Tunisia - Technical Assistance Project

D_matof The World Bank FMO OFm CIAL USE ONLY lepat N..9129 PROJU:T CCI4PLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJLCT (LOAN 2197-TUN) NOVEMBER 9, 1990 Country Operations Division Country Department II Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office hs docuewnt bag a reskted distribut and may be ud by rcpints only the perfebsa ce of tleofficir a matios Its contents may ot otherwise biclosed withot Worl Bak authoaen.  CIUNXYKQ EuZYWI 1 SDR - 1.2090 Tunisian diner (TD) (December 1988) Jarwary 1 - December 31 AKE Agence de Maltrise de l'Energie ( Agency for Energy Control) API Agence de Promotion des Investissements : (Ageney for the Promotion of Investments - formerly Agence de Promotion de l'Industrie) APIA Agence de Promotion des Investissements Agricoles : (Agency for the Promotion of Agricultural Investments) ASAL Agriculture Sector Adjustment Loan CEPEX Centre de Promotion des Exportations r (Center for Export Promotion) CNEA Centre National des Etudes Agricoles - (National Center for Agricultural Studies) CNEI Centre National des Etudes Industrielles - (National Center for Industrial Studies) DPSAE Dire_tion de la planification, des statistiques et des - analyses dconomiques : (Directorate for planning, statistics and economic analysis) ETAP Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activitds P6troli&res : (Tunisian enteprise for petroleum operations) FAO Food & Agricultural Organization of the United Nations INM Institut National de la M6t6orologie : (National Meteorological Institute) MoA Ministry of Agriculture MoPF Ministry of Planning and Finance OCT Office du Comeerce de la Tunisie : (Tunisian Trading Office) SIAPE Socidt6 industrielle d'&cide phosphorique et d'engrais : (Industrial corporation for phosphoric acid & fertilizers) STEG Societe Tunisienne de 1'Electricit6 et du Gaz : (National gas and electricity company)  TO* WORLD SANK FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Washton. DC 20433 U.S A Office of Di,eetorGOcr,al Op.ratSs clvtlct November 9, 1990 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AID THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report or Republic of Tunisia Technical Assistance Projict (Loan 2197-TUN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled 'Project Completion Report on Republic of Tunisia - Technical Assistance Project (Loan 2197-TUN)" prepared by the Agriculture Operations and Industry and Energy Operations Divisions of Country Department II of the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment L Thu doc~am.nu a ,rtg diumbutaon and may be ANN by mpouim only in Ub. pw mome of thsir edicial dAtiesL Is 6"OWie MAY not Stherwns be dielomd wdtJ1et W@,I l6bit Sfltbwnmtz.e  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Loan 2197 -TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS PaPfe No Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ................................ Evaluation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii PAR I: BANK'S ASSESSENT Background .1 Project Objectives and Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Design and Organization .1 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Project Results and Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Bank Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Borrower Performance. 6 General Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 PART II: BORROWER'S ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 PART III: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Agricultural Component .10 Industry and Export Components .14 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA TE',HNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Loan 2197-TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR for the Technical Assistance Project to the Government of Tunisia for which Loan 2197-TUN in the amount of US$5 million, was approved by the Board in September 1982. The loan was closed on June 30, 1988, eighteen months behind schedule. It was fully disbursed, the last disbursement occurring on December 30, 1988. The PCR was prepared with substantial inputs from the Agriculture Operations and Industry and Energy Operations Divisions of Country Department II of the EMENA Region for Parts I and III. Parts I and III were sent to the Borrower for comments but none was received. Despite the Bank's requests, the Borrowar did not prepare Part II. The preparation of this PCR's industrial and energy component was started with a mission in November 1989. The preparation of the agriculture component was started in early 1989. The PCR is based on the findings of these two missions as well as the Steff Appraisal Report; the Loan, Guarantee, and Project Agreements; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and internal Bank memoranda.  v ii - REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Loan 2197-TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY Obiectivel The objective of the project was to assist the Tunisian authorities in increasing the number of projects for the 6th Development Plan (1982-86) and in improving their quality in the areas of agriculture, industry/exports, and energy. Implementation ExRerience The agriculture component produced several useful studies (paras. 8-11 and 21-23). They were behind schedule, but if the planning department of the Ministry of Agriculture (DPSAE) had not shown the initiative it did (para. 34), they might not have been produced at all because responsibilities has not been clearly assigned to concerned agencies (para. 3). The industry component was hampered by its dependence on two agencies that were themselves being reorganized or absorbed into another agency (paras. 5 and 11). The energy component was hampered by the shortage of expertise available to them at the crucial moments in procuring complex information technology and equipment (paras. 7 and 15-18). All the project suffered from Tunisian government procurement procedures, which had to be circumvented by various devices, such as implementing project components through autonomous agencies (paras. 8, 15, 31 and 34). Results The agricultural component yielded useful results in the form of studies that provided the basis for future Bank lending (paras. 22-23). The industry/export coi.ponent's results were confined to some organizational improvements, studies that led to the creation of two export enterprises, and some training for young entrepreneurs (paras. 24-25). The energy component led to improvements in the data systems of the oil company, ETAP, the electric power company, STEG, and the meteorological institute, INM. It also resulted in a pilot windmill program run by the INM and an energy assessment program run by a specialized agency, AME (paras. 26-30). Sustainability The longer term outcome of the agricultur '!omponent are seen in the Bank loans that made use of it (para. 22). The inaustry/export component does not appear to have had a signific-nt sustained effect, since the organizational improvements it achieved have been limited (paras. 24-25). The energy assessment program has already led to energy saving in several industrial enterprises and appears to be well established.  - iii - The STEG data systems have become or are becoming fully operational (para. 27), but the INM and ETAP have been having difficulties with their systems because of the lack of expertise in selecting them (paras. 16 and 18). The windmill program has been equally affected by poor supplier performances as well as problems of competition with the STEG (paras. 18-20), though it provides the first tests of a potentia'.ly sizable energy source (para. 30). Findings and lessons learned Although the basic idea of providing technical assistance to improve the capacity for creating investment projects was attractive, the execution through numerous agenicies under different authorities led to great problems. It led to oddities such as the executf.on of studies by agencies whose own funcrions were put in question by the pro;ect and to the lack of a central project authority that could ,;. sound choices of software and suppliers. This dispersion of effort wab ..airrored in the Bank for which the project cost in terms of staff time was high and continuity in supervision difficult to maintain.  REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Loan 2197-TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART I: BANK'S ASSESSMENT OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Proiect Identity Project Name. Technical Assistance Project Loan Number: Loan 2197-TUN RVP Unit: EMENA Country: Tunisia Sector: Agriculture, Energy and Industry Background 1. At the start of Tun'.sia's Sixth Development Plan (1982-86), the portfolio of well prepared projects in agriculture and industry slated for the Plan was insufficient to meet sectoral targets. This situation prompted the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MoPF) to request technical assistance from the Bank to help strengthen project preparation capabilities in Tunisia, to increase the number and improve the quality of investment projects, and thus help achieve Plan targets. Prosect Oblectives and Descriotion 2. Given the Government's objectives, the project included three components: agriculture, industry and exports, and energy. The agriculture component comprised the preparation of feasibility studies, national programs and action plans and assistance with the start-up of an Agency for the Promotion of Agricultural Investments (APIA). The industry and export component included preparation of six priority subsectoral studies, feasibility and export-marketing studies, review of the institutional environment for export promotion, and establishment of an export expansion system. In the area of energy, the project was to have made assessments of renewable energy sources, energy conservation audits, plans for handling petroleum products, geological surveys, and power system planning. Design and Organization 3. Under the agriculture component, providing MoA with the means to conduct, a number of nationwide studies on key services and institutions was a beneficial innovation. Until then the Ministry's capacity for studies was geared to projects, rather than policy or institutional issues. In practice, only two technical departments took leading roles for studies in their fields (Farm Mechanization and Forestry), while APIA took full responsibility of the Investment Support Component. Some technical departments showed almost no involvement (the extension study). In some cases (marketing, irrigation management), no technical department was identified for responsibility for the study, too much emphasis was given to statistical and analytical aspects and insufficient attention was given to policy issues.  4. The industry and export component was carried out by two different agencies, Centre National D'Etudes Industrielles (CNEI) and Centre de Promotion des Exportations (CEPEX). 5. One of the main criticisms of the design aspect of this component involved the merger of CNEI and API as a result of one of the component's studies. It is difficult to understand how a dissolved agency or even a newly merged one would have been designated as the responsible agency to effectively implement another series of studies which was the case with CNEI. Although CNEI did perform several of the studies including one on electronics, there was no coordination at all between the two studies done on the electronics sector by CEPEX and CNEI which resulted in substantial overlapping of studies. Such coordination should have been incorporated into the original design of the project. 6. te energy subcomponents of this project were executed by several agencies: Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activites Petrolieres (ETAP), Institut National de la Meteorologie (INM), Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz (STEG), and Agence de Maitrise de l'Energie (AME). 7. In general, training needs and expert services were inconsistently designed and greatly underestimated for this particular component. ETAP staff could have benefitted very much from the provision of expert advice in writing the specifications for their geological database, in overall training in the use of the software and hardware and the input of the collected data into the database in an adequate form. STEC and INM also needed more training than was originally foreseen during the design stage owing tr, their inexperience in writing bid specifications, preparing bid documents and using collected data correctly in the context of databases acquired under the project. In the case of STEG, the additional training resulted in a substantial underestimation of the cost involved. Implementation 8. The studies in the agricultural sector were carried out with, on the average, about one year delay. Delays were basically due to the Government's complicated procedures for selection and recruitment of consultants; reluctance of MoA or certain of its agencies to the execution of studies, or to their execution by consultants; and the difficulty of obtaining approval for the purchase of vehicles. 9. Preparation of the N.W. Agricultural Prcduction Project and the shallow well study were carried out by Government staff assisted by FAO/CP, which at Government and Bank request was in charge of report preparation. For the preparation of the forestry study, the Government signed a Fund-in-Trust Agreement with FAO, which provided additional funding for the study through its Technical Cooperation Program (TCP). 10. The farm mechanization input distribution, irrigation management and marketing studies were carried out by consulting firms, in all cases  except one (the input distribution study) consisting of an association of a foreign and a local firm. 11. The industry and export components experienced difficulties and delays in implementation due to problems arising from the reorganization of some of the key agencies involved in the project, such as CEPEX and CNEI, lengthy implementation of studies, lack of follow up on such studies and little institutional memory. 12. Three studies regarding the country's export promotion program were undertaken hy the chosen consultant. The first study (May 1985) concluded that the effort for export promotion in Tunisia was spread among too many different entities and was not well coordinated. To counter this problem, the study recommended a merger between CEPEX and the export promotion arm of the Office du Commerce de la Tunisie (OCT) and at the same time a full reorganization of the resulting entity. This reorganization did occur in the first half of 1987, however, the long implementation period of the studies resulted in portions of the studies becoming irrelevant as a result of the changes in the country's trade policies. 13. CNEI also carried out several subsector studies, including those completed for the electromechanical (1984), ceramic (March 1985), pickaging (May 1985), electronic (December 1987), glassware (January 1985) and automotive parts (September 1985) sectors. These studies led to several positive developments including the identification of projects in the electronics sectors and the integration and restructuring of production in the glassware sector. Specifically, the three studies on the export prcmotion program led to the identification of two projects involving the assembly of electronic cards for computers and production of printed circuits. Both projects have been implemented. 14. Despite these accomplishments, no follow up was performed on the subsectoral studies mentioned above and no one in API is responsible for such follow up actions. None of the feasibility studies for the newly identified projects from these studies has been undertaken nor was the study on promotional activities for private industrial projects made. At this point, one must acknowledge that, in all likelihood, the money spent on the studies has been wasted because the studies have become outdated. 15. The energy component experienced difficulties and delays in implementation as well. Its situation developed from problems with inexperience in system implementation, inexperience with the Bank's procurement process, untimely authorization of purchases, contractor delays and changes in location for installations. 16. In regard to system implementation, ETAP experienced considerable delays as a result of its inexperience in this field and because of problems with the software. During the bidding phase of the project, the supplier indicated that the database could be easily applied to the development of ETAP's information system. However, in the actual implementation phase, this database turned out to be too global to include important details.  17. STEG also incurred a delay in purchasing its load measurement equipment and accompanying software due to the lack of authorization coming from the Comite National d'Information. Collection of data for the database has been accomplished by sampling four groups of consumers for four months each. This measuring program is now well underway. 18. Lack of experience in the Bank's procurement process and problems with the contractor caused delays in INM's portion of the energy component. Implementation of this component took, in total, three years longer than estimated. il general, the performance of the contractor with this particular subcomponent was below standard expectations. For example, ordered spare parts are still undelivered. Moreover, the same contractor provided some instruments without a manual and has acknowledged that it does not know how to integrate these instruments into the whole system. 19. Although fifteen windmills (under AhE s subcomponent) were installed for irrigation purposes in the region of Cap Bon between July and September 1986, eight of these mills are currently inoperative. This situation developed because some of the farmers or whose land the pumps are located have access to STEG's Electric grid and refuse to pay for maintenance costs for the windmills. Due to the existence of subsidies, electricity is cheaper for them than phying maintenance costs. 20. AME also experienced some difficulties in the installation of wind generator-s because of a change in location. The original choice for the location of the generators, Sidi Oued Labid, had to be abandoned because STEG extended their grid to this town after an Italian-Tunisian joint venture decided to build a cheese factory there. A new location, Jabouza, had to be chosen whi.ch caused an important delay. Prolect Results and Sustainabilitv 21. At the policy level, the a6riculture component of the project provided the C.vernment with important recommendations for decision making in resource man -ement (irrigation, forestry), support services (research, extension, input distribution) and institutions (land tenure, marketing, farm mechanization). 22. The studies have also led to important investments aimed at better resource use and improved support services. The Irrigation Management, North;est Agricultural Production and Forestry Projects (Loans 2573-TUN, 2502-TUN and 2870-TUN) with a total loan amount of $57 million, are the direct result of the studies made under the Project. The Research and Extension Project, also resulting from studies made under the Technical Assistance Project, was approved on June 5, 1990. 23. Finally, several studies resulted in projects with an important institution building aspect (irrigation management, forestry, research and extension) and thereby are having a long term impact. The Project's support  to APIA also resulted in a greatly improved capacity of systematic identification, appraisal and follow up of investments. 24. One of the results of the industry and export component involved the reorganization or merger of various institutions in the industry and export sectors. In the case of CEPEX and OCT, this activity led to a somewhat clearer definition of roles for the two agencies which had previously overlapped in function. But the API, whose function had been to examine and approve industrial investments, has not found a clear sanse of direction now that the need for such approvals haE been largely removed. 25. CEPEY is now contcentrating on export promotion for small and medium sized industries, by arranging participation in trade fairs and helping exporters meet specifications and quality required in the targeted export country. It is also organizing in conjunction with API and other export associations educational training for small industries and identifying products which have the potential to be manufactured in Tunisia. 26. ETAP implemented a pilot project for heating ten greenhouses. The results are very promising with an agroindustrial project a very possible outcome of the study. It appears that a joint vent4re is possible with an Itaiian and Tunisian company for participating in such a project. 27. STEG's objectives in its subcomponent are generally meeting expectations. The LODEN program is being fully utilized at this time, but the SICRET program will not be fully operational until the necessary data is collected from the newly installed measuring instruments. 28. As for INM, the experience with the measuring equipment in the fifteen operative stations is good. There are some difficulties with processing the data in the GEOPAD database, because INM officers were never trained to program this system with the particular sensors. that the contractor installed. Regarding any further follow up activity, INM pointed out that they are very interested in completing the original system as soon as the contractor supplies the needed spare and missing parts. They would also like to have additional training in using the GEOPAD system. As a next step, further coverage of the country with more automated stations is necessary. 29. All phases of AME's auditing subcomponent have been completed and full reports have been issued. Five of the six audited enterprises ara implementing the recommendations of these studies. One enterprisa, Socidte industrielle d'acide phosphorique et d'engrais (SIAPE), will make the recommendations part of a full site restructuring plan which will be started shortly. The energy savings from this exercise will amount to 15,000 toe per year. 30. Under the windmill subcomponent, fifteen windmills have been installed. Although some farmers (within STEG's electricity grid) are no longer utilizing the installed windmi'lls, Tunisia, nevertheless, has a potentially good market for these windmills since more than sixty percent of Tunisian farmers cannot tap into Steg's grid.  Bank Performance 31. Under the agriculture component, the speed of project preparation and loan processing was an important factor for the success of the agricultural component. The Bank showed considerable flexibility in enabling the Government to carry out several of the studies with FAO/CP assistance, or through arrarxgements with international organizations. 32. The Bank's comments on draft reports of the various phases of the studies weze not always made on time. In those cases, MOA was obliged to provide the consultants with its comments within the time limits specified in the contract before it had received the Bank's observations. Finally, a larger degree of continuity of Bank staff responsible for supervision would have been an asset in providing the Bank's support to project execution. 33. The energy and industry components of Loan 2197-TUN were, in a sense, two "casualties" of the Bank's reorganization. Implementation of this project took place during the reorganization period with the result that the people who had originally worked on these components had either transLarred to other departments or had departed the Bank altogether. Consequently, these two components lacked continuity in Bank supervision which was especially critical given the complexity of the subcomponents involved. Regular and consistent supervision by Bank staff in conjunction with experts would have helped the implementing agencies identify and correct any difficulty which arose thereby reducing delays and very likely costs. In general, the Bank underestimated the effort and money necessary for successful implementation of these components. During appraisal, the Bank also failed to consider the impact of electricity subsidies on the choice of energy sources by users. This is evident in the windmill example. Borrower Performance 34. Within the context of the agriculture component, the planning department of the Ministry of Agriculture, the DPSAE, displayed considerable leadership, butc due to various other tasks its staff sometimes could not devote sufficient time Lo the studies. With a few exceptions, the technical departments were much iess involved than planned. The role of the steering committees was variable; in most cases they performed an important function in the review of studv iecommendations and conolusions. A main cause for delays in execution of the stuidies was the required submission of consultant contract proposals to the procuremrent commission (commission de marches) for approval, and consequently the need to follow public invitation for bid procedures instead of the Bank's short list procedure. The situation was improved when the Bank agreed. on l(0% fitnanr.ing of the Foreign Exchange part of Consultants. 35. The Borrower &,t)vely followed up on many of the main conclusions of the studies in regard to reform and strengthening of support services (research, extension) and improved resource management (irrigation, forestry). The conclusions ot the agLicultural mechaiiization study were presented at a  seminar attended by MoA staff as well as representatives of farmers' organizations, farm machinery traders and the local farm machinery industry. The Government should have been encouraged to initiate a more concerted follow up of the shallow well and marketing studies. 36. If the Bank underestimated the effort and money necessary for successful implementation of the industry and energy components, the Tunisians overestimated their capabilities. ETAP, for example, was inexperienced in implementing a geological database system. Because of this inexperience, decisions which were needed for following up this project were postponed at several levels. CNEI's segment of the project was totally lacking in management direction. Although the Bank may have been at fault in designating a reorganized enterprise to carry out subsector studies, it appears that CNEI's and API's management of th studies was practically nonexistent. 37. The Borrower in these two components also failed to contribute its portion to the PCR. During the project completion mission, the borrower was asked to provide a summary of its feedback on the project, but this was never done. General Conclusions and Recommendations 38. The agricultural component was more successful than either the industry/export or the energy components. Its main success was that most of the studies contributed to the preparation of Bank loans, namely the Agriculture Sector Adjustment Loan (ASAL), the Northwest Agricultural Production Project, the Forestry Development Project, and, most recently, a second ASAL and the Research and Extension Project. No Bank loans emanated from the industry/export component, whose main benefits were the organizational improvements affecting the CEPEX. Since the API has not yet become effective in a new vocation after having lost its former authority, the absorption of the CNEI does not appear to have achieved anything. Two export enterprises were created, and some training for young entrepreneurs took place. The energy component was followed by a small Bank loan, the Petroleum Exploration Project, for $5.5 million, and it. yielded a useful geothermal assessment that indicated several project possibilities. Moreover, the energy assessment program has already led to considerable energy savings and is expected to add regularly to them in the future. 39. However, much of the project did not bear fruit or fell much behind schedule. In agriculture the main causes of delay were due to the lack of clear and workable allocations of responsibilities. The fact that the CNEA played only a marginal role, when it was meant to be the main agent, would have produce much worse results had the DPSAE not shown the leadership it did. Procurement of consultants by ministries has been a continuous problem in Tunisia, which has to be circumvented by devices like implementing project components through autonomous age-^ies, which are not bound by the same rigid rules, or allowing the FAO to pro,-re vehicles for the project.  - 8 - 40. In the industry/export component the basic weakness seems to have been that the studies were entrusted to agencies that were themselves being put into question. The CEPEX survived and produced some results, but the CNEI was, in effect, eliminated by being absorbed into the API and losing much of its staff. The API, itself, appears not to have felt committed to the project and the efforts of the CNEI were lost. The energy component suffered most from the insufficient expertise provided to help the ETAP and INM, both inexperienced, at a time when it was essential to ensuring that the equipment and software that they were obtaining was adequate and would be adequately serviced. 41. Finally, the project was a victim of the Bank's reorganisation. Since ir lacked a strong central component that ensured a commitment within the Bank, it was virtually orphaned after the reorganisation. It resulted in tangible benefits that seem to have outweighed its nominal cost, but the same results could have been achieved cheaper under different circumstances.  REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Loan 2197-TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART II BORROWERS ASSESSNENT OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT The Borrower was requested to prepare Part II but did not respond to this request.  - 10 - REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Loan 2197-TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART III: STA MISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1 I. ML2 D Basic Data Sh"et Koy Project Data Estimated Date Estimated Date Estimated Cost Start of Study Coi.letion ADO Actual Study or TA ADOr, Actual &RRr. Actual Total Total -US$ '000--- 1. Planning - Consultant 130 256 Studies: 2. Extension 3/83 9/85 12/84 6/86 ( 66 3. Research 3/83 6/85 12/84 6/86 (390 81 4. Input Distrib. 3/83 1/84 12/84 1/84 190 175 5. Mechanization 2/83 12/84 12/84 4/86 320 178 6. Northern Tun. Rainfed Devel. 1/83 7/83 3/84 8/84 130 7. Marketing and Processing 1/83 7/85 4/85 12/86 500 317 8. Land Tenure Ref. 1/83 10/85 8/84 12/85 150 8 9. Irrigation Mgmt. 6/83 5/83 4/84 2/84 270 193 10. Shallow wells 1/83 5/83 6/84 12/83 110 2/ 11. Forestry & Range 3/83 12/84 5/85 6/86 180 195 Other: 12. Support to APIA 1/83 3/85 9/84 4/86 480 -- 13. Training 20 3/ 14. Equipment 190 68 Total 36 166 1 Study carried out by Government with FAO/CP assistance. - As above. I Minor training expenditures included under APIA support.  - 11 - Pass i of 2 TUMISIA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PIOJECT LOAN 2197-ThU AGRICULTURAL COUPOIENT PIOJECT 004PLETION MP0U UASIC DATA SWEET KISSIN DNTA Date No. of Persona Date of MISSION (No/Yr) IS FAO/CP Non/Week Spcialia. Report Identificatfon - Agric. Sector Nission 10/81 5 20 1,A,L,C 10/81 - Pre-appraisel 1/82 2 2 L.E 2/82 AppraiseaL 4/62 1 2 E 5/82 Irr. Study PreparatIon 12/82 1 1 1 1 12/82 Farm Mch. Study Sup. 1/83 2 2.0 E,F 2/83 Implmaent. Follow up 1/83 1 0.1 mg 1/83 Ilplement. Fotlow up 4/83 1 0.2 A 4/83 Land Tenure Study Prep. 4/83 1 1.0 R 5/83 Forestry Study Preparat. 7!t 1 0.5 E 7/83 Imploeent. Follow up 7/83 1 0.1 No 7/83 Impltemnt. Follow up 10/83 1 0.2 A 10/83 APIA Support Preparat. 11/83 1 1.0 E 11/83 Land Tenure Study Prep. 12/83 3 0.2 E,R 12/83 SuLervision 12/83 1 0.1 A 1/84 Farm KMch. Study Sup. 1/84 1 1.5 F 2/84 Irput Distr. Study Sup. 2/84 1 2.0 E 2/84 Agr. Research Study Prep " S84 1 2.0 A 5/84 Farm ach. Study Sup. 4/84 2 A,E 5/84 Implement. Follow p 4/84 1 0.1 A 5/84 Forestry Study Prep. 4/84 1 1.0 FO 5/84 Suiervision 7/84 1 A 8/84 Inplement. Follow up 10/84 1 A 11/84 Forestry Study Prep. 12/84 1 0.4 FO 12/84 Marketing Study Prep. 12/84 1 1.0