Benin - Highway and Feeder Roads Projects

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 9000 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1142-BEN) AND THIRD FEEDER ROADS PROJECT (CREDITS 1485-BEN AND SF23-BEN) SEPTEMBER 13, 1990 and Central Africa Department ture Operations Division a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of s. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  AB8REVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAA -- Coinrs autonom d axortlior-mnt CNAERDR -- Cooit national d rAmnagement et d entroti-n des routes do dessert, rurale/Rural Roads Development and Maint.nance Coordinating Comittee 0NSR -- Centra national de s6curit6 routi4re/National Center for Road Safoty DRO -- Directorate of Roads and Bridge FRP -- Feoder Roads Project 0oo -- Governmnt of Benin MET -- Ministire de l'Equipament et deo Transports/Minister of Equipment and Transport MOF -- Uinistre du Finance/Ministry of Finance OPEC -- Organization of Potroleum Exporting Countries SEMTP -- Service d'entr-tin du mat6rlel des Travaux Publics/Division of Equipment Maintenance SER -- Service d'entr*t en des routes/Division of Road Maintenance SRDR -- Service des rc so do dessert. rurale/Division of Feeder Roads TIR -- Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project CURRENCY EXCHaANE RATES Name of Curroncy: CFA Franc (CFAF) 1982 . 329 1968 . 381 194 .437 196 .449 196 B..4 1987 ............... SO1 19 . .298  THE WORtD BANK FOR OFFICIAL US ONLY Washington, DC. 20433 U.S.A. Off ce ofl Do4cIcv-GewaI Opmatm [Eakiatam September 13, 1990 mEmoRANM To THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on the People's Republic of Benin Fourth Highway Project (Credit 1142-BEN) Third Feeder Roads Project (Credits 1485-BEN and SF23-BEN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on the People's Republic of Benin Fourth Highway Project (Credit 1142-BEN) and Third Feeder Roads Project (Credits 1485-BEN and SF23- BEN)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No audit of this report has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment LThis document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients eily in the performanc7e of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Wodd Bank authorization.|  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT. CREDIT 1142-BEN THIRD FEEDER ROADS PROJECT. CREDITS 1485-BEN AND SF23-BEN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Table of Conteuts Page No. Preface ................................................... Basic Data Sheets . ......................................... Evaluation Summary ......... ............................... vi I. INTRODUCTION ........... ................................... 1 IU PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL ......... 1 A. The Fourth Highway Project ....... ..................... 1 B. The Third Feeder Roads Project ...... .................. 3 III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ..................I....... 4 A. The Fourth Highway Project ....... ..................... 4 B. The Third Feeder Roads Project ..... ................... 6 IV. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION ..................................... 8 A. The Fourth Highway Project ....... ..................... 8 B. The Third Feeder Roads Project ...... .................. 9 V. INSTITUTIONAL PEfiFORMANCE ..........................9 A. The Fourth Highway Project ....... ..................... 10 B. The Third Feeder Roads Project ...... .................. 10 VI. CONSULT NTS' PERFORMANCE .................................. 10 A. The Fourth Highway Project ........ .................... 10 B. The Third Feeder Roads Project ........................ 11 VII. THE ASSOCIATION'S PERFORMANCE ........ ..................... 11 A. The Fourth Highway Project ........ .................... 11 B. The Third Feeder Roads Project ...... .................. 12 VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED ....... .................... 12 TABLES 1 Road Rehabilitation Program, ERR Data, Cr. 1142-BEN 14 2 Cost Estimates at Appraisal and Completion, Cr. 1142-BEN 15 3 Financing Sources at Appraisal and Completion, Cr. 1142-BEN 16 4 Vehicle Operating Cost Data, Cr. 1142-BEN 17 5 Cost Estimates at Appraisal and Completion, Crs. 1485/SF23-BEN 18 6 Financing Sources at Appraisal and Completion, Crs. 1485/SF23-BEN 19 MAPS IBRD 15423R -- Fourth Highway Project IBRD 17313R1 -- Third Feede;. Roads Project This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF B'*IN FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT, CREDIT 1142-BEN THIRD FEEDER ROADS PROJECT. CREDITS 1485-BEN AND SF23-BEN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Preface 1. This report presents a completion evaluation of the Fourth Highway Project and the Third Feeder Roads Project in Benin for which Credit 1142-BEN in the amount of US$11.1 M was approved on May 14, 1981, and Credit 1485-BEN and SF23-BEN in the amount of US$12.0 M was approved on May 29, 1984, respectively. Approximately US$0.21 M was cancelled from Credit 1142-BEN on May 11, 1988, while approximately US$10,000 and US$3,000 was cancelled from Credits 1485-BEN and SF23-BEN, respectively. 2. The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division, Occidental and Central Africa Department, Africa Regional Office. It is based on a review of correspondence files, on the findings of a short mission to Benin in October 1988, a completion report submitted by the Government on the Fourth Highway Project, and on discussions with Bank staff assigned to the project. 3. The completion'report for the Fourth Highway Project noted some useful lessons on the problems in implementing the project. These include: (a) there is no doubt that small local contractors can make a useful contribution, but they were handicapped by inadequate capital and slow payments for work performed; (b) the next project should provide for longer technical assistance, especially for the accounting service; and (c) more training of the field maintenance brigades should have been provided. 4. This PCR was read bv the Overations Evaluation Department (OE.D). The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower and Cofinanciers for comments and they are attached to the Report as an Annex.  - ii - PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT, CREDIT 1142-BEN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BASIC DATA SHEETS KEY PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (USS million) 20.3 19.6 Cost Underrun (%) 3 '-inancing (USS million) 17.3 16.7 Credit Amount (US$ million) 11.3 11.3 Disbursed 11.1 /a Cancelled .2 Repaid Outstandirg 10.9 Completion of Physical Components (date) 06/85 01/88 Proportion Actually Completed by Above Date (%) 100 85 Economic Rates of Return (S) /b 25 & 34 30 & 18 institutional Performance Poor CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (US$ million) Item FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 Appraisal Estimate 5.5 8.2 10.4 11.3 Actual 1.2 3.5 5.0 8.0 9.7 10.0 11.1 Actual as % of Estimate 21% 43% 48% 71% 86% 88% 98% OTHER PROJECT DATA Actual or Item Original Amended Current Estimate First Mention in Files or Timetable 10/79 Negotiations 01/81 04/81 03/02-05/81 Board Approval of the Credit 02/81 05/81 05/14/81 Credit Agreement Date 07/16/81 Effectiveness Date 06/81 08/81 04/08/82 Credit Agreement Closing Date 06/30/85 06/30/86 06/30/87 Borrower People's Republic of Benin Executing Agency Ministry of Equipment and Transport (MET) Fiscal Year of the Borrower January 01 -- Decemter 31 Follow-on Project Transport Infrastructure Rehab. & Maintenance Project (Cr. 1807-BEN) /a US$0.21 M was cancelled on May U1, 1988. /b For paved road and reh. - tation of laterite roads, respectively.  - iii - MISSION DATA Item Month/Year No. of Mis Iton /a /b Date of Report Persons Compositicn - Weeks / Identification 01/80 3 H, E, L 1.5 Appraisal 06/80 2 H, E 2.0 07/16/80 Supervision 1 05/81 1 H 1.0 06/17/81 Supervision 2 11/81 1 R .5 01/26/82 Supervision 3 02/82 3 H, H, E 1.5 05/13/82 Supervision 4 10/82 1 H 1.0 12/07/82 Supervision 5 11/82 1 E 1.0 12/30/82 Supervision 6 01/83 2 H, E 1.0 04/04/83 Supervision 7 04/83 1 H 0.5 04/26/83 Supervision 8 09/83 1 T 1.0 11/23/83 Supervision 9 10/83 1 H .5 11/21/83 Supervision 10 01/84 3 H, H, E 2.0 03/06/84 Supervision 11 06/84 2 H, E 1.0 07/13/84 Supervision 12 02/85 1 H 1.0 04/08/85 Supervision 13 09!85 1 H .5 10/31/85 Supervision 14 01/86 3 H, H, E 1.5 03/13/86 Supervision 15 09/86 2 H, E 1.5 10/30/86 Supervision 16 07/87 1 H .5 10/23/87 Supervision 17 04/88 2 H, E .5 06/28/88 Supervision 18 10/88 1 H .5 /c /a E = Economist; H = Highway Engineer; T = Training Specialist; L = Loan Officer. /b Most supervision missions were combined with supervision and preparation of other highway projects. /c Project completion Report drafted following return of mission. STAFF INPUT (Staff Weeks) Fiscal Year: FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 TOTAL Preappraisal 17.9 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17.9 Appraisal 29.3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 29.3 Negotiations 8.6 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8.6 Supervision -- 3.7 4.9 12.2 8.4 7.0 4.1 3.1 1.5 -- 44.9 Other -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4.6 0.1 4.7 Total 55.8 3.7 4.9 12.2 8.4 7.0 4.1 S.1 6.1 0.1 105.4 AFIIN, March 14, 1990 D1/MISC1  - iv - PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN THIRD FEEDER ROADS PROJECT. CREDITS 1485-BEN AND SF 23-BEN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BASIC DATA SHEETS KEV PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (USS million) 13.2 13.5 Cost Overrun (%) 2 Financing (USS million) 12.0 12.0 IDA & SF Credits Amount (USS million) 12.0 12.0 Disbursed 12.0 Cancelled .01 Repaid Outstanding 11.9 Completion of Physical Components (date) 10/87 12/87 Proportion Actually Completed by Above Date (%) 100 85 Economic Rate of Return (%) 29 n.a. Institutional Performance Fair CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (USS million) Item FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 Appraisal Estimate .5 6.0 10.8 12.0 -- Actual 2.3 5.6 9.7 11.7 12.0 Actual as % of Estimate 460% 93% 90% 97% 100% OTHER PROJECT DATA Actual or Item Original Amended Current Estimate First Mention in Files or Timetable 09/82 Negotiations 01/84 04/84 Board Approval of the Credits 02/84 05/29/84 Credit Agreement Date 07/03/84 Effectiveness Date 06/84 02/20/85 Credit Agreement Closing Date 03/31/88 03/31/88 Borrower People's Republic of Benin Executing Agencies Ministry of Public Works Fiscal Year of the Borrower January 01 -- December 31 Follow-on Project Transport Infrastructure Rehab. and Maintenance Project, Cr. 1807-BEN /a Approximately US$10,000 was cancelled from Cr.1485-BEN and US$3,000 from Cr. SF23-BEN on September 27, 1988. lb See Chapter IV, Part B.  MISSION DATA Item Month/Year Mision /a Man /b Date of Report Persons Composition - Weeks Preparation 09/82 2 H, H 2.0 ........ Preparation 11/82 1 E .5 12/30/82 Preappraisal 01/83 2 H, E 1.5 01/20/83 Appraisal 05/83 3 H, S, E 6.0 06/16/83 Post-appraisal 09/83 1 T .5 11/29/83 Post-appraisal 01/84 3 H, H, E 1.0 02/13/84 Supervision 1 06/84 2 H, E 1.0 07/13/84 Supervision 2 02/85 1 H .5 04/08/85 Supervision 3 09/85 1 H .2 10/31/85 Supervision 4 01/86 3 H, H, E 1.5 03/13/86 Supervision 5 09/86 2 H, E 1.0 10/30/86 Supervision 6 07/87 1 H .5 10/23/87 Supervision 7 04/88 2 H, E .5 06/28/88 Supervision 8 10/88 1 H .5 /c /a E - Economist; F = Financial Analyst; H - Highway Engineer; T Training Specialist; and S - Sociologist. /b Most supervision missions were combined with supervision and preparation of other highway projects. /c Project Completion Report drafted following return of mission. STAFF INPUT (Staff Weeks) Fiscal Year: FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 TOTAL Preappraisal -- 1.8 15.9 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17.7 Appraisal -- 10.4 45.4 -- -- -- -- 55.8 Negotiations -- -- -- 6.5 -- -- -- _- __ __ 6.5 Supervision -- -- -- 0.5 7.0 4.6 3.4 1.8 0.2 ^- 17.5 Other _ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3.1 0.1 3.2 Total 0 1.8 26.3 52.4 7.0 4.6 3.4 1.8 3.3 0.1 100.7 AFlIN, March 14, 1990 D2/MISC1  - vi - PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT, CREDIT 1142-BEN THIRD FEEDER ROADS PROJECT, CREDITS 1485-BEN AND SF23-BEN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Evaluation Summary A. Obiectives 1. The objectives of the Fourth Highway Project were to continue the strengthening of the DRB and the improvements in the efficiency of routine and periodic road maintenan?e begun under previous highway projects. To achieve these objectives, the project was to; (a) improve the organization and administrative procedures of DRB; (b) train field, workshop and office staff at different levels to carry out road maintenance tasks; (c) continue the program for rehabilitation of paved and laterite roads; and (d) institute axle-load control and road safety programs. The main objectives of the Third Feeder Roads Project were to: (a) support rural development by the construction and maintenance of feeder roads; (b) improve local capacity to plan, coordinate and execute such works; and (c) test the effectiveness of complementing feeder roads construction with upgrading some adjoining footpaths to low standard tracks. B. Implementation Experience 2. Performance on works by contract for the Fourth Highway Project was poor, but it was good on the works by departmental fcrcea on both the Highway and Feeder Roads Projects. Performance on institutional building on the Fourth Highway Project, and the extension of this work under the Feeder Roads Project was poor. However, performance on the remaining institutional components of the Feeder Roads Project was good (paras 5.02-5.06). 3. Performance of the consultants on the Fourth Highway Project was unsatisfactory, but the consultants on the Third Feeder Roads Project performed well (paras 6.01-6.04). C. Results 4. The reevaluated rates of return for the rehabilitation of the paved and laterite road components of the Fourth Highway Project are acceptable. A reevaluation of the Third Feeder Roads Project is not possible at this time because the data used at appraisal are not available (paras 4.02-4.04).  - vii - 5. Both projects demonstrated the importance of having well coordinated and motivated teams of local staff and competent technical assistance to implement them (para 8.01). 6. Labor intensive methods contributed greatly to the success of the Feeder Roads Project. They were generally successful in Benin, although as elsewhere, their effectiveness is limited (a) to areas where labor is readily available; (b) to roads where a high degree of compacting is not required; and (c) to road building which does not require the hauling of large quantities of earthworks over long distances (para 8.04). D. Sustainability 7. With the help or follow-up lending operations, the project benefits are likely to be sustained. E. Findings and Lessons 8. The Fourth Highway Project demonstrated over again, the problem of r1lowing state enterprises to bid on Bank work (para 8.07). 9. Performance of the Association was mixed. Some of the contracting aspects of the Fourth Highway Project should have been supervised more closely. On the other hand, the monitoring of the Third Feeder Roads Project was satisfactory (paras 7.01-7.04). 10. Lessons learned include the followings (a) even ongoing works from an earlier project that are being financed under a new project should be carefully reviewed to ensure that the design is satisfactory, costs ar lip-to- date, and the works are justified; (b) works being executed by cont^gct, or for that matter, departmental forces, should be adequately supervised by on-site staff; and (c) state enterprises should not be allowed to bid on Bank-financed civil works (para 8.09).  PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT. CREDIT 1142-BEN THIRD FEEDER ROADS PROJECT, CREDITS 1485-BEN AND SF23-BEN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 The project completion reports for these two projects are presented together because they complemented each other, and because they were implemented at about the same time by the same executing agency, the Directorate of Roads and Bridges (DRB). 1.02 The audit of the First Highway Project noted that the planned training program in highway maintenance and technical assistance for transport coordina- tion components were not completed, and the Government was unable to provide sufficient local funds for road maintenance. The audit of the Second Highway Project reported that the institution building objective for road maintenance (continued from the previous project) wac largely unfulfilled, and that the transport coordination was deferred to the subsequent project upon the Government's request. On the other hand. under the Third Highway Project, the tecinical assistance component was considered generally effective. As regards the First and Second Feeder Roads Project, the combined PCR noted that while performance was poor under the First Feeder Roads Project, the Second Feeder Roads Project achieved 95Z of physical targets, and that institutional development was satisfactory. 1.03 At the time of appraisal, the DRB included three main divisions: the Division of Road Maintenance (SER), the Division of Feeder Roads (SRDR) and the Division of Equipment Maintenance (SEMTP). The responsibility for carrying out the Fourth Highway Project was entrusted to the SER. The responsibility for implementing the Third Feeder Roads Project was entrusted to the SRDR whtch had been created several years earlier, and organized as a semi-autonomous entity with its own administrative and financial services. Both the SER and the SRDR were supported by the SEMTP. 1.04 This report is based on a review of the correspondence files, including supervision reports, on the findings of a short mission to Benin in October 1988, a completion report submitted by the Government on the Fourth Highway Project, and on discussions with Bank staff assigned to the Project. II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL A. The Fourth Highway Proiect 2.01 In 1975, shortly after execution of the Third Highway Project had started, the Bank discussed with the Government of Benin (GOB) the possible scope of a follow-on project which would address both feeder roads and the maintenance and rehabilitation needs of the main gravel roads. Feasibility studies were conducted by the consultants in charge of the First Feeder Roads Project and of the Third Highway Project. In early 1980, an initial project brief was prepared. The two main project components were later divided into two separate projects.  - 2 - 2.02 The Fourth Highway Project was appraised in mid-1980. It included the rehabilitation of about 500 km of main gravel roads and technical assistance for training personnel and implemeating the project. The main project issue was the financing of a cost overrun of the paved roads rehabilitation works carried out under the Third Highway Project. This overrun was caused by the weakening jf the US dollar which represented a loss in credit value of about US$2 M in CFAF and, also, by an unusual rainy season in 1978 which caused the break up of about 28 km of paved roads. This road had to be fully reconstructed instead of resurfaced as originally scheduled. The Association agreed to finance the overrun under the project at an estimated amount of US$6.6 H, and in the absence of cofinancing, to increase the IDA allocation from US$11 M to US$16.5 M to cover the entire project cost evaluated at US$20.3 M. 2.03 Negotiations were held in March 1981, at which time confirmation was received from the OPEC Fund that it would cofinance an amount of US$G.0 M. The proposed IDA credit was consequently reduced to US$11.3 M. Part of the credit was to be used for retroactive financing of the paved roads rehabilitation works already underway, and for the extension of an office building for DRB, the construction of which was also underway. The GOB had committed itself to prefinance these works through the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA). Proiect Obiectives and Description 2.04 The objectives of the project were to continue the strengthening of the DRB and the improvements in the efficiency of routine and periodic road maintenance begun under previous highway projects. To achieve these objectives, the project was to: (a) improve the organization and administrative procedures of DRB; (b) train field, workshop and office staff at different levels to carry out road maintenance tasks; (c) continue the program for rehabilitation of paved and laterite roads; and (d) institute axle-load control and road safety programs. 2.05 The project financed the following items: (a) construction of office space for the new Administrative Division of DRB; (b) the rehabilitation, expansion and re-equipping of two existing workshop buildings and some equipment for the Cotonou workshop; (c) a training program for field, office and workshop staff of DRB; (d) equipment, fuel, and supplies for two brigades to rehabilitate 500 km of laterite roads; (e) pavement rehabilitation totalling 35 km and resurfacing of 49 km, by contract, of sections of the Cotonou-Hilacondji and Come-Lokossa roads; (f) a research program on pavement construction materials;  - 3 - (g) constructing and equipping vehicle weighing stations at Godomey and Seme; (h) a line-marking machine and road signs; (i) constructing and equipping a vehicle inspection center in Cotonou; and (j) technical assistance for the above components: (i) aid in establish- ing the Administrative Division in DRB; (ii) training for field, workshop and office staff of DRB; (iii) assistance in the rehabilita- tion of 500 km of laterite roads and 84 km of paved roads; and (iv) starting up the new vehicle inspection center in Cotonou. The project was expected to be completed by December 31, 1984. B. The Third Feeder Roads Proiect 2.06 This project was prepared in 1982 by the SRDR with financing from the Second Feeder Roads Project. The selection of the roads to be incorporated in the project had been proposed by the Rural Roads Development and Maintenance Coordinating Committee (CNAERDR) created under the First Feeder Roads Project. It was intended that the project would be a continuation of the two previous projects, and, also, that it would serve as a support of a Rural Development Project underway in the central provinces of Zou and Borgou. 2.07 The First and the Second Feeder Roads Projects had tested three different road construction methods comprising equipment intensive, moderately equipped and labor intensive brigades. The resulting experience showed that the heavily mechanized brigades had management difficulties and severe problems with operational availability of equipment, and that in some regions, the labor intensive brigades were adversely affected by a scarcity of manpower. Therefore, a mix of construction technologies was adopted to ensure a better balance between the need to reduce excessive dependency on labor on the one hand, and to reduce the dependence on a few items of heavy mechanized equipment and concomitant supplies on the other. It was also decided to include in the project a pilot scheme of building low standard t.acks to link small remote communities to the feeder roads network. The condition for such construction would be that the beneficiary communities would be willing to assure labor for their maintenance, the cost of which would be supported by the local budget. 2.08 The project was appraised in May 1983. A technical assistance component was incorporated in the project to strengthen DRB and SEMTP. The IDA lending program allowed for a credit of US$11 M for the project, the total cost of which was estimated at US$13.2 H. Taking into account the difficult financial situation of the GOB, it was evident that cofinancing was needed, but it could not be obtained. Finally, it was agreed that IDA would provide a US$6 H credit and another US$6 H from the IDA Special Fund. This reduced the GOB contribution to less than lOZ of the total project cost. 2.09 Negotiations were held in April 1984. The GOB agreed to an action plan to assure financing and execution of the feeder roads maintenance program. It also agreed to implement a socio-economic impact study to develop more specific criteria for selecting low standard tracks to be included in a possible follow-on project.  Proiect Obiectives and Description 2.10 The main objectives of the project were tot (a) support rural development by the construction and maintenance of feeder roads; (b) improve local capacity to plan, coordinate and execute such works; and (c) test the effectiveness of complementing feeder roads construction with upgrading some adjoining footpaths to low standard tracks. 2.11 The project included the following; (a) construction/improvement ofs (i) 840 km of feeder roads; and (ii) on a pilot basis, low standard low cost tracks connecting selected remote villages to these feeder roads; (b) maintenance of about 2,000 km of feeder roads covering almost 1002 of the constructed feeder road network; (c) equipment and some tools for the existing four labor intensive brigades, for one bridge brigade, and the mechanized brigades; (d) technical assistance: (i) to SRDR for implementing the proiect and the training program; (ii) for a socio-economic impact study to monitor the growth of traffic and analyze motives for trips generated, assess the medium-term (10-year) needs for feeder roads in the country, and monitor the pilot scheme for low-cost tracks; and (iii) for the training center in Cotonou and for SEMTP; and (e) future project preparation. The project was expected to be completed by September 30, 1987. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION A. Fourth Highway Proiect 3.01 The office building extension consisted of the addition of a third floor to the two story building which was started under a previous project. The works were awarded by an addendum to the original contract to a state-owned contracting firm which secured the lnitial construction work. The structural work was executed promptly but the interior finishing was extremely slow, resulting in about a two-year delay. Since the contractor was state-owned, the GOB was reluctant to take any remedial measures. The workshop renovation works in Parakou and Nattitingou were also delayed by about one year until DRB decided to cancel the contracts and continue the works by force account. In both of the above cases, the delays greatly slowed the institutional reorganization programs of DRB and SEMTP. 3.02 A training center was established in a renovated building near the SEHTP workshop in Cotonou. The renovation works were executed by force account. The training experts were professional teachers with poor practical experience. Out of the forty man-months spent on their program, more than half had been devoted to the preparation of training material and lecturing. The results of this training program were so poor that the GOB had to develop a follow-on program which was ultimately financed by the Third Feeder Roads Project then under preparation.  3.03 Invitations to bid for equipment and supplies were sent out in March 1981 and all the contracts were awarded in the first quarter of 1982. Due to the GOB's adverse financial situation and its poor management capacity, the Administration was late in disbursing t.e advance payments and this resulted in long delays in delivery. Most of the equipment was delivered during 1983; some essential pieces, however, remained blocked in the Port of Cotonou for more than one year as a consequence of a dispute between the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the supplier. The DRB could not persuade the MOF to resolve the issue, and the delay slowed down the gravel roads rehabilitation program. 3.04 The laterite rc. ds rehabilitation works continued without interruption between the Third and th - Fourth Highway Projects. According to the consultant's final report, 531 km of roads were rehabilitated which is somewhat more than the 501 km included in the project at appraisal (see Table 1). The Beninese staff in charge of operating the mechanized brigades were assisted by an efficient technical assistance team composed of a laterite road maintenance specialist and a field mechanics expert. A special program was developed to maintain these roads which remained in a good condition in spite of two successive heavy rainy seasons. The rehabilitation works included the construction of small drainage structures which was successfully carried out by force account. The construction of four large structures was awarded by LCB to small Beninese contractors; these, however, did not receive special guidance and suffered many difficulties in managing their contracts. First, the local banks refused to prcvide the guarantees for the advance payments which were essential for them to start the works, and, secondly, the administration was slow in effecting the supervision and disbursing payments due. The local contractors were unable to contend with these difficulties, and this resulted in substantial delays. 3.05 The pavement rehabilitation works were awarded during the Third Highway Project to a joint venture of a French contractor with a state-owned contracting firm for the international road Cotonou-Hillacondji-Lome and the national road Come-Lokossa-Dogbo. These works were continued without interruption under the Fourth Highway Project; however, they were carried out in the absence of supervising consultants whose contract was in the process of being renewed. The CAA did not honor its commitment to prefinance part of the work so that at the time of effectiveness of the Fourth Highway Project, invoices amounting to more than US$3 M remained due to the contractor. The latter firm, being unpaid and lacking supervision, and being politically influential due to association with a state owned firm, did not pay much attention to work quality, which declined steadily. 3.06 Shortly after the project started, deterioration on the already rehabilitated sections appeared and increased to a point that it was decided to concentrate on the Cotonou-Hillacondji road and reduce the work on the Come- Lokossa road. Later on, in 1984, when all other project components were well under control, the Association agreed to allocate the remaining uncommitted funds for complementary strengthening works on the Cotonou-Hillacondji road. The closing date was consequently extended. Further, the OPEC Fund agreed to follow the same policy and allocated US$700,000 for these strengthening works which were tendered by ICB procedures. A contract for about US$2 M was awarded to the same contracting firm as on the previous works. Under this arrangement, heavy repairs and resealing were carried out on about 76 km of road, including 15 km on the Come-Lokossa road. The works started in November 1986 and were completed in January 1988. The closing date was once again extended. Currently, new failures are appearing on sections not restored under this program.  3.07 The IDA contribution to the research program on the use of local materials was modest (US$50,000) and was considered only as an incentive for the GOB to finance this type of research. The final report was presented in late 1987, and should be useful to contractors in locating materials. 3.08 The Credit Agreement provided that the procurement of two new weighbridges was conditional on the rehabilitation snd re-opening of the two existing weighbridges in Parakou and Malanville. The new weighbridges were not operational until mid-1987. Currently, all installations are in operation, but no penalties are applied for operating overloaded vehicles. Efficient axle load control can only be applied if the two neighboring countries to the north of Togo and Benin closely coordinate their actions in that matter. Axle load enforcement is difiicult and must be done on a regional basis. This is now being done through a study of tariffs, and a regional corridor transport study is also being prepared. 3.09 The road safety program was expanded in the course of the project. Bids were opened at the end of 1984 for the vehicle inspection center and its equipment. Due to the continuous difficult financial situation of the GOB, the contractors were not paid on time, and the works were delayed until the end of 1986. The National Center for Road Safety (CNSR) started work in December 1986 with the assistance of the specialist who prepared the program. Its dynamic and motivated manager is willing to expand the work program in the northern provinces, and the time now seems favorable to review the situation and fix new operational and budgetary objectives for the next several years. 3.10 The technical assistance component was negotiated with the same consultants who were responsible for technical assistance under the Third Highway Project. The consultants were selected by the GOB in view of their excellent prior performance. Due to the gap between the Third and the Fourth Highway Projects, the former team was no longer available, and the consultants had difficulties to field a new team acceptable to the GOB. Three successive Mission Chiefs were appointed to manage the project (para 6.01). 3.11 The total cost of the project was estimated at appraisal at 4,465.8 million CFA, while the project was completed at a cost of 6,506.1 million CFA (Table 2). The value of the US dollar to the CFA franc was substantially higher during the years of project execution, which permitted the execution of considerably more work than foreseen at appraisal, especially on the rehabilitation of bitumen roads. The financing plan at appraisal and completion is shown in Table 3. The average value of the CFA franc was 331.9 to the US dollar. The weighted value of the CFA franc to the US dollar, based on IDA disbursements over the project life, was 373. This is reasonably close to the average value of 331.9, especially if it is assumed that the Government's contribution was spent at a somewhat earlier pace than IDA disbursements and thus at a lower rate. On the other hand, IDA disbursements usually reflect processing and submission delays. OPEC's disbursement schedule is not available. B. Third Feeder Roads Proiect 3.12 The road construction works were started by force account in January 1985. The initial productivity was low, due to the fact that the complementary equipment provided to reinforce the capacity of the labor intensive brigades had not yet been delivered. However, productivity eventually increased and the SRDR, impressed by this good result, proposed to increase the level of mechanization. The Association agreed, and a second lot of equipment was  procured. As a result, productivity improved above that originally expected. Due to funding limitations, the works were stopped at the end of 1987, with about 85Z (714 km) of the appraisal targets met and within the scheduled time limit. 3.13 The construction of low standard tracks was lcng delayed due to objections of some local remote communities to being linked with lower standard tracks than other communities and, in addition, being made responsible for the routine maintenance of these tracks. Eventually, out of the 150 km of tracks scheduled, only 50 km were constructed. However, the GOB now favors a system of such tracks which are adequate for the low traffic, consisting mainly of light motorcycles. 3.14 Execution of the feeder road maintenance component progressed satisfactorily with increased productivity resulting from an increase in mechanization. By 1987, about 94Z of the feeder road network of 2,000 km was under maintenance. These results were considered satisfactory by the consultants who noted that the overall condition of the network was good. However, this was not sustained after project completion since no permanent financing source for the maintenance budget could be arranged, and the newly created Feeder Roads Maintenance Section in the SER could not be merged with the SRDR because of its poor performance. Action in this matter is being taken under the follow-on Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation (TIR) Project now underway through the establishment of a comprehensive maint nance plan. 3.15 Procurement of equipment and tools was implemented without problem. The changes in construction technology resulted in a doubling of the expendi- tures for equipment purchases. Amendments to Credit 1485-BEN and the Special Fund 23-BEN were signed on November 20, 1987 in order to readjust the disburse- ment schedules. 3.16 The technical assistance (TA) team was in place before the start of the project so that the institutional objectives and the training component could be carefully monitored and coordinated with field activities. The TA component was divided into two different parts, the first directly affected to the SRDR and the second, addressed mainly to the DRB (para 2.08). As regards SRDR, the objectives were to expand computerization, to improve administrative operations and cost accountancy, and to help carry out the works in the field. These objectives were achieved satisfactorily. 3.17 The main objective of the follow-on TIR Project was to assure a continuity between it and the Fourth Highway Project, and to continue the actions initiated but not achieved by the TA team on the Fourth Highway Project. Further progress is needed on (a) the extension of the SRDR administrative computerized system to the DRB Administrative Division; (b) the continuation of training activities; and (c) the reorganization of SEMTP. These activities are now all underway, and the Association agreed to extend for the duration of the TIR Project, the experts involved in this program. In addition to the initial program, a Road Management Division was created in DRB and an equipment maintenance section was reactivated in Abomey, at about 130 km north of Cotonou. 3.18 The socio-economic impact study was expected to be carried out by the SRDR; however, a copy of the study has not yet been received.  3.19 The project cost eotimates at appraisal and completion are shown in Table 5, while the financing sources at appraisal and completion are given in Table 6. The cost of the project was slightly higher than the appraisal estimate. The main differences between the appraisal and actual costs are that considerably more was spent on maintenance and equipment, and less on road construction and periodic maintenance. IV. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION A. Fourth Highway Project Paved Road Rehabilitation and Resurfacing 4.01 The vehicle operating costs used in the appraisal report are shown in Table 4, Section A. A more recent appraisal 1/ using the Bank's HDM Methodology with Beninese data and assuming a traffic mix of 752 light vehicles and 252 heavy vehicles is shown in Table 1, Section B. Table 1, Section C shows the VOC in the appraisal report converted to the same traffic mix. It assumes the roughness index corresponds somewhat to the type of road, that is, the cost per km of travelling over a 9,000 mm/km of roughness is about the same as the cost per km for a barely passable b.rack. The more recent VOC using the Bank's HDM methodology are more conservative. 4.02 The appraisal report states that both the Cotonou-Hilacondji and Come-Dogbo roads were cat ryovers from the Third Highway Project and required resealing of a remaining 49 km and reconstruction of 35 km, in stretches up to 3 km. The average traffic on the sections requiring reconstruction was 1,215 vpd (1981), with a growth of 52 p.a. The average on the sections (Come-Dogbo Road) requiring resealing was 465 vpd (1981). The rate of return for the entire 84 km was expected to be 25Z. The Come-Dogbo Road (61.5 km) was evaluated in 1987 for the Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (Credit 1807- BEN). Traffic ranges from 300-700 vpd. This evaluation projects an internal rate of return of 302 when the rehabilitation is completed. Rehabilitation of Laterite Roads 4.03 The final cost of the program for rehabilitating laterite roads is about two thirds that estimated at appraisal (CFAF 1,367.2 million vs. 865.2 million -- Table 1). There is no indication in the supervision reports that the works were not carried out satisfactorily. This suggests that either the costs at appraisal were overestimated or that all the works anticipated at appraisal were not carried out. Approximately 200 km of the 530 km of the roads rehabilitated under the program were included in the follow-on Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project. However, it is difficult to assess the quality of the rehabilitation works now. The economic reevaluation thus takes a very conservative approach and assumes that the works were not completed to the appraised design standards. The economic reevaluation assumes that regravelling was required every five years instead of every seven years; no residual value was assumed for drainage (502 at appraisal); and while the technical assistance costs were considered, these were cancelled out by the residual value of the equipment. In addition, only 802 of the vehicle operating 1/ Staff Appraisal Report, "People's Republic of Benin, Transport Infrastruc- ture Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project," April 30, 1987.  - 9 - costs savings for the first year were applied with each subsequent year being reduced by one half. Average traffic growth for the project roads is 6.31, slightly higher than that estimated at appraisal (5Z). Using the above assumptions, the overall rate of return is 182 compared to the appraisal's estimate of 341. B. The Third Feeder Roads Proiect 4.04 A reevaluation of the project applying the methodology used at appraisal is not possible as neither the farm model data nor the working papers describing the farm models and assumptions used at appraisal are available. A socio-economic impact study, which is being carried out by SRDR, will collect data relevant to the reevaluation of this project. The terms of reference call for the calculation of the benefits and rates of return for similar feeder road projects. SRDR has been requested to reevaluate the project roads using the data from their study, following the approach outlined below. 4.05 The initial evaluation was based on the producer surplus approach, using the assumption that agricultural production would increase if reliable transport services were provided. The factors for the growth of this increased production were the difference between the average population growth for the country (2.59Z) and the average population growth for the provinces concerned (ranging from 1.2Z to 2.01) 2/ plus increased yields for certain crops less the costs of inputs for all crops. A subsistence area with below average rate of population growth could, with proper incentives -- e.g., improved transport --, increase its production to at least the average rate of growth for the entire population. 4.06 The proposed approach to be used by SRDR would use the same factors for the with- and without-project. From the information to be obtained from the socio-economic impact study, the net value of production per typical farm by province would be determined. The net value of production would exclude farm and market losses as well as on-farm consumption. 3/ Where yields are increased, the costs of inputs, e.g., fertilizer and technical assistance, would be deducted. The net value of production without the project road over a ten-year period (assuming periodic regravelling in year seven) would be deducted from the with-project road net value stream and the difference compared to the investment cost of the project road to arrive at the economic rate of return. V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 5.01 During implementation of both projects, the Government's financial position remained precarious. The Association several times had to threaten disbursement suspension because of non-payment of debt service. The financial management of the two projects was the responsibility of the CAA, whose overall financial capacity was low. 2/ Borgou 2.02; Mono 1.2Z; Oueme 1.2Z; and Zou 1.21. 3/ The marketable surplus or the ratio of these losses and on-farm consumption to total production from the socio-economic impact study would be compared to those in the appraisal report which are: Borgou North, 02; Borgou South, 31Z; Mono North, 182; Mono South, 122; Oueme North, 502; Oueme South, 162; Zou North, 552; and Zou South, 301.  - 10 - A. The Fourth Highway Project 5.02 The C M did not honor its commitment to prefinance the civil works carried out by contract without interruption during the period between the Third and the Fourth Highway Projects. This seriously handicapped the GOB in its dealings with the bankrupt state contracting enterprise, and with the local banks when it tried to help small Beninese contractors who needed a guarantee for advance payments. 5.03 Regarding civil works carried out by force account, such as laterite road rehabilitation and building renovation, performance was satisfactory. The works were executed within the schedule and the cost estimate. The force account works represented about 402 of total project costs. 5.04 The civil service suffered from a lack of stability. At the beginning of the project, the Director of DRB was suspended for about one year without being replaced. About one year after having returned to his job, he was transferred to another service and replaced by the former Director of DRB who had been removed about six years earlier. Managers of the SER, SEMTP and the training center lacked experience. The Chief of SER, in charge of implementing the project, was transferred to another service and replaced by a young but inexperienced technician. Overall, institutional performance was poor. B. The Third Feeder Roads Proiect 5.05 All the civil works were carried out by force account, and by the same staff who were responsible for two earlier projects. Thus, the performance on this component by experienced personnel was good indeed. 5.06 The other project components were mainly managed by the technical assistance team. Unfortunately, the Chief of the Training Center and all its Beninese trainers, who had been appointed during the implementation of the Fourth Highway Project, were transferred to other services at the end of the project. Thus, no lasting institutional benefits can be attributed to the project. VI. CONSULTANTS' PERFORMANCE A. The Fourth Highway Project 6.01 Following a gap of about five months between the Third and the Fourth Highway Projects, the consulting firm selected to continue assisting the DRB under the latter project had many difficulties in reassembling a satisfactory technical assistance team (para 3.10). Three successive Mission Chiefs were appointed. The first left for health reasons about a month after his appoint- ment. The second, who was inefficient, stayed on the job about two and a half years despite the numerous protests and complaints by the Administration and supervising Bank staff. In hesitating so long before recognizing the poor qualification of its employee, and replacing him, the consultants jeopardized the outcome of the project. 6.02 Of the other experts assembled to provide technical assistance, few had prior experience in Africa and they did not receive guidance from their team leader who was unable to grasp what was expected of him. Thus, there was virtually no coordination of the work to be done. The training experts, for  - 11 - example, had been in the country ten months before any training was provided under the project. When the third team leader arrived, it was too late to overcome the poor performance of the team. B. The Third Feeder Roads Proiect 6.03 To remedy these poor results, the GOB, in agreement with the Association, decided to include further technical assistance in the Third Feeder Roads Project, then under preparation, with the objectives of continuing assistance to the training center, to help reorganize the DRB administrative division, and restructure SEMTP. The TA team in charge of these activities performed well and they are continuing their work under the TIR Project. 6.04 Thanks to the efficiency of the SRDR in project preparation, the technical assistance team in charge of the Feeder Roads Project was in place at the right time to continue the momentum developed under the Second Feeder Roads Project. They adapted readily to the new work technology for labor intensive methods, increasing the productivity and, thus, the motivation of the SRDR staff. The performance of these consultants was excellent. VII. THE ASSOCIATION'S PERFORMANCE A. The Fourth Highway Project 7.01 This project was a continuation of the works started under the Third Highway Project. In agreeing to finance this component of the project without calling for a new engineering and feasibility study, the Association failed to properly evaluate the project. Despite the enormous advantage resulting from the increase of more than double the dollar value in relation to the CFA, only 60Z of the appraisal targets under the paved road component was achieved. The Association was wrong in agreeing with the GOB to continue the paved road rehabilitation works with the same contracting joint-venture as before, and to allow the work to proceed without the supervising consultants being present on site (para 3.05). 7.02 The above decisions were made in a period of internal reorganization in the Region, and many changes of supervising staff occurred at that time. After this more or less confusing period, the Bank's supervision staff made every effort to improve project performance. The initial scope of the paved roads works was scaled down to the 602 currently completed, and an engineering study was requested for the remaining 402 of the alignment which crossed difficult terrain. In coordination with the cofinancier, OPEC, credits were reallocated in order to permit all necessary repairs and resurfacing of most of the sections already completea. These works were awarded through ICB to the same contracting firm which had previously carried out the works in association with a Beninese state enterprise. 7.03 Despite efforts spanning two decades and a series of six projects, it is difficult not to conclude that while progress on civil works varied from mixed to good, progress on institution building and training has been less than satisfactory. It is beyond the scope of this report to take a detailed look at the effectiveness of technical assistance and training. A closer study may be needed, not only of Benin, but for similar countries in Africa as well, to determine whether IDA objectives are set too high and its programs too ambitious, and what, if anything, can be done to achieve better results in institution  - 12 - building in future. This needs to be looked at in the light of a continuing si.ortage of local currency which alro handicapped project execution, another frequently encountered problem in West Africa. B. The Third Feeder Roads Proiect 7.04 The Association's performance in monitoring the Third Feeder Roads Project was mostly satisfactory. The project was well prepared and was implemented by an experienced and motivated team of Beninese in association with competent TA experts. Problems which arose regarding feeder roads maintenance were addressed effectively. However, disbandment of the local staff of the Training Center at the end of the project (para 5.06) was a step backwards. As in many other countries, road maintenance is not yet considered a high priority task, and the Association's efforts must be continued in the framework of the on-going TIR Project. VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 8.01 Both projects demonstrate the importance of having well coordinated and motivated teams of local staff and competent technical assistance to implement them. In the case of the Fourth Highway Project, the SER was mismanaged and was assisted by an inefficient TA team leader. The project failed in most of its institution building objectives. In the case of the Third Feeder Roads Project, the experienced SRDR staff, which was well motivated by its successful performance on earlier projects and associated with a compe tit TA team, was fully successful. 8.02 Performance of the consultants on the Fourth Highway Project was unsatisfactory, but the consultants or. the Third Feeder Roads Project performed well. The former team provided a more useful completion report than the latter. 8.03 On both projects, work implemented by force account was successful, particularly the rehabilitation of grav;el roads. This type of work has been traditionally implemented by force account, and local staff have long experience in executing it. They should not be discouraged by requiring that future rehabilitation works be executed by contract. 8.04 Labor intensive methods were generally successful in Benin, although as elsewhere, their effectiveness is limited (a) to areas where labor is readily available; (b) to roads where a high degree of compacting is not required; and (c) to road building which does not require the hauling of large quantities of earthworks over long distances. Institutional and staffing stability, and a willingness to adapt work methods to the local situation, greatly contributed to the success of the Feeder Roads Project. 8.05 The road safety program has been implemented, and Benin is now well equipped to enforce axle load controls. But the legislation remains insuffi- cient to dissuade the truckers from overloading their vehicles. Weight scales are now operated full time, but no penalties are applied since there are no legal provisions, and no physical facilities ixist to enforce the unloading of the vehicles. The Government seems reluctant to go ahead in this matter unless Togo, the competing neighbor country on the South-North axis to the land-locked countries, follows the same policy. This matter is being carefully reviewed in the light of these competing needs and existing agreements and lekislatlon in the neighboring countries (para. 3.08).  - 13 - 8.06 The reevaluated rates of return for the rehabilitation of the paved and laterite road components of the Fourth Highway Project are acceptable. A reevaluation of the Third Feeder Roads Project is not possible because the 'data used at appraisal are not available. 8.07 The Fourth HIghway Project demonstrates once again, the problems of allowing state enterprises to bid on Bank work. Generally, state construction enterprises in Africs do not perform satisfactorily; their workmanship is poor, and quality is difficult to control as they use their political influence to allow them to circumvent their contractual responsibilities. Lastly, state enterprises discourage private industry from bidding as it is generally realized the state enterprises will get the job, usually by underbidding. A contract between a state enterprise and the state is not an arms length transaction; it is the enterprise that benefits from its failure to p-operly perform, not the state which is saddled with poorly built roads which it has to maintain. 8.08 A closer study may be needed, not only of Benin, but for similar countries in Africa as well, to determine whether IDA objectives are set too high and its programs too ambitioua, and what, it anything, can be done to achieve better results in institution building in future. 8.09 Lessons learned include the following: (a) even ongoing works from an earlier project that are being financed under a new project should be carefully reviewed to ensure that the design is satisfactory, costs are up-to- date, and the works are justified; (b) works being executed by contract, or for that matter, departmental forces, should be adequately supervised by on-site staff; (c) other road construction methods than those employing fully mechanized units can be made to work well if properly adapted to local conditions; and (d) state enterprises should not be allowed to bid on Bank-financed civil works.  T ble I rED