Morocco - Third Highway Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 7015 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KINGDOM OF MOROCCO THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) November 19, 1987 Infrast-aucture Operations Division Country Department II Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (abbreviation) Dirham (DH) Appraisal Year Average US$1 = DH 3.8 Intervening Years Average (construction period) US$1 = DH 7.6 Completion Year Average US$1 = DH 10.0 PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED CNER - National Studies and Research 'enter LPEE - Road Laboratory LTD - Land Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Transportation MOF - Ministry of Finance MOT - Ministry of Transportation RTD - Roads and Traffic Directorate  FOE OFFUVIL ~UR 0641 THE WORLD SANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Offi to .idw-fw.wah Opwnt*w Ivautum November 19, 1q87 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Kingdom of Morocco Third Highway Project (Loan 1830-MOR) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Kingdom of Morocco Third Highway Project (Credit 1830- MOR)" prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office. Under the modified system for project performance auditing, further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. Yves Rovani by Ram K. Chopra Attachment This document has a restncted distribution and may be used by rocipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  I ,,,d  FM OfFCIAL USE ONLY KINGDOM OF MOROCCO I PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i BASICDATASHEET .................. .. ... ii HIGHLIGHTS ........... ... ... ............ . iv I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .... . . . . .1... . . . . . . . 1 II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION, APPRAISAL, AND NMi TIATIONS ................ ... 2 A. Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 B. Preparation and Appraisal ..... . .. . . .. . . .. 2 C. Negotiations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 III. THE PROJECT.. 3 A. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 B. Financing .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 C. Amendments to the Loan Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 D. Cancellation of Loan Funds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A. Pavement Strengthening. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 B. Pavement Preservation ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 6 C. Road Maintenance.. . . . 7 D. Technical Assistance to the Roads and Traffic Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 E. Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Transportation . . 8 F. Vehicle-Weighing Equipment. . . . . . . . . . 8 G. Feasibility Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 H. Performance of Consultants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 I. Performance of Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 J. Performance of the Borrower ... . . . . . .. . 9 K. Adherence to Loan Covenants . . . . . . . .. . 9 V. PROJECT COST AND DISBURSEMENT ... . ..... . . . . . . . . 11 A. Project Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 B. Disbursement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . 11 VII. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . 12 VIII. ROLE OF THE BANK .......... . 14 rx. CONCLUSIONS ....... . 14 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Worid Bank authorization.  TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) Page No. ANNEXES 1. Comparison of Actual Costs with rorecast Estimates . . . . . 16 2. List of Road Maintenance Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3. List of Pavement Evaluation Equipment Procured under the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4. Ex-Post and Original Estimates of Economic Rates of Return on Pavement Strengthening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5. Vehicle Operating Costs - 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6. Borrower's Observations on the Original Project Completion Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 MAP IBRD 19919 - MOROCCO: Third Highway Project, National Road Network  (i, KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) PREFACE This Project Completion Report describes the preparation and implementation of the Third Highway Project in Morocco, for which Loan 1830-MOR in the amount of US$62 million was signed on May 19, 1980. The loan became effective on September 19, 1980 and was to have been closed by June 30, 1984. Two extensions brought the Loan Closing Date to December 31, 1985. US$4.8 million of the loan was cancelled on May 3, 1985. The accounting books were closed on September 30, 1986, with a surplus of US$4.3 million, which was also cancelled. The amount of the loan that was utilized, therefore, was US$52.9 million. This report was prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Projects Department. It is based on information derived from the files in the EMENA Information Center, supervisions missions, and a Project Completion Report prepared by the Roads and Traffic Directorate of the Kingdom of Morocco. In accordance with the revised procedures for project performance audit reporting, this Project Completion Report was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) but the project was not audited by OED staff. Copies of the draft report were sent to the Borrower for comment. The Government reviewed the report and made observations regarding pavement. evaluation and road maintenance equipment procured under the project (Annex 6). The PCR has been changed to reflect the Government's observations.  I eA-"7,0 K-- 116 I i i  (ii) KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) BASIC DATA SHEET Key Project Data Appraisal Actual or Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 94.33 82.96 Underrun (%) - 14% Loan (US$ million) Disbursed 62.0 52.> Cancelled - 9.1 Repaid to June 1986 0.0 0.0 Date Physical Components Completed 12/31/83 12/31/85 Proportion Completed by Above Date (2) 85% 100% Proportion of Time Overrun (%) - 87% Economic Rate of Return 39% 32% Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ million) FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 Estimated 0.8 16.6 47.6 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 Actual 0.0 5.7 30.6 45.1 46.8 48.4 52.9 Actual/Estimatei (%) 0.0 34.3 64.3 72.7 75.5 78.0 85.3 Other Project Data Original Item Plan Revisions Actual First Mention in Files 12/29/75 Government's Application 09/26/78 Negotiations 03/03/80 02/25/80 Board Approval 03/25/80 04/15/80 Loan Agreement Date 05/19/80 Effectiveness Date 09/29/80 Closing Date 06/30/84 06/30/85 12/31/85 Borrower Kingdom of Morocco Executing Agencies Roads and Traffic Department of the Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Transportation Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 Follow-on Project Name Fourth Highway Project Loan Number 1830-MOR Loan Amount US$62.0 million  (iii) Mission Data Sent Month/ No. of No. of Staff Date of Item By Year Weeks Persons Weeks Report Identification Howard 04/78 0.5 2 1.0 05/25/78 Preparation Howard 06/78 0.7 2 1.4 07/10/78 Preparation Howard 10/78 0.5 1 0.5 12/22/78 Preparation Howard 02/79 1.5 2 3.0 03/30/79 Pre-Appraisal Wouters 06/79 0.8 2 1.6 07/16/79 Appraisal Wouters 09/79 3.0 2 6.0 10/02/79 Subtotal 7.0 13.5 Supervision I Howard 06/80 1.3 2 2.6 06/30/80 Supervision II Howard 11/80 l.I 2 2.3 12/08/80 Supervision III Howard 03/81 1.7 2 3.0 03/16/81 Supervision IV Howard 07/81 1.4 2 2.9 08/03/81 Supervision V Howard 11/81 1.9 2 3.7 11/20/81 Supervision VI Howard 02/82 1.1 2 2.1 03/01/82 Supervision VII Howard 06/82 1.4 2 2.7 06/28/82 Supervision VIII Revuelta 11/82 1.6 2 3.1 11/10/82 Supervision IX de Matons 04/83 1.3 1 1.3 04/27/83 Supervision X de Matons 10/83 1.4 1 1.4 10/11/83 Supervision XI de Matons 02/84 1.1 2 2.3 02/23/84 Supervision XII de Matons 10/84 1.3 2 2.6 11/01/84 Supervision XIII Howard 04/85 1.7 2 3.4 04/22/85 Supervision XIV Abe 10/85 1.4 1 1.4 10/24/85 Supervision XV Abe 04/86 0.5 2 1.0 05/28/86 Supervision XVI Abe 10/86 1.0 2 2.0 11/26/86 Subtotal 21.2 37.8 TOTAL 28.2 51.3  (iv) KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) HIGHLIGHTS 1. The Third Highway Project was a road strengthening and maintenance project. Its objective was to continue the institution building process begun under the First and Second Highway Projects, while establishing a long-term road maintenance and pavement strengthening program, based on systematic application of technical and economic criteria. The project was specifically designed to launch the pavement strengthening and preservation program, to rationalize road maintenance operations and to strengthen transport policy and planning. These were to be achieved through: (a) strengthening of 700 km of road sections and iesurfacing of 1,000 km of road sections; (b) acquisition of equipment for routine maintenance of classified road network and for pavement evaluation; (c) strengthening of cost accounting of routine maintenance operations, management of road maintenance equipment, and training of road maintenance personnel; (d) development and implementation of recommmendations leading to improved transportation planning and coordination; and (e) provision of mobile weighing scales and fixed weighing stations to intensify enforcement of legal maximum axle loads. Although these actions were not completed exactly as planned, the changes that were made fully reflected subsector objectives and priorities set by the Governmert. 2. The project was completed two years behind schedule. The Government's difficult budgetary situation and insufficient liquidity since the early 1980s slowed down the execution of ongoing civil works and led to a postponement of new commitments. This culminated in two extensions of  (v) the Loan Closing Datte, it;1 u Julit- 30, 1485, and thern to December 31, 1985. To allow the PBrrowe.r lime ti tuinish fiinal withdrawal applications for eligible expenditute!, ht.I: Liut A ciunt was kept open uitLil September 30, 1986. 3. The actual prolec t cos-.t ,,Is ,ibnult us$83 million. This was US$11 million (14%) below 1;pp,isal estimat.s. However, in local currency, total expendittare inci-2as,:J troum [dl 3'9 million to DH b33 million (76%). This was caused hy a shar- rise in IJ: dollar paritv of the Dirham together with an extension in tlre s eope ot the project to include an additional 400 km of road strengthleninlg, t:quipiclnt, and studies. 4. Under this Third Project, institntion building would focus on maintenance management capability, and transportation planning and coordination. Instead of the direct technical assistance to the Roads and Traffic Directorate of the Ministry ot Public Works, the Bank agreed to finance a study on road maintenlance reorganization to strengthen the management of maintenance operations. Another project-supported study drew attention to a number of issues relating to transportation planning and coordination to be addressed in the future. Acquisition of pavement evaluation equipment provided the permanenIt capacity to carry out extensive _-easurements of pavement roughness and deflection under different traffic volumes and pavement structural indices. 5. The project objectives have been largely accomplished. Points of particular interest highlighted in tle project completion report are: - The comprehensive study on road maintenance reorganization that made substantial recommendations for improving the efficiency and productivity of road maintenance operations, which are being implemented (para. 4.09-4.10). - The introduction of portable weighing scales that led to implementation of axle-load control (para. 4.13). - The pavemenlt strenigthening and preservation component that contributed measurably to the country's road conservation objectives. Without it, many sections of the main road network would have deteriorated beyond repair as a result of heavy traffic (para. 7.04). - Bank help to the Government of Morocco to find ways to streamline the processing of contract awards and withdrawal applications (para. 8.01).  KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1.01 Morocco thas a population of about 21 million growing at an annual rate of 2.5%. The 1985 per capita GNP was estimated at US$570 at the official exchange rate (US$1 DH 10). The economy underwent a brief period of accelerated growth in the 1970s when the GNP grew at an annual rate of 6-7%. However, heavy external borrowing to finance large infrastructure investments of low economic priority proved unsustainable when world phosphate prices declined in the 1980s. The 1981-85 Development Plan proposed substantial increases in transport investments over the two previous Plans. But in 1983 the Government reexamined its public investment program and determined that cancellation of some investments and a slowdown in the implementation of other programs would be necessary to meet budgetary constraints. 1.02 Most of the road network is situated in the plain between the Atlantic Ocean and the Atlas mountain ranges. In 1985, it consisted of 60,000 km, including 26,500 km of paved roads, an increase of 7% over 1980. Although the design standards of the classified roads are satisfactory, the pavement structure for many roads cannot accommodate the present traffic distribution. For example, about 90% of the heavy trucks are concentrated on 10% of the network. About 20% of the total paved network is in good condition, 45% in average condition, and 35% in poor condition. 1.03 The Roads and Traffic Directoiate (RTD) oI the the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) is responsible for the design, construction, and maintenance of the classified road network. In late 1982, road maintenance operations were decentralized. District offices were delegated substantially more reponsibility for contract awards and administration, and supervision of works. Unclassified roads are administered by the local authorities with financial assistance from provincial budgets and, whenever necessary, technical assistance from RTD. 1.04 Under the First and Second Highway Projects, Bank financing of mechanical equipment helped RTD improve its ability to execute routine maintenance works. However, available funds barely enabled it to support maintenance of primary roads. Under the Third Project, RTD would step up maintenance of the primary network, while further expanding maintenance of the secondary and tertiary networks.  - 2 - II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION PREPARATION, APPRAISAL, AND NEGOTIATIONS A. Origin 2.01 Whell the Second Highway Project was approved in 1973, the country was enjoying a plentiful inflow of foreign exchange from the export of phosphates. But by late 1977 foreign exchange earnings had begun to decline. At Lthe same time, inadequacies in the road network were beginning to constrain rural development. 2.02 In 1.976, RTD engaged a French-Moroccan joint-venture consulting firm for a study on pavement strengthening. The stiudy recommended a five-year pavement rehabilitation and strengthening program. The program was estimated to cost US$117 million at current prices. 2.03 In April 1978, a Bank supervision mission carried out a brief reconnaissance of the highway network, paying !jarticular attention to the condition of secondary and local roads. The mission found some deficiencies in road maintenance techniques relating mainly to drainage, which was causing the breaking up of pavements, landslides, and a reduction of usable roadway width through the deterioration of shoulders. The mission also concluded that investment in secondary and tertiary roads was inadequate, and that substantial improvements were needed in primary roads. It further identifi-4 needs for institutional strengthening in the organization of road rnaintenance and in transport policy and coordination. B. Preparation and Appraisal 2.04 Project preparation was a collaborative effort involving RTD at both central and district levels, and the autonomous Road Laboratory (LPEE). The recommendations made by the maintenance study (para. 2.02) were used as a guideline for drawing up a preliminary list of potential subprojects covering some 3,400 km of roads. RTD had based the economic-technical feasibility study on a computerized program for evaluating economic rates of return, the RENTAREF model, prepared by RTD experts. 2.05 In view of budgetary constraints, the project was designed to include pavement strengthening of only 700 km and periodic maintenance of about 1,000 km of existing roads. As a first step toward the realization of the long-term program, it was envisaged that selected roads would be strengthened and some of these also be widened. About 250 km of road sections were identified for strengthening during the first year of the project. RTD submitted to the Bank the detailed engineering and economic evaluation of more than 300 km of road strengthening as a condition for the  - 3 - invitation to negotiate. Owing to time constraints and to avoid further deterioration of the roads, it was determined that detailed engineering and economic evaluation of the remaining sections would have to be carried out during project implementation. The Bank and the Government would agree on the criteria for selecting these sections at negotiations. 2.06 Project-supported technical assistance was designed to improve RTD's capability to manage road maintenance operations and the Ministry of Transportation's (MOT) planning and coordination capabilities. Experts' services would help RTD upgrade cost accounting of routine maintenance operations, manage road maintenance equipment efficiently, and train staff in charge of road maintenance equipment. Studies financed under the project were meant to provide the necessary technical assistance to improve policy formulation involving all transport modes based on data collection by MOT'S Planning Department. 2.07 The National Studies and Research Center (CNER) was being created to establish a long-term road maintenance and pavement management system. The Bank joined this effort by financing pavement evaluation equipment, while the Belgian Government provided both financial and technical assistance. 2.08 Overloaded vehicles were damaging pavements severely. Moroccan authorities, therefore, resolved to intensify enforcement of the legal maximum axle loads by purchasing weighing scales and fixed weighing stations. C. Negotiations 2.09 Negotiations between the Bank and the Government of Morocco took place from February 25 to February 29, 1980. The Moroccan delegation requested an increase in the proposed loan amount of US$57 million to finance the foreign exchange costs of a portion of the pavement preservation originally expected to be financed under the Government's budget for periodic maintenance. The Bank agreed to an increase of the Loan amount by US$5 million. III. HE PROJECT A. Description 3.01 The project, as described in the Loan Agreement, would consist of: (a) a three and one-half year phase of a long-term pavement strengthening and preservation program covering approximately 700 km of road sections to be strengthened and approximately 1,000 km of road sections to be resurfaced. All sections were to be selected in agreement with the Bank;  - 4 - (b) a three and one-half year phase of routine and periodic maintenance program for the classified highway network, including acquisition of mechanical equipment; (c) strengthening of the management of road maintenance operations by: (i) improving, with the assistance of some 23 staff-months of experts' services, RTD's cost accounting of routine maintenance operations, management of road maintenance equipment, and training of road maintenance personnel; (ii) assisting in the preparation of the pavement strengthening and preservation program through the provision of advisory services by LPEE; and (iii) equipping CNER with pavement evaluation equipment; (d) assistance to MOT in the development and implementation of recommendations on transportation planning and coordination through 64 staff-months of consultants' services; and (e) provision of mobile weighing scales and fixed weighing stations to intensify MOT's enforcement of legal maximumi axle loads. B. Financing 3.02 The total cost of the project was estimated at about US$94 million equivalent (Annex 1). The loan of US$62 million would finance the foreign exchange component. The project would start by February 1980 and be completed by December 31, 1983. The Loan fund allocation and disbursement percentages eligible for financing were fixed by category as follows: Amount of Amount Category Loan Allocated to be Financed (1) Civil works 45,000,000 65% (2) Equipment 10,450,000 100% of foreign expenditures and 73% of local expenditures (3) Consultants' Services 850,000 85% (4) Road Laboratory Services 300,000 70% (5) Unallocated 5,400,000 TOTAL 62,000,000  C. Amendments to the Loan Agreement 3.03 The Loan Agreement underwent several amendments as follows: (a) April 24, 1981 (formalized with Bank letter of March 15, 1982). Direct technical assistance to RTD (Section 3.03 of the Loan Agreement) was ehlangpd to a study on road maintenance organization. In addition, the amendment allowed for contracts tor resurfacing wotks costing less than US$500,000 each to be awarded OtI the basis of locally advertised competitive bidding. It also limited the Bank's prior review of procurement decisionIs to contracts for civil works estimated at US$500,000 or more and those for highway maintenance equipment aud weigliing scales estimated at US$100,000 or more. (b) January_2, 1983. Financing of the long-term pavement strengthening and preservation program under this loan was increased from 700 km to 1,100 (Schedule 2 of the Loan Agreement). The date by which consultants for RTD and MOT studies were to be employed was postponed from July 1, 1981 to July 1, 1982. Economic feasibility studies and engineering work for the Fourth Highway Project were included. Contracts for civil works estimated at less than US$1.5 million each could be awarded on the basis of locally advertised competitive bidding. Bank prior review of contracts for civil works wouIld be limited to those estimated at US$1.5 million each or more, and for service vehicles for highway maintenance persoinnel to those estimated at US$100,000 each or more. D. Cancellation of Loan Funds 3.04 Two cancellations occurred: (a) US$4.8 million on May 3, 1985 because of the increase in the value of the US dollar; and (b) US$4.3 million, which were undisbursed when the loan account was officially closed on September 30, 1986. Nonetheless, there were sufficient funds to cover financing of additional 400 km of pavement strengthening and of additional equipment. and engineering studies. IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION A. Pavement Strrepg theni_ng 4.01 Execution of the first yeai of the three and one-half year phase of the road strengtthening progran started in earlv 1980. By the end of the year, RTD had signed contracts covering 196 km (69%), and RTD and LPEE had  completed economic evaluation and detailed engineering work on the road sections for the second and third years. When RTD had awarded all contracts for the first year of strengthening (286 km) in early 1981, contractors were unprepared to execute a sudden flow of new works. This was because they ha(d reduced capacity in response to a recent cutback in public works. Once strengthening was underway, work proceeded at a steady pace, but withdrawal applications lagged behind the amount actually paid due to slow administrative procedures. By mid-1982, all but one contract for the original 700-km pavement strengthening program had been signed. Works proceeded satisfactorily. 4.02 In 1982, a sharp increase in dollar parity from DH 3.8 to DH 6.3 reduced the share of the Loan amount that had been committed from 82% to 65%. This would leave an estimated surplus of about US$16 million. Because the strenghthening program had been conceived as an open-ended sector loan, the increase in dollar parity presented an opportunity not only to expand the strengthening program, but also to finance other project-related activities. A Loan Amendment of January 12, 1983 provided for, inter alia, an additional 400 km of pavement strengthening and the acquisition of additional maintenance equipment (para. 3.03 (b)) and engineering studies. 4.03 By mid-1983, works on about 600 km of the original 700 km of strengthening and about 250 km of the additional 400 kmn, had been completed. Many of these works were starting much later than agreed and lagged behind contractual implementation periods. The delays were caused and compounded by a number of circumstances. In response to a temporary shortage of bitumen, RTD had to suspend works. Much of the traffic on the roads being strengthened could not be readily diverted. Payments from the Treasury were behind schedule because of insufficient liquidity. When it became clear that some road sections would not be completed by the Loan Closing Date, the Bank approved a one-year extension to June 30, 1985. 4.04 In 1984, the difficult budgetarv sittuAtion resulting from insufficient Treasury liquidity increased, and the execution of civil works slowed down even more. During the third quarter, there were no payments at all for project-supported civil works, goods, or services. RTD assured the Bank that regular payments would resume as soon as the Ministry of Finance (MOF) had revised the investment budget. This situation delayed ongoing civil works and impeded commitments against new works. The delays reduced the extent to which civil works could be fully executed by the new Closing Date, causing a loan surplus. To allow more time for completion of works that had already started and for the MOT studies (para. 4.11), the Loan Closing Date was extended to December 31, 1985. B. Pavement Preservation 4.05 Surface treatment of 1,000 km of primary and secondary roads was carried out over four years instead of three. Some 709 km were completed in 1981-82 as scheduled and 123 in 1983. This represented 42% of planned surface treatment for 1983. The remaining 168 km were treated in 1984.  - 7 - C. Road Maintenance 4.06 The national budget for 1981 allocated DH 120 million for the highway maintenance program. This amount was in line with the projected cost of the overall maintenance for the project period as agreed at negotiations (i.e., DH 350 million, over three and one-half years, at 1980 prices). In fact, the annual maintenance action plan required by loan covenant prevented a reduction in the real value of the allocation for highway maintenance, while there was budgetary stringency elsewhere in the public sector. Although from 1984 budgetary constraints held the maintenance allocation below the agreed amounts, RTD managed to plan the use of available amounts in a manner that kept the more important roads in a satisfactory condition. 4.07 Road maintenance equipment was delivered in three tranches. Delivery of the first and second tranches proceeded according to schedule. The third tranche experienced repeated delays due to unsatisfactory tenders and retendering. Annex 2 lists all road maintenance equipment procured under the loan. 4.08 Pavement evaluation equipment was procured in 1981 under ICB although the Loan Agreement allowed Limited International Bidding. CNER technicians received training through Belgian technical assistance and became proficient in the use and maintenance of the equipment. In 1983, the RTD requested that additional equipment be financed under the loan. In view of the commitment under the Fourth Highway Project to carry out extensive measurements of pavement roughness under different traffic volumes and pavement structural indices, the Bank agreed. Annex 3 lists all pavement evaluation equipment procured under this loan. D. Technical Assistance to the Roads and Traffic Department 4.09 In 1978, at the time of project identification, RTD was staffed predominantly with young, French-trained engin:e"L. A'LIough they had only limited practical experience, they had a good grasp of the main issues confronting them. Their relative newness in Government implied a time lag between the upgrading of RTD personnel and the favorable impact on the physical structure that could be expected to follow. With a view to improving their capability to rationalize road investments and maintenance, technical assistance under the project was originally to have been executed directly through consultancy. But an internal study, during the first year of project implementation, suggested that structural modifications in RTD might improve road maintenance management and operations. Since RTD doubted that direct technical assistance could be effective in all respects unless its organizatinal structure were better defined, it requested that the project scope be modified to include a study leading to road maintenance reorganization. On review of the draft terms of reference, the Bank agreed.  -8- 4.10 In early 1982, RTD evaluated the proposals it received from an agreed short list of eight consultants and awarded the contract to a French firm. The consultants examined the overall organization of road maintenance, with particular attention to the organization of equipment maintenance units, rate schedules for internal equipment rental, staff training programs and the training center, and snow and sand removal. They prepared a series of reports and produced five operational manuals. They completed the study in late 1984, about one year behind schedule. RTD drafted a comprehensive staff development plan based on the consultants' recommendations and set up committees to prepare another plan for training sessions to disseminate the conclusions of the study to central and district staff. E. Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Transportation 4.11 In November 1980, the Bank reviewed the draft letter of invitation including descriptions of the various studies that would lead to upgrading overall (i.e., multimodal) transport planning and coordination capability in MOT. When the proposals were evaluated, the proposed contract price was much higher than forecast with the result that MOT had to reject all of them. MOT then excluded the study on railway management organization from the terms of reference and invited the three best placed consulting firms from the previous round to submit proposals. It selected a French/Moroccan joint-venture. 4.12 The final draft reports were issued between March 1984 and June 1985. The studies focused heavily on the pricing and coordination of both freight and passenger transport across modes, including urban and domestic air transport. Four were carried out on air transport and meteorology, and four on road transport. The ninth study, which was to assess the training needs of MOT staff, was not carried out because a suitable expert was no longer available. The Bank recommended that the results of the studies and the data base be reviewed and used in the context of the Transport Policy and Development Study to be financed under the Fourth Highway Project. F. Vehicle-Weighing Equipment 4.13 Due to lack of technical knowledge, MOT did not prepare the technical specifications for the purchase of mobile scales until mid-1981, a year behind schedule. MOT's Land Transport Directorate (LTD) procured ten double weighing scales in 1982 after a lengthy bid evaluation and contract award process. Within a year there was an 80% increase in fines for vehicle load violations. By mid-1983, procurement of fixed weighing stations remained in a preparatory phase. LTD had prepared bidding documents, which the Bank found unsatisfactory because LTD had failed to consider the close interdependence between supplied equipment and buildings. In assigning suitable locations for the installation of the four fixed weighing stations, LTD repeatedly sought but failed to obtain the cooperation of local authorities. It became apparent that considerable time would be needed to reach an agreement between MOT and local authorities to process bids, to construct necessary premises, and finally, to assemble the equipment. LTD therefore decided, with Bank concurrence, to cancel the fixed stations and purchase some i5 additional mobile weighing scales and three vehicles to increase the number of existing check  -9- points through random control by mobile teams. The last 15 mobile scales were delivered in May 1985. MOT is using all 25 mobile scales and three transport vehicles, purchased under the project, to carry out a continuous program of axle-load control. G. Feasibility Studies 4.14 RTD engaged a local branch of a French consulting firm to carry out the economic evaluation, while LPEE performed the engineering work for pavement strengthening for the Fourth Highway Project. The studies covered the improvement and construction of approximately 900 km of provincial roads, the repair and reconstruction of approximately 20 bridges on the classified road network, and the pavement strengthening of approximately 800 km of primary and secondary roads. Also included was an update of the feasibility study on the Oued Cherrat-Rabat section (29 km) of the Casablanca-Rabat expressway, which had been carried out under the First Highway Project. These studies were carried out competently and in a timely manner. H. Performance of Consultants 4.15 The same French firm executed studies for both RTD and MOT, although in the second case it was in joint-venture with a domestic firm. The study for RTD was successful and performance was good. With respect to the studies for MOT, the conclusions tended to reflect MOT's point of view rather than an independent one. However, after reviewing the original version of this report, MOT pointed out that it had encouraged objective assessments (Annex 6). I. Performance of Contractors 4.16 All contractors for civil works were Moroccan. Their performance was generally satisfactory. J. Performance of the Borrower 4.17 RTD's performance was satisfactory despite financial constraints and cumbersome administrative procedures. In fact, RTD made every effort to adhere to the implementation schedule and timely compliance with loan conditions (para. 4.18). RTD carefully supervised the execution of civil works under the project, while LPEE provided assistance in testing and quality control where necessary. MOT, on the other hand, was slow in preparing technical specifications for the purchase of mobile weighing scales (para. 4.13). K. Adherence to Loan Covenants 4.18 The Government's compliance with loan covenants was generally satisfactory, although it had some difficulty complying with the following covenants:  - 10 - (a) Section 3.02 (ii). RTD was to have submitted its annual programs of civil works and road maintenance for 1982 and 1983 for Bank review by September of the previous years. It submitted these several months past the due dates. For subsequent years, however, the target was regularly met. (b) Section 3.02 (ii). MOT was to have hired consultants for the transport policy and coordination study by July 1, 1981, which was later extended to July 1, 1982 (para. 3.03-(b)). The financial proposals that were received far exceeded MOT's budget, and MOF refused to raise the allocation during a period of austerity. The scope of the study was finally reduced, and a contract was signed on August 9, 1983, over one year past the revised aue date. (c) Section 3.05 (c). An ex-post evaluation report on the execution and initial operation of the project, its cost and benefits, and other project-assisted activities was due from RTD on June 30, 1986, six months after the Loan Closing Date. It was not received until January 1987. Discussion of project preparation and implementation issues was lacking in some instances and cursory in others. On the other hand, tabulations relating to the economic reevaluation were extensive, though incomplete. (d) Section 4.03. During the inital years of the project (i.e., until 1984), budget allocations for road maintenance were sufficient to comply with the agreement reached at negotiations on the amount of maintenance to be carried out annually, but by 1984 continued devaluation of the Dirham caused budgetary constraints, which allowed for sufficient amounts to keep only the major roads in satisfactory condition (para. 4.06). (e) Section 4.05. The Loan Agreement provided for reasonable measures to be taken by the Government to ensure the proper use of its national highway system. This condition could not be fully met until mobile scales to be procured under the project were operational. MOT was thus unable to begin a program of random checks of vehicle axle-load until January 1983 (para. 4.13). Axle-load control is now carried out regularly with satisfactory results.  - 11 - V. PROJECT COST AND DISBURSEMENT A. Project Cost 5.01 Actual project costs compared with appraisal estimates are shown in Annex 1. Pavement strengthening and preservation amounted to 80S of total project cost, as estimated at appraisal. The total expenditure in local currency was increased by 64%. In US dollar equivalent, the total cost decreased by 182 because of a sharp decrease in the ve.lue of the Dirham in relation to the dollar auring the implementation period. The unit cost of pavement strengthening increased by 34% in local currency from DH 285,000 to DH 383,000 per km, but decreased by 232 in equivalent US Dollars from US$75,000 to US$57,000 per km. 5.02 Foreign exchange costs were about 88% of appraisal estimates. But the cost of technical assistance to RTD was several times appraisal estimates: 1552 for consultants' services and 280% for laboratory services provided by LPEE. This marked increase was mainly due to the financing of feasibility studies and engineering work for the Fourth Highway Project, pursuant to the Loan Amendment of January 12, 1983 (para. 3.03 (b)). The foreign cost of equipment was lower than expected: 911 for highway maintenance equipment, 59% for weighing scales, and 79% for laboratory equipment, including the additional laboratory equipment purchased for CNER. The bulk of equipment (92%) was for highway maintenance. Price increases for this equipment were lower than expected. B. Disbursement 5.03 Actual disbursements lagged behind the appraisal schedule. This lag was caused not only by the usual delays in implementation and procurement, but also by slow administrative procedures. By June 30, 1984, the original Loan Closing Date, actual disbursements were 731 of expected disbursement. The Closing Date was extended to June 30, 1985, by which time total disbursements increased by only 3%. It was extended again to December 31, 1985, but the Loan Account was kept open until September 30, 1986. Cancellations amounted to US$9.1 million (para. 3.04). VI. INSTITUTIONAL PEFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 6.01 The two previous highway projects contributed to the organizational and manpower development of the relevant agencies by helping build the structures needed for rationalizing road construction, road maintenance, and overall transportation planning and coordination. Institutional gains under the First Highway Project were underscored by good performance of local contractors and efficient construction  - 12 - supervision by RTD engineers. Under thie Second Project, the local construction industry continued to gain valuable experience. Local contractors carried out all civil works competently, including the country's first modern expressway. The Second Project also introduced cost accounting methods for road maintenance recommended under the First Project. 6.02 The Third Project provided the next logical step in institutional growth and maturity. RTD requested that technical assistance by consultants be included in the project to help improve the quality of its maintenance operations and to strengthen its planning and budgeting capability. But an internal assessment in RTD, which was carried out shortly after implementation was underway, found that some organizational restructuring could enhance mainteniance management. This led RTD to reconsider the kind of technical assistance needed and to change direct assistance to a study (para. 4.09). The study outlined a strategy for long-range operational planning and made recommendations for upgrading cost accounting procedures, developing procedures for heavy equipment maintenance, and improving the agency's capability in maintenance manpower planning anid development. Before the project was coumpleted, RTD had planned training courres for central and district staff. Mhe other study, which was directed at sectorwide planning and coordination in MOT, identified and outlined major issues facing the transport sector to be addressed outside the scope -f the Third Project (para. 4.11). 6.03 Despite major changes in the technical assistance component, significant institutional growth occurred. It was both concomitant with, and a direct result of, the project. In late 1982, during the course of project implementation, road maintenance operations were decentralized. Under the new scheme, RTD headquarters began to focus on matters of general planning and coordination, while delegating contract awards and administration, as well as supervision of works, to district offices. The field organization was extended to 40 provincial offices, grouped under seven regional offices, with 70 subdivisions. This structure enhanced reporting relationships and communication between central staff and engineers in charge of district offices, allowing problems to be identified and solved quickly. 6.04 The loan also financed pavement evaluation equipment to be used in the new CNER, which was being assisted with Belgian bilateral aid (para. 4.08). Acquisition of this equipment provided the subsector with the permanent capacity to carry out extensive measurements of pavement roughness under different traffic volumes and pavement structural indices. VII. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION 7.01 At appraisal, the Bank agreed on a methodology to program strengthening works. It consisted in evaluating the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) on a set of road sections. Works were to proceed on those  - 13 - road sections with highest values. It was agreed that strengthening was not warranted for economic reasons on road sections that showed a return of less than 12%. 7.02 RTD applied a computerized model, RENTAREF, which was prepared by its own experts. The model took into account: (a) road roughness and its effects on vehicle operating costs (VOCs); and (b) routine maintenance costs on each road section before and after strengthening. This method was applied to 286 km of road sections that were selected at appraisal as a priority in the first stage of project implementation. It was then updated to take inflation into account and applied to the remaining road sections. During project implementation RTD submitted to the Bank for approval the list ot roads to be strengthened for which the IRR was calculated. 7.03 Following project completion, new traffic counts were taken on a sample of the roads strengthened with project financing and ex-post IRR's were calculated using the same methodology as agreed at appraisal. Ex-post economic evaluation showed an average IRR of 32% as compared with the original 39% (Annex 4). This is based on 75% of road sections strengthened for which comparative data are available, including those appraised before and after loan effectiveness (para. 2.05). The higher ex-post IRRs on some sections are due to higher than expected traffic growth between 1981 and 1985 on sections where circulation tends to concentrate between the high density population centers. Sections below the 12% threshhold (para. 7.01) show an average IRR of 7% as compared with the original 29%. The lower ex-post IRRs occur because initial calculations were based on standard structuires. In some cases, however, detailed engineering shows that stronger pavement was needed because of local subsoil and drainage conditions which increased the cost of strengthening. By the time RTD staff calculated ex-post rates, they had gained experience using the Bank's Highway Design and Maintenance Model (HDM), which requires many more inputs than RENTAREF. At the Bank's suggestion, RTD has compared the two models, applying RENTAREF to road sections included in the Fourth Highway Project, which had been studied through the application of HDM. Almost invariably, HDM results are higher; on average, they are 60% above those given by RENTAREF. One reason for this improvement is that HDM takes into account the actual roughness for each section before strengthening, which is generally higher than 3,500 mm/km, whereas RENTAREF assumes a constant roughness equal to 3,500 mm/km. On that basis, the 7% average ex-post IRR on sections below the 12% threshhold would have been about 11% if HDM had been applied. Annex 4 provides a breakdown by section of ex-post and original IRRs on 75% of project-assisted strengthening and Annex 5 a breakdown of VOCs in 1983. 7.04 Overall, the project proves to have been a good investment for the Government. Without the pavement strengthening program, many sections of the main road network would have deteriorated beyond repair as a result of heavy traffic. Most importantly, it established in the Ministry of Public Works a methodology to evaluate economic returns on all future investments, which is subject to further refinements and adaptation to the specifics of each investment.  -14 - VIII. ROLE OF THE BANK 8.01 The Bank devoted 51 staff weeks in the field to the project from its inception to its completion. Supervision missions visited Morocco at least twice a year during implementation. Bank missions maintained a continuous dialogue with the Government on ways to minimize the time lag between the implementation of studies and works, and disbursement of loan proceeds. As the Loan Closing Dates approached, the Bank emphasized the need to increase the amount of withdrawal applications to ensure full financing of project items. 8.02 Bank staff helped the Government examine ways to reduce the scope of the MOT studies while it stressed the importance of selecting high-quality consultants and starting the studies without further delay. Because MOT lacked the appropriate knowledge to prepare technical specifications for the purchases of mobile weighing scales, the Bank referred MOT to the description of a type of mobile scale already approved under a loan for another country. The Bank constantly monitored the preparation of bidding documents for this equipment. 8.03 The flexibility of the sector-loan approach to pavement strengthening and road maintenance allowed for additional civil works and procurement of equipment when exchange rate fluctuactions were causing a loan surplus. This was accomplished without having to change original project objectives and thus facilitated amending the Loan Agreement. IX. CONCLUSIONS 9.01 The Third Highway Project achieved its objectives and contributed to the country's long-term pavement strengthening and preservation program. The loan surplus resulting from exchange rate fluctuation made it possible for RTD to benefit from Bank financing of pavement strengthening of an additional 400 km of road sections. The management of road maintenance operations and equipment has improved measurably as a direct result of the project. The project, therefore, had a decisive impact on the institutional growth of the subsector, although its contribution to improvements at the macro level of transport planning and coordination must still be confirmed. As a result of the project, the Bank has learned lessons in the following areas: (a) preparation of technical assistance components; (b) effectiveness of loan covenants that cover recurrent expenditure; and (c) the continuing need to help the Government improve the processing of contract awards and withdrawal applications. 9.02 It was necessary to scale down MOT studies due to the unavailability of local funds. Consequently, the technical assistance component fell short of expected results. In future transportation  - 15 - projects, the Bank should seek assurances from the Government at negotiations that adequate local tunds will be available to execute agreed studies. The Banik should also supervise their progress closely to assure that they maintain an independent point of view. Loan covenants should require that studies follow proven methodologies and approaches. 9.03 Loan conditions should also specify budgetary allocations for road maintenance. This approach was successful during the early years of project implementation and prevented cutbacks in road maintenance operations while the reEt of the public sector faced austerity. In view of the implications of satisfactory road maintenance for overall agriculture and infrastructure development, similar condition lities in future projects could help offset austerity measures. 9.04 In 1984 a Regional Procurement Review ' m:.,ttee examined the basic decrees for rules and regulations for procurement of works, goods, and services and recommended some changes and clarifications in Local Competitive Bidding rules and procedures. In the transportation sector, the Bank has maintained a continuous dialogue with the Government on related issues in the context of the Fourth Highway project, the Casablanca and Mohammedia Port Project, the Public Enterprise Rationalization Loan, and proposed Transportation Sector Loan. In conjunction with ongoing and future projects in Morocco, the Bank should continue this dialogue with a view to helping the Government streamline administrative procedures affecting the execution of public works to minimize the time lag between implementation of works and disbursement (para. 8.01).  KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) Comparison of Actual Costs with Forecast Estimate Actual Cost as a Proportion --^--- Actual Cost ---- Forecast Estimate of Cost----I/ oF Forecast Estimate Proiect Contonent Loca Foreign Total / Local Freia Total V2 Local Foreian lQtal (DH M) (US$ M) (US$ M) (OH M) (US$ M) (US$ M) Pavement Strengthening and Preservation Program 175.80 42.79 65.83 100.68 49.21 75.70 175% 87% 87% (3-year time slice) Equipment for Highway Maintenance 33.57 9.36 13.76 18.36 10.26 15.08 183% 91% 91% Technical Assistance: for Roads Directorate: (i) Consultants' Services 0.46 0.34 0.40 0.14 0.22 0.25 327% 1S5% 160X (ii) Laboratory Services 3.02 0.92 1.32 0.48 0.33 0.46 629% 280% 528% for Minitary of Transportation: 0.00 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.72 0.85 0% 63% 53% Miscellaneous Equipment: Weighinig Scales 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.82 0.38 0.60 58X 37% Pavement Evaluation Equipment 2.14 0.70 0.98 1.93 0.89 1.39 111% 79% 71% Total Base Cost 214.99 54.78 82.96 122.89 62.01 94.33 175% 8BX 88% I Including contingencies. h' Using an exchange rate of US$1 7.63 for actual costs and US$1 3.80 for forecast estimate of costs. Source: World Bank. U9t  - 17 - ANNEX 2 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) List of Road Maintenance Equipment Procured under the Project Equipment Quantity - Trucks, less than 6 tons 76 - Trucks, over 6 tons 90 - Spot-patching trucks 37 - Graders 24 - Front loaders 3 - Smooth Wheel Roolers 5 - Vibrating Rollers 9 - Snow Blower 1 - Snow ploughs 16 - Light pick-ups 44 - Light service vehicles 126 - Four-wheel drive vehicles 5 - Jeeps 46 - Transport vehicles 59 Total foreign cost US$13,755,000 Source: Ministry of Public Works, Roads and Traffic Directorate and World Bank.  - 18 - ANNEX 3 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) List of Pavement Evaluation Equipment Procured under the Project Equipment Quantity - CBR machines (in situ) 2 - CBR machine (lab) 1 - Deflectographs 2 - CRR test drill 1 - Profilographs 3 - Bump integrator 1 - Road surface profile tester 1 - Machine for aggregate polishing test 1 - Portable skid resistence testers 3 - Plate-bearing test apparatus 2 - Weather station 1 - Benkelman beams 2 - Rut gauge (lab) 1 - Dynamic weighing Scales 2 - Mobile weighing Scales 2 - Test drills 4 - Spare parts Total foreign cost = US$700,000 Source: Ministry of Public Works, Roads and Traffic Directorate.  - 19 - ANNEX 4 Page 1 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT {LOAN 1830-MOR Ex-Post and Original Estimates of Economic Rates of Return on Pavement Strengthenina Major % of Economic Rate of Return Road Total Ex-Post Original Section Scifton Length 1.100 EstimateS Estimate (km) (km) (X) (X) RPI 70.5 - 77.0 6.5 0.6% >100 28 80.0 - 85.0 5.0 0.5% >100 63 212.6 - 227.0 14.4 1.3% 41 35 236.5 - 237.0 0.5 0.0% S8 48 237.0 - 239.0 2.0 0.2% 58 51 239.0 - 253.0 14.0 1.3% 61 46 253.0 - 258.0 5.0 0.5% 58 46 278.0 - 280.0 2.0 0.2% 58 46 326.0 - 345.0 19.0 1.7% 14 39 395.0 - 410.0 15.0 1.4% 23 38 413.5 - 435.0 21.5 2.0% 25 26 RP2 47.3 - 61.0 13.7 1.2% 70 53 RP3 25.5 - 60.0 34.5 3.1% 32 38 62.0 - 74.0 12.0 1.1% 19 32 RP6 1.0 - 9.0 8.0 0.7% 17 27 RP7 12.6 - 18.6 6.0 0.5% 44 50 32.6 - 36.0 3.4 0.3% 41 42 75.8 - 79.0 3.2 0.3% 27 28 104.0 - 118.8 14.8 1.3% 34 34 139.5 - 168.0 28.5 2.6% 16 34 178.0 - 179.0 1.0 0.1% >100 29 213.5 - 217.5 4.0 0.4% 34 29 RP8 6.7 - 22.0 15.3 1.4% 44 44 187.0 - 206.0 19.0 1.7% 8 68 216.6 - 224.0 7.4 0.7% 18 24 266.0 - 274.0 8.0 0.7% 4 27 RP9 0.0 - 20.0 20.0 1.8% 10 28 RP1O 96.0 - 99.0 3.0 0.3% 12 20 RP13 0.0 - 31.6 31.6 2.9% 78 29 32.0 - 37.0 5.0 0.5% 25 31 61.5 - 78.0 16.5 1.5% 25 29 93.0 - 102.0 9.0 0.8% 22 29 110.5 - 113.0 2.5 0.2% 33 29 153.0 - 155.0 2.0 0.2% 32 30 RP22 226.0 - 235.0 9.0 0.8% 21 38 RP24 0.0 - 6.0 6.0 0.5% 22 33 19.0 - 25.0 6.0 0.5% 20 25 36.0 - 46.5 10.5 1.0% 34 45 48.0 - 60.5 12.5 1.1% 12 22 251.0 - 255.0 4.0 0.4% 23 22 274.5 - 283.3 8.8 0.8% 22 29 293.5 - 305.5 12.0 1.1% 31 39 392.0 - 449.0 57.0 5.2% 20 30 452.0 - 454.0 2.0 0.2% 28 48 472.5 - 477.5 5.0 0.5% 9 21 RP27 11.5 - 27.5 16.0 1.5% 45 42 49.3 - 56.0 6.7 0.6% 25 42 87.0 - 89.5 2.5 0.2% 20 35  - 20 - ANNEX 4 Page 2 Major % of Economic Rate of Return Road Total Ex-Post Original ,S,e,tion Section Lenath l.1O,O, EstiAmate Estimate (km) (km) (X) (X) RP32 8.0 - 13.8 5.8 O.S% >100 >100 53.0 - 65.0 12.0 1.1% 90 86 75.0 - 83.1 8.1 0.7% SS 56 RP33 12.0 45.0 33.0 3.0% 6 24 RP34 0.0 - 5.3 S.3 O.S% 30 34 14.4 - 25.0 10.6 1.0% 32 38 RP36 44.5 - 60.0 15.5 1.4% >100 >lO0 63.0 - 72.4 9.4 0.9% >100 >100 RP38 37.4 - 50.0 12.6 1.1% 36 35 RP40 46.0 - S1.2 5.2 0.5% 14 28 78.0 - 83.5 5.5 0.5% 1S 28 164.0 - 165.0 1.0 0.1% 20 28 173.0 - 181.0 8.0 0.7% 18 28 RS114 6.8 - 18.3 11.5 1.0% 96 63 RS117 0.0 - 20.0 20.0 1.8% 8 20 RS130 19.0 - 24.0 5.0 0.5% 15 37 RS20S 37.0 - 49.0 12.0 1.1% 24 19 RS207 8.0 - 23.0 15.0 1.4% 29 54 RS209 128.8 - 143.0 14.2 1.3% 6 25 RS222 5.0 - 18.3 13.3 1.2% 26 26 RS316 0.0 - 17.5 17.5 1.6% 6 12 RSSO9 20.0 - 60.0 40.0 3.6% 12 Sa RS607 1.0 - 10.0 9.0 0.8% 11 27 Totals 820.8 74.6% Weighted Averages 32 39 Source: Ministry of Public Works, Roads and Traffic Directorate  - 21 - ANNEX 5 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1830-MOR) Vehicle Operating Costs - 1983 Vehicle Operating Costs (exclu- sive of taxes) on Different Categories of road 2/ --------- -(DH/km)------- -------A- ----- -- ----C-- Vehicle 1/ Flat Hilly Flat Hilly Flat Hillv Light 0.80 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.95 1.01 Heavy 2.49 2.66 2.65 2.83 2.95 3.15 Notes I/ Vehicle Type X of Total Light = car 65.0S Heavy = van 12.2% small truck 14.1% large truck 5.22 bus 2.12 trailer 1.42 2/ Road Category Condition Roughness (mm/km) A good 2,000 B fair 3,000 C bad 5,000 Source: a) MPW, RTD b) BCEOM, "Etude d'amelioration de l'entretien routier", 1984 c) SETEC "Evaluation economique des projets", 1982  - 22 - Annex 6 Page 1 of 5 Translation of incomin telex from Morocco Rabat, Sept. 14, 1987 Attention: Mr. Graham Donaldson IBRD Washington, D.C. Subject: PCR on Third Highway Project (Loan No. 1830 MOR) Ref: Your letter of Ausust 14, 1987 After examining the Report as prepared by the Bank, I wish to make the following observations regarding pavement evaluation and road maintenance equipment procured under the Project: 1. Re paragraph 4.08: It was Morocco which thought it necessary to purchase a new lot of equipment. The Belgian Government approved. The list of equipment given in Annex 3 should be rectified as follows: CBR machines (in situ) 2 CBR machine (lab) I Deflectographs 2 CRR test drill 1 Profilographs 3 Bump integrator 1 Road surface profile tester 1 Machine for aggregate polishing test 1 Portable skid resistence testers 3 Plate-bearing test apparatus 2 Weather station 1 Benkelman beams 2 Rut gauge (lab) 1 2. The list of equipment given in Annex 2 should be rectified as follows: Spot-patching trucks 37 Smooth wheel rollers 5 Vibrating rollers 9 Light service vehicles 126 Four-wheel drive vehicles 5 Transport vehicles 59  - 23 - Annex 6 Page 2 of 5 3. The map of Morocco is incomplete. The new map including the Saharan provinces should be substituted. Yours, etc. 1sf A. Azzaoui Director of Roads (Acting)  - 24 - AMU 6 Page 3 of 5 Jwsq65S ZSTOOS IN 14/05:43 GllT 14/05:49 MEDRCRRH 31755M ROYAUMgE DU MAROC _ RABATP LE 14 SEPTEMBRE 1987 A L'ATT. DF MR. GRANAH DONALDSON - BANQUE MONO!ALE-WASHINGTON - U.'S#A 0BJET/-RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT OU) 3E PROJET ROUTIER ---- PRET 1830 MOR REFER/- VOTRE LETTRE DU t4/9/87 L'EXAMEN DU RAPPORT FTAPL.T PAR LA BANQUF APPFLl PF MA PART l ES OUSERVATIONS SIJIVANTES RELATIVfS AUX MATFRIELS D'AUSCULTATJON ET D'ENTREltIENS 1- PARAGRAPHE 4.ORSC'EST L.E MAROC 011 A SENTI LA NECESSITE D'ACQUERIR UN NOUVEAU TOT F ItS HATERIFL LE OOUVERNEMSNT BELOE A APPROIJVE LA LISTE DU MATERIEL MENTTONNEE EN ANNEXE 3 DOIT RECTIFIER COMME SUIT: - MACHINE C B R IN SITU : 2 - MAGNINE C B R - LABO : 1 - DEFLECTOGRAPHF : 2 -SONDE OE BATTAGE TYPE C.R.R: 1 -TRANSVERSOPROFILOORAPHES 3 -BUMP INTEGRATOR I 1 -ANALYSEUR DE PROFIt EN LONG S 1 - MACHINE C P A :1 - PENDULES T R R L :3 -APPAREIL POUR ESSAI DE PORTANCE A LA PLAGUE S 2 _ UnZNX - STATION METEO : 1 - POUTRES DENKELMAN : 2 ORNIEREUR LABO S 2- LA LISSTE DU MATERIEL MENfIONNEE EN ANNEXE 2 EST RECTIFIER COnME SUIT - CAMIONS POINT A TEMPS 37 - CYLINDRES 4 5 - ROULEAUX VIDRANTS S 9 - VFHICULES DF SERVICFS IEGERS : 126 - VOITURES TOUT TERRAIN : 5 - VFHICULES DE TRANSPORT S 59 3 - LA CARTE DU MAROC EST INCOMPt.ETE.ELI.E EST A REMPLACER PAR L.A NOUVEl.L E CARTF COMPNRtNANT LES PROVINCES SAHARIFNNES. CONSIDERATION DISTJNGUF.F LE DIRECTEUR DES ROUTES ET DE LA CIRCULATION ROUTIERF (P.#.) SINE:A.AZZAOUI. MEDRCRRH 31755M MEDRCRRH 31755M  -25- AM 6 Page 4 of 5 88E0208 October 5, 1987 French (Morocco) OED TS:mec Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Transport No. !70/DEPCT/DEP/SE Rabat, September 21, 1987 The Minister of Transport to Mr. Graham Donaldson Division Chief, Operations Evaluation Department World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 SUBJECT: Completion Report on Third Highway Project Loan 1830-MOR REF: Your letter of August 14, 1987 Dear Sir: Further to your above-referred letter we have the honor to inform you that after reading the completion report on the Third Highway Project we have the following comment to make: Page 10, paragraph 4.1' Because of its concern to know the true situation of the transport sector in Morocco, the Ministry has never influenced the opinions of experts to turn the conclusions of their studies toward its point of view. On the contrary, it has encouraged them to interview transport system users in the field in order to better ascertain the actual situation of the sector. We would accordingly request you to delete the last sentence of paragraph 4.15. Yours sincerely, s/Abdelkader Nouini Secretary General for the Minister of Transport Stamp: Minister of Transport Kingdom of Morocco  - 26 - UINER 6 ?al 5 of 5 _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a a I