Documnt of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 6167 E90 JECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO MERNES AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 555-MOR) May 2, 1986 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their clcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System CURRENCY EQIVALENTS Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Dirham (DH) Currency Exchange Rate: Appraisal Year Average DH 4.14 Rate during Project Period 1976 DH 4.42 1977 DH 4.50 1978 DH 4.17 1979 DH 3.90 1980 DH 3.94 1981 DH 5.17 1982 DH 6.02 1983 DH 6.99 1984 DR 9.00 1985 (till February) DH 9.63 FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER January 1 - December 31 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ASAP - Association Syndicale Agricole Privil6gi&e (Agricultural Syndicates) CNCA - Caisse Nationale de Crfdit Agricole (National Agricultural Credit Bank) CT - Centre de Trpvaux (work center) DCFTT - Direction de Ia Conservation Fonciare et des Travaux Topographiques (Directorate of Land Conservation and Topographic works) DMVA - Direction de la Mise en Valeur Agriccle (Directorate of Agricultural Development) DPA - Direction Provinciale de 1'Agriculture (Provincial Directorate of Agriculture) DPAE - Direction de Ia Planification et des Affaires Economiques (Directorate of Planning & Economic Affairs) FAO/CP - Cooperative Programme of the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Bank ICB - International Competitive Bidding LCB - Local Competitive Bidding MARA - Ministare de 1'Agriculture et de la Rfforme Agraire (Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform) M&E - Monitoring and Evaluation MOF - Ministry of Finance NGB - Negotiated Bidding O&M - Operation and Maintenance SODEA - Societf de Developpement Agricole (Parastatal in charge of farms mainly oriented towards production of citrus, fruits and wine) SOGETA - Societ6 de Gestici des Terres Agricoles (Parastatal in charge of farms mainly oriented towards production of seeds) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK WastAngton, D.C. 2043! U.S.A. Office af Dwector-Genwal Operatian Evaluatkm May 2, 1986 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report - Morocco Meknes Agricultural Development Project (Credit 555-MOR) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report - Morocco Meknes Agricultural Development Project (Credit 555-MOR)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Departme-t. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. WoR OFFICI USE ONLY PROJECT PERF01ANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPKENT PROJECT (CREDIT 555-MOR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ............................... i Basic Data Sheet ................................................... 1 Evaluation Summary ............................................... tii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDU I. SUjMMARY .......................... 1 II. MAIN ISSUES ......C*.............. . .. ......... 3 A* General ............................................. 3 B. Land Consolidation ......... 4 C. Land Reform ....................................... 5 D. Sustainability .................... 6 Attachment: Government Comments ................................... 9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Background ........................ 17 II. Formulation of the Project ............................... 18 III. Implementation ...................... 19 IV. Agricultural Impact .................... 31 V. Institutional Performance and Development ................ 33 VI. Economic Evaluation ................................... 38 VII. Bank Performance ........-............................... 41 VIII. Conclusions and Lessons Learned .......................... 42 Annexes 1-7 Map - IBRD No. 11201 This document bas a rsrcted disuibuion and ay be ueed by recipients only in the perfonance of their offcial duties. Its conteots may not otherwise be disclosed without World ank authoriuation. PROJECT PERFORMAXCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO NEKNES AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 555-MOR) PREFACE This is a performance aadit of the Meknes Agricultural Development Project in Morocco for which Credit 555-MOR, in the amount of US$14.0 mil- lion, was approved in June 1975. The Credit was closed after a three-year extension on June 30, 1984. The final disbursement was made on February 11, 1985 and the remaining balance of US$7.46 million was cancelled the same day. The audit consists of a memorandum prepared by the Operations Eval- uation Department and a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated June 28, 1985. The PCR was prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office based on a country visit in May 1985 and a completion report prepared by the Borrower. The audit memorandum is based on a review of the Appraisal Report (No. 682-MOR) dated May 9, 1975, the President's Report (No. P-1638- MOR) of May 23, 1975 and the Credit Agreement dated June 11, 1975, and the PCR. Correspondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda contained in relevant Bank files have been reviewed and staff associated with the proj- ect have been interviewed. An ORD mission visited Morocco in November 1985. The mission held discussions with officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and the Provincial Agricultural Directorate at Meknes. A field trip to visit the project area was undertaken. The information obtained during the mission was used to test the validity of the conclusions of the PCR and permitted discussion of the project's institutional and development aspects. The audit finds that th. PCR covers adequately the project's salient features, its accomplishments and shortcomings, and the PPAM generally agrees with the conclusions. The issues discussed have been selected for this as well as other Bank-assisted projects dealing with issues of land consolidation and land reform. The draft audit report was sent to the Borrower for comments on January 13, 1986, and comments received have been appended to the report. The valuable assistance provided by the Government, the agencies involved and their staff, as well as the farmers met during the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged. - it - PROJECT PIRFORMAMCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO NMES AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CEDIT 55*110R) BASIC DATA SHET KEY PROJECT DATA Actual or Actual as 2 Appraisal Estimated of Appraisal estimate Actual estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 32.4 17.3 $3% Credit Amount (US$ million) 14.0 6.54 472 Amount Cancelled (US$ million) - 7.46 53% Date Board Approval 06107/75 06/07/75 Credit Agreement Date - 06/11/75 Date effectiveness 09/11/75 11/14/75 extension Date * 04/10/81 Completion Date 09/30/80 12/31/84 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) - * Closing Date 03/31/81 06/30/84 Economic Rate of Return (2) 24 11 Institutional Performance - Poor Agricultural Performance - Satisfactory STAFF INPUTS (man weeke) FY72 FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 Y83 FY84 FY85 TOTAL Appraisal - 24.1 69.7 - - - - - -- - - - ---93.8 Negotiatione - - - 6.9 - - - - - - -- - - - - - 6.9 Preparation .0 3.1 29.8 2.5 - - - - - --35.4 Supervision - - - .0 11.1 31.7 16.5 12.0 5.3 19.1 12.6 8.8 4.2 10.4 131.7 Total .0 3.1 53.9 79.1 11.1 *.7 16.5 12.0 5.3 19.1 12.6 8.8 4.2 10.4 267.8 CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 fY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 Appraisal Estimate (US$ million) 0.3 1.6 4.7 9.4 13.0 14.0 Actual (US$ million) - - - 0.1 0.3 1.0 2.1 2.8 4.2 5.7 6.5 Actual as I of Estimate - - - 1 2 7 li 20 30 41 47 Date of Final Disbursement February 1985 MISSION DATA Date No. of Mandays Specializations Performance Types of Mission (so./yr) Persons in Field Represented /a Ratinag /b Trend /c Problems /d Appraisal 06/74 5 126 Ag.ec,Ls,So,Rur Supervision 1 12/75 2 10 zc'Ag 2 2 P.M Supervision 2 06/76 2 14 Ag,Irr. 2 2 M Supervision 3 10/76 1 4 le 2 2 M,F Supervision 4 03/77 2 16 Ls.Ag 2 2 M,F Supervision 5 08/77 1 2 Ag 2 3 V.P Supervision 6 10/77 2 5 Ag.Ls 2 2 P.M Supervision 7 03/78 1 1 Ag 2 2 P.M.P Supervision 8 0/78 1 4 AS 2 2 P,F Supervision 9 10/78 2 8 Ag.Irr. 3 2 MF.T,P Supervision 10 04/79 2 8 Ag,lrr. 2 1 M,T,F Supervision 11 10/79 1 3 Ag 2 3 M,T,0 Supervision 12 05/80 2 9 Ag 2 1 M,T,0 Supervision 13 12/80 2 10 At.ASC 2 2 H,T.0 Supervision 14 03/81 3 8 Ag.Age,c 3 2 M,T,o Supervision 15 11/81 3 5 Ag.Ec. AgEc 3 2 M,T Supervision 16 07/82 2 5 Ag.MG8 2 2 M,T Supervision 17 01/83 2 6 Ag.Ec 2 2 H,F Supervisic . 18 10/83 2 6 Ag.9c 3 2 N'T Total 124 25 manweeks Completion 05/85 2 14 Nc Grand Total 264 53 manweeks OTHER PROJECT DATA Sorrower: Kingdom of Morroco Executing Agencies: Nekoesa Services Provinctaux (MARA) /a AG - Agriculturist; AgC * Agriculture Credit Specialist; Age Agricultural Economist; Irr Irrigation Engineer; e - Economist; M&E - Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist; la -* Livestock Specialist; So - Sociologist; Sur - Rural Engineer. lb 1 - Problem-free or minor problems; 2 * Moderate problems; and 3 - Major problems. 1 1 Improving; 2 * Stationary; and 3 - Deteriorating. F - Finascial; M - Managerial; P - Political; - Technicial; and - Other. - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 555-MOR) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction The potential for development of the Meknes area was examined as part of the Sebou Project Studies undertaken jointly by the Moroccan Govern- ment and UNDP/FAO in 1963-1968. The project was identified by an FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program mission in June 1972 and was prepared following a further Cooperative Program mission in 1973. The Bank appraiss' the project in June 1974. Objectives The objectives of the project were to increase agricultural produc- tion, particularly on land then cultivated by traditional methods, and to improve income distribution. Increases in production were expected to be achieved through (i) the creation of viable, well organized holdings and measures to limit future fragmentation; (ii) the strengthening of extension services and introduction of cooperative management to ensure that agricul- tural practices and inputs already developed are applied; and (iii) the pro- vision of agricultural infrastructure. Better income distribution was assumed to result through (i) distribution of land to the poorest members of the population; and (ii) higher returns resulting from improved agricultural practices. The project as appraised consisted of: (a) aerial photography of about 200,000 ha; (b) soil, topographic, cadastral, and socio-economic surveys on about 135,000 ha followed by preparation of plans for and implementation of a land reform program; (c) destoning of about 5,000 ha of cultivable land; (d) construction of about 160 km of earth access roads; (e) an irrigation program aiming at (a) rehabilitation of an existing 3,500 ha irrigation/drainage system and (b) establishing 600 ha of small irrigation schemes; - iv - (f) other constructions, including provision of water and storage facilities for cooperatives, offices and staff housing; (g) training and a study of collective lands in Morocco. Implementation Experience The project suffered implementation delays and underwent design changes during its execution. Reductions in public lands available for redistribution resulted in a reduction of the land reform component. The need for roads in the land consolidation component was underestimated and the project assisted in a construction program three times the original size. The irrigation rehabilitation component had to be reduced due to increasing demands on available water for human co..umption. Small scale irrigation had to be reduced in accordance with the limited scope of land reform. Results Because of its pilot nature, land consolidation had never been tried before in Morocco, the project was partly successful. It succeeded in the consolidation, destoning and road construction component but had little impact on land reform and improved operations of the cooperatives. Project experience demonstrated the economic viability of land consolidation and destoning of high potential but only extensively used land. In the project area shifts towards production of higher value crops are noticeable. The economic rate of return has been recalculated at 11.4%, down from the appraisal estimate of 14.8%. Sustainability Land consolidation and destoning have become attractive features not only to the Government but also to the farmers. Immediate plans for con- solidating about 60,000 ha during the next five years exist and plans are under preparation for a further 220,000 ha to be consolidated by 2005. Insufficient budgetary funds may jeopardize proper maintenance of project financed roads. Entrusting maintenance to village communities was a sound decision but this needs to be backed up by financial support. Findings and Lessons Land consolidation was found to be an economic undertaking. How- ever, Bank experience in providing proper guidance is limited and all aspects contributing to the economic justification have as yet not been fully analyzed. In the light of likely future land consolidation needs in the Mediterranean and Asian countries as well as possibilities of saving costs, preparation of working papers to provide appropriate guidelines would be warranted (PPAM, paras. 11-18; PCR, paras. 3.08-3.13, 5.06, 8.02). The project was too optimistic in expecting large scale transfer of state owned and managed farms to beneficiaries of land reform. The Government's reluctance to face possible losses of revenue, foreign exchange earnings as a consequence of this transfer was recognized at appraisal, but no covenants of the Credit Agreement compelled the authorities to surrender state lands. In the future it will be necessary to assess the consequences of temporary lower production following the transfer from high technology enterprises to smallholders (PPAM, paras. 19-24). Destoning operations are cost effective, relatively simple to implement and yield quick results. In addition to direct production benefits the destoning, being highly labor intensive, can provide sizeable employment opportunities (PCR, paras. 3.19-3.21, 8.04). - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM MOROCCO MENES AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 555-MOR) I. SUMMARY1/ 1. The Meknes Agriculture Development Project was the first Bank Group operation supporting rainfed agriculture in Morocco. The project's main objectives were to (a) increase agricultural production through the creation of holdings of viable size, the strengthening of extension services, the improvement of cooperative management, and the provision of agricultural infrastructure, particularly irrigation; and (b) to improve income distribu- tion in the project area by distributing land to the poorest members of the population and increase small farmers' incomes through adoption of improved agricultural practices. 2. The project luded: (a) a land redisuribution and consolidation program, which encompassed aerial photography, soil, topographic, cadastral and socio-economic surveys on about 135,00 ha, redistribution of 28,700 ha to small farmers and landless workers who would be grouped in cooperatives, and consolidation works; (b) a road construction program consisting of 160 km of earth access roads in the consolidated areas; (c) an irrigation program, consisting of (a) rehabilitation of an existing irrigation and drainage system on 3,500 ha and extension of the system over an additional 500 ha in the Bittit area; and (b) construction of small irrigrtion systems over 600 ha on newly established cooperatives; (d) a destoning operation on 5,000 ha of cultivable land; (e) other constructions, including provision of potable water and con- struction of storage facilities to serve the new cooperatives, con- struction of offices for project administration, and staff housing for extension agents; (f) a training program, in the form of in-service training for newly recruited agents and sessions on cooperative farm management; and (g) a national study of collective lands ir Morocco. 1/ Adapted from the PCR. - 2 - 3. The project experienced several implementation delays (which led to a 3-year extension of the original closing date) and underwent numerous design changes, attributable in large part to the pilot nature of the land- related components and to constraints which had emerged since appraisal. The components that underwent major changes were (a) land redistribution (agrar- ian reform), for which a significant reduction in land made available for that purpose led to a corresponding reduction of the program; (b) road con- struction, where the program was increased more than threefold (see PCR para. 3.14, confirmed by Borrower comments appended to the PPAM) and modified to include gravelling, so as to provide an adequate access network to consol- idated areas; (c) the irrigation program in the Bittit area, which was scaled down because of an unforeseen decrease in water availability; (d) the small- scale irrigation program, which was reduced as a result of the changes in the agrarian reform program for the cooperatives and modified to include irriga- tion rehabilitation of five small traditional schemes not foreseen at apprai- sal. The economic viability of the components affected by design changes was reassessed by the Bank in 1981, prior to agreeing to the changes. Because of the net impact of the design changes introduced and due to the sharp appreci- ation of the U.S. dollar vis-A-vis the Moroccan currency, and despite signif- icant delays in implementation, total project costs were lower than foreseen at appraisal, and more than 50% of the credit amount remained undisbursed and had to be cancelled. 4. Given its pilot nature, the project was modestly successful in cer- tain components while it failed to achieve useful results in others. Its history was one of trial and error and of learning from experience, with some components having succeeded beyond expectations and others having largely failed. The project's reestimated rate of return, although lower than expected at appraisal, mainly because of the delays in implementation, remains acceptable (11.4%). The two major accomplishments of the project were the land consolidation and destoning components. Project experience shows that land consolidation by itself is technically feasible and economi- cally viable (ERR of 14.8%) in the high rainfall areas and that its impact on agricultural development through improving the access to all farms through providing incentives to invest (sense of security resulting from official fixation of farm boundaries, issuance of land titles, easier access to short and long term credit), and through reducing land fragmentation, is substan- tial. In the consolidated areas major shifts in cropping patterns towards high-value market-oriented production have taken place. In addition, rele- vant factors and criteria to be taken into account for future land consolida- tion programs are now much better known. 5. Destoning is the other component that has been successful and proved economically justified in the project. Beneficiaries of destoning operations have undertaken substantial additional improvemeLts on their land (including well development) and cropping intensity has reached levels comparable to those of traditional agricultural lands. The destoning program also had a sizeable demonstration effect, with farmers outside the project area beginning to undertake similar destoning works without Government's assistance. Finally, the destoning component has provided important employment opportunities during its execution (estimated by the audit at 5,500 man-years). The success of the operation is attributable to the high - 3 - potential of the land treated and to the fact that most beneficiaries were well motivated private farmers. Its replication in other rainfed projects with similar conditions can now be considered. 6. The major conceptual failure of the project was linking the agrar- ian reform and land consolidation programs. The basic idea was to establish larger more viable holdings on private land as well as on collective lands. This was to be achieved through allocating farmers, including rightholders of collective land, viable lots in agrarian reform cooperatives to be estab- lished on existing State lands. These beneficiaries were in turn required to relinquish their rights to their "uneconomic" sized lands or their share in the collectives. These relinquished lands or shares in collectives would then become available for redistribution to other farmers or rightholders for creating larger holdings. 7. The major reason for the program's failure was the requirement under the Agrarian Reform law for the constitution of production cooperatives on redistributed 3tate lands leading to the exclusion of individual farming. The constraints associated with collective farming have clearly discouraged private farmers from joining despite promises of larger sized holdings. The concept of including a pool of state lands in a consolidation program in order to increase average farm sizes probably remains valid assuming partici- pation of beneficiaries would require that State land be redistributed directly to individual farmers. This would, however, necessitate changes in the Agrarian Reform laws. Since historically these laws have been linked to the decolonization process the time has now come to reassess the situation and introduce necessary changes. 8. Lessons learned led to changes during the implementation of the project. In the second district (Sebag Aloun), the land consolidation com- ponent was carried out separately and the creation of production cooperatives on State lands was finally ruled out. The scaling down of the agrarian reform component led to most of the design changes that took place in the other components (small irrigation, infrastructure, etc.) and largely explains the process of continuous adjustment in project implementation. This flexibility was essential to the success of this pilot operation. II. MAIN ISSUES A. General 9. The project concept was changed substantially during project imple- mentation. The focus shifted from land reform to land consolidation. By concentrating on land consolidation, with full Bank support, the project started an activity which had not been financed by the Bank before. It was also an entirely new activity for the Moroccan authorities and both the Bank, as well as the Government, could draw valuable lessons from project experi- ence. 10. Reservations voiced about the feasibility of, and the Government's interest in, land reform involving division and redistribution of large estates managed by two parastatal groups were overruled by management and land reform remained the centerpiece of the project. Although it was clear from the onset that Government cooperation would not be forthcoming on the redistribution issue, no stipulations in this regard were included in the Credit Agreement. While supervision missions kept on urging the Government to surrender state-owned plantations/land to small farmers, authorities did not find any covenants in the Credit Agreement that would oblige them to do sO. B. Land Consolidation 11. A primary concern of the project as appraised related to the con- solidation of lands to be redistributed through the agrarian reform. Land of the smallholders was quite fragmented prior to the project and often without direct access. To r%jach their fields some farmers had to pass over land owned and cultivated by other smallholders. Crossing over newly seeded or not yet harvested fields led to friction and extended litigation. 12. The number of plots in the project area was reduced from 5,500 to 3,638 with smaller plots, below 2 ha, reduced from 3,774 to 2,164 (see PCR para. 3.08). The total area involved amounted to about 36,000 ha before land consolidation started .2/ 13. It was the first Bank involvement in land consolidation and there- fore guidance provided was limited. Although land consolidation has, and also will become, an important issue in the Mediterranean as well as in South and East Asia, there have not been any land consolidation working papers issued. Discussion and preparation would be worthwhile considering possi- bilities of cost savings - as demonstrated by this project - and by likely benefits to be obtained. 14. The project had employed the services of a Spanish consulting firm to assist in the land consolidation operations. The consultants did an excellent job but some questions can be raised about the cost effectiveness of some items. This applies especially to the cost of roads. Roads serving the individual plots have a width of 7 m and those connecting land consolida- tion blocks 10 m. In the audit's view this seems to be excessive, not only because of the cost involved, but also in light of valuable land lost. Com- parable roads in Europe barely exceed 5 m. If the use of wider machinery (combination harvesters) is envisaged, bypasses at set intervals would be more economic. 15. Costs would be saved, and this has already been recognised by the Ministry, through greater farmer involvement in assessing differences in soil quality. By comparing and ranking soil quality of fields in relation to test points established and evaluated by pedologists, costs can be reduced. Com- bination or advance planning of field destoning - a highly successful project subcomponent could also contribute to savings. 2/ The area after land consolidation is actually smaller because land has been lost to road construction. - 5 - 16. What is still needed is appropriate legislation which would halt future attempts of land fragmentation especially in cases of estate execu- tion. 17. Some more consideration needs to be given to the economic evalua- tion of land consolidation projects. The PCR in its analysis (Annex V, Appendix 1) bases the economic justification on two factors: (i) cost sav- ings in mechanized operations; and (ii) the net gain of arable land. In the audit's view the second point, net gain of arable land, should be challenged in light of PCR statements made in the table of para. 3.08 which shows the consolidated area to be 35,567 ha, down from the pre-project area of 36,024 ha. The difference has been explained to come from land used for road con- struction. 18. However, there are several other benefits, albeit not all quantifi- able, which should be studied. These additional benefits would come from: (i) easier and lower cost transport from fields to markets - especially important in case of high value vegetable or fruit production; (ii) time savings since prior to land consolidation some farmers had to carry off their harvest by hand from their enclave fields to the nearest road; (iii) time lose to ext-4ded litigation, quarrels with neighbors because of ill-defined plot bordeis; (iv) easier access to credit due to proper land registration; and (v) easier expansion of overcrowded villages due to clear titlis to land. C. Land Reform 19. From files and discussions with Project staff, it became obvious that the Government of Morocco (GOM) had entirely different perceptions about the pace and lands to be involved in land reform. However, the correct assessment of the situation was overruled by Program's staff who insisted on the project's continuous focus on land reform. However, no stipulations were introduced in the Credit Agreement compelling GOM to surrender lands of the parastatals SOGETA and SODEA for land reform. During project supervision GOM correctly pointed to the absence of covenants when pressure increased to expand the land reform component. 20. While the basic consideration of the project's land reform com- ponent was sound, i.e., relieving the pressure of too many farmers having rights and access to communally-owned land on the one hand and establishing new holdings by using at least partly state land on the other, some aspects did not receive the required attention. First, the justified concern of GOM that a transfer of highly productive and in its view properly managed farms to smallholders of an unknown standard would lead to a drop in production; and second, the unresolved question of what to do with redundant labor from the state farms.3/ 3/ The Borrower notes that this would not have been a problem as these laborers would have had priority in the land distribution (see Attachment). - 6 - 21. Although SOGETA and SODEA together farm a very small proportion of Morocco's lands (SOGETA 95,000 ha and SODEA 56,800 ha), their contribution to the economy and to the export sector is most important. SOGETA produces about 25,000 t of cereal seeds covering about 40 percent of the country's needs. In addition it produces 1,200 t of leguminous, 800 t of sunflower and 1,200 t of potato seeds. In regard to sunflower seeds it covers 100 percent of Morocco's requirements. In addition it delivers 30,000 t of citrus, 11,000 t of other fruit and other agricultural produce. The value of its exports is estimated to be around US$300 million. 22. SODEA, with its emphasis on fruit production, accounts for about 45 percent of the national citrus production. In addition to citrus (264,000 t at the time of appraisal), it produces grapes (93,000 t for wine and 4,400 t table grapes), deciduous fruits (15,860 t), and almonds (360 t). Other out- put included 12,300 t cereals, 27,000 t sugar beet, 690 t cotton and 3,600 t vegetables. 23. This production would not have been assured by transferring lands to smallholders, especially through production cooperatives which had and still have the same problems as all these collective farms found in other countries4/: poor management and excessively large numbers of members/ workers for fully mechanized farms. 24. Furthermore a conflict of interest was at the base of the land reform idea. By addressing the small farmer, members of the rural poor, through giving them land to establish viable holdings, the fate of the SOGETA/SODEA labor force became an issue. SOGETA employs a permanent labor force of about 1,500 and provides 1.8 million mandays of seasonal employ- ment. In addition it employs abut 400 managerial staff, of which 70 are academically trained agriculturists, veterinarians, etc. SOGETA provides incomes to a labor force of about 4,470 permanent workers and about 1,000 managerial/advisory staff. 25. If implemented as appraised the project would have relieved press- ure on collective lands, 6ettled and improved living conditions of some poor smallholders but on the other hand increased the number of unemployed.5/ D. Sustainability 26. The Government as well as the farmers are aware of the benefits of land consolidation and destoning of fields. Land consolidation of about 60,000 ha is planned in several provinces and should be completed within the next five to six years and another 220,000 ha are expected to be consolidated by 2005. Destoning is continuing and financing of this operation is assured through available agricultural credit funds. 4/ See also Portugal Agricultural and Fisheries Credit Project (Loan 1603), OED report under preparation. 5/ The Borrower disagrees (see footnote 3 and Attachment). 27. maintenance of roads remains at this time an open issue. While the organization of maintenance, i.e., making village communities responsible, is sound and while equipment has been procured, recurrent costs have been inadequate due to a prolonged budget crisis. The roads are still in good shape but will require some regrading and filling of potholes in the near future. -4s às -9- translation Attachment Mr. Yukinori Watanabe Page 1 Director, OED February 20, 1986 "WouLd Like to inform you that comments from Meknes DPA reLative to the PPAR have been transmitted to MARA who wiLL send you a synthesis of aLL the comments received from DPA, DPV and DPAE." ProvinciaL Director of AgricuLture Meknes IFRANE Signed A. Kabbaj - 10 - Attachment Page 2 F-797/86 April 15, 1986 French (Morocco) OEDDI DRJB:cc Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Directorate of Plant Production Rabat, March 24, 1986 The Director Operations Evaluation Department World Bank Washington, DC Dear Sir: Subject: Performance Audit Report on Meknes Agricultural Development Project (Credit 555-MOR) Your ref: Communication of January 13, 1986 In response to your abovementioned communication, I have the honor to set out below my observations regarding the Performance Audit Report on the El Hajeb project. While the document is consistent in content with the completion report of May 1985 drawn up by the relevant departments of this Ministry, and although it provides good coverage of the major aspects of the project, its outcomes, the conclusions to be drawn from it, and the problems encountered during its implementation, I nevertheless see the need for certain changes: 1. The only basis available for comparing expectations and achievements was the Appraisal Report. Evaluation of the success of the main components would have been better had account been taken of the improvements in project design made during the execution process. 1.1. Regarding the roads component, for instance, the PPAM refers to its having tripled in size. Cetainly, the original program calling for 160 km of earth roads, to provide the 160 cooperatives to be set up through the project with access to the general road system, was not carried out, but neither had its replacement with a total of 736 km of roads built to allow access to newly created farm lots been envisaged at appraisal. (V. para. 4 of the PPAM Summary and para. 3.14 of the PCR.) * audit note In general achievements will have to be compared with original objectives, although due account is given to changes introduced during implementation. -11 - Attachment Page 3 1.2. The PCR implies (para. 3.08) that there were originally no specific targets and no specific program for land consolidation. Such a program was envisaged, however, involving 70,000 ha in the districts of Dir, Seba Aioune, Ain Taoujdate and Tizguit; in the end, constraints in the form of improvements (irrigation, plantings, etc.), and non-distribution of certain areas of state land controlled by government agencies, meant that the program extended to only 36,000 ha. Land consolidation program objectives are in fact enumerated in para. 3.09 of the PCR. 1.3. There are several instances of errors in interpreting Morocco's agrarian reform legislation: - Contrary to statements made in paras. 3.07 and 5.07 of the PCR, there is no legislation requiring land reform grantees to set up production cooperatives. - Despite the views given in paras. 21, 24, and 25 of the PPAM Different Summary, distribution of state lands by the government agencies riewpoint will not increase the number of unemployed, since workers on moted. state farms scheduled for distribution have priority access to land reform. - The PCR (para. 3.05) gives as one of the reasons for the creation of production cooperatives the fact that distribution of individual lots would tempt grantees to sell off their holdings for housing developments. It should be noted, however, that the land reform legislation prohibits such sales, and that the lots are anyhow untransferrable. - The term "production cooperative" appears with great frequency as a synonym for land reform. It should be understood, however, that the land reform involves three types of cooperative: service (59%), mixed (35%), and production (6%). The creation of three production cooperatives in the Dir district was exceptional, necessary because the areas subdivided are used for the multiplication of cereal seeds, an operation requiring considerable experience on the part of grantee farmers. 1.4. Land consolidation and agrarian reform: Linkage of these two processes was requested by the Bank during loan negotiations (PCR, para. 3.02; PPAM Summary, para. 6). It should be noted, however, that it was not the compulsory creation of production cooperatives which reduced the size of this program, as stated in the PPAM Summary (pp.4-6); the inclusion of Melk made very little difference, given the gap between projections and achievements. - 12 - Attachment Page 4 2. Itemized Observations 2.1. Memorandum: Necessary PPAR, page vi: Specify that the consolidation is on a village basis. adjustments made if PPAM, para. 2: Mention that the initial program included cadastral they were and soil studies on 135,000 ha and scheduled 70,000 ha needed. for consolidation. PPAM, para. 5: The figure of 5,500 man-years for destoning has yet to be verified. PPAM, para. 6: As far "uneconomic" plot size is concerned, it should be noted that the regulations governing consolidation include provision designed to prevent fragmentation. PPAM, para. 21: Specify that the question here is one of seed production and not total production. 2.2. Completion Report: para. 3.10: In the Sebag Aioune district, there were six not seven, grades of soil in the land classification system applied. The figures on grievances in the Dir and Sebat A'oune districts are of interest: Number of Area Total Grievances small- (ha) grievances resolved holders Number % N mber % Dir 2,374 27,000 477 20 266 12 Seba& Kioune 2,505 8,300 742 30 409 16 Contrary to what the Report states, grievances were more numerous in Sebad AMoune than Dir. Rowever, the operation proceeded more smoothly in Sebaf Aioune. The higher number of grievances there was due to a much higher degree of fragmentation of the farms and to irrigation. para. 3.27: The number of trainees is 112, not 12. - 13 - Attachment Page 5 para. 4.03: The Report does not mention small- and medium-scale irrigation systems among the achievements of the project. para. 5.03: Although the Report asserts that the exact purpose of the Project Implementation Committee remained unclear, it is enough to go back over the Committee's activities throughout the project execution process to see the arbitrary nature of this statement. Its purpose was coordination of the various agencies involved in the project. The minutes of its meetings show clearly the importance of the questions it dealt with and the value of the work it did. For The Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform /s/ Rami Yahyaoui Abdellatif Director, Plant Production _／タ戸一 ノ谷1戸タG多んぐ (1707E) - 15 ENGDOM OF MOROCCO bffJa= AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Loon 555-MOR) coieLEnoN REPORT June 28, 1985 驢 갹 & 차 l 騙 뉼 놀 폭 17 - KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMM PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LBACKGROUND 1.01 The project area is located southeast of Mekn6s and extends over about 170,000 ha comprising the Districts of Dir, Sebal Moun. gin Taoujdate and Tisguit. The land is gently rolling with local rocky outcrops. The plains (totalling about 100,000 ha) are bordered on the south by a steep escarpment with undulating topography. South of the escarpment in the mountainous region of tit Causse with an area of around 10,000 ha. Great soil variability with regard to depth and stoniness exists. The climate is Mediterranean with winter rains and cool temperatures. Precipitation during the summer is relatively unimportant. Average annual rainfall is about 450 mm to 625 ow in the plains and 19100 mm in the Causse. Several streams traverse the project area. A phreatic aquifer lies underneath the plains and is already exploited through several wells. A deep aquifer exists which is currently being tapped to augment the water supply for Meknbs town. At the time of appraisal, the population was estimated at 70,,300 or 12,,650 families In the project area, 85% of which had incomes below one-third of the national average. 90% derived all or a significant part of their livelihood from agriculture. 1.02 Prior to the project, the Bank Group had financed six projects in the icultural sector in Morocco. Four of these concerned irrigation development - Sidi Slimane Irrigation Project (FY65), comprising repair and improvement of certain hydraulic structures; Sebou I (FY69), providing for the construction of the Idriss I Dam, irrigation of 38.300 ha, improvement of irrigation on 50,000 ha and of rainfed agriculture on 26,700 ha; Sebou II (FY74) concerning agro-industrial facilities and flood protection worksg later modified to exclude most of the flood protection works and to provide infrastructure and equipment for a National Sugarcane Center and several extension centers* and Souss Groundwater Project (FY75) providing for the development of sp;inkler irrigation on 6,000 ha and improvement of gravity irrigation on 1,000 ha. All of these have been completed. The other two projects concerned Agricultural Credit (CNCA I in FY66 and CKCA II in FY72). Both of these have also been completed. Since the present project became effective, the Bank group has financed three irrigation projects-Doukkala I (FY76) Doukkala II (FY77), and Small and Medium Scale Irrigation (FY83); three agricultural credit projects (FY77, FY79 and FY84)); four agricultural development projects focussing on rainfed agriculture-Fes-Karia-Tissa (FY79), Ioukkos (FY80), Middle Atlas (FY82) and Oulmes-Rommani (FY83); a Vegetable Production and Marketing Project (FYSO)- a Forestry Project (FY82); and an Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loan (FY85). - 18 - II. FORMULATION OF THE PROJECT 2.01 The Third Plan (1973-77) a&.- the beginning of a shift away from irrigation development towards rainfed agriculture development. In addition, the Government's emphasis on income distribution influenced Bank lending strategy in Morocco, with increased shares devoted to agriculture, education and urbanization. The small size and fragmentation of holdings and complex traditional tenure systems, frequently involving joint ownership, were thought to be major obstacles to improving agricultural productivity. By the time of the project, the Government had already taken various measures to overcome these problems: a comprehensive legislation on land consolidation was issued in 1962 to be used primarily in the newly developed irrigated areas, an Agricultural Investment Code was enacted in 1969, enabling the Government to carry out major infrastructural investments in the irrigated areas and land previously held by foreigners was acquired by the Government for distribution to the rural poor (Agrarian Reform laws of 1965-66). The legislation as a whole was designed to ensure that changes in the tenure system did not lead to declines in produc%ivity. The present project originated during the Third Plan and was the fi,st Bank involvement in rainfed agricultural development in Morocco. It was prepared by FAO/CP personnel for the Government. Proleet Objeetives and Desorlption 2.02 The objectives of the project were to increase agricultural production, particularly on land cultivated by traditional methods, and to improve income distribution. Increases in production would be achieved through: (a) the creation of viable, well-organized holdings; (b) the strengthening of extension services and the introduction of cooperative management to ensure that agricultural practices and inputs already developed are applied; and (c) the provision of agricultural infrastructure. Better income distribution would be achieved by: (a) distribution of land to the poorest members of the population, and (b) higher incomes to poor farmers resulting from improved agricultural practices. 2.03 At appraisal, the major components of the project were as follows: (a) Land Consolidation and Redistribution - aerial photography of 200,000 ha, soil, topographic, cadastral and socio-economic surveys on 135,000 ha, and provision of consultants' services to assist in the above activities; (b) Roads - construction of 160 km of earth access roads in the consolidated areas; (c) Irrigation - rehabilitation of the existing irrigation and drainage system on 3,500 ha and extension of the system over an additional 500 ha in the Bittit area and construction of small irrigation system over 600 ha on newly established cooperatives; (d) Destoning- on 5,000 ha of cultivable land; - 19 - (e) ther Construction - provision of potable water and construction of storage facilities to serve the new cooperatives and construction of offices for project administration and staff housing for extension agents; (f) Training - in-service training of newly recruited extension agents; and (g) Studies - in addition to those involved in (a), a National Study of Collective Lands. 2.04 The primary responsibility for project execution was to be in the hands of Meknis Provincial Services (SP)-" of the Ministry of Agriculture (MARA). This unit was to be reorganized and staffed accordingly to enable effective project execution. The loan was expected to disburse over the period January, 1976 to June, 1981. 2.05 At appraisal, three major issues were identified. The first of these concerned the lack of essential information needed for project evaluation and cost increases affecting economic viability. In spite of repeated requests, data were incomplete by the end of the appraisal mission.t' The second issue was the existing organization of agricultural services which was thought to be a major hindrance to effective project implementation. Thirdly, the question of land distribution and tenure reform on collective lands was a sensitive one with some divergent views regarding the commitment of the Government to the land reform aspects and the on selection criteria of beneficiaries. Following the appraisal mission, further processing of the project was made contingent on obtaining a clear indication of Government commitment to the land reform prosram. Subsequent missions obtained verbal indications of such a commitment, which formed the basis for continuing with the lending operation. III. IMPLEMENTATION Design Changes and Delays in Implementation 3.01 The project underwent several implementation delays and design changes during the course of its execution, due mainly to the pilot nature of the operation. The components that underwent major changes were (a) land redistribution (agrarian reform), where a reduction in land made available for redistribution resulted in a corresponding reduction in the program (paras. 3.03-3.07); (b) roads, where the program was increased more than threefold, and modified to include gravelling (para. 3.14); (c) irrigation in the Bittit perimeter, where the program was reduced in scope due to an unforeseen 1/ The name was later changed to Direction Provinciale de l'Agriculture (DPA). Both these terms are used in the report and refer to the same organizational unit. 2/ The important discrepancies revealed during the completion mission on agricultural land use and farm size distribution in the project area confirms the apprehension expressed by the appraisal mission in 1975. - 20 - decrease in the availability of water (para. 3.16); and (d) small-scale irrigation, which was reduced as a result of the changes in the land reform program for the cooperatives and modified to include irrigation for five small perimeters not foreseen at appraisal ( ara. 3.18). The economic viability of the last three was reassessed in 1981.- Annex II provides a comparison between original physical targets and actual implementation for each of the components. The closing date was eventually extended from June 30, 1981 to June 30, 1984 to allow sufficient time for completion of key project components. Agrarian Reform and Land Consolklation Components. 3.02 At appraisal, these interlinked components consisted of redistribution of about 19,000 ha of Government-owned land to benefit existing owners of small, non-viable freehold farms, landless agricultural workers and collective rightholders and of the consolidation of fragmented medium and small freehold and collectively held lands in four districts (Dir, Sebag Aioun, Ait Taoujdate and Tisguit). In accordance with the Agrarian Reform laws, the recipients of new holdings under the land redistribution scheme were required to relinquish their rights on the freehold or collective land they owned, with the freehold lands (estimated at 2,350 ha) contributing to a common pool of land for redistribution to remaining private farmers and the collective lands becoming available (estimated at 7,300 ha) to expand the holdings of those remaining in the collective. Membership of cooperatives was compulsory for the beneficiaries of the land redistribution scheme, and encouraged for the rightholders remaining on tribal collective land. Although the processes for land redistribution and consolidation were established separately, an integration of the two operations was called for and agreed upon during negotiations. i 3.03 The Agrarian Reform Component. The extent of the redistribution program accomplisned under the project was considerably reduced from that originally foreseen at the time of appraisal. Less than half of the state land originally intended for distribution to small farmers and landless workers has in fact been made available to the program, very few private holdings have been released through resettling of small farmers in the Agrarian Reform cooperatives (288 ha in the Dir district), and no collective land has been redistributed due to problems in organizing collective members. The scope of the redistribution/agrarian reform program under the project as compared to the SAR proposals is summarized below: Land Redistribution Program SAR Actual Ha Farmers Ha Farmers State land 19,050 7,585 Private land 2,350 288 Collective land 7,300 28,700 6,950 7,873 618 1/ Supervision Report 1/82 2/ The Borrower claims that the Bank insisted on linking the two programs. - 21 - 3.04 The agrarian reform program in the Dir district has been the only land reform activity carried out under the project, instead of involving 28,700 ha in three districts (Dir, Sebag Aoun Ain Taoujdate) as envisaged at appraisal. All land redistribution took place in the Dir district, where only three large production cooperatives were created on 7,585 ha with 618 members. These members were either landless, or owners of non-viable units (between them all, they brought in only 288 ha of private land, which they gave up on entry). Most of the land allocated to these three cooperatives was transferred from SOGETA, one of the State farming enterprises, and is still largely used for seed production. Other state lands in the Dir district, mostly those managed by SODEA, another State farming enterprise, and consisting of about 2,300 ha in orchards and vineyards, and those under litigation (1,300 ha), which were initially to be included in the agrarian reform program, were not distributed despite insistance of early Bank supervision missions on this matter. A decision not to subdivide the three newly created cooperatives into individual plots (service cooperatives) wLs also made after a lengthy debate on the costs and benefits associated with such a subdivision. 3.05 Besides the foreseeable diseconomies of scale which would have resulted from the subdivision (particularly unit costs of mechanization), there was also a concern that the quantity and quality of seed that individual farmers could produce would be inferior to those of cooperative production. In addition, project authorities argued that distribution in individual lots would result in a loss of land to access roads and subsidiary purposes, that the timeliness of cropping operations would suffer, and it was also felt that several members of the cooperatives could attempt to sell off their holdings for housing development, given the strong demand for land for this purpose in the project area.1' However, small individual irrigated plots of approximately 0.4 ha were finally distributed to each cooperative member. Bank supervision missions acknowledged the constraints and agreed, in June 1980, that the three cooperatives should not be subdivided. Based on the experience gained in the Dir district, which had shown that farmers were very reluctant to give up their rights on private holdings to join production cooperatives and that consequently only very few private holdings could be freed for redistribution to remaining private farmers, a decision was also made to entirely delink the agrarian reform and consolidation programs in the Sebal Aioun district. Accordingly, state lands were excluded from the consolidation program in that district and it was also finally decided not to distribute those lands to landless farmers to create new production cooperatives under a separate land reform program. 3.06 The two major objectives of the agrarian reform component as conceived at appraisal were: (a) to establish more viable holdings on privately held lands of the project area through the allocation of an agrarian reform lot in a production cooperative to the ones leaving their private land; and (b) to achieve a decongestion of collectively held lands by transferring a certain proportion of the rightholders to production cooperatives. None of these two objectives was achieved since (a) rightholders of the collective lands refused to participate in the program and collective lands were finally not integrated in the redistribution scheme; and (b) private farmers' reluctance to relinquish their rights on private plots to join a production 1/ However, this is forbidden by law (Agrarian Reform legal texts). - 22 - cooperative for collective farming (despite the much larger size of their prospective plot in the cooperative) finally led the project authorities to choose most of the beneficiaries for the new production cooperatives among landless farmers and former salaried workers of the state farming enterprises rather than among small farmers owning non-viable private holdings, thus freeing very little land to increase the average farm size through the parallel land consolidation program. In addition, the reduction of state land made available for the program from 19,000 ha to about 7,600 ha, due to the reluctance of the state farming enterprises to release their land, aggravated the situation. 3.07 Based on the experience gained under the project, a major conclusion to be drawn is that the concept of linking agrarian reform and land consolidation programs does not work in the existing legal framework which has de facto often led constitution of production cooperatives involving collective farming for those farmers resettled on the redistributee state lands (para. 5.07). The constraints associated with a resettlement in a cooperative1" have clearly discouraged most private farmers eligible and resulted in a failure of the program. On the other hand, the idea remains valid to include a pool of state land in a consolidation program in order to achieve not only larger plot sizes and better accessibility but also an overall increase in the average farm size to improve the viability of the farming units. This would, however, require that the state land made available can be distributed directly to individual farmers and would therefore involve changes in the Agrarian Reform laws. Only with such changes could project objectives have been achieved. 3.08 The Land Consolidation Component. In contrast to the limited scope of the agrarian reform program, land consolidation actions (for which the specific targets were a consolidation program on 70,000 ha in four districts)-' have been extensive. In terms of physical achievements, land consolidation has taken place on about 36,000 ha (27,700 ha in the Dir district and 8,300 ha in the Seba& Aoun district), as shown below: District Number of Farmers Ha Consolidation Index Dir 27,700 0.54 (of which private land) 1,008 10,300 Seba^ AMoun 8,300 0.82 (of which private land) 1,238 7,300 The distribution in number and size of all and individual private plots respectively before and after consolidation is given below: 1/ The agrarian reform sector includes three types of cooperatives: services cooperatives (59%), mixed cooperatives (35%), and production cooperatives (6%). In the Dir sector, the choice of creating production cooperatives was based on the need to carry out seed multiplication activities. 2/ There is however no mention of a quantitative target in the SAR. - 23 - sunaSea saets.na,m.nis ----------0 OISTAICT------------ --------SamA AMO DSTA= --------------- --AL------------ aaa hdE tS Aat 8$A tA nes ta efore after 0-1 he 1,554 613 600 242 1,206 693 517 392 2,760 1.506 1.117 634 (private) (1.366) (501) (642) (204) (1.186) (889) (506) (382) (2,551) (1.360) (1,048) (586) 1" to 549 270 778 3"0 48 403 889 561 1.014 688 1.437 949 (private) (5264 (218) (712) (318) (436) ($93) (4*8) (848) (952) (611) (1.340) (863) 2-8 he 485 316 1,528 1.03 399 378 1,210 1.182 884 694 2,738 2.195 (private (416) (265) (1.326) (842) (38) (373) (1.188) (1.164) (804) (638) (2,514) (2,006) 5-10 he 229 174 1.608 1.218 140 199 959 818 369 293 2,567 2,036 (private) (95) (140) (733) (966) (137) (117) (931) (799) (232) (257) (1,664) (1.767) over 1o ha 356 340 23.206 24.SS 117 133 4.959 5,201 473 473 28.165 29.753 (Orvate) am LIM un jfl.1;.311 La=n L= .172 Lm4n0a) s Ws am 1a1 0i2141 TOTAL 3.17) 1.713 27.720 27.413 2.327 1.925 8,304 8.184 5.500 3.638 36,024 36.867 (private) (2.614) (1.319) (10.318) (10.272) (2.249) (1.861) (7.430) (7.299) (4,8 ) (3.110) (17.748) (17,571) umaber of private farmers 1,008 1.238 2.246 The consolidation index (total number of plots after consolidation divided by the total number before ) is 0.66 (0.54 for the Dir district and 0.82 for the .8eba& Kioun district), i.e. the average number of fields owned by the same landowner was reduced by more than half. In fact, -the average landowner in the consolidated areas now has 1.4 plot (1.3 plot in the Dir district and 1.5 plot in the Seba& ioun district). The cultivable area lost through consolidation amounts to 1.2% on the basis of cadastral figures, because of new access roads and communal grounds, but the consulting firm which carried out the land consolidation surveys pointed out that these cadastral figures were overestimated. It seems that some arable land (1.5% of the total) was, in fact, gained through the consolidation program by rationalizing the access roads network and eliminating various natural obstacles and informal rights of way. 3.09 The land consolidation program, which was the first one ever undertaken on rainfed lands in Morocco, appears to be the major success of the project. The three basic objectives of the component as foreseen at appraisal were to: (a) reduce the number of plots and increase their average size so as to provide a structural basis for intensification (especially mechanization); (b) provide an adequate access network of roads and tracks to all farms in order to facilitate input use and output marketing; and (c) increase the average size of small farms through redistribution of land. The first agricultural development indicators available at the time of the completion mission (shifts in cropping patterns, on-farm investments and credit use - details are in para. 4.03) show that the synergic effect of the structural actions included in the consolidation program (reduction of fragmentation and better access to farms) has started to yield significant results. This happened despite the fact that the scaling down of the agrarian reform component prevented the achievement of the third objective of increasing the overall size of small farms to bring them to a more viable level and generate additional economies of scale in that category. In fact, the only physical achievement of the land consolidation program was to convert benefitting farmers' land, previously consisting of several irregularly shaped plots often without access, into bigger and more regular plots with access. - 24 - 3.10 Because of its pilot nature and due to some technical problems which appeared during implementation of the program in the Dir district (para. 5.06) some delays were experienced (about 2 years in Dir). Compared to the experience in the Dir district, the program in Seba& Aioun proceeded smoothly. Certain procedures were modified (e.g. land was divided into six classes instead of four as in Dir, and farmers were consulted earlier in the process) resulting in fewer grievances.-' Overall, the program in Sebai Aoun, while more complex than in the Dir because of the presence of more tree crops, buildings, and irrigated plots, and of a much higher degree of fragmentation of the farms, has taken only three years to be completed, as compared to four years for the Dir program. 3.11 Total costs of the consolidation program (including roads) amounted to DH 980/ha on average for the two districts and were as follows for each of the two districts: Costs (DH/ha) Item Dir Sebag AYoun Ae al Photography /a 53 57 Reconnaissance Studies and Cadastral Surveys 55 67 Soil and Agro-Economic Studies /a 34 37 Consolidation Works (including roads) 742 1.160 TOTAL 884 1,321 No of Ha 27,700 8,300 Total Costs (in DH million) 24.5 10.9 /a Since these works were carried out under combined contracts, these costs have been attributed pro rata to each program on the basis of the number of hectares in each. 3.12 Based on the experience gained under the project, the following preliminary conclusions can be drawn with respect to the consolidation program: (a) the two overwhelming factors which seem to have triggered intensification are, on the one hand, the development of the roads network with provision of access to all farms and, on the other hand, the incentives to invest (sense of security and easier access to credit) resulting from the official fixation of farm boundaries and issuance of titles, while the reduction of fragmentation has been more perceived by farmers as a cost savings device; and (b) the existing legal and procedural framework for carrying out land consolidation in Morocco is adequate and well adapted to the local context; only minor adjustments to correct the problems experienced in this first pilot operation are necessary (para. 5.06). 1/ However, the Borrower recently provided a new set of figures indicating that the number of grievances was higher in Sebfa AYoun than in Dir. - 25 - 3.13 The problems encountered during implementation of the program in the two districts suggest that the following factors and criteria should be given primary importance in the identification of suitable areas for future consolidation programs: (a) Socio-Economic Environment. The willingness of the farm population to undertake a program leading to important changes in agrarian structures is a key prerequisite to success. Adequate information campaigns on the nature and benefits of the operation prior to any decision are definitely required. In the SebaA Aioun district, where more attention was given to encouraging participation of the farming population early in the process, the operation proceeded with fewer problems than in Dir, despite a less favorable context on technical grounds. It seems also that the ethnic and social structure and the age distribution of the population are the most important factors to take into account for an accurate assessment of farmers' receptivity to a consolidation program; and (b) Technical Parameters. The following indicators should be among the first ones to be collected during identification of potential areas to be consolidated: (i) farm size distribution; (ii) degree of farm fragmentation (number of plots per farm); (iii) plot size distribution; (iv) density of the roads and tracks network; (v) importance of buildings, plantations, and common grounds; (vi) importance of irrigated farming in the area; (vii) range and homogeneity of soil potentials; (viii) proximity to urban areas; and (ix) land ownership status (state, collective, private). Based on the experience gained under the project, it is possible to state that areas with many encumbrances (buildings, common grounds), a high share of plantations and irrigated plots, sizable state or collective lands, a low homogeneity and wide range of soil potentials, and located close to urban areas, should be avoided, while areas with good soil potential, low average farm size, high degree of fragmentation, and insufficient roads and tracks network would appear to be good candidates for a successful and economically viable consolidation program. Roads Component 3.14 The principal objective of this component was to provide access to newly created (consolidated or distributed) parcels. To ensure that full economic benefits are achieved, the land reform and consolidation program included the construction of access roads to holdings. This is also a requirement of Moroccan law. At appraisal, the road component was severely underestimated. It provided for the construction of 160 km of earth access roads. In the Dir district alone, 320 km had to be constructed. A further 218 km were included to serve the SebaA Aloun district (where land consolidation did take place). In addition, 198 km were gravelled to provide year-round access to holdings. Although gravelling was not envisaged at appraisal, it was felt to be necessary given poor soil and weather conditions which rendered earth roads virtually impassable, as well as economically - 26 - justifiable (ERR = 10% over a 20-year period as determined by the economic analysis of proposed new components undertaken in 1981). The table below summarizes the road program effectively implemented by sector: Access Roads Sector in kilometers Earth Gravelled Dir 320 135 Seba Aioun 218 63 Total 538 198 3.15 A major issue concerning this component was the maintenance of rural roads created under the project. No mechanism for regular maintenance existed; any maintenance works carried out were so done by individual communes. The Bank requested the formulation of an adequate maintenance program before examining any new proposals for road construction. It was initially felt that the DPA should establish an equipped unit for maintenance in the project area, with operating costs covered through user contributions in the general framework of ASAP1*' (users' association). This last proposal was subsequently felt to be unfeasible for all practical purposes, and was abandoned in favor of turning over the equipment to be purchased to the provincial road maintenance unit, with operating costs provided through the provincial budget allocation for road maintenance. As of the closing date, the authorities were still awaiting delivery of equipment. Irrigation Component 3.16 Bittit Irrigation Perimeter. At appraisal rehabilitation of the existing system (including an entirely new layout) commanding about 3,500 ha was envisaged. Rationalization and lining of the main and subsidiary canals was to enable irrigation of a further 500 ha (tied in with land consolidation) 1/ ASAPs are cooperatives established to create, rehabilitate and maintain irrigation or drainage systems. They are legal entities, represented by an elected council, and they have the right to sell, purchase, rent, mortgage or borrow for eligible purposes. The council prepares annual operating and investment budgets to cover the cost of O&M of the network. These budgets are approved by the DPA. Each ASAP member is charged with a percentage of the budget in proportion to his rights on the water flow at canal head. - 27 - due to prevention of seepage and water losses. ' In fact, however, the complicated structure of existing water rights prevented the implementation of a land consolidation program involving a new layout of the irrigation network. It was finally decided to limit project works to rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure. Water in the system is provided by three springs, and the distribution of water rights on their flow between potable water supply for the city of Meknes and irrigation needs are fixed by a decree. During the course of project execution, the Governor of Meknes Province decided to increase the share of water for Meknes town from 400 1/s to 800 1/s (about 50% of total flow available), resulting in a reduction of water available for agriculture, then servicing around 910 ha (see Annex VI, Tables 1-2). In the absence of alternative water resources, the scope of the Project was limited, following a reappraisal in 1981, to rehabilitating 40.5 km of seguias-' which would maintain irrigation of the original area at former levels. At the time of project closing, the five main seguias of the Bittit network had been rehabilitated, and were providing irrigation to 915 ha. 3.17 Small-Scale Irrigation. At appraisal, this component consisted of construction of small irrigation systems serving 600 ha in the newly established cooperatives utilizing surplus water available from wells constructed for potable water supply. It was later modified to include rehabilitation of exi-ting infrastructure in five perimeters located in the project area outside of the cooperatives. The economic analysis undertaken to assess the new components' viability showed an average rate of return of 45%, due to sunk costs, high value of irrigated crops and low economic cost of investment (Supervision report 1/82). 3.18 The reduction in scope of the land reform program resulted in a corresponding reduction in the initial program foreseen at appraisal. 16 km of seguias were constructed on two cooperatives, serving 100 ha and using surplus water. Two wells were constructed permitting irrigation of a further 100 ha on the new cooperatives. In addition, 25 km of seguias were rehabilitated for five existing ASAPs. (see Annex VI, Table 1). Destoning 3.19 Instead of the 5,000 ha estimated for destoning at appraisal, 5,705 ha were completed by project closing. These were undertaken in four tranches. Each destoning program consisted of three operations: digging up of stones, carried out by private enterprises on contract, collection of stones, carried out manually by farmers, and evacuation of stones, carried out either manually or on contract, by farmers. In general, the destoning operations were most successful in private holdings, where motivated beneficiaries provided labour in a timely manner, and least successful on collective lands, where collection and evacuation of stones lagged behind schedule. 1/ It was estimated that an additional flow of about 0.3 m3/s could be made available for irrigation through efficiency gains in the network. 2/ Arabic word for irrigation channels in traditional schemes. - 28 - 3.20 The table below summarizes the four tranches of destoning carried out in the Project area by type of beneficiary. 1981 1982 1983 1984 Total Private 862 1,200 1,117 1,189 4,368 Cooperatives 520 208 - 240 968 Collectives 369 - - - 369 Total 1,751 1,408 1,117 1,429 5,705 3.21 This component suffered several delays in implementation. Initially, Project staff had requested financing for equipment for rock removal. Experience of existing programs, however, seemed to indicate that farmers were quite willing to use labor for rock removal, for which they received a subsidy from MARA. Relative ignorance on the cost/benefit implications of various rock removal methods led to further delays. Eventually, arrangements were made with a private firm to study technical aspects of these options in the project area. Two options were considered for implementing the program - creation of a unit in the SP or contracting with private enterprises to provide the service to interested farmers. Additional delays were caused in obtaining a decision from MARA in Rabat concerning both choice of implemertation method and determination of farmer contributions (para. 5.11). It was finally decided to use private contractors and the program started in July 1981. Other Comstruction 3.22 Cooperative Infrastructure. The project initially called for the establishment of 160 small cooperatives on the 19,000 ha of State land to be made available for the redistribution program and provided for infrastructure consisting of 80 wells, storage facilities and construction of small irrigation systems utilizing surplus water from the wells (para. 3.17). With the decision to establish three large cooperatives in the Dir District only, these activities were scaled down. In addition to 14 wells which were constructed the Project installed 24 pumps and constructed 12 pumping stations for potable water, 27 drinking troughs and six water fountains. The Bank also received a request from the authorities to include electrification for the three cooperatives and the two work centers with the provision that cooperative members would be building their houses on cooperative sites. Due to administrative problems in formulating acceptable financing plans for housing construction on the part of the Moroccans, this subcomponent suffered delays and was only partially completed by project closing. Electrification was carried out for the Work Centers in the land reform area, and for farm buildings on the three cooperatives. No works were carried out in the housing zones on the cooperatives. With regard to storage facilities, 17 buildings were either constructed or rehabilitated. 3.23 Administrative Infrastructure. At appraisal, this component consisted of construction of offices totalling 600m2, a District Extension office in Tizquit, 48 3-room houses, 80 2-room houses and purchase of equipment and vehicles. This subcomponent was modified during implementation, since it was found that appraisal estimates had underestimated costs of office construction (costs having more than doubled) and overestimated the number of - 29 - staff housing units required (existing facilities not having been taken into account). A reassignment of funds from staff housing to project headquarters was thus undertaken. Other construction completed in the project area was two Work Centers (CT) and two sub-cqnters, and 20 housing units. Vehicles purchased were 19 cars, 19 land rovers, 2 light cars, 10 trailers and 5 tractors. The District Extension office was not constructed since the Tizguit District was not included in the land consolidation program. Studies 3.24 In addition to the preparatory studies and surveys concerning land consolidation and reform, a National Study on Collective Lands was programmed for execution in the appraisal report. This subject proved to be very sensitive politically. In spite of repeated requests to and discussions with the authorities, no progress was made in the execution of the study, and it was finally abandoned. .. 3.25 The principal objective of this component was to provide practical training for recently graduated extension agents. Initially, the program was designed to give each trainee a 5 ha plot within an agrarian reform cooperative, with the possibility of keeping any profit from its exploitation being the motivating factor. This proposal was later modified to place trainees on 5 ha "farms" to be created at the training school in Bouderbala. In the first year of operation, however, delays in start-up meant that land preparation works had already been undertaken, and division into individual plots was not possible. The trainees therefore farmed the land collectively. 3.26 In addition to practical training, the project also provided for training in cooperative farm management (accounting, bookkeeping, etc.). The project authorities requested the participation of Institut National Agronomique et V4t6rinaire in Rabat to provide such training. A contract was finally signed for short courses in cooperative management after several delays resulting from negotiating an acceptable format and price. 3.27 The training component was plagued with several problems: it got off to a late start (the first batch of trainees entered in November 1977); the Director of the Center resigned shortly thereafter and the nominated replacement was not satisfactory; the program was not given a special budget and often, equipment for works had to be borrowed from Work Centers; and an absence of professional training staff and programmed training activities resulted in underutilization of both trainees' time and Center facilities. Most of these problems appear to have been alleviated over time, and the program was modestly successful overall. Three sessions of practical training involving 22 trainees and 8 sessions of cooperative management training involving 112 trainees were completed during the course of the project. Costs, Procurement and Disbursements 3.28 The total cost of the project at completion was US$17.30 million, or 53% of expected cost (see Annex I, Table 1). This is due to: (a) some components not being implemented or partially implemented (as discussed earlier); and (b) the average weighted exchange rate of the US dollar being considerably higher than at appraisal (DR 6.16 instead of DH 4.14). The - 30 - various modifications brought to the project as well as the delays in implementation make assessments of what the costs would have been had the project been implemented as foreseen in the appraisal report of dubious value. Nonetheless, a rough estimate would indicate a slight underrun of 1%. In the actual situation, major overruns occurred in irrigation works, construction of roads and construction of project headquarters. Not only were the costs associated with these components underestimated at appraisal, but their implementation took place three to four years later than scheduled. Major underruns occurred in construction of housing for staff, farm buildings on the cooperatives, and staff salaries, all of which would appear to have been overestimated at appraisal. 3.29 Goods and services for the project were procured in 119 contracts (see Annex III). The table below summarizes the method of procurement and average value per contract. It can be seen that the total value of contracts which went to ICB was around DH 20 million, representing 20% of the total value of all contracts awarded. These were for civil works (land consolidation and land :eform) procurement of equipment and vehicles and for consultants' services. Of the 12 contracts, four vent to foreign firms. Contracts awarded through local procedures (LCB) concern civil works for buildings, road construction, irrigation rehabilitation and construction and cooperative infrastructure. These items bad a total value of around DH 76 million, awarded through 99 contracts. Distribution of Contracts A Method of Number of Total Average Procurement Contracts Value Value/Contract ----(DH)--- ICB 12 19,595,761 1,632,980 LCB 99 75,545,516 763,086 NGB 8 2,092,254 261,532 Total 119 97,233,531 /a Presented to the Bank for reimbursement. 3.30 A total amount of US$6.54 million was disbursed out of the US$14.0 million Bank loan. A further amount of around US$0.65 million could have been disbursed had the Government transmitted reimbursement requests for project works completed before the closing date of June 30, 1984 and paid before the closing of the loan account (February 15, 1985). In addition, losses of around US$0.40 million resulted from incorrect or incomplete disbursement requests received prior to the closing date. Further losses resulted from delays in proceeding with withdrawal requests due to exchange rate fluctuations (Annex IV, Table 2). These may be attributed to inadequate coordination between project authorities and the Ministry of Finance, as a result of which several requests sent by DPA Mekns would appear to be lost within the Ministry. A loan balance of US$7.46 million ha, therefore, been cancelled. A comparison of actual and projected disbursements is shown in Annex IV, Table 1. - 31 - IV. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT 4.01 Despite repeated Bank requests and the assistance provided by a consultant specialist in monitoring and evaluation during a supervision mission in 1982, a system for monitoring of the agricultural impact of the project was not set up during implementation. This made detailed quantitative evaluation (particularly at farm level) very difficult. Consequently, the completion mission's analysis is based on the scattered data available (1984 survey in the consolidated areas of Dir and Sebai A'oun, 1982 survey in the Sebai Aoun district, provincial agricultural statistics, evolution of credit use and on-farm investments in the project area....) and findings of the field visits and discussions with the technicians of the DPA. An assessment has been made of the major changes taking place in the project area and around it with respect to cropping patterns, land use and yields. As for the evolution of farm incomes, it proved impossible to compare the actual situation with appraisal estimates on the basis of the farm models presented in the SAR, since these farm models were all representative of production system to be employed in the various service cooperatives to be created under the project and which never materialized. Last, because of the significant delays experienced in project implementation, full agricultural development has not yet been reached in 1985, contrary to what had been foreseen at appraisal. This factor introduces an element of uncertainty in the assessment. 4.02 The SAR did not anticipate major changes in cropping patterns in the project area, but that at full development the project would lead to an increase in production of all major crops. In particular, the main increases in production and in marketable surpluses were expected to occur for wheat, vegetables, potatoes and onion. Yields of wheat were expected to increase by about 30% due to the adoption of modern cultivation techniques while yields of irrigated vegetable crops and alfalfa were expected to increase 10 and 20% respectively. It was also foreseen that the average cropping intensity for the cultivated area would increase from about 80% to about 90%. 4.03 In factc the agricultural development which took place in the project area (and particularly in the consolidated areas where the evolution is the most striking) has been quite different. Not only has there been an increase in cropping intensity from about 85% (based on revised 1975 data) to about 93% and an increase in the total area cropped due to destoning operations, but other major changes have occurred which were not anticipated: (a) small farms have specialized in vegetable and dairy production and moved away from the cere.i-pulses rotation, probably as a result of (i) the better marketing possibilities made possible by the significant improvement of the roads and tracks network; and (ii) excess supply of family labor; (b) medium and large farms have specialized in soft wheat production and fruit tree plantations, with a very sizeable increase in the acreage planted in fruit trees in the entire project area (about 60% over the acreage estimated at appraisal). Even in the three large production cooperatives created in Dir, the increase in fruit tree plantations is the only noticeable change in cropping patterns that has taken place over the life of the project; and - 32 - (c) on-farm investments (particularly for mechanization, wells and irrigation equipment) have substantially increased in the project area during the recent years as indicated in the tables below, based on data collected in CNCA-' on the evolution of medium-term credit use from 1977 to 1983 and on investments made in a sample of 100 farms located in the consolidated areas of Dir and Seba& Aioun. Evolution of fAmnd far Medin-tem edit In the Prbadet Area (in 10 0N) *---1977-8--** ---178-79--- --- ----- 19-81-1 -------198142---- -----1982-83--* Ct L. In CA h CL, CR. CL . .. A .. C R. C L C R ItmE Mah Mk E ll2 Haiab Meknes I1 Maah A. G1 !ae knes El aeH anl Ana. K"Iah Me Constructions 1M8 740 44 1.475 54 1.416 61 1.034 3tt 611 614 1,188 Land arovements 59 78 12 109 18 117 54 101 13 16 4 600 Irrigation squipmnt 163 169 20 137 1M6 198 43 20 189 22 399 $39 Nechanisation 15 1,717 - 3,2S 5 5,578 7 2.711 107 11,341 34 9.040 Animal Traction 235 407 89 347 338 781 355 373 6$1 364 413 346 AAIes 9Mt 964 353 1,008 384 1,8? 486 184 1.478 139 3.039 2.431 Plantation - ..12 - LUit - .258 .. .....AA ...L.812 fi2 L Total /4 1.492 4,403 518 7,441 775 10,87 1.086 5,129 2.630 13.513 4.498 15.233 ---- 5.895 ---7.959 ----11, t-- ----6.138--* -- 16.143----- -----19.731*--- - +35% +465 -47 +1635 *235 COmPOunded annual growth rate over the period: 275 /8 Local oranch El Hajob. A Regional branch M6knes. /A Drought year. /d oes not include credit for agro-industries and other miscollaneous not linked to direct on-farm investments. Investaents an a Samle of 100 Farm in the Dir and Seba AYoun distriet. (to,At) District ---Total Housing- -Total Constructions-/A ---Total Wells- --Total Tractors- --Total Puss--Total Threshers- -Total Sprayers i17-7 197"2a 1974-7& 1222=U 1974-72 it".82 IS~ 12L- 12M--nf 19ZU 1974- 2 &: 12fa IzU2 1070-2 (a) (b) (a) Mb Ca) Mb (a)y- -(5T- (a&F M ) (a)- Mb Ma b Seba AToun 01,600 185.800 278,000 653,400 15.800 87,000 30.733 184.240 105.486 646,459 5,000 t0.000 800 8.850 Dir 61.600 133.600 235,200 339.640 19,000 40.600 96.280 30.733 - 319,739 15,385 30,000 3.180 $.607 Total 1 S0 31Ug0 912408 "I, ca th-21 127,600 12LA12 IMaJ2 1IiLMA ii, al 4800 L8 A,2 S b/a 2235 1935 3665 1435 9165 196% 3635 /a Stables. storage, sheds. 1/ Caisse Nationale de Cr6dit Agricole. - 33 - (d) based on available information there does not seem to have been a noticeable increase in yields in the project area; and (e) the acreage under cereals, pulses and sunflower decreased substantially. While for cereals, this is linked to the increased specialization of small farms in vegetable and dairy production and the shift to fruit tree plantations in large farms, technical problems largely explain the quasi-disappearance of sunflower. As for pulses, the combination of low prices (largely linked to the export ban as of 1977) and diseases (broom-rape) has played a major role in farmers' disaffection towards those crops. 4.04 Overall, a substantial move of farmers towards high-value crops and milk production and away from cereals (particularly hard wheat) and pulses seems to have taken place over the last few years. Better access to markets and better integration in the agricultural economy of the region have certainly been the key elements behind these changes, as confirmed by farmers' interviews and discussions with project staff. In addition, the ineffectiveness of the price support program for cereals and the inadequacy of producer prices during the period have most likely played a significant role. V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT General Management and Organisational Effeotiveness 5.01 Implementation of the project was to have been the responsibility of the existing staff of the Mekn6s DPA. The Deputy to the Chief of the SP was to have executive responsibility of the project. He would report to the Chief of the SP, who would report to the Secretary General of MARA. Within the SP, the Equipment Office would be responsible for undertaking land reform studies, design and construction works. Management staff for the cooperatives in the project area as well as extension services would be the responsibility of the Agricultural Production Office. 5.02 From the very start, project management faced several problems in the areas of administration and budget. The reorganization proposed by the authorities differed from that foreseen in the appraisal report, and suffered a delay of over one year in its implementation. In the new organization, the Director of the SP was appointed Project Manager with day-to-day responsibility for project coordination delegated to a junior member of his staff. Under the coordination of the Director, a subdivision comprised of five technical bureaus was formed to implement the project. Given the other demands on his time, the Director was not always able to devote enough attention to the project. Upon repeated requests from the Bank to appoint a deputy to the Director of SP, MARA finally appointed a junior "ing6nieur d'application" to the post (in 1982). He had previously been in charge of project coordination, in which function he had been unable to make a major impact on project implementation. - 34 - 5.03 As part of the reorganization, a Project Implementation Committee was formed in Rabat in 1976, chaired by the Director of DMVAL", which appeared to have primary responsibility for the project. The exact purpose or efficiency of this committee remained unclear to the various supervision missions. *a 5.04 For the first two years of the project, project activities were financed as part of general expenditures, with no increases in budget. An agreement was reached in 1977 between the DPA, MARA and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) that Project Management would submit a separate budget for the project. However, delays in budget approval and actual release of funds, austerity measures on the part of the Government (such as a freeze on hiring staff), and the resulting under-financing severely crippled effective project implementation, until its completion in 1984. 5.05 Although not foreseen at appraisal, the need for an organized monitoring and evaluation unit became apparent during the course of project implementation. The main task of the unit woulc be to monitor the costs and benefits of the land consolidation and agrarian .eform programs and to measure project's impact on farmers' income and crop proeuction. The data to be collected together with baseline data available would serve as a basis for a detailed cost/benefit study of the program and as a guideline for similar operations in the future. The supervision mission of March 1981 recommended setting up of such a unit by the consultants already responsible for implementing the land consolidation and reform program, with provision for training of local staff to follow-up on M&E activity. A second alternative suggested was the establishment of the unit within the DPA with short-term consultancies and/or the Planning and Economic Affairs Directorate (DPAE) in MARA providing the required assistance. After several administrative delays, it was finally decided that MARA would select one of its staff to be sent abroad for M&E training, at the end of which he would be attached as counterpart: to a consultant who would be recruited to assess the projects' M&E requirements, define parameters to be monitored and set-up the methodology. However, no action was taken to implement this decision. The land consolidation program was evaluated in 1985 by consultants recruited for this purpose for inclusion in the Completion Report prepared by the Project Authorities and DPAE. Land Consolidation Techniques and Procedures 5.06 As mentioned in para. 3.12, the land consolidation techniques and legal procedures as defined in the Land Consolidation Law of 1962, which had so far only been applied in the large irrigation schemes in a much easier socio-cultural and technical context, proved to be efficient and well adapted to consolidation on rainfed lands (see outline in Annex VII). However, a set of issues emerged during implementation and provides indications on the improvements that would have to be introduced for future programs: (a) the reliability of the National Cadastre as a basis for identifying farm and plot 1/ Direction de la Mise en Valeur Agricole. 2/ This is questioned by the Borrower. - 35 - boundaries proved to be lower than expected; in a number of cases, the information provided by the National Cadastre did not match field observations, and was, in fact, underestimating the degree of fragmentation and the various natural encumbrances (seguias, rights of way, etc.); this raises the issue of the updatability of the National Cadastre and probably reflects the fact that a number of transactions recorded through the traditional notary system are not reported to the Directorate in charge of the Cadastre (DCFTTI in MARA); this issue could be largely resolved by reminding the traditional notaries.' that they have to report all real estate transactions to DCFTT; (b) it is essential that the detailed maps and plans of the area before consolidation ("4tat et plan parcellaire") and the land capability classification for each and every plot be completed and approved by all the beneficiaries before starting the preparation of the consolidation plan; failure to do so led to numerous grievances and delays in the Dir district; (c) the land capability classification has to include a sufficient number of classes with each class being allocated a fair amount of pointa relative to the others (the classification is done on a point system, and it is the main purpose of the consolidation program to make sure that the total number of points of each farmer's new land is equal to that of his old land); a wide range of land classes allows for a more precise and equitable redistribution, which reduces complaints by farmers; based on the experience in the Dir district where there were only five classes and an inequitable allocation of points among classes which led to a lot of grievances, eight classes were retained for Sebag Aioun where significantly fewer complaints were introduced. Agrarian Reform Cooperatives 5.07 Agrarian Reform was decided upon in 1965-66, and sought to supervise the use of formerly foreign held lands to ensure their rational development, control changes in ownership and institute a right of pre-emption on the part of the State with a view to award state controlled land through the agency of a Lands Office. Agrarian reform was implemented on the basis of lands regained from foreign settlers, totalling around a million hectares. Of this, about 350,000 ha were privatised spontaneously. Another 330,000 ha were retained as State lands. About 320,000 ha were assigned to agrarian reform, with parcels being awarded either on an individual basis or in the form of "co-parcenary" rights in a collective holding. Awardees assigned with individual titles are required to give up any other rights to land and to join a service or production cooperative whose objective is to facilitate farming and marketing. The parcel reverts to the State or is transferred to a single legatee on the awardees' death; it cannot be divided or alienated. 5.08 The retention of lands undcr State control came about for a variety of reasons. Most of the expropriated holdings were large sized, specialized farms at a certain technological level. Maintaining state control was an interim measure initially designed to prevent indiscriminate privatization 1/ Direction de la Conservation Fonci6re et des Travaux Topographiques. 2/ Adouls - 36 - (generally in favor of large Moroccan land-owners), and to continue farming the units until suitable means for disposal were devised. However, potential beneficiaries would have been landless or small-scale farmers whose expected production system would be very different from that required to effectively farm these lands, and substantial diseconomies of scale would have resulted. This was presumably the riding logic behind requiring beneficiaries of redistribution to form cooperatives and farm the subdivided units collectively (paras. 3.04-3.05). 5.09 In the light of the historical background of state control of expropriated lands and given that the project area encompassed some of the more fertile and productive land, it is clear that the appraisal mission doubts about the possibility of successfully implementing agrarian reform on 28,700 ha were well founded. Despite statements by officials to the contrary, the parastatal companies installed on these lands were predictably reticent about subdivision and redistribution; private farmers were similarly hesitant about giving up their small, non-viable holdings in favor of larger ones where they would have little or no autonomy in production decisions. The implementation difficulties with this component, which required re-design during the project period, had been well foreseen at appraisal. 5.10 Experience with agrarian reform in Morocco shows that problems related to such institutional and cultural issues are not confined to the project area. Beneficiaries of land redistribution are grouped into three categories of cooperatives: service cooperatives, set-up to provide services to their members farming their parcels individually; production cooperatives, whose role is to farm the lands distributed communally; or mixed cooperatives where parcels are farmed communally, and services are provided at the individual parcel level. In 1981, their distribution was as follows: Cooperative Type Number % of Total Service 433 59 Production 47 6 Mixed 259 35 739 100 Although the three types were proposed at appraisal, only production cooperatives were retained in the actual implementation. From past experience, it may be inferred that these are less popular (6% of total, as seen in the table above). A preliminary conclusion, reinforced by project experience may therefore be that this type of cooperative is not attractive to beneficiaries. For future reference then, it may be advisable to study the socio-cultural implications of creating the various types of cooperatives, possibly including the basic concept of creating production cooperatives. Cost recovery 5.11 Destoning. Various practical considerations mitigated against full cost recovery for this subcomponent. The Investment Code for Agriculture grants a subsidy for destoning operations after the necessary works are - 37 - completed, and involves a lengthy refund process. Given that the major beneficiaries are small farmers who have neither the capacity to finance such works nor the size to justify the use of the heavy equipment required, the proposed cost recovery scheme for the Project consisted of farmers being responsible only for collection and evacuation of stones. 5.12 Preliminary analysis of the costs of destoning show Government participation of around 30% of total costs, with the remainder being the responsibility of the beneficiaries. This would appear to be consistent with subsidies granted by the Investment Code for similar land improvement works. On average over the four tranches, costs borne by the Project for destoning were around DR 2,700/ha. Costs of collection and evacuation of stones amounted to roughly DH 6,300/ha, or 70%. Beneficiaries had access to medium- and long-term credit of up to DR 4,600/ha for such works through the Caisse Locale de Cridit Agricole. 5.13 The success of the destoning program is evidenced by the high level of interest on the part of the beneficiaries and a positive demonstration effect on neighboring areas where farmers not constrained by the factors mentioned in para. 5.11 undertook similar operations at their own expense. In addition to the direct economic and agronomic benefits such as an increase in cultivable areas and productivity of land (para. 4.03), the program happened to coincide with a drought and was able to absorb a large number of unemployed labor about 5,500 man-years of labor were generated. This raises an interesting possibility of using such operations for productive public works programs. 5.14 Irrigation Schemes. In the absence of a national legal framework for cost recovery applicable to small and medium-scale irrigation schemes, it was agreed during implementation of the project that the basic formula to be retained for Bittit and the other small schemes rehabilitated would be somewhat similar to the one provided for in the Agricultural Investment Code and applying to large irrigation (Dahir 1.69.25 and Decree 2.69.37, dated July 25, 1969). This formula applicable to large irrigation stipulates that the farmer's contribution is recovered through: (a) a volumetric water charge covering operation and maintenance costs; (b) a fixed betterment levy on a per hectare basis (to be recovered in the form of annuities corresponding to a loan at 4% interest rate with 20 years maturity and 3 years of grace period); and (c) exemptions from the betterment levy for farms below 5 ha. Total investment cost recovery cannot exceed 40%. This formula enacted in 1969 has recently been modified by the inclusion of 10% investment cost recovery in the water charge and computation of the betterment levy on the basis of actual investment costs in each scheme (previously, the betterment levy was uniformly fixed at DR 1,500/ha and remained unchanged since 1969). The provisions discussed above were applied as follows in the specific context of the small-scale traditional irrigation systems rehabilitated under the project: water users' groups (ASAPs) were proposed for both the Bittit perimeter and the five other seguias rehabilitated; each group was to prepare and deposit with the local authorities a proc6s-verbal to establish itself, provisional statutes and a list of members including those elected to the steering committee; a contract was also to be signed with the DPA describing obligations regarding cost recovery; the ASAPs were to be responsible for the O&M of the network and contribute 40% to investment costs in the form of - 38 - annuities corresponding to a loan at 4% interest with 20 years maturity and 3 years of grace. At the time of closing, these contracts had been signed between DPA and the ASAPs and submitted to MARA for their approval. For the newly established cooperatives, the beneficiaries do not participate in investment costs, the state being responsible for all investment connected with land reform in Morocco. 0&M costs, however, are borne entirely by the cooperatives. 5.15 At the time of the completion mission, the approval of the statutes and of the cost recovery contracts had not yet been given by MARA, pending issuance of the new legai framework for water users' associations in small and medium scale irrigation schemes (as agreed to under the Bank-financed Small and Medium Scale Irrigation Project, Loan 2253-MOR, FY83) which was being finalized in draft by the concerned services in the Ministries of Agriculture and Interior for submission to the Legal Services (Secr6tariat G6n6ral du Gouvernement). 5.16 Consolidation and Land Reform Beneficiaries. Assurance was obtained during negotiations of the project that Government would charge beneficiaries of the program of distribution of State land in the project area the fair market value for land so distributed. No direct recovery of the cost of implementing land reform, of the capital costs of cooperatives infrastructure or of the cost of consolidation works had been proposed. At the time of the completion mission, land reform beneficiaries were about to begin to make payments starting in 1986 for the land received under the distribution program in the Dir in the form of annual payments over 20 years, including a two year grace period, at an interest rate of 41 on the outstanding balance. Delays were due to the administrative processing of new titles and the preparation of contracts for the lots. A technical commission comprising provincial authorities finally met in 1983 to fix the value of the lots distributed according to criteria reflecting the productivity of the land. VI. ECONOMIC EVALUATION Project Benefits 6.01 Production: The SAR assumed that without the project, production in the project area would remain at its level at the time of appraisal, and that a decline in yields resulting from deteriorating soil conditions in the Bittit irrigation scheme would take place. Since the SAR does not provide any indication on the extent to which yields would be affected in Bittit, the analysis of the completion mission is based on the assumption that the without project situation in Bittit would remain the same as the one prevailing before the project. The other assumptions of the SAR with respect to rainfed land are still valid and have been retained for the economic evaluation. However, some yields before and after the project have been revised on the basis of data collected for the area over the 1975-1985 period, since the yields considered in the SAR were overestimated in both cases (see Annex V, Table 1) - 39 - 6.02 Prices. For traded commodities, the SAR based its economic analysis on projected world market prices (1985) from the Bank's Economic Analysis and Projection Department, expressed in 1974 constant dirhams, and adjusted to farmgate values. Other prices for the non-traded (but tradeable) commodities were based on mission estimates and considered identical to financial prices. The PCR uses (a) actual economic prices for traded commodities (as derived from CIF/FOB prices and adjusted to farmgate) for the 1975-1985 period and 1990 economic prices for the 1985-1994 period; and (b) actual farmgate prices experienced in 1984-1985 for the non-traded output, adjusted by the urban consumption conversion factor (estimated at 0.83 in 1984). All prices were adjusted in 1985 constant dirhams. 6.03 Value of Production. The SAR projected that the total net value of incremental production generated by the project at full development (to be reached in 1985 in the SAR) would be DR 28.15 million (US$6.8 million) in 1974 constant prices. With an adjustment for local inflation over the 1974-1985 period of 136%, the value of net incremental production at full development expressed in 1985 constant prices (as projected by the SAR) can be estimated at DH 66.4 million. The PCR estimate of the net value of incremental production at full development (to be reached in 1993, instead of 1985, because of the delays in implementation) is DR 60.75 million in 1985 prices. 6.04 Foreign Exchange Impact. The SAR estimated that the annual impact on the balance of payments resulting from the incremental production of the project at full development (net of debt service) would amount to* US$2.3 million (in 1974 prices at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of appraisal), which can be translated into US$2.2 million in 1985 prices at the present exchange rate. The PCR estimate of the net foreign exchange savings resulting from import substitution at full development (1993) is only US$1.6 million (in 1985 prices). This is largely the result of the difference observed in the evolution of cropping patterns between SAR estimates and the actual situation, with a larger than expected development of non-traded output. 6.05 Employment Impact. No major employment benefits were expected from the project. The SAR estimated that labor requirements would increase somewhat on traditional farms due to the substitution of legumes for fallow, and in the Bittit area due to an extension of the irrigated area, but that the conversion of small traditional to larger cooperative holdings under the land distribution program would lead to a reduction of labor requirements per hectare due to increased mechanization. Although no precise assessment can be made because of the lack of data before and after project on representative farm models, the completion mission estimates that the trends observed in the evolution of the major production systems of the project area have led to increased family labor requirements on the small farms and increased hired labor requirements on the larger farms (impact of plantations). 6.06 Income Distribution Effect. The SAR projected that the income distributional effect of the project would be substantial, as it specifically aimed at increasing the farm size of small traditional rainfed farmers and giving holdings to landless agricultural workers. Since farm sizes in the freehold (Melk) sector were not increased due to the scaling down of the land - 40 - redistribution program, the only sizable effects of the project are the increase in income of the 618 landless workers resettled on the Dir cooperatives and of the small farmers (1,656) located in the consolidated areas. 6.07 Beneficiaries. The SAR estimated that the principal beneficiaries would include about 6,000 recipients of new or expanded freehold holdings and about 2,500 rightholders remaining on tribal collective land, whose holdings would be enlarged as a result of decongestion. In fact, due to the substantial design changes that took place, the main beneficiaries of the project are the 618 landless workers resettled on the three production cooperatives in Dir and the 2,246 farmers having benefitted from the consolidation program in Dir and Seba Aioun. Project Costs 6.08 The total economic investment costs of the project amount to about DR 108.5 million in 1985 prices. In the SAR, economic costs were obtained by deducting from financial project costs the import duties and local taxes. Economic costs in the PCR were derived in the same way from actual expenditures and adjusted for inflation. Economic 0&M and replacement costs were estimated on the basis of the actual investments made (irrigation, roads). Econoi. e Analysis 6.09 On the basis of the project costs and benefits discussed above, and an assumed project life of 20 years ( as in the SAR), the estimated economic rate of return of the project is about 11% (compared to 24% at appraisal). The main reasons for the lower rate of return are: (a) the significant delays in implementation; and (b) the substantially later achievement of full development (1993 instead of 1985). Given their possible inclusion in future investment operations, a separate economic analysis was carried out for the land consolidation and destoning components. For the land consolidation component, the economic costs were derived from the actual costs (para. 6.08), and amount to D 785/ha in 1985 prices for the total program. The benefits taken into account were: (a) the costs savings in production (time saved in transport, time and fuel saved for mechanized operations); and (b) the net arable land gained through elimination of various encumbrances, estimated at 1.5% of the total (533 ha) on the basis of pre- and post-consolidation data. Production increases, indirectly generated by the land consolidation program through intensification and shifts in cropping patterns towards higher-value crops, have not been counted in the benefits. Under these assumptions, the estimated economic rate of return of the land consolidation component is about 15%. On the basis of cost savings alone, the estimated economic rate of return is above 12%. Details are in Annex V, Appendix 1. For the destoning component, economic costs were derived from the actual costs and amount to DR 7,358/ha in 1985 prices for the total program. For the benefits, the most conservative estimate of land use (wheat/fallow rotation) was used. The minimum yield required to achieve an economic rate of return of 12% is 11.4 q/ha. Observations in the project area indicate that yields are around 15 q/ha, at which level the economic rate of return for the destoning component is about 21%. Details are in Annex V, Appendix 2. - 41 - VH. BANK PERFORMANCE 7.01 This Project was essentially a pilot effort addressing the difficult and sensitive area of land tenure. Consequently, its history was one of trial and error and of learning from experience. The appraisal report rightly called for a deliberately loose design of project components. Bank performance may be summarized as one of flexibility and readiness to change in reaction to changed circumstances. The flexibility so introduced and the strong supervision effort expanded over the life of the project were the key elements contributing to project performance. 7.02 Many of the problems encountered during implementation can be attributed to the very nature of the project. In retrospect, the major conceptual shortcoming of the project was the assumption, despite clear indications to the contrary, that the State lands would be available for redistribution and the formal linking of agrarian reform on State lands and land consolidation on private farms. Experience has shown that such a program is not workable in the context of the current legislative framework, as discussed in para. 3.07. Private farmers are unwilling to give up existing rights even to uneconomic size units of land in order to join a production cooperative despite the possibility of owning larger economic size holdings. The willingness of the Bank to be flexible and to learn from experience is apparent in the design changes introduced in these components over the life of the project. 7.03 The general lack of adequate data on the subsector and the project area precluded detailed recommendations on implementation in the SAR. The lack of reliable statistics on production and land use in the area (notably, no baseline data were available) had been a concern of the appraisal mission. The overestimation of the initial and projected situations in the appraisal report can be attributed to this lack of reliability. The Bank decision to proceed with the project despite obvious lack of essential data and clear Government commitment to all land reform measures included in the project, represented a calculated risk for launching a pilot effort in an untested area. While this explains a large part of the implementation problems, this calculated risk permitted the Bank to support some useful Government initiatives in the critical area of land reforms. 7.04 An aspect that was overlooked at appraisal was the institution of a monitoring and evaluation program. Although the formal Bank requirement for establishing M&E components in all projects was only established in 1976, it is surprising that this aspect was ignored, especially for a project that attempted to implement land reform on a large scale. Although agreement was subsequently reached to institute a M&E service, during the redesigned phase (following a supervision mission comprising an M&E specialist in 1982), it was never fully implemented as of the closing date. The resulting lack of "before" and "after" data makes it difficult to carry out a detailed quantitative assessment of the project's impact. - 42 - VIL LESSONS LEARNED 8.01 The experience gained in the project provides several lessons that may be of value for similar efforts in the future. These concern both the feasibility of certain project actions as well as factors of an institutional nature that affect project performance. 8.02 Land consolidation is viable and technically feasible in the Moroccan context. The success of such a program depends on several factors which must be borne in mind when designing projects is the future. The most important of these is the willingness of the farm population involved to undertake the program. This can best be achieved by providing adequate information on the nature and benefits of the program and involving beneficiaries in the decision process from an early stage. The ethnic and social structure and the age distribution of the population are important factors to take into account. From a technical standpoint, areas most suited to successful implementation of land consolidation are those with relatively minor encumbrances, good soil potential, low average farm size, high degree of fragmentation and insufficient roads and tracks network. Lessons learned from this project are being taken into account in the several land consolidation projects involving some 75,000 ha currently under preparation at MARA. 8.03 In the existing legal framework, the linkage of agrarian reform and land consolidation on private lands (a not feasible. However, the concept of utilizing State lands in a consolidation program to achieve larger farm sixes is probably a valid one. Future efforts in this area would benefit from a review of the Agrarian Reform Laws and the introduction of changes making it possible to distribute State lands to private farmers without mandatory creation of Agrarian Reform cooperatives. 8.04 The success of the destoning program in the project suggests that such operations could be valuable complementary actions in future rainfed development projects. These programs are cost effective, relatively simple to implement and yield quick results. They are likely to be most successful in areas where intensification on high potential lands is prevented by the density of stones and where beneficiaries are likely to be well motivated. In addition to the direct production benefits achieved through higher cropping intensities, such programs, being highly labor-intensive, can provide sizeable employment opportunities. 8.05 Projects of this type are best if designed loosely, with built-in flexibility to enable quick reaction to changing circumstances. The success of some components of the project can largely be attributed to this. One lesson learned regarding project design is that in a complex project with many components, it is desirable to aim for maximum complementarity between components. Besides the synergic effects of such a design, supervision activity is greatly facilitated. Similarly, if a project is designed to address a key complex constraint such as land tenure as its major focus, it is desirable to limit other project actions to relatively simple interventions. 8.06 A major lesson learned from this project and one that should be kept in mind for future projects is the absolute necessity of including and assuring the implementation of a monitoring and evaluation system as a separate project component. If suitably qualified people are not available - 43 - locally to staff a M&E unit, the project should envisage the hiring of consultants to set up the unit from the very start of the project and to train project staff so that this function can be later assumed locally. Such training would in itself be a valuable project achievement. The unit should collect basic information to enable a reliable assessment of project impact, which would ideally consist of baseline data and yearly surveys to measure trends in the "after project" situation. For actions such as land consolidation data should be collected over at least five years after implementation. Assessments undertaken immediately after implementation run the risk of not capturing the full impact of such programs. A full impact study of this program by OED in about five years would provide useful information on the long-term viability of land consolidation. If a suitable M&E effort it is established immediately by the Government, the necessary data can be collected and analyzed with a view to formulating more detailed recommendations for future reference. 8.07 From an organisational standpoint, management of a project of this nature through an existing provincial administration is preferable to creating a separate project entity. The provincial administration is likely to have long standing established contact with the beneficiaries and a better understanding of local conditions in the project area. It would also be able to draw upon various technical services within the administration for better implementation of the project. 8.08 Major lessons learned under the project are being taken into account by the Government in the design of future programs of land consolidation and destoning, while more attention is being given to the setting up of monitoring and evaluation units in other rainfed agriculture development projects. The Government has initiated, in the context of its agricultural medium-term adjustment program supported by the first Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loan (FY85), an extension of the comprehensive lond policy already developed for irrigated areas to the rainfed sector. The major objectives of this new land policy in the rainfed sector are to: (a) strengthen the knowledge of characteristics and of productive potential of holdings as a necessary data base for implementation of land-related operations; (b) encourage the establishment of economically viable production units; and (c) provide a better security of tenure to tenant farmers. The lessons learned under the project have been used for the design of the draft legislation and policy instruments in the first two areas. ータダー メぐ汝j砂ぐ必グ片 - 45 ANNEX I Tabl e I KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MEKNES AdRICULTURE DEMILOpmENT pgOjECT COMPLETION REPORT AbOraisal and Final Cost Estimates Actual as ApRraisal EstiMAtes Actual /d % of Total Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Appraisal ---------------- (In US$ Million) --------------- A. Land Reto 1. Aerial Photography 0.13 1.08 1.21 O.OS 0.4S 0.50 41 2. Topographic Survey 0.97 0.9S 1.92 0.01 0.02 0.03 2 3. Cadastral Survey 0.41 0.39 0.80 0.23 0.23 0.46 57 4. Agra-econo.Aic Study 0.28 0.27 0.55 0.27 0.27 G.S4 98 S. $oil Survey 0.72 0.69 1.41 Al - 6. Land Consolidation 1.78 1.72 3.50 1.49 1.48 2.97 8S & Settlement Plan Sub-Total IM Ail L" 1Z 0. 881tonino Lm 1JA JAM 1 n 14M zz C. Coonerative Infrastructure 1. water Supply 2.22 2.1S 4.37 0.81 0.80 1.61 37 2. small Irrigation 0.24 0.27 8.91 0.81 :.17 1.98 388 3. Buildings (Storage) 1.30 0.84 2.14 0.15 0.09 0.24 11 4. No&ds O.OS 0.12 0.17 0.63 2.21 2.84 1,670 . Sub-Total SAI LM ZJ2 1.0 AJZ AAZ 21 0. Bittit Irrioation 1. Survey & Studies 0.16 0.09 0.2S 0.04 0.02 0.06 24 2. Rehabilitation 2.34 1.52 3.86 0.92 0.6s I.S7 41 3. Extn. of Irrigation O.Sl O.S? 1.08 /r, - Sub-Total LM AAAZ JAI 31 E. Proiect Administration 1. Buildings a. Offices 0.11 0.04 O.IS 0.4t; 0.20 0.60 400 b. Extension Staff housing 1.87 0.82 2.69 0.34 0.18 O.S2 19 2. Equipment & Vehicle 0.02 0.30 0.32 0.02 0.31 0.33 103 3. Local Staff Salaries 3.29 - 3.29 0.64 - O.S4 16 Sub-Total F. ConsUltants 1. Land Reform 0.12 0.43 O.SS 0.02 0.06 0 08 14 2. Short Term 0.04 0.30 0.34 0.01 0.09 0.10 29 3. Colleclive Lands Study 0.08 0.19 0.27 Sub-Total AAA AJU Tim 18.41 14.09 22.41 /1 17.30 12 /j Reconstructed based on appraisal report taking into account physical and price contingencies per category. /h Not possible to disaggregate. /r Component not implemented. /A Using weighted average exchange rates based on period & category of expenditures. /a Difference between this. amount and amount disbursed (US$6.S4 million) can be explained by; (i) incorrect amounts requested by government resulting in losses of around US$0-40 million; (ii) expenses incurred but not requested for reimbursement by closing date. of around US$0.6S million; (iii) foreign exchange losses due to delays in submission of reimbursement requests (see Annex IV. Table 2); and (iv) error resulting from averaging exchange rates in computation of doller- equivalent costs. 1707f, p.36 - 46 - Table 2 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Appraisal and Final Cost Estimates Actual as Aparaisal Estimates LA Actual % of Total Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Appraisal -------------------(In OH Million)-------------- A. Land Retnn 1. Aerial Photography 0.52 4.49 5.01 0.22 1.94 2.16 43 2. Topographic Survey 4.01 3.94 7.95 0.07 0.08 0.15 2 3. Cadastral Survey 1.68 1.61 3.29 0.99 0.98 1.97 60 4. Agro-economic Study 1.17 1.12 2.29 1.15 1.15 2.30 100 5. Soil Survey 2.99 2.88 5.87 /A 6. Land Consolidation 7.37 7.12 14.49 6.30 6.30 12.60 87 & Settlement Plan Sub-Total 1Z.J4 1..i 3A0 8.ll 10.A 19.1 S 8. Destaning Zil JIM A,] .gg aM,, 15,, Jag C. CgoMrative Infrastructure 1. Water Supply 9.20 8.93 18.13 S.90 5.84 11.74 6S 2. Small Irrigation 1.00 1.10 2.10 5.47 7.96 13.43 639 3. Buildings (Storage) 5.40 3.47 8.87 1.08 0.73 1.81 20 4. Roads 0.20 0.50 0.70 3.93 13.77 17.70 2.528 Sub-Total 1S,AA &I 2. 1628 28.20 AA4.68 in 0. Bittit Irrigation 1. Survey & Studies 0.68 0.34 9.62 0.33 0.19 0.52 51 2. Rehabilitation 9.68 6.30 15.98 7.26 5.22 12.48 78 3. Extn. of Irrigation 2.12 2.38 4.50 /C - Sub-Total 12.4a 2.. 21.50 Z.JS LA1 1.00 Afa E. Prolect Administration 1. Buildings a. Offices 0.4S 0.18 0.63 2.96 1.48 4.44 705 b. Extension Staff housing 7.73 3.36 11.09 2.08 1.11 3.19 29 2. Equipment & Vehicles 0.07 1.19 1.26 0.13 2.25 2.38 189 3. Local Staff Salaries 13.62 13.62 3.27 3.27 24 Sub-Total 21.87 L.nZ.2 A& 2..80 113.28 .t F. Consultants 1. Land Reform 0.50 1.77 2.27 0.12 0.41 0 53 23 2. Short Term 0.17 1.23 1.40 0.09 0.65 0.74 53 3. Collective Lands Study 0.33 0.80 1.13 /S - Sub-Total l.0 2.AA 4SA AI1 lafl 1..2Z 2f IIAL 26.20 57.90 13l1l S,2 AZ.J1 102A40 8 /a Reconstructed based on appraisal report taking into account physical and price contingencies per category. /h Not possible to disaggregate. /& Coqmonent not iaplemented. 1707E p.35 KINGDOM OF M.~ MEKNES AGRIULTURL DVLPETPlC CMPLEHIM.EER Proiect Costs by Year (in millions of Dirham) Components 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total A. Land Reform - - 0.59 2.54 2.65 4.81 1.S7 5.54 1.06 - 0.59 19.35 3. Destoning - - - - - - 2.05 6.26 3.72 3.35 0.59 15.97 C. Cooperative Infrastructure /a - - 6.04 S.73 3.89 17.47 5.09 6.46 44.68 S 0. Bittit Irrigation - - - - - - - 0.02 0.42 7.94 4.62 13.00 E. Project Administration /1 - 0.11 0.33 0.66 0.65 2.21 2.71 2.78 2.13 0.90 0.96 13.43 F. Consultants & Professional Training - - - - - - 0.09 0.28 0.37 0.22 0.01 0.97 TOTAL - 0.11 0.92 3.20 3.30 13.06 12.15 18.77 25.17 17.30 13.22 107.40 /a Includes roads and small scale irrigation. /I Includes office buildings. 1707E. p.36 KINGDOM OF MACCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PAD.1ECT COMPLETION REPORTf Comarison Between Original Physical Tarets and Actual molementation SAR ACTUAL Component Physical Targets Cost % of Total Physical Construction Cost % of Total A. Land Refom /a Consolidated: /r Distributed 28.700 /4 41.02 30.59 Consolidated: 36,000 Distributed 7,873 19.35 18.14 B. Destanine 5,000 ha 11.62 8.66 5.705 ha 15.99 14.88 C. Conn. Infrastructure water Supply /h 80 wells inter alia 18.37 13.70 14 wells inter alia 11.73 10.92 Small Irrigation 600 ha 2.11 1.S7 400 ha /a 13.43 12.50 1 Buildings /4 8.93 6.66 17 constructed & rehabilited 1.81 1.68 p Roads 160 km .L1 _21 538 km. 198 gravelled 1.70 16, to Subtotal 30.12 22.46 44.68 41. D. ittit /a 3,500 ha rehabilitated. 500 ha new 21.02 15.67 1,058 rehabilitated 13.00 12.40 E. Project Administration Buildings - Offices 1 Headquarters building + 1 Work Center 0.62 0.46 1 NQ + 2 CT + 2 Sub. Cent. 4.44 4.13 - Extension Staff Hqs. 48 3-rm., 80 2-rm 10.81 8.06 20 houses 3.19 2.97 Equipment & Vehicles 10 cars. 3 pickups, 64 motorcycles 1.12 0.83 40 cars. 10 pick-ups. S tractors 2.38 2.22 Local Staff Salaries 13.81 10.30 3.27 3.04 Subtotal 26.36 19.66 13.28 12.36 F. Consultant 3.96 2.95 0.97 0.90 TOTAL 134.10 99.99 / 107.40 99.98 /f /a Not possible to disaggregate. /A Includes water dist. systems, pumping and storage centers. etc. I Not specified. /4 Of which 19,000 ha of State land. 2.350 ha of private land and 7,300 ha of collective land. /a Includes 5 additional seguias not part of the cooperatiaves included at later stage. /f Does not add up to 100 due to rounding. 1707E. p39 ANNEX M KINGDOM OP MOROCCO EKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Procurement Summary /a A. Proeurement and Financial Status Total Category Contract Payment by Transmitted Actual Amount Government to Bank Disbursement - (DH Million)---------- 1 A 19.49 19.15 18.12 8.52 1 B 68.29 61.31 61.10 28.72 1 C 4.84 4.72 4.32 2.03 2 2.80 2.80 2.80 1.60 3 1.81 1.46 1.46 1.04 Total 97.23 89.42 87.80 41.91 B. Type of Procurement Category Method of Number of Amount Procurement Contracts (DR Million) 1 A ICB 6 18.08 LCB 5 1.41 1 B LCB 73 66.92 NGB 4 1.37 1 C LCB 11 4.46 NGB 1 0.38 2 ICB 4 0.48 LCB 11 1.97 NGB 3 0.34 3 ICB 2 1.03 LCB 3 0.78 Total ICB 12 19.60 LCB 99 75.54 NGB 8 2.09 119 97.23 /a Based on requests received before February 15, 1985 (1707E p40) - 50 - ANNEX I Table 1 KINGCOM OF MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION R&PORT Chedule of Disbursements Accumulated Disbursements (US$ Million) IDA/Fiscal Year --------------------------------------- Actual Appraisal Actual as % Estimate of Appraisal September 30, 1975 - - December 31, 1975 - - - March 31. 1976 - 0.18 - June 30. 1976 - 0.36 - 1926i/ZZ September 30. 1976 - 0.66 - December 31. 1976 - 0.99 - March 31. 1977 - 1.35 - June 30. 1977 - 1.73 - 19ZZ/Z& September 30, 1977 - 2.48 - December 31. 1977 - 3.23 - March 31. 1978 0.11 3.98 3 June 30. 1978 - 4.76 - 19Z8/Z Septaber 30. 1978 0.12 S.92 2 December 31. 1978 - 7.08 - March 31, 1979 0.30 8.24 4 June 30, 1979 - 9.43 - 1929/.8D September 30. 1979 - 10.32 December 31. 1979 - 10.92 March 31, 1980 - 11.55 June 30, 1980 1.03 12.17 8 1la11 September 30. 1980 - 12.79 - December 31. 1980 1.22 13.45 9 March 31. 1981 1.38 14.00 10 June 30. 1981 2.07 - 19812 September 30. 1981 2.21 16 December 31, 1981 - March 31. 1982 2.69 19 June 30. 1982 2.78 20 19122 September 30, 1982 2.93 21 December 31. 1982 3.45 25 March 31. 1983 4.24 30 June 30. 1983 1983/1984 September 30, 1983 - December 31. 1983 4.85 35 March 31, 1984 5.67 40 June 30. 1984 - - 1984/1985 September 30. 1984 6.41 46 December 31. 1984 - - March 31, 1985 6.54 47 1707E. p.41 KINGDOM OF MDADCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DELoPMEhT PIPJECT COMPLETION REPORT Main ExaMOeS Of Moroco's Losses of Forein Exchange Resulting from Delayed Disbursmnt Atuests Dates of Date Application Amount Payment made Received Date Paid Length Result of Result if reimburse/ Losses to Morocco Number Disbursed to Contractors by Bank by Bank of..1ay Actual ment request had in Foreign Exchange (ON 1000) (Months) Disbursement been prompt ---------------(US$ 00)----------- 4 643 06/79 03/15/80 04/18/80 10 157 165 8 5 822 03/79 12/28/79 04/18/80 10 201 211 10 9 738 OS/80 09/16/80 09/30/80 5 186 194 8 10 778 7-8/80 01/16/81 02/17/81 8-7 164 205 41 I0a 109 7-8/80 01/16/81 06/18/81 8-7 20 25 5 11 3,602 10-12/80 04/21/81 05/11/81 8-5 661 907 246 13 2,798 09-10/81 01/20/82 03/05/82 5-4 473 526 S3 Ia + 14a 1.133 10-12/81 12/03/82 12/09/82 15-12 181 213 32 Is 878 02-03/82 07/08/82 08/06/82 7-6 140 148 8 16 2,193 04-05/82 11/01/82 12/06/82 8-7 3S0 355 S 17 1,919 07/82 12/20/82 01/24/83 6 306 31 6 17a 339 07/82 12/20/82 02/10/83 6 51 5S 4 18 1,007 10/82 02/08/83 03/07/83 6 153 161 8 21 2.908 08/83 12/14/83 12/30/83 S 361 424 63 24 222 12/81 06/13/84 07/16/84 30 25 42 17 Ial 20.0t la LM9 1.21M AU /a Total disbursed = ON 45.74 million IM1: This table shows a partial listing of foreign exchange losses, since iteam with delays of less than five months were omitted, as were items with losses amounting to less than US$5,000. In addition, losses due to foregone interest earnings were not included. 1707E. p.42 KINGDOM OF NOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTU DEVELOPMENT PRO.ECT COMPLEIZM RJEPORT Total Cropped Area. Yields and Production - Camarisan of AnDraisal Estimates and Actual Situation (1975 and 1985) - Situation in 1975 --------------------- - Situation in 1985 ------------ SAR ------------ --------- Actual /k --------- ------------ SAR ------------ ---------- Actual /C ---------- Crs AYA 1ield Production AA Yitld Production AM Yi1 Production Aa eld Production hal (T/hal (T) thal (T/hal (TI thal (T/hal (T) (hal (T/hal /d (T) Durum Wheat 35,145 1.50 51,850 27,441 1.50 41.161 33,715 2.00 67.650 25,863 1.60 41,380 Bread Wheat 13,040 1.90 24.710 10,210 1.90 19,399 19.325 2.38 46,095 15,943 2.10 33,480 Legumws 13,S65 0.88 12.015 10.210 0.70 7.147 13,080 0.98 12,815 5,802 0.70 4,061 Sunflower 4.540 1.00 4,540 3,510 1.00 3.510 7.245 1.00 7,245 298 1.00 298 1 Late Potatoes 1,320 20.00 26,400 1.021 13.00 13.273 1.480 22.68 32,775 1.192 14.70 17,522 . Winter Vegetables 2.630 10.00 26.300 1.915 10.00 19.150 2,960 11.10 32.205 2,912 12.00 34,944 r Suer Vegetables 2.630 20.00 52.600 1,915 20.00 38,300 2,960 24.05 69,750 958 22.00 21,076 Onions 1,320 24.99 32.990 1.021 20.00 20,420 1.480 25.76 40.195 3,316 20.50 67,978 Tobacco 90 1.00 90 64 1.00 64 140 1.00 140 240 1.05 252 Alfalfa/Vetch oat 300 50.00 15.000 574 35.00 20.090 300 57.58 17,850 4,979 37.50 186.712 Orchards 4,150 20.00 83,000 3,191 10.00 31,910 4.150 30.00 125,000 5,495 14.00 76.930 Vineyards 3.300) 7.00 23,000 1.100 7.00 7,700 3,300) 7.00 23,000 2,769 7.00 19,383 Olive groves ) - - 2,200 2.00 4,400 ) - - 2,213 2.00 4,426 Sub-total 2.f3 - - 6LA1 - 90,11U - - 71,9.0 Fallow /A 8,350 /a 5,440 Total 82,030 72,166 90.135 77,420 /a No estimate available. /h Estimates made by the completion mission on the basis of agricultural statistics for the project area (1975-77) / Based on surveys done in the project area in 1982 and 1984. /1 Average yialds for the project area; the surveys indicate higher yields on private lands. 1707E. p.43 - 53 - ANNEX V Table 2 KIGDOM OF MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Economic Analysis - Summary of Costs and Benefits Streams NET TOTAL LAND CIVIL 0 AND TOTAL TOTAL PERIODS BENEFITS DESTONING REFORN REPLACENENT VORKS N COSTS BENEFITS 1 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 2 0.00 0.00 1.14 0,00 0,50 0.00 1.64 -1,64 3 0.00 0.00 4.48 0.00 0,90 0.00 5.38 -5#38 4 0.00 0.00 4.32 0.00 0.82 0,00 5.14 -5.14 5 0.00 0.00 716 0.00 9.56 0.00 16.72 -16#72 6 0.00 2.41 2.19 0.00 8.69 4,29 17658 -17.58 7 3.25 667 6,97 1.05 6.24 4.29 25.22 -21o97 8 4,50 3.74 1.61 0.00 17.57 4.29 27.21 -22.71 9 7.08 3.00 0,22 2.64 10.92 4.29 21.07 -13*99 10 10,11 0.47 0*54 0.00 8.42 4,29 13.72 -3.61 11 13.83 0.00 0.00 1.30 0.00 4.29 5,59 8.24 12 19.06 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 4.29 4,96 1410 13 23.76 0.00 0.00 0400 0.00 4.29 4.29 19.47 14 27o16 0,00 0.00 2.64 0.00 4.29 6.93 20,23 15 33.08 0100 0.00 0,00 0.00 4,29 4.29 28,79 16 40,08 0.00 0.00 1.30 0.00 4.29 5,59 34.49 17 44.93 0100 0.00 041 0.00 4,29 4.70 40.23 18 50.90 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4,29 4.29 46.61 19 60.75 0.00 0.00 2.64 0.00 4.29 6.93 53o82 20 60.75 0,00 0.00 0,00 0.00 4,29 4,29 56.46 Internal Rates of Return of Net Streams N.TOT 11.422 - 54 - ANNEX V Appendix 1 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO IMMN AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Economic Analysis of the Land Consolidation Component Economic Costs 1. For the computation of economic costs, all the preliminary studies (aerial photography, reconnaissance studies and cadastral surveys, soil and agro-economic studies) were valued at their actual financial cost, while consolidation works (including roads) were adjusted by the construction conversion factor (0.75). Sconomic costs have been phased according to the actual expenditure patterns under the project and have been adjusted in 1985 prices. Eonomic BeqeWfts 2. They include: (a) the cost savings in mechanized operations (time saved in transport, time and fuel saved for the operation itself); and (b) the net gain in arable land through the consolidation program. Table 1 presents the estimated time necessary to carry out various mechanized operations and was prepared on the basis of surveys in the project area. Table 2 presents the estimated time necessary to carry out these mechanized operations in the two districts before and after consolidation and the corresponding time savings attributable to the project (6,600 hours, or 1.5% of total time spent). The Losa methodology has been used to estimate time served in transport and is presented below. 3. In a given area, the number of trips necessary to carry out farming operations can be expressed as follows: A (1)n = n ( 1 + 1 /s) with n: number of trips/ha n: adjustment coefficient (10 < n < 30 in rainfed lands) s: average size of plots The time necessary for transport (T) can be expressed as follows: (2) T = wn.D) with D: average distance of each trip v v: speed (6km/h on earth roads, 14 km/h on gravel roads) To estimate D, the following formula is used: (3) D - 5 (D is very sensitive to farm Y 4,000 fragmantation) - 55 - ANNEX V Appendx 1 Page 2 This gives for D a value of 6.6 km in the case of Dir and Sebat ioun districts. Table 3 presents the time spent in transport before and after consolidation (with a difference of 43,740 hours or 4.8% of the total time spent). 4. Before construction of the roads and tracks network, 28% of the time was spent on mechanized operations in the field and 725 in transport, while after construction of the network, these values became 48% and 52% respectively. 5. Total time saved in the consolidated areas can then be estimated at 50.351 hours/tractor-year (1.42 hour/ha). Since the economic costs of 1 hour of tractor services is about DR 100, the annual economic cost savings attributable to the project amount to about DR 3.6 million/year. 6. ' To estimate the economic benefit of the net gain in arable land (533 ha over the entire consolidated area), each additional hectare put under cultivation has been valued on the basis of the net average economic return of 2T of wheat/year, which is very conservative (DO 1850). Econooe Rate of Return 7. Based on the costs and benefits mentioned above, the economic rate of return of the land consolidation component computed on a 25 year period (to take into account the risk of fragmentation through inheritance in the area) is 14.8%. On the basis of cost savings alone, the ERR would still be 12.3% (see Table 4). 1707E, p.45-46 - 56 - ANNEX V Appendix 1 Table 1 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MEKUM AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Economic Analysis of the Land Consolidation Component Average Time Necessary for Mechanized Operations PLOT SIZE I'M/HOURS/HA 0-1 ha 14.7 1-2 ha 13.4 2-5 ha 12.0 5-10 ha 10.5 over 10 ha 9.2 1707E, p.47 -57 - ANNEX V Appendix 1 Table 2 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Economie Analysis of the Land Consolidation Component Time Necessary for Mechanized Operations in the Two Districts Time (hours/ba) Plot Size Before ConsolidatioA After Consolidation 0-1 ha 16,214 9,335 1-2 ha 19,015 12,730 1-5 ha 32,448 26,352 5-10 ha 26,617 21,378 Over 10 ha 255,843 273,728 TOTAL 350,137 343,523 1707E, p48 - 58 - Appendix 1 Table 3 KIml OF MORCCO MEKNES AGRICULTu= OVLOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EconoMie Analvis of the Land Consolidatien Camponent Time Spent in Trantport with Machinery Before Consolidation PLOT SIZE NMER OF PLOTS åYRAGE SIZE N/HA) TOTAL AREA l TINE thoursI 0-1 ha 2.760 0.4046 69.4 1.116.7 77.499 85.249 1-2 ha 1.014 1.4177 34.1 1,437.6 49.022 53.924 2-5 ha 884 3.0982 26.5 2.738.8 72.578 79.836 5-10 ha 369 1.9582 22.9 2.567.6 58,798 64.678 over 10 ha 473 59.5468 20.3 28,165.7 57176 628.94 TOTAL 829;661 912.627 After Cmnsol idtion 0-1 ha 1.506 0.4215 67.5 634.7 42.842 47,126 1-2 ha 672 1.4131 34.2 949.6 32.476 35,724 2-5 ha 694 3.1647 26.3 2.196.3 57,763 63.539 5-10 ha 293 6.9510 22.9 2.306.6 52.821 58.103 over 10 ha 473 62.9041 20.3 29.753.6 602.998 6.29 TOTAL 783.900 868.890 1707E. p.49 -59- ANNEX V Appendix 1 Table 4 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO BEKaM AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Economic Analysis of the Land Consolidation Component SUMMARY TABLE BENEFITS NET INCREMENTAL COSTS COST SAVINGS GAIN IN ARABLE LAND BENEFITS 0 9,775 - - -9,775 1 9,812 1,500 391 -7,921 2 5,396 2,750 716 -2,034 3 5,141 3i150 820 -1,111 4 0 3,600 940 4,540 5 0 3,600 940 4,540 6 0 3,600 940 4,540 7 0 3,600 940 4,540 8 0 3,600 940 4,540 9 0 3,600 940 4,540 10 0 3,600 940 4,540 11 0 3,600 940 4,540 12 0 3,600 940 4,540 13 0 3,600 940 4,540 14 0 3,600 940 4,540 15 0 3,600 940 4,540 ER: 14.8% 1707E, p.50 - 60 - ANNEX V Appendix 2 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Economic Analysis of the Destoning Component Economic Costs 1. For the computation of economic costs, the total average financial cost per hectare in 1985 prices of destoning was broken down into its two components - mechanized works and labor. These were adjusted by the respective conversion factors of 0.8 for mechanized works and 0.7 for labor. All costs are assumed to occur in year 1. Economde Benefits 2. In the "before" destoning situation, the land was assumed to be rangeland, yielding 125 F.U. per hectare, with an economic value of DR 0.65/UF. ' The "after" situation assumes the most conservative use of land, i.e., soft wheat/fallow rotation. Gross value of production and production costs were valued in 1985 economic prices. The production technology assumed is representative of that observed in the project area and uses relatively low mechanization.A/ Benefits are assumed to start in year 2. Economic Rate of Return 3. The approach used attempted to measure the minimum yield of wheat required to obtain an economic rate of return of 12% over 20 years. Under the assumptions mentioned above, the switching value was obtained at a yield of 11.4 q/ha. A conservative estimate of the actual situation in the project area suggests a yield of around 15 q/ha. At this yield, the economic rate of return is 20.7%. 1/ From "Range Management Improvement Prospects - Morocco", EMPA2 Staff Working Paper, June 1982 2/ Production and cost data taken from "Prices and Incentives Study", (draft), MARA/AIRD, April 1985 - 61 - ANNEX VI Table 1 KINGDOM OF MROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Water Availability. Area Commanded and Irrigated Before and After Rehabilitation of Network Area Area Irrigated Area Irrigated Perimeter/ASAP Water Availability Conmanded Before Rehabilitation After Rehabilitation (/s) (ha) (ha) (ha) Bitit 785 /A 3.500 910 549 /1 915 Small Irrigation mijja 400 686 266 379 AVn 61ume 250 .2.565 200 232 An Aioun 98 667 59 91 Mahdouma 100 767 64 93 Ambajar 60 126 43 S6 /A Average flow available at the headworks at time of appraisal. /1 Future situation after additional off-take by RADEM and deduction made of water used for irrigation in Fes province. 1710E. p.52 - 62 - ANNEX VI Table 2 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Bittit Water Balance At Appraisal Actual L/S U/S Yield of Bittit Spring 1,420 1,420 Off-Take by. RADEN 400 800 Water Available 1,020 620 Water from Seba& Spring 310 310 Total irrigation water 1,330 930 Water for Fee (41%) 545 381 Water for M4knes (59%) 785 549 17078, p.53 - 63 - ANNEX VII KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MEKNES AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT OUTLINE OF THE PROCEDURES USED FOR PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF CONSOLIDATION PROJECTS. 1. A Consolidation Commission, chaired by the local authorities (Caid) and comprising representatives of the administration and of farmers is constituted (Decree of August 3, 1962). The role of the Commission is first to delineate precisely the territorial boundaries of the area to be consolidated, to assess the physical characteristics of the farms, and establish the classification of all plots in categories according to their soil potential. It then formalizes the project and submits it to the local authority for public inquiry for one month. During that period, the Commission receives the comments of the beneficiaries and takes them into account to the extent that they are not contrary to the public interest. At the end of the inquiry period, the Commission formally adopts the final project and transmits it through the Minister of Agriculture to the Prime Minister for approval. 2. Upon publication of the decree approving the consolidation project in the Official Gazette (Journal Officiel), the registrar publishes an announcement stating the date and time at which demarcation of the properties will begin. This notice is published in the offices of the magistrate, the caid and the registrar at least 10 days before the date set. On the prescribed date, the registrar causes the boundaries to be defined by the sworn surveyor in the presence of the consolidation commission and the affected owners. He then draws up minutes of proceedings identical to those prescribed for land title registration (immatriculation). Six months after the announcement in the Official Gazette, the registrar proceeds to prepare the land titles. If objections are lodged, he transmits the file for the cases in dispute to the regional court in accordance with the provisions of the land tenure legislation. 1707E, p.54 认 IBRD 112이（PP시 꽈
Groupe de la Banque mondiale · Project Performance Assessment Report
Morocco - Meknes Agriculture Development Project
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Project Performance Assessment Report
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Maroc
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Banque mondiale