India - Bihar Rural Roads Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 8256 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA BIHAR RURAL ROADS PROJECT (CREDIT 1072-IN) DECEMBER 29, 1989 Transport and Energy Operations Division Country Department IV Asia Regional Office This document bas a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Countrv Exchanee Rates (Yearly Averages) Currency and (Abbreviation) Rupee (Rp) Year RuBees/USS 1978 (Project Preparation Starts) 8.19 1979 8.13 1980 (Project Appraised and Approved) 7.86 1981 (Project Becomes Effective) 8.66 1982 9.45 1983 10.10 1984 11.36 1985 12.37 1986 12.61 1987 12.96 1988 (Project Completed) 14.60 Government of India Fiscal Year April 1 - March 31 Abbreviations BCR Borrower Completion Report ERR Economic Rate of Return IDA International Development Association PCR Project Completion Report of the World Bank PWD Public Works Department REO Rural Engineering Organization SAR Staff Appraisal Report of the World Bank TEC Technical Examiner's Cell of the Audit Dept. in Bihar's Chief Minister's Office  FOR OMCIAL U ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. ofk*c of Ov.cl-aw.mai Opwrat0 e ivoaubn December 29, 1989 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Bihar Rural Roads Proiect (Credit 1072-IN) Attached, for information is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on India Bihar Rural Roads Project (Credit 1072-IN)" prepared by the Asia Regional Office. Further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. Attachment This document has a tcstticed distribution and may be used by recipients ony in the perfonnce of their oflicial duties Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Worl Bnk authormution.  FoR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT INDIA BIHAR RURAL ROADS PROJECT (CREDIT 1072-INK TABLE QF CONTENTS Plat No Preface . Evaluation Sumary ................ ,. , .i. Part I Project Review From Bank's Perspective 1 Project Identity . .. Background .... Project Objectives and Description.. 1 Project Design and Organization ... 2 Project Implemtation. ... 4 Project Results... 6 Project Sustainability.. . 7 Conclusions ......................................... 7 Part II Project Review From Borrower's Perspective ........... 9 Part III Statistical Summary.. 10 Project Data. ..... .. .. . .... . .. . 10 Project Timetable .. .10 Related Bank Loans and Credits . .10 Project Finnces . .11 Expected and Actual Costs and Expenditures. 11 Expected and Actual Cumulative Disbursements.. 12 Expected and Actual Economic impact . . .12 Staff InPut ....12 Field Mission Data..... 13 Expected and Actual Civil Works Constrctn and Costs. 14 Expected and Actual Equipment Purchasec and Costs... 17 ATTACHMENT I Borrower's Comments ...... 18 MAPS IJDD 141878 Project loads - North Bihar IBRD 15088 Project Roads - South Bihar IBRD 15089 Project Roads - Chotanagpur & Santhal This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in thec pefonuance of their official duties. Its contents maY not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA BIHAR RURAL ROADS PROJECT (CREDIT 1072-IN) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Bihar Rural Roads Project in India, for which Credit 1072-IN in the amount of SDR 35.0 million (US$50.0 million equivalent) was approved in November, 1980. The last disbursement from the credit account was made on April 18, 1989 at which time the Credit was closed, three years behind schedule. This PCR was prepared by the Transport and Energy Operations Division, Country Department IV, of the Asia Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). The Bank sent the Borrower Parts I and III with the request to prepare Part II, but none was received. Preparation of this PCR was started during the Bank's final supervision mission of the project in October 1988, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the President's Report, all legal documents on the project including the Loan, Guarantee and Project Agreements, Bank supervision reports, Bank records and files, and interviews with Bank staff familiar with the project.  ii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA BIHAR RURAL ROADS PROJECT (CREIT 1072-INli EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives The main objective of the project was to provide all-weather access to farms and villages and thus complement other investments financed by IDA ( addressing chiefly institutional and agricultural needs) (paras. 2 and 3). The project was expected to allow the full unfolding of all possible benefits resulting from those investments (SAR, para. 4.02) in addition to producing an improvement in rural road construction and maintenance tech- niques. Implementation Experience Of a total of 742 km sanctioned to be constructed or improved under the project, a total of 733 km of earthworks were completed. 712 km of consolidation works were done and 688 km of roads vere black-topped. This compares with appraisal expectations of a total of 725 km of completed road- works (paras. 12 and 13). Proiect Results It was an achievement in itself that the physical results of the project were as expected, as in terms of quality of the final output the project has turned out to be quite different from appraisal expectations. As verified by the completion mission, many roads have failed prematurely or are in an advanced state of deterioration and will therefore, unless imediate remedial measures are taken, fail very soon. This means that the roads as constructed are not likely to last sufficiently to accumulate enough benefits to justify the investments in them (para. 14). These results are the consequence of both design and workmanship shortcomings (para. 15) and a lax and permissive supervision and quality controls (para. 25). Sustainability The short life of the roads coupled with the lack of an effective maintenance system do not bode well for the sustainability of project benefits (para. 26). Findings and Lessons Learned Project tesults highlight the need for improved quality control and supervision, and to improve construction techniques and methods. All are heavily dependent on the training of road engineers and work-site foremen. However, persistent efforts by the Bank to arrange overseas training courses have failed in the past because the Government has felt it unnecessary for road engineers to travel abroad. Trivial as it may appear, overseas training is essential to obtaining better results (para. 28). Rural roads project should not be viewed lightly but as technically complex civil works, which should be done by the best available professionals.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA BIHAR RURAL ROADS PROJECT (CREDIT lO72-IN) PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PZRSPECTIVE Project Identity Project Name Bihar Rural Roads Ln/Cr Number Credit 1072-IN RVP Unit Asia Country India Sector Transport Subsector Highways Background 1. The state of Bihar is the ninth largest, the second most populous and the poorest of India. In the Late 1970s, when the project was identified, it had about 65 million people. 85? of whom depended on agriculture for their subsistence. Of the 17.4 million hectares of the state, 10.6 million were es- tiuiated to be suitable for cultivation and 8.7 million were actually used. The area under cultivation had remained practically the same for over a decade. and with population pressures and a skewed distribution of holdings, the median size of farms had become less than one hectars while the minimum neces- sary to feed an average family in the state was estimated to be between 2.0 and 2.5 hectares. Considering the presence of over 7 million landless rural workers, it was estimated that some 752 of the state's population existed be- low the poverty line. 2. The lack, and inadequacy of village and intermediate level roads was identified, along with other shortcomings, as a serious impediment to increasing agricultural production and bringing farmers from subsistence farming into a market economy. Institutional and agricultural needs were being addressed under other IDA credits (Bihar Agricultural Credit, Bihar A&ricultural Markets, Bihar Agricultural Research and Extension projects, Second National Seeds and the National Diary projects). A project to improve access by building and improving rural roads was therefore considered a logical, complementary step. Pro1ect Obiectives and DescriPtion 3. The main objective of the project was to provide all-weather ac- cess to farms and villages so that the full benefit of complementary invest- ments (para. 2 above) could be realized (Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), para. 4.02). To this end the project included the construction, improvement and strengthening of about 700 km of rural roads (SAR, paras. 4.03 (i), 4.04 and 4.05). 4. The project was also intended to produce an improvement in rural road construction and maintenance techniques (SAR, paras. 2.12 to 2.14). To this end the project included the procurement of road construction and main-  tenance equipment (SAR, paras. 4.03 (iii) and 4.08), and a phased program of road mainter.arce (SAR, paras. 4.03 (ii), 4.06 and 4.07). In addition, it was agreed to uue a strict approach to quality control and technical auditing of the works, the latter to be done by the Technical Examiner's Cell (TEC) in the Audit Department of Bihar's Chief Minister Office. 5. Techniques to build rural roads in Bihar were typically labor intensive. They were found acceptable by the Bank, but in order to reduce the risk of premature failure it recommended to: (i) apply intensive checks and quality controls, (ii) adhere strictly to the published Indian standards, (iii) use mechanical equipment rather than time and weathering to compact earthworks, and (iv) use simple cost saving equipment to apply the expensive stone chips and asphalt (SAR, para. 2.12). A major impediment to proper quality control and improved supervision was the shortage of laboratory equipment and of light vehicles to reach the construction sites. Therefore, under the project, equipmtnt for surveying, for materials testing, and to set up four mobile laboratories was to be procured. and 4 four-wheel drive vehicles (one per laboratory) and 48 light vehicles were to be purchased (SAR, para. 4.08). Similarly, considerable quantities of rollers, asphalt mixers, bitumen kettles, power bitumen distributors and manual pumps were to be procured. 6. The project was initially also intended to improve the efficiency of farm-to-market transport by assisting farmers to replace their steel rimmed wooden wheel bullock carts with rubber tired carts. Considerable effort was invested in researching the issue, it was determined that rubber tired carts were two to three times more efficient than the wooden wheel variety, and that their use would allow farmers, in addition to higher farmgate prices, obtain a considerable proportion of the reduction in transport costs. A project com- ponent to assist the technological change and ensure a fuller materialization, and more equitable distribution of project benefits was, thus, originally in- cluded. However, it was later dropped at negotiations for lack of internal Bank agreement on how to manage the component. Project Design and Organization 7. The project was meticulously prepared and considerable effort was spent in ensuring that a fair and reasonable choice was made of the roads to be included, based on economic priorities. The original proposal compiled by District and Block development committees included 3,000 different roads ag- gregating 1,900 km; using a simple methodology and broad assumptions the length was reduced to 1,570 km and 252 routes, and by using more refined tech- niques, developed specifically for this project by Bank staff and which used mostly readily available information, the sample of best candidates was reduced to the list in the SAR (Table 6) which had 165 road sections and a total of 725 km. 8. Given the emphasis that the Government of India placed at the time on the development of village and rural roads, the techniques used to assess priorities (among the large number of competing road sections) were expected to becoue a model for subsequent rural road projects, whether financed by the Bank or not. Indeed, monitoring closely the effects of road construction and  3 betterment (on agricultural output, prices, marketing methods, and other socio-economic developments, particularly education, health and overall mobility) was expected to alLow improving the methods used to appraise future projects. However, monitoring, although pa t of the project, was minimally funded under it and mostly left to the Goverament of Bihar to handle. Bank interest ins the monitoring of project developments, although strong in the beginning (1981-1984), eventually waned. 9. Twelve road sections studied earlier during project praparation were included in a baseline survey of socio-economic conditions and mobility patterns, part of what the Bihar authorities undertook to monitor and evaluate under the project. The Sinha Institute of Social Studies in Patna was con- tracted to do the survey and Bank staff actively assisted in designing the questionnaires and later assessing the results. A similar survey to be carried out some years after road construction to assess the impact of the project, had not been done when the project was completed (1988). Thus, des- pite the acceptance of the need to continue the quantum jump that project pre- paration had meant for project evaluation and assessment techniques, there is little evidence that subsequent projects have significantly benefited from these developments. 10. Some interesting findings came out of the baseline survey. For instance, it was determined that traffic increased considerably after the roads were improved, but the increase was mostly non-motorized (bullock carts and bicycles, 652) and pedestrian movements (302). Motorized traffic in- creased only 5Z. Moreover, the increase was predominantly people (85X) as opposed to goods (15Z). Thus, it could be inferred that project benefits would derive more from increased personal mobility, and perhaps better employ- ment opportunities away from the farms, than from increases in the value or volume of agricultural production. Further substantiation of this hypothesis and a detailed evaluation of the appraisal techniques has not been possible for lack of follow up monitoring. 11. Execution of the project was the responsibility of the Rural Engineering Organization (REO), which set up a specially staffed Project Cell to manage it. Procedures to carry out the project were well defined. so were the standards to prequalify contractors, to bid, and to award contracts. The standards to design, execute, control and supervise the works were the normal Bihar Public Works standrrds as contained in their codes since 1948. At the time of negotiations about 50t of the final engineering designs had been com- pleted, they had been reviewed and found acceptable. This was enough for over a year of work and the rest of the designs were to be prepared as the project progressed. The project broke no new ground, was not innovative in any way, and no particular risks other than poor maintenance and unforeseeable floods were identified as likely to jeopardize its outcome. The limited ability of the REO to supervise the execution of the works according to standards was also foreseen as a possible cause of nonsuccess but this risk was expected to be overcome.  4 Pro1ect Imolementation 12. On July 31, 1988, of a total 742 km sanctioned to be constructed or improved under the project, a total of 733 km of earthworks had been comp- leted, 712 km of consolidation had been done and 688 km had been black-topped; of 1600 pipe culverts and 132 box culverts, 1517 and 114 respectively had been built; of 82 bridges 64 had been completed. Total expenditures on roadworks were Rs. 450.1 million; in addition, other expenditures including plant and equipment purchases (Rs. 47.0 m), and planning, supervision. and monitoring expenditures (Rs. 23.5 m) raised total estimated expenditures to Rs. 520.6 million (equivalent to USS 45.7 m)(see Part III page 11, Expected and Actual Cost and Expenditure Tables). Costs of completing yet unfinished works would have to be added to this total. 13. This compares with appraisal expectations of 725 km worth a total of Rs. 382.3 million; plant and equipment, and surveying and testing equipment purchases worth Rs. 39.9 million; and planning, supervision and monitoring costs of Rs. 22.2 million; for a total project cost of Rs. 444.3 million. To be strictly comparable, however, these figures would have to be adjusted to reflect comparable physical targets and Rupee values to the works as carried out and the expenditures as incurred. Still. roughly, roadworks turned out to be about 15Z costlier than expected at appraisal in Rupees and slightly cheap- er than expected in US dollars (including all taxes and contingencies). 14. It is an achievement in itself that the physical results of the project were close to appraisal expectations. as the project was carried out under trying conditions. The State of Bihar was affected frequently by severe floods. one of the conditions foreseen to possibly affect project results. Yet, in terms of quality of the final output the project has turned out to be considerably different from appraisal expectations. Although it was not ex- pected that the project would bring about radical changes in the road cons- truction and maintenance techniques used in Bihar, it was expected to build roads of a quality that would last about ten years under normal traffic and weathering conditions. Instead, as verified by the completion mission (technical audits as required contractually to be done by the Technical ExAminer's Cell, see para. 4. were not done), many roads have failed prema- turely or are in an advanced state of deterioration and will therefore, unless immediate remedial measures are taken, fail very soon. This means that the roads as constructed are not likely to last sufficiently to accumulate enough benefits to ensure that the rates of return of the investment in them will be similar to appraisal expectations. 15. These results are the consequence of both design and workmanship shortcomings. For example, the embankments of several road sections in areas subject to flooding have been built too low, and no protection works such as encasing in clay or turfing were provided for, nor was there sufficient cross- drainage. Roads were built without the appropriate camber and shoulders of 1.75 m were not built on all the roads. In addition, there was a general lack of adequate compaction of subgrades and embankments which resulted in early failures particularly when the roads were subject to the effect of annual floods or heavy vehicles. Potholes and early cracking of the rather thin  5 bituminous carpet was largely the result of overheating the bitumen and the lack of control over the mixing and laying of the carpets. 16. The results are also consistent with the generalized use of static rollers in Bihar, which are particularly ineffective in the terrain and soil conditions prevalent in Bihar. Although the project made provision for the purchase of rollers, only static rollers were bought and instead of limiting their number to the 67 originally included in the project a total of 122 were bought. In contrast, considerably fewer pieces ef equipment were procured, which would have enhanced the quality of the end result. For instance, 2 instead of 13 asphalt mixera, 57 instead of 87 bitumen kettles, none instead of 2 bitumen preheaters and distributors, 14 instead of 54 concrete mixers and 9 instead of 25 concrete vibrators were bought. More widespread use of asphalt mixers to replace the current practice of heating the bitumen drums over open wood fires and mixing the stone chips and bitumen by hand, would have substantially improved the quality of the roads. 17. The results raise questions on the continued use of exclusively labor based construction techniques in cases where, as in Bihar, very expen- sive materials are handled such as bitumen and stone (which, in addition to their high value were, not unusually, transported for hundreds of kilometers). In these cases some degree of mechanization (for example the use of vibrating rollers and bitumen preheaters and mixers), as was expected to be used in the project, is needed to make the best possible use of the expensive components of the road structure. 18. Problems were compounded by the limited technical capacity of contractors and the lack of skilled foremen on the jobs. In such cases con- tractors rely heavily on the Government (PWD) for supervision and quality control, two elements on which considerable emphasis was placed during project preparation. Yet, these were not satisfactory. This was partly the result of a shortfall in the number of vehicles procured for the supervision crews, which was compounded by the limited number and use made of laboratory and other monitoring equipment acquired with the assistance of the credit. Also, despite provision in the project, none of the 75 REO officers that were to be trained either at, or by CRRI on the use of modern construction equipment, on improved standards of road construction and on quality control, got the neces- sary training. 19. In addition, when the volume of work picked up in late 1982 and a Bank mission identified a number of serious technical construction deficien- cies which were reported as requiring urgent action and possibly jeopardizing the project, the Bank took an extremely soft stand and just gently reminded the Borrower of its contractual obligations. A stronger stand was necessary at that critical moment. Moreover, during the next construction season (1982- 1983) when close to 50 of the total length built under the project was com- pleted, no supervision mission visited Bihar. In fact, there were no super- vision missions during the key construction period from November 1982 until March 1984. P  6 20. The high costs (for Indian standards) of the roads (over US$50,000 per km) also give cause for concern. This result is consistent with the use of expensive materials, in particular stone as opposed to other locally avail- able materials, and of disproportionately expensive qtructures (for instance, on the 16 km road from Bhabhua Jahanabad to the junction with National Highway 2 near Kudra, where there is hardly any traffic, a half a million dollar bridge was built. rhe result clearly reflects also an insufficient effort to locate alternative sources of paving materials. and a lack of flexibility to use alternative construction techniques to make better use of those materials. Efforts in this direction should have been made under the project. as this shortcoming had been identified during project preparation. 21. Under the project the Government of Bihar agreed to have imple- mented through REQ a program of road maintenance that by June 30, 1986 would have ensured that REO's network was receiving proper maintenance (Project Agreement Section 3.02). There is no evidence that this plan and the conse- quent maintenance were put in place. While this was also foreseen to possibly jeopardize the materialization of the benefits of the project, it is now certain that this was the case. There is little hope that the roads may be made to last longer through appropriate maintenance actions. simply because the mechanisms to do it are not in place. In addition, the funding that was expected to be allocated for maintenance every year was considerably less than agreed at appraisal. The expected use of contractors for most maintena3ce, including a range of routine maintenance operations (SAR, para. 4.07), does not seem to have materialized and therefore maintenance prospects for the roads are not suspicious. Project Results 22. In retrospect, the overly confident assessment of REO's capability to manage the project, properly supervise the execution of the works according to standards, and its ability and will tc put in place the maintenance program essential to uphold the integrity of the roads, were the immediate cause of the significant variance observed between appraisal expectations and actual results. However, REO's lack of capacity to satisfactorily carry out the project, was paralleled by an insufficient dedication to supervision on the part of the Bank. The amount of time the Bank allocated to project super- vision contrasts starkly with the amount of time devoted to preparing and appraising the project: 54 staffweeks over 8 years, against 114.5 staffweeks concentrated in little over two years. In other words, less than half the effort that was dedicated to preparing the project was spent in ensuring that it was carried out properly. 23. Project results are reason for concern because if they occur under the rather favorable circumstances of a specially staffed World Bank Project Cell, what then can be expected of REO's considerable number of rural roads built outside Bark assisted projects, which had no specially staffed super- visory Cell ? Between 1983 and 1988, concurrent with the execution of the project, REO built 4,200 km of rural roads under the Minimum Needs Program and about 6,700 km under the Rural Landless Employment Generation Program, both funded by the Central Government. Altogether, about Rs. 1,820 million (about  7 USS 150 million) were spent under the first program, and Rs. 1,040 million (about USS 85 million) under the second. 24. Similarly, what was the result of Bank assisted rural road cons- truction under irrigation and other agriculture projects (see Part III, Related Bank Loans and Projects) which received much less specialized. professional supervisory attention than this one ? Rural roads built under irrigation projects, for instance, are normally entrusted to irrigation engineers who often give the roads little importance and in many cases are not knowledgeable about roads. It is estimated that no less than 11,500 km were built throughout India under irrigation projects assisted by the Bank, an investment of about USS 585 million if costs were comparable to those incurred under this project. Information from supervision reports for those projects point to results as poor as those obtained under this project. 25. It is unfortunate that standards of quality control have failed to reach acceptable levels. Bank efforts to improve them go back many years. For instance, as the project was being prepared, Bank engineers and a special engineering consultant observed that "without implying incompetence on their part, Indian road engineers appear to have come to accept as normal a totally inefficient system of working. Most of the younger engineers have never ex- perienced the proper planning and execution of works. They have been encour- aged in the false belief that rural roads require little technology and no quality control, and that earthworks consist of nothing more than spreading mhatever earth is readily available along the alignment and leaving nature to consolidate the embankment over a period of time. The standards for struc- tural concrete can, similarly be described as poor". Harsh comments these may be, but unfortunately there are thousands of kilometers of rural roads and thousands of structures to confirm them. The project was supposed to have improved the situation but results show otherwise. Project Sustainability 26. The short life of the roads coupled with the lack of an effective maintenance system to prolong the efficient use of the assets, do not bode well for the sustainability of project benefits. In some villages the availa- bility of a better access road may have created permanent beneficial changes, higher mobility and with it access to better health and education facilities in the larger towns. Also, markets for village farmers may have expanded. However, to satisfy those now more permanent expectations the shortlived better road may impose on villagers a considerably higher costs, for a much longer time, than was the case before the roads were built. Conclusion 27. In retrospect, although the project's physical results were close to expectations, it seems to have yielded a very low, perhaps negative rate of return because (i) the quality of the construction was poor, (ii) the short life of the roads did not allow the accumulation of sufficient benefits to offset the high construction costs, and (iii) improved maintenance practices and programs designed to preserve the integrity of the physical investments have not been put in place. That the project made no direct provision for  8 maintenance and relied on the Government to put the system in place. seems to have been a significant shortcoming. So were the rather limited supervisory effort provided by the Bank, and the minimal effort and inadequate implement- ation capacity displayed by the REO. Closer, more pointed, and better quality control by the REO would, no doubt. have avoided the poor workmanship, while closer supervision and a firmer stand by the Bank on technical deficiencies observed during construction would have improved construction techniques. Both would have resulted in longer road life and higher rates of return. 28. The solutioui to the quality control lies in the training of road engineers and work-site foremen. Persistent efforts by the Bank to arrange overseas training courses for road engineers have failed in the past because the Government has considered it unnecessary for road engineers to travel abroad. Trivial as it may appear, overseas training is essential to obtaining better results, particularly because few Indian road engineers have been ex- posed to well designed, well controlled and well executed road projects. In addition. exposure to overseas practices could lead to a more flexible ap- proach to rural road design specifications, away from relying almost exclu- sively on crushed stone and more adapted to using locally available materials. Future rural road projects should place heavy emphasis on assisting with the effort necessary to improve construction techniques and methods, and on the need to train engiueers overseas. 29. These needs are highlighted by the experience of this project which epitomizes the inconsistency of doing projects on a shoestring with less than the most competent staff. Since most rural road projects are carried out on minimal budgets, the use of nothing but the most highly qualified engineers is a necessity if adequate results are sought, only their talent and abilities will compensate, through the adaptation of techniques and methods, for the lack of money. In the future, rural road projects should not be viewed light- ly but as what they are, technically complex civil works, which should be done by the best available professionals.  9 PART II PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE This part has not become available. Written comments by the Planning Commission, New Delhi, on Parts I and III are reproduced as Attachment I.  10 PART III STATISTICAL SUMMARY Project Data RVP Unit Asia Sector Transport Subsector Highways Borrower Government of India Executing Agency State of Bihar's Rural Engineering Organization Fiscal Year of Borrower April 1st - March 1st Project Timetable Original Actual Plan First Mention in Files 1/78 Government's Application - - Appraisal 3/80 3180 Negotiations 9/80 9/80 Board Approval 11/80 11/80 Credit Agreement Date 12180 12/80 Effectiveness Date 1181 1/81 Project Completion Date 6/85 6/88 Closing Date 6/86 6/88 Related Bank Loans and/or Credits Title Purpose Yr. Approved Status Kadana Irrigation Irrigationlrural roads 1970 Completed Chambal Cmd. Area Dev. Irrigation/rural roads 1974 Completed Rajasthan Cmd. Area D. Irrigation/rural roads 1975 Completed Chambal Cmd. Area Dev. Irrigation/rural roads 1975 Completed Andra Prdsh. Cmd. Area Irrigation/rural roads 1976 Completed Periyar Irrigation Irrigation/rural roads 1977 Completed Maharashtra Irrigation Irrigation/rural roads 1978 Completed Karnataka Irrigation Irrigation/rural roads 1978 Completed Haryana Irrigation Irrigation/rural roads 1979 Completed Maharashtra Irrgtn.II Irrigation/rural roads 1979 Completed Madhya Prdsh. Irrgtn. Irrigation/rural roads 1981 Active Chambal Irrigation Irrigation/rural roads 1982 Active Haryana Irrgtn. I1 Irrigation/rural roads 1983 Active Gujarat Rural Roads Rural roads 1987 Active  Proiect Finances Original Actual or Item Expectation Reestimate Credit Amount (SDR mln) 38.0 26.7 Credit Amount (USS mln eqvlnt) 50.0 35.0 Disbursed (USS mln eqvlnt)(5/89) 35.0 29.7 Cancelled (USS mln eqvlnt)(5/89) 0 0.1 Repaid (USS mln eqvlnt)(5189) 0 0 Outstanding (USS mln eqvlnt)(5/89) 35.0 32.9 Project Costs (USS m1n eqvlnt) 52.9 45.7 11 Expected and Actual Costs and Expenditures 2/ Appraisal Cost Estimate Actual Expenditures Rs million USS million Rs million USS million Item Local Foreiqn Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Construction & Imprvmnt 3/ 334.9 47.4 382.3 39.9 5.6 45.5 - - 419.4 - - 36.8 Rsrve Schd /- - - - - - - - 30.7 - 2.7 SUB TOTAL - 334.9 47.4 382.3 39.9 5.6 45.5 - - 450.1 - - 39.5 Equipment & Spares 33.4 6.5 39.9 4.0 0.8 4.8 - - 47.0 - - 4.1 Supervision 20.4 1.8 22.2 2.4 0.2 2.6 - - 23.5 - - 2.1 TOTAL 388.7 55.7 444.4 46.3 6.6 52.9 - - 520.6 - - 45.7 Sources: World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, October 1980 Rural Engineering Organization, Draft Project Completion Report, October 1988 1/ Actual expenditures. However, items are not strictly comparable with those appraised. 21 Including taxes, and price and quantity contingencies. 3/ Excluding construction and upgradings in the reserve schedule of the appraisal report or those done but not appraised. 4/ Reserve Schedule of the appraisal and other works not expected at ap- praisal.  12 Expected and Actual Cumulative Disbursements (USS million) FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 51 Estimated 0.7 8.3 18.2 27.9 35.0 - - - - Actual 0.4 1.3 10.6 13.3 19.1 22.0 22.6 26.9 28.3 Actual/Est. (Z) 57 16 59 48 55 63 65 77 81 Expected and Actual Economic Impact Appraisal Estimated Estimate Actual Economic Rate of Return 21 Z 0 Z 6/ Staff Input (Staff-Weeks) FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY!35 Preparation 3.5 14.4 53.2 - - - - - Appraisal - - 32.1 11.3 - - - - Negotiations - - - 12.3 - - - - Supervision - - - 5.5 4.7 4.2 6.3 4.4 completion - - - - - - - - GRAND TOTAL 3.5 14.4 85.3 29.1 4.7 4.2 6.3 4.4 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 TOTAL Preparation - - - - 71.1 Appraisal - _ _ _ 43.4 Negotiations - - - - 12.3 Supervision 11.1 9.9 7.9 - 54.0 Completion - - - 8.7 8.7 GRAND TOTAL 11.1 9.9 7.9 8.7 189.5 5/ To February, 1989. 6/ An actual ERR for the project could not be calculated for lack of data: however, since the roads as constructed did not last sufficiently to accumulate enough benefits to justify the investment in them, the rate of return of the project is estimated to be very low, perhaps negative.  13 Field Mission Data Month/ No.of No.of Staff Report Item Year Persons Weeks Weeks Date Identification 1J78 1 1 1.0 3178 Identification 6178 1 1 1.0 8/78 Preparation 9/78 3 1 2.0 10178 Preparation 5/79 1 1 1.C 5179 Preparation 6/79 2 1 2.0 7179 Preparation 8/79 1 1 1.0 9/79 Preparation 10/79 1 1 1.0 12179 Preparation 10/79 1 4 4.0 12179 Preparation 10/79 4 2 8.0 12/79 SubTotal 22.0 Appraisal 3/80 2 3 6.0 4/80 Supervision I 11/80 1 1 1.0 1/81 Supervision II 3/81 1 .2 0.2 4/81 Supervision III 6/81 1 1 1.0 7/81 Supervision IV 10/81 2 .6 1.2 11/81 Supervision IV 10/81 1 1 1.0 11/81 Supervision V 5/82 1 1 1.0 6/82 Supervision VI 11/82 1 1 1.0 12/82 Supervision VII 3/84 2 .5 1.0 3/84 Supervision VIII 3/85 1 1 1.0 4/85 Supervision IX 1/86 1 1 1.0 2/86 Supervision X 5/86 1 .4 0.4 5/86 Supervision XI 8186 1 1 1.0 8/86 Supervision XII 2/87 2 1 2.0 5/87 SubTotal 12.8 Completion 10188 2 2 4.0 12188 Completion 3/89 1 .4 0.4 5189 SubTotal 2.4 GRAND TOTAL 45.2  14 Expected and Actual Civil Works Construction and Costs (km and Rs'OOOs) Route I District Road Section Appraisal Actual Estimate Execution km Rs km Rs N/BEG/2K Begusarai Bhairwar to Gorganwa 1.0 505 N/BEG/3K Begusarai Phulvaria to NH31 Jctn 2.0 1,004 1.8 1,388 N/BET/1K W. Champaran Binwalia to Chengauna 2.0 1,034 1.4 998 N/BET/3K W. Champaran Mathura to Pirari 13.2 6,583 12.4 7,534 N/BET14K U. Champaran Sargatia Link Road 5.0 2,550 5.0 2,626 N/BET/5K W. Champaran Rudalpurpaterwa to Dumri 3.5 1,984 3.4 2,105 N/BET/6K W. Champaran Baqhambarpurto to Rampurwa 5.0 3,049 6.0 4,694 N/BET/7K W. Champaran Mahespur to Basurari 6.4 3,173 7.0 3,950 N/BET/8K W. Champaran Kaitwalia to Chanby Tola 6.0 3,065 6.4 3,818 N/BET/10K W. Champaran Jagdisphur to Mach Harganwa 16.5 8,786 16.2 9,313 N/BET/IIK W. Champaran Gawchari to Narjadwa St. 8.0 4,647 6.6 4,494 N/BET/12K W. Champaran Narkatiaganj to Balthar 12.0 7,357 19.4 10,824 N/BIR/IK Saharsa Charne to PWD Road Jctn 10.0 6,673 10.0 8,043 N/BIR/2K Saharsa Piprahi to arnmotra 10.0 5,606 9.6 7,894 N/BIR/5K Saharsa Birpur to Baurahia 7.0 7,944 7.0 10,246 N/MADHE/1K Saharsa Link Road to Majaura 3.0 2,117 3.0 2,247 N/fADHE/2K Saharsa Rajpur to Shahidpur 12.0 8,234 13.5 8,438 N/MADHE/3K Saharsa Litiahi to BaiJnathapur 35.0 20,009 32.8 21,925 N/NADHE/5K Saharsa Tikulia to Lakshmipur 8. 10.0 8,473 10.0 8,446 N/MOT/1K E. Champaran Kushar to Khizirpur 1.0 448 1.0 563 N/MOT/2K E. Champaran Pataura*ola B. to Boswaria 3.0 1,341 3.0 2,133 N/MOT/4K E. Champaran Madubani Viliq. Link 2.0 892 2.0 998 N/IOT/SK E. Champaran Ranjita to Oudhahi 2.0 892 2.0 1,678 N/HOT/6K E. Champaran Tajpur to Sundarpur 2.0 1,030 2.0 1,136 N/MOT/8K E. Champaran Siswania to Sinhasini 3.0 1,491 3.0 3,656 N/MOT/9K E. Champaran Kanchedwa to Paparyia 2.0 1,003 2.0 1,435 N/HOT/18K E. Champaran Areraj to Bariaria 9.0 6.508 9.0 6,905 N/HOT/19K E. Champaran Bhuwa Chopra to Koilabelwa 3.0 1,505 3.0 2,410 N/MOT/21K E. Champaran Siswa Narsing to Puran Ch. 6.0 3,519 6.0 3,935 N/MOT/22K E. Champaran Nananpur M. to Siswa K. 5.0 2,905 4.6 2,744 N/SAH/3K Saharsa Pama to BishuDur 23.3 14,352 24.5 15,311 N/SAH/4K Saharsa Patarghat to Gulam 6.0 3,969 6.0 4,406 N/SAH/1K Samastipur Chand Chauk to Baikunth 4.0 1,607 4.1 2,835 N/SAR/3P Saran Man"hi to Barauli 14.5 7,736 20.2 16,911 N/SIK/3K E. Champaran Patahijado to Kodaria M. 5.0 2,728 5.0 5,249 N/SIW/IP Siwan Gopalgani to Naharajganj 25.6 12,348 25.5 12,435 N/SI/2P Siwan anjhi to Barauli 30.2 19,026 34.1 20,620 N/SIU/3P Siwan Mairwa to Kuchaikot 12.8 6,511 13.1 8,076 N/SUP/IK Saharsa Jaolia to Purnea Border 18.0 11,452 12.5 7,230 N/SUP/3K Saharsa Kankar to Patti 30.0 25,598 N/SUP/2K Saharsa Mangani to Pilwaha 5.0 3,232 6.5 5,351 N/SUP/4K Saharsa Parsami to Chikini 16.0 10,759 15.9 12,523 Sub Total North Bihar 396.0 243,645 376.5 257,523  15 S/AUR/3K Aurangabad Kasma to Arthna 3.0 2,156 3.0 2,311 SIAUR/4K Aurangabad Feshar to Unthu 4.9 1,679 4.9 1,988 S/AUR/6K Aurangabad Lata to State Road Jctn 9.0 4,196 8.6 4,276 S/AUR/7K Aurangabad Haria to Bariawan 2.0 792 3.1 1,935 SIAUR/8K Aurangabad Bariawan to REO Road Jctn 1.3 510 1.3 519 SIAUR/9K Aurangabad Hanspura to 6obardhanpur 2.8 1,140 2.0 1,022 S/AUR/IIK Aurangabad Bel to Pauthu 15.5 5,315 16.6 7,838 S/AUR/12K Aurangabad Jailwan to Mahuwan 4.0 1,831 4.1 2,292 S/AUR/16K Aurangabad Bhupatpur to Kachanpur 3.9 1,976 3.9 2,405 S/AUR/17K Aurangabad Hadanpur to Umga 5.6 1,707 5.1 2,101 S/AUR/18K Augangabad Berhni to Pachokhar Banua 9.5 5,147 9.5 4,414 SIBANI1K Bhagalpur Ohauni to State Road 1.0 428 ;.0 437 SIBAN/2P Bhagalpur Punsia to Dhoraiya 14.4 3,998 14.4 4,726 /SBHAB/IK Rhotas Barkakatr to NH 30 Jctn 1.5 703 1.5 498 SIBHABI2K Rhotas Kochilla to NH 30 Jctn 4.0 1,948 SIBHAB/3K Rhotos Hvian to NH 30 Jctn 2.3 1,152 2.5 873 S/BHAB/4K Rhotas Bathupar to NH 30 Jctn 5.1 2,382 5.1 2,865 SIBHAB/5K Rhotas Sehuka to NH 30 Jctn 2.0 1,000 1.0 536 S/BHAB/1P Rhotas 9habua to Jahanabad (Kudra) 17.6 5,299 17.7 15,617 SIBUXI1K Bhojpur Rajpur to State Road Jctn 0.7 251 0.6 284 SIBUX/2K Bhojpur Para'i to Niyajipur 5.0 1,777 5.0 2,726 SIBUX/3K Bhn3pur Rupsagar to State Road Jctn 0.8 299 0.6 410 S/BUX/5K hojpur Kazpur to State Road Jctn 1.0 420 1.2 575 S/BUX/6K Bho pur Krishna Brahm to Oelha 5.5 2,380 4.5 2,804 S/BUXI7K Bhoipur Pokhraham to State Road Jctn 1.0 473 1.0 455 /SBHAG/IP Shagalpur Nathanagar to Rhadanagar 9.6 3,038 11.6 4,600 S/BHAG/2P Bhagalpur Sultanganj to Shakund 12.2 4,080 12.2 5,662 S/GAY/2K Gaya Siripur to REO Road Jctn 0.5 180 0.5 230 SIGAY/4K Gaya Tituia to Gafa Khurd 2.0 788 2.0 1,075 S/GAY/6K Gaya Watirganj to Ghuriawan 4.0 1,907 3.9 1,940 S/GAY/BK Gaya Utran to State Road Jctn 0.4 136 0.4 205 S/6AY/9K Gaya Gapalpur to Bar 1.0 352 1.0 386 S/GAY/ilK Gaya Pathara to Tankupa 2.8 1,650 2.7 1,950 S/GAY/14K Gaya Bartara to Mangrawan 3.5 1,574 3.4 2,470 S/GAV/15K Gaya Tarwan to Hearl 2.0 1,213 2.6 2,460 S/GAY/16K Gaya Kusabija to City Road Jctn * 1.0 307 1.0 105 S/GAY/17K Gaya Hathmarwa to Nagwan 10.0 3,519 8.5 3,418 S/GAY/19K Gaya Goitha to Panion * 2.5 4,287 2.5 1,340 S/GAY/21K Gaya Ohibar to Fatehpur Rd Jctn 0.3 333 0.3 186 S/6AY/22K Gaya Lakrahi to Bagdhi 5.0 1,558 5.0 1,790 S/GAY/23K Gaya Kormathu to Intara 5.0 1,672 5.0 2,153 SIGAY/25K Gaya Kurkihar to Amethi 3.0 1,329 2.7 1,235 S/GAY/27K Gaya Sandiha to Kanausi 4.0 1,452 2.6 1,225 S/GAY/3OK Gaya Atribahorma to Jimraur 14.8 7,692 13.0 8,730 S/JAH/IK Gaya Sisamua to Kurtha Rd Jctn 0.5 172 0.4 241 S/JAH/2K Gaya Kansua to Jamanapur Rd Jctn * 1.3 715 1.4 994 S/JAH/3K Gaya Nonhimore to State Rd Jctn 1.0 316 1.0 360 S/JAH/4K Gaya Kakato to Utter Sarthu 6.3 2,397 7.0 2,030 S/JAHiSK Gaya Kurtha to Pandaul 3.2 1,353 3.3 1,795 SIJAH/6K Gaya Dewara to REO Road Jctn * 3.5 1,695 1.4 2,446 S/JAH/7K Gaya Rampur to State Road Jctn * 3.8 1,830 5.8 2,844 S/LAK/3K Monghyr Chakandra to State Road Jctn 1.0 442 S/LAK/4K Honghyr Itaun to HNP Rd 68 1.6 699 S/LAK15K Monghyr Ohira to State Road Jctn 0.8 390 0.8 570 S/LAK/6K Monghyr Urain to State Road Jctn 4.8 2,093 4.2 2,348 S/LAK/7K Monghyr Unman to State Road Jctn 1.0 449 1.0 312 S/LAKI8K Mooghyr Narpur to State Road Jctn 6.0 2,613 5.2 2,227 SILAK/9K Monghyr Gohri to MNP Rd 68 1.6 699 S/NAW/1K Nawadah Daulatpur to Shur 0.5 194 S/NAW/IOK Nawadah Bhatta to Siue 5.0 2,276 5.4 2,197 S/NA /IIK Nawadah Toladin to Amawan 3.5 1,385 3.4 1,336 S/NA /14K Nawadah Tiar to NH31 Jctn 4.8 2,194 4.8 2,105 S/NA 17K Nawadah Jalpa to Rals 4.1 1,579 4.0 1,814 S/PAT/1K Patna Singariawan to Shahjahanpur 2.0 1,089 2.3 1,795 S/SAS/1K Rhotas Balthari to State Road Jctn 1.0 442 1.0 561 S/SAS/3K Rhotas Barahri to State Road Jctn 6.0 2,444 6.4 4,298 S/SAS/4K Rhotas Hahauna to State Road Jctn 1.0 402 1.0 390 S/SAS/5K Rhotas Ugahni to State Road Jctn 1.0 425 1.0 470  16 S/SAS/6K Rhotas Parsia to State Road Jctn 2.0 851 2.0 1,174 SISAS17K Rhotas Burhawal to State Road Jctn 2.5 1,069 2.5 1,244 S/SASI8K Rhotas Baradih to State Road Jctn 3.0 1,409 2.8 1,498 Sub-Total South Bihar 279.8 117,648 267.2 140,216 C/OEO/lK Palamau Hadhupur to Lahajori 18.0 13,371 18.9 10,637 C/KHU/4K Ranchi Karra to Urikel 5.0 1,718 5.0 2,263 C/KHU/7K Ranchi Sonahatu to Jamudag 9.:0 3,159 8.3 3,201 C/RAN/1K Ranchi Murma to Tandul 2.0 620 2.0 1.018 CIRAN/2K Ranchi Bero to Purio 3.0 925 3.0 891 C/RAN/3K Ranchi Khelari to Indrapuri 2.0 620 2.0 606 C/RAN/4K Ranchi Itki to Rani Khatanga 3.0 930 3.0 906 C/RAN/7K Ranchi Anandi to Baridih 1.5 473 1.5 500 C/SAR/4K Singhbhum Kuji to Icha 2.5 590 C/SIM/1K Ranchi Karmdih to Barkibura 3.0 936 5.7 1,596 Sub-Total Chotanagpur 49.0 23,342 49.4 21,618 GRAND TOTAL 724.8 384,635 693.1 419,357 GRAND TOTAL (USS million equivalent) 45.8 36.8 N/IAOHEI4K Saharsa Singheshwar to Maura 16.0 14,541 3.5 2,660 N/SAH/2K Saharsa Sonbarsa to Bhaghawa 12.0 12,875 12.9 10.196 N/81R/3K Saharsa Chatapur to Ratansar 15.0 11.790 5.0 6,326 S/AUR/1OK Aurangabad Panthu to Itawan 8.0 3,947 8.0 3,876 S/NAMI4K Nawadah Jiuri to Kawakole Rd 1.0 56i 1.0 700 S/NAW/13K Nawadah Manjitur to Mai 1.0 526 1.0 1,025 S/NAW/16K Nawadah Mathurapur to Nawadi * 3.1 1,615 3.1 1,702 S/SAS/2K Rhotas Khuchila Village Road 5.5 4,242 Sub-Total Reserve Schedule/Others 56.1 45,861 40.0 30,727 GRAND TOTAL FOR PROJECT 780.9 430,496 733.1 450,084 GRAND TOTAL FOR PROJECT (USS million equivalent) 51.2 39.5 * Roads not yet completed, either consolidatiorn, cross drainage or surfacing works not yet done Note: Appraisal Estimates include all taxes, and centingency allocations (about 50% of base costs) Sources: World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, Bihar Rural Roads Project, October 1980 Rural Engineering Organization, Draft Completion Report, ctober 1988 February 1989  17 Expected and Actual Epuiment Purchases and Costs (km and Rs'OOOs) Appraisal Actual Item Estimate Execution No Rs No Rs 8-10 ton Diesel Rollers 67 18,982 122 Asphalt Mixers 13 3,203 2 Bitumen Kettles with Hand Pump 87 2,036 57 Bitumell Distributors 2 1,232 Bitumen Preheaters 2 862 Mobile Concrete Mixers 53 1,110 14 Concrete Vibrators 25 123 9 F.W.D. Pick-ups for Mobile Laboratories 4 443 4 F.W.D. Sucervision Vehicles 4,109 22 Mobile Drilling Rig 1 246 1 Station Wagon Vehicles 7 Earth Spreader/Compactor 1 Wheel Barrows 100 Excavator Loader 2 Front-end Loader 8 Walk Behind Vibrating Roller 12 Baby Roller, Tandem, 2 Ton 4 Maxi-mix Baby 14 Sub-Total 32.346 Spares 5,809 Testing and Survey Equipment 1,716 TOTAL FOR PROJECT 85,732 47,046 Note: Costs include all taxes, and quantity and price contingencies Sources: World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, October 1980 Rural Engineering Organization, Draft Completion Report, October 1988 February 1989  18 Attachment I buria -sk- b* sp I II ST s e ~K. L. Thapar iRtw1q) Principal Adviser q r _ y E Tele.No.: 382775 PLANNING COMMISSION NEW DELII August 22, 1983. Dear Mr. Donaldson, Many thanks for sending me a copy of the Project Completion Report "Bihar Rural Roads Project". It is indeed distressing that the physical component of the project will not yield the desired results and the traffic projections have also gone awry. Let us hope we learn some lessons for the future. With regards, Yours sincerely, ' K.L. Thapar ) Mr. Grahm Donaldson Chief Agriculture, Infrastructure and Human Resource Division Operations Evaluation Department The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 U. S. A.  IBRD 1487 84-00' 86 00' has been prepued by ld Sankds stDarr I N UI mwnie,w !" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~INDIA aendis e isfi, for the & oml ThsWorld BankLt BIHAR RURAL ROADS Whtmnldtonal Fo,anae gm do notrieYS dj-t KILOMETERSS I. .5. Project Roads - North Bihar aWold Sank andt MILES the onal Flinne Corporaton, _ 30 60 mont on the legal statu _ omtniY ore a n ofnO