Ecuador - Technical Assistance Project

The World Bank FOR OFFICL4L USE ONLY Report No. 6327 . , PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECUADOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 1230-EC) June 30, 1986 Projects Department Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFCAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANKF O Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. 04k. of Dk.ctat-GewaI Opvaicn IV" E* June 30, 1986 _ EMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Ecuador Technical Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Ecuador Technical Assistance Project (Loan 1230-EC)" prepared by the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office. Further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evalua- tion Department has not been made. This document has a strictd dstrbution and may be used by ncpients on In the peformuuc of their ofelet duties Its contents may not othwinse be diacosed without Wodd Bank authoutlon.  ECUADOR 1FI OFICIUL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 1230-EC) Table of Contents Page No. PREFACE *,***.*............***** i BAIC DATA SHEET .,****** -************@0*****oooOOOOOO EVALUATION SUMMoRY'e0** 0000.6.00...... 00.0 o*ooo.... -..t.-.. iii Project Objectives *...***.**.,..,,..*,**** '*.00000...* ii Project Implementation ........ ..... 000*00000**0 iv Lessons Learned .......oov.** ****........, v 24, IN'rRODUCTION I....... II. PROJECT FORMULATION I Identification, Preparation and Appraisal .................. 1 Negotiations and Board Approval ....................e..... 2 Project Objectives and Descriptions 2 III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 3. a............. , 3 At Achievemen:s by Component 4 Be Disbursements *...***.* .****..** 7 Co Procurement 7 D. Reports and Auditing 8......*.8 E. Compliance with Covenants .... 8 F. Performance of Consultants 8 IV. AGRICULTURAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 8 V. BANK PERFORMANCE 9 VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 9 VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....... ..................... 10 ANNEXES . 12 Attachment I - Comments from the Ministry of Agriculture 14 and Livestock .......0o0oee............... 14 Attachment II - Comments from CEDEGE .................... 16 Attachment III - Comments from INERHI 9................... 19 Attachment IV - Comments from the National Pre-Investment Fund ................. 21 Attachment V - Comments from the National Development Board 23 MAP Thb documnt has a ratted distrdbutn nd may be ued by ropents ony in te peformane ofthi oici dutI.l 1w contats my ot ohrwie be disoed withou Wodd ank ugtboraton.  -i1- ECUADOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT LOAN 1230-SC PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is the project completion report (PCR) for the Technical Assistance Project (Loan 1230-EC). A loan of US$4.0 million was approved by the Board March 30, 1976 and the Loan Agreement was signed May 24, 1976. The estimated project co8t was US$5.6 million of which the Bank would finance 71X. The final project cost was about US$3.7 willion of which the Bank financed about 75%. Total disbursements as of June 30, 1984 were US$2.83 million and US$1.7 million was cancelled September 20, 1984. The PCR was prepared by the Latin America and Caribbean Region Agricultural Division C following a desk review of preparation documents, staff appraisal report, presidents report, supervision reports, the correspondence files and consultants reports prepared under the project. A PCR summary was prepared by the Borrower. Following a review of the PCR by OED staff, it was decided not to audit the project and the PCR was sent to the Borrower for comment on April 30, 1986. Comments are attached as Attacbments I-V.  tLem lan- ASIC DATA 8812? KS? 1P20J2T DAT Appraisal Actual or Actual S of btXtc ~ ~ ~ ~~cta AbtX 1 ppraisal Endtif Project Costs (Ws$ million) 5.6 3.7 66 lon Amount (W$ sutltan) 4.0 2.8 70 Data berd Aprocvl 3/30/76 - _ Data If fectiteas 10/20/76 - Dat Ptltesal CDo_mots Coapleted - - Proportion then Completed - Closing Date 12/31/80 12/31)83 Ecoomc Rate of Isiurn N.S U.S N Il. STAN? PUTS m76 IT77 a_18 1179 80 16l 162 1183 n14 M8 TOTAL Identificstion/ Preparation 2.2 2.2 Appr*ail 10.2 10.2 ngotiatton 7.7 7.7 Supervieion 6.6 14.7 5.7 12.9 12.9 19.1 10.1 12.7 5.9 7.0 127.0 26.8 14.7 5.7 12.9 12.9 19.1 10.1 12.7 5.9 7.0 127.3 cm 8nAT9 DlSBVIRBTM 1177 T78 1179 0 118 118 183 14 18S AppreaI REtiste (U# mIllon) 1.8 3.20 4.00 Actual (US1 ailUon) .14 *24 .36 .44 .44 1.30 1.72 1.47 2.63 Data of Anail Disburs_nt; 09/20/84 Printcial Revpad (1s$ dllioa) .11 .35 .62 .90 1.21 1.38 MISSION DAT Data No. of UnY Specaliationa Perfora Tp of rsilLon (oo./Yr.) PrsorvW in Ptel d eprasenAtedf ftttngL tredjc lrobl m Identification 1/75 7 20 d,*.aco,c,d,o - - - Prepratioa 10/75 3 19 ,; - . - Appl"l 1 3 25 *,a,* - - - leat Appraisal - - S:prvision 1 6/76 2 4 *,a 1 2 Suprvion 2 8/76 2 6 a I 2 U Suparvilstn 3 2/71 1 9 a 2 2 r Suprvision 4 9/77 1 10 3 2 U Sudrvision S 10/77 2 7 d,a 3 2 t Supervision b bl79 3 10 *.e. * I P.It Sndtp5ision 7 lO/79 2 6 d. -d Supervuison 8 1/80 1 3 a 1 2 P,t SuprviCion 9 3/80 1 9 a - - t ,P,t Supervison 10 4/80 1 - a _ _ _ Supervision It 1/81 I 10 a 3 2 P.t Supervsion 12 6/81 2 5 a,. 3 2 N.t Spervision 13 12/81 2 8 *,d 3 2 P.T,N Supervistin 14 3/S2 1 10 a Supervision 15 10/82 2 5 s.o Supervion 16 12/82 1 4 - -d Suparvision 17 5/83 1 10 d 2 1 T., supervision 18 9/83 1 14 a 2 2 T,1 Supervision 1s 2/84 1 8 * 2 I T,l Total SPI isions: 19 Completton mistions 1/85 1 10 a - - 05 PXOJtSt DATA Borrower Coveronas of ca dot Executing A4nncy IWOIU, UDoU, It1l, CU1s5. WAC Nam of Currecy (abbreviation) Suect Carrency Sechange Arta: Appraisl Yet Average 1976 US$1 * 25.00 Intrving Yer Aerage 1971-1981 1l891 * 25.00 1982 111 - 33.15 1963 1161 - 54.10 Copletion Tear Averg 1984 US#1 - 67.18 follow-on Projactt maslo Ib Proj3etsl Tuurabu, Pto. tin Coon, nd Ia _raldaa Loan/Dsist 1644. 191, end 2044-SC lan/Jonft (CSUillioo) 16" - 5I8 14 1991 - US$20 1, 244 - US$17 it Dait Board Appro;al 1644 - 12/21/78, 1l9 - 05/15/81, 2044 - 05/15/81 A - agrivclturtlist; b * agricultural economist; onftnceial analyst; dirr, engineerg a *conmit; ftlvttock speialist; tb S"cialist; h-credit speciilist; I * ibgway enginer; 3-saitatioa engner I - Proble-fr or Uior Probilem; 2 - VAderat- Problem; 3 - Major Problem. 1 * Improvin; 2 Stationaryt 3 * Dterioratbi. I P*nuacilt- N *_rtsrial T ; Tle micallP * PoliticAt O * Other.  - iiI - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECUADOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Loan 1230-EC) Evaluation Summary Introduction 1. The project arose from the Technical Cooperation Project (TCP) for Rural Development ATN/SF 1196-VA, financed by the Bank, which provided consultant assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture (NAG) for identification and preparation of integrated rural development VIRD) projects. Following the TCP, Government requested Bank support to provide technical assistance to establish a special unit to strengthen MAG capacity to identify and prepare rural deveiopment projects. Loan 12'10-EC was prepared and appraised in October 1975 in the process of preparing a series of rural development projezts that later formed the basis of the Tungurahua Project (Ln. 1644-BC), Puerto Ila Chone Project (Ln. 1991-EC), and the Esmeraldas Project (Ln. 2033-XC) (PCR, paras. 2.01, 2.02). 2. The project comprised four principal activities: - establisbment and operation of a Rural Development Planning Unit (UNDER) within the National Planning Board (UNNAPLA); - studies to improve flood control and drainage in the Lower Guayas Basis (including feasibility studies in 2 areas of about 100,000 ha each); - completion of the Tungurahua Rural Development Project feasibility studies and project preparation report; and - completion of the Esmeraldas Rural Development Project feasibility studies and project preparation report. A fifth component, the Sanborondon pilot rice scheme, was added in March 1979. (PCR, paras. 2.08, 3.15). 3. The project was to be completed by June 30, 1980 but in fact ran through June 30, 1984. Total project cost was estimated at appraisal at US$5.6 million of which the Bank agreed to finance US$4.0 million. In the event, there were significant cost underruns and some US$1.69 million was cancelled at closing. Project Objectives 4. The project aimed to strengthen the institutional framework for rural development policy formulation, planning, project preparation and project execution. Two specific projects were to be prepared for possible Bank finance, and prefeasibility studies were to be conducted in the Lower Guayas Basin that could lead to investments in Infrastructure for flood control and dral-sge. (PCR, paras. 2.06-2.09).  - iv - Project Implementation 5. The project provided for 294 man-months of consultant assistance including an international specialist in Rural Development as the team leader to assist with the establishment and operetion of UNDER. UNDER was established and the Rural Development Specialist was recruited as a condltion of effectiveness (Sept. 1976)--but the consultant subsequently resigned August 1977. A second specialist was later hired and served for about 18 months. 6. Bank financing was limited to foreign exchange to fund foreign consultant costs. The project encountered problems and delays from the beginning over issues regarding their recruitment. Hiring was a bottleneck until the Loan Agreement was amended in September 1980 to provide disbursements for both local and foreign constultants. Because of the various independent executing agencies, the National Pre-Investment Fund (FONAPRE), which was the channel for project funds, encountered difficulties in coordinating operations under the project as it did not have adequate authority or control over the executing agencies and its own administrative procedures contributed to project implementation delays. (PCRs Par&. 3.06). In fact, Government never really accorded the project, and the consultant issue in particular, sufficient prioritys4/ Prnject Results 7. Of the four original components of the project a) establishment and operation of UNDER was a failureP!although some of the operations envisaged for UNDER are now the responsibility of the Secretariat of Integrated Rural Development (SEDRI, established 1981); b) the studies of the Lower Guayas were completed (in 7 years rather than 4) and include prefeasibility studies for two areas (150,000 ha and 200,000 ha); c) the Tungurahua Project (now Loan 1644-EC) final preparation was financed under the Loan; also, studies and designs for the Ambato (the principal city in the Tungurahua project area) municipal market were financed and completed as an adjunct to this component; d) the Esmeraldas Project (now Loan 2044-EC) preparation was financed from GOE and OAS sources; and e) the Sanborondon Pilot Rice krrigation Ptoject (added during implementation) was successfully completed. (PCR, paras. 3.05-3.07, 3.13-3.15). 8. The major problem in execution of the Lower Guayas Basis studies related to aerial photography, restitution and topography mapping. It was envisaged that a private firm would do this but in fact IGM was the only agency authorized to undertake aerial photography in Ecuador. Folloving an amendment of the Loan Agreement to permit Bank finance of local expenditure, 1/ Government has questioned the accuracy of this assessment and has explained the basis of its views in Attachment IV. 2/ Government has also questioned this statement and has provided a counter- view in Attachment V.  - v - a one-year contract was signed with IGM in May 1980 to complete the work by May 1981. Less than five percent was completed by that date and the contract was extended to complete the work in 1983. The aerial photography and mapping slipped because the work was assigned a low priority and the weather in the Lower Guayas Basin was frequently unsatisfactory. (PCR, paras. 3.08-3.10). Sustainability 9. In spite of the problems and delays with the Lower Guayas studies, it ultimately was the most successful activity under the project. The works can form the basis for final feasibility studies and possible future investment. Government has recently requested the Bank to consider a flood control and drainage project in the area. (paras. 5.03, 7.01). These combined activities if successfully developed will provide a significant element of sustainability to some important project objectives. Lessons Learned (PCR, Section VII) 10. The following lessons were learned: - where foreign expartise is required, a strong commitment must be obtained from the borrower and projects must have a high national priority; - the Bank should not limit finance of consultants to foreign exchange and should finance qualified internationally recruited consultants whether foreign or local; - more emphasis should be placed on recruiting qualified local consultants and less on long-term foreign consultants; and - poor implementation performance and delays were adequate justification for early cancellation, as suggested by supervision missions on several occasions -- these recommendations should have been given more consideration if nothing more than to serve notice on the Borrower that the Bank would refuse to extend the Closing Date and cancel the balance of the Loan unless progress was satisfactory.  ECUADOR Technical Assistance Project Goan 1230-EC Project Completion Report I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 During the period of the early 1970. agriculture was the most important sector in the economy in terms of output and emrloyment, and second to petroleum as a source of foreign exchange earnings. Although the country had a good agricultural potential, production and productivity were low. An estimated 1.5 million of the rural population had a per capita income less than that requi*md for basic needs. Food production per capita was declining in the early 1970. while growth in other sectors was 3trong. There were and still are l ..ge uncultivated areas suitable for crops and livestock production, particularly in the coastal plain where some of the best soils suffer from flooding and poor drainage. 1.02 In the early 70s, the Government announced that it would provide additional resources for agriculture and rural development, This combined with agrarian reform in 1973 began to show promising results by the time this project was appraised in 1976. 1.03 In an attempt to expand these initiatives, the Government requested Bank assistance to apply its worldwide experience in rural development and proposed to concentrate its agricultural lending on rural development. The Bank made recommendations for basic organizational changes to improve the Government's planning and control of the rural development activities. These recommendations were incorporated in the Technical Assistance Project. II. PROJECT FORMULATION Identification, Preparation and Appraisal 2.01 During the mid-seventies and since, Ecuador's agricultural development program has emphasized irrigation and rural development, the latter as a means of alleviating poverty. The Bank lent its support to the rural development program and projects that were being prepared for possible Bank financing in the Province of Tungurahua in the Sierra and the Esmeraldas Basin on the coastal plain. This technical assistance project was identified in the process of preparing rural development projects when it became evident that neither the institutional framework or policy were adsquate for rural development.  -2- 2.02 The project was prepared and appraised by the Bank during the process of preparing Rural Development Projects I, II, and I11--now Bank- financed Integrated Rural Development Project, Loans 1644, 1991 and 2044-EC. A Bank mission appraised the project in October 1975. A tentative agreement was reached with the Government that foreign consultants would be placed within JUNAPLA (now Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo - CONADE). The proposals for drainage and flood control studies in the Lower Guayas Basin were discussed with JUNAPLA, CEDEGE and INERHI. It was also agreed that a team of international specialists would prepare terms of reference for these studies. 2.03 The mission considered that there vere no major issues as there was substantial agreement with the Government on the direction of rural development activities in Ecuador and the role of the Bank. The mission cautioned that the Bank's capacity for rural development assistance was limited. The only issue was the mission's recommendation to iacrease the Bank finance from US$3 million to US$4 million (the estimated foreign exchange cost) out of a total project cost of US$5.2 million. Negotiations and Board Approval 2.04 Negotiations took place in February 1976 focusing on selection and provision of consultants by the Bank and possibly by UNDP, and the terms of reference for the Lower Guayas Basin Studies, It was decided not to indicate the type of expertise of the three consultants to be engaged by JUNAPLA for the planning unit. It was also agreed not to specify the agencies which would execute the Lower Guayas Studies, thus leaving the Government with some flexibility. An understanding was reached cn all assurances and conditions. 2.05 The Board approved the loan of US$4 million on March 30, 1976. It was indicated that such projects were vitally important, particularly to the extent that it would help to prepare rural development projects and improve the quality of life of the poorest segment of the Ecuadorian population. Questions were raised regarding the feasibility of recruiting expatriates with the necessary experiente and whether it would be possible to train local expertise in the time envisaged. Project Objectives and Descriptions 2.06 The objective of the project was to strengthen the institutional framework for rural development policy formulation, planning, and project preparation and implementation. The project would also complete the preparation of two rural development projects for Bank finance and conduct prefeasibility studies for flood control and drainage investments in the Lower Guayas Basin.  -3- 2.07 The project was to provide a three-year program of technical assistance to the Government in rural development planning and project preparation to benefit the rural poor and lAcrease agricultural production. It was also to assist the Government in defining a clearer rural development policy and strengthen Government planning agencies. Furthermore, the studies were to assist in the formulation of a long-term water control plan in the Guayas Basin and thus help to eliminate a fundamental constraint for agricultural production. 2.08 The project was to include: (a) establishment and training of a planning and project preparation unit (UNDER) within the planning board (JUNAPLA), designed to provide national leadersh'p in rilicy analysis and direction of all Government at .vity related to rural development; (b) studies contributing to the long range flood control, drainage and agricultural development of the Lower Guayas Basin-- including feasibility studies in two areas of about 100,000 ha eacn; (c) preparation of two rural developmentl/ projects in the highlands in the Province of Tungurahua; and (d) preinvestment studies of rural development in the Esmer-ldas river basin and preparation of a rural development Investment project. 2.09 The project was to form the basis of a larger Bank role in rural development in Ecuador. III. PROJECT DMPLEMENTATION 3.01 The loan was approved March 30, 1976 and became effective October 20, 1976. There was some delay in meeting the condition of effectiveness regarding hiring of a rural development team leader (consultant) and designating his counterpart. The consultant's contract was finalized in September 1976. The appraisal assumed a three-year implementation period for the principal activities requiring consultants (UNDER), and the completion date was June 30, 1980. Actual implementation took more than 7 years and the closing date was December 31, 1983. 1/ The areas of Huachi-Pelilea and Quero-Ladrillos-Ruambalo, that now constitute the Tungurahua Project Loan 1644-EC, were originally envisaged as separate projects.  -4- A. Achievement by Component 3.02 The project was originally designed to provide foreign technical assistance for: (a) establishment and operation of a Rural Development Planning Unit (UNDER); (b) conduct of studies in the Lower Guayas Basin; (C) preparation of projects in the Province of Tungurahua; (d) preparation of project3 in the Esmeraldas Basin. The appraisal estimated that about 294 man-months of consultants would be required; however, after long delays, and amendment of the loan agreement in September 1980 (para. 3.08), the Bank agreed to reimburse for both local and foreign consultant services. The total man-months of consultants used is not available as provision of consultants were part of comprehensive contracts with the executing agencies-INERHI, CEDEGE and IGM (para. 3.08). Seventy-one man-months were utilized as follows: (a) 12 man-months foreign consultants services were provided for UNDER (para. 3.03 and 3.22); (b) 24 man-months for the Sanborondon Pilot Rice Irrigation Project (para. 3.15); and (c) about 31 man-iaonths of short-term foreign consultant services were financed as part of the INEREI, CEDEGE and FONAPRE contracts to assist in the conduct of studies. Expenditures by component are shown in table 3.1 below and the related activities are discussed in subsequent paragraphs. TABLE 3.1 ECUADOR TECHNtCAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Loan 1230-EC) KEY PROJECT DATA Item Appraisal Achievement Estimate Estimate 2/ Total Project Cost (US$'000) 5,600 3,735 Rural Development Planning Unit (UNDER) 975.0 118.0 Lower Guayas Studies 2,750.0 2,661.0 Esmeraldas Project Preparation 525.0 0.0 Tungurahua Project Preparation 3/ 550.0 178.0 Sanborondon Rice Project (pilotT - 208.0 Equipment for all studies - 570.0 Contingencies 800.0 - 2/ Disbursements against each category are shown in Annex 1 and 2. 3/ Includes the Ambato Municipal Market Study and Design added Juring implementation.  -5- 3.03 After the loan became effective in October 1976, and the consultant required as a condition of effectiveness was hired (para 3.01), there was a long and Intensive exchange of communications between the Bank and the Government regarding further recruitment of consultants. Initial supervision missions focused on this issue. At one time it was indicated that a Presidential Decree would be necessary to enable JUNAPLA to engage international consultants for the rural development planning unit (UNDER); however there is no evidence that a decree was ever enacted or even required. Following furtlher delays an attempt was made to use the UNDP as a vehicle for engaging consultants. After arrangements were finally made with UNDP the proposal was rejected by the coordinating agency leaving the issue unresolved once again. 3.04 In the meantime some short-term specialists had been engaged to assist with preparing the terms of reference (first phase) for the Lower Guayas Studies. 3.05 By the original completion date of June 30, 1980 only 10% of the loan had been disbursed; however, preparation of the Tungurahua, Puerto Ila Chone and Esmeraldas Projects (para 2.02) had been completed, for the most part using other sources of finance, I.e., OAS and GOE for Esmeraldas, and the Fourth Highways Project Loan 1231-EC for Puerto Ila Chone. 3.06 The Loan Agreement was amended In September 1980, the end of project year 4, to provide for Bank disbursements from the loan account for both local and foreign consultants. By this time supervision missions had already given up on UNDER and had previously recommended that funds allocated to that component (Part A of the project) be cancelled because it had become apparent that the Government no longer considered it important enough to see that consultants would be engaged to provide adequate staff for the unit. Thus one of the principal objectives of the project, to establish an effective rural development planning unit to formulate national policy, control resources, and guide project identification and preparation was not achieved. Following events unrelated to the project some of the functions originally intended for UNDER were absorbed by the new Secretariat for Integrated Rural Development (SEDRI) establiahed in 1981.4/ 3.07 The first phase Lower Guayas Basin Studies, carried out by INERHI and CEDEGE with the assistance of consultants, made satisfactory progress and the report and T.O.R. for the second phase detailed studies were completed in March 1979. However, execution of the second phase encountered numerous problems and delays, the most serious of which was the arrangements for and carrying out of the aerial photography and related topographic mapping. 3.08 It had been envisaged that aerial photography and mapping would be undertaken by contract with a commercial firm to be selected in accordance with normal procedures of the Bank and the Government of Ecuador. However, the Bank was advised that IGM was the only agency in Ecuador authorized to take aerial photography. In September 1980, following amendment of the Loan Agreement to permit Bank finance of local expenditure,5/ the primary 4/ Government has provided further explanation of this situation in Attachment V. 5/ This amendment provided for reimbursement of services provided by firms and agencies locally contracted and local expenditures.  4 executing agencies (INERHI and C)DE3E) for the second phase Lower Guayas Studies signed a one-year contract with IGM for the aerial photography and mapping. The contraet ended in May 1981 with less than 5% of the aerial photography having been completed. 3.09 Based on IGW's failure to perform, the Bank suggested that all or part of the work be contracted to a commercial firm. However, I&M's contract was modified and extended to January 30, 1982 after the Bank verified that ION had the capability and capacity to do the work. By January 1982 about 600,000 ha (80% of the aerial photography) had been completed and 400,000 ha (67%) had been certified as adequate for restitution. The IGN contract was once again extended to September 1983 at which time the works were 95% complete. The aerial photography and topographical mapping was satisfactorily completed in 1984. 3.10 There were some factors beyond the control of IOM which contributed to delays--long periods of heavy cloud cover in the Basin, poor conditions during the dry season caused by burning of rice straw, unavailability of aircraft at the proper time, etc. However, given the small number of flying hours required to photograph the area, it is reasonable to assume that the photography could have been completed much sooner had the project been given sufficiently high priority. X.11 In addition to the aerial photography and topographic mapping, hydrological, soil and land tenure studies were carried out, which can form the basis for a long term plan to develop the Lower Guayas Basin. Prefeasibility studies were completed for two areas of about 200,000 ha and 150,000 ha. The Government of Ecuador has recently requested the Bank to consider the possibility of financing a project for flood control and drainage in these areas. 3.12 The performance of INERHI and CEDEGE, the two agencies responsible for executioa of the Lower Guayas Basin Studies, although delayed, was satisfactory. The reports provide detailed analysis of various aspects, focusing on irrigation and drainage, required for future development of the Basin. The studies indicate that there is a good potential for agricultural production in the area; however, final feasibility studies would be required before investment can be made. 3.13 Preparation of a project in the Province of Tungurahua (Part C) was already at an advanced stage when the Technical Assistance Project became effective; however, the project contributed to the final stages of preparation. The Tungurahua Rural Development Project was appraised by the Bank in November 1977 and February 1978 and became effective in September 1979. At the request of the Government, part of the funds earmarked for preparation of the Tungurahua Rural Development Project were used to carry out a marketing study for the Ambato municipality. A study of the market requirements and the design of a municipal market facility was completed in 1983. The Ambato Municipal Market construction is expected to be financed by the Ecuadorian Development Bank (BEDE).  -7- 3.14 Part D of the project was to carry out feasibility studies in the Nsmeraldas Basin and prepare projects for possible Bank finance. Two projects were prepared: (i) Pterto Ila Chone Rural Development (now Bank Loan 1991-EC); and (iiW smeraldas Rural Development (nov Bank Loan 2044-BC). This project made no contribution to preparation of either of these projects because their preparation was financed from other sources, pdinoipally OAS and GOE. 3.15 A fifth activity (Part E), the Sanborondon Pilot Rice Irrigation Scheme was added at the Government's request in Narch 1979. The objective of the scheme was to demonstrate that rice could be produced in the area by constructing a system of dikes and pumps for flood and water control. A consultant was engaged for two years and the demonstrations were successful. Private farmers, with the assistance of INNRHI, have subsequently adopted the system and completed development of about 2,000 ha (para 3.08). 3.1' As the result of the Government's emphasis on rural development beginning in the mid-1970s and the Bank's support of that policy and program, the Bank has subsequently financed three rural development projects (para 2.02). All three projects have experienced serious delays in implementation. B. Disbursements 3.17 Total disbursements under the project were US$2,831,531.00--70% of the loan amount. The balance of US$1,168,469.00 was cancelled September 22, 1984 (Annexes 1 and 2). ProJect execution and disbursements were exceedingly slow reaching only about 10% of the loan amount in the first 4 years. After amending the Loan Agreement in September 1980, to provide for finance of local as well as foreign expenditures, and later improvement in the performance of 1M, 60% of the loan funds were disbursed in the final 3 years of the project. C. Procurement 3.18 Procurement was a problem to the extent that there was a reluctance on the part of the executing agencies to engage foreign consultants. The appraisal report and consequently the Loan Agreement were too rigid in allowing disbursements only for 100% of foreign expenditures, thus precluding any Bank finance of local consultants. Following amendment of the loan agreement, loal firma and agencies were contracted according to procedures satisfactory to the Bank (para. j.02 and 3.08). Bquipment and materials were purchased following local procedures acceptable to the Bank. Expenditures for equipment (purchased by LCB) was much higher than originally estimated, however, this was money well spent as it provided for the establishment of rainfall and hydrological metering stations that will provide essential data in the Lower Guayas Basin for many years to come.  D. Reports and Auditing 3.19 Periodic reports were not submitted on a regular basis. Records and accounts consistent with sound acc"'nting practices were not regularly made available to the Bank. In 1982, an unaudited financial report was submitted to, and reviewed by the Bank. The 1983 audited financial statement for FONAPRE was received in January 1985. E. Compliance with Covenants 3.20 The Borrower failed to employ a team of consultants to assist in the establishment and operation of a rural development planning and project preparation unit. Independent of the project, the Government established a Secretariat for Rural Development (SEDRI) within the President's Office with the main purpose of coordinating the implementation of rural development projects. The Borrower did not prepare adequate periodic reports or financial statements. 3.21 FONAPRE was required to make the proceeds of the loan available to the various executing agencies. However, complex administrative procedures for hiring of consultants and processing contracts contributed to delays in implementation. F. Performance of Consultants 3.22 A team leader for the rural development unit was hired in September 1976 as a condition of effectiveness; however, he resigned at the end of the first year because he was unable to carry out his duties. A consultant was hired for two years to carry out the Sanborondon Pilot Rice Project. Several short-term consultants were engaged to assist in the preparation of the T.O.R. for the Lower Guayas Studies and their performance was satisfactory. Consultants (local and foreign) were hired by INERHI and CEDEGE to assist in carrying out the Lower Guayas Studies and consultants (local and foreign) were hired by FONAPRE to carry out the Ambato Market Studies (para. 3.13). Performance of consultants was considered satisfactory. IV. AGRICULTURAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 4.01 The project was not designed to have a direct agricultural or economic impact and no analyses were carried out at appraisal or for this PCR.  - 9 - V. BANK PERFORMANCE 5.01 The Bank was overly optimistic about its ability to assist the Government of Ecuador in the planning, preparation and implementation of rural development projects. In hindsight it is questionable whether the establishment of a rural development planning and preparation unit was a viable proposition. The Bank over-emphasized the role of foreign consultants and apparently did not have a firm commitment on the part of the Borrower to hire foreign consultants. Early supervision missions focused on the problem of hiring foreign cousultants but failed to achieve a satisfactory solution to the problem. Also it would appear that the appraisal mission was not aware of the restriction regarding the taking of aerial photography by foreign firms. 5.02 Frequency of supervision missions was adequate and they recognized as early as 1978 that the principal objective of the project, to establish a rural development planning and preparation unit, was not going to succeed and recommended that finance allocated for that component be cancelled. On several subsequent occasions it was suggested that the loan be cancelled and/or that the closing date not be extended. 5.03 With the prospect for follow-up investment in the Lower Guayas Basin for flood control, drainage and increased agricultural production (para 10), extension of the closing date to complete the Lower Guayas Studies may have been justified. Initial review indicates tnat the basic studies completed under the project are adequate for preparation of investment projects. VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 6.01 Funds for execution of the project were channeled through FONAPRE, the Governments agency for financing and coordinating preinvestment studies. The principal responsibility for execution of the project was assigned to JUNAPLA (now CONADE). It has not been possiule to determine what role, if any, CONADE played under the project. It was JUNAPLA's responsibility to establish a rural development planning unit (UNDER) and make suitable arrangements for carrying out studies and 'implement projects arising from the studies. INERHI, CEDEGE, IGM and NAG were the technical agencies designated to execute the Lower Guayas Basin studies and the Sanborondon Pilot Irrigation Project and performed satisfactorily after considerable initial delay. The institutional framework for planning and implementation of rural development activities was not strengthened by the project. INERHI and CEDEGE have established a network of rainfall and hydrological metering stations throughout the Lower Guayas Basin that will serve to provide essential data for development of the area.  - 10 - 6.02 JUNAPLA never succeeded in establishing UNDER; therefore FONAPRE, the specialized government preinvestment agency, was assigned the responsibility for arranging for coordinating the studies. FONAPRE's complex procedures for engaglng consultants became a constraint to execution of the project. Although FONAPRE had the responsibility to make arrangements for execution of the project It did not have the authority or control to assure timely and proper implementation of the project activities. 6.03 The inability to engage consultants in a timely manner and institutional ehanges made it necessary to reprogram the project three times during the seven-year implementation period. Esmeraldas Basin Rural Development project's preparation was carried out successfully using other resources. Part of the funds ($70,000). originally earmarked for the Tungurahua Project preparation were used to carry out the Ambato Municipal 'Market study and design. It is estimated that expenditures under the Tungurahua component were about $178,000 and the Bank disbursed about $140,000. The Sanborondon pilot rice scheme (costing about $208,000- $157,000 disbursed by the Bank) was financed from funds originally allocated to other components that were not completed under the project. 6.04 FONAPRE prepared a PCR but details about man-months of consultants and performance of consultants were not provided. VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENATIONS 7.01 The project did not achieve its principal objective of strengthening the institutional framework for rural development planning, preparation and project execution. After considerable delay, the Lower Guayas Basin Studies (including the Sanborondon Pilot Rice Project) were satisfactorily completed. These studies can provide the basis for preparation of a master development program and investment projects for the Lower Guayas Basin. 7.02 The major lesson of the project regarding limiting Bank disbursements to foreign exchange (thus foreign consultants) has been rectified in subsequent Bank policy and procedure changes. In projects of this nature, where it is considered necessary to engage foreign consultants, such as staff for the rural development planning unit (UNDER), and carry out aerial photograpy and mapping, a firm commitment must be obtained from the borrower during appraisal and loan negotiations. For future projects, when aerial photograpy and mapping consultants are required, the Bank should require that a number of local and foreign firms (acceptable to the Bank and the Borrower) be invited to submit offers, and be evaluated and selected according to agreed criteria. Experience under this project has tndicated that simply having the technical capability to undertake the work (as in the case of IGM) is not sufficient justification for accepting that the works be done by force account. In this case, neither the contracting agencies (INERHI or CEDEGE) had sufficient control or any recourse over the performance of the contractor.6/ 6/ Government has countered that INERHI discharged its responsibilities satisfactorily in setting up a supervision and monitoring unit which submitted quarterly reports to FONAPRE (Attacbment III).  - 11 - 7.03 Tho experience of this project indicates that som. of the activities did not have a sufficiently high priority to obtain Government interest to resolve problem of hiring consultants and delays in contract performance.7/ Furthermore, the. Bak did not have adequate experience in dealing with rural development to play the guiding role envisaged (para. 1.03). 7/ Government has questioned the accuracy of this evaluation and bas explained the basis of its counterview in Attachment IV.  ECUADOR TECBIICAL ASSISTANtZ WOAY 1230eC PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DISDURSENRN PER CAITSORY reR TZAR CATECORY FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 PY83 YY84 TOTAL PART I A - 45,902.63 18,238.33 23,856.70 66 87,997.66 3 - 42,985.86 24,901.66 _ _ 741,604.42 283,545.91 920,714.81 2,013,752.66 C _ 45,902.63 83,264.12 _- - 21,273.91 - 139,821.20 9~~ _ __ _ _ _- - _ , - a _ _ _ 78,444.18 79,312.00 IS7,756.18 FART It Ai ,, ' - , a _ _ _ _ _ _ 113,133.85 113,740.73 193,400.60 420,275.18 C _ 11,927.86 _- - 11,927.86 PART Itt UMALLWCATRO -- - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _! TOTAL 93,113.66 144,U8.31 127,202.4 79,312.00 - 854,38.2i 418,560.55 1,114,11S.41 2,831,530.74 Note: Balance of US$1,168,469 was cancelled September 22, 1984.  - 13 - ANNEX 2 ECUADOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Loan 1230-EC) Allocation and Actual Use of Loan Funds Original Final Allocation % Bank Expenditure Bank Allocation Balance Category USS ('000) Finance ('000) Finance US$ ('000) ('000) Consultant Services and Training 100% FE Part A 575 118 90 97 7 Part B 2,120 2,661 2,017 2,570 553 Part C 330 178 135 240 105 Part D 325 00 00 00 00 Part E 00 208 158 158 00 Subtotal 3,350 3,165 2,400 3,063 665 Equipment 100% ' Part A 20 80% L -al 554 420 - Part B 65 16 12 Part C 45 - - Part D 20 - - - Part E 00 - - - Subtotal 150 570 432 638 206 Unallocated 500 - - 297 297 Total 4,000 3,735 2,832 4,000 1,168 S~l _- _- Part A - UNDER and JUNALPA (operation of a planning unit) B - Lower Guayas Surveys C - Tungurakua (Quero-Huachi-Pelilio) Studies and Project Preparation D - Esaeraldas Studies and Project Preparation E - Sanborondon Pilot rice Scheme-added during implementation  - 14 - Attehbment I Pagp 1 of 2 E-976/86 June 17, 1986 Spanish (Ecuador) OED JVS:bas Couaents from the Ministry of A&riculture and Livestock Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Quito, May 12, 1986 Ref No. 097-86 MAG-AEI Mr. Otto Maiss Acting Director, OED World Bank Washington, D.C. Dear Sir: Thank you for your letter of April 25 and the Project Completion Report for the Technical Assistance Project, L?qn 1230-EC, prepared by the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department.&' We feel that this is a useful document which accurately reflects the objectives of the project, its effectiveness, the causes of delays and the most significant achievements. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock has already carried out reviews of progress in certain Integrated Rural Development projects, particularly that of Puerto Ila-Chone, Quininde - Malimpis - Nueva Jerusalen, Tungurahua; the findings as regards delays in execution coincide with those in the ex-post evaluation of project 1230-EC, viz.: - Delays in feasibility studies - Delays in effecting disbursements - Sluggish bureaucratic procedures - Problems with bidding competitions for contracting physical works - Delays in contracting consultants - Others. / Editorial note: In fact the PCR was prepared by the Latin America 1a5 MMrSen -Region staff. Q.  - 15 - Attachment I Page 2 of 2 May I also suggest that in future ex-post evaluations the World Bank should include the following aspects, which are vitally important for purposes of analysis: - When amendments and additions are made to the loan agreement, it is essential to update the loan and subloan conditions. - For purposes of comparison, measurement and analysis, an examination of accounting and auditing performance is necessary. - It is also important to detail the programming and reprogramming of project activities. - As this was a Technical Assistance Project it would be appropriate to mention the number of beneficiaries that received formal or in-service training, identifying the specialization, location and duration. Thank you for sending us this important report, on which we congratulate you. Yours, etc., Is/ Jorge Mufioz T. Adviser on Economic and International Affairs  - 16 - Attacbmsnt II Page 1 of 3 Comments from CEDEGE CEDEGE Guayaquil, June 2, 1986 200000-P-E-050 Mr. Otto Maiss Acting Director, OED World Bank Washington, D.C. Dear Sir: Please find attached the comments prepared by the Planning Directorate of this institution, under the coordination of the Executive Board, regarding the Project Completion Report on the Technical Assistance Project (Loan 1230-EC). Hoping that this meets your needs, I remain ... Yours, etc., /a/ Gustavo Gross Urrutia President of CEDEGE Attachment  Attachment II 17- Page 2of3 I-100008-054 To: Alfredo Elizalde, Executive Director From: Jos6 Guerra, Director of Planning Subj: Comments Requested by World Bank Date: May 26, 1986 With reference to the request for comments from this Directorate on the Project Completion Report for the Technical Assistance Project (Loan 1230-EC), I hereby submit the following comments under three headings: - Aspects of Project Organization - Partic..pation of CEDEGE - Observations and Suggestions. Aspects of Project Organization In diagram form the structure of the project was as follows: IDB FINANCING COORDINATION OF STUDIES PROJECT CEDEGE MAG INERE PROJECT SUPERVISION SUPERVISION * X *E~iTCONTCTED j Although there were formal links between IDB and JUNAPLA and FONAPRE, project supervision and monitoring were not among the specific tasks of any of these organizations; this caused difficulties for the coordination of the various projects assigned to the agencies executing the studies, such as MAG, INERHI and CEDEGE. It should be noted that FONAPRE, in its capacity as the organization through which project funds were channeled, had neither the legal machinery nor the supervision systems to enable it to function as project coordinator, which prejudiced project activities.  -18- Attachm9at II Pa8e 3 ofr This leads to a first conclusion: responsibilities must be definec and delimited before a start on the project is authorized, given the joint intervention of various executing agencies. Participation of CEDEGE The World Bank comments positively on the execution of the studies and the technical level achieved, although we should consider the kind of contracting to be used in future work with the IGM in view of the impact on project duration and costs. In order to speed up aerial photography we believe that it is necessary to: - Carry out the aerial photography restitution work with the institution or with private companies; or - Contract the aerial photography and restitution work with private companies and pave the way for changes in the Cartography Law, which should not be affected in its basic purpose of protecting national security; through a process of proper zoning, including the definition of security limits, the work could be carried out in a timely and efficient manner. Suggestions for Future Proiects 1. We need to devise an organization structure in conjunction with institutions with similar functions and objectives (CEDEGE-INERHI), and comparable activity levels (MAG-SEDRI). 2. The administrative procedures of the lending agency should be reviewed insofar as the present structure of that institution is not perhaps entirely appropriate to meet the ever-growing needs of the developing countries. Its multi-layer procedures and regulations, etc., may initially provide a framework for situations and help define courses of action, but subsequently they become stumbling blocks for the institution's own activity. The Bank is then prevented from responding rapidly to requests for technical and financial assistance from its member countries. A review of operating policies would contribute significantly to swift reactions and timely measures by the Bank in its relatione with institutions in the borrowing countries. 3. Systematic evaluation of the activities in a project would probably lead to substantial improvements in both project design and execution.  - 19 - At t III Page 1 of 2 G~Vts frm INMI E-994/18 June 24, 1.986 Comments from 111311 Spanish (Ecuador) OED Dl JCB:bas Instituto Ecuatoriano de Recursos Hidraullcos (INERHI) Ministry of Agriculture and Stockraising Quito, Ecuador Our Ref. 13T-862549 Mr. Otto Maiss Quito, May 28, 1986 Acting Director, OED World Bank Washington D.C. Re: Comments on Loan 1230-EC Dear Mr. Maiss: In reply to your letter of April 25, 1986, requesting comments on the Technical Assistance Project (Loan 1230-IC), I write to inform you that INERHI participated in the following studies: Lower Guayas Basin Prolect In 1976, to promote studies designed to boost rural development in Ecuador, the National Government signed a loan agreement with the World Bank for the partial financing of the Program to Prepare Rural Development Projects in the Lower Guayas Basin. In September 1976, INERI and CEDEGE signed an agreement to carry out the program with the assistance of the National Planning Board (JUNAPLA). The study was planned in three phases: Phase I: 1976-1978: Project identification, resulting in the selection of two major projects for flood control in rural areas and villages, and irrigation and drainage works. These two projects were known as Yaguachi-Taura and Vincababa. Phase IT: Prefeasibility studies of the selected projects. These vere partially financed by FONAPRE, and in May 1981 a loan contract was signed under World Bank loan 1230-EC. In September of that year INERHI startel on the studies for Yaguachi-Taura (now called Lower Guayas Basin), which were completed in 1984. In this connection, we approve the Bank's technical report, except as regards Chapter VII, Conclusions and Recommendations, which statee that Commented' neither INERHI nor CEDEGE provided adequate supervision of the contractors' upon in performance, or had any type of recourse in that connection. Footnote 6 para. 7.02.  - 20 - Attachment III Page 2 of 2 We wish to affirm that INERHI discharged its responsibility, having set up the Supervision and Monitoring Unit (Unidad de Supervisi6n y Fiscalizaci6n), which submitted quarterly reports to FONAPRE as a basis for its payments. DRI-Tun&urahua Project With respect to the Tungurahua Integrated Rural Development Project, all its objectives were accomplished in 1977-78. Within the Tung"srahua Project, in the Irrigation and Drainage Subproject, there is the Ambato-Ruachi-Pelileo project and the Mocha-Quero-Ladrillos project, under which all of the distribution system is presently being constructed, financed by World Bank Loan 1644-EC and the respective local counterpart. With respect to the financial statement on Loan 1230-EC, it would be advisable to obtain verification of e&isting data from the agencies responsible for handling the loan funds, since INERHI was directly in charge of the technical side. Yours very truly, Is/ Pedro Alava Gonzalez M.Sc. Executive Director of INERHI  - 21 - Attachment IV Page 1 of 2 Comments from the National Pre-Investment Fund E-t101/86 June 27, 1986 Spanish (Ecuador) OED OTS:mfp National Pre-Investment Fund Quito Letter No. GE-11052 FNi-86 Quito, June 19, 1986 Mr. Otto Maiss Acting Director, Operations Evaluation Department World Bank, Washington, D.C. Subject: Project Completion Report on Ecuador Technical Assistance (Loan 1230-EC) Dear Sir: I refer to your letter of April 25, 1986 with which you sent us a copy of the Project Completion Report on Ecuador Technical Assistance, Loan 1230-EC, administered by the National Pre-Investment Fund (FONAPRE). I would appreciate it if you would revise the following statements in the report, so that it will contain balanced conclusions regarding the experience obtain from execution of the project: - Highlights.,/Page iii, para. 7 of Spanish (page iv, para. 6 of English) We do not consider the value judgment expressed as follows at the end of this paragraph to be accurate: "Because of the various independent executing agencies, the National Pre-Investment Fund Commented (FONAPRE), which was the channel for project funds, encountered upon in difficulties in coordinating operations under the project as it did Footnote 1, not have adequate authority or control over the executing agencies Evaluation and its own administrative procedures contributed to project Summry. implementation delays." On this point, and in order to offset such judgments, we would mention the following: 1. The different supervicion missions found that once the problem connected with the establishment of the Rural Development Planning Unit (UNDER) had been overcome, FONAPRE's coordination was fundamental for the implementation of the projects referred to in the report, so that even internal administrative problems connected with various national institutions having institutional jurisdiction over the Lower Guayas Basin were successfully overcome. Once it was 1/ Evaluation Summary.  22 - Attachment IV Page 2 of 2 agreed that INERHI and CEDEGE would be solely responsible for the projects, the objective of the Technical Assistance Agreement was achieved in that the basic studies for the country's most important river basin were carried out. To give due recognition to the problems overcome by FONAPRE, we would also point out the following: 2. Regarding the statement that "its own administrative procedures contributed to project implementation delays," we feel it necessary to observe that the selection of the individual consultants for UNDER, which did take an excessively long time, would not have been stalled by disagreements between JUNAPLA and the World Bank, if it had not been for the intervention of FONAPRE's administrative procedures. 3. An important point to add to the conclusions from this Technical Assistance Project is that its contractual terms were extrenely rigid, with the result that decisions to be taken by the World Bank regarding proposals by FONAPRE took a very considerable time, which was a factor that contributed significantly to the delays in project implementation. With the exception of the above points, we are in agreement with the report as received. Sincerely, i/8 Alberto Cardenas Divalos Executive M.inager  - 23 - Attachment V Comments from the National Development Board Page 1 of 2 E-1017/86 June 30, 1986 Spanish (Ecuador) OED OTS:mfp Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Quito Letter No. 001979 Quito, June 10, 1986 Mr. Otto Maiss Acting Director, Operations Evaluation Department World Bank, Washington, D.C. Dear Sir: I refer to your letter of April 25, 1986, with which you sent CONADE the Project Completion Report on Ecuador Technical Assistance (Loan 1230-EC). I would like to make the following comments. These comments relate exclusively to the establishment and operation of a Rural Development Planning Unit (UNDER) within the Junta Nacional de Planificaci6n y Coordinacion Econ6mica (JUNAPLA), which in its turn constituted the chief objective of the project under reference. 1/ Paragraph 8-of the part of the report referring to project implementation states that the creation and functioning of UNDER proved a failure, which is not an accurate reflection of reality. The Rural Development Unit in the National Planning Board (JUNAPLA), as it was then mmented known, was in fact established with the support of the Bank technical on in assistance project; however, the national personnel forming the Unit were otnote 29funded out of the budget of JUNAPLA, with whose participation the Secretaria aluation de Desarollo Rural Integral (SEDRI) was established, including subsequently on .mary the basis of UNDER, within CONADE's functional organization, the Rural d Foot- Development Division, currently the Rural Development Program with functions te 4, and responsibilities that are clearly defined in the Integral Rural ras 3#069Development Subsystem (Decree 637). The project viewed as an end in itself evidently did not produce the results expected from it, since the role of UNDER was canceled, one of whose functions - that of coordinating and organizing the formulation and execution of integrated rural development projects -- was assigned to the Secretaria de Desarrollo Rural (SEDRI). It is true that the formulation of national rural development policy and the identification and prioritization of integrated rural development projects were not defined by UNDER (Loan 1230-EC). However, they were clearly defined by CONADE and approved by the Government through the 1980-84 and 1985-88 Development Plans. 1/ Editorial note: Actually Evaluation Summary, para. 7; and PCR, para. 3.06.  - 24 - Attachment V Page 2 of 2 To sum up, the establishment of UNDER served the country as the start and the means for, with the participation of the 'State agencies, achieving a larger goal, that of the creation and implementation of the Rural Development Subsystem and the defining of rural development policy at national level. Sincerely, /8/ Oswaldo D&vila Andrade Secretary General of Planning  79-8 l 5Cn lcOfenf~~~~~SW to" A %SG n Fron C O L M B I A ESMERALA LL C L I A ComoronesAIoTnb TJCA t ~~Alo 5 9loo A16 ,,*b Rurnionoco ( v ' M>s \T& S