Cameroon - Technical Assistance Project

DocmW of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 6114 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT CAMEROON - FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 673-CM) March 24, 1986 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ABBREVIATIONS APMU - Agricultural Project Management Unit DCA - Development Credit Agreement DEP - Project Preparation Unit (Direction des Etudes et Projets) DP - Directorate of Programming (Direction de la Programmation) VINAG - Ministry of Agriculture MINER - Ministry of Equipment and Housing MINEP - Ministry of Economy and Planning PCR - Project Completion Report PCU - Project Coordination Unit PR - President's Report TA - Technical Assistance TOR - Terms of Reference FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A Okice of DrWecto-WC4nral Opersaons~ Evaluaton March 24, 1986 MIMDRANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on Cameroon - First Technical Assistance Project (Credit 673-CM) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report on Cameroon - First Technical Assistance Project (Credit 673-CM)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. Yves Rovani by Yukinori Watanabe Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT CAMEROON - FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 673-CM) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ****************************************************** I Basic Data Sheet ................................................... 11 Evaluation Summary ........................ ....... ........ iv PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM PROJECT DESIGN AND PREPARATION ............................. 1 Background and Objectives ................................. 1 Project Preparation ........................................ 2 Major Design Features ......................5............... 5 Institutional Strengthening .............................. 5 Project Coordination Arrangements ........................ 5 I. IMPLEMENTATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS ........................... 6 Difficulties in Project Start-Up ........................... 6 Overall Achievements .................................... 7 Disbursements ........................................... 7 Studies and Project Pipeline ............................... 8 Training ................................................... 8 Institutional Improvements ................................. 10 III. FACTORS AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS ............................ 10 Lack of Borrower Involvement ............................... 10 Inadequate Borrower Capacity .............................. 11 Design and Preparation ..................................... 12 Design Problems ...................................... 12 Lack of Focus on Institutional Development ............... 13 Arrangements for Coordination ............................ 14 Role and Selection of Consultants ........................ 15 Unrealistic Expectations ..'...****.....................**.. 16 Inadequate Supervision...................................... 16 IV. LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE ................................* 18 Increased Borrower Collaboration ........................... 18 More Rigorous Project Preparation and Appraisal ............ 19 Follow-Up in Supervision ................................... 20 Need to Focus on Institutional Development ................. 20 New Lessons to be Learned ........................ 21 This document has a estricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their oicial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoriation. TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT 1. Project Context, Objectives and Content ............,..., 25 11. Project Implementation ********6********************* 26 III. Project Costs and Disbursements .......................... 27 IV. Project Results and Achievements . 28 V. Government and Bank Performance .......................... 30 VI. Conclusions .............................................. 31 ANNEX - Studies and Consultancies Financed Under the Project ....... 32 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT CAMEROON - FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 673-CM) PREFACE This report reviews the experience with the First Technical Assistance Project in Cameroon supported by Credit 673-CM for US$4.5 million equivalent signed in June 1977. The audit consists of a Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAK) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated February 15, 1985, prepared by the Bank's Western Africa Regional Office, with assistance from the Resident Mission in Cameroon. The PPAM is based upon a review of the President's Report (No. P1951-CM) dated December 8, 1976, the Development Credit Agreement dated June 15, 1977, Bank supervision reports and other related documents, and the PCR, and has also benefitted from interviews with a number of Bank staff. Following customary OED procedures a draft copy of the audit report was sent to the Borrower for comment on October 15, 1985. Yo comments have been received. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SMBET CAMEROON - FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 673-CM) KEY PROJECT DATA (US$ millin) As of 10/31/85 Original Credit Disbursed Cancelled Repaid Outstanding 4.50 4.14 0.36 0.00 4.14 CUMULATIVE CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS (US$ million) FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 Appraisal Estimate 0.1 0.8 2.4 4.2 4.5 - - - - - Actual - 0.05 0.6 1.6 2.4 3.1 3.3 3.6 4.1 4.1 Actual as % of Estimate - 6% 25% 38% 53% 69% 73% 80% 92% 92% OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Item Plan Revisions Actual First Mention in Files or Timetable 02/76 Government's Application 04/76 Negotiations - 11/76 Board Approval 12/76 12/76 Loan/Credit Agreement Date 06/77 06/77 Effectiveness Date 09/77 11/77 Closing Date 12/80 06/82, 12/82 12/83 Borrower Government of Cameroon Executing Agency Ministry of Finance Fiscal Year of Borrower July 1 - June 30 MISSION DATA Month/ Mission Year Supervision I October 1977 Supervision II June 1978 Supervision III July 1979 Supervision IV August 1981 Supervision V March 1982 Supervision VI May 1983 Supervision VII January 1984 Total The staff of the Resident Mission spent an average of two mandays per month on project supervision and stepped in to resolve difficulties as required. In addition, ReadquartArs.staff from the concerned Urban, Water Supply and Transport divisions visited C.-meroon to monitor project progress. COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) CFAF Currency Exchange Rate: Appraisal Year Average (1976) CFA 225 - US$1.00 Intervening Years Average (1977-83) CFA 257 - US$1.00 Completion Year Average.(1984) CFA 437 = US$1.00 FOLLOW ON PROJECTS. Second Technical Cooperation Project Credit 1168-CM (US$10 million), approved on June 23, 1981. - iv - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT CAMEROON - WIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 673-CM) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction The first technical assistance project was conceived at a time when the Bank was considerably expanding its program of lending to Cameroon and when technical assistance from traditional sources was on the decline (PCR, para. 1). The project was identified by the Bank primarily as a means of preparing a number of projects for the lending program (PPAM, para. 1i). The credit of US$4.5 million was approved in December 1976 and signed in June 1977. The closing date was extended on three separate occasions and the Credit finally closed on December 31, 1983, although disbursements under the Credit continued to be made through August 1985. A follow-up project, the Second Technical Cooperation Project, Credit 1168-CM for US$10 million equivalent, was signed in November 1981. Objectives The primary objective of the project was to strengthen the capacity of Cameroonian agencies to formulate sound investment policies and programs and to prepare and implement projects (PCR, para. 1, PPAM, para. 3). To this end, the project provided some 36 manyears of technical assistance for long- term advisory support to the Ministry of Economy and Planning and other ministries, short-term consultancies for project preparation and policy studies, and for training (PCR, para. 5, PPAM, para. 2). Implementation Experience It was originally expected that the project would be implemented over a three-year period between 1977 and 1980. In the event, project start- up and implementation were severely impeded by administrative and procedural difficulties. Lack of early agreement between the Bank and the Borrower on consultant selection procedures delayed recruitment (PPAM, paras. 21, 22) and after they were recruited, the technical assistance personnel were hampered by inadequate logistical and administrative support, cumbersome disbursement procedures and poor coordination (PCR, paras. 7-9). As a result of these factors, disbursements under the project were very slow. By the original closing date only 45 percent of the funds had been disbursed. Results Project activities have resulted in the preparation of a number of projects for external financing (PCR, para. 14 and Annex) ani also made a significant contribution to preparation of the Fifth Plan (1902-86) (PCR, para. 16). Other significant initiatives resulting from the project have -v - been the carrying out of retrospective and prospective surveys of agricul- tural development projects and the production of an c4gricultural map. Less progress was made in institutional development. Although the project supported the establishment of a project planning capacity in the Ministry of Agriculture and made a significant contribution to training, the early emphasis on strengthening borrower capacity was not meintained during itplementstion (PCR, paras. 13 and 15, PPAM, paras. 14-16, 28-38, 4-52). Sustainability The long term objective of the project was to improve the capacity of Cameroonian agencies, and there was therefore an early emphasis on training. Despite poor preparation of the training component and the absence of a training adviser, some useful progress was made in training local staff in two agencies. However, the project appears to have had only a limited impact on developing local capacity, and it will be left to follow up projects to ensure that sustainable improvements in planning procedures are achieved. Findings and Lessons The PPAN draws attention to a number of Pactors that limited the impact of the project: - the lack of involvement of the borrower in design and preparation of the project (paras. 5-6, 39-41); - the limited capacity of the borrower to implement the project, which was not fully appreciated by the Bank (para. 42); - deficiencies in design, particularly in regard to its lack of focus on institutional development (paras. 44-52), arrangements for coordination (paras. 53-55) for the recruitment of consultants (paras. 56-57), and unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved (para. 58); - poor supervision by the Bank staff (paras. 59-63). These factors suggest some lessons for future projects of this kind (PPAM, paras. 64-70). In particular, the PPAM draws attention to the need for more vigorous preparation and appraisal of TA projects, for greater borrower participation, for more effective follow-up by the Bank during supervision and for a greater focus on institutional development to ensure that- project benefits are sustained. - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT WEMORANDUK CAMEROON - FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 673-CM) 1. PROJECT DESIGN AND PREPARATION Background and Objectives 1. The Cameroon First Technical Assistance Project (Credit 673-CM for US$4.5 million) was approved by the Board on De6ember 30, 1975 and signed after some delay by the Borrower in meeting the conditionality stipulations of the Credit Agreement (Section 6.01). The December 31, 1980 Closing Date of the Credit was extended on three separate occasions, and the credit was finally closed in December 31, 1983, although the final disbursement was not made until August 1985. An undisbursed balance of US$360,000was cancelled. 2. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) specified (in Art. III, Section 3.01) that the Project would consist of "high-priority sub-projects designed to assist the Borrower in planning, preparing and implementing its investment policies and development projects in the transport, agricul- tural and urban development sectors and in training its personnel required for said purpose." The President's Report (PR) (paras. 30-31) indicated that the project would include the following technical assistance (TA) components: (i) long-term advisory support for the Ministries of Economy and 'Planning, Agriculture, Transport, Mines and Energy, and Equipment and Housing (20 person/years); (ii) short-term consultant services for "pre-investment and feasibility studies leading to priority projects for financing and special studies related to project or economic policy implemention in the sectors where project activities are concentrated" (130 person/ months); (iii) short-term training consultant services, courses and activities relevant to "the upgrading of local personnel to be associated with the project and to the development of Cameroonian institutions concerned with pre-investment and project work" (60 person/months) (iv) provisions for additional local staff, equipment, vehicles and operating costs required to support the project. 3. The major project benefit was anticipated to be "the strengthening of the capabilities of the Cameroonian agencies" in formulating and imple- menting an effective and well-planned investment policy and development program (PR, para. 65). The-PR also expected that the project would enhance the project preparation, implementation and supervision capability of the technical ministries; only lastly was it thought to help develop an expanded pipeline of projects suitable for financing. The priorities of the PA are in marked contrast to those of the PCR which calls this last point a "major 2- project objective" (para. 22). The recruitment of consultants, the appoint- ment of Cameroonian officials and the quality of these personnel were the only anticipated risks in implementation (PR, para. 0). 4. The most significant constrainc in attaining these sectoral priori- ties was.Identified as the absorptive capacity of each of the sectors con- cerned.1/ The expansion of this capacity was- viewed as a "time-cons -ming and gradual process [which] does not permit sudden large improvements..." The two determining factors for the short- and medium-term absorptive capacity of the Borrower were identified as: (i) an increase in the number of projects identified and "the status of project preparation, i.e., the amount of projects in the pipeline" which could be stdrted before the end of the current (Fourth Plan) period, This suggested a need to increase "the number of projects identified during the early years and prepared during the later years of the Fourth Plan, so as to be ready for implementation in the early 1980s";2/ (ii) the institutional framework necessary to implement and manage these projects once their preparation has been completed. Project Preparation 5. The project is said to have been identified by various Bank missions (PR, para. 29 and PCR, para. 2), in particular by the special economic missions which visited the country in February and November 1975 to advise on the preparation of the Fourth Plan. Although the project record does not support this contention (see para. 6 below) it does confirm that these missions' findings provided ample justification for strengthenirdg the Borrowei's project planning and implementation capability. The missions concluded that in order to attain more satisfactory rates of growth in the early 1980s, the Government of Cameroon would have to maintain a high volume of public investment and further expand and diversify its production base during the 1977-81 Fourth Plan period. Moreover, to achieve even the more modest level of investment suggested by the Bank, th- Government would have to considerably strengthen its ability to choose, prepare and implement projects, particularly in the agricultar,,, livestock, forestry and transpar- tation sectors. 6. The identification and design process started in late 1975 with the onset of the UNDP budget crists and the suggestion that tie Bank might assist in maintaining UN technical assistance posts which would otherwise have to be terminated. The process ended with the signature of the DCA in June 1977. The project was identified and designed almost exclusively within the Bank: namely between the Headquarters' Country Programs Department and the Bank's 1/ Proposals for a Medium-Term Public Development Program: A Special Study: Cameroon, April 23, 1976, Report No. 1097a-CAM, p. 38ff). 2/ Ibid., p. 82. -3- Cameroon Resident Mission. Contacts between the Bank and the Borrower only played a distant secondary function. The Project was, from the start,. a Programs activity and the relevant Project divisions appear to have had only minimal opportunity to contribute to its design. Whenever they did, particu- larly in the case of the Education Division, the subsequent record does not indicate the advine to have been incorporated in the design or acted upon in another manner. 7. The first mention of the Project in files is in a cable from the Programs Department to the Cameroon Resident Mission (February 2, 1976). This proposed that the project include three components: (i) a line of credit--to finance project p:eparation in traditional and newer sectors and other specific studies--with a view to (il) the strengthening of some institutions in charge of project implementation and supervision; and finally, (iii) some a la carte training for managers. -Several technical ministries, including parastatals, were mentioned as possible recipients of the assistance package. 8. The immediate response from the field strongly urged that, "for maximum effectiveness TA should not be dispersed" across Government agencies, and that the management of such a project should rest squiarely on the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MINEP), and its Directorate of Programming (Direction de la Programmation - DP) which was thought to need assistance in the form of expertise and the meqns to coordinate and supervise. An additional suggestion was to create a monitoring structure for donors to track the status of studies in all sectors and to follow tip on actions needed in each instance. Except for the MINEP focus, the amendments proposed by the field sLaff to the initial proposal were not incorporated in the final de3ign. A report to the Regional Office (January 21, 1976) expressed the contrasting view that priority in technical assistance should be given to technical ministries rather than to MINEP. The record does not indicate that these dissenting perspectives caused the Programs Department to re-assess its initial approach. 9. For. all practical purposes, the final design of the Project was defined in a March 10, 1976 Issues Paper, which outlined a number of concerns and set the objectives of a strategy designed to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Government through the establishment, with Bank Group finance, of a "planning and study implementation facility." Under the proposed project: (i) the technical ministries' planning and supervisory functions were to be strengthened through expert assistance; (ii) a study coordination unit was to be established in MINEP; (iii) funds were to be made available to finance studies, most of which were to be identified during appraisal; and (iv) provisioa for the training of nationals in planning, project preparation and execution was deemed "essential and urgent." 10. The regional project divisions made varying contributions to the design of the Project. Transport sector needs were identified in the course of a country field visit June 1976) and the well advanced assessment of urban needs was communicated to Programs (September 1976). The Education division commented at length on the proposal; it specifically pointed out that only the immediate problems of lack of personnel and not "..0 the -4- medium- and long-term problem of training national personnel to perform these functions" were addressed. Nor did the project deal with the "... develop- ment of more appropriate institutional arrangements." The Education Division also recommended that part of the credit be specifically used for training personnel and that a training advisor, backed by consultants, should assess training needs in project planning, preparation and management. Additional comments from the Education Department (October 1976) referred to the proposed on-the-job training activities in the technical ministries: it specifically pointed to the need for identifying institutional training needs before recruiting the technical assistance, so that each advisor's training responsibility could be clearly specified. The Agriculture Division had expressed at an early date (April 1976) the view that if TA was to be provided to the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), that component should be part of agriculture projects. In response to Programs' request for areas of technical assistance needs, the Division expressed the view that "the justification--rests with those who proposed it." 11. Between April and November 1976, the project preparation process was essentially driven by the perceived need to start preparing a number of projects for the lending program, at as early a date as possible and prefer- ably even before the start of the TA project. To this end, the Region proposed use of Project Preparation Facility funds for an early start of the project activitiea, but the proposal was rejected. 12. In the final formulation of the project, the Bank appeared to give highest priority to 'tangible' demonstrations of commitment on the part of the Borrower. These indicators included the early nomination a project coordinator and the timely recruitment of critical national project staff. The sense of urgency in implementing the project was reflected in the Programs Department's readiness to find "acceptable" the nomination by the Government of an expatriate for the position of Project Coordinator in order to get the project started (October 28, 1976). 13. The Bank insisted upon the establishment of special Advance Funds ('Regies d'Avance') for each of the technical agencies to ensure that they had funds for the travel and incidental costs of staff and advisors engaged in the identification of future projects and in the formulation of the subsequent Plan. The Bank rdlied on the expert advice of the MINEP Principal Advisor In proposing the creation of these Funds and it was not until the project was well under way that it was found that such Funds could only legitimately handle relatively small amounts (approx. $1,000)--clearly insufficient for the intended purposes. As late as two years after signature of the DCA, the Government, in clear violation of that Agreement, had still not established the Advance Funds for ministries other than MINEP (Supervision report July 15, 1979, para. 16). Indeed, the Government, through its Ministry of Finance, had taken the defensible position that all expenditures had to conform to administrative regulations, and that the Advance Fund formula was intended to circumvent these regulations. Moreover, by compelling ministries to function within the existing system, rather than by making a special system available to them for the purposes of this project -5- alone, the Government facilitated the medium-term integration of pro ect preparation functioni as part of the normal operations of these agencies. / Major Design Features 14. Institutional Strengthening. As a condition of effectiveness, the Bank required a Project Preparation Unit (Direction des Etudes et Projets - DEP) to be established in MINAG. This requirement seems to have reflected the Bank's desire to accelerate proj.ect preparation in the agriculture sector and the fact that MINAG was more responsive than other agencies. The record does not explain, however, why the Bank did not require other technical agencies to set up similar DEPs. 15. The Bank's expectations in the transport sector were significantly different: confronted with an existing number of projects with dubious rates of -zonomic return (e.g., the construction of a new rail-line and the status of the Yaounde-Douala corridor), the Bank initially provided transport economists under the Project to the Ministry of Transport and to MINEP. Although the regional Transport Division prepared terms of reference for a DEP in the Ministry of Transport, the proposal was not followed up. 16. From the start, training was -perceived by all parties to be a crucial element in project design, particularly its longer-term impact on strengthening institutional capacity in project preparation. The first formulation by the Programs Department mentions "a la carte training for managers." The formal Government request makes specific mention of scholar- ships for training staff in MINEP and the technical ministries to help over- come the shortage of qualified personnel ("... faiblesse numerique des cadres nationaux ayant la competence voulue"). Both of these concerns were confirmed by the Bank's education specialists (see para. 10 above). Mindful of the need for Cameroonian staff to participate in project activities, the DCA sought to ensure that the Borrower would provide incentives to local staff to participate in the project. 17. Project CoordinatIon Arrangements. Questions about project coordination emerged early in the preparation of the project: both the Bank Resident Representative and the Secretary-General of MINEP felt that if technical ministries were to develop a greater role in the identification and preparation of projects, some means had to be found for MINEP to support their initiative. The understaffed DP within that Ministry was seen to have management and leadership problems which would hinder emergence of a greater planning role for technical ministries. 3/ While agreeing that it would have been desirable to have studied all available options more in detail, the Region points out that this was one of the earliest attempts to deal with this kind of problem. The 'short cut' solution opted for is at least partially justified by the fatt that "normal operations" of the Cameroonian system still leave a lot to be desired and continue to hamper the project cycle. -6- 18. The Bank was anxious to see earlier action on the appointment of a project coordinator, since it wished to involve him in project preparation and negotiation. It was also hoped that an early appointment to the position would ensure that the project would be more rapidly staffed and could' make an early start on project preparation activities. A possible candidate for the posit.on was ident*fied during discussions between Bank staff and the expatriate principal advisor to MINEP. The Borrower included the identified candidate as a member of the negotiating team but did not officially name him to the position until shortly after signing. 19. In the meantime (December 1976), the same individual had been appointed to the directorship of the DP. The Bank therefore objected to his nomination on the grounds that the position required full-time attention, and that the head of the DP could not possibly have sufficient time for such additional responsibilities. The Bank's attempt to force the issue was seen by the borrower as an interference in its internal affairs; on the other hand the reluctance of the Borrower to nominate a full-time coordinator was perceived by the Bank as evidence of lack of commitment. Some of the subsequent problems of the project can be seen to have arisen from this basic lack of agreement on administrative arrangements. 20. As expected, there were no marked improvements in coordination until "increased delegation of authority on the part of the Project Coordinator" to one of this two Deputies took place (Supervision Report, July 15, 1979). The selection of the DP Director as head of the project unit effectively neutralized the potential effectiveness of the project for facilitating the development of technical agency capacities in project preparation. Achievement of the main institutional development objective of the project became as a result even less probable. II. IMPLEMENTATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS Difficulties in Project Start-Up 21. The lack of early agreement between the Bank and the Borrower on procedures for considering candidates, for interviewing them, and for the selection and contracting of project staff introduced considerable delays in project start-up. The Bank undertook to assist in the search for consultants "on Government request and at project cost." The Agriculture Project Management Unit was asked to support the Borrower in finding suitable candidates. It does not appear that the APMU had access to any unusual sources of potential candidates. Difficult under any circumstances, the recruitment of suitable candidates who are also available when needed can only occur with sufficient lead time. As it was, the fields of specializa- tion foy the seven technical advisors were known as early as mid-1976; by April 1977 the names of candidates for only two positions had been provided to the Borrower, both in MINAG. 22. Progress in filling the remaining five positions continued to be slow. The Senior Agricultural Economist did not assume his post until March -7- 1978 and, by July 1979, nearly two years after effectiveness, only four of the positions were filled. From the standpoint of the Borrower, Bank assis- tance in finding technical experts did not prove to be any more efficient and productive a process than if the task had been assigned to a specialized firm. In the evenc the Borrower was still obliged to contract with consul- tants, albeit reluctantly, in order to staff the project. 23. An alternative to Bank assistance in the recruitment process was available. In December 1975, a bilateral agency offered to provide a full TA team, but the offer was not seriously pursued by the Borrower. Overall Achievements 24. The audit agrees with the view expressed in the PCR that ... it is difficult to assess precisely the lasting impact of project activities" (para. 13). This is due in no small measure to the absence of agreed criteria for assessing the performance of sub-projects and the overall effectiveness of the project. The Project was perceived by the Programs Department as providing the Bank with the kind of "flexibility" it thought it might require in developing its dialogue with the Borrower: discussions over the use of such funds were perceived as opportunities to define future lend- ing programs. A& delays in start-up appeared to threaten the attainment of project objectives, the Bank found it necessary to remind the Government of the dependence of an important lending program upon the rapid implementation of the TA Project (Letter to MINEP, May 22, 1978). Disbursements 25. As indicated in the PCR (para. 10), disbursements were very slow under the project. By March 1979, at the halfway mark of the project, only 10 percent of the present total credit had been disbursed. By the end of 1980, at the original Closing Date, the proportion had risen to only 45 per- cent. Just before the final Closing Date there was an attempt to accelerate commitments and disburse the remaining balance of funds. In November 1983, the Resident Mission made detailed proposals to MINEP on the suggested use of the US$1.1 million undisbursed funds. By December 30, 1983 all project funds had been allocated in the following categories: training (less than 1%), studies and project preparation (55%), advisory services and recruitment (6%) for the TC II project (Credit 1168-CM) and office equipment and vehicles (38%) for four MINEP divisions scheduled to be the beneficiaries of the TC II project. 26. The disbursement experience clearly did not bear out early fears that the funds provided under the Credit would not be sufficient. In the first. Supervision Report (October 1977) it was thought that delays in implementation and inflation might deplete the credit prematurely and could require some form of "direct/indirect replenishment." In a later informal note regional staff thought that "... If the funds are as low as we guess, we should try to find some means of refinancing the project." Proposals included the use of UNDP funds for the water supply and urban sector work and the suggestion that projects to be appraised could repay the costs of related studies financed under the TA project. The fact that disbursements were so -8- much slower than expected can be attributed to the late arrival of technical advisors, their difficulties in securing official administrative and finan- cial support for their participation in the identification of new projects, and the relatively cumbersome reporting and requesting procedures for technical agencies under the project.4/ Studies and Project Pipeline 27. By mid-1979, with the Resident Mission preparing for a second TA project, supervision reports noted that three bankable projects were prepared in MINAG, the water supply feasibility study had been completed, and the urban sites and services study was underway. By the end of 1983 a total of 11 studies and consultancies had been completed (PCR, Annex 1); two of these were related to implementation of the training component and another one was an assessment of training needs in preparation of the second project. The PCR points to three loans as prepared under the Credit (para. 14). Although apparently useful for other purposes as well (para. 17), the record is not clear that the remaining studies and consultancies were also directly relevant to increasing the number of projects in the pipeline. It does appear, however, that the advisors in the agricultural sector were generally valued, both for their practical contributions (index of projects, develop- ment map) and their assistance in formulating policy for the next Plan (PCR, para. 16). Training 28. The early importance of training was attested by the fact that it accounted for 11 percent of funds approved under the Credit. Shortly after the start of project activities, it was estimated by the Resident Mission that thA component would account for 4 percent of total funds. By March 1983, during the second extension of the Closing Date for the project, disbursements for training accounted for only 2.6 percent of total funds, while the unallocated funds portion increased from 17 percent in 1976 to 28 percent in 1983. 29. Neither the Bank nor the Borrower were clear as to what elements, apart from the training of counterparts by the advisors, should be included as part of a training component. The matter was left up to the discretion of the technical agencies. Tangible results, in the form of implemented training components within MINAG and the Ministry of Equipment and Housing (MINER) led to a renewed interest in training in 1979. On August 24, 1979, the Bank reiterated its request that technical agencies consider their options for a training component, but in this instance provided the staff resources to assess the results achieved to date in MINAG and MINER. A consultant's study was not undertaken until 1981, as preparation for the second project, and its findings were not followed up for immediate use in the ongoing project. 4/ See Region's comment on para. 43. -9- 30. The training component in MINAG was developed solely through the initiative of that agency and without any assititance from the Bank. From the start, MINAG sought the involvement of a regional training institurion, the Pan African Institute for Development, in mounting a program of seminars for its staff. An assessment of training needs and the design of a staff train- ing and upgrading program was conducted in August 1978. However, a request by MINAG for assistance from the Bank, to contribute staff - time to the training program in the course of their visits to Cameroon, did not receive any response. 31. The training program in MINAG was- effectively. carried out but had limited impact. Between 1978 and 1981 the Ministry recruited and trained 24 new staff who, unfortunately, could not be maintained in permanent positions in the Ministry. The record is not clear as to whether counterparts were specifically assigned to advisors for the purposes of their on-the-job train- ing. The PCR states that this kind of training could not have been done in view of the advisors' involvement with 'urgent tasks' and problems that were not 'strictly related to their operational role' (para. 16). Although there are well-known difficulties involved in combining advisory and training roles, in this case it seems to have been a feasible approach that was not seriously considered. Had counterparts been assigned to advisors and their TORs written to reflect a 'training' role (as called for by the Bank's Education Department during PR review) the implementation of both the opera- tional and training components of the Project might have been more effective. 32. The training component in MINER was, as described in para. 15 of the PCR, "practical, innovative and useful." Its design came closest to the MINEP concept of training suitable staff by having them participate in actual planning and project preparation. The component consisted of teams of Cameroonian professionals developing a well-defined urban site under the supervision of consultants in charge of urban development studies in Yaounde and Douala. Participants in the exercise are reported to be still in the Ministry of Urbanism where they constitute effective interlocutors for the Bank as well as other donors.. 33. There was wide agreement both within and outside the Bank that the institutional development dimensions of the project would be enhanced by a training component. It was agreed in 1976 that a "training advisor," backed by consultants, would be -a useful element in giving impetus to this project objective. The UNDP Resident Mission also expected that a Bank-funded train- ing specialist would be backed up at a later point by a UNDP financed human resources specialist. It was even thought during PR review that the.duties of the training advisor were not sufficiently detailed, and his appointment was listed in August 1977 as one of the remaining project management tasks to be undertaken by the Borrower. It is therefore surprising that there was no subsequent reference to a training advisor in Bank documents, including the PCR. 34. The supervision reports make clear that, starting in September 1979, the training sub-project was the only element to be implemented on schedule and with tangible results. A possible explanation is that training - 10 - components were placed under technical ministries rather than MINEP manage- ment. MINAG had recruited 24 new junior staff by the end of the project. On its part, MINEH had fielded teams of urban planners to work under the super- vision of the consultants responsible for the urban sites and services study; however, unlike the MINAG, it had not done a staff inventory nor drawn a medium-to-long-term staffing and training plan. None of the other ministries took the initiative of defining their training needs or drew on available funds to start a staff development activity of their own. Institutional Improvements 35. The DEP in MINAG was created by Presidential decree at the same time as the Project Coordinating Unit at the MINEP, and as part of fulfilling conditionality. However, due to his late arrival, the principal advisor did not contribute to the proposals prepared by the MINAG DEP concerning its own organization and the establishment of a training program based on that work organization (training program proposal, MINAG, September 1, 1978, p. iii). This supports the conclusion of the PCR (para. 13) that the success of that unit can be attributed to the competence and personal commitment of its Director and his later relationship to the expatriate advisor. The PCR also details (paras. 16-17) the ways in which the work output of the unit was instrumental in shaping agricultural policy. 36. Although the PCR makes no reference to it, the input of advisors made available by the project to MINEH resulted in similar longer-term impact. The drafting of an Urban Plan in 1980 was expected to have a signif- icant impact on the preparation of the urban sector component for the next national Plan. As a result of their apparent success, DEPs acquired greater importance in the second project and the Ministry of Social Affairs was subsequently required to establish one as a condition of effectiveness. 37. Bank staff worked very closely with the Ministries of Energy and Mining, of Agriculture and of Transport in attempting to develop workplans for each sub-project. MINAG submitted its workplan to the Bank for review a year after effectiveness (May 1978) and two months before the principal advisor arrived in post. The involvement of Bank staff during supervision in the preparation of the Water and Sanitation Study was judged to be so useful that it was proposed as a model for the other sub-projects (Supervision Report, October 7, 1977). The relevant project division provided guidance in the course of field visits on the TOR for the study and on the selection of consultants. However, despite this initial good start, no subsequent work- plan or reports from the Ministry could be found in project files. III. FACTORS AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS Lack of Borrower Involvement 38. Apart from the relatively formal expressions of interest by MINEP (on February 9, 1976) and of MINAG (on March 12, 1976), there is no record of any substantive and conceptual contributions to project design by Government - 11 - agencies. MINEP formally requested a technical assistance project on April 20, 1976 along the lines suggested by the Programs Department of the Bank to its Resident Mission, MINEP also expressed misgivings on the coordination requirements for such a program. Indeed, as late as June 1976, a field report to Headquarters indicated that the Government had expressed interest in the project only after some hesitation ("periode de flottement7), indicat- ing that there were still doubts on the part of the Borrower, even at an advanced stage of preparation. 39. The Government's support for the central concept of the TA project's approach, i.e. the provision of advisors for a number of technical ministries, is best exemplified by its subsequent position that the project should more appropriately be termed a Project Preparation Fund ("Fonds de Preparation de Projets"). It was thought this would remove any "ambiguity" as to the objective of the project (Proces-Verbal, Reunion de Synthese, September 1978). The Government clearly would have preferred to use the 45 percent of project funds allocated to advisory services for project prepara- tion activities and related studies. The Bank believed that delays in signing the DCA were indicative of the Borrower's lack of commitment. The later explanation that these were due to the "absence from the country of the President" (as noted in PCR, para. 4) was less likely than the noted hesi- tancy at the levels of the Presidency and MINEP about the "... desirable status of the MINEP experts" (cable from Resident Mission to Bank February 7, 1977) and the problem of securing the agreement of a number of ministries. Subsequent delays in recruiting and contracting for the seven advisory posts had a significant impact on project progress but it is not clear that the Borrower can bear sole responsibility in the matter. 40. A number of events constituted early indications for the Bank of the weak "commitment" of the Borrower. This might have been more applicable to tLe instrumentalities of the project rather than to its objectives. A number of outstanding issues (the construction of a rail-line, a road between Yaounde and Douala and the status of a forestry project) may have contributed to poor Bank-Borrower communications. Moreover, there is no way of demon- strating that lack of commitment was unique to this project; it appears to have been only one symptom of a more generalized attitude toward the Bank and its approach to lending at that time. Inadequate Borrower Capacity 41. The Bank initially assumed that MINEP would be capable of support- ing the project logistically and administratively. In fact, as pointed out in the PCR (para. 9), administrative arrangements for project implementation worked very poorly. Starting in 1978, supervision reports repeatedly noted the lack of Government administrative support. The Borrower characterized this situation as due not to substantive disagreements but to a series of small administrative and communication details (PV Reunion de Synthese, September 19, 1978). There were apparently a sufficient number of these 'details' for the Borrower not to be able to comply with some of the covenants in the DCA. There is now widespread agreement that the long delays in decisions and documentary transmittals were manifestations of structural problems endemic to Cameroon, and not specific to this project. The Borrower - 12 - later rejected a Bank proposal (June 1982) to set up a financially autonomous Technical Cooperation Unit, responsible for recruitment, contracting and logistics of the technical assistance. The concept was rejected first for the TA project and later for the second project as well. The proposed project coordination unit design might have facilitated access of experts to support services, funds for travel and even to office space which were, according to the DCA, the clear responsibility of the Borrower (see PCR, para. 7). It is not clear, however, that the Unit would have improved the Borrower's capacity beyond its ability to deal with the immediate Bank- financed project. Design and Preparation 42. Design Problems. The project was designed as a MINEP support activity. The proposal to coordinate the project through MINEP was due essentially to the fact that the Programs Department of the Bank had principally entertained relations with that Ministry as part of its ongoing activities. There was, from the start, an underlying ambiguity as to the purpose of the project: was it to strengthen the Ministry's functions of interministerial coordination or to strengthen the technical ministries' periormance of their project identification and preparation activities?5/ 43. The ambiguities in the project's objectives and the relatively ad hoc procedures developed for the design of project components underscore the Bank's lack of knowledge of the Cameroon agencies' operational environ- ments.6/ The Bank did not undertake, as part of project preparation, to systematically assess the technical and institutional capabilities of agencies for which sub-projects were to be developed. The extent of knowl- edge by the Programs Department of the functioning of these agencies was limited to a technical survey which was conducted in April 1975, some information already available to the Resident Mission from UNDP sources, and information shared with the preparation teams by advisors at the Ministry of Planning. It is not clear from the record that the UNDP experience in managing a large technical assistance team was fed back into the Project design. 44. In retrospect, there were two obvious gaps in the Bank's knowledge of the Borrower's institutional environment. First, the Bank had mistakenly 5/ The Region notes that both these objectives were envisaged and were seen as complementary. The intent was to strengthen technical ministries which had expressed interest and at the same time, provide the coordination necessary to bring the technical ministries' proposals to fruition. 6/ The Region wishes to emphasize that more attempts than appear on the record were made to obtain Government input to project design. In the absence of interlocutors from whom we could obtain useful advice, an ad hoc solution was adopted to resolve the problem of cumbersome revorting and requesting procedures. As this report notes in para. 26, these procedures were a root cause of slower than expected disbursement under the project. - 13 - assumed that Advance Funds were legitimate financial instruments for sub- project purposes, and that the Ministry of Finance would approve their use by technical agencies. Thus even if experts had arrived in a more timely fashion, progress in achieving project objectives would still have been constrained by a shortage of funds. 45. Second, the Bank clearly overestimated the Borrower's administra- tive and financial capability to service the project. This was particularly evident in the delays involved in the processing of consultant contracts for studies and project preparation, in the approval of contracts for technical assistants, and in the provision of office space, support staff and living arrangements. Although the need for a coordination unit was recognized at an early date and incorporated in the design, its relationship to other units in the host Ministry and to the other technical agencies was not fully delin- eated prior to effectiveness. Moreover, proposals for a relatively more autonomous unit to facilitate implementation of the second project met with firm Government objections. 46. Lack of Focus on Institutional Development. Although the responsi- bility for management and implementation of the project was formally allocated to MINEP, the Bank still had the obligation to make sure that the Borrower had the capacity to fulfill its newly acquired responsibilities. Yet no institutional needs assessment was conducted nor any comprehensive effort undertaken to satisfy such needs in the course of implementation. 47. There is reason to question the design of a TA project which makes the smooth operation of inter-agency relationships wholly dependent on the involvement of a Project Coordinator. As the decision-making role of MINEP in financial and administrative matters was reinforced, the role of the DP was strengthened in substantive sectoral matters as well. The project design reinforced the existing centralized form of policy making and, according to the Bank sources, did not encourage "good communications between Government agencies ..." or "the willingness to delegate authority." Nor was it possible to adjust the project design so as to counteract the unintended impact of the appointment of the Director of the DP as Project Coordinator (see para. 19 above). 48. Attempts to aesign the training component occurred after the start of project activities rather than as part of project prcparation. As was previously pointed out the Bank was not wholly sensitive to the need for developing a training component to institutionalize the agencies' capacity for project preparation. However, neither was the Borrower fully cooperative in this regard: there appears to have been no response from the Government to a June 6, 1976 request for a "definition of needs in personnel training and the way to satisfy them in Cameroon and elsewhere." This remained the Bank's concern in October 1977 when the first Supervision report considered that "... although training is not expected to improve the implementation of project related activities in a major way during this project, this aspect should not be neglected. There is some hesitation as to what a training program, apart from the direct training of counterparts by advisors, should consist of. "The report recommended that the issue be studied by a short-term consultant, assisted by a Cameroonian training officer, as this - 14- was the "first training subproject." The study was done in 1981 in preparation for the Second Project. Recommendations for the appointment of a training advisor to the project were never fully incorporated in the design or acted upon at a later date. 49. The Bank, at an early stage in project identification (February 1976), had considered including a la carte training for managers involved in project and policy implementation and supervision. However, this aspect of the project was never fully developed and the specific needs of technical agencies were not defined either before submission of the President's Report or, with the exception of the MINAG, in the course of implementation. 50. The project did not address the issue of career incentives for newly recruited staff and as a result, the training and staff development program did not have the impact expected at the time of appraisal. The recruitment of new staff was not considered to be an important part of the project, although the initial project doc-umentation allowed for the appoint- ment of counterparts and the inclusion of financial incentives to elicit their participation in training. The record is not sufficiently detailed to assess the impact of advisory staff's on-the-job training. Such assessments are not made any easier in the absence of any formal definition of the specific functions of either the technical assistance or their immediate counterparts. 51. Arrangements for Coordination. Due to its understaffing, the role of the DP was so problematic that in initial discussions with the Ministry (in particular with the principal advisor at the Cabinet) the Bank felt it desirable for the Project Coordination Unit to be located at the Cabinet level and made accountable to the Secretary-General of MINEP. The rationale for this decision was that only in this way could inter-ministerial adminis- trative and procedural bottlenecks be easily resolved; moreover, the inter- ministerial flow of project information would be facilitated and the effort of technical agencies in the development of new investments would receive more tangible support. The Project Unit would perform similar inter-agency coordination functions as the DP and would improve a process which at that point left much to be desired. The location of the project unit increased the risk of it being considered in direct competition with the DP in the planning process. 52. The PCR traces failures in recordkeeping, accounting, project monitoring and reporting to "weak central coordination" (para. 20), and asserts that "it may have been a "structural design weakness" to locate the Project Coordination Unit in MINEP (para. 23). The intent of the initial design of the project was to reinforce the capacity of MINEP to coordinate the process of project identification and preparation in technical agencies. The design assumed that a coordination unit located within the Ministry would have the needed incentive to encourage project preparation activities it could not undertake on its own and which would facilitate the subsequent planning and programming functions of the Mini%try. The decision to locate the PCU outside of the DP as opposed to strengthening the latter to assume the new functions, or even opting for a duel approach, was in retrospect a serious error. The implicit assessment by the Bank of the DP was made - 15 - explicit: that it was not capable of undertaking the programming task even though formally charged with that responsibility. In not acting to strengthen that function within the DP, the Bank responded to immediate concerns with an ad hoc design rather than with a longer-term institutional development perspective. 53. The Ministry of Planning used the project as an instrument of control over the technical agency units responsible for project preparation, a purpose for which it was not intended. The net effect of the DP's assumption of administrative and financial as well as substantive functions in project coordination, was to centralize decision-making in project preparation rather than just emphasize the coordination of sub-project management. The absence of operational Advance Funds made it impossible for technical agencies to implement the workplans they had prepared, without seeking prior approval from MINEP, and to have access to funds withott direct approval from both the Project Coordination Unit and the Ministry of Finance. This arrangement made any project decision within each of the subprojects wholly dependent on the effectiveness of the PCU and its Coordinator. It should be noted, however, that MINEP could not draw additional funds into its own operational 'Project Preparation Fund' without Ministry of Finance oversight, so this situation was not specific to the technical agencies or this project. The Government repeatedly stated that the purpose of maintaining strict financial controls, and its refusal to deal with the project in an extra-administrative framework, was to facilitate the transition of technical agencies in assuming the costs associated with their new project functions. 54. Role and Selection of Consultants. There were a number of problems associated with the selection and recruitment of advisors (see paras. 21-22 above). The essential function of advisors in the technical agencies was not fully clarified during preparation. As a result, their effectiveness on the job was even more dependent than might otherwise be expected on the relation- ship they were able to develop with counterparts and on the Ministries' assessment of their operational usefulness. The absence of definite work- plans, including a definition of the advisors' responsibilities in the train- ing of Ministry personnel, makes the 'advisory services' component difficult to evaluate. Only two reports from advisors in MINAG and MINEH have remained as part of the record, and these are, perhaps not coincidentally, by the two advisors who were given the greatest degree of acceptance by the agencies in which they served. There were no interim or regular periodic reports by any of the other advisors in post. 55. The effectiveness of advisors might have been greater had technical supervision by the Bank not been so loose. An evaluation of advisors in MINAG by Projects staff (June 1981) found that one of them was "... used excessively for routine operative matters ... an extremely expensive adminis- trative assistant procedure." Earlier and more regular monitoring of the advisors' work programs would certainly have established greater account- ability as well as offered more opportunities for collaborative dialogue with the technical agencies. - 16 - 56. Unrealistic Expectations. On balance, the limited achievements of the first TA project can be attributed to the lack of Bank experience in preparing and supervising the implementation of a free-standing multi-sector technical assistance project. This was particularly manifest in the following areas: - The size of the credit. There is reason to believe, basee on the 25 percent of credit funds which were still unallocated one month prior to the third closing date (December 1983), that initial cost estimates were based on a misleading premise. It was assumed that resident experts would generate a markedly increased pipeline of bankable projects. The portion of the credit attributed to these services (45% in the President's Report) is indicative of the importance given to external TA in stimulating the national development planning process. However, the feasibility of the approach was not adequately tested during appraisal. -- Scheduling and complexity of project activities. The attainment of project objectives was dependent upon the early staffing of advisory positions and the rapid integration of experts in host institutions. However, the Bank overlooked its own President's Renort assessment--that recruitment of appropriate personnel might pose an obstacle to implementation. Nor was the Bank particularly helpful in the recruitment process. The Borrower had access through the APMU to the same type and quality of personnel as would have been accessible through private recruitment channels, and in some cases was dissatisfied with the quality and cost of candidates for advisory positions. Lack of agreement on contracting procedures and the resulting variations in the conditions of employment of contract personnel contributed to the general confusion as to their entitlements and the respective responsibilitids of the Bank. - Administrative Arrangements. The most likely reason for logistic and administrative confusion during implementation can be traced to the assumption by the Bank that such problems can be solved through personal interventions of the Project Coordinator, instead of defining the conditions of employment of experts beforehand. As a result, it was unclear in these instances who was in fact responsible for their housing and other services. Inadequate Supervision 57. The Bank provided some substantive support to the Borrower in the management of the project. Assistance was given in the definition of sectoral needs (Transport June 1976, Urban July 1977), in the review of terms of reference for studies (Water December 1977) and the drafting of TORs for a Planning and Coordinating Unit (Transport February 1978). Essentially, how- ever, staff actions were of a supervisory nature, intended to prod executing agencies into achieving their sub-projact objectives, and for the most part the Bank did not attempt to diagnose institutional weaknesses or propose measures for strengthening institutional capacity. - 17 - 58. The Programs Department had consulted the Projects divisions before presentation of the project document to the Loan Committee and to the Board. However, there had been no agreement at that time for any division of responsibilI.ties between them in the supervision of project activities. In fact, the first informal supervision of project progress was done at the sole initiative of the Resident Representative shortly before credit effectiveness in October 1977. Approximately 10 percent of his time was allocated to supervision of the project. The formal arrangement was established on December 12, 1977, a year after Board approval, and included the following provisions: (i) Programs would consult Projects at regular intervals on the scheduling of supervision work and agree on the timing and form of participation of Projects staff in Agriculture, Transport, Water Supply and Urban Development. (ii) In addition to ordinary monitoring functions, the Resident Mission would coordinate periodic supervision work in the field and produce progress reports which Programs would upgrade as supervision reports. (iii) Requests from the sub-projects went to the Resident Mission who would transmit them to Programs. 59. As the above provisions make clear, Programs intended to include Projects staff only when their presence was required for the supervision of the sub-projects. These guidelines do not shed any light on how Programs, in the absence of clear performance standards for the purpose of monitoring, would determine the need for Project staff involvement. Even as early as May 1978, project monitoring had deteriorated so far that a staff report to Programs management called attention to: "A matter that is not resolved and which is squarely the Bank'a responsibility [is] supervision of the projects. It is urgent that somebody do an audit of the progress of this project, i.e., such basic information as (1) how many experts, for how long, where and for how much; (2) studies financed and identified for financing, length of studies, carried out by whom, how much; (3) what is the balance of funds available for different project com- ponents ... One method of [arranging to update a status report] is to insist that supervision missions regularly include this project in their terms of reference for whatever other project they are supervising ... One problem the project has faced is lack of regular super- vision. Until such a system is established, I am reluctantly relying on [the principal MINAG advisor] to alert us to problems in the project ..." 60. Programs almost immediately requested the Resident Office to update its previous report, but it seemingly did not insist that Projects staff also monitor the Project on the occasion of their supervision of other projects in - 18 - Cameroon. The next formal supervision of the project did not occur until July 1979, and only then did it reflect the Government's view that training should become an immediate project priority. At that time the Education Division was brought in to "... evaluate- Government proposals for staff training ... and draw up a definite program for staff training that could be implemented relatively quickly" (mission TOR of August 24, 1979). It was not until 1981, when the need to staff a subsequent technical assistance project (Cameroon Technical Cooperation II) was felt, that other projects divisions were involved in assessing the performance of experts currently in post. 61. The project was supervised on the average of once a year between 1978 and 1983. Given the attendant difficulties in attaining the main objectives, there was a definite need for close monitoring of sub-project progress and for following up on an ever growing number of problems. The Bank and its Resident Representative found this task to be increasingly "difficult and frustrating." This was particularly the case as the second project got under way even before the problems of the first came under control. The early and close involvement of the Resident Representative was a particularly positive aspect of the TA project; however, by making him responsible for supervision, the Bank effectively abandoned the use of "non- involved" personnel in technical supervision. The personalization of the project could well have been one of the unintended results of a much too exclusive link to the Programs Department and insufficient input on the part of the projects divisions. IV. LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 62. The Cameroon First Technical assistance project was one of the early projects in this sector and in the Western Africa region. In the interim some lessons have been learned, even if not always applied in subsequent projects. The experience gained from these projects has been incorporated, starting in 1981, in the Operational Manual Statement (particularly Sections 2.28 and 4.00) which has been a useful tool in guiding the more recent process of project preparation and appraisal. Increased Borrower Collaboration 63. The most important lesson to be learned from this project is that the process of preparing technical assistance projects ought to be a more collaborative one between the Bank and the Borrower. The Bank should, in particular, ensure that the project meets the actual needs of the Borrower. The participating agencies on the Borrower's side and all the relevant Projects- divisions on the Bank's side should be involved in the preparation. The present project raises questions about the value of informal negotia- tions, over project design or other issues, with participants who cannot legitimately be considered Government representatives. The controversy surrounding the appointment of the Project Coordinator is an example of the risk of using expatriate advisors, or other officials peripheral to a Borrower's governmental process, in the design of a project. In later stages, it appears that joint Bank-Borrower reviews of pro4aect progress could - 19 - have helped to institutionalize the monitoring and follow-up of project activities by national officials. More Rigorous Project Preparation and Appraisal 64. Designed at a time when there were no formal guidelines regarding the identification and preparation of free-standing technical assistance projects, this project was prepared in a relatively ad hoc manner. The lesson to be learned here is that the Bank needs to apply standards to TA projects which are closer to the standards applied to other projects. The present project underscores the need for more detailed preparation of each of the components in a multi-sectoral TA project. Preparation and appraisal of all components, in time for their inclusion in the PR, would have taken into account the factors which became sources of difficulty during implementa- tion. Specifically, the design of TA projects should be based on an assess- ment of the institutional capabilities and needs of participating agencies. 65. The project points to the importance of the following issues, as addressed in guidelines subsequently made available in the Bank: -- The capacity of the Government to service the project: the Bank is currently one of only a few agencies that puts responsibility on the Borrower for recruiting and employing TA personnel. However, the Borrower's difficulties in fulfilling this obligation are not always acknowledged by the Bank. There is therefore a real need for the Borrower's, and all participating agencies', contribution to the administration of the project to be clearly specified. If necessary, measures should be proposed -to ensure that the "recipient's capability [be] strengthened or a central capability created to assist the recipient and related agencies. Alternative- ly the necessary administrative and logistics support may be obtained on a contractual basis" (OMS No. 4.00, para. 49); - Early preparation of project-related training components: these elements need to be fully prepared by the time of the loan negotia- tions at the latest (OMS No. 4.00, para. 48). In the case of on- the-job training activities, components should specify the role of advisors and include a detailed description of the positions which national staff will be trained to assume. The financial capacity of the Borrower to integrate any new staff as part of its civil service also needs to be examined at an early stage. -- Establish performance standards for each sub-project: a detailed schedule of expected substantive outputs should be associated with each sub-project and responsibilities assigned for their implement- ation. In the case of staff recruitment or the provision of administrative and logistic support, the respective obligations of the Bank and the Borrower should be jointly defined and their feasibility assessed prior to the start of project activities. An early agreement on performance standards would facilitate joint monitoring of project progress and the technical supervision of the implementation of subprojects. The definition of performance - 20 - standards can contribute to the establishment of realistic time- frames for completion of TA components and, in the case of advisory services, for the timely and orderly replacement of contracted assistants by civil servants. Follow-Up in Supervision 66. The minimal involvement of the Projects divisions in the course of the first TA project led to a review of the relationship for the second. More generally, the need for clearly defined responsibility for the oversight of TA projects led to the creation of a TA unit in the Region to assist with project preparation and with the backstopping of personnel contracts. Never- theless, the essential problems of managing TA remain: one is the absence of sufficiently experienced staff in the Regions to deal with the various aspects of project preparation and supervision, the other is the need to allocate management responsibility for what are diverse TA objectives. For example, the Programs Department may still be the most appropriate source for managing TA whose purpose is macro-economic policy development without specific sectoral allocations. Sector specific TA could, on the other hand, be more effectively managed by Project divisions. The allocation of funds for studies from a general TA Fund could be most usefully managed through a joint committee operating under detailed approval criteria. Increased Regional capability to prepare and supervise all aspects of TA is a sine qua non to increased Bank effectiveness in this area and to the closely related issues of institutional development and policy reform. Need to Focus on Institutional Development 67. One of the important lessons to be learned from this project is that TA might concurrently seek to achieve objectives in different time horizons, rather than aim at some to the exclusion of the rest. The choice is not one between institutional development objectives and operational support, but how to integrate both of them in a single project design. The following issues are of specific importance: - Strengthen Borrower's Capability to Manage a TA Project. This project had as its goal increasing the Borrower's capacity to add to the number of projects in the program pipeline; it is not evident in this instance that project designers established the necessary linkages between the need for an increased capability to identify and prepare projects, the additional resource represented by the presence of expatriate advisors and the Government's capability to manage and coordinate a TA project. However complex it may be to assess the Borrower's capability to manage this process, there may be no other realistic medium-term way of maximizing the use of available resources than to develop a more - 21 - permanent local organization to perform this function.7/ This effort would include the development of inter-agency linkages as well as the development of operational procedures and systems for the new functions. -- More Training for Developing Absorptive Capacity. The longer-term objectives of institutional development for the technical agencies are no less important than the shorter-term goal of a pipeline of new projects which may be beyond their capacity to absorb. Allowance for additional training should be incorporated in the design of TA projects, particularly in those situations where there is a demonstrable need for advisors. If it is neither feasible nor desirable to assign a training function to advisors, alternative forms of training and recruiting future agency staff should be developed. The measures taken by MINAG and by the MINEH in this regard represent good models of possible actions to be supported by the Bank. -- Focus Support on Organizational Units. The project was successful in supporting an effective organization in at least one instance: the establishment of a DEP in MINAG. There is some evidence that this was due to internal Ministry support for such a structure, as well as to the good working relationship between the DEP Director and the Principal Advisor to MINAG. The model was applied to the Ministry of Social Affairs under the second project but does not seem to have met with similar internal support and success. New Lessons To Be Learned 68. The pattern of Bank management as reflected in this project indicates a continuing need for qualitative improvement of TA project design and management. Some of the lessons of experience might have been identified at an earlier date had there been a more systematic process to evaluate project progress and incorporate these findings into the management of the project. The preparation and supervision of TA projects may benefit from the following: - Midpoint Project Evaluation. The Bank seems to have been engaged in a rapid roll-over of TA projects in Cameroon. The first project was barely underway and the problems of implementation not yet clearly understood when suggestions were already made that funds would be insufficient. In 1980, shortly before the first postpone- ment of the Closing Date, a Project Brief was circulated for a second project. This in turn had not yet fully gotten underway in December 1982 when the Bank was already planning the preparation and appraisal of the third project. Discussions between the Senior 7/ The Region points out that there may also be exceptions, as in this case, when the Bank is willing to take a risk. Had the Project Cocrdinator been effective, that risk could have paid off handsomely and the evaluation of the project's implementation been very different. - 22 - Vice President of the Bank and the Government as well as technical discussions ensued and by May 1983, the Bank was ready to submit a tentative list of project items for discussion with the Government. The rapid rate at Yhich these projects were being formulated did not allow Bank-Borrower experience with the ongoing project to guide the substance of subsequent technical assistance. Nor was it possible to assess the validity of the initial design in a rapidly evolving administrative and policy environment. It might have been useful in such a situation to undertake a mid-project evaluation so that the lessons from one project could be drawn and applied to the next phase of a technical assistance program. Such an evaluation would of course require that performance standards and criteria of project progress be established as part of the initial project design. -- Institutional Assessments. There seems to have been insufficient understanding by the Bank of the institutional dynamics of Cameroon's public sector, certainly insufficient as a guide to the process of preparation and appraisal. The absence of high level national input, as well as a detailed assessment of obstacles and constraints in the environment of each potential sub-project, further complicated the task of the Bank. It would not be necessary for TA activities to be held in abeyance while an overall package is developed which is consistent with an institutional development strategy. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to expect initial TA projects to be designed in such a manner that they will systematically yield the kind of experience and knowledge to be used subsequently in a broader strategy of institutional development.// 8/ While many of the recommendations and observations of this report are well-taken, the Region maintains that this project did yield useful experience and knowledge. It is arguable that at that time, there was no other way to learn anything definite than through this project. - 23 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 673-CM) February 15, 1985 Western Africa Regional Office 一夕7一 戶魚才伶二州以，斤 - 25 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 673-CM) 1. PROJECT CONTEXT, OBJECTIVES, AND CONTENT 1. Need for the Project. The first mention in Bank files of the possibility of a technical assistance projeit for Cameroon occurs towards the end of 1975. The need for such a project arose from three principal causes: (I) the technical ministries were weak and in practice not,able to carry out any significant development planning or study; (ii) the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning (MINEP), responsible for monitoring preparation of projects and interaction, with external donors, had limited capacity to evaluate investment proposals submitted by the technical ministries and put together a coherent development plan; and (III) funds for studies to set sectoral policies and develop appropriate long-term strategies were becoming increasingly scarce and there was a growing tendency for bilateral and UNDF funds to be used only on studies that led immediately into investment. From Identification to Effectiveness 2. The project was identified by various Bank missions to Cameroon and chiefly by two special economic missions which qisited the country in April and November 1975 to advise on preparation of the Fourth Plan (1977-81). In April 1976 the Government requested the Bank to finance a technical assistance project and subsequent preparation was undertaken with the assistance of Bank staff including staff of the Resident Mission in Cameroon. The project was appraised in August 1976 and negotiated in Washington in November 1976. 3. During negotiations, the Bank proposed that Govert ment undertake to consult with IDA on the appointment of the Project Coordinator (para. 6) and of the Director of the newly created Direction des Etudes at Projets (DEP) In the Minist;y of Agriculture. The Cameroon delegation strongly opposed this proposal. It was finally agreed that the Government would appoint a suitably qualified and experienced person to the post of Project Coordinator. It was also agreed that the DEP would be provided with qualified professional staff and its operations be periodically reviewed in consultation with IDA. It was also agreed at negotiations that the Government would rapidly open a Project special account ("Regie d1avance") to facilitate timely implementation of the subprojects (paras. 7 and 11), 4. The Credit of US$4.5 million equivalent was approved by, the Executive Directors under the Special Procedure in December 1976. Signing was delayed because the President of the Republic was absent from the capital and the necessary authorization for the Cameroon Ambassador to sign was not forthcoming until June 1977. Appointment the Project - 26 - Coordinator, the Director of the DEP, and the senior agricultural economist, which was a condition of credit effectiveness, was delayed and the Credit became effective only in November 1977. Project Description 5. The project as appraised comprised: (i) about 20 man-years of advisory support to selected ministries through the services of seven long-term technical assistants. These were: two transport economists, one in the Ministry of Transport and one in MINEP; an agricultural economist, a general agriculturalist and a financial analyst in the Ministry of Agriculture: and an urban development expert and an urban hydraulics engineer in units of the Ministries of Equipment and Housing and Mines and Energy involved in urban development; (ii) about 130 man-months of short-term consultancies for pre-investment and feasibility studies of priority projects for financing and special studies related to project or policy implementation in the sectors concerned by the project; (iii) about 60 man-months of short-term consultancies for training and other training activities; (iv) provision for additional local staff, vehicles and other project-related expenses. 6. The Credit Agreement called for the appointment of a Project Coordinator in MINEP. The role of the Coordinator was to be vital for successful attainment of project goals. He was to ensure timely and proper implementation of project activities and effective coordination between the various agencies involved in them. He was also to be responsible for appropriate channeling and use of Government and IDA funds, provision of qualified Cameroonian staff and adequate logistic and administrative support to the various technical teams. II. PROJECT IMLEMENTATION 7. Start-up. Project start-up was very slow. Of the seven advtsors envisaged at appraisal, only six were actually recruited and in these cases the process was subject to long delays. After they were recruited, numerous difficulties arose with respect to logistic and administrative matters. Project technical assistance staff found themselves hampered by issues surrounding the provision of housing, cars, visas, and tax status questions. The seventh of the advisers envisaged at appraisal, an hydraulics engineer for the Ministry of Mines and Energy, was never recruited. Because the "Regie d'avance" was set up for only a brief time and then closed again, cumbersome disbursement procedures had to be gone through for project and sub-project related expenses. This resulted in serious difficulties, most notably a very unsatisfactory working environment for the technical assistants who had practically no access to support services, to funds for travel to the field, or even to office space. In these conditions, it was difficult for them to pursue project objectives with vigor or enthusiasm and this added to existing controversy in some Government circles over the utility of the project and to the occasional resentment felt by some expatriate technical assistants long-established in Cameroon over the benefits enjoyed by project technical - 27 - assistants. These difficulties were exacerbated by a serious lack of coordination between ministries and departments concerned in the project. 8. Coordination. The Credit Agreement provision which called for establishment of a Project Coordination Unit under a Project Coordinator (para. 6) was complied with in a form but little of substance was done and all the supervision reports refer to "poor" or "weak" coordination of the project. The Project Coordinator, a senior official of MINEP, had regular full-time functions and had no incentive to spend time doing work which he may have perceived as largely irrelevant to his own Ministry (only one of the technical assistants was located in MINEP). Throughout project implementation he shoved himself reluctant to take operational decisions and provide the required leadership. The Bank's Resident Representative in Cameroon was required to step in on several occasions to resolve critical bottlenecks. 9. Project Administration. The administrative arrangements for project implementation worked very poorly. In practice, the coordination of project activities by MINEP meant that all paperwork, etc. had to go first from the technical ministries to the Project Coordinator who then was supposed to forward them to their intended recipient. In practice, the documents were either lost or delayed for long periods. Each time a new technical assistant (and sometimes short-term consultant) arrived, large amounts of time were lost over immigration formalities, residence permits and the like. This is a structural problem in Cameroon and does not apply to this project alone. It arises in part from the very poor communication between Government agencies and in part from an unwillingness to delegate authority. III. PROJECT COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS 10. Because of the delays in recruitment, start-up and implementation, disbursements were very slow under the Project. The Credit Agreement did not specify any allocations to be made by category. The Resident Mission established an unofficial schedule of allocations by category along the lines of the project content as anticipated at appraisal. Actual disbursement for advisory services, studies, and training, the three principal project components, varied considerably from these initial estimates due to modifications in project content in the light of chaning circumstances. Actual disbursements for long-term technical advisors amounted to US$2,211,000 (compared to an estimated US$1,678,000); for studies and training they amounted to US$1,672,000 (US$1,390,000 estimate). 11. The project closed on December 31, 1983, the closing date having been three times extended. However, subsequent disbursements from the balance of approximately US$1.2 million were authorized on commitments made before the final closing date for studies of a proposed rural development project, various equipment needs, and trainiag activities. - 28 - IV. PROJECT RESULTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 12. General. In the course of a supervision in May 1983, towards the end of the project, Cameroonian officials directly concerned with the project were interviewed by Bank staff. In general, they gave a positive evaluation of the long-term advisers' expertise and expressed satisfaction with their work and that done by the short-term consultants. Their only reservations were over the amount of on-tue-job training done in some instances (para. 15). 13. Institution Building. Long-term advisers were located in the Ministries of Agriculture, Transport, Economy and Planning, Equipment and Housing and Mining and Energy. Their overall performance was good but it is difficult to assess precisely the lasting impact of project activities. Establishment of the Direction des Etudes et Projets in the Ministry of Agriculture on a sound footing was the focus of the projects institution-building objectives. In this, it was successful. A large part of this success was due to the competence and personal commitment of the Director who was also able to develop an effective working relationship with his expatriate adviser and to motivate the nationals of his unit. The DEP is functioning as a national planning office for development of the agricultural sector and has taken some positive initiatives (paras. 16 and 17). On the other hand, its organization and working methods leave much to be desired, especially in personnel management policy, and it is not yet capable of preparing, appraising, or supervising projects alone without external assistance. One of the reasons is that of about 30 young professionals from DEP trained as part of project activities (para. 15), only one or two remain in the Ministry, the others having been attracted into the private or parastatal sectors. This, however, is the result of the administration's inability to provide career incentives, which the project could not address. To this extent, the impact of the project is probably not as great as was hoped at appraisal. 14. Project Preparation. The project objective of preparing a pipeline of projects suitable for Government, World Bank and other external financing has been achieved. The Second Western Province Rural Development Project (Loan No. 2406 for US$21.5 million equivalent) and the First Urban Project (Loan No. 2244 for US$20.0 million equivalent) were prepared under the project. The urban development expert financed under the technical assistance project made a very valuable contribution to identifying the principal problems of the sector and preparing the sectoral report. These activities in turn have provided useful input for the preparation of three more urban development projects which are in the Bank pipeline. One of the transport economists financed under the project prepared the technical assistance component of the ongoing Fourth Highways Project (Loar No. 926/Cr. No. 1723 for US$10.0 million equivalent). The project succeeded in establishing a core of national and expatriate 'interlocutors fully abreast of project and sector development to whom all donors could turn to obtain information and to discuss progress of project preparation and actions to - 29 - be taken. This capacity was not available before and greatly facilitated the expansion of donor lending to the sectors covered. 15. Training. A cycle of training seminars for all professional staff of DEP and professional staff of other Government agencies involved in development was designed and run by the Institut Panafricain de Dgveloppement (IPD) in Douala with project funds. The seminars were complemented by on-the-job training by the technical assistants and training sessions at the University in macro and micro-economics. The IPD training is consistently reported by participants and Bank staff to have been excellent. The training undertaken by the urban technical assistance component was also a positive element of the project. A contract extension agreement was reached with the U.K. consultants carrying out urban development studies of Yaoundi and Douala, whereby two teams each of eight to ten young Cameroonian professionals were fully integrated into the study team for a particular segment. The area was carefully chosen to be a representative microcosm of the full exercise and the training provided was practical, innovative and useful. In general, on-the-job training activities, as could be expected, suffered somewhat from the fact that the technical assistants' time was frequently taken up with urgent tasks and with problems that were not strictly related to their operational role (para. 9). 16. Planning and Programming. Xnder the project, a detailed inventory of the agricultural sector was carried out. The index of agricultural projects and the agricultural development map which were produced are used by donors, including the Bank, as a basic guide for assistance to the sector. Project staff also made a significant contribution to the preparation of the Fifth Plan (1982-86) and the policy orientation of this document reflects many strategy recommendations which the Bank supported, in particular with regard to the role of smallholders as opposed to State Enterprises in the agricultural sector. The DEP also carried out a prospective study of the agricultural sector up to the year 2000 which emphasises long-term issues of food production and labor. This study gave rise to others on foodcrops, seeds, coffee, cocoa, vegetables, prices, seed policy and fruit. The Government has subsequently taken policy decisions based on these studies which reflect a much more realistic set of objectives than did the Fourth Plan. These declarations of intent have been followed by a solid planning effort for realizing the objectives of the Plan and Government has drawn up a standard structure for the presentation of projects and of progress reports which is a useful management tool for ensuring that activities in the sector are compatible with the provisions of the Plan. 17. Studies. Project activities included various studies in addition to those connected with preparation of the Plan. A list of these studies is given in Annex 1. In the transport sector, a national study was done on traffic origin and destination: this kind of investigation is indispensable to establishing traffic flow patterns and coordination and preparation of appropriate roads investments. The most significant studies undertaken as part of the project concerned the agricultural sector: these included a - 30 - study of the rice-growing potential of low-lying forest areas, of cooperatives, the national trade in foodstuffs, extension systems and the role of young farmers. In many instances, project staff participated in studies initiated outside the project, for instance a study on the establishment or reorientation of large-scale agro-industrial projects. 18. Studies were also undertaken of selected Bank-financed projects under implementation in the agricultural sector. Accounting and management studies were carried out on behalf of SODECAO, the implementing agency for a cocoa project (Loan No. 1039 for US$6.5 million equivalent) and a need was identified for critical technical assistance which was subsequently recruited from those project funds. Mechanization and other technical studies were undertaken for SODERIM, the implementing agency of the Plaine des M'Bos project (Credit No. 672 for US$2.0 million equivalent) and project staff carried out the first audit of the ZAPI Integrated Rural Development project (Loan No. 776 for US$8.5 million equivalent). In some instances, support of this kind was also made available to non-Bank financed agricultural projects since these were typically most in need vf it. V. GOVERNMENT AND BANX PERFORMANCE 19. Undertakings and their Fulfillment. Lack of Government's counterpart contribution and non-compliance with key undertakings constituted serious impediments to the smooth implementation of the project. The "Regie d'avance" was never established in the technical ministries due to misunderstanding at appraisal of the Government administrative regulations governing these funds. While the Government did create a Project Coordinating Unit, that part of the Covenant relating to its maintenance was not complied with and the Unit's operational contribution is very questionable. Compliance with Covenant 4.04 of the Credit Agreement which concerned the provision of qualified support staff was only partial: some necessary support staff were never recruited because Government salaries were too low to attract appropriate candidates. Covenant 4.09 stipulated that Government would maintain adequate records of costs and progTess for each subproject: this was done in the Ministry of Agriculture but for other components compliance was inconsistent over time and among activities. 20. Record keeping, accounting, project monitoring and reporting by the Coordination Unit were inconsistent and generally unsatisfactory. All the above failures are traceable, at least in part, to weak central coordination of the project in MINEP. However, viewed in conjunction with the failure to provide adequate offices, transnort, and elements of the Government's "in kind" contribution, they can .1so be seen as a disturbing indication of Government's weak commitment to the project. 21. In retrospect it can be said that Bank performance was unsatisfactory in- three areas: (i) the evaluation of the Government's true commitment to the project; (ii) the drawing up of terms of reference for the long term advisers; and (iii) the arrangements made for supervision. - 31 - On the first point, it could be argued that this was the first operation of this kind in Cameroon. The Government had given verbal assurances that, while it did not want the Bank to approve nominations (a matter of national sovereignty), it wished the project to succeed. On the second, experience suggests that some of the difficulties encountered in project implementation could have been minimized if the technical assistants and consultants had had detailed terms of reference with agreed work programs and clearly defined progress monitoring procedures. Finally, with regard to supervision, the concerned Programs division had official responsibility for supervising the project but in practice, no single Programs officer had the time and technical expertise to do this alone. Help was sought from Projects divisions but this was quite ad hoc and did not include any formalized commitment of time and resoutces or clear lines for sharing responsibility. VI. CONCLUSIONS 22. Given the numerous problems encountered in implementing the project, the results it achieved are surprisingly good. Major project objectives of preparing a viable pipeline of future projects and of establishing the DEP on a sound footing were realized. The project was also successful in developing some Economic and Sector Work capacities for development planning in the Government. Overall, the performance and expertise of the long-term advisers was perceived by the Cameroonian authorities as good. The training financed under the project was evaluated positively by participants and by Bank staff. 23. The project was timely i1 that it responded to a real need at the time. The need was also a perceived one, but the project had to fit into such an awkward and ponderous administrative environment that it was not easy to reconcile its objectives with existing procedures. Experience with the project underlines the need for more explicit, agreed terms of reference and progress monitoring mechanisms with respect to the contribution of the technical advisers. With respect to Bank internal arrangements, it underlines the need for supervision provisions to be more flexible and adapted to the diversity and complexity of projects of this kind. In retrospect, it seems that it may have been a structural design weakness to locate the Project Coordination Unit in MINEP. There was a need for central leadership, and this would normally be a Plan function, but it was so poorly ansumed that the question arises as to whet'aer it would have been a more effective solution to have had the line ministries each responsible for coordination of their particular project components. -32- Annex 1 CAMEROON First Technical Assistance ?roject Studies and Consultancies Financed under the Project The following studies and consultancies for project preparation were financed under the project: 1. First Urban Development Project. 2. Second Water Supply Project. 3. Lekie-Mbam Agricultural Development Project: stidies included agricultural resources, migration, and erosion. 4. REVECAM II Rubber Project, including topographical studies. 5. Northern Province Rural Development Project: studies of agricultural components including feeder roads. Other Studies and Consultancies: 1. ZAPI East Agricultural Development Project: project audit. 2. DEP, Ministry of Agriculture: Staff training program. 3. Feeder roads maintenance study. 4. Training needs assessments and training evaluation for the Ministries of Planning, Mines and Energy, and Social Affairs and for the National Investment Corporation. 5. Department of Urban Development staff training program. 6. Feasibility study of a proposed Wood Processing Project (Sangmelima). The studies and consultancies listed above were generally of high quality according to senior officials in the Ministries concerned. Points to note are the following: . (a) Two of the consultancies were for preparation of projects to be financed by the Bank: Second Water Supply (Ln. No. 1753-CM for $21 million); Second HEVECAM rubber (Cr. No. 975-CM for $15 million); Northern Province Rural Development (Cr. No. 1075-CM for $12.5 million and Ln. No. 1919-CM for $25 million); and the Urban Development Project for $20 million. In the latter case, although the quality of the consultants' work was satisfactory, considerable delays were originally experienced in drafting TORa and appointing the consultants and the Director of Urban Affairs stated that in his opinion the consultants took too narrow a view of their assigned task and did not devote enough attention to the overall objectives of the study. (b) The Pan-African Institute for Development in Douala conducted a training program for Cameroonian staff of the Ministry of Agriculture. The program, which focused on agricultural sector planning and the project cycle, consisted of a series of three 3-week seminars and was judged useful both by the participants and by outside consultants. (c) Government expressed some dissatisfaction with phase I of the consultants' study for the proposed Sangmelima wood processing project. In the Government's view the market analysis was inadequate.