officer status calls for continuous presence on c.opus). Here again, the drastic reduction of appraisal targets for enrollments means a teaching space allocation that seems inordinately high. - 8 - 3.07 However, as the PCR points out (para. 23), the EMI has broadened its activities to encompass a much greater extent of research and develop- ment work. This, and the fact that the first two years of the five-year program take place outside the institution (see para. 3.04 above), makes comparison with appraisal targets less relevant than in the case of the other project schools. IV. FINDINGS Project Content and Scope 4.01 While the project presented a coherent investment package comprising several levels of technical education, it suffered from some conceptual flaws. 4.02 First was the absence of reliable information on the economy's demand for the various levels and types of technical manpower. This gap was expected to be bridged through the establishment of a tracer system for the graduates of the project schools, a development which never materi- alized. Today the Government's and the Bank's information in this area is not noticeably better than a decade ago. 4.03 Second, and related to the first, is a lack of clarity about the role of the technical lyc6es, suspended uneasily between the two opposing poles of preparation for employment and for university, respectively. This question still awaits clarification. 4.04 Third, it seems that the Borrower and the Bank never reached a genui.e agreement on appropriate space standards. The proposed figures in the original project application by the Government were well in excess of Bank averages implemented worldwide; the final agreement on reduced space allocations/increased enrollments, however, was ignored during implementa- tion, with the result that the eventual space utilization will be even inferior to that foreseen in the original Government proposal. In some of the higher education institutions, the decision to place the first two years of the programs outside the project institutions, made the earlier space planning exercise completely irrelevant. 4.05 Fourth, the very scope of the project made a satisfactory implementation all but impossible, given the staff limitations of the PIU and the difficulties of recruiting key staff. In its comments, the Government feels that a more cautious phasing of the project investment may have been preferable but that the new schools have benefitted secondary education. This, however, represents the limited view of a beneficiary agency; for the country as a whole, the implementation delays and attendant cost increases, as well as damaged facilities and equipment resulting from inadequate project implementation, represent real economic losses, and the continuing underutilization of expensive facilities is a wasteful use of resources. -9- Snetainabli"M ad Ralicability 4.06 In a narrow technical sense, all project institutions are operating, albeit on a lesser scale than envisaged at appraisal and some- times with apparently different objectives (e.g., the technical lycged whose labor market orientation remains limited). The Government's view that "the experience (viz., of the technical lyces) should be replicated and expanded" (Part II, p. 14, para. IA is) however, is not supported by the operational experience available so far. Neither the proper role of these schools (and hence the composition of their curricula) nor their size (or, viewed from a different angle, their space standards) appear free from controversy, which would make a repetition of this investment an uncertain proposition. 4.07 In the case of the higher education institutions assisted under the project, the question is not so much orientation of educational pro- grams (although Institutional planning could benefit from a data base on the employment of graduates), but rather on economy of resource use, having in mind that educational institutions are not simply a once-and-for-all investment but are a continuous (and in the case of technical higher insti- tutions, heavy) user of budget resources which makes careful calibration Imperative.