Jordan - Fourth and Fifth Power Projects

Docunent of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 7888 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT JORDAN FOURTH AND FIFTH POWER PROJECTS (LOANS 1986-JO AND 2162-JO) JUNE 22, 1989 Industry and Energy Operations Division Country Department III Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wi'hout World Bank authorization.  FOR OFMCIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD SANK Washington. DC 20433 L) S A Offie iE Dv.ewCeu~aI Opw tm Evaktiatun June 22, 1989 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT. Project Completion Report on Jordan Fourth and Fifth Power Projects (Loans 1986-JO and 2162-JO) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled 'Project Completion Report on Jordan - Fourth and Fifth Power Projects (Loans 1986-JO and 2162-JO)" prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department. K' Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  *' , 1 @, JORDAN FOURTH AND FIFTH POWER PROJECTS (LOANS 1986-JO AND 2162-JO) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE ............ i EVALUATION SUMMARY .. . , ......... .. ........ ....... *...* * * * * * * * * PART I - BANK'S EVALUATION I. BACKGROUND ................................................. 1 II. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION ......................... I Project Objectives ......................................... 2 Project Description ........................................ 2 III. CHANGE IN PROJECT SCOPE .................................... 3 IV. PROJECT COSTS .......................... ................... 4 V. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION ............................ 5 VI. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ....................... ........ 5 VII. PROJECT RESULTS ............................................ 6 Institutional Performance .................................. 7 Training ................................................... 8 Financial Performance. .................................... 8 Environmental Aspects ...................................... 10 VIII. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY ........................,O10 IX. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................... 11 X. BORROWER PERFORMANCE ....................................... 11 XI. PROJECT RELATIONSHIP ....................................... 12 XII. CONSULTANT SERVICES ........................................ 12 XIII. PROJECT DOCUMENTATION AND DATA ............................. 12 XIV. SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED ................................ 13 PART II - BENEFICIARIES' COMMENTS . > 15 - ANNEX I ................................................... 19 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  T. E (Cont.) Page No. PART III - STATISTICAL TABLES Table 1 - Related Bank Loans and/or Credits .. 20 Tabie 2 - Project Timetable (Ln. 1986-JO) ........................... 22 Table 3 - Project Timetable (Ln. 2162-JO) ........................... 23 Table 4 - Cumulative Est .d ti,1 A, '-iai Dishursen14, ,ts (Ln. 1986-JO) 24 Table 5 Cumulative Est. and Actual Disbursements (Ln. 2162-JO) 24 Tabse 6 - Project Implementation (Ln. 1986-JO) . . 25 Table 7 - Project Implementation (Ln. 2162-JO) . .25 Table 8 - Project Costs (Ln. 1986-JO) ..26 Table 9 - Project Financing (Ln. 1986-JO) ..27 Table 10 - Project Costs (Ln. 2162-JO) .28 Table 11 - Project Financing (Ln. 2162-JO) .29 Table 12 - Direct Benefits (Ln. 1986-JO) .30 Table 13 - Economic Impact .30 Table 14 - Financial Impact .31 Table 15 - Studies (Ln. 1986-JO) .32 Table 16 - Status of Covenants (Ln. 1986-JO) ........................ 33 Table 17 - Status of Covenants (Ln. 2162-JO) ........................ 35 Table 18 - Staff Inputs (Ln. 1986-JO) ............................... 38 Table 19 - Staff inputs (Ln. 2162-JO) ............................... 38 Table 20 - Missions (Ln. 1986-JO) ................................... 39 Table 21 - Missions (Ln. 2162-JO) ................................... 40 Table 22 - Costs .................................................... 41  i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT JORTAN FOURTH AND FIFTH POWER PROJECTS (LOANS 1986-JO AND 2162-JO) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Fourth and Fifth Power Projects in Jordan, for which Loan 1986-JO of US$25 million and Loan 2162-JO of US$35 million we're approved in May 1981 and May 1982, respective- ly. The loans were closed in September 1986 and December 1988, i.e nine and twelve months behind schedule. Whereas, US$0.45 million of Loan 1985 were cancelled, Loan 2162 was fully disbursed. Parts I and II of the PCR were prepared by the Industry and Energy Division of the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office, largely based on information provided by the Beneficiaries, whose comments on the Bank's evaluation are set forth in Part II of the present report. Preparation of the PCRs was started during the Bank's November 1988 supervision mission of the follow-on project.  ii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT JORDAN FOURTH AND FIFTH POWER PROJECTS (LOANS 1986-JO AND 2162-JO) EVALUATION SUMKARY Introduction 1. In May 1981, the Bank made Loan 1986-JO of US$25 million to the Government of Jordan, which relent US$5 million of the proceeds to the Jordan Electricity Authority (JEA), the Government-owned utility, responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution in all of Jordan, except for ser- vices in Amman and Irbid, which are entrusted to Jordan Electric Power Company (JEPCO) and Irbid District Electricity Company (IDECO), both mixed-economy concessionaires, in which Jv.A has a large stake. The remaining US$20 million of Loan 1986-JO were relent to JEPCO. In May 1982, the Bank made Loan 2162-JO again to Government, which, this time, relent the entire US$ 35 million to JEA. Objectives 2. The main objectives of the operations weret (i) to help Jordan meet future electricity demand at least cost through construction of two 130 MW thermal units at Aqaba and appropriate expansion of transmission and distribu- tion facilities, (ii) to improve quality of supply, (iii) to support rural electrification, and (iv) to promote institutional improvements both in JEA and JEPCO. (PCR, para.2.02). Implementation Experience 3. The completion of the fourth project was two years late, mainly because of JEA's late award of rural electrification contracts, on the one hand, and JEPCO's unfamiliarity with the Bank's Procurement Guidelines as well as some changes in project scope, on the other. Despite a slow start related to difficulties in finalizing cofinancing arrangements, JEA was able to complete the fifth project on schedule. The training activities in JEA and JEPCO associated with the two projects emphasized finances, accounting, and administration. They were successfully completed. Actual costs in US$ of the two projects were 72 and 122 lower, respectively, than estimated at appraisal. As there were no major changes in project scope, the differences are mainly due to the appreciation of the US$ against other main currencies, which took place during project implementation. (PCR, paras. 3.01 to 4.04 and 6.01 to 6.04).  iii Results 4. The projects achieved their principal objectives, in particular, they helped strengthen the institutional capability of both JEA and JEPCO, by, in particular training personnel to suzh extent that, at present, JEA does only occasionally need to rely on outside consultants for management and operation. The physical project components have been operating with very satisfactory results. (PCR, paras.7.01 to 7.15). 5. Whereas JEA complied with the covenant prescribing at least 25Z self-financing in the period 1981-1983, it fell short of the 35? contribution to investment envisaged for subsequent years. In connection with the sixth operation, the Bank, in the presence of slower growth than anticipated in the early 1980s, agreed to relax the covenant to require a minimum 35? contribu- tion to investment only by 1989. The justification of such relaxation should be investigated by OED in the context of the proposed audit. Except in 1985, when its self financing ratio was 21?, JEPCO complied with the 25? minimum requirement. (PCR, paras. 7.10 to 7.13). Sustainability 6. The PCR discusses in relative detail the risks that may endanger sustainability of benefits. The general conclusion is that such sustainabi- lity is reasonably assured on the basis of JEA's and JEPCO's proven operating ability and Government's demonstrated commitment to the sector's development. (PCR, para. 8.01). Findings and Lessons 7. Project implementation was affected by the lack of experience of the Beneficiaries, in particular JEPCO, with procurement under the Bank's Guidelines. Hence, the desirability of (i) a headstart in procurement, (ii) the development within the Beneficiaries' organizations of strong in-house capability to deal with ICB, (iii) strong monitoring of consultants, if such are hired to carry out procurement tasks, and (iv) participation of the Beneficiaries' staff in Bank sponsored procurement seminars. The Borrower felt that Bank involvement in these projects fell short of the desirable leve! most importantly because of a lack of continuity in the personnel assigned to the operations. (PCR, paras 14.01 to 14.05).  -1- PART I d PROJECT IDENTITY Project Name: Fourth and Fifth Power Projects Loan Nos: 1986-JO and 2162-JO RVP Unit: Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region, Country Department III, Industry and Energy Division Sector: Energy Subsector: Power I. BACKGROUND 1.01 The most notable feature of the energy sector in Jordan during the early 1980s was its total dependence on imported crude oil. Jordan's modest energy resources consisted of oil shale deposits, tar sands, a small hydropower potential and solar energy. Oil shale and solar energy were considered the most promising domestic resources and studies were mounted to assess the potential of using oil shale for power generation and the extraction of synthetic fuel. The studies indicated that the chances of commercially exploiting oil shale fcr either purpose were minimal and that use of solar energy was not expected to increase significantly over the next ten years. In this environmenL of constrained domestic energy resources, the Government's short-run energy policies were aimed primarily at stemming the growth ot demand for energy by rationalizing energy prices and encouraging conservation. The long-run policies were aimed at further studies for determining the feasibility of future exploitation of oil shale and at intensifying exploration efforts for oil and gas. 1.02 In the early 1980s the principal power subsector issues tLigh on the agenda of the authorities were: the pricing of electricity and petroleum products; the autonomy and financial soundness of JEA - the main power supplier; and escalating demand for power fueled by rapid increases in industrial consumption and the increasing demand for rural electrification. Petroleum product prices were gradually increased to rationalize the -onsumption of energy in Jordan and to increase Government revenues. Electricity prices have been maintained roughly in line with the economic costs of supplying power by a combination of a 10% average tariff adjustment in 1984, further minor adjustments in 1986 and 1988 and a softer international market for petroleum and petroleum products. To increase access to public power supply, especially in the rural areas the power subsector development program for the period 1981-1990 provided for a thermal power station at Aqaba, a transmission link between Aqaba and Amman and electrification of about 300 villages amongst other investments. It is against this background that tne Fourth and Fifth power projects were conceived. II. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION 2.01 The projects, supported by Loans 1986-JO (US$25.0 million) and 2162-JO (US$35.0 million) were made to the Government of Jordan in FY81 and FY82 respectively. For 1986-JO the Government relent US$5.0 million of the  loan proceeds to thw '4.rdan Flectricity Authority (JEA), arid US$20.0 million to the Jordanian Electric Power (ompiatiy UJEPCO); and for 2162-JO, the proceeds of the loan were relent to JEA. 2.02 Project Objectives. The two loans were part of a continuing series of Loans to JEA which began in 1973 and the beginning of Bank lending (Loan 1986-JO) to JEPCO. The primary objective of the Fourth and Fifth Power Project Loans was to help Jordan meet future power demand at least cost to the economy through constru-tion of two 130-MW units at Aqaba and through expansion of power transmission and distribution facilities. They also aimed at improving the quality or power supply services, assisting the country's rural electrification program, continuing the institution building efforts to strengthen JEA as a financially viable and technically efficient entity, and to initiate a similar program of assistance for JEPCO. 2.03 Project Description: The following are the project components as originally appraised: A. Loan 1986-JO (a) JEA Component (i) about 160 km of 132-kV transmission lines to connect Aqaba, Quweira, Subeihi, Asharafiya and Sahab with the national transmission network; (ii) extension and reinforcement of 5 existing transformer substations at Irbid, Bayader, Hussein Power Station, Amman South and Ma'an, and construction of 5 new transformer substations at Subeihi, Ashrafiya, Sahab, Quweira and Aqaba,with a total installed capacity ot about 619 MVA; (iii) electrification of about 30 villages near Karak, Tafilah, Shoubak, Ma'an and Wadi Musa; (iv) consultants' services; and (v) staff training. (b) JEPCO Component (i) extension of the urban distribution network, including about 13 km of 33-kV overhead lines, about 43 km of 33-kV cables, about 140 MVA of 33/11-kV power transformers, equipment and materials for about 120 distribution substations (11/0.4 kV), upgrading the existing 6-kV distribution network to 11-kV and related auxiliaries; (ii) electrification of about 20 villages around Amman; (iii) power supply to three low cost housing developments; (iv) consultants services; (v) organization and management review; and (vi) staff traininig.  -3- (c) Energy Department (MTT) Component: Consultants services to the Energy Department of MIT to help it in strengthening its capabilities in tormulating policies aimed at improving utilization of domestic energy resouLces, energy planning and energy demand management. B. Loan 2162-JO (i) a seawater-cooled steam power station at Aqaba with its first stage to be commissioned in 1986 consisting of two 130-MW oil-fired generating units and accessor.es; (ii) a 400-kV transmission line from Aqaba to Amman, about 320 km long, to be initially operated at 132-kV; and (iii) consultants' services for engineering, erection, supervision, and initial operation. III. CHANGE IN PROJECT SCOPE 3.01 During project execution the following main modifications were made: A. Fourth Power Project - Loan 1986-JO (a) Rural Electrification: Electrification of six additional villages, three by JEA and three by JEPCO. (b) Substations: Two additional substations for Queen Alia International Airport to secure reliability of supply as the original 33-kV substation was inadequate. This resulted in an increase of total installed transformer capacity for the project from 619 MVA estimated at appraisal to 759 MVA; (c) Transmission: The original estimate of the line route was lbO km. When a final survey was made at time of bidding the length was re-estimated at 177.6 km. During implementation, a 22.5-km line was added (Aqaba Thermal to Aqaba Town) to supply Aqaba town loads from the national grid. (d) Energy Department (MIT) - Consultant Services: During project implementation the Government decided not to utilize Bank funds for this activity as alternative funds had been secured under bilatera' aid. On reviewing the results of the consultants studies, it emerged that substantially more work still needed to be covered. It was then decided to finance the additional work under Loan 2371-JO. (B) Fifth Power Proiect - Loan 2162-JO: The main change in project scope was a reduction in the civil works component which resulted in a 10% reduction in the cost of the component or a contribution of about 2% to the project's overall cost savings of 12% (para. 4.03) compaced to appraisal estimates. When the bids were received for this component it emerged that the costs were zubstantially higher than had been anticipated at appraisal. To ensure that adequate foreign exchange financing would be available JEA revised the civil works component and excluded several items which were not regarded  as esseatial for the first stage of the power station. Many of these items had been plannied (in advance of their need) co meet the requirements of the power station upon completion of the proposed second sta,e. IV. PROJECT COSTS 4.01 For both projects actual costs were lower than appraisal estimates. The reasons for the lower project costs are explained in detail below. Loan 1986-JO 4.02 Despite the addition of six more villages, 40.1 km of transmission lines and two substations the total project costs were about 7% lower than the appraisal estimates (Part III, Table 8). Due to intense competition among contractors the costf of the rural electrification component were roughly the same as estimated at appraisal and the costs of the transmission component were 9% lower. In addition, favorable bids for the urban electrification component resulted in actual costs being lower than appraisal estimates by about 20% Only the substations component showed substantial cost increases (about 22% over appraisal estimates) due to the addition of two more substations accounting for the increase in installed capacity from 619 MVA to 759 MVA (23%). The beneficiary organizations are of the opinion that the iniensely competitive market conditions that existed at the time of procurement is one of the maini factors that led to overall lower project costs. JEA Iso felt that the pra tice of splitting project components into multiple conLract packages was another factor contributing to lower costs. Rowever, JEPCO indicates (Part II) that, if carried to an extreme, this practice can have the opposite effect. It should also be noted that although the total project costs were lower, the foreign costs were higher by about 15% resultitng in the Bank loan contributing about 42% of the foreign exchange expenditures instead of the 48% estimated at appraisal. Loan 2162-JO 4.03 Project costs were about 14% lower than anticipated at appraisal (Part III, Table 10). Costs for the Power Station were 9% lower than appraisal estimates mainly due to the reduction in the scope of the civil works components (para 3.01 (B)), and the lower than expected prices for the Boiler Island. The revisecd project costs indicate that the foreign cost requirements of the civil works component would be about US$35.7 million compared to US$S0 million estimated at appraisal. Thus the Bank Loan (US$35.0 million) financed about 98% of the foreign costs of the civil works component compared to 70% estimated at appraisal. 4.04 Costs for the Transmission Line were about 34% lower than appraisal estimates, mainly due to sharp competition among bidders leading to lower than expected contract prices. Furthermore, in the case of the Towers and Erection contract, the specifications called for block type fouadations. However, the contractor's prices were based on the anchor type foundations (which are much cheaper). After much negotiation the contractor agreed to use block type foundation, but the price of the contract remained the same as that estimated on the besis of anchor type foundation.  - r, - V. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION 5.01 Both projects corresponded to clearly defined needs of the Jordanian power system and were based on a clear conceptual foundation, which was for Loan 1986-JO to strengthen and extend the transmission and distribution system of JEA and JEPCO and, for Loan 2162-JO, to increase the generating capacity of JEA and to connect the southern and northern part of the country through a strong transmission link. The concepts involved well-established principles in engineering practice and were well understood and shared by all relevant parties. 5.02 The scope and scale of the prcjects were appropriately chosen in light of their objectives except for some changes such as relocation of substations, changes in the length and routing of some lines, anid the like which are normally expected to occur in the course of such projects. The projects were well prepared and the costs were estimated with reasonable accuracy given the data available at the time of the estimate. The timing of the projects was appropriate although in light of the slowdown of demand growth in Jordan the Aqaba thermal power station has resulted in temporary over-capacity and the transmission line linking Aqaba to Amman is presently underutilized. The full capacity of this line will only be fully used if and when the extension of the Aqaba thermal power station with units 3 and 4 materializes or if the interconnection with Egypt takes place. 5.03 The roles and responsibilities of the institutions and agencies responsible for project implementation were clearly defined and understood and consequently there was no confusion or undue interference in project implementation. 5.04 In retrospect, the accurate design of the projects and the strong internal organization of the implementing agencies with their continuous and careful monitoring of the projects contributed greatly to the successful implementation of the projects. In fact, in some cases, careful procurement procedures resulted in cost savings even though the scope of work was, in certain cases, augumented. The completion of the Aqaba Thermal Power Station within budget, with minimal delay and with a high degree -of technical competence testifies to the strength of JEA's internal organization and project monitoring capability. VI. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Loan 1986-JO 6.01 The project as appraised was expected to be implemented during ctue four year period 1981-84 (JEA component to be completed by December 1983 and JEPCO component by December 1984). Both components suffered a delay of about 24 months (Part III, Table 6). The JEA delays were mainly in awarding the contracts for the erection works due in part to changes in scope of the rural electrification component, delays on the part of the contractor for which he was partially penalized, and delays by JEA in providing planning drawings for some villages. This component was fully completed in December 1985. 6.02 JEPCO's delays were primarily related to procurement, especially during the early implementation of the project. This organization's lack of familiarity with Bank procedures at that time led to major delays in contract award due to the need to modify various specification documents, and a request by the Bank to award -ktitri ts lot-wise to arhieve the greatest cost savings.  6- Other causes for slippage iti implementation schedules were: (i) delays in receipt of municipality maps fcr several of the villages to be eleccrified; (ii) the pending completion of the city center 33 & Il-kV reinforcement program; and (iii) modificatiorn of site layouts by Government for the three new low cost housing developments. This component was fully completed in December 1986. Loan 2162-JO 6.03 The project's implementation was originally scheduled in the period 1982-1986. Difficulties in finalizing cofinancing arrangements, JEA's cumbersome procurement procedures, re-tendering of the civil works contract due to change in scope and a manpower problem related to the hiring of local workers as required by Jordanian law caused initial delays of about 8 months. However, JEA recovered these delays and the main part of the project was completed on time. The first and second units were connected to the grid in March and July 1986 respectively and the plant was commissioned on December 3, 1986. The project was thus substantially completed about one month ahead of the original completion date of December 31, 1986.' 6.04 During negotiations of the Fifth Power Project Loan the Government had undertaken to construct a pipeline between Zarqa and Aqaba by March 31, 1986. The pipeline was intended to provide fuel oil to the power stationi, transfer petroleum products to consumers in Central and Southern Jordan and to transport imported crude oil from the port of Aqaba to the refinery. The pipeline was not part of the project and was not to be financed by the Bank. Due to changes in the Government's assessment of the need for the pipeline it was not constructed. However, non-implementation of the pipeline has not jeopardized the supply of fuel oil to the Aqaba power station as alternative means of transport, by sea and by truck from the refinery have proved adequate. VII. PROJECT RESULTS Loan 1986-JO 7.01 The project implemented under the loan achieved its principal objective, i.e. improved electric supply services to the electricity customers of Jordan through a more extensive, stronger, and more reliable transmission and distribution network. The project's lower total costs, an average electricity tariff which broadly matches the economic cost of supply and a revised economic rate of return of about 9% compared to about 11% estimated at appraisal strongly suggests that the project's objective was met at least cost to the economy. Loan 2162-JO 7.02 In achieving its main obiective of meeting the growing demand for power at least cost to the economy, the project was also expected to benefit the economy by improving power supply services, accelerating regional electrification, strengthening JEA and enhancing energy planning and coordination activities in the sector. The project resulted in the addition of 2x130 MW of oil-fired capacity to the Jordanian generating system. Since total capacity was about 650-MW prior to the Aqaba station commissioning, the project represents growth in installed capacity of 40 which has contributed significantly ir. raising the reserve margin, thus decreasing system I/ Original completion datt (ronmissioning of power plant) as defined in the Loan Agreement was De (-mbe, i, 148b.  -7- unreliability to about 0.4 day/year which is comparable to that prevailing in many developed countries. The 400-kV transmission line from Aqaba to Amman provided the necessary means for evacuation of the Aqaba station power to the largest load center of Lhe country, and connected the southern and northern parts of the country through a strong transmission link. Operating experience with the Aqaba plant hai been excellent from commissioning date (12/3/86) to 11/19/88, unit I and 2 generated (gross) 1,382.1 GWh and 1,405.4 GWh respectively with internal consumption in 1988 representing 9.3 and 9.52 of gross generation respectively. The specific fuel consumption was about 0.22 kg/KWh for both units which translates into about 10 MJ/KWh, a satisfactory figure for heat rate. The efficiency of the station in 1988 was about 40% based on gross generation, and about 36% based on net. The availability of unit I in 1988 was 92.2% whereas of unit 2 was 82.3% which are satisfactory figures. The lower availability of unit 2 was due to a longer planned outage of inspection. The forced outage hours for the units were I hr, 26 mins. and 9 hrs. 26 mins. respectively. Overall the performance of the station has been very satisfactory and substantially in accordance with appraisal expectations.. 7.03 Furthermore, during the course of both projects there were sizeable benefits in the areas of institution building and human resources development. Financial objectives as defined at appraisal were substantially achieved (Part III, Table 14). The economic re-evaluation also shows satisfactory revised economic rates of return of about 22Z for Jordan's investment program during the period 1981-87 and 112 for its rural electrification component financed under Loan 1986-JO compared with the appraisal estimates of 21X, and 9X respectively. For Loan 2162-JO the revised economic rate of return of about 132 also compared favorably with the appraisal estimate of 10.4X. The favorable revised rates of return reflect primarily the lower actual investment costs and the softer international oil prices than at the time the projects were appraised. Institutional Performance 7.04 Prior to these projects Bank Group assistance in the power sector had helped to develop JEA into a well-organized and well-managed semi-autonomous public utility that is both efficient and financially viable. The projects under review assisted JEA to maintain the quality and reliability of services, to extend services to new consumers, develop a core staff, through training programs and working with consultants and Bank staff, that is capable of undertaking most of its functions with minimal outside help. During the course of project implementation, JEA decided not to utilize consultant services on the rural electrification component as adequate in-house capability had been developed to undertake the work. JEA has also developed its accounting and financial management systems substantially, enabling it to finance reasonably high levels of its investments from internal sources. 7.05 For the first time Bank assistance in the power sector was also extended to a mixed public-private sector distribution company,'' JEPCO. The main contributions to institutional strengthening of JEPCO were: (a) the organization and management review undertaken by consultants and implemented by JEPCO (Part III, Table 15); (b) broadening of the scope of JEPCO's training program; and (c) exposure of its staff to international procurement practices. 1/ About 77% of JEPCO's share capital is owned by the public, 13% by JEA and 10X by municipalities.  -8- Training 7.06 Under the Fourth Power Project, both JEA's and JEPCO's training programs were reviewed to identify areas where training was most needed; strengthen the training departments within the institutions; ensure that training facilities available within Jordan (such as the University of Jordan and the Institute of Public Administration) were used, and identify areas where training abroad could be most beneficial. 7.07 JEA staff (under the Third Power Project - Loan 1688-JO), had prepared a comprehensive training plan covering the Authority's needs in the period 1980-1983. Under the Fourth Power Project this training program was reviewed, for the 1981-83 period, and recommendations made for its improvement. JEA decided to give greater priority to training for administrative and financial/accoun-ting personnel. The Fourth Power Project included training of 15 of JEA's management, technical and financial staff. 7.08 Before the Fourth Power Ptoject JEPCO's training programs had been carried out in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. These programs were geared toward technical aspects such as cable laying, jointing, and installation of switchgear and associated equipment. Although the training programs were satisfactory, it was felt that further efforts were needed to intensify JEPCO's training activities and prepare comprehensive staff training programs covering all basic training needs. Under Loan 1986-JO, JEPCO, with the help of a Bank training specialist, prepared a program for th