Rwanda - Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 7240 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF RWANDA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 567-RW) May 16, 1988 Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted disribution and may be used by ripients only In the perfomane of their official duties. Its contents may not Othenise be disdosed witbout Wordd Bank uthorizaton  LYcat OL THE WO.iLD BANK W,hsngt. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. may 16, 1988 EMGORANDUN TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECTt Project Completion Reports Republic of Rwanda First Educstion Pro1ect (Cr-dit 567-RW) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled ,Project Completion Report: Republic of Rwsnd& - First Education Project (Credit 567-RW)' prepared by UNESCO and revised by the Africa Regional Office. Under the modified system for project performance a,uditing further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. Attacbment I This document has a retricte disbution and may be used by rcipients only In tbe peformane | of their olblaW dudea Its contents may not otherwe be disclosed without World Bnk autboraton.  NOR OFFICaL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF RUANDA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 567-RW) ThBLE OF eOWTtPT3 Pa-a No. Preface ...... ...............e...e..e.....ee.. A Key Project Data ......ii Evaluation SM"'Bry . * .......vi I. SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS ................. I................ 1 Project Objectives ..I.. ............** ... ............... 1 Project Content ........... ............................... 1 Project Amendments ..............................0......... 1 Project Implementation .....o. .............................. 2 Compliance with Credit Conditions ....... ................. 3 Project Operating Outcomes ............................... 4 * Lessons Learned ....o g oe.... ee......ec..o........ ...e ee.. 4 Recommendations .e.oeo.eoo.g.e...... .....................o 5 II. INTRODUCTION o.o.......o..oo.oo...oo...oo......oo...e.oe 6 III. PROJECT BACKGROUND ......*oe...ee.....o.ooeoo.e*o*o..o..eeo.ee04 7 Socio-economic Context e.o.o.... eeo ooo........o.............. 7 Education Sector ..................... .................. ece 7 Project Identification .............so eo...o................ 9 Project Objectives e..eege@@0@*eeeoeOe*.e- ,...,.S@S0*. 9 Project Content eo..eo...e..eo* ..eeoseo .e.ee.e.ooo .o ..eoee 9 Project Amendments .....eec...... e.g ......... ............. 10 IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ......o.. o......................oe o...... 11 General ....eog.eo.eeo.ee.ee..eo.o.*oooee*eeeee**eeoo-gooo 11 Civil Works ee.eeoo.eeeege.g.eo.eo ee.o..eeo.ee.ego oe...... 12 Furniture and Equipment 0e......00......................... 16 Technical Assistance oo.e*.e.c.e....ee...e..... ee....... .0 17 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients onlY in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Page No. V. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCINr .................................. 17 Estimated CO9r ...... ...................... 17 Actual Costs .......................... 17 Building Construction Costs .......................... 18 Equipment Costs .......................... 18 SFCS Operating Costs ... ....................... 18 Technical Assistance Costs .......................... 18 Building Areas .............00 ..0 ............... 0..0....0 19 Credit Withdrawal Impact on Implementation Schedule .................. 19 VI. PROJECT OPERATIONAL OUTCOMES ................................ 19 Introduction ..................................... 19 General Outcomes .................................... 19 Educational Printshop ............. ...................... 23 School Financing and Construction Unit (SFCS) ............ 24 VII. BANK GROUP PERFORMANCE .. ...... o......... 25 ANNEXES 1. Comparison of Estimated and Actual Project Costs. 2. Financial Costs of Project by Category and Funding Source. (Estimated and Actual) Budget 3. Comparative Analysis of Projected and Actual Building Dimensions of Administrative and School Structures. 4. Compliance with Credit Conditions. 5. Estimation of Real Costs of IDA workshops (in FRW and US$). 6. Construction Material Used for School Workshops. 7. Quality Ratings of School Workshop Construction and Materials. 8. Project Implementation Schedule. 9. Misprocurement Problems. 10. UNESCO/UNDP Technical Assistance Per-sonnel by Function, Name, and Commitment. 11. Project Intervention by IDA, Government of Rwanda, UNESCO/UNDP, and RFA in Relation to Type and Level of Support. 12. Workshops financed by IDA (by Prefecture). 13. School Workshop Building use in Representative Prefectures. 14. Structure of Primary and Secondary Education in Rwanda, 1982-83. 15. Weekly Schedule for Practical Classes Grades 7 and 8 (Subject, Days, and Hours per Week). 16. Enrollment in Grades 7 and 8 after the Reform, 1979-80 to 1982-83 Levels. 17. Trends in Primary School Teacher Qualifications, 1979-80 to 1982-83. 18. School Enrollment by Age Group, 1982-1983.  PROJECT COHPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF RWANDA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 567-RW) PREFACE This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the First Education Project in Rwanda, for which Credit No. 567-RW was signed on June 30, 1975 for US$8.0 million. The credit amount was subsequently reduced by US$1,621,000 due to two cases of misprocurement. The project was closed December 31, 1983 but disbursement continued to September 12, 1984, at which time a further US$110,099.27 was cancelled. This report was prep-red by staff of the UNESCO Cooperative Program and later revised by the Bank's Africa Regional Office staff. The Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education Project Implementation Unit School Financing and Construction Service assisted in the preparation of the report by providing, inter alia, detailed technical information which we gratefully acknowledge. In accordance with the revised procedures for project performance reporting, this PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) but the project was not audited by OED staff. The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower and its agencies for comments in March 1988. No comments were received.  RWANDA - FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 567-RW) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Item Estimate Actual Total Project Cost (US$ Million) 9.0 6.4 Cost: Differential (X) - 29S Credit Amount (US$ Million) 8.0 6.27 Amount Disbursed (US$ Million) 8.0 6.27 Amount Cancelled (US$ Million) 1.73 Date Physical Components Completed (12/31/81) (12/31/83) No. of Months since Credit Signing 69 96 Proportion Completed by above Date (1) 100 Proportion of Time Overrun (1) 39 OTHER PROJECT DATA Item Original Amended Actual First mention in file - - 10/15/73 Government Application - - 11173 Appraisal Mission - - 9/8/74 Negotiations - - 4/75 Board Approval - - 6/ 9/75 Credit Agreement - - 6/30/75 Effectiveness Date 9/29/75 11/28/75 12/1/75 Closing Date 6/30/82 12/31/82 12/31/83 and 12/31/83 Borrower Republic of Rwanda Executive Agency Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education Scool Financing and Construction Service Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 Foliow up Projects Second and Third Education Projects Credit Numbers 1263-RW and 1683-RW Amount US $ $10 million and $15.6 million Credlit Agreement Dates June 30, 1982 and May 22, 1986  (iii) Currency Exchange Rates Currency Iwandese Franc (RWY) Year: Appraisal year (1975) US$1 - RWF 90.00 Intervening years US$1 - RUF 97.56 1/ Completion year US$1 - RWF 95.26 1/ In September of 1983, the Rwandese franc, previously pegged to the US dollar, was tied to the SDR of the IMF. CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (US$ million) FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 a) Appraisal estimate 1.21 3.26 4.82 6.57 7.94 8.00 - - - b) Actual 0.27 0.70 2.70 2.70 2.70 4.32 4.47 4.53 6.27 2/ c) b) as Z of a) 19 21 56 41 35 54 2 Final disbursement occured 9/12/84 for a total of $6,268,900.73  (iv) MSIsion Data lb. of No. of no. of Report Typ" of Misslon Sont Dy Month/ear weeks staff staff/aks bete lV;onemle s*a1ed IDA 10/11/73 3 7 21 12/30/73 secooAua l e 03/74 2 3 6 04/12/74 /identStication UEZSCO (t/tCJPE) Prepartion/c/apprlual IDA/UNEScO 08/09/74 4 6 24 05/121/75 (K/RG/PI A/WA Peat-appraisol IDA 11/74 1 3 4 12/03/74 uqaitiattoa IDA 04/75 1 4 4 04/28/75 (A/E/CI/AV) Subtotal 11 23 58 Supervision IDA - - - - 06/03/75 Superviolon IDA 07/75 1 EG/A 2 06/05/75 Supervislon IDA 10/75 0.5 e 0.5 11/17/75 Supervision IDA 02/76 1 A 1 03/12/76 Supervislon IDA 05/76 1 A I 06/3076 Supervision IDA 09/76 1 tG/A 11/05/76 Supervision IDA 01/77 1 EG/A 2 03/04/77 Supervlison IDA 06/77 1 A 1 08/05/77 Supervision IDA 07/77 1.5 KG 1.5 08/23/77 Supervision IDA 10/77 1 A 1 11/23/77 * SupervislolL IDA 05/78 1 3 3 05/19/78 Supervlslon IDA 06/78 1.5 EG/A 1.5 07/21/78 i Supervision IDA 12/78 1.5 E/A 3 11/23/79 Supervision IDA - - 06/03/75 Supervision IDA 07/75 1 eG/A 2 08/05/75 Supervision IDA 10/75 0.5 e 0.5 11/17/75 Supervlidon IDA 02/76 1 A 1 03/12/76 Supervision IDA 05/76 1 A 1 06/30/76 Supervlsion IDA 05/79 2 K/A/KG 6 06/01/79 Supervision IDA 11/79 1 V/A/Av 3 11/26/79 Supervision IDA 03/80 1 E/A 2 06/30/80 Supervlsion IDA 10/80 I K/A 2 12/10/80 Supervision IDA 03/81 2.5 EC/A 5 04/21/81 Supervision IDA 07/81 3.5 EG/A 7 08/17/81 Supervision IDA 02/82 2 PR 2 03/19/82 Supervision IDA 07/82 1 PE 1 07/30/82 Supervialon IDA 01/83 1 A 1 12/03/83 Supervision IDA 07/83 2.5 PE/A 5 08/10/83 Completion IDA/UNESCO 03/84 2 EG/A 4 03/27/84 Subtotal 32.5 39 57.5 TOTAL 43.5 62 115.5 Number of supervision missions: 23 Maximum interval between m*lsions: 7 sonths Minimum interval between missione: I month Average intervol between sissions: 4.2 months Mission Legend: A - Architect Al - Implementation Advtsor AV - Lawyer CP - Financial Auditor E - Economast EA - Agricultural Education Specialist EG - General Education Specialist PE - Education Planner  ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS (US $) Amount of the Credlt Allocated Category (Expressed In Actual Dollar Equivalent) Disburements Part A.1 of the Prosect (1) Civil works (a) Labor hired by the co m_nes 250,000 818,896.40 (b) Construction materials 1,000,000 3,012,138.80 (i) directly imported (ii) locally procured (2) Furniture and instructional equipment 550,000 60,021.68 (i) directly imported (ii) locally procured Part A.2 of the Project (3) Civil works 150,000 133,999.34 (4) Printing equipment & furniture 300,000 413,171.98 (i) directly imported !ii) locally procured (5) Paper 1,000,000 992,944.33 Part A.3 of the Project (6) Civil works 50,000 58,819.45 (7) Equipment, furniture & vehicles 100,000 194,642.87 (i) directly imported (ii) locally procured (8) Salaries and operating costs with respect to Project administration 250,000 584,265.88 Part B of the Project (9) Technical Assistance under Parts B.1, B.2 and B.3 800,000 - (10)Consultants' services under Part B.4 200,000 (11) Unallocated 3,350,000 TOTAL 8,000,000 6,268,900.73 mm-----  (vi) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RZPUBLIC OF RUANDA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 567-RW) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction The First Education Project (Credit 567-RW, in the amount of US$8.0 million) was identified in March 1974 and soon after was prepared by the Government with UNESCO assistance. The project was appraised by the Bank in September 1974 and reviewed in November 1974. Total project cost was estimated at US$9.0 million, or RF 810 million, including contin- gencies, with foreign exchange cost at US$6.18 million (69X of the total). The IDA Credit of US$8.0 million was to cover 892 of total project cost and the Government would finance the rest. Following Board approval on June 9, 1975, the Credit Agreement was signed on June 30, 1975. The Credit became effective on December 1, 1975 after two postponements. The project was originally scheduled to be completed in December 1981 and the Closing Date was to be June 30, 1982. Instead, the project was completed in December 1983 and the final Closing Date was December 31, 1983. The project sco": was changed during implementation, partly as a consequence of misprocure- ment which resulted in the cancellation of US$1.6 million out of the total US$1.73 million cancelled from the Credit. When the final disbursement was made on September 12, 1984, a total of US$6.27 million had been disbursed. Oblectives and Scope In line with the Government's educational reform which was later articulated in the Second Development Plan, 1977-1981, the project's main objectives were to improve the quality and efficiency of primary education in the first phase of a long-term program of educational development. To this end, the project was to provide: (a) Civil works, furniture and equipment for: (i) About 150 workshops for practical subjects with an aggregate capacity for about 6,000 students; (ii) A printshop, including paper, for the printing of about 2.7 million textbooks and 1.6 million teaching guides; (iii) An office building for the School Financing and Construction Service (SFCS, effectively the project implementation unit) and vehicles for SFCS's operation; and  (vii) (b) Technical Assistance for: (i) About 32 man-years of civil engineering technician services to assist local craftsmen at various construction sites; (ii) About 10 man-years of architectural and procurement services; (iii) About two man-years of specialist services for the operation, maintenance and repair of the printing equipment to be pro- vided the printshop; and (iv) About four man-years' consultant services during project implementation for the evaluation of the financial management and construction procedures establiahed by FSCS for the purposes of the project. Implementation Experience In retrospect, this education project - the first in Rwanda - was far too complex for an implementation unit with no prior experience. The SFCS, which was specially created within the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MINEPRISEC) by Executive Decree, faced at the outset many organizational and wanagement problems which caused most of the imple- mentation delay. The SFCS was burdened with too many responsibilities without adequate trained staff to carry out satisfactorily its designated functions. These functions, besides the standard PIU responsibilities, included the administration of technical assistance (TA) personnel and management of a revolving fund (para. 4.02). Inexperienced in Bank- financed projects, the SFCS did not fully understand the Bank's procurement guidelines and did not see the need for a procurement specialist. Addi- tionally, a high staff turnover adversely affected monitoring/evaluation and particularly project procurement and accounting during the first four years of the project (paras. 4.05-4.06). This SFCS weakness was largely responsible for the two misprocurement cases that resulted in the cancella- tion of 20Z (US$1.6 million) of the Credit and modification of the project (para. 4.06 and Annex 9). During implementation the number of workshops to be constructed under the project was expanded from 150 to 250 (which was part of a total of over 900 the Government planned to build throughout Rwanda) and the responsibility for workshop construction was shifted to the Communes from the SFCS which then became a procurement agency for the workshops, supply- ing building materials such as cement, steel, roofing, etc. The responsi- bility for site supervision, originally planned for expatriate staff under SFCS, was subsequently passed on to local technicians under the Communes. The 40Z implementation time overrun was due mainly to the huge increase in the Government's construction program, periodic shortage of building materials, and administrative and financial problems (para. 1.06). The final project cost of US$6.9 million was 232 lower than the appraisal estimate. The cost difference was due to the financing of some components  (viii) by other donor agencies, cancellation of part of the Credit, and cost- sharing by the Coumunes. Building construction, even though costing 26X lower than estimated originally, actually providod 552 more space for the workshops built by the Comunes using volunteer asd contract labor, instead of the 150 which were to have been b-ilt through the SFCS (para. 1.07 and Annex 3). Results Overall the project achieved most of its physical targetsa the 250 school workshops vere completed, as part of the 924 workshops (one per school) built by the Government (para. 6.01) The quality of theso workshops, however, is below average because they are poorly constructed and equipped (paras. 4.16-4.25 and Annex 7); and it is doubtful that the Comunes will have the resources to maintain them adequately (para. 4.28). The main purpose of the workshops is to provide the facilities for implementing the educational reform in which primary education is to be extended from six to eight years with greater emphasis on learning practical subjects. With the exception of schools with two 7th and 8th grades, it is doubtful that the workshops nationwide are fully used because of staff constraints, shortage of water, inadequate land for agricultural activities, and the lack of fungible materials for practical work. Although this project component made no significant contribution to developing an economical school construction program, as was envisaged at appraisal (para. 1.15), it has nevertheless aided the school reform program by making it possible to introduce pre-vocational training in primary schools and to improve the quality of instruction. The printshop, on the other hand, is well constructed (para. 4.22), with equipment procured through a grant from the Federal Republic of Germany (para. 4.26), which also provided technical assistance in printshop management, accounting and maintenance, supplemented by UNESCO/UNDP train- ing. Despite this assistance, however, the printshop has not been a success because of: (a) failure to appoint Rwandese staff to key management and accounting positions and (b) non-cost-effective operation (paras. 6.14-6.15). Although the printshop was to produce and distribute 2.7 million textbooks and 1.6 million teaching guides, there is no information on the extent to which these targets have been achieved (para. 6.11). The process of institutional development had a good start through the establishment of the SFCS in Hay 1974, a major Credit condition. The office building, completed in May 1983, is adequate. Following initial difficulties, which arose partly because no procurement officer was appointed, the SFCS has accumulated experience in implementing projects, such as the IDA-financed Education II and Education III, and projects financed by the Government and other bilateral agencies (paras. 6.19-6.21). At the Commune level, the Government decision during project implementation to transfer financial responsibility for school reform to the people and their leaders (bourgmasters) has given them as well as district inspectors valuable experience in school construction. By the same token, the Communes are also responsible for the maintenance and operational costs of the school workshops (para. 1.17).  (ix) Sustainability The lack of fungible materials for teaching practical subjects in many Commune school workshops suggests the absence of adequate financial resources to sustain the physical maintenance and educational operation of the workshops (paras. 4.28 and 6.04). In the case of the printshop, the problem of financial stability and profitability could be resolved if the enterprise is commercialized (par&. 6.15). While some institutional development has taken place in the SFCS, its sustainability depends on the financial and human resources the Government is prepared to continue to invest in it. The sustainability of the workshops, the printshop and the SFCS in turn has a direct bearing on the sustainability of the Government program to improve quality and efficiency in basic education. This could be assessed after the completion of the Second Education Project, Credit 1263-RW, expected in September 1988. Findings and Lessons In addition to what is outlined in the PCR (paras. 1.15-1.22), the following findings and lessons may be culled from this project's experience: (a) For first-time projects, the Bank Group should ensure that the PIU (in this case, the SFCS) should be staffed according to conditions spelt out in the Agreement and that such staff be thoroughly familiarized with Bank Group project implemen- tation procedures to establish sound project management, accounting and financial control (paras. 1.04 and 1.11-1.12); (b) Project monitoring and evaluation should be a built-in, on- going responsibility of the PIU to ensure that project activities are in line with objectives (para. 1.13); and (c) Adequate funds should be provided for technical assistance to local communities which have been delegated the responsibili- ty for school construction and maintenance to ensure that such community participation has a reasonable chance of success (para. 1.14).  I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Project Objective 1.01 The principal objective of the First Education Project was to support the Government's Educational Reform incorporated in the Second Development Plan 1977-1981. The project focused on the Reform's objectives related to primary education and changes in curricula emphasizing rural/agricultural needs. This included a major structural change in the Education and Training System with the following implications: (a) prolongation of primary education from 6 to 8 years for the 7-14 years' age-group with introduction of practical subjects in grades 7 and 8 in workshop extensions to schools and target of universal primary education by 1986; (b) orientation of 90 percent primary school leavers to CERAI (Centres d'enseignement rural et artisanal integre) for elementary vocational training in grades 9-11; and (c) orientation of 10 percent primary school leavers to the reformed secondary school system. Othar actions planned included: discontinuance of the secondary 3-year "tronc commun", re-training required primary teachers in practical subjects, increased proportion of day-students, increased coeducation, increased secondary school size to minimum 240 enrollment, termination of double-shift and automatic promotion. The intent was to reflect the reality of life in Rwanda and ensure that the majority of primary school leavers would have a higher probability of being absorbed into the economically active population. Project Content 1.02 The purpose of the project was to assist the Borrower in financing the first phase of a comprehensive approach towards improving the quality and efficiency of primary education. The project consisted of provision for: (a) about 150 workshops for the teaching of practical subjects with an aggregate capacity for about 6,000 students; (b) an instructional materials printshop and paper and related materials for the printing of about 2,700,000 textbooks and about 1,600,000 teaching guides; (c) an office building for SFCS and vehicles for SFCS's operation; (d) about 32 man-years of civil engineering technicians' services to provide technical advice to local craftsmen at the various construction sites; (e) about 10 man-years of architects' and procurement specialists' services; (f) about two man-years of specialists services for the operation, maintenance and repair of the printing equipment; and (g) about four man-years of consultants' services for the evaluation, during the implementation of the project, of the financial mechanisms and the construction procedures established by SFCS for the purposes of the project. Project Amendments 1.03 The project was amended several times to: (a) rehabilitate the premises of the Gitarama Rural Center for Training Craft Instruction (CRAFAG); (b) increase the number of school workshops to be constructed and equipped (from 150 to 250); (c) reduce the disbursement percentages specified in the Credit Agreement (following a misprocurement case); (d) cancel portion of the Credit (following further misprocurement cases); (e) reallocate the proceeds of the Credit; and (f) postpone the Closing Date of the Credit.  -2- Project Implementation 1.04 The Agreement became effective December 1, 1975 about two months beyond the specified date, after a Project Revolving Fund was opened with an initial sum of US$100,000 equivalent deposited by the Government of Rwanda. During the start-up period, numerous technical and managerial problems arose, due mostly to unsound administrative procedures and the lack of appropriate accounting and financial control. The result was several cases of misprocurement, which, following intensive Government/IDA consultation led to cancellation of US$1.62 million representing a significant amount of the Credit funds (Annex 9) and redefinition of the project. The inadequacy of SFCS's supervision of this first IDA project became even more obvious because of the increasing number of othe.L projects it had to implement. Its failure to recruit a procurement specialist only exacerbated the situation. After this initial period, during which progress reports and reimbursement applications were submitted incomplete and with no regularity, the Government made staffing changes in the SFCS management. A mission by an accountancy expert was called, after which the SFCS accounting system improved considerably. 1.05 Physical execution of the project was the task of SFCS's technical personnel recruited under a UNESCO/UNDP Technical Assistance Project (RWA/74/020). Because of the shift of responsibility of the workshops to the Communes, the expatriate staff was not employed to supervise the school workshop sites; instead, this responsibility was carried out essentially by local technicians (recruited during the course of the project) who were expected to monitor all MINEPRISEC school construction work. As a result of the change in the scope of the project, the SFCS became a procurement agency supplying cement, steel, roofing, etc., to many more construction sites but without having the possibility to provide adequate site supervision. Selection of Rwandese nationals qualified for supervising the project construction work proceeded at a snail's pace. Most architectural and accounting aspects of the project were neglected until it was too late to undo the damage, which led to misprocurements and a high turnover of technical assistance experts (who also left without Rwandese counterparts). 1.06 The project execution period extended over 8 years instead of the 6-year, 9-month period originally projected. This was due mainly to the large increase in the Government's construction program, difficulty in supplying some construction materials, and administrative and financial problems. It was agreed that disbursements would continue to June 30, 1984, 6 months after the revised Closing Date and 24 months after the Closing Date initially envisaged. Finai disbursement occurred on September 12, 1984, with a total amount of US$6.27 disbursed. 1.07 The estimated total project cost in June 1975, was US$9 million and the Credit was to cover 89% of that amount (US$8 million). Final cost was US$6.9 million or 23% less than estimated. This difference was caused by the cancellation of part of the Credit and the takeover of some project components by other donor agencies. Despite cancellation, corresponding project items were carried out. Building construction represented 45% of total cost and was 26% less than originally estimated, despite the total built area being greater than estimated at appraisal. The main reason for this difference was due to the change in financing materials for 250 workshops with the communes supplying  -3- labor instead of the original 150 which would have been built through SFCS. Simpler finishes and the subsequently reduced unit cost of the school workshops also contributed to the change from appraisal figures. The equipment for the printshop and the equipment supplement for the school workshops were provided by a grant from the Federal Republic of Germany, which represented about 16X of that originally estimated. 1.08 The sites chosen for the various project facilities are adequate. Design and construction of the printshop and SFCS officels are good. However, the school workshops are extremely simple and of mediocre but adequate construction quality. 1.09 Procurement of imported building materials did not always follow agreed Bank Group guidelines and included items not used for the facilities financed under the project. The situation caused cancellation of part of the Credit funds and a revision of disbursement percentages. 1.10 Construction began in July 1976 and ended May 1983, reflecting: (a) the enlarged scope of the Government school building program, which included the IDA project; and (b) the time overrun required for the completion of the SFCS office building and the printshop. There is virtually no furniture in the school workshops and while the equipment provided is adequate, the lack of fungible supplies limits its use. Compliance with Credit Conditions 1.11 In the haste to build 924 school workshops (250 funded under the project) throughout the country, the (then) director of SFCS did not always follow proper administrative and financial procedures, especially in accounting. Workshops were eventually built by the Communes with help from SFCS, which however was not equipped to manage a scattered program of self-help construction. Specifically, SFCS at first failed to keep separate accounts for the IDA-financed and Government-financed workshops. This not only would have provided the possibility to distinguish between IDA and Government expenditures and also to verify SFCS operating costs. In 1980, four SFCS reimbursement applications were rejected for lack of adequate documentation and failure to comply with Credit Agreement conditions. 1.12 As noted, a procurement specialist was never recruited. The views of the Government held that the SFCS director and the chief accountant jointly could perform that function. In retrospect, however, an experienced procurement specialist was needed, and clearly the misprocurement problems could have been avoided by hiring such a person. 1.13 Project funds were allocated for consultants to evaluate periodically the financial mechanisms and construction procedures set up by SFCS over the life of the project. No such consultants were ever nominated by the Government. At IDA's suggestion, a final inspection of the 250 workshops was undertaken in September/October 1981 by SFCS with the help of three UNESCO architects to properly assess implementation status and facilitate accounting corrections.  -4- 1.14 Finally, SFCS funds were never adequate to provide the technical assistance for local communities to properly maintain those schools selected to receive a workshop that did not actually meet the required criteria. Project Operating Outcomes 1.15 As a result of the Government's Educational Reform at the primary level, a total of 924 school workshops were built, 250 of which were financed under the project. The construction of these buildings, however, made no significant contribution to developing an economical school construction program, as was envisaged at the time of appraisal. 1.16 In accordance with project design, the SFCS waa established. The start-up period was difficult due to staffing problems, but the situation improved, with the activities of the Unit extending to include technical assistance to the entire school construction program of the MINEPRISEC. Standard plans for different school buildings were prepared to facilitate construction projects of this type in the future. 1.17 During implementation, a fundamental decision was made by the Government that interested population groups (Communes) and their leaders (bourgmasters) were required to contribute to the program of building school workshops and 7th and 8th-grade classrooms. In this way the local population acquired useful experience for future projects. Also, the skills of district inspectors who participated in this program improved substantially. The Government, with this decision, transferred the financial responsibility of the Reform to the Communes, thus involving these population groups not only in construction but in maintenance and operational costs thereafter. Lessons Learned 1.18 Project Administration. The school workshop building component of the project placed considerable responsibility on the local authorities for both construction implementation and financial management. Emphasis also should be given to participation of the local population (on a volunteer basis through Movement for Community Participation and Development (UNUGANDA), in actual project implementation if reasonable supervision can be assured. 1.19 Project Implementation (a) A wide-ranging project having a very large number of items scattered in many remote project locations is difficult to manage and monitor in Rwanda. More compact projects with less items, less widely scattered are more readily controlled by both parties and are more appropriate for the country at this time. However, such a lesson applies with difficulty to primary schools.  - 5 - (b) Planning for availability of adequate expertise, built-in evaluation and continuous follow-up by the Bank on procurement and accounting matters are necessary to offset implementation problems, because of difficulty in following Bank regulations and frequent personnel changes. 1.20 Staff Requirements. During project implementation, problems frequently arose with procurement accounting and work in progress reports, which was traced to the lack of qualified personnel within SFCS. In the future, the tasks assigned to SFCS should be closely monitored to ensure that the Rwandese staff acquire the qualifications that will enable them to run the SFCS office with full efficiency. It seems particularly important to have a full staff complement (both administrative and technical) as prescribed at the time of appraisal. 1.21 Future projects should be less complex and include provision for more intensive local supervision. Also, an improved filing system should be maintained by the SFCS. Such documentation would serve as a means to facilitate dialogue between Bank representatives and the Rwandese authorities. 1.22 Education Sector Issues. The weaknesses in the educational sector, which the project was designed to reduce, should be addressed progressively and according to a strategy adapted to the human and financial resources the country can make available, without compromising what ought to be a fundamental principle, the access of a larger number of children to formal schooling. The goal of professionalizing primary-school teaching should be synchronized with the development of the local communities and the modernization of agriculture, the only two local spheres able to absorb young school leavers. The basic issue is therefore one of efficiency and resource mobilization. Recommendations 1.23 The following general recommendations emerge from the experience with the First Education Project: (a) While SFCS is responsible for all school construction work of the MINEPRISEC, it is recommended that SFCS build up its administrative staff and develop a network of district inspectors in the provinces to better establish its supervisory authority. Building programs of the magnitude under consideration also should enable SFCS to effect a general improvement in the building indu;try in Rwanda by pressing for the use of local materials and by providing the opportunity to carry out preliminary studies on the architectural, technical, economic, and financial aspects of such ventures. The role of SFCS should however be increasingly focused on planning, programming and supervision while design and architectural work can be subcontracted to the private sector; (b) Technical assistance from a variety of sources contributed significantly to the execution of all project components. However, in the future, attention should be given to accelerate the process of recruiting specialists while coordination and integration of their functions should be carefully monitored so that project timetables can be more closely met;  (c) The recent Rwandese evaluation of school workshops was limited to a survey of physical facilities. An in-depth study would be required to focus on the operation of these workshops, capacity utilization, efficiency, costs and financing and learning outcomes. Only with such results at hand could the Educational Reform be evaluated correctly and a strategy evolve for future action; and (d) To reduce the already heavy financial burden incurred in the production of school textbooks, the printshop should be granted more autonomy to increase its commercial viability and thus enhance its return on investment. The printshop should be better managed and if unable to compete in terms of unit printing costs, the printing of school textbooks should be contracted to local private printshops. In retrospect, more caution should have been applied in the preparation of this project component. 1.24 Lessons learned through the implementation of the First Education Project were incorporated into the Second and Third Education Projects as follows: design of the Second Education Project was less complex and focussed more specifically on a smaller number of components, albeit secondary institutions, to facilitate project implementation. Particular attention was paid to ensuring that project implementation units had adequate administrative capacity, especially with regard to project accounts and the Bank Group insisted on the recruitment of key professional staff required. In this regard, allowance was made for the lack of familiarity with Bank Group implementation procedures which were evident in the First Education Project and extra monitoring was accordingly provided. The Third Education Project was designed to further strengthen the planning, management and training capacities of MINEPRISEC and MINIFOP through technical assistance and staff training. It also established a self-sustaining textbook/teaching materials replenishment scheme as part of the supply and distribution of textbooks and other teaching materials. II. INTRODUCTION 2.01 This Project Completion Report was prepared by a UNESCO team comprised of Messrs. Ben Mady Cisse, Coordinator and General Education Specialist, and X. Nuttin, Consulting Architect. The team spent time between February 19-25, 1984 in Washington, D.C. and in Rwanda between March 11-27, 1984 gathering the necessary information to complete the draft version subsequently submitted to the World Bank. Messrs. CissG and Nuttin then travelled to Washington in July 1984 to discuss its contents with Bank staff from which a French language version was produced. The report was translated into English by Bank staff and subsequently revised. 2.02 The Rwandese authorities worked closely with the UNESCO team providing whatever documentation was available and all necessary logistical support.  2.03 The team's recome ndations and conclusuon are based on: (a) careful consideration of the documents examined; (b) the results of field Inspections; and (c) discussions with the Rwandese officials and World Bank staff engaged in the project. The draft UNESCO report was noted to reflect views of the team and not necessarily those of the Government of Rwanda or of the World Bank. III. PROJECT BACKGROUND Socio-economic Context 3.01 With a population estimated at 5.6 million and a surface area of 26,338 km2, Rwanda is one of the most densely populated of the African countries (211 inhabitants per kn2). The majority of the population (96%) live in rural areas, which will be true for some time to come, since the urban growth rate is intentionally kept low (6% per annum). The population is very young, with 47% below age 15. Agricultural production, based on family-type holdings averaging one hectare, is the dominant factor in the economy, accounting for 47% of GNP and 73% of exports. 3.02 Rwanda's food production is barely sufficient to meet the needs of its rapidly expanding population. Shortage of land, widespread unemployment, malnutrition, high energy costs, and its landlocked site (the nearest port, Mombasa in Kenya, is 1,700 km away) combine to make it one of the poorest nations in Africa. 3.03 From 1973 onward, coinciding with the time of project implementation, Rwanda enjoyed a period of political stability that was reinforced by a sense of national unity and shared purpose. 3.04 In the face of growing economic difficulties, the 1977-81 Second Development Plan aimed for self-sufficiency in food production as well as reduced economic dependence on exterior sources. However, not all its objectives were achieved, mainly due to the lack of qualified technicians and managers. The 1982-86 Third Development Plan, while pursuing the same agricultural, industrial, and commercial productivity goals, has improved planning techniques and decentralized both the formulation and implementation processes down to the level of the comunes which, through the Directorate-General of Community Action and the participation of the "Banque Populaire", are to play the major role of launching a grass-roots development movement. Education Sector 3.05 Orientation and Structure of the Education System. The education system Rwanda inherited at independence in 1962, besides being ill-suited to the requirements of economic and social development, was fragmented in character, consisting of several types of institutions supported by a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations spread across the country.  - 8 - 3.06 A reform was launched to rationalize the system, first in 1974 (but was not implemented). Again in 1979-80 an ambitious reform, the "R