Docunent of The World Bank FOR OFm CIAL USE ONLY Report No.6962 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT CAMEROON WESTERN HIGHLANDS RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CREDIT 784-cM October 12, 1987 Africa Regional Office iTbi doenuent has a rercted dlsrbutlm and may be _ed by recpints oly in the pedormance of their offica dutis t sentt may not oherwe be dIsoCld without World Bank utbli*bton. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS US$1 = CFAF 245 CFAF 1 = US$0.0041 CFAF 1,000 = US$4.1 CFAF 1,000,000 o US$4,081.63 ABBREVIATIONS BCU Bottomlands Cultivation Unit (UCCAO) Caisse Coffee Price Stabilization Board COOPMUT Department of Cooperatives and Mutual Assistance (Ministry of Agriculture) DEP Planning Unit - Ministry of Agriculture DPA Provincial Delegation of Agriculture, Western Province FONADER National Rural Credit Fund FTDU Field Trials and Demonstration Unit (UCCAO) Genie Rural Rural World Department of Western Province (Ministry of Agriculture) IRAP Agricultural and Forestry Research Institute MIDEVIV Fooderop Developmea't Agency (Ministry of Agriculture) ONAREST National Scientific Research Organization PCU Pest Control Unit (UCCAO) PMEU Project Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (DPA) SPU Seed Production Unit (UCCAO) UCCAO Arabica Coffee Growers' Cooperative Union, Western Province RMWA Regional Mission in Western Africa FISCAL YEAR UCCAO - January 1 to December 31 Government - July 1 to June 30 THE WORltD BANKI Wash.ton. D.C. 20433 US.A. Office of sw.Css&I Ope.fn Ivatai October 1?, 1987 MEORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report - Cameroon Western Highlands Rural Development Project (Credit 784-CM) Attached, for information, is a copy oi a report entitled "Project Completion Report: Cameroon Western Highlands Rural Develop- ment Project (Credit 784-CM)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Under the modified system for project performance auditing, further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. Attachment lThis ument has a rsttd distdbuion and my be usd by reciints 9.. ',t th pformance of their offWcial dutes 1w contt ma so thre be dsWcW withut Wol "A &utat. MR OmUU ONLY CAMEOON WESTERN HIGHLANDS RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CREDIT 784-CM PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE *. 000 *00* e.**o*,*.*. ******* BASIC DATA SHEET ............................,...........,.. i EVALUATION SUMMARY *......... ,.......................... iii Is INTRODUCTION . 1 II. PROJECT FORMULATION AND PROCESSING ..................2 A. Background and Project Origin ............................. 2 B. Identification and Preparation 2.......................,... 2 C. Appraisal 3 D. Negotiations and Board Presentation ....................... 4 B. Project Description and Objectives 4 III* IMPLDMZNTATION .........................*6 A. Effectiveness and Start-up 6 B. Progress and Revision ..................... 6 C. Procurement ........................... ....... .... 7 D. Costs 7...*............... ......, 7 E. Financing ................................................ 8 F. Disbursewtnt ........................ ...... 8 G. Project Closing . .......................................... 9 IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE *..... ......................... 10 A. Institutional Deslgn .... 10 B. Management and Organizational Effectiveness ....... ........ 12 C. Covenants and Sectoral Development ...... .................. 15 D. Borrower's Performance .... 15 V. OPERATIONAL PERFORNANCE AND PROJECT INPACT ................... 15 A. Training and Extension .................................... 17 B. Field Trials and Demonstration ..... 18 C. Seed Production ....... 19 D. Pest Control ........................... . 21 E. Cooperative Service Centers 22 F. Revolving Credit Fund . 22 G. Village Water Supply .................................... 23 Tbh documet ba aenstted disbutionsad may be ud by rcints only in th pfomace of thi ofcl dutea Its otents may nototwis be disoed without Wold Bank utholtidn. TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.) Page No. H. Bottomland Development .......... . ......................... 24 I. Coffee Processing ...................................................... ....... 25 J. Crop Production ................................... 25 VI. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE .......... . 29 A. Financial Results ..............*....*........ ........... . 29 B. Economic Results .......................... 30 VII. BANK PERFORMANCE/CONCLUSIONS .......... ...................... 31 ANNEX (Tables I and 2) Maps: IBRD 13072R IBRD 13073R IBRD 13821R (French) CAMEROON WESTERN HIGHLANDS RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 784-CM) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This Project Completion Report reviews the Western Highlands Rural Development Project in Cameroon for which an IDA credit of US$13.0 million was approved on March 28, 1978. Although the official credit closing date was June 30, 1983, it had to be extended by twelve months to compensate for the start-up delays in establishing the Directorate of Production within UCCAO, the executing agency. The final disbursemen. under Credit 784-CM, for expenditures committed before July 1, 1984, was made in October 1984. This report was prepared upon the re turn of a completion mission to Cameroon in February 1985. Additional sources of information included the Western Highlands RDP Staff Appraisal Report No. 1780-CM of March 6, 1977, the Project and Credit Agreements of April 17, 1978, ten supervision reports (1978-1984), the completion study prepared by UCCAO in January 1985, correspondence in the West Africa Information Center, and discussions with staff associated with the project. This report's main conclusions have been discussed with the Borrower. A draft PCR was sent to the Borrower on July 22, 1987 for comments; however, none have been received. This project has not been subjected to an audit by OED. - 1t - CANEROON WESTERN tGHIANDS RURAL DFVELOPPEKT CRUD!? 784-CM PROJECT CONPLETTeW RFPORT BASIC DATA SPPFt KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Actual as 2 of Estimate Estimated Actual ADpratsal Estiaet Project Costs (CFAF billion) 6.1 6.3 1352 Credit Amount (US$ million) 13.0 3 1Wf 1002 Date Board ApprtVal 3,2/06/8 Date Effectiveness 12/04/78 Closing Date 06/30/84 Economic Rate of Return 20 n.a. Number of Direct Beneficiaries (year) 30,200 40,000 farm families farm families 1332 CUMULATIVE DISBURStEWMS FY79 FY60 FY81 FY82 FY83 FVY4 FY85 Appraisal Estimate (USS million) 0.5 2.5 5.8 4.5 13.0 - - Actual (USS million) 0.0 1.1 4.3 7.5 10.l 12.3 13.0 Actual as I of Estlate 0 44 74 79 78 95 100 Date of Final Disbursement 10/12/84 Principal Repaid NIL MISSION DATA No, of Mandays Specializations P*rf. Typ of Mission Date Persons In Fitld Represented I/ RatinR 21 t o/d 1 Froblu 6/ Identification /75 - - - - - rreparation 4/76 - - _ _ _ Appraisal 5/77 6 - - - - Supervision 1 7/78 1 6 d,e 1 2 1 Supervision 2 3/79 1 9 a,- 1 2 x Supervision 3 10/79 2 10 ate 1 2 K Supervision 4 3/80 2 10 a,d 1 2 9 Supervision 5 9/80 3 13 c.d,f 1 2 n Supervision 6 3/81 3 12 a,b,d 2 2 HP? Supervision 7 10/81 1 9 b 2 1 IIP Supervision 8 6/82 2 6 b,c 2 1 Hp Supervision 9 11/83 1 12 b 2 2 am Supervision 10 7/84 2 9 b,c 2 2 P OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower Governmwnt of Caeroon Executing Agency Union Centrale des Cooperatives Agricoles de l'Ouest (UCCAO) Flscal Year JanJary I to December 31 Name of Currency (abbreviation) CFAF Curreacy Exchange Rates Appraisal Year Average US$1.00 a 24S Intervening Years Average US81.00 - 329 Completion Year Average US$1.00 a 460 Follow-up Projectt Name: Second Western Province Rural Development Project Loan Number: Ln 2406-CM Loan Amount: US$21.5 million Date Board Approval, 64/1?/84 T/ a- agriculturist; b - apricultural economist; c - financial analyst; d * economist; e - rural engineer; f - agronomist. I/ problem-free or minor problems; 2 n oterate problems and 3* spjor problems. 3/ 1- improving; 2 - stationary; and 3 a deteriorating. Z F a financial; 1 a managerial; T * technical; P a political and 0 - other. - iii - CAMEROON WESTERN HIGHLANDS RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 784-CM) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. The Western Highlands Development Project was part of a larger development program for the then Western and Northwestern provinces and the first in a series of area development projects financed by the Bank and other donors. It was in line with the objectives of the Government's Fourth Development Plan (1977-81) for the agriculture sector, which aimed at improving the standard of living of the rural poor and at reducing income disparities. It also adopted the Bank's then emerging philosophy of encouraging rural development rather than cash crop projects. In support of the Government's program, the project was to provide an institutional framework in extension, training, and improved seeds, fertilizer, insecti- cide and credit distribution to about half of the farm holdings in the four districts of the Western Highlands. To emphasize the integrated rural development approach advocated by the Bank, it included pilot actions such as afforestation, small ruminant husbandry, bottomland development and field research on food crops. The "Union des Coop4ratives de Cafg Arabica de l'Ouest" (UCCAO) was the executing agency. Objectives 2. The project's main objective was to intensify the cultivation of all crops included in the prevailing farming system while introducing measures to prevent the erosion and loss of soil fertility due to the overpopulation of the area. To reach its objective, the project was to (a) strengthen the Planning Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture and strengthen and equip a new directorate of production services in UCCAO; (b) establish a seed farm and construct 10 new rural service centers and 220 village water points; (c) develop about 400 ha of bottomland; (d) introduce better processing equipment; and (e) establish a training center, a monitoring and evaluation unit, and a revolving credit fund. Total project costs were estimated at US$25 million. The IDA credit was for US$13 million. Implementation 3. The first supervision mission (July 1978) was carried out before Credit effectiveness due to delays in filling two key head positions and because UCCAO did not ratify the Project Agreement until December 1978. The slow start of the project has been attributed mainly to (a) MINAGRI's reluctance in seconding staff to UCCAO, and (b) controversy over site selection for the seed farm. These delays resulted in a one year lag at the beginning of project implementation. In fact, little development occurred before mid'1980 due to delays in the construction program and in - iv - provision of technical assistance caused by Government's cumbersome pro- curement procedures. However, project implementation subsequently acceler- ated and no major changes or revisions were neLessary. Most components exceeded their appraisal targets, but only after the two project extensions due to the long preparatory phase. The project closed in June 1984 with 115 disbursement applications showing a cost overrun of 35% over a six year period instead of the five years anticipated at appraisal. Results 4. An interesting development under the project was that in the context of unattractive coffee prices to producers, this crop was neglected in favor of food crops production which registered a dramatic increase. Extension records show an overall rate of completion of 85% in that the project (a) reached 40,000 farmers instead of the 30,200 estimated at appraisal; (b) developped 235 water points (220 envisaged); and (c) carried out 36 demonstrations in soil conservation techniques against 7 planned at appraisal. Shortfalls in fertilizer supplies and seed production were due respectively to cumbersome procurement procedures and the imbroglio that resulted from the farm site selection. Overall, the targets for the pilot actions had been set at an overoptimistic level. The economic rate of return to the project was estimated at 17% compared with 20% at appraisal. Sustainability 5. A second phase (Second Western Highlands Rural Development Project--Loan 2?4)6-CM) became effective in September 1985 after a 14 month gap. Findings and Lesson; 6. A major lesson learned from the project is that secondment of staff from the public to the private sector (MINAGRI to UCCAi) to execute projects can bring conflicts and lead to costly over-bureaucratization and overlap, especially when production oriented activities are not kept separate from Lommercial operations. Other lessons that can be learned from the project are: (a) the difficulty of addressing a key national policy issue in the context of a regional project. Low coffee producer prices (relatively and as a share of export price) made coffee relative- ly unattractive; (b) insufficient attention was paid to linking and conveying the applied research unit findings (field trials and demonstrations) to the extension service. This resulted in the latter not having enough messages to convey to farmers, and extension did not effectively convey farmers- priorities and problems to research; and (c) given the complexity of the technical iscues in this type of project, regular visits by an agronomist are essential. CAMEROON WESTERN HIGLNDS RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 The Western Highlands area is densaly populated, i.e., 17% of Cameroon's population lives in these humid mountains, which cover only 3% of its land area. The resulting pressure on land resources has led to intensive cultivation of nearly 95% of the cultivable land, including steep slopes, which in turn has led to declining soil fertility and to erosion. It is anticipated that a gradual emigration and resettlement in nearby, under-populated areas will help to ease these problems. Meanwhile, improvements in agricultural productivity must be attempted in situ. 1.02 Farm holdings in the project area are uniformly small, with only 20% exceeding 2 ba. The average family consisting of seven persons, including three working adults, plants about 1.3 ha with perennial (mostly coffee) and annual crops (maize, groundnuts) mostly in mixed stands. Women are generally responsible for food crops and men for cash crops. The farming system involves complex intercropping, with a large variety of shrubs, trees and grass-type plants, all grown on the same ridge. Customary cultivation rights are granted to male heads of families by the traditional rulers. Land so granted is passed on from one generation to the next. 1.03 Most farmers are members of cooperatives whose apex organization, the 'Union des CoopOratives de Cafe Ar&bica de l'Ouest" (UCCAO) founded in late 1973, has as its principal task the grading, processing and marketing of arabica coffee. It also provides central engineering and workshop services. Its major source of income is a 1% commission on coffee sales and a pro-rata charge for coffee grading. Its operating policy is formulated by a Board consisting of elected officials from member cooperatives. In 1975, the Government asked the Bank for assistance in financing a rural development project as part of a larger development in the Western Highlands. Thus, the Bank prepared the project in collaboration with UCCAO, the organization designated bv the Ministry of Agriculture as the project executing agency. The project was appraised in May-June 1977, became effective in late 1978, and was completed 'n June 1984. -2- II. PROJECT FORMULATION AND PROCESSING A. Background and Project Origin 2.01 The project was identified in the context of a declining growth in agriculture from 5.3% per annum in 1966/1971 to 2.22 per annum in 1971/1976 due to low export prices for coffee and cocoa, production terms of trade shifting from traditional export crops to food crops, and a population growth rate of 2.3% coupled with a rural-urban migration which put pressure on food supplies, especially in the urban areas. During project formulation, the Government stressed coffee development and showed little interest in a project that placed emphasis on food crop development, as suggested by the Bank. It was only in late 1975/early 1976, after a Bank reconnaissance mission, that the Government agreed to include food crops in the project. A key element in this decision was the Government's aim, as stated in the then new Fourth Development Plan (1977-1981), to raise the standard of living of the rural poor and to reduce income d'sparities. Due to the Western Highlands' high population density, low incomes, and practice of intercropping cash and food crops on small plots, it was decided that an integrated rural development project rather than a coffee production project would better serve the interests of tle area and the country. The emerging Bank philosophy of stressing rural development projects rather than plantation cash crop projects was also a factor. B. Identification and Preparation 2.02 An identification mission from RMWA visited the country in April 1976 and submitted its report on June 15 of that year. The project was strongly biased toward food crop production and had as its main objectives the reduction of income disparities and the improvement of income and nutritional standards of the rural population, by encouraging a more intensive use of the scarce land resources in the area. It was a classical integrated rural development project with diverse components: extension, training, seed production, and, as pilot actions, afforestation, small animal husbandry, crop storage, bottomland development and field research on food crops. These components, to be implemented in the Western Province, were to reach about half of the farm population (40,000 holdings) and to provide the institutional framework for the project. The main issues raised were the following: (a) the availability of proven technological packages tested at the farm level; (b) the possibility to produce seed by using contract growers within the project area instead of a mechanized seed farm outside the project, as proposed; (c) the emergence of land tenure problems in bottomland development; - 3 - (d) the financial burden of a government subsidy policy for fertilizer; and (e) the iuestion whether "UCCAO can be induced to diversify into food crops anu to participate in the financlng of such diversification." 1 / Each of these issues became a constraint or highlighted problems during project implementation. A more appropriate wording for issue (e) wotld have been "should UCCAO be induced to diversify into food crops?" Although there were definite advantages for UCCAO's involvement, there were also certain disadvantages, both requiring thorough investigation. 2.03 The preparation report closely followed the project identification report. Most components remained unchanged, but the pilot components became major components, i.e., In its final form the project comprised 14 separate activities; six of them were to be contracted out to the provincial services of "Genie Rural" (GR) and "Eaux et Forets" of MINAGRI, to the Ministry of Livestock and to the "Institut des recherches agricoles et foresti6res" (IRAF). UCCAO was confirmed as the overall executing agency for the project. C. Appraisal 2.04 The appraisal mission visited Cameroon in May 1977. The essential elements presented in the preparation report were maintained by the appraisal team with the exception of the small livestock component. The number and the diversity of these components were important issues at the Decision Meeting on July 8, 1977. Another major issue was whether the new extension ande related agrlcultural support services firanced by the project should be placed under UCCAO. This in turn was linked to the broader question of whether area-based development should be channelled through existing, but strengthened, line ministries or through a regional development authority. It was agreed at the Decision Meeting that creating semi-autonomous regional development agencies was necessary in Cameroon at that time but that "this policy would be kept under review and an appropriate strategy devised in the longer term". 2/ The Yellow Cover Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) was released on October 21, 1977, the Green Cover on December 30, 1977, and the project was submitted to the Loan Committee on January 4, 1978. 1/ IBRD, Project Brief on the Identification Report for Western Highlands Agricultural Project, August 6, 1976, page 6, para 13 (a). 2/ IBRD, Decision Memorandum, August 3, 1977, page 2, para 8. -4- D. Negotiations and Board Presentation 2.05 Negotiations were held from January 31 through February 3, 1978. Particular attention was paid to the two items below: (a) producer prices for coffee--the IDA delegation stressed the importance of setting coffee producer prices high enough to allow producers a reasonable return; and (b) small livestock component--the government delegation expressed intereet in reinstating the small livestock component in the project. The small livestock component was dropped from the project as it was decided during appraisal to integrate it in the Second Livestock Project which was appraised later in the same year. On the issue of producer prices, the Government stated that this aspect should be addressed in the context of a national pricing policy rather than in a regional development project. It nevertheless assured the Bank that it would periodically review producer prices and, if needed, adjust them to maintain rroducer incentives. The Board approved the credit on March 28, 1978. E. Project Description and Objectives 3/ 2.06 The project was part of a program for the development of the overpopulated Western Highlands. For social reasons, improvements in agricultural productivity in situ rather than resettlement projects were required to reduce population pressure on soil fertility. The major objective of the project was to provide for the development of institutions, procedures, and techniques to improve agricultural production and the standard of living of the many small farmers in the project area. The system of multiple intercropping ruled out development initiatives based on a single crop. The project was thus designed to intensify the cultivation of all crops included in the prevailing farming system and to devise measures to prevent erosion and loss of soil fertility. Apart from increasing crop production and soil fertility, the project aimed at reversing the trend of declining coffee production. 2.07 The four-year project had nine components: (a) the strengthening and equipment of a new Directorate of Production Services within UCCAO to be responsible for extension, plant protection, seed production, training, and field trials and demonstrations; 3/ IBRD Staff Appraisal Report, March 6, 1977, page 5, para 3.01. - 5 - (b) the establishment of a training center for technical staff; (c) the construction of 10 new rural service centers; (d) the opening of a revolving credit fund for seasonal inputs and tools; (e) the construction of about 220 village water points; (f) the development of about 400 ha of uncultivated bottomlands; (g) the introduction of better coffee processing equipment; (h) the establishment of a project monitoring and evaluation unit; and (i) the st;rengthening of the Planning Unit in MINAGRI. -6- III. IMPLEMENTATION A. Effectiveness and Start-up 3.01 At the time of the first supervision mission in July/August 1978, the project was still not effective because, first, the positions of Director of Production Services (an expatriate) and Chief of the Extension Division (a Cameroonian) had not been filled, and second, the Project Agreement had not been ratified by UCCAO's Board of Directors. These two conditions were met by the end of the year and the project became effective on December 8, 1978. 3.02 The project started slowly and, therefore, the implementation of several key components was delayed, in particular the production-related activities. Although the first supervision mission aimed at facilitating project start-up, two major factors were beyond its control. The most critical one was the difficulty in filling key Cameroonian positions. In spite of the Bunk's considerable concern in filling these postions quickly, the procedures for seconding personnel from MINAGRI to UCCAO were more cumbersome than anticipated, and it was not until mid-1980, 18 months after effectiveness, that these positions were filled. The other major delay was in the selection of a site for the seed production farm (para 5.08). Therefore, the start-up of the project, estimated at appraisal to take from 10 to 12 months, took nearly 18 months, with the result that many components lagged one year and disbursements did not start until 1980. B. Progress and Revisions 3.03 The project, originally planned over four years-an overly optimistic estimate for an institutionally complex project--closed in June 1984 after two extensions, and five and a half years after effectiveness. No major changes or revisions were made in the project components and at closing date some of the components had in physical terms realized or exceeded their appraisal targets while others had not. The key indicators of physical development in the final supervision mission report of August 9, 1984 are given in the annex (Table 1). Although little physical development was accomplished until mid-1980, implementation accelerated in the following years. However, while a four year period was perhaps reasonable for implementing the various components once the projec" had "geared up", it was certainly not sufficient to cover both the prt1?aratory phase and the execution phase. 3.04 The delays in the project construction program were caused to a large extent by the lengthy government process of reviewing and awarding contracts. This was to have been the responsibility of UCCAO, but in 1980 a new government policy required that all contracts be cleared by the Central Procurement Commission. This and other constraints resulted in the completion of the training center in 1982 instead of 1978. The difficulty in finding and deciding on a suitable site and the inexperience of local contractors exacerbated the delays. The seed farm was finished in 1981 instead of 1978/79 after experiencing major problems in site selection. The housing for experts in Bafoussam originally planned to be finished by end PYI was completed in late PY3 (1980). C. Procurement 3.05 The Project Agreement stipulates ICB for all contracts worth more than US$100,000 equivalent (for coffee processing factory and seed farm equipment, vehicles and heavy equipment). The entire package was estimated at about US$3.2 million equivalent. Contracts for project technical assistance were to be contracted under limited international tendering for an amount not exceeding US$2.1 million. The total amount of US$5.3 million was contracted under ICB without noteworthy procurement problems. 3.06 However, due to the centralisation of procurement in Yaoundg and inadequate preparation, the first tenders for vehicles, equipment and technical assistance were delayed and published only in April 1979, i.e., one year after the credit signing date. The expatriate personnel and the vehicles and equipment arrived in end-1979, thereby delaying project implementation by one year. The second and third tenders for vehicles and equipment, undertaken in PY3, were properly carried out. D. Costs 3.07 Cost to completion was CFAF 8,268 million (Annex, Table 2), including some investment to prepare the Second Project. In absolute CFAF terms the project represents a 35% cost overrun. A comparison in U.S. dollar terms would be meaningless given the more than 100% appreciation of the dollar. An exact assessment as to whether the project reached its goals is difficult; therefore, it would also be highly arbitrary to calculate cost over/underrun. Nevertheless, the following may indicate a trend. The US$13.0 million credit converted at the exchange rate of CFAF 245/US$1 prevailing at project negotiations amounts to CFAF 3,185 million; converted at the average exchange rate of CFAF 329/US$1, prevailing during project implementation, it amounts to CFAF 4,277 million. This implies that if costs at appraisal had been correct, the project would have spent only US$9.7 million of the US$13 million credit. 3.08 Project overspending can be attributed mainly to (a) UCCAO's headquarters (130% overrun); (b) UCCAO's commercial services (62%); and (c) the seed multiplication farm (20%). Another factor is the cost of technical assistance (US$3.2 million at project completion, i.e., about 40% above appraisal costs) due to the extension of contracts. Conversely, the project underspent approximately 43% in monitoring and evaluation. 3.09 UCCAO's projec: accounting system is not sufficiently developed to indicate true costs. Therefore, the real cost of each component may vary because the operatir.g overhead has not been allocated to components. -8- E. Financing 3.10 The adjusted (net of commercial services costs) financing percentages of the SAR compared with the actual percentages are as follows: SAR Actual Government 22 26 IDA 67 66 UCCAO 11 8 The Government's contribution to project costs covers local salary payments as well as the cost of incremental insecticides and pesticides (procured through FONADER). Domestic inflation has risen more rapidly than international inflation and, based on the dollar appreciation, the foreign exchange component originally estimated at 67% may have actually slipped to about 55%. Moreover, due to this appreciation, the dollar denominated funds sufficed to finance nearly six project years instead of four. 3.11 In the first project year, government funding was insufficient to keep the project going without making use of short-term bank overdrafts. This was due to the absence of IDA reimbursements during these years, as the credit was not yet effective. Also, the initial reimbursement applications took an inordinate length of time to be approved by the Ministry of Finance in Yaound6 (para 3.12). However, once the first reimbursement reached the project, cash flow problems disappeared. Although cost control was relatively good, the project never really mastered the establishment of quarterly cash flow forecasts. F. Disbursements 3.12 Whereas the SAR estimated that the full credit (US$13.0 million) would be disbursed over five years (four-year project period), it was disbursed over six years. The first disbursement took place only in October 1979, i.e., 1-1/2 years after signature of the Credit Agreement; the 115 applications were presented to the Bank over a 4-1/2 year period. The initial delay was due to a lack of experience in preparing withdrawal applications at UCCAO's level and to the excessive documentation required by the External Debt Department of the Ministry of Finance. An additional factor was the relative remoteness of Bafoussam and the wholly inadequate communication system with Yaounde. These factors contributed to a lag of over one year in the reception of the first application in Washington, and the average process time of an application from UCCAO to the Bank was six months. The average application received amounted to US$113,000 which is well above the presently recommended Bank minimum amount of US$20,000. As is the case in most Cameroonian projects, preparation costs per disbursement application were extremely high due to the Ministry of Finance's requirement for complete documentation. This problem still exists. -9- G. Reporting 3.13 The Project Agreement between UCCAO and IDA obligated the project to provide audited annual accounts six months after the end of each fiscal year. Quarterly and annual progress reports as well as budnets and work programs were not required to be submitted to IDA under the Agreement. However, UCCAO faithfully submitted budgets, work programs, quarterly and annual progress reports throughout the period. Audited accounts were consistently submitted with up to one year delay and are still awaited for the last project year. This suggests a weakness in the finance/accounting department since it cannot closely control project expenditures. H. Project Closing 3.14 The project completion date was to be December 1982 with a credit closing date of June 30, 1983. However, the absence of agreement between the bank and the Government on input subsidy and interest rate policy led to a substantial delay in negotiating the Second Project. The closing date was formally extended to June 30, 1984, with disbursements continuing until October 1984 (for expenditures committed before July 1, 1984). Despite this extension, the project suffered a hiatus as the loan for the Second Project was signed in June 1984 and did not become effective until September 9, 1985. This rather lengthy period between the closing date of the project and the effectiveness date of the Second Project adversely affected the morale of project staff. - 10 - IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE A. Institutional Design 4.01 The first step in project formulation appears to have been identification of actions that would either help to remove technical constraints in development or take advantage of untapped potential in the area; the second step was then to find the institutional structure within which these actions could be successfully implemented. UCCAO was, and still is, a successful coffee marketing organization representing the arabica coffee producing cooperatives in the Western Province. Moreover, it was, and still is, the only body of any size and importance in the agricultural sector in the area with the support and confidence of more than 75% of the farming population. Thus, it naturally became the initial institutional focus in project formulation. The idea of using UCCAO as the project executing agency derived from government policy of, on the one hand, using existing organizations whenever possible and, on the other, managing development projects through regional development authorities. 4.02 Some project activities were directly linked to the operations and goals of UCCAO and its cooperative unions-i.e., improvement of coffee yields and production, provision of inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides, improvement of coffee quality and of the efficiency of coffee processing and marketing. The strengthening of UCCAO's capacity in these areas was to directly benefit its members and increase coffee revenues, and to reinforce its existing services. However, some project activities (an integrated crop extension service, provision of maize and other food crop, seeds and demonstration programs) were, and still are, debatable in terms of their complementarity with UCCAO. As all UCCAO's farmers grow not only coffee but also food crops and as the latter are often interplanted with coffee, it could be argued that a multiple crop extension service is not only useful to the coffee farmers, but also unavoidable. Whether this should logically have been placed within UCCAO's organizational structure is another question. The justification for having seed production and field research activities in UCCAO follows the same line of argument but is somewhat extenuated. Certain activities envisaged under the project (bottomland development and village water supply) had very little to do with the UCCAO's activities or management structure; both were subcontracted to "GEnie Rural" with UCCAO providing only coordination. 4.03 There were two options available at project formulation. The first option was to use UCCAO as the organization in which to build a regional development capability. This was in line with the Government's policy of overcoming the persistent ineffectiveness of MINAGRI's field services. UCCAO had the advantage of being already in place and efficiently managed, of having farmer support and good financial control, and of covering through its cooperatives 80% of the farmers in the area. The most serious risk was that by loading it with too many diverse activities it might lose its efficiency as a ccffee marketing organization and not necessarily become an effective regional development body. There - 11 - was also the question of what would happen to UCCAO as a regional development authority after project completion. Who would finance the ongoing services and activities that were not directly related to coffee and thus could not justifiably be financed from coffee margins? Where would be the motivation for a coffee marketing body to continue with regional development activities that did little to help improve its cash flow? Another risk was the inherent conflict between a profit oriented coffee marketing body and the broad objectives of ie regional development body. This risk was largely negated by the Government's direct payments to UCCAO for salaries and operations of extension and associated services; however, reductions in future funding could increase UCCAO's operating costs, 4.04 The second option was to rely on the line ministries (i.e., their provincial field services) to execute those components that fell under their purview, with UCCAO being responsible for cooperative and coffee related components and with a project planning and coordination unit which, over the life of the project, was to become a provincial unit responsible for planning and coordinating development activities and projects in the Western Province. Possible advantages of this approach would have been (a) that the implementation capacity would have been built into the line ministries; this would have helped to avoid the duplication of services, thus permiting a closer integration of national development objectives and programs and facilitating the transfer of technical know-how to other provinces; and (b) that while the continued provision of financial support at the end of the project would not have been guaranteed under this arrangement, at least by using line ministries a budget mechanism would have been in place that could have facilitated, with the right pressures and priorities, the channelling of government and other funds. However, there was one over-riding disadvantage: the traditional government services in the Province, and elsewhere in the country, had a record of being extremely weak and generally lacked operating and capital budgets. As this was seen as a structural problem that could not be changed, without jeopardizing the successful execution of the project, it was decided that UCCAO was the safest institution for executing the project. 4.05 The key to project implementation was the setting up of a new four-unit Directorate of Production Services in UCCAO, i.e., Extension Division, Pest Control Unit, Seed Production Unit, and Training and Publicity Unit. This was to be the core of the project and the prime means of achieving the proposed production increases in coffee and food crops. By drawing personnel from existing government services, particularly from the Provincial Delegation of Agriculture where the majority of extension staff were to be recruited, the project intended to build up a field production support service to operate within UCCAO. Over the five and a half years of the project, most recruitment had taken place but not without considerable friction, especially with the Delegate of Agriculture who strongly resisted the transfer of his staff to UCCAO. The compromise on agricultural support services was that the "moniteurs agricoles" up to the "Chef de Secteur" would come under UCCAO while the positions of "Poste Agricole Principal" (PAP) would stay within the Delegation. In spite of an - 12 - agreement in principle at higher levels, at the provincial level the Delegation of Agriculture never accepted the arrangement and even as late as December 1982 it was reported 4/ that efforts to formalize this arrangement led to a political imbroglio with the risk that the hrovince could end up with a double extension service at the district level. This conflict was not adequately resolved during the project period. The Second Project attempts to diffuse this issue by requesting, once again, that MINAGRI clearly state the sharing of responsibility for extension service activities in the Western Province. Accordingly, the Ministry stated, as a condition of effectiveness, UTCCAO's technical and organizational responsibilities for the extension service in the project area. B. Management and Organizational Effectiveness 4.06 While the effectiveness of the project in terms of strengthening UCCAO overall management is difficult to assess, it is clear that a capacity was built within UCCAO to handle implementation of a number of development actions and services. It is less clear whetler UCCAO developed its capacity to carry out the broader planning and coordination of development, even agricultural development, in the region--a normal responsibility for a regional development authority, but a responsibility that was not explicitly given to UCCAO under the project and one that would probably have been better placed under the Ministry of Economic Planning and Industry (MEPID). If MEPID's provincial office had been able to fulfill this role, there would have been no need for UCCAO to build this capacity. In fact, it might have been logical during project formulation to have included funds to strengthen MEPID's provincial planning and coordination capacity as was the case in the Bank-financed Northern Province Rural Project. 4.07 Project design had limited effect on UCCAO's traditional activity of coffee processing and marketing and even less on the activities and operations of member cooperatives. These two areas were intentionally neglected during project formulation in order to avoid complicating an already complex project. They have both been taken into account in the Second Project through the financing of warehouses and coffee sorting-machines, short-term consultancy in coffee processing, and an organization and management study (MCS). 5/ The MCS study made detailed recommendations for improving the management and accounting systems, on a union-by-union basis, and proposed ways for the cooperatives and UCCAO to improve their storage, transport and handling of coffee. The 4/ IBRD, Supervision/Back-to-Office Report, December 21, 1982, para 13. 5/ AFC - Rapports de la mission MCS, April & December, 1982. A study covering marketing system for coffee, input supplies, credit, management, personnel, structure and strategy. - 13 - implementation of these results started in the final year of the project; recommendations will, however, be followed up in the Second Project. The Executive Controller studied the operations of the individual unions and made recommendations for improvement in their functioning, but as his main responsibility was to "refine UCCAO's accounting systems by developing analytical accounting tools and procedures," 6/ only a limited amount of his time could be spent on this activity. Therefore, although there were definite recommendations on how to improve the functioning of the cooperatives and the operation of the coffee marketing system (some of them had begun to be impleme-ated by the end of the project), most of the cooperative support was intended to be provided under the Second Project. 4.08 A review of the effectiveness of the project in terms of UCCAO's financial management performance shows that considerable piogress was made on the financial and accounting sides. An excellent Director of Finance (Cameroonian) was recruited during the project and marked improvements were made especially in liquidity management. The accounts were kept current and financial information was readily available. In contrast, little progress was made in improving UCCAO management performance which, in epite of its good reputation was, and still is, run without any real management system; the Director General takes most of the dLcisions alone. To further exacerbate the situation, there was no deputy director for most of the project period. Thus, on those frequent occasions when the Director General was away on mission, either decisions were not taken or, as was often the case, the expatriate Director of Production Services, who was also responsible for project procurement, filled in, to the detriment of his own responsibilities. UCCAO remains a relatively efficient cooperative apex organization, primarily charged with coffee marketing; it has also built a certain management capacity while running extension, seed production and, Indirectly, bottomland and water development. 4.09 Coordination and liaison with outside agencies and other development projects and activities are aspects of institutional performance where the project experienced some difficulties. This might have been expected, first, because the project was set up within UCCAO, an established organization with an independent mode of operation and limited links to other bodies; second, because the institutional design of the project, while ensuring that UCCAO would to an extent fulfill the role of a regional development authority, made no allowance or provision for planning or coordination as an operating part of the management structure. A "Comite de Coordination" chaired by the Governor and comprising the heads of key provincial agencies was established and met quarterly as necessary. 6/ IBRD Staff Appraisal Report, Op. cit., Annex 2, Appendix 1. - 14 - While these meetings provided a forum for UCCAO to keep the provincial authorities informed and for the authorities to express their desires and grievances, it could not, and should not, replace a formal planning process. 4.10 Extension. As no reliable data about the MINAGRI extension service prior to the project were available, there was no discussion on its strengths and weaknesses or on how the existing institutional arrangements affected its operation. It appears to have been taken for granted that the extension service would be best managed and run under UCCAO. Thtis may have been a valid assumption, and in fact, the training given to extension staff and the support provided by the project's technical assistance team was successful in building up an efficient agricultural extension service. By the end of the project, a regular schedule of visits and reporting had been established and extension workers had a series of themes to pass on to farmers and farmer groups in their areas. 4.11 Seed Production Unit. An independent unit reporting to the Director of Production Services was established at Bafole, about 60 km from Bafoussam. As stated in the SAR, the unit was to be assessed in PY4 to determine if it could become an autonomous commercial enterprise. The management of the seed farm, which had been entrusted to an internationally recruited expert (seed agronomist) from its inception, did not experience any significant difficulties apart from delays in installing the seed processing equipment and keeping a proper cost control of operations. The major problems concerned technical design, the physical properties of the site, and the economics of the operation (Sections V and VII). 4.12 Although difficult to determine at this stage, the institutional arrangements for pest control appear not to have been thought of at appraisal; in fact there is only a passing reference to the component in the SAR. The unit, to be created within UCCAO, was to have two bases (Dschang and Foumbot) and to draw from the present unit in MINAGRI, in a way similar to the extension service. This move was strongly resisted by the Provincial Delegate of Agriculture who wanted to keep the pest control unit within MINAGRI, his argument being that the service was intended to serve all crops and all farmers in the Province, not only UCCAO members. The pest control unit ("Service de Lutte Phytosanitaire") remained in MINAGRI throughout the project (para 5.12). 4.13 Village Water Supply and Bottomland Development. These activities were the responsibility of "Genie Rural", with UCCAO coordinating the planning and pre-financing the works. Two new units had to be created within GR and, after a slow start particularly in bottomland development, they performed well. The delay in the bottomland development component (about one year) can be largely attributed to the selection of an incompetent head for the unit, who was replaced In 1980. UCCAO major direct involvement was through the extension service which provided technical support to farmers in the bottomland area. Indirectly, by providing project finances, UCCAO gained some measure of control. - 15 - C. Covenants and Sectoral Development 4.14 The project was reasonably efficient in meeting legal covenants as negotiated between the Government and IDA. The one covenant that was not met during the project--submission of audited accounts within six months of the end of the fiscal year--was beyond the direct control of the project, since UCCAO audits the accounts of six cooperatives along with its own. To achieve this task within six months ftom the end of einch fiscal year is somewhat unrealistic. What should have been realized is a separate opinion on the status of the project accounts at the beginning of the joint audits, so as to ensure the timely delivery of the report to the Bank. 4.15 Coffee production in Cameroon steadily increased until 1981, reaching 105,000 tons, or about 2.4% of the world market. In the following years, production fell substantially due to a drought that lasted several years. Approximately half of Cameroon's production comes from the Western Province where farmers produce mostly arabica; thus the Province accounts for about 90% of total arabica and about 30% of total robusta production. Producer prices are reviewed and set annually by the Government. During the entire project, this pricing mechanism proved to be insufficiently flexible to keep farmer incentives alive so as to compete with the increasing demand for food crops (mainly maize) whose prices were set by free market forces. Consequently, the major sectoral development during project implementation was a gradual shift from perennial to annual crops. This undoubtedly accounts for the shortfall of coffee production when compared with SAR targets. D. Borrower Performance 4.16 Three key points, all directly traceable to policy issues, are responsible for the project failure at not fully reaching its objectives: (a) arabica producer price levels (para 5.22); (b) subsidization and distrlhution of inputs (para 5.12); and (c) the centralized procurement of project specific contracts for services and goods (para 3.06). The Ministry of Agriculture has recently commissioned a study on producer prices for arabica coffee, as the Government has realized that price levels paid to producers are not sufficiently remunerative to stimulate production. The results of this study will undoubtedly lead to an upward revision of prices which will, hopefully, rekindle the interest of planters. Under the Second Project the Government has agreed to decentralize the ordering of agricultural inputs and to let UCCAO handle the determination of quantities, qualities and time of procurement. Given the substantive quantities involved, however, the tendering will still have to pass through the Central Procurement Directorate in Yaoundg. This procedure represents a considerable improvement over the past and, to the extent that UCCAO prepares the tenders sufficiently in advance to permit timely arrival, a major bottleneck of the project will have been removed. 4.17 The input subsidization and distribution issue is the focus of ongoing discussions between -he Government and the Bank on the agricultural - 16 - sector. More time is required to convince politically minded government officials that subsidization of agricultural inputs leads to waste. In any case, the problem of procurement is to some degree faced by all Bank Group-financed operations in Cameroon. Nevertheless, by careful planning and compliance with Bank procurement guidelines, the two activities can be carried out satisfactorily, as demonstrated during the latter years of project implementation. - 17 - V. OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND PROJECT IMPACT A. Training and Extension 5.01 The performance of the training program far exceeded the SAR target, although the training facilities (classrooms, dormitory, cafeteria) to be financed under the project were not available until the end of the project (para 5.02). Rental of facilities by UCCAO allowed the training to be carried out more or less as planned. Instead of the 750 man-months of training forecast, about 1,800 man-months were provided in the four-year period, reaching over 2,500 man-months by project completion. 7/ Most of the training was for recruits who were to fill the positions of "moniteurs agricoles" (65%); the remainder was divided between training supervisory extension staff, farmer leaders, cooperative officers, and refresher courses for extension staff. These four-month courses focused on subjects such as cultural techniques for the major crops grown in the area, zonal ecology including erosion prevention, methods of interaction with farmers, and the principles and operations of the Training and Visit (T and V) system. The result of the training peogram in terms of extension staff placed in the field was also in excess of the appraisal estimates: 784 "moniteurs agricoles" versus 378, and 515 supervisory personnel versus 295. 8/ The expanded number of personnel trained permitted the project to introduce the T and V system into five departments instead of three, as originally planned. 5.02 The 30-person training center provided by the project was intended to be operational by the end of the first year, at which time the courses were scheduled to start. The reasons for the four year delay are discussed briefly in para 3.04. However, looking in longer terms, more important than the delay in construction was the selection of the site in a residential section of Bafoussam. While it is argued by UCCAO that it is a good location because of its ready access to the UCCAO offices and facilities in town, more relevant is the fact that the center of town distracts students and takes away from the group rapport that should develop among them. Another and more serious drawback is the lack of an adjoining area where field trials and demonstrations can be carried out and incorporated into the training curriculum--an essential element in the training of extension staff. A much more suitable site would have been at the nearby research station where ample land was said ta be available and where the center would have benefited from exchanges with the research staff and their programs. Considering the time it took to select the present site, there would appear to be no logical justification for not selecting a more appropriate location. 7/ UCCAO, Completion Study, Op. cit., Table 2. 8/ Ibid., Tableau 1. - 18 - 5.03 It was planned during project formulation that the project extension service would reach 30,000 farm families by full development (PY4), i.e., about half of the farmers in the Province. Although it is difficult to get an accurate estimate of the number of farmers reached by the project without an agricultural census, detailed records were kept of extension contacts--with individuals and with groups--whose figures indicate an increase from 16,300 at the end of PY4 to 30,000 in PY5 and to almost 40,000 by project completion; thus the SAR target has been met. In terms of the ratio of farmers per extension worker, the estimation was 410:1 against 400:1 planned. 5.04 The ability to determine the performance and to separate the impact of the extension service on production is very difficult because of the influence of other factors (paras 5.19 to 5.22). Nevertheless, a survey carried out from January to March 1984 by the project monitoring unit indicates how well the service performed in the eyes of the farmers. This survey, which covered 739 farmers (a 2.4% sample) within the project area, shows that although the extension service was well received and had good penetration it had problems with its messages: whereas in the first year of an extension agent's work meetings were well attended (68% on average) and many themes were deemed useful (70%), by the fourth year the attendance had dropped to 52% and the perceatage of themes judged useful had fallen to 26%. This is to a large extent indicative of the fear expressed prior to appraisal (para 2.02(a)), i.e., a lack of suitable packages and messages to extend. It also reflects the difficulties encountered by the farmers in getting inputs, such as fertilizers, recommended by the extension agents. Not only did the farmers become disinterested in hearing the same themes, but the motivation of the extension workers declined along with the unavailability of agricultural inputs. B. Field Trials and Demonstrations 5 05 The performance of this component was mixed. The component comprised three separate activities, one being adaptive research and the other two being oriented toward improving the environment. The first program was reported in the UCCAO completion study as not responding in general to the needs of the project. The "Institut de Recherche Agronomique" (IRA), entrusted with research, is oriented toward pure single-crop rese-,rch and, consequently, while its recommendations for improvement in coffee were positive, little useful information was produced on food crops, especially in terms of mixed culture (either food crop with other crops or food crops with cash crops, such as coffee). At appraisal, particularly in light of IRA's background, consideration might have been given to establishing a separate unit as a link between research and extension, i.e., a unit that would have drawn on research findings, developed a feedback system to elicit farmers opinions and set up trials and demonstrations at farm level with the participation of extension workers and farmers. As it was, the extension service had too few aieuspges to extend. - 19 - 5.06 The second program (demonstrations) set up by the trials and demonstrations service to illustrate erosion control measures was highly successful. By selecting responsive farmers, the service set up erosion control measures on the si es, normally on steep slopes, with farmers being responsible for providing the labor and maintenance for the schemes. In fact, the farmers implemented the improvements themselves by stabilizing bunds, ridging contour and hedge rows under the guidance of the service on part of their holdings. These farmers who acted as catalysts within their communities were, and still are, paid a nominal fee by UCCAO to fulfill this role. In total, 36 of these demonstrations were set up in the project area over the five and a half year implementation period--more than five times the original target of seven. As over 80% of the land farmed in the Province Is on steep slopes and erosion continues to be the main problem, this program potentially has a considerable impact. 5.07 Although the third program within this component (afforestation) established 460 ha of new forest, as compared with 450 originally foreseen, problems were experienced with the concept as presented in the SAR, which was the reforestation of bare hilltops subject to heavy erosion that in most cases had been abandoned by farmers. The approach, which aimed at stabilizing the ecology of the area, ran into difficulties because the local villagers who supplied the labor to plant the seedlings left the area shortly thereafter and, consequently, did not maintain the plantations. About 107 ha were planted by PY2 in Bangou and Bamendou (two of the areas experiencing the most serious erosion problems), 123 ha by the end of PY3, 164 ha in PY4 and 200 ha in the final year. About 60 ha were destroyed by fire after the drought of 1983. It was observed during the later stage of implementation 9/ that, in spite of these problems, the plantings were well established, particularly considering the small team used to execute the program. During the final year of project implementation, the original approach of establishing plantations on public land was abandoned and a new approach adopted whereby assistance was given only to individuals or groups willing to establish plantations on their own land and maintain them. As this stage, it appears that farmers' response to this change in approach is positive as they tend to maintain the bunds and ridging contours necessary initially to prevent erosion more regularly on their own land. C. Seed Production 5.08 The original site proposed was located about 30 miles north of Foumbot in the department of Bamoun and met the main criteria set out in the SAR: a large enough area (500 ha), good soils, sufficient rainfall, relatively flat terrain, easy access to labour and proximity to a research establislhment. In early PYI, the site had been committed for a 9/ IBRD, Back-to-Office Report, April 28, 1984. - 20 - tomato-maize scheme. At the end of PY1, a less suitable site on long-term tenancy from the local sultan was found, but the soils tended to waterlog and were low in fertility, thus requiring more fertilizer. However, it was only 7 km from the main road, closer to Bafciussam and easily connected to the electricity grid. Work started in early PY2 with the first 25 ha sown in April of that year, 5.09 Cultivation expanded from the 25 ha in PY2 to 180 ha in PY3, 200 ha in PY4 and 220 ha in PY5. Seed production was well organized and yields were higher than projected in the SAR. 10/ Maize, for example, which occupied about two-thirds of the farm, averaged 3.8 t/ha with a high of 4.4 t/ha in PY5 compared with the original target of 2.8 t/ha. Maize production increased from 358 t in PY3 to 590 t in PY5; however, the annual amounts of seeds for distribution were considerably lower, ranging from 150 t (PY3) to 200 t (PYS). The farm also produced seeds of soya beans, groundnuts, beans and potatoes 11/ but in smaller quantities. Since PY2, maize supply has by far exceeded demand which caused the seed farm to sell it at a low price, much of it being used for home consumption. The selling price was about CFAF 60/kg until the end of 1984. The real seed demand for the Western Province has been estimated by the project at under 100 t; sales in 1984, for example, were 55 t of certified prepackaged seed. 5.10 The mach.nery and supporting infrastructure are also over-dimensioned in relation to throughput. For instance, a 200 m2 hangar and adjoining 200 m2 store were built plus 12 houses for staff; the Farm Manager reported that he had difficulty in filling the staff houses because personnel preferred to live in town. The drying and seed processing equipment, installed in late 1981 (PY3), has a handling capacity of 10 t of seed per day, which is excessive; and the equipment is too sophisticated and delicate for an operation of this nature in Africa. Some questions have been raised about the design of the installation and the preselection of machinery and its procurement. Lack of adequate control at the preselection stage might have exacerbated the problem. In the future, when the farm is managed without the internationally recruited expert, difficulties could arise in keeping a reasonable level of operating efficiency. 5.11 The farm is now in place with its 250 ha under cultivation, machinery and equipment and associated infrastructure. What are the options for making it a viable operation? The first one considered was to sell seeds to other areas (adjoining provinces were suggested in the SAR) but for only 20% of the production or 180 t/annum. Although this is still theoretically possible, the available capacity would be closer to 700 t/year at full production. Apart from the large volume to dispose of, 10/ Annex, Table 3. 11/ Potatoes were produced on a separate site at a higher altitude. - 21 - another problem that would mitigate this option is the Government's current policy which stipulates that each province should be self-sufficient in seeds. If one considers producing for export to other areas, possibly even to other countries, it would be essential to operate on a sound financial basis probably only achievable in the longer run if the farm becomes a commercial venture. The other option, assuming that UCCAO or the Government continue to run the farm, is to reduce the size and staffing of the operation to the level of the local demand. The main drawback to this option is that the seed processing machinery is not divisible and could thius be expensive to operate and maintain especially for such a small throughput. All indication points toward the fact that the farm was considerably overdesigned at the outset and that no matter what operational adjustment are opted for, it will never be run profitably as it is constructed to produce articles in quantities that by far outstrip the limited demand. Therefore, the best solution would seem to be closing down the farm and selling the equipment--especially since it appears that for the 1985 growing season the farm sold onlv 14 t of seeds, the remainder being produced by the private sector. D. Pest Control 5.12 The original idea was that a special unit would be set up within the Directorate of Production Services in UCCAO to carry out the ongoing spraying against antestia and to supervise farmers who would spray their coffee trees against anthracnose. The SAR contains no description of the recommended structure of this unit, its proposed method of operation or the mechanism for ensuring the supply and distribution of pesticides and fungicides. In fact, very little attention appears to have been given to the component, except in the investment cost table. Thus, the only measures of performance are: (a) the hectares projected to be covered; (b) the establishment of housing; and (c) the provision of vehicles and equipment. The original targets were 46,000 ha per annum for antestia control and 31,000 ha for anthracnose control. These figures were revised during implementation, respectively to 75,000 ha and 54,000 ha out of a total hectarage estimated at 95,000 ha. 12/ The area actually covered by the service was on average 67,000 ha for antestia and 34,000 ha for anthracrose control--an implementation rate of about 80% and 60% respectively. The main problem with the service was the inadequate MINAGRI/FONADER system for supplying chemicals, in terms of quantity, quality and availability. Often, UCCAO had to purchase chemicals directly (as it did fertilizers) to supplement the quantities of aubaidized material made available by MINAGRI/FONADER, and, in these instances, UCCAO had to bear the full cost. Even though the pest control service was successful in covering a relatively large area, its impact is questionable. In the case of anthracnose, two reasons underlined the considerable waste of fungicide: 12/ UCCAO, Completion Study, Op. cit., Tables 8 and 9. - 22 - first the fungicide was, and still is, free; second, in many cases farmers did not own a sprayer or did not have access to one, but still received fungicide. 5.13 The performance of this component was intended to be controlled by placing the unit under UCCAO. However, there was a strong resistance to this proposal and the Government was adamant about leaving the service in the Delegation of Agriculture. The Bank agreed to it in 1980 13/ on the condition that "UCCAO's Technical Director continued to control the resources involved." The main resources involved were the vehicles and equipment and their related operating costs. The project controlled these costs indirectly. E. Cooperative Service Centers (CSCs) 5.14 This was the only component that directly reached the 27 individual cooperative sections. Financial provision was made to build 10 new warehouses and rehabilitate 25 existing ones; 16 seven-ton trucks, 13 utility pick-ups and 35 motorcycles were also provided. Although the requirements of the cooperatives in terms of vehicles and civil works were detailed in the SAR, there was no discussion or guidance on the operation of these centers and no provision for improved management and technical assistance. The result was that while six CSCs were constructed during the project and 16 existing ones were renovated, little improvement occurred in their management. Some key cooperatives personnel received short-course training through the project's training program and new stock control procedures were elaborated, but considerably more effort is required particularly if the cooperatives are to take an increased responsibility for managing FONADER's expanded credit program. The Second Project has recognized this weakness and has thus placed considerable emphasis on strengthening the cooperative movement through reorganizing accounting, financial control administration and credit operations both within UCCAO and in each member cooperative. F. Revolving Credit Fund 5.15 A Revolving Credit Fund was established in PY2 (1980) to receize the contributions of UCCAO (CFAP 320 million), the Government (FCFA 608 million through FONADER) and farmers who were members of the six cooperatives (CFAF 72 million). These funds were deposited one year late primarily due to the delayed payment of the government portion and confusion with FONADER over the modalities of payment. Two types of credit were to be financed from the Fund: (a) seasonal credit with repayment in one year; and (b) medium-term credit (three year repayment) for pulpers, 13/ IBRD Supervision Report, April 28, 1980, Annex V, page 7. - 23 - sprayers and grain storage cribs. The SAR discussed neither the need for credit nor the potential target group, the system of credit, the organizational structure required and how the credit administration was to operate. Apart from the financial provision and the related institutional arrangements, no preparation for the component was done. Furthermore, no provision was made for a credit study or for the services of a credit specialist. It is thus not surprising that no disbursements were made from this component during the project for the purpose of seasonal or medium-term credit. The only withdrawals from the Fund were for the bridge-financing of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs while waiting for FONADER funds. The comment of the project Executive Controller and the MCS study was that while credits were being distributed on a cooperative-by-cooperative basis, either from their own resources or from FONADER funds, they were basically distributed on an ad hoc basis and with limited record keeping. It was also found that the cooperatives' accounts were normally six to nine months out of date, that the linkages among cooperative unions, cooperative service centers, cooperative centers and farmers groups were often tenuous and that no formalized relations had been established with the extension service--all critical points for the successful operation of a credit program. Under these circumstances, it was recommended that the distribution of credit be withheld until the accounting practices were improved and the associated systems and linkages developed, and that they should then be made only on a pilot basis. These recommendations were adopted in 1985. G. Village Water Supply 5.16 The project performed well in meeting the targeted number of water points for this component entrusted to "GEnie Rural" where a special service was established "Hydraulique Villageoise," and realized 233 installations over the project period. 14/ No water points were installed in the first year which was essentially a preparatory year to organize the service and identify sites. In the following years, between 30 and 70 water points were installed each year. The service was basically well organized but a number of problems have been identified. While 233 water points were established, the identifying and assigning of priority to the sites were not well organized. Consequently, the choice of sites was often influenced by personal pressures, and water points were not always installed in areas with the highest need for clean drinking water or with the highest population density or the greatest need for coffee washing facilities. This problem could have been avoided, or at lesnt minimized, if more rigorous selection criteria and detailed operating procedures had been instituted from the start. Another weakness was the lack of systematic recording of the materials and type of construction used for each water point. It was thus difficult to evaluate the performance on an 14/ UCCAO, Completion Study, Op. cit., Table 7 - 24 - installation-by-installation basis. A further potential problem not in the performance of the component but in the performance of the water points was the difficulty of ensuring adequate cleaning and maintenance, and provision of spare parts. However, in late 1982, following Bank initiatives, the Government agreed to officially give village development committees responsibility for the operation and maintenance of their water points and to collect a fee for part of the maintenance costs. These committees received training during the project from "Genie Rural" and have recently been active in maintaining their water sources, thus greatly reducing the load on the Government. H. Bottomland Development 5.17 This component consisted of two types ef activities: (a) engineering-oriented tasks under the responsibility of "G4nie Rural"; and (b) crop production-oriented tasks under the extension service--both aimed at taking advantage of under- or unutilized low lying areas subject to flooding. Due to their high population density, these areas represented an important untapped potential for the Province. About 400 ha were programmed to be developed over the five-year project period; by the end of the project, 436 ha had been reclaimed and, of these, 290 ha had been distributed and cultivated. Most of the bottomlands developed had been proposed in the SAR and considerable detail was in annexes (engineering parameters, costs, organization and cultivation of the areas). The detailed preparation and the competent local team facilitated the implementation of the component and contributed to exceeding its target. Some delays occurred in setting up and training a survey team, but by PY2 it was fully operational and by the end of the project 1,651 ha had been surveyed. 5.18 One of the more difficult aspects was the organization of local villagers to provide labor for the works, a problem which was closely linked to the larger question of land tenure and distribution of parcels of land. While the engineering works went relatively smoothly, enormous effort was made to sort out the land tenure issues. UCCAO, in charge of these issues, started a dialogue with the senior traditional chief in the area early in the development process, but agreement on the distribution of parcels took from 12 to 18 months of negotiations, involving not only the technicians but also the Director General of UCCAO and the Governor of the Province. The agreement reached was that, to receive cultivation rights a family had to supply on average 187 man-days of labo-, it would then have the possibility to work a 0.2 ha plot. The process of working through the traditional authorities was slow, but resulted in a relatively fair distribution of land and in a development very much in harmony with the existing society and its norms. 5.19 Because of good soils and encouragement from the project and UCCAO. most farmers cultivated vegetables in the bottomland areas. But with more hectares under vegetable cultivation, farmers often found considerable difficulty in marketing their crops, both in terms of - 25 - physical aspects, such as transport and storage, and of market demand, price and ac^essibility. This was an area where the project had paid insufficient attention and, aa a result, farmers who had successfully grown tomatoes or other vegetables were sometimes unable to sell them. An important measure was introduced at the end of the project to help alleviate this situation. Pre-cooperative groups were established independently from UCCAO's cooperative system, to provide a collective market mechanism to help farmers organize transport, storage and eventually represent them in the markets. A second measure was proposed but not carried out: the detailed investigation of vegetable marketing from the schemes. One related area that was not adequately covered was the evaluation of the economic viability of the individual schemes. Because of the split in responsibility between the engineering side, which maintained investment cost information, and the extension side, which maintained crop production and benefit information, no one was specifically responsible for the economic analyses or for the integration of their results into the decision making process to determine to which bottomland priority should be given. l, Coffee Processing 5.20 To improve the quality of coffee and make processing more efficient, the project was to finance ten sorting machines, three machines to detect stinking beans, and 3,000 coffee pulpers. The coffee washing points which were part of the village water supply component were included in this initiative. The number of coffee sorting machines purchased, which were financed directly from UCCAO's budget, was more than double that foreseen in the SAR. Similarly, the number of stinking bean detecting machines purchased was also increased. It is worth noting that (a) there was no uniformity in the makes of the machines purchased; and (b) the operation of the machines was inefficient (low utilization of capacity and bad adjustment); and third, there was little routine maintenance of the 2,900 coffee pulpers by farmers during the project. In spite of these purchases, there was little improvement in coffee quality as noted by several supervision missions. The recommendations were: (a) improvement in the efficiency of the pest control service; (b) introduction of a bonus system for higher quality beans; (c) introduction of more pulpers and easier provision of spare parts; and (d) improvement in the operation of central coffee processing. Some of these recommendations are included in the Second Project. J. Crop Production 5.21 A comprehensive analysis of the project impact on crop production is difficult due to the following factors: (a) no reliable annual crop statistics are compiled in the Province; (b) no baseline survey was undertaken at the beginning of the project, thus no control group or area was established; (c) the data gathered during the preparation of the Second Project, while well researched and documented, only cover one year-the - 26 - without project case (1982); and (d) wide yield fluctuations due to the drought and other unforeseen factors. Nevertheless, it has been possible to piece together a picture for the main project crops, particularly coffee and maize. 5.22 Coffee. At appraisal, coffee production had fallen to about 11,000 t as a result of a bad crop year, disease, increasing age of many trees and worsening terms of trade in relation to food crops. The stated aim of the project was to "stabilize the arabica coffee industry,...., and to stop the declining trend in production through improved fertilization and pest control." 15/ The "without project" base production (SAR) was taken as being 15,2907t; over the following nine years, production was to increase to 26,150 t. As it was assumed that production would increase to 18,850 t without the project, only 7,300 t of the increment was attributed to the project. The actual production over the period, recorded below, shows a marked recovery from 1977/78 to 20,000 t in 1979/80, then holding at 17,000 t for the ensuing years and then falling to 12,500 t in 1983/84 (a drought year). With such a trend it is almost impossible to isolate the impact of the project. It is clear that the production targets set in the SAR were not achieved, but what is not quite as clear is what the situation over the six-year period would have been without the project. As discussed earlier (para 5.11), the pest control program covered the major part of the coffee producing area, but possibly with limited effect. Besides, more fertilizers were distributed during the project, but it is probable (and frequently asserted) that farmers used a larger portion on food crops which gave a higher return. Production ('000 t) Yields (kg/ha) Without With Without With Project a/ Project a/ Actual b/ Project a/ Project a/ Actual b/ (PYO) 15.3 15.3 - 1.7 1.7 1975/76 - - 15.2 - - 160 1976/77 - - 11.1 - - 110 1977/78 - - 14.7 - - 150 1978/79 (PYl) - - 16.8 - - 180 1979/80 (PY2) - - 20.4 - - 210 1980/81 (PY3) - - 17.9 - - 180 1981/82 (PY4) - - 17.8 - - 180 1982/83 (PY5) - - 17.3 - - 170 1983/84 (PY6) c/- - 12.5 - - 120 (PY9) 18.9 26.2 - 200 280 - a/ SAR estimates b/ UCCAO and MINAGRI estimates cl Drought year 15/ IBRD, SAR, Op. cit., Annex 3. - 27 - As the area under coffee did not change appreciably over the project period, the trend in yields closely approximates the production trend. While the decline in coffee production can be attributed to a number of factors, the underlying one is the relatively unattractive price for arabica coffee to the growers. Although farmers continued to harvest their coffee they put little effort into its cultivation. 5.23 Maize. Maize production, as recorded by the provincial statistics service of MINAGRI, shows 428,167 t on 360,258 ha in the Province, giving an average yield of 1.2 t/ha for 1983/84. The SAR established the hectarage of maize (pure stand) at 57,880 ha (PYO 74/75) and projected that it would increase to 60,280 ha by PY9 without the project; the "without project" yields were respectively 1.3 t/ha and 1.6 t/ha. The impact of the project's extension service, improved seeds, and some additional fertilizer were projected to increase maize yields to 2.5 t (pure stand) by PY9. After a detailed study involving discussions with technicians in each department of the Province and a review of production statistics in the departmental agricultural offices, the appraisal mission for the Second Project (March 1984) determined that maize yield at the end of the project was 2.2 t/ha on a pure stand basis and 1.8 t/ha in association on about 68,000 ha. This is in line with the estimates made by the FAO/CP preparation mission (December 1981) which arrived at a yield of 1.7 t/ha (in association) over 74,000 ha. MINAGRI's production and hectarage figures would appear to be much too high even under extreme assumptions regarding crop association, and the yield levels too low. 16/ The trend shown by the yields derived from these figures gives an annual increase of 10%--figures very much in line with those used in the project SAR. 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 Maize Yields (t/ha) 0.97 0.99 1.19 1.44 1.79 (in association) Knowing the price advantage of maize over coffee, the availability of improved seeds, and a tested package of better cultivation practices, it can be concluded that project production did in fact exceed the appraisal targets. 5.24 Other Crops. Root crops, yams, taro, macabo, and cassava are the most important crops in the area. Little change in yields and production was recorded over the project period. There might have been a small increase as is implied in the Second Project SAR, but figures for these crops are notoriously unreliable. Since no extension messages were specifically intended for root crops, any yield inereases would be only marginally attributable to project 16/ The Sample Census of Agriculture carried out in 1984 estimates 59,700 ha for the Western Province as a whole, with an average yield of 1.89 t/ha. - 28 - actions. The other important crops are beans and groundnuts. Comparison between the SAR figures and those for the "without project" case in the Second Project SAR shows no improvement in bean yields but marked improvements in groundnut yields (from 0.4 t/ha without project to 1.0 to 1.2 t/ha by the end of the project). Considering the improved varieties of grouudnuts, the associated package of cultivation practices extended by the project, and the lack of support for bean cultivation the conclusions are logical. - 29 - VI. FINANCIAL AN) ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE A. Financial Results 6.01 Insufficient data were collected by the project's Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (MEU) to establish comparative farm budgets at project completion. While the overall decline in coffee production over the project suggests that farmer income from coffee has also declined, it can be safely assumed that the substantial increase in food crop production in the project area more than made up for the shortfall. It is, however, close to impossible to measure farmer financial benefits as crop production figures are unreliable and consumption patterns are not known. On the other hand, the consolidated profit and loss account of UCCAO, the cooperatives, and the project as of September 30, 1983 (the lastest) shows a net profit of CFAF 2 billion (US$4.1 million) on total sales of CFAF 18 billion (US$36.7 million). The combined net worth of the six cooperatives, including UCCAO, amounts to CFAF 13.7 billion (US$28 million) as of December 31, 1983, and is made up as follows: Cooperative CPAF billion CAPLAME 4.5 CAPLANOUN 2.2 CAPLAMI 3.7 CAPLABAM 2.6 CAPLAHN (0.3) CAPLANDE - UCCAO 1.0 Total 13.7 The foregoing distribution of UCCAO's net worth indicates a considerable problem and at the same time highlights one of the principal weaknesses of the project design: insufficient project support to individual cooperatives. For, to show a negative or zero net worth as is the case for CAPLAHN and CAPLANDE means simply extreme carelessness in management. The Second Project has clearly recognized this weakness and, as a result, put more emphasis on administrative and accounting assistance to those member cooperatives that need it. 6.02 Financial Impact on the Government. Instead of the CFAF 465 million (US$0.9 million) foreseen at appraisal, the Government's contribution to project costs was CFAF 692 million (US$1.4 million). As UCCAO was unable to determine how much of the production during each of the project years was attributable to the project (incremental), it is not possible to determine whether this amount was recovered through export taxes and levies on arabica/robusta exports. It must, however, be assumed that, based on UCCAO's 1982/83 profit and loss statements which show taxes and levies (ONCPB) paid off CFAF 3.1 billion (US$6.3 - 30 - million), the Government's annual contributions to project costs are more than compensated. B. Economic Results 6.03 Due mainly to lower than expected coffee production, the overall rate of return for the project has been re-estimated during appraisal of the Second Project (May 1984), at 17% against the 20% forecast at appraisal. This does take into account rainfed crop production which excaeded targets by about 10,000 tons (mainly maize). This estimate of additional food crop production is based on statistics collected by the Provincial Delegation of the Ministry of Agriculture for the whole province. Although the complex, mixed cropping system and the unknown consumption pattern make it extremely difficult to measure crop production levels, the additional project area production has been estimated by the appraisal mission of the Second Project to arrive at some indicati..1 of an econwomic rate of return (ERR). Again, these assumptions could not be verified at completion of the project as UCCAO had no additional data. Therefore, the ERR was not recalculated. - 31 - VII. BANK PERFORMANCE/CONCLUSIONS 7.01 RMWA's formulation of the project followed standard lines for an integrated rural development project. The constraints to development, particularly agricultural development, were well identified; the technical means for meeting those constraints were essentially well developed, with a few exceptions; and an institutional structure to implement the project was worked out very much along the lines that the Government had been following (entrusting development to existing major institutions in the region). Conceptually, a number of weaknesses could be attributed to the over-ambitious project goals and to difficulty in interpreting the institutional demands of the project. 7.02 The first weakness which in some quarters would be considered a strength, even the strength of the project, is the selection of UCCAO as the project executing agency. Since UCCAO was one of the more efficient agricultural bodies in Cameroon and the only major one in Western Province, it appeared to represent an ideal vehicle for efficient management of the project. However, little discussion took place in the Bank, at least documented discussion, on the implications of using a cooperative apex organization, with its main scope of activities and mode of operation focused on coffee marketing, as the project executi-g agency and indirectly as a regional development authority. The impact of selecting UCCAO has in the short-term resulted in the relatively efficient implementation of a number of project components. But a question remains: What will be the impact in the longer term, especially if and when the financial and technical support, being given under the Second Project, stops? The same question could have been asked if the project had been implemented by the field services of MINAGRI. 7.03 The project formulation process resulted in a project with 9 components involving two ministries and requiring various management skills. The narrowing of project scope could have made implementation easier. T;.chnically, one of the constraints to project implementation was the lack of emphasis in project formulation on adaptive research. The need for a strengthened extension service was identified, but in spite of queries during project formulation, issues such as the limited availability of proven paccages tested at the farm level and the lack of a mechanism to generate information that could be readily used by the extension agents were not adequately addressed. The result was that, while the extension service grew and extension agents were trained and mobilized, no parallel development of tested extension messages took place. 7.04 The project's institutional design did not foresee (but should have foreseen) the conflicts that were to arise 1etween MINAGRI and UCCAO, especially the resistance not only by the Provincial Delegate, but also by MINAGRI in Yaoundg, to the moving of the extension and pest control unit to UCCAO. The concept of transferring these services (and strengthening them) to UCCAO instead of alternative arrangements requires further study to decide on the best location for the extension service before the Second Project ends. This issue forms part of the sector review of extension and training being carried out by the Governfment and the Bank. - 32 - 7.05 Although difficult to determine at the time of project formulation, the concept of producing improved seeds on a large mechanized seed farm, which was possibly to be turned over to a commercial venture, presents some difficulties. While the Government's intention was to have a large capacity able to serve not only the needs of the Western Province but also the requirements of other provinces, in retrospect it might be asked if it was justified to allocate 20% of project finances to this activity, especially considering the doubtful availability of suitable hybrid maize seed from research establishments. 7.06 The final point on project design regards credit. A revolving credit fund was provided, but no effort was made to detail how thea credit should be distributed, what should be the institutional arrangements or how to get the credit to farmers and to ensure reimbursement. It should be noted, bowever, that in contrast to the lack of information on a few components, in particular credit, pest control and the Cooperative Service Centers, most components were prepared in great detail and provided a good basis for project implementation. 7.07 The Bank supervised the project on average twice a year. The supervision missions were thorough and considerable support was given to project management. However, only one visit was made by an agronomist during the project (PY2). Considering the agronomic complexity of the area and the objective of the project to restructure and strengthen extension, pest control, and seed production services, a greater impact on this side would have been useful. Nevertheless, the supervision missions pinpointed the major problems during execution and, in most cases, proposed solutions before they got out of hand. The three areas which caused problems throughout the project and were not resolved during the project period were (a) the conflict between MINAGRI and UCCAO and the resulting duplication of extension services; (b) the overproduction of the seed farm in relation to demand; and (e) the poor performance of the monitoring and evaluation unit in YaoundE. The overall performance of the Bank in executing the project within tb',cronfines of its 4'ormulation was good. 7.08 The Second Western Province Rural Development Project, which is in its second year of implementation, takes account of t'ne lessons learned during the execution of the Western Highlands Rural Development Project. -33- now Owr 7-01 ReV bsdicats of 1WIoa ltpuw Prject kdhv t hapril Obiective ReUi stff aaa q 9 _wws (re.) 57 1/ 23 (52) asiad q*a (nW.) 190 7 5 (200) 1/ Direct arm portiaiprt (no.) 40,000 2/ 3D,200 3/ lnrneta feftilise eis5 10,00 4/ 10,520 / Inratal padmt coffee (tyer) 2,00 6/ 3,160 5/ Seed fain cultiwtfin N3ize (ha) 1:0 300 Ohr sdstuEe crtops (ha) 80 50 Potats (t) 2(. 11 700 Redintino/& laimp (ha) 330 400 (AItivatign (ha) 330 (1,400 parcels) 400 Reaffortatim (ha) 400 8/ 450 aisswtin (No. eites) Pilots _utm ) 36 9/ 7 *te points cutructin (Wo.) 235 220 Cdllecti W coff poSpbD/oRtig wudm 10 11/ 0 !nJisl&l acffee popli wcldhs 2,900 1O/ 3,000 3/ y/ AIpoW ptoposel: azevios 23 (yer 4), 52 (ea 9); ateito ftnu.: 75 (vow 4) 200 (yer 9); both tnor in Hml vith red aceleratin in rate of c_me8s atauia ervie dswlo.t f thee to six dqurlArtan blmd plaea. / Of idh 15,I00 wi O br patcipit (twited to fid mtne. amu ad reived fgofle p sew aBiU m en farm for only I yr. 3/ Year 4 tarpt apndaisal P. 4/ 1978 enApio (10,000 t) as plJsm 1by aprs to ris to 27,730 t (or 17,73D t Szintual) 'ar 9. The awly In 1981 . rd 1982, totllg 20,000 t (or 10,000 t I_mmItal) wr. late 1d us qu' so; stuation ipreed for 1983 m with 22,500 t dIIvSu (or 12,500 t inr.trn), but ufitS will wt be refle in prject. 5/ AIpcolma1 twpt 3,160 t yar 4 risIn to 6,540 t yewr 9. COq_ ed to the afda offe I 1978 of 15,290 t, the eae pronstion for th last three yas h bern 17,290 t pa year-dds eflet both insde*te fertiUalr &VVIUs (4) ad tbeaet of dereed d&et in 102/3. 7/ mhe iuem to mIG t potao d we beig addivd in 1984 by introdcbg a seond atp -Atilicatit an lWc ell ftan; em pye Is new bein eaAa an a pilot beei for utlAtio of iqvd wvrtise of hricot bam.. 8/ Totd 3 dapams fi, Mmm ad BUsbxts) 460 ha plaed, of uAic 60 ha dtred by fifte folladna St s 1983. 9/ 1983 prop to I frm 18 pllot plots (3 d qateaft) to pre-ateniono phase invol crati0n of 6 derstrttmn sites in each dqpra ( 6 x 6 + 36) by project wd. I0/ 2,700 BomaI offee d qpulpln md%e Wem purcaed blv iXW in 1979 ad 1981, an a furher 70D in 1982 ad 1983. It is calca d that 75S of this total diU hae been sold to fanmrs bv 6/30/84. I1/ Tota of 10 collective (t farm) dqupe hoe been introed (also tlled the project wtr ponts) late In the project as an Initiative for heapinr to Iqnme coffee qushit'. *.Je 1''- ANNEX ~ 34 - Table 2 CAMEROON WESTERN HIGHLANDS RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CREDIT 784-CM PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Project Cost and Financing (CFAF '000) 1/ Actual Total -------- SAR - ---- Actual As of SAR Components Local Foreign Total Total Total I. UCCAO 1. Headquarters/Garage 744.8 289.2 534.0 1227.3 230 2. Production Service Extension Service - General 127.0 185.8 312.8 774.5 248 - Field Trials 298.8 180.9 479.7 430.6 90 - Bottomlands 68.3 28.0 96.3 54.9 57 Seed Production 487.1 564.8 1,051.9 1,253.7 119 Pest Control 52.7 118.7 171.4 109.6 64 Training 159.6 157.6 317.2 438.1 138 3. Commercial Service Coop Service Centers 729.1 539.6 1,268.7 2,422.2 162 Industrial Investments 64.0 129.3 193.3 - - II. Revolving Credit 345.0 667.7 1012.7 608,0 60 . ~as III. Village Water 174.5 146.5 321.0 457.9 143 IV. Bottomlands Development 126.1 55.0 181.1 385.2 213 V. M. & E. Studies 66.8 120.4 187.2 106.0 57 TOTAL 29 43.8 3,183.5 64127.3 8"68.0 L 5 Financing IDA 3,185.0 4,277 134 UCCAO 1,813.0 2,681 148 FONADER - 928 - Government 1,129.0 382 34 1/ Due to the continuous shlft in exchange rates throughout the project no breakdown in local/foreign costs has been calculated. WAPAD June 1985 ( 0 , ; t 60 30' 10000' KILOMETERs'x ' 20 3 40 o Western Highlanc 0 / 20 30 r< 4 WES -6o00''I 6''00'? DELIMITATIC (K J N t-< 9 ' < * " X -/5t ), \tProject are Physical p ~~~ - / - ~~~~~~~~~~~~Provincial ) i4 ; / - - Departmer 1) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--District (Ar , v /) @S) < ; Chief-dorr ~ AFOUS Fal Province I *a B Prefecture A / / \ t ( h 'c\) 5 O Subprefec 1- 1? if ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-District h \4g,,_4 I; ' - C 600' -Not Chief-dom I / ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~0 10 .. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~KILOMETERS' < ; (.. s ; ' ;- MILESI r <
Groupe de la Banque mondiale · Project Completion Report
Cameroon - Western Highlands Rural Development Project
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Groupe de la Banque mondiale
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Project Completion Report
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Cameroun
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Banque mondiale