Sri Lanka - Recent economic developments, prospects and policies

Report No. 5038-CE Sri Lanka: Recent Economic Developments, Prospects and Policies May 4,1984 South Asia Programs Department FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Document of the World Bank This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS a! End-December Currency Unit 1983 US$1.00 Rs 25.00 Rs 1.00 US$ 0.04 Average Annual Exchange Rates Foreign Exchange Entitlement Official Rate Certificate (FEEC) Rate b/ 1969-71 US$1.00 = Rs 5.95 Rs 9.22 (55Z FEEC) 1972 US$1.00 = Rs 6.00 Rs 9.30 (55% FEEC) 1973 US$1.00 = Rs 6.40 Rs 10.56 (65% FEEC) 1974 US$1.00 = Rs 6.65 Rs 10.97 (65% FEEC) 1975 US$1.00 = Rs 7.05 Rs 11.63 (65% FEEC) 1976 US$1.00 = Rs 8.46 Rs 13.96 (65% FEEC) 1977 (Jan. 1-Nov. 15) US$1.00 = Rs 7.89 Rs 13.02 (65% FEEC) 1977 (Nov. 16-Dec. 31) US$1.00 = Rs 15.76 - 1977 US$1.00 = Rs 9.15 - 1978 US$1.00 = Rs 15.61 - 1979 US$1.00 = Rs 15.57 - 1980 US$1.00 = Rs 16.53 - 1981 US$1.00 = Rs 19.25 - 1982 US$1.00 = Rs 20.81 - 1983 US$1.00 = Rs 23.53 - a/ The Sri Lanka rupee, which had been linked to the US dollar from November 6, 1971, was re-linked to the Pound Sterling from July 10, 1972, onward at a parity rate of US$1.00 = Rs 15.60. Parity rates with all other currencies were determined from time to time by the Central Bank. The rupee was delinked from Sterling on May 24, 1976, linked to a weighted basket of currencies. On November 15, 1977, the exchange rate was unified, depreciated, and allowed to float at an initial rate of US$1.00 = Rs 16.00. bf This rate applied to all exports other than tea, rubber, and coconut, and all imports other than food, fertilizer, and drugs. FEECs were abolished on November 15, 1977. This report is based on the findings of an economic mission which visited Sri Lanka between November 28 and December 23, 1983; the mission comprised Messrs. Rene Vandendries (Chief of Mission), Harold Pilvin, Fakhruddin Ahmed, Hassan Fazel, Mike Lav, John Wilton, and Mrs. Vidya Shetty. The energy section was prepared by John Borthwick, based on work by the Bank's energy department. Ms. Geri Wise provided secretarial support and coordinated production of the report. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GLOSSARY AND PRINCIPAL ACRONYMS ARTI - Agrarian Research and Training Institute BTT - Business Turnover Tax BTU - British Thermal Unit CBC - Central Bank of Ceylon CDA - Coconut Development Authority CEB - Ceylon Electricity Board CPC - Ceylon Petroleum Corporation CWE - Cooperative Wholesale Establishment ECT - Energy Coordinating Team EDB - Export Development Board GCEC - Greater Colombo Economic Commission GPS - Guaranteed Purchase Scheme GWh - Gigawatt-hour (1,000,000 kilowatt-hours) IRR - Internal Rate of Return JEDB - Janatha Estates Development Board KWh - Kilowatt (1,000 watt hours) LPG - Liquid Petroleum Gas Maha - Northeast monsoon, October-February M&LT - Medium and Long Term HMPE - Ministry of Power and Energy MRID - Ministry of Rural Industrial Development MW - Megawatt (1,000 kilowatts) NDB - National Development Bank NHDA - National Housing Development Anthority PE - Public Enterprise PIP - Public Investment Program Poonac - Copra cake PTC - Presidential Tariff Commission SLCTB - Sri Lanka Central Transport Board SPC - State Plantations Corporation TSHDA - Tea Smallholder Development Authority Yala - Southwest monsoon, May-September This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfomance of official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be dischsed without World Bank authorization. TITLE : SRI LANKA: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS AND POLICIES COUNTRY : SRI LANKA REGION : SOUTH ASIA SECTOR : COUNTRY ECONOMIC REPORT TYPE CLASSIF MK/YY LANGUAGES 5038-CE CEM Restricted 05 84 English PUBDATE : 8405 ABSTRACT : The Sri Lankan economy improved in several respects during 1983. Despite a major drought and severe civil disturbances, economic growth was only marginally lower than in the preceding year, while the deficits in the budget and the current account of the balance of payments declined as a share of GDP. These improvements notwithstanding, the size of these deficits remained excessive, reflecting large imbalances between invest- ment and savings, and between the volume growth of exports and imports. These imbalances in Sri Lanka's economy symbolize underlying structural weaknesses, which include a low-yielding public revenue system in the face of an ambitious and long- gestating public investment program; and distortions in the incentives framework for production and trade. Against the setting of developments during 1978-83 and the medium-term outlook, this report considers the short-term stabilization task now facing Sri Lanka and the requisite measures for structural reforms in budgetary practices, and in the incentives and institutions of the key sectors of agriculture, industry and energy. The report notes the significant reforms under way in the energy sector and the recent initiatives in strengthening budgetary management. The report also presents a medium-term balance of payments outlook for the country, embodying the main elements of stabilization and structural reform measures, and provides estimates of aid requirements during 1984-85. SRI LANKA: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS AND POLICIES Table of Contents Page No. Country Data SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................................. I. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ..................... 1.. ... A. Introduction ........................................ 1 B. Major Economic Developments, 1978-83 ................ 2 II. MEDIUM-TERM OUTLDOK ... ............ .......... 15 A. The Macro-economic Problem . ....... ...... 15 Medium-Term Prospects Without Adjustment ......... 15 Medium-Term Prospects With Adjustment ............... 17 B. The 1984 Budget and Recent Revisions ............... 19 The November Budget ... ...................... 19 Subsequent Revisions .............. . . .... 23 C. The Balance of Payments Outlook and Creditworthiness .................................. 25 D. Past Aid Flows and Requirements in 1984/85 ......... 32 Aid Commitments and Disbursements, 1977-83 ......... 32 Aid Requirements, 1984-85 ....................... 36 III. MAJOR DEVELOPMENT ISSUES ..... ......... . ...... 39 Introduction 39 A. Agricultural Sector Policies ............. 40 Introduction ......... .. ................ .... .0. 40 Performance Since 1978 ..- ...o ............ ... 41 Adjustment Issues and Policies ...................... 46 (a) Prices and Incentives ........................ 46 (b) Strengthening Selected Institutions .......... 47 (c) Future Investments ........................... 49 B. Industrial and Trade Policies ...................... 50 Introduction ........................ o................ 50 The Present Policy Environment ..................... 52 (a) Trade and Industrial Policy .................. 52 (b) Manufacturing Public Enterprises .... 54 Adjustment Issues and Policies ...................... 57 C. Energy Policies ................... . ................ 59 Energy Supply and Demand ............................ 60 Energy Conservation ........ ....................... 62 Institutional Developments ........................ 63 Prospects in the Energy Sector ....... ........ 64 STATISTICAL APPENDI ....................... ...... ........ 67 MAP -ii- Page No. LIST OF TABLES IN THE TEXT Table 1: Economic Indicators, 1978-83 ....................... 4 Table 2: Agriculture: Selected Indicators, 1977-82 ......... 6 Table 3: Summary of Budgetary Operations, 1977-83 ........... 9 Table 4: Selected Balance of Payments Data, 1977-83 ......... 12 Table 5: Projected Major Economic Indicators, 1983-90 ....... 18 Table 6: Summary of Budgetary Operations, 1983-84 ........... 19 Table 7: Proposed Capital Expendituxes, 1984 ................ 21 Table 8: Government Revenues, 1983-84 ....................... 24 Table 9: Balance of Payments Projections, 1982-90 ........... 26 Table 10: Projected Total Foreign Exchange Requirements and Financing, 1983-90 ........................... 31 Table 11: Aid Commitments, 1977-83 ........................... 33 Table 12: Aid Disbursements, 1977-83 ......................... 34 Table 13: Disbursement Performance, 1978-83 .................. 35 Table 14: Foreign Exchange Requirements, 1982-85 ............. 37 Table 15: Summary Aid Pipeline, 1984-85 ...................... 38 Table 16: Net Financial Return per Unit of Family Labor: Selected Field Crops, Maha 1982/83 ............... Table 17: Tree Crops: Ratios of Domestic to Export Prices, 1977-82 .................................. 45 Table 18: Value Added in the Manufacturing Sector, 1977-83 ... 51 Table 19: Characteristics of Public and Private Sector Factory Industries in 1979 ....................... 55 Table 20: Employment and Output Trends for the Private and Public Industrial Sector, 1976-81 ............ 55 Table 21: Primary Commercial Energy Consumption, 1980-83 ..... 60 Table 22: Net Petroleum Imports, 1980-83 ..................... 61 Table 23: Electricity Generation, 1980-83 .................... 62 Page 1 of 2 pages COUNTRY DATA - SRI LANKA AREA POPULATION a/ DENSITY 65,607 sq km 15.2 million (mid-1982) 235 per sq km (1981) Rate of Growth: 1.7% (from 1971 to 1981) 763 per sq km of agricultural land (1979) POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (1982) hI HEALTH (1982) Crude Birth Rate (per '000): 26.8 Population per physician: 7,460 Crude Death Rate (per '000): 6.1 Population per Hospital Bed: 350 Infant Mortality (per '000 live births): 38.0 c) INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1978) DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP Z of national income, highest quintile: 54 Z owned by top 10% of owners: - lowest quintile: 4 1 owned by smallest 10% of owners: - ACCESS TO PIPED WATER (1981) ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (1971) Z of population - urban: 47 % of dwellings - total: 9 rural: 10 rural: 3 NUTRITION (1977) EDUCATION (1981) Calorie intake as % of requirements: 97 Adult literacy rate: 87% Per capita protein intake (grams per day): 43 Primary school enrollment: 98% GNP PER CAPITA IN 1982: $320 di OUTPUT IN 1983 BY SECTOR ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (Z. constant prices) Value Added $ Million % 1970-77 1977-83 1970-83 Agriculture 1.304 27.5 2.0 4.2 3.0 Industry R/ 1,257 26.6 2.1 5.8 3.8 Services 2,171 45.9 3.7 7.0 5.2 Total f 4,732 100.0 2.9 6.0 4.3 GOVERNMENT FINANCE Central Government (Rs million) % of GDP at Market Prices 1983 1975 1982 1983 Current Receipts j] 21,088 17.2 16.6 17.2 Current Expenditures ./ 23,822 18.3 18.0 19.5 Current Surplus -2,734 -1.1 -1.4 -2.3 Capital Expenditures i 15,578 7.3 15.9 12.7 External Assistance 10,974 3.2 8.1 9.0 a/ Based on Provisional 1981 Census estimates. b/ Provisional. S/ 1981: Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. dA World Bank Atlas estimate. ef Manufacturing, mining, construction, and utilities. If GDP at factor cost. g/ Includes capital revenue. hi Includes advance accounts. i/ Includes net lending. Page 2 of 2 pages COUNTRY DATA - SRI LANKA MONEY. CREDIT, AND PRICES 1970 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 a/ (end of period) (Rs Millior) Honey and Quasi Money 3,115 8,717 10.892 15,058 19,860 24,447 30,510 35,324 Bank Credit to Public Sector 2,856 4,659 4,226 6.267 13,095 17,277 21,828 20,850 Bank Credit to Private Sector 1,320 4,116 6,449 8,705 12,709 16,690 20,570 26,873 (Percentages or Index Numbers) Money and Quasi Honey as Z of CDP 22.8 23.9 25.5 28.7 29.9 28.8 30.4 28.9 General Price Index (1970-100) 100.0 147.0 164.8 182.6 230.2 271.6 301.1 343.3 Annual Percentage Changes in: General Price Index +5.9 +1.2 +12.1 +10.8 +26.1 +18.0 +10.9 +14.0 Bank Credit to Public Sector +10.4 +7.7 -9.3 +48.3 +109.0 +31.9 +26.3 -6.1 a/ Bank Credit to Private Sector +8.6 +40.5 +56.7 +35.0 +46.0 +31.3 +23.2 +33.0 a/ BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (1983) 1981 1982 1983 $ Million 2 (US$ Million) Tea 353 33.3 Exports of Goods, NFS 1,346 1,305 1,354 Rubber 121 11.4 Imports of Goods, NFS 2,055 2,205 2,136 Coconut Products 60 5.7 Resource Gap (deficit - -) -709 -900 -782 All Other Commodities 525 49.6 Interest Payments (net) -82 -80 -117 Workers' Remittances - - - TOTAL 1,059 100.0 Other Factor Payments (net) -15 -18 -18 Net Transfers 203 264 272 Balance on Current Account -603 -734 -645 EXTERNAL DEBT ($ Million) h/ Direct Foreign Investment 49 63 38 December December ci Net MfLT Loans 337 416 360 1982 1983 Disbursements 380 484 445 Amortization 43 68 85 Total Outstanding 3.554 3,736 Capital Grants 161 162 171 Other Capital (net) 23 66 77 Total Outstanding Change in Reserves (+ - increase) -33 -27 +1 and Disbursed 1,969 2.393 Gross Reserves (end-year) 451 520 514 Net Reserves (end-year) 5 -22 -21 DEBT SERVICE RATIO d/ (W) 10.1 11.9 Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Imports 448 590 469 Exports 175 158 114 IBRD/IDA LENDING. March 31, 1984 (US$ Million) IBRD IDA RATE OF EXCHANGE Outstanding and Disbursed 45.0 287.8 End 1978 End 1981 Undisbursed 22.4 374.6 USS1.00 - Ru 15.51 US$1.00 - Ra 20.55 Rs 1.00 - USS 0.06 Rs 1.00 - USS 0.05 Outstanding, including Undisbursed 67.4 662.4 End 1979 End 1982 USS1.00 - Re 15.45 US$1.00 - Ra 21.32 Rs 1.00 - US$ 0.06 Rs 1.00 - USS 0.05 End 1980 End 1983 US$1.00 = Ra 18.00 US$1.00 = Rs 25.00 Rs 1.00 - US$ 0.06 Rs 1.00 - US$ 0.04 s/ End-November data; changes are from November 1982 to November 1983. V/ Repayable in foreign currencies and vith a maturity over one year. c/ Preliminary estimate. d/ Ratio of debt service on public and publicly guaranteed MALT debt (excluding IMF charges and repurchases) to exports of goods and services. South Asia Programs Department May 4, 1984 Summary and Conclusions i. Sri Lanka's efforts to liberalize the economy and stimulate growth and employment during the past several years have been successful in a number of ways, in spite of the adverse impact on the economy of such external factors as deteriorating terms of trade and world recession. At the same time, some disappointment has set in as financial imbalances in the budget led to inflation and large deficits in the balance of payments, and industrial and export growth remained low. These problems have become a source of concern. Economic performance during 1983 broadly continued along the trends of previous years, even though there were some positive develop- ments as compared with 1982. Real GDP growth, at 4.9%, was lower than in previous years, partly a result of drought in early 1983 and partly because of severe civil disturbances in July. On the other hand, the 1983 budget deficit and the current account deficit in the balance of payments, at respectively 15.0% and 12.4% of GDP, were an improvement over 1982 for a variety of reasons. These include policy measures (such as exchange rate adjustments and efforts to increase resource mobilization), a decline in public capital spending, and, above all, an estimated 14% improvement in the terms of trade because of much increased tea prices. Nevertheless, the deficits remained high, net international reserves remained negative because, in spite of the terms of trade improvement, there was no reserves build up, the public debt service ratio rose further from 11% in 1980 to 18% in 1983, and inflation accelerated during the year reaching 23% when measured between February 1983 and February 1984. ii. The underlying characteristics of Sri Lanka's recent economic developments and the accompanying problems remained, fundamentally, unchanged during 1983. Having initially taken some bold economic reform moves during the late 1970s, the Government did not follow through with a further series of policy measures needed to achieve its objectives of sustained faster economic growth, higher levels of domestic savings to finance higher levels of investment and accelerated export growth. Instead, subsequent economic policymaking has been responding more to short-run political and economic pressures rather than medium-term objectives. The result has been an ini- tially high but then declining GDP growth rate over time against a background of increasing and unsustainable balance of payments and budgetary deficits. The crux of these problems is the extremely high level of capital formation in relation to national savings and the slow growth of exports in relation to import requirements. Between 1980 and 1983 capital formation remained at a high 30% of GDP largely because fully half of it was financed by foreign savings. iii. A review of the performance of various sectors throws some light on these developments. On the positive side, paddy, garments and tourism stand out as sustained successes. The growth in these areas has been a direct response to the liberalization measures of the late seventies, including the move to full-cost pricing for rice, the initial devaluation of the rupee, the reduced controls on foreign exchange transactions and favorable incentives for foreign investors. Sectors which have performed poorly include tree crops (tea, rubber and coconuts), public manufacturing enterprises, which account for 40% of value added in the non-petroleum manufacturing sector, and practically all non-traditional exports, excluding garments. Underlying the -ii- poor performance of these sectors are two principal factors: poor management of publicly owned activities, and the overall incentive framework, including the exchange rate and tariff policies embodying very high and uneven levels of effective protection. In between, the construction sector has registered periodic high growth rates, reflecting the rapid expansion in the level of investment, led by the large increase in public expenditure. Whenever the Government has been forced to bring spending more into line with domestic resources, as in 1981, the construction sector has undergone a similar contraction. iv. Although external circumstances were an important contributing factor, the Government's budgetary management has been the major source of the financial instability in the economy during the past several years. The disequilibrium was greatest in 1980. Considerable progress has been made since then in reducing the size of the balance of payments and budget deficits, but much still remains to be done. In addition, the need to improve the quality and composition of public sector spending has received inadequate attention as the authorities have had to focus their efforts mainly on getting the level of spending under better control. v. As a share of GDP, budgetary spending increased sharply from 23% in 1977 to a record 43% in 1980, declining subsequently but still remaining at 32% in 1983, in spite of a shortfall from original spending plans in 1983 as a result of the July disturbances. The increase in capital spending was especially dramatic, with heavy emphasis on capital-intensive and long- gestating projects, such as Mahaweli and housing and urban development. The rapid growth in spending was accompanied by large budget deficits which peaked at the equivalent of 23% of GDP in 1980 and still amounted to 15% of GDP in 1983, largely because of a weak revenue performance. The principal cause of the latter is reduced earnings from export duties, as the tree crop surplus was squeezed between declining world prices and falling productivity, and insufficient measures were taken to reduce dependence on these duties by searching for revenues from alternative sources. The slow growth in revenues, together with rapidly rising interest payments associated with the large deficits, meant that current spending had to be squeezed, including spending on wages and salaries and operation and maintenance, not without important costs to the economy. Even so, savings on current account remained negative. In spite of impressive donor support for the country's development programs, equivalent to 7.3% of GDP during 1981-83, the high level of capital investment meant that this covered only 45% of the overall deficit during these years; about 10% was covered by foreign commercial borrowing and the remaining 45% through domestic borrowing. vi. The large budget deficits were a primary cause of the deteriorating balance of payments situation. Other factors included the low growth in ' export volumes and the weakening terms of trade and international recession. The current account balance deteriorated from a positive 2.4% of GDP in 1977 to a record 19.8% deficit in 1980, subsequently leveling off at an average 13.7% during 1981-83. Roughly 60% of the large external deficits during 1981-83 have been financed by gross aid disbursements, with the remainder met by a drawdown of reserves and non-concessionary borrowing. By the end of 1983, net international reserves were slightly negative, gross official reserves were equal to about two months of imports, and growing debt service obligations put limits on Sri Lanka's future borrowing on non-concessional terms. -iii- vii. The problems faced by Sri Lanka today, to a large extent, tave their roots in basic structural characteristics of the economy which have existed for many years and were not fully remedied by the reforms of the late seventies. At the center of Sri Lanka's economic development since independ- ence has been the paddy economy. Up until 1977-79, the basic thrust of Government policy with respect to paddy was consumer oriented. This was made possible by using the surplus extracted from the tree crop sector to pay for rice imports. In addition, the tree crop surplus was also used to finance social programs, which made Sri Lanka's outstanding social achievements possible, and government investments generally. Among the latter were sub- stantial investments in the manufacturing sector which the Government viewed as a means to alter the structure of the industrial base as well as to satisfy certain social goals, including employment creation. The reforms of 1977-79 introduced a major change in the paddy economy in that policies now became producer oriented. On the other hand, the Government inherited an inefficient manufacturing sector, which has been largely left untouched since, and a run-down tree crop sector, which had been starved for funds and subjected to a prolonged nationalization process in the early seventies, which delayed necessary investments. This situation was further aggravated subsequent to nationalization by a weakened management of the sector. As the tree crop surplus continued to decline and the terms of trade deteriorated after 1977, the high level of investment had to be funded by foreign and domestic borrowing plus the use of international reserves. While the 1983-84 terms of trade improvement is giving the economy some breathing space, not only is there a need for stabilization measures in the short term, but it is apparent that basic structural change is needed, above all in the tree crop and manufacturing sectors, to regain the growth momentum in the medium term. viii. To avoid the consequences of an abrupt downward adjustment in aggregate demand which is likely to follow from a continuation of past policies, one of the priority objectives of Government policy should be to restructure the economy away from producing for the very limited domestic market towards exports. The basic thrust of the required policy package would be to move towards a more neutral incentive framework which would permit the full diversity of Sri Lanka's particular comparative advantage to develop. However, in the short run, the capacity of the economy to respond to a changed set of incentives may be limited. In these conditions, the restoration of economic stability will depend upon a period of planned reductions in aggregate demand. These short-run measures must be taken against the background of further policy changes designed to stimulate growth and restructure the economy. ix. While the Government is making efforts in the right direction, they need to be strengthened considerably. To illustrate, traditional export crops are not expected to fully reverse the past declining trend in output until 1988 even if the Government implements the positive policy measures currently under consideration. This means that non-traditional exports will have to expand rapidly to strengthen the balance of payments, which is unlikely to occur unless the existing anti-export incentive framework is reformed. Likewise, the revised 1984 budget, though a substantial improve- ment over the recent past, has only begun to incorporate some of the struc- tural reforms needed to put government finances on a sound footing. It is difficult to see how existing revenue measures can generate the resources required to meet projected expenditures. A review of the budget suggests, -iv- first, that it may prove difficult to hold both recurrent and capital expen- ditures to budget estimates. Second, the imbalance between current and capital expenditures, which has reduced O&M expenditures to grossly inade- quate levels, has not been resolved. Third, the budget continues to rely upon planned underexpenditures to live within resource limits. Fourth, to a large extent, the revenue system continues to rely on discretionary annual measures and export taxes which cannot be sustained in the medium term. x. A more viable scenario, presented in this report, is based upon projections which embody a package of policy measures designed to strengthen long-term growth potential while maintaining a manageable balance of payments. The real GDP growth rate should remain at approximately 5% in 1984, declining temporarily thereafter until the economy has gone through the necessary short-run adjustment process. The higher growth in 1984 reflects the recovery from the 1983 drought, the revival of tourism and the income effect of the terms of trade improvement. However, by 1985 the effect of these factors will have dissipated, commodity price projections suggest that the terms of trade are likely to deteriorate and the reduced level of govern- ment expenditure will dampen demand. Thus, during the adjustment period, when the Government is attempting to restrain aggregate demand, economic growth is expected to fall to some 4%. If these short-run measures are taken in addition to the longer-term policy initiatives, then the economy should be well positioned to grow by at least 5% per annum beyond 1987-88. In this scenario the current account deficit in the balance of payments should decline rapidly in the short run to about 9% of GDP in 1984 and then gradually fall over the medium term. Given expected disbursements of conces- sionary assistance, commercial borrowing needs should be at sustainable levels and Sri Lanka's medium-term creditworthiness should be strengthened considerably. xi. The package of policy measures underlying the above scenario includes, apart from immediate attention to the short-run stabilization problem, four broad problem areas which have been identified as comprising the foundations for a further restructuring of the economy. The need for structural reform applies especially to budgetary practices, and to the key sectors of agriculture, industry and energy. xii. The first requirement is for economic stabilization through a reduc- tion in excess demand. As there are limits to possible or desirable reduc- tions in consumption, the major burden of the adjustment will have to fall on investment demand, and especially public sector investment. The latter follows because future growth and strengthened creditworthiness will depend on shifts in the composition of investments with more emphasis on quick- yielding and private sector investments. In addition, there is a clear need for the Government to begin to generate savings on current account. This will require, above all, a thorough review of the taxation system to make it more elastic. On the recurrent expenditure side, economic efficiency con- siderations call for much increased spending for O&M purposes and for higher civil service salaries. These increases will have to be accommodated largely by reallocating expenditure away from low return uses, such as the continuing subsidies to public corporations. With regard to capital spending, the desirability of introducing priority setting cannot be overstressed. -V- xiii. There have been encouraging institutional developments affecting budgetary management in recent weeks. A new committee on economic policy has been created, comprising the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance and Planning, empowered to enforce financial discipline and ensure that Cabinet decisions on economic policy are implemented. A comprehensive inter-ministerial exercise is ongoing, designed to ensure adequate expenditures on O&M which, starting in 1985, will appear explicitly as a separate category of spending in the budget. Finally, the Cabinet has laid down criteria for project selection for inclusion in future public capital budgets which should remedy a major weakness. Actual implementation of these measures, which would, among others, do away with the need for the underexpenditure provision and help ensure improved coordination among the multitude of ministries, would be a major breakthrough in budgetary management. xiv. In addition to the above, sustained economic growth and long-tern viability in the balance of payments call for major policy changes in key sectors of the economy to create an incentives' environment for increased private investment and expanded economic activity. In agriculture the recent experience of agricultural performance points to the principal issues which should be addressed in order to exploit the considerable potential for further growth and diversification. The determined application of strong incentives for paddy production and marketing has elicited a remarkably positive farmer response. In contrast, for other field crops (coarse grains, pulses, tubers, oilseeds), farmer incentives as well as institutional support have been weak relative to paddy, thus resulting in their limited adoption. Milk prices were maintained at low levels through subsidized imports, con- straining dairy development. Tree crops growth was constrained by squeezing profit margins and allowing the development of a fragmented institutional base and poor management practices for the plantations. Clearly, while government policy is committed to promoting producer initiatives-and has been applied successfully in the paddy sector-the incentive framework and the institutional support system for other subsectors need to be strengthened and backed with priority investments. A first step towards reviewing the overall effects of government policies on agricultural incentives was taken in November 1983 when the National Food Policy and Agricultural Prices Committee was formed. The Committee secretariat should accord high priority to organizing the data base and analytical methods for assessing agricultural incentives and formulating recommendations for Government action to remove economic distortions. At the same time, the Government will need to under- take a number of institutional measures, including the completion of manage- ment and organizational reforms of the JEDB and the SPC; a review of the role of other public enterprises in agriculture; rationalization of the multiple ministries and other government agencies involved with tree crops; and the improvement of extension services for smallholders, particularly in field crops, minor export crops and tree crops. In planning investments, the imbalance between Mahaweli and tree crops will need to be corrected, with more emphasis placed on rehabilitation and modernization of investments designed to obtain maximum returns from existing facilities. Furthermore, the wide range of investment subsidies now available for tree crops should be reviewed and rationalized with a view to providing appropriate signals regarding the choice of crops and the choice between activities such as infilling, replanting or interplanting. -vi- XV. In industry, evidence suggests that the growth momentum which resulted from the 1977 policy package has recently begun to slow down. Although external factors, such as sluggish world growth and rising petroleum prices have had a negative effect on performance, the industrial policy of the Government has been a contributing factor. While the 1977 reforms did liberalize the economy significantly, the overall incentive framework has remained biased in favor of import substitution at the expense of export activities, both because of subsequent exchange rate policies and because of a tariff structure providing high and non-uniform levels of effective protec- tion biased against exporting. As has happened in other countries, some growth has occurred under this situation as investors were drawn into produc- ing for the domestic market. However, due to the small size of Sri Lanka-s domestic market, the "easy" import substitution activities were quickly exhausted. In addition, the Government inherited a large and inefficient public enterprises sector. The cumulative effects of ineffectual management, unrealistic salary and bonus policies, employment practices and the condi- tions under which public enterprises are financed have been highly detrimen- tal to their viability and to the maintenance of their capital assets. Xvi. The above suggests that many policy measures to stimulate efficient industrial production need to be put in place. The relative inaction so far may well reflect the absence of a consensus on future strategy, with both protectionist forces at work as well as forces intent on establishing a more uniform incentive framework which attempts to minimize the discretionary influence of public administrators. The latter is clearly the desirable route for Sri Lanka to take, and proposals for a time-phased tariff reform towards that end are expected to be placed before the Cabinet in the near future. If adopted, appropriate adjustments in the exchange rate will have to be combined with tariff reforms to avoid exacerbating the short-run balance of payments impact. With respect to public manufacturing enterprises, Government policy will need to be flexible in order to address the special needs and circumstances of a group of activities which span a wide range of potential economic efficiency. For the small number of enterprises which are highly inefficient, unable now or in the future to cover even their variable costs, the Government should consider the pos- sibility of shutting them down. At the other extreme, in the case of enterprises which already appear to be able to meet the market challenge, the Government should consider the option of selling them to the private sector; this option would relieve the Government's overstretched administrative and financial resources. However, for many enterprises a transition period will be required during which changes in the incentive structure are introduced so as to determine their long-term viability and bring them to the point where private investors would find the undertaking attractive. If a commitment is made to introduce these reforms, there may be a major need for assistance, in the form of technical, managerial and financial support during the transition period. xvii. In energy, most of the rapid growth in commercial energy consumption during the past few years was accounted for by petroleum, especially for thermal power generation, as hydro-electricity generation was constrained by poor monsoons and inadequate generating capacity. As a result, the burden of net petroleum imports, which had risen from 14% of non-petroleum exports in 1977 to 35% in 1980, rose to almost 50% by 1982. Despite heavy thermal power -vii- generation, there were serious shortages of electricity during this period, which inevitably had adverse effects on economic growth. xviii. Although the overall energy situation will ease significantly through the end of the decade with the expected conissioning of three major hydropower projects under the Accelerated Mahaweli Program during 1984-86, over the longer run Sri Lanka will become increasingly dependent upon imported energy to meet its needs. To help sustain economic growth and a: healthy balance of payments over the longer run, it is important that energy be used efficiently. Important areas for action include improved demand management, the development of alternative sources of energy including renew- ables and imported coal, and strengthening of the institutional framework. The Government has acted on a number of these recommendations: petroleum and electricity prices have been increased to reflect economic costs and in the process important changes in the price structure were made; it is taking steps to improve energy efficiency in large industrial and commercial uses; it has begun planning for coal-based power generation in the 1990s, and the institutional structure and data base in the energy sector have been greatly strengthened. Provided Sri Lanka can maintain the adjustment momentum developed over the recent past, it should be able to cope with the energy situation through the 1980s and be in a good position to meet its energy needs relatively efficiently in the years beyond. xix. Early implementation of the several adjustment and structural reform measures discussed above is essential if Sri Lanka is to re-establish growth momentum in the medium term. The scenario in this report presupposes such action. In order to finance the. near-term costs of adjustment, Sri Lanka will require substantial foreign assistance. The aid community has responded enthusiastically to the Government's development efforts in recent years. The overall level of aid commitments increased from $250 million in 1977 to a record of $815 million in 1981, equivalent to $55 per capita. Disbursements grew much more slowly and there was a rapid build up of the aid pipeline to around $1,630 million by the end of 1981. With the need to curtail public capital spending during 1982-83, both because of implementation and domestic financial constraints, commitments declined to $550 million in 1982 and $370 million in 1983, halting further increases in the pipeline. Aid disburse- ments have grown steadily, from $200 million in 1977 to $450 million in 1983, or close to $30 per capita. The slow growth of disbursements relative to commitments through 1981 can be explained largely by two factors: the rapid acceleration in aid commitments themselves which proved beyond the country's absorptive capacity, and the relative shift over time from food and commodity aid towards slower disbursing project aid. xx. Aid requirements during 1984 and 1985 are determined by a variety of factors, including the decline in the current account deficit, the need to build up reserves, the declining reliance on commercial borrowing and the still relatively large aid pipeline. During 1984 non-concessionary capital inflows are still expected to be fairly substantial as a result of commit- ments already made. At the same time, because the proposed budget cuts fall mainly on aided projects, some slowdown in the growth of aid disbursements appears likely. Required gross disbursements of aid are estimated at $457 million, about the same level as in 1983. During 1985, however, aid disbur- sements required will rise. While the level of capital spending will be reduced, this should be achieved on the basis of economic criteria, resulting -viii- in an increase in the proportion of aid-financed projects in the total public capital expenditure target. Required gross disbursements of aid should increase substantially to some $540 million. On average about one-fifth of these disbursements will have to come from new commitments. xxi. Consistent with the temporary restraint in public capital spending, new commitments during 1984 are estimated at $486 million, but are projected at about $600 million in 1985. It may at first appear that Sri Lanka's public finance situation would argue for further restraint in the introduc- tion of new projects in 1985, and that the case for food and commodity aid is somewhat weakened by the currently relatively strong balance of payments position. But, since project commitments now are primarily for disbursement in future years, the proposed commitment levels are justified in view of Sri Lanka's medium-term needs. They do, however, reflect the assumption that their composition responds to a well-defined set of priorities for public investment and that the structural reforms discussed earlier are put in place. With regard to food and commodity aid, Sri Lanka's balance of pay- ments remains vulnerable to volatile tea prices. The projected build up of reserves in 1984/85 is essential and the transition towards a more viable balance of payments situation will need to be supported through non-project aid. The proposed commitment levels can also be considered realistic given the likely availability of foreign aid. On a per capita basis they amount to about $31 and $38 respectively for 1984 and 1985, below the levels of earlier years even in nominal terms. xxii. Expected commitments for Mahaweli downstream development during 1984 amount to $200 million and a further $130 million is recommended during 1985. The present outlook for non-Mahaveli project aid is for $216 million of new commitments during 1984, and a further $335 million is recommended during 1985. Expected food and commodity aid commitments during 1984 are $70 million; for 1985, $130 million in new commitments is recommended. If this aid is to support an appropriate public investment program, it is essential that the aid be directed towards those high priority investments which the Government is already committed to undertake. These would include among others the development of the tree crop sector, rehabilitation investments, agricultural diversification, credit lines for the private sector and development of energy resources. Chapter I: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS A. Introduction 1. The Sri Lankan economy showed improvement in several respects during 1983. In spite of a major drought and the outbreak, in July 1983, of severe civil disturbances, GDP continued to grow though at a marginally lower rate than in the preceding year. Both the overall budget deficit and the deficit in the current account of the balance of payments declined as a share of GDP. Nevertheless, the deficits remained very large, reflecting the massive imbalance between investment and savings and the inadequate volume growth of exports. Also,-only modest progress was made towards consolidation of the basic reforms initiated in 1977. 2. The economic gains in 1983 were in part the result of government policy initiatives. These included efforts to increase resource mobilization, progress in energy conservation policies, exchange rate adjustments, and an effort to place a freeze on new public investment projects. Yet, the improved performance also reflected fortuitous developments, and especially a dramatic turnaround in the country's terms of trade. This was a major factor in the improvement in Sri Lanka's fiscal position and in the balance of payments outcome for 1983. 3. Real GDP grew by an estimated 4.9% in 1983, compared to 5.1% in 1982, with highly divergent performances in some subsectors. While total agricul- ture grew at 5.1%, paddy output increased by an unprecedented 14.7%, but tree crop sector output declined by 4.1%. Growth in the manufacturing sector was a disappointing 0.8% but the services sector continued to expand at 6%. Paddy production benefitted from a very favorable 1982/83 maha harvest which was the result of both an increase in area under cultivation and a rise in average yield. The expanded maha harvest more than compensated for a sharp decline in 1983 yala production which resulted from the drought conditions of early 1983. Notwithstanding a rise in fertilizer prices (May 1983), fer- tilizer use in paddy increased during 1983. Output expansion was also encouraged by an increase in the guaranteed price of paddy in March 1983 to Rs 62.5 from Rs 57.5 per bushel. In contrast to expanded output of paddy, production of plantation crops experienced a considerable decline. Declines in output of 8% and 5% occurred in coconuts and tea, respectively; production of rubber, on the other hand, increased by 8%. Although higher world prices for tea and rubber increased producer margins for both commodities during 1983, there is no assurance that the improvement in the financial position of the state plantations is other than temporary. It is thus essential to emphasize the need for fundamental improvements in the efficiency of the tree crop sector. 4. Value added in manufacturing grew by 0.8% in 1983, a sharp reduction from the expansion in the previous year. This slower rate of growth reflected depressed activity in most major industrial subsectors, as agro- processing industries showed a sharp reduction in production (reflecting declining tree crop output), while the rate of growth of factory industries declined from over 9% to around 2%. The declining pace of expansion in manufacturing output was due to three factors: the drought in the first half -2- of 1983, which affected tree crop output and agro-processing activity; the civil disturbances; and, a lengthy shut-down of the national petroleum refinery for repairs. Manufacturing activity was hampered also by the drought-induced decline in hydro-electric energy output. The resulting shortage led to the imposition of power shut-downs in the latter part of the year and a large resort to thermal electricity; during 1983 thermal plants accounted for about two-fifths of total power generated as compared with one-fifth in 1982. 5. The July 1983 civil disturbances, while short-lived in duration, had a measurable impact on some areas of economic activity. They also had a considerable effect on investment psychology and on the time and energy which government leaders had to devote to a solution to the problem of communal unrest. While agriculture was largely unaffected, considerable damage was inflicted on industrial, commercial and residential property. Rough estimates suggest that the replacement value of damaged industrial machinery, plant and equipment alone was about $75 million; total damage, including that to retail outlets and housing, may have amounted to $300 million; at the time, the impact on employment was estimated at a reduction of nearly 50,000 jobs and the total decline of wage income from both direct and indirect effects at around Rs 300 million. The absence or departure of skilled workers for security reasons slowed down or stopped work on several develop- ment projects. Although the full economic impact of the disturbances is difficult to assess, restoration .f private (including foreign) investor confidence will inevitably take some time, as will the full revival of the tourism sector which by 1982 had become one of Sri Lanka's major sources of foreign exchange. 6. The Government adopted a number of measures aimed at assisting riot- affected persons and business. Relief camps were established to house, clothe and feed some 80,000 persons who, on leaving the camps, received cash and food grants to assist in their rehabilitation. As a protective measure damaged business establishments and residences were temporarily vested in the State, though most of these have by now been divested. Rehabilitation of business was helped in several ways, including the use of aid-financed industrial credit facilities; the allocation of Rs 37 million to aid the tourism sector; and the provision of fiscal assistance through waiving of duties on purchase of replacement equipment and allowing the deduction from taxable income of expenditures for repair of damaged property. B. Major Economic Developments, 1978-83 7. Macro-Economic Developments and Policies. The basic objectives of the Government remain as they were when the initial steps towards liberaliz- ing the economy were taken in 1977, i.e., higher growth of production and related employment, higher levels of domestic savings and investment, and faster export growth. To achieve these objectives, the Government introduced a series of policy measures which (a) reduced government intervention in commodity markets, (b) reduced government consumption subsidies to help restore public savings and finance public investment, and (c) created a favorable environment for private (foreign and domestic) investment by tax concessions, the creation of an Investment Promotion Zone, and the unifica- tion and depreciation of the exchange rate. Having initially taken some bold moves, the Government did not follow through with a further series of policy -3- measures needed to achieve its objectives. Instead, subsequent economic policymaking has been responding more to short-run political and economic pressures rather than medium-tern objectives. This may be seen from a review of major developments since the initial liberalization. 8. The economy in recent years has been marked by a positive but declin- ing GDP growth rate against a background of increasing balance of payments and budgetary problems. The real GDP growth rate has declined from an average 7.3% during 1978179 to an average 5.3% during 1981/83. Over the same period the current account deficit in the balance of payments increased sharply before leveling off at an average 13.7% during 1981-83; budget deficits followed a similar pattern, increasing to a record 23% in 1980 before declining subsequently. The large budget deficits have contributed to intermittent periods of high domestic inflation, which recently again accelerated; the rate of inflation, as measured by the Colombo cost of living index, was 14% on average in 1983 over 1982, but reached 23% when measured between February 1983 and February 1984. The deficits also led to increased dependence on foreign loans on commercial terms to finance the resulting increase in import demand. This has led to a rise in the ratio of service payments on public external debt from 11.4% of exports of goods and services in 1979 to 17.7% in 1983. 9. The crux of Sri Lanka's problem of macro-economic imbalance remains the extremely high level of capital formation in relation to national savings and the slow growth of exports in relation to import requirements. In 1983 the ratio of gross domestic fixed capital formation to gross product was close to 30%, about the level of 1980-82. In an effort to reduce the growth in investments, the Government has put a halt to new public sector starts. With public savings negative, financing this very high level of investment remains a major problem, although total national savings increased modestly during 1983. Domestic savings rose to around 14% and national savings to 16% of GDP, with migrants' remittances contributing no less than one-third of the total. While the ratio of foreign savings to gross product is well below the extreme level reached at the beginning of the decade-around 20% of GDP and amounting to nearly two-thirds of total investment-external savings in 1983 still amounted to around 12% of GDP, financing over two-fifths of total investment. Although 1983 witnessed some decline in the ratio of foreign savings to GDP, this was largely due to the improvement in the country's terms of trade; the volume of exports remained stagnant during the year. -4- Table 1: ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1978-83 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983A/ Value Added (% change) Real GDP 8.2 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.1 4.9 Tree Crops 5.6 3.9 -10.1 7.5 1.3 -4.1 Paddy 12.7 1.4 11.9 3.6 -3.4 14.7 Manufacturing 7.8 4.6 0.8 5.2 4.8 0.8 Savings and Investment (Z of GDP) Gross Fixed Investment 20.0 25.3 31.3 27.4 30.3 28.8 Public b/ 12.3 14.0 19.3 13.8 15.9 12.7 Private 7.7 11.3 12.0 13.6 14.4 16.1 Change in Stocks - 0.5 2.5 0.4 0.3 -0.2 Total Investment = Total Savings 20.0 25.8 33.8 27.8 30.6 28.6 Gross National Savings 15.5 14.8 14.0 14.3 15.4 16.2 (ia) Public b/ -1.4 0.2 -3.8 -1.8 -1.4 -2.3 (ib) Private 16.9 14.6 17.8 16.1 16.8 18.5 (iia) Domestic 15.2 13.8 11.2 11.7 11.9 13.6 (iib) Net Private Transfers from Abroad 0.8 1.4 3.4 4.6 5.5 5.2 (iic) Net Factor Income from Abroad -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -2.0 -2.0 -2.6 Foreign Savings c/ 4.5 11.0 19.8 13.5 15.2 12.4 Resource Balance (% of GDP) 4.8 12.0 22.6 16.1 18.7 15.1 Exports of Goods and NFS 34.8 33.8 32.2 30.4 27.1 26.0 Imports of Goods and NFS 39.6 45.8 54.8 46.5 45.8 41.1 Terms of Trade 132.9 116.8 107.1 100.8 100.0 113.6 Price Index for Exports, GNFS 98.5 103.6 114.3 107.8 100.0 106.2 Price Index for Imports, GNFS 74.1 88.7 106.7 106.9 100.0 93.5 Colombo Cost of Living (% chanie) 12.1 10.8 26.1 18.0 10.8 14.0 Money Supply (% change) d/ 25.0 38.2 31.9 23.1 24.8 22.1 a/ Estimates. / Government finance data. c/ Equals current account deficit in the balance of payments. d/ December to December. Sources: Central Bank; Ministry of Finance and Planning; and Bank staff estimates. -5- 10. Considerable light can be thrown on the declining GDP growth rates and the expanding fiscal and balance of payments deficits through an examina- tion of the performance of various sectors over the past few years. On the positive side, paddy, garments and tourism stand out as sustained successes, with construction registering periodic high growth rates. Paddy output increased by more than 6% per year in real terms since 1977, resulting in a decline in rice imports from an average 33% of total rice consumption during 1970-77 to only 12% during 1978-83. Manufactured garment exports have increased from $12 million in 1977 to nearly $200 million in 1983, raising their share of total merchandise exports from 2% in 1977 to 19% in 1983, whereas tourist arrivals have increased from 154,000 in 1977 to 407,000 in 1982, with a reduction to 337,000 in 1983 due to the civil disturbances. 11. The growth in these areas has been a direct response to the liberalization measures introduced in 1977. In the case of paddy, the most important factor in the strong performance was the decision in September 1979 to replace the previous rice rationing scheme by a food stamp scheme and to move to full-cost pricing on imported rice and wheat flour. As a result, retail prices for rice rose significantly, opening up profitable oppor- tunities for the private sector and maintaining farm gate prices well above the government guaranteed price level. This in turn led to reduced govern- ment procurement and increased competition in the private sector which has lowered marketing costs and increased farmer incentives. The growth in the garments and tourism sectors has been due to the combined effect of a number of economic measures: the initial devaluation of the rupee, the reduced controls on foreign exchange transactions and the generally more favorable incentives for foreign investors, for example, the Investment Promotion Zone and tax concessions. 12. In the case of construction, the growth has resulted from rapid expansion in the level of investment, led by the large increase in public expenditures. Whenever the Government has been forced to bring expenditures more into line with domestic resources, for example in 1981, the construction sector has undergone a similar contraction. Given the present financial constraints, it is unlikely that the growth in construction activity will match past experience. -6- Table 2: AGRICULTURE: SELECTED INDICATORS, 1977-82 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 PADDY Production ('000 NT) 1,677 1,891 1,917 2,133 2,230 2,156 Imports ('000 MT) aj 774 235 312 279 231 237 Gross Area Sown ('000 ba) 828 876 839 845 877 845 Fertilizer Used ('000 NT) 122 136 130 190 156 167 Area Under Improved Varieties ('000 ha) 692 685 648 683 839 763 Average Yield (kg/ha) bj/ 2,521 2,613 2,750 2,927 3,014 3,260 TEA Production (Mn. kg) 209 199 206 191 210 188 Exports (Mn. kg) 186 193 185 185 184 181 Planted Area ('000 ha) 242 243 244 245 245 242 Fertilizer Used ('000 NT) 80 116 105 110 103 103 Area Replanted (ha) 1,242 1,709 2,491 2,156 2,677 1,981 Average Yield (kg/ha) b/ 1,007 958 993 922 RUBBER Production (Mn. kg) 146 156 153 133 124 125 Exports (Mn. kg) 135 138 128 121 133 131 Tapped Area ('000 ha) 189 185 186 186 176 171 Fertilizer Used ('000 NT) 12 21 23 22 17 17 Area Replanted (ha) 2,617 3,226 4,168 5,434 6,442 6,782 Average Yield (kg/ha) bI 773 845 820 718 705 726 COCONUTS Production (Mn. nuts) 1,812 2,207 2,393 2,026 2,258 2,510 Exports (Mn. nut equiv.) 281 595 537 242 439 628 Fertilizer Used ('000 MT) 29 43 50 56 38 30 Area Replanted (ha) 264 722 1,737 2,731 3,555 3,542 SUBSIDIARY FOOD CROPS Production ('000 NT) 874 814 628 694 828 Cultivated Area ('000 ha) 238 238 168 187 221 Feztilizer Issue ('000 NT) .. .. 13 14 .. Not available. aj Rice imports converted to paddy equivalent at 1 MT paddy = 0.68 MT rice. bV Per hectare harvested or tapped. Sources: Statistical Appendix, Tables; Central Bank of Ceylon; Ministry of Coconut Industry, Progress 1983; and National Fertilizer Secretariat. 13. Sectors which have performed poorly include tree crops (tea, rubber and coconuts), public manufacturing enterprises and practically all non- traditional exports, excluding garments. The combined value added in tea, rubber and coconuts has basically remained stagnant during the last six -7- years. Public manufacturing enterprises, which account for approximately 40% of value-added in the non-petroleum manufacturing sector have depressed the performance of the manufacturing sector as a whole. Thus, output of private enterprises had increased by 102% between 1977 and 1981, while public enterprises achieved only a 19% increase. Over the same period, employment in the public sector expanded by 24% compared to an increase of 50% in the private sector. The real growth of non-traditional exports has also been fairly low and erratic.l/ Underlying the poor performance of all these sectors are two principal factors: poor management of publicly owned activities, and the overall incentive framework, including the exchange rate and tariff policies. 14. In the particular case of public manufacturing enterprises, the effects that production inefficiencies have on output levels are muted by the often high levels of protection afforded them via import tariffs, licensing and subsidies. In the short run this strategy may protect existing levels of employment and output, but at a considerable cost in terms of misallocated resources and growth opportunities foregone. 15. Public Finances. The major source of financial instability in the Sri Lankan economy during the past few years has been the Government's budgetary policy. Not only has the level of spending been far in excess of available resources, there are also important shortcomings in the composition of spending, both between current and capital spending as well as within these two categories. While some progress has been made since 1981 in tack- ling the "size" problem and reducing the overall deficit, much more remains to be done. Moreover, efforts to improve upon the quality and composition of public spending have had limited success thus far. 16. As a share of GDP, budgetary spending increased sharply from 23% in 1977 to a record 43% in 1980, declined to about 34% during 1981-82 and remained at 32% in 1983, in spite of a shortfall from original spending plans during the latter year as a result of the July disturbances (Table 3). The increase in capital spending was especially dramatic, with heavy emphasis on capital-intensive and long-gestating projects, such as the Mahaweli program and the housing and urban development program. The rapid growth in spending was accompanied by large budget deficits which peaked at the equivalent of 23% of GDP in 1980 and still amounted to 15% of GDP in 1983. Following the initial jump in government revenues between 1977 and 1978, primarily as a result of the exchange rate reform, revenues have fallen rapidly as a share of GDP. While current spending has, as a result, also been reduced as a share of GDP, current savings have still been negative, since 1978 equivalent to 1.8% of GDP on average. This, together with the large public investment program, has led to the large deficits. If That is, exports excluding tea, rubber, coconuts (and by-products), and petroleum re-exports. Garments are also excluded as they are dealt with separately. -8- 17. The principal cause of the weak revenue performance is reduced earn- ings from export duties, and one weakness in government fiscal policy has been inadequate measures to reduce dependence on these duties by searching for revenues from alternative sources. The taxable surplus of the tree crop sector could not be sustained given declining world market prices, declining productivity, and insufficient movewent in the nominal exchange rate to compensate for domestic inflation. Moreover, even excluding export duties, government revenues as a share of GDP in 1983 were lower than in 1978. While the revenue to GDP ratio in 1983 was 1.4 percentage points below the originally budgeted amount, primarily on account of the impact of the July disturbances, the budget itself had included new tax measures (increases in import duty and turnover tax rates) equivalent to 2.5% of GDP to make up for the lack of buoyancy of the system. Some of the reasons for the weak perfor- mance of non-export tax revenues were generous tax holidays and exemptions, lax tax administration, considerable reliance on specific levies, and the lack of growth in the contributions to net current revenues by public sector corporations and government enterprises. Progress made in remedying these deficiencies in 1983 was confined to the removal of tax holidays and the reduction in investment relief which should allow for increasing revenues in the future. Clearly, however, a thorough overhaul of the tax system is needed to increase its elasticity and buoyancy. 18. On the current expenditure side, subsidies and transfers increased dramatically immediately after 1977 to enable a phasing in of the required price adjustments following the unification and devaluation of the exchange rate. The increase went primarily for fertilizer, food, petroleum products and the Central Transport Board. With the subsequent gradual conversion to full costing, expenditures on transfers and subsidies declined as a share of GDP from 11% in 1978 to 4.9% in 1983. The slow growth in revenues, however, together with rapidly rising interest payments associated with the large deficits, meant that the Government had to restrain other current spending items as well, uot without important costs. While interest payments grew from 3.2% of GDP in 1978 to 5.4% in 1983, expenditures on wages and salaries declined from 5.4% to 3.9% between the same two years. Also, though no precise estimates are available, expenditures for operation and maintenance (06M) of the country's growing capital stock are grossly inadequate. 19. The impact of the July 1983 disturbances on government current spend- ing was minor. While there were supplementaries for rehabilitation work and some increases in transfers to public corporations, these were much more than offset by underexpenditure on interest and some subsidies. Provisional estimates of actual spending during 1983 are below original budget estimates by 1 percentage point of GDP. -9- Table 3: SUMMARY OF BUDGETARY OPERATIONS, 1977-83 (in percent of GDP) Budget Provisional 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1983 Revenues 16.7 26.1 23.0 19.9 17.9 16.6 18.6 17.2 Income tax 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.4 2.9 3.0 2.7 Turnover taxes 1.8 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.3 4.1 6.1 4.1 Import duties 1.5 3.5 4.3 4.4 3.8 3.2 4.0 4.0 Export taxes 3.3 11.1 8.4 5.6 4.4 2.6 2.4 2.8 Other 7.5 6.4 5.4 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.1 3.6 Current Expenditure 16.6 23.4 20.8 19.1 17.9 18.9 19.6 18.6 Wages & salaries 5.0 5.4 5.5 4.8 4.3 4.4 4.3 3.9 Goods & services 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.6 3.3 2.9 2.9 Pensions 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.5 Transfers & subsidies 5.6 11.0 8.1 7.0 5.4 4.7 4.9 4.9 Interest, domestic 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.7 4.2 4.8 4.4 Interest, foreign 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.0 Advance Accounts 0.2 4.1 2.0 4.6 1.8 -0.9 0.4 0.9 Current Account -0.1 -1.4 0.2 -3.8 -1.8 -1.4 -1.4 -2.3 Capital Expenditure 5.7 12.3 14.0 19.3 13.8 15.9 14.7 12.7 Overall Deficit -5.8 -13.7 -13.8 -23.1 -15.6 -17.3 -16.1 -15.0 Foreign Finance (net) 2.9 9.0 7.1 9.2 8.9 8.1 10.3 9.0 of which: Commercial loans - - - 1.3 2.0 1.2 - 0.8 Domestic Finance (net) 2.9 4.7 6.7 13.9 6.7 9.2 5.8 6.0 Central Bank profits a/ - - - - - - 1.2 1.2 Banking System -2.0 0.4 1.2 10.6 4.5 3.7 1.1 0.4 Other 4.9 4.3 5.5 3.3 2.2 5.5 3.5 4.4 a/ While the authorities treat these transfers as revenue, they are shown here as a financing item for purposes of comparison with previous years. Sources: Central Bank; and Ministry of Finance and Planning. -10- 20. While a combination of higher revenues and restraint in current spending will be necessary in order to start generating budgetary savings on current account, a major burden of the adjustment may well have to fall on increases in revenues. There are, on the one hand, some areas of current spending where further cuts are possible: they include the transfers to cover losses of public corporations, such as the National Water Supply and Drainage Board, and continued subsidies such as those for fertilizer. On the other hand, interest payments are fixed obligations which cannot be cut except over the longer run by reducing the size of the deficit, and there are other important areas of current spending where cuts are unwise or where increases are called for. Further reductions in the relative size of the total wage bill may be difficult and, depending on the nature of the adjustments, to some extent counterproductive. A primary requirement for a longer-tern improvement in the efficiency of the public sector is a substantial increase in salaries at the higher professional level. To make room for this, the current wage indexation scheme, which instead favors the lower income groups, should be reduced further while, over the longer term, a gradual reduction in the total number of public sector employees is needed. In addition, there will have to be substantial increases in spending for O&M not only because it is inadequate now but especially in order to ensure that the hoped for benefits of the huge investment outlays of recent years materialize. 21. Excessive capital spending in relation to available resources has been the dominant feature of Sri Lanka's budgetary developments in recent years. Donor support for the country's development programs has been generous and averaged the equivalent of 7.3% of GDP during 1981-83, but even this covered only 45% of the overall deficit; about 10% was covered by recourse to foreign commercial borrowing and the remaining 45% through domes- tic borrowing. The reliance on non-concessionary foreign borrowing for budget support is undesirable. Gross borrowings were close to $90 million in 1981, $60 million in 1982 and $40 million in 1983. The level of domestic financing of the budget deficit is also uncomfortably high. While Central Bank financing has been reduced sharply since 1980 to as low as 0.4% of GDP by 1983, borrowing from captive institutions (the National Savings Bank, the Employees' Provident Fund) has remained large. 22. While the Government has made efforts to curtail capital spending, these efforts have been both insufficient, as witnessed by the continuing large deficits, and poorly directed. The 1983 budget speech included a welcome decision not to introduce any new projects during 1983 and 1984. It was not clear, however, whether "new projects" meant "projects not already included in some previous investment program" or "new, yet to be initiated projects". By the latter definition some new projects have continued to be introduced. More importantly perhaps, until very recently, the review of the capital budget was not undertaken systematically enough, with investment allocation criteria in mind, so as to be able to identify possible rephasings, reductions or eliminations of ongoing capital works. In particular, efforts to restrain non-aid-financed expenditures have been weak and there has been a tendency to assist more public and private corporations through transfers without a systematic review of the medium-term budgetary implications. -11- 23. Provisional estimates of capital spending during 1983, at 12.7% of GDP, are well below budgeted amounts and lower, as a share of GDP, than at any time since 1979. While it is unclear how much of this underexpenditure is due to implementation constraints and how much is the result of the July 1983 civil disturbances, it did not result from any systematic effort to reduce or rephase spending on the basis of investment allocation criteria. There was, in fact, a massive underexpenditure in aided projects while there were large increases in supplementiries to non-aided activities which included the Air Force, the Shipping Corporation, Air Lanka and Administrative Complexes. About 25% of the Government's capital spending during 1983 consisted of transfers to public corporations, including the Water Supply and Drainage Board, Air Lanka, the National Housing Development Authority, the Sugar Corporation, the public plantation corporations, the Port Authority, Shipping Corporation, and the Fertilizer Manufacturing Corporation. These transfers are prime candidates for a thorough review of their economic justification, especially in the light of the Government's overall severe budgetary constraints. 24. Balance of Payments. The principal features of balance of payments developments in Sri Lanka since 1977 can be read from Table 4. The overall picture is one of a sharp deterioration in the trade account up until 1980, followed by continued high deficits and increased foreign borrowing. The current account balance deteriorated from a positive 2.4% of GDP in 1977 to a record 19.8% deficit in 1980, subsequently leveling off at an average 13.7% during 1981-83. Roughly 60% of the large external deficits during 1981-83 have been financed by gross aid disbursements, with the remainder met by a drawdown on reserves and non-concessionary borrowing. 25. As a result, by the end of 1983, net international reserves were negative while gross official reserves were less than two months of imports. Even after allowing for imports financed by foreign aid, gross official reserves covered only 2.4 months of imports. The build up of external debt has resulted in a steady rise of the public debt service ratio to 17.7% by 1983.1/ In order to strengthen Sri Lanka's creditworthiness in the future, it will be necessary to resolve the basic structural weaknesses-savings- investment imbalance, low export growth-underlying the past performance of the economy. 26. Three major factors have contributed towards creating this weak balance of payments situation: viz. the international recession and weakening terms of trade, the budget deficit and the low growth in export volumes. 1/ The debt service ratio is defined as the ratio of debt service payments (interest and amortization) on public and publicly guaranteed medium and long-term debt, including IMF interest charges and repurchases, to exports of goods and services. If debt service on private non-guaranteed debt and on short-term debt were to be included, the total debt service ratio in 1983 amounts to 23.6%. -12- Table 4: SELECTED BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DATA, 1977-83 (in million US$) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Exports, f.o.b. 747 846 982 1,065 1,066 1,014 1,059 Imports, c.i.f. 716 999 1,450 2,051 1,877 1,990 1,922 Current Account 78 -124 -372 -798 -603 -734 -645 Gross Aid Disbursements 204 251 268 326 370 414 454 Change in Reserves (- - decline) 183 94 48 -220 -33 -27 1 Net Reserves 116 210 258 38 5 -22 -21 Gross Official Reserves 292 399 517 246 337 352 298 (in months of imports, c.i.f.) (4.9) (4.8) (4.3) (1.4) (2.2) (2.1) (1.9) (as percent of GDP) Exports, f.o.b. 22.5 31.0 29.2 26.5 24.1 21.1 20.4 Imports, c.i.f. 21.6 36.6 43.1 51.0 42.5 41.4 37.0 Current Account 2.4 -4.5 -11.0 -19.8 -13.5 -15.2 -12.4 Gross Aid Disbursements 6.1 9.2 8.0 8.1 8.4 8.8 8.7 Sources: Central Bank; and Ministry of Finance and Planning. 27. With respect to the first point, both the international recession and the adverse movement in Sri Lanka's terms of trade have contributed sig- nificantly to worsening the trade gap. For example, between 1977 and 1982 the price of tea (which accounted for 55% of total exports in 1977) declined by 23%, while petroleum prices doubled and the unit values of capital goods imports increased by 36%. The overall terms of trade deteriorated every year after 1977 (by approximately 30% between 1978 and 1982), until this was reversed (by 14%) in 1983. Although the trade balance would still have deteriorated over this period, the susceptibility of the Sri Lankan economy to wide fluctuations in the terms of trade is an important factor in assess- ing both past performance and future prospects. 28. Secondly, the budgetary deficits and a fairly heavy reliance on domestic bank borrowing have increased the trade deficit via increases in total domestic demand. As discussed earlier, total investment increased sharply after 1977, to an average of approximately 30% between 1981-83. with a very large increase in public capital expenditures. As total national savings have been well below investment levels, a considerable part of total investment had to be funded by increased foreign borrowing. 29. Over the period 1977-80, when the level of public capital expenditure increased rapidly, the average annual real rate of growth in imported capital goods was approximately 60%. As public capital expenditure liveled off, the annual rate of increase in investment goods also declined, to roughly 5% per annum in real terms between 1980-83. The problem is that the investments made with foreign savings have largely been in the public sector and have not yielded the gains in output and exports required to service the associated -13- increased external debt. This is partly because the public investments necessarily have been in long-gestating projects (e.g., infrastructure) but also, and of greater concern, because some investments have been in low return, low priority areas. 30. In addition, the general expansion of the budget deficit has resulted in a rapid growth in imported consumer goods. The real rate of growth in imported consumer goods (excluding rice, sugar and wheat) averaged some 43% per annum over the period 1977-80, subsequently leveling off under the influence of tighter monetary and budgetary discipline to an approximate 8% real annual growth rate between 1980-83. The adverse economic effects of allowing rapid monetary expansion at the same time as import barriers were lifted without adequate incentives to export inevitably resulted in a deteriorating trade balance. 31. The low growth in export volumes has been a third factor underlying the balance of payments performance. Aside from garment exports, which are affected by world import quotas, neither traditional (tea, rubber and coconut) nor non-traditional exports have performed well. Between 1977 and 1983 the average annual growth rate of real merchandise exports has been approximately 3% against an average annual growth rate in merchandise imports in real terms of over 10%. This poor performance largely reflects the absence since the 1977 reforms of government policies designed to create an incentive framework, with some major exceptions such as for paddy or tourism, which would encourage efficient export or import substitution activities. 32. With regard to traditional export crops, both tea and rubber volumes have declined since 1977 (by 15% and 8%, respectively) with coconut volumes staying fairly constant. This declining trend resulted from a neglect of necessary investments, brought about by a prolonged nationalization process in the early seventies, followed by the creation of numerous and poorly coordinated ministries, the absence of medium-term planning. and inadequate worker incentives. In addition to these managerial problems, the overall incentive framework, which is largely defined by the high net export taxes and real exchange rate, has provided low to negative margins for both public and private producers. 33. The real growth of non-traditional exports 11 has also been fairly low and erratic. After an initial jump following the 1977 reforms, volumes declined in 1979 and 1980 with positive growth rates in 1981 and 1982 being followed by a decline again in 1983. Given the small base figures aad dif- ferent price deflators, it is difficult to be precise in dealing with this basket of goods; however, the overall trend is not encouraging. 34. Any explanation of the poor performance of non-traditional exports is complicated by movements in external markets over which Sri Lanka has no control. However, domestic policies do impinge on export competitiveness, and in terms of two of the most important components in determining that competitiveness, the exchange rate and tariff policy, the Government's record 1! Excluding petroleum re-exports and garments. -14- has been inadequate. A recent study j demonstrates that the present trade tax system has established levels of effective protection which are high and non-uniform with an overall bias in favor of production for the domestic market. With regard to the exchange rate, a comparison of price-level- deflated exchange rates with Sri Lanka's major trading partners and export competitors indicates a real appreciation of the rupee ranging from 10% to 25% between 1978 and 1982 depending on the comparator countries selected. These distortions have protected inefficient manufacturers and encouraged private investors to enter non-traded activities. The result has been sub- stantial growth in the non-traded sector and low growth in non-traditional exports. 35. Although the Government has introduced several export promotion schemes since 1979 via the Export Development Board, these schemes have added very little to incentives. This is largely because the various selective measures that the Government has employed since 1979, such as import duty rebates and concessionary export finance schemes, have been dwarfed by the adverse effects of the exchange rate and tariff structure. 36. The balance of payments position as of end-1983 does show some improvement. The lower rate of growth in imports and the significant improvement in the terms of trade (approximately 14% over 1982) have enabled the Government, for the first time since 1979, to finance the trade deficit without a further reduction in international reserves. The lower rate of overall economic growth, the reduced budget deficit and the adoption of a more realistic exchange rate policy have been partially responsible for the slow down in the growth of imports. However, although these developments are encouraging, the continuing negative trend in the trade account indicates that the structural weaknesses in the economy remain. It is estimated that total merchandise export volume actually declined by approximately 4.4% in 1983 while merchandise import volumes increased by 3.4%. Thus, while the balance of payments position has improved in 1983, and is likely to continue to do so through 1984, much of the gain derives from an improvement in the terms of trade. For the future, therefore, it remains imperative to design economic policies to stimulate real growth through structural change so as to attain a sustainable balance of payments. 1/ "Effective Protection to Manufacturing Industry in Sri Lanka", Cuthbertson and Khan, September 1981. -15- Chapter II: MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK A. The Macro-economic Problem 37. In the past the total resource gap arising from successive budget deficits and slow export growth has been financed partly by increased remit- tances and partly, and of more importance, by an increased use of foreign capital inflows. This strategy has been sustainable to date because conces- sional finance was available and the initial level of debt, especially non- concessionary debt, was low. However, given likely future capital inflows it would seem that Sri Lanka will not be able to continue to finance its large trade deficit without, in the medium term, sacrificing economic growth. Gross reserves are roughly equivalent to two months of imports and publicly guaranteed commercial borrowing has clear limits. Basically, the current level of demand is being sustained by foreign borrowing. Unless output expands, so as to make the servicing of the associated debt compatible with Sri Lanka's resources, the level of consumption and investment will even- tually have to be cut drastically. 38. To avoid the consequences of such an abrupt adjustment, the objective of Government policy should be to restructure the economy away from producing for the very limited domestic market towards exports. As discussed below, in Chapter III, the basic thrust of the required policy package would be to move towards a neutral incentive framework which would permit the full diversity of Sri Lanka's particular comparative advantage to develop. This, in addi- tion to measures aimed at alleviating other constraints to development, such as the strengthening of key institutions and the tightening of budgetary mechanisms, should enable the economy to satisfy the current level of demand without recourse to a prolonged period of recessionary cuts. 39. However, in the short run, the capacity of the economy to respond to a changed set of incentives may be limited. In these conditions, the res- toration of economic stability will depend upon a period of planned restraint in aggregate demand. The scenario presented beginning in para 44 attempts to illustrate one way I--- which the restraints needed to address the short-term problems could, when combined with longer-term policy measures, create the conditions whereby the Government's growth objectives can be approximated. Medium-Term Prospects Without Adjustment 40. The outlook for 1984 is for a further improvement in the current account of the balance of payments because of an additional improvement in the terms of trade over 1983, and a projected reduction in the budget deficit (from 15% of GDP in 1983 to 10% in 1984). However, if no new policy initia- tives are taken, the economic situation is likely to deteriorate rapidly beyond 1984. The external deficit would increase due to a subsequent weaken- ing in the terms of trade coupled with the continued stagnation of export volumes. For example, traditional export crops are not expected to fully reverse the past declining trend in output until 1988 even if the Government implements the positive policy measures currently under consideration. Furthermore, neitber garments nor petroleum exports, both of which have a high import content, are likely to expand rapidly. The latter is constrained by the capacity of the refinery and increasing domestic demand, and the -16- former is constrained by the current quota restrictions in importing countries; relaxation of these quotas would clearly improve Sri Lanka's export prospects. Lastly, and most importantly, other non-traditional exports seem unlikely to fill the gap unless the existing anti-export incen- tive framework is reformed. 41. With regard to the budget, it is difficult to see how existing revenue measures can generate the resources required to meet projected expenditures. The analysis of the planned 1984 budget, provided in the following section, illustrates the problems. To briefly summarize, there appear to be four basic problems; firstly, it may prove difficult to hold both recurrent and capital expenditures to budget estimates. Secondly, the imbalance between current and capital expenditures, which has reduced O&H expenditures to grossly inadequate levels, has not been resolved. Thirdly, the budget continues to rely upon across-the-board underexpenditure provi- sions to reduce future expenditure targets. And, lastly, the revenue system continues to rely on discretionary annual measures and high export taxes which cannot be sustained in the medium term. Thus, unless the Government carries through with its proposed comprehensive review of the budgetary process (paras 64 and 65), deficits will increase in the coming years raising the level of required borrowing, increasing inflationary pressure and worsen- ing the balance of payments. 42. A primary problem of the medium-term scenario without adjustment is an overambitious public investment target. If we assume that the Government does not want to reduce private investment, the level of public capital expenditure planned for in the most recent five-year public investment program appears to exceed resource availability. That is, although the budget shows a reduced the level of public investment, the new public expen- diture estimates from 1985 through 1987 would generate a total investment requirement in excess of the level of total resources available from domestic savings plus an acceptable level of foreign borrowing. Whether the Government's medium-term projections of public investment can be achieved without either inflationary domestic financing or additional commercial borrowing is questionable, as they appear to be based on the assumption that the terms of trade remain at the very favorable 1984 position. Although this provides the additional savings required to balance investment needs without recourse to increased borrowing, the assumption of no change in the terms of trade does appear extremely unlikely. Thus, given more likely price trends, if the Government's projected public investment level is to be attained, it would appear that either increased pressure on domestic interest rates will occur due to increased domestic borrowing or additional foreign commercial borrowing will be incurred. Neither development would be conducive to medium-term growth. 43. To conclude, without adjustment the medium-term economic position appears unsustainable. If corrective economic measures are not taken now, expanding deficits will continue to raise the debt service ratio, ultimately forcing the economy to achieve the required degree of balance in the external account via slower growth. -17- Medium-Term Prospects With Adjustment 44. The more favorable scenario presented here is based upon projections which embody a package of policy measures 11 designed to achieve the Government's growth objectives while maintaining a viable external account. In the "adjusted" case, the real GDP growth rate should remain at approximately 5% in 1984, declining temporarily thereafter until the economy has gone through the necessary short-run adjustment process. The higher growth in 1984 reflects both the recovery from the 1983 drought and the income effect of the terms of trade improvement. However, by 1985 the effect of these factors will have dissipated, the terms of trade are expected to deteriorate and the reduced level of government expenditure will dampen demand. Thus, during the adjustment period, when the Government is attempt- ing to restrain aggregate demand, economic growth is expected to fall to approximately 4%. If these short-run measures are taken in addition to the longer-term policy initiatives, then the economy should be well positioned to grow by at least 5% per annum beyond 1987-88. Under this scenario, the current account deficit in the balance of payments should follow a similar trend declining rapidly in the short run (from 12.4% of GDP in 1983 to 8.9% in 1984), and then gradually falling over the medium term. Given the disbur- sement of total concessionary finance projected in para 92, it is anticipated that the necessary level of commercial borrowing should be sustainable. As discussed in greater detail below, this scenario should strengthen Sri Lanka's medium-term creditworthiness, thereby enabling the country to raise the total external assistance required to attain the Government's growth objectives. 45. A reduced level of public expenditure is one of the primary measures underlying the adjusted scenario. To avoid an increased dependence on non- concessional foreign savings, total investment should decline from 28.6% of GDP in 1983 to 25% by 1987. In order not to squeeze the private sector and thereby inhibit potential growth areas, the burden of adjusting to this lower level of total investment should fall primarily on the public sector. Public capital expenditure would have to decline from the 12.7Z of GDP in 1983 to approximately 10% by 1987. The adjusted scenario implies maintaining the real level of public capital expenditures at the 1984 level until 1987, with expansion thereafter on the basis of higher GDP growth rates. 46. With regard to current expenditure, the earlier arguments concerning the past neglect of O&M expenditures coupled with the comparatively low level of public sector salaries indicates a need to increase expenditure levels. However, in order to contain the Government's claim on resources, much of this increased expenditure will have to be obtained by reallocating revenue within the recurrent budget away from low return uses, such as, e.g., con- tinuing subsidies to public corporations. In these circumstances, current expenditures would need to be contained to a ceiling of 211 of GDP. 1/ These policy measures are discussed in both the following sections of this chapter, i.e., the budget and balance of payments, and in Chapter III. -18- Table 5: PROJECTED MAJOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1983-90 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 GDP Real Growth 4.9 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 Agriculture 5.1 5.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 Industry 1.9 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Services 6.4 4.0 4.8 5.6 5.6 5.0 4.8 5.5 As % of GDP Total Consumption 86.5 83.9 84.4 84.3 84.4 84.3 84.1 83.9 Total Investment 28.6 27.0 27.0 26.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 Private 15.9 15.1 15.5 15.1 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7 Public 12.7 11.9 11.5 10.9 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 Gross National Savings 16.2 18.1 18.1 18.1 17.8 17.8 17.8 18.0 Private 18.5 16.2 16.1 16.1 15.8 15.8 15.8 16.0 Public -2.3 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Foreign Savings 12.4 8.9 8.9 7.9 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.0 Source: Bank staff estimates. 47. These adjusted expenditure estimates will require a renewed resource mobilization effort to reduce borrowing to a sustainable level. It is estimated that revenues will have to increase from the 20.5% of GDP budgeted for in 1984 to an average 23% for the 1985-87 period and 24% for 1987-90. Although this level of resource mobilization is high for a low per capita income country like Sri Lanka, past experience demonstrates that the Government can attain these revenue levels. However, this should not detract from the Government focusing on the trade-offs involved in claiming more resources to finance public expenditure as against cutting expenditures beyond projected levels to free resources for the private sector. 48. The expenditure and revenue levels in this scenario imply public savings equivalent to 2% to 3% over the 1984-90 period and a reduction in the overall budget deficit from an average 17% over the period 1979-83 to 9% over the period 1984-87 and 7% over 1987-90. This level of deficit can be financed by the projected inflow of foreign savings plus domestic non-bank borrowing equivalent to approximately 3% of GDP. There would be no need to resort to domestic bank borrowing. 49. However, it should be stressed that the projected deficits in both the current account of the balance of payments and in the budget are sus- tainable only if the corresponding level of foreign concessionary savings materializes. The fairly high deficits should not be interpreted as repre- senting desirable targets for Government policymaking. Lower overall deficits and a higher level of public savings will be required if aid flows decline or external developments, e.g., the world recovery or the terms of trade, prove less favorable than currently forecast. The first task, in any -19- event, is to control public expenditure, and this must begin with an examina- tion of the budgetary process. B. The 1984 Budget and Recent Revisions 50. The 1984 budget proposals, as presented to Parliament in November 1983, include a sizeable increase in expected revenues over 1983 (27% in current prices, 12% in real terms), strict control of current spending, including advance accounts (12% growth in current prices, -1% in real terms) and further restraint in capital spending growth (6% in current prices, -61 in real terms). As a result, the overall deficit would decline from 15.01 of GDP in 1983 to 11.2L.in 1984. Even so, there would still be a need for some foreign commercial borrowing (about Rs 900 million) and domestic bank borrow- ing (about Rs 700 million) to finance the deficit. Of equal importance, there are a number of uncertainties, especially with regard to capital expenditures, which could easily lead to a considerably larger overall deficit than is envisaged by the budget. Subsequent revisions to the original budget estimates have led to a further substantial reduction in the overall deficit to the equivalent of 10.0% of GDP, which would permit a significant net repayment of bank borrowing by the Treasury, although many of the uncertainties remain. The following paragraphs first review some major features of the 1984 budgetary estimates as presented to Parliament in November and then discuss the recent revisions. Table 6: SUMMARY OF BUDGETARY OPERATIONS, 1983-84 Provisional 1983 Budget 1984 Revised 1984 Rs Mn. % of GDP Rs Mn. Z of GDP Rs Man. of GDP Revenues 21,088 17.2 26,698 18.4 29,115 20.1 Current Expenditure 22,702 18.6 26,300 18.1 25,657 17.7 Advance Accounts 1,120 0.9 300 0.2 650 0.5 Current Surplus/Deficit -2,734 -2.3 98 0.1 2,808 1.9 Capital Expenditure 15,578 12.7 16,473 11.3 17,309 11.9 Overall Deficit -18,312 -15.0 -16,375 -11.2 -14,501 -10.0 Foreign Financing 10,974 9.0 10,653 7.3 10,153 7.0 Domestic Financing 7,338 6.0 5,722 3.9 4,348 3.0 (CBC profit trs.) (1,500) (1.2) (1,700) (1.2) (1,650) (1.2) (Interest trs. sinking Fund) (-) (-) (500) (0.3) (500) (0.3) (Non-Bank borrowing) (5,331) (4.4) (2,841) (1.9) (3,641) (2.5) (Bank borrowing) (507) (0.4) (681) (0.5) (-1,443) (-1.0) Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning. The November Budget 51. Several new revenue proposals were introduced in November, including the following major ones. Two temporary (one year) revenue measures were taken in response to the additional expenditures resulting from the July 1983 -20- disturbances: a rehabilitation levy of 1% on the gross remuneration of all employees in the public and private sectors, expected to yield Rs 200 million, and a rehabilitation surcharge of 10% on income taxes, expected to yield Rs 400 million. The rate of turnover tax on general trading was reduced from 4% to 1% while a number of rates at the point of import or manufacture were raised; largely because the lower rate on general trading is expected to lead to an enormous reduction in evasion, the additional revenue from these rate changes is projected at Rs 400 million. This will clearly require a substantial administrative effort. The exemption limit on income tax for individuals has been raised to Rs 18,000 and the tax bands have been adjusted to reflect inflation. The resulting revenue loss is estimated at Rs 100 million. On the other hand, a major effort to reduce tax evasion through strengthening tax administration and collection is envisaged which would yield an additional revenue of Ru 300 million. 52. The projected extra revenues from improved tax administration could be on the optimistic side. Administrative reforms take time under the best of circumstances and there may have to be a considerable strengthening of the staff of the Inland Revenue Department. Even assuming, however, that the budgetary revenue estimates were on target, the buoyancy of the revenue system did not change much; the raising of the exemption limit on income tax, by itself, in fact narrowed the tax base. The budget implies a revenue to GDP ratio of 18.4% for 1984 as compared with 17.2% in 1983. However, the rehabilitation levy and surcharge (Rs 600 million) are temporary, and the collection of import duties on government imports (Rs 585 million) as well as the transfer from the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation to cover the additional cost of kerosene stamps (Re 210 million) are new entries. Subtracting these items from projected revenues would yield a revenue to GDP ratio of 17.4%, only marginally above 1983. 53. The 1984 capital budget proposals raise a number of issues which are cause for some concern. While an effort has been made to lower the overall level of public investment more in line with available resources, this has been achieved in a manner that is both untenable and unsatisfactory. As explained further below, the assumed level of underexpenditure (expected shortfalls in spending from approved amounts) is likely to prove too high, and the composition of public capital spending has been shifted from foreign aid-financed to non-aided projects, increasing the financial burden on the Government. -21- Table 7: PROPOSED CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, 1984 a/ (Rs million) 1983-87 Public Investment Program 1984 Budset Foreign- Non- Foreign- Non- Aided Aided Total Aided Aided Total Agriculture 9,438 1,181 10,619 8,464 564 9,028 Industry 98 79 177 45 79 124 Rousing 1,380 1,507 2,887 1,111 944 2,055 Economic Overheads 2,458 1,911 4,369 2,384 1,780 4,164 Social Overheads 378 877 1,255 303 661 964 Other - 1,000 1,000 53 3,096 3.149 Total 13,752 6.555 20,307 12,360 7.132 19492 Underexpenditure Provision 1,625 2,924 Net Total 18,682 16,568 a/ Note: Details may not add to total due to rounding. a/ On Treasury basis; differs slightly from data in other tables which are on IMF basis. Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 54. As a share of GDP, capital spending is budgeted at 11.3% in 1984 versus an estimated 12.7% in 1983, a significant reduction from what was already an unplanned low level of spending in 1983 as a result of the July disturbances. A more meaningful comparison is with the 1984 provisions in the 1983-87 Public Investment Program (PIP). The PIP envisaged 1984 capital expenditures at Rs 20,307 million, gross of underexpenditure, and these have now been cut to Rs 19,492 million in the budget or by Rs 815 million. If one takes account of the differing exchange rate assumptions (US$=Rs 23 in PIP, versus US$1=Rs 26 in the budget) and of the inclusion in the budget of Rs 585 million for duties on government imports which were not included in the PIP, the cut is significant. In addition, the 1984 budget includes a provision for underexpenditure of 15% versus 8% in the PIP. 55. Although the cuts in the 1984 budget from the original PIP provision for 1984 were not across the board, they were far from desirable (Table 7). While foreign-aided projects were cut by about 10% on average, the allocation for non-aided projects was increased by 9%. This has increased the imediate financial burden on the Government in carrying out its investment program. Also, several of the increases for non-aided projects could be questioned on economic grounds, including substantial transfers to public corporations, the decentralized budget and defense. Moreover, by prolonging the disbursement periods of ongoing aided projects, future aid receipts are jeopardized and, to the extent that the cuts in aided projects include local cost financing, the country loses free foreign exchange. -22- 56. It is far from clear that the 15% underexpenditure assumed in the 1984 budget will be realized. The assumption derives from actual experience during 1983 which was clearly unusual. The underexpenditure is expected to materialize on activities that have already been subjected to substantial cuts, as indicated above. Thus, e.g., an underexpenditure of 15% on foreign- aided projects on top of the 10% cut below the PIP would mean a 27% reduction in spending on those projects below PIP provisions, an unrealistic and in many cases undesirable outcome. Looked at differently, it is relatively easy to identify individual items in the budget for which no underexpenditure is likely. They would include, e.g., Victoria (Rs 1,536 million), Kotmale (Rs 1,304 million), Randenigala (Rs 938 million), SLCTB (Rs 600 million), NDA (Rs 584 million), Power VII (Rs 250 million), decentralized budget (Rs 840 million), GCEC (Rs 60 million) and the Shipping Corporation (Rs 250 million) for a total of Rs 6,362 million, representing 33% of the capital budget (Treasury basis). This would imply a 22% underexpenditure on all other projects/items in the budget, even though many of these have already been cut substantially from PIP provisions. 57. The above not only throws serious doubts on whether capital spending can be contained to budgeted amounts, but also serves to underscore the possible undesirable consequences on resource allocation resulting from the underexpenditure provision mechanism, which is a major weakness in the budgetary process in Sri Lanka. It is an expression of the inability to closely monitor and control capital spending by allowing for large margins of error and consequently substantial misallocation of resources, because it is a clear indication that spending priorities have not been fixed. It also is a potential source of budget indiscipline in that higher amounts have been voted and approved for individual programs than allowed for in the budget, and there is no legal restraint to spending those amounts. In practice, the Treasury has ensured underexpenditure and enforced budget discipline through a calculated, slow release of funds. It would clearly be a much sounder budgetary practice to contain the size of the capital budget to available resources and allocate those resources according to an agreed set of priorities. 58. There remains an ambivalence about the definition of new projects. Both the 1983 and 1984 budget speeches stressed that no new projects would be introduced, in order to be able to finish what is ongoing before taking on something new. While donors are as much to blame as Government, there are new activities started in 1983 which are being allowed to gather momentum in 1984, while ongoing projects are being subjected to cuts which cannot always be justified on either economic or implementation capacity grounds. Investment allocation criteria are being developed now and should be effec- tively introduced as soon as possible so as to identify real spending priorities, provide projects crucial to maintaining growth in the short to medium term with adequate funding, emphasize projects nearing completion as well as those with 100% financing, and wean out other activities that can be safely delayed without adverse impact on the economy. 59. With regard to the longer term, the overall thrust of economic policy proposals outlined in the budget speech to achieve stabilization and maintain the momentan of growth is generally in the right direction, with emphasis on the importance of maintaining a realistic exchange rate policy, carrying out -23- structural reform and ensuring law and order. In particular, the Government's policy proposals stress improvement in the quality of public investment and in the performance of public enterprises, priority to opera- tion and maintenance expenditures and the creation of an appropriate incen- tive framework for the private sector to strengthen export development and efficient import substitution. As discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report, however, given the current financial situation and outlook, and the considerable catching-up which remains to be done in order to rectify the incentives structure, the projected real growth rate in GDP of 5.5% p.a. during the next few years appears optimistic. With respect to public finan- ces in particular, a mechanism to improve the quality of public investment, a system to provide for needed operation and maintenance expenditures, and a revised taxation system to ensure adequate revenues all are still in the developmental stage. Subsequent Revisions 60. The revisions in the 1984 budget authorized by the Cabinet during early 1984 would, together with upward revisions in expected export tax revenues, result in an improvement (reduction in the overall deficit) of some Rs 1.9 billion over the November 1983 proposals, made up as follows: revenues are up by Rs 2.4 billion, current spending (including advance accounts) is reduced by Rs 0.3 billion and capital spending is up by Rs 0.8 billion. For the first time in several years, the Government would be gener- ating budgetary savings equivalent to about 2% of GDP to help finance its investment program. 61. Revenues are now forecast to rise in 1984 to the equivalent of 20.1% of GDP. The main increases over the November budget are in tea ad valorem export duty (Rs 1,400 million) and specific duty (Rs 90 million), rubber duty (Rs 350 million), import duties (Rs 300 million) and contributions from public corporations (Rs 350 million). Recent price trends for tea would indicate that the tea revenue estimate may still be on the conservative side. The estimated increase in import duty collections is based on some administrative changes as well as higher sugar duties. The contributions from public corporations result from a decision that the corporations pay 50% of net after tax 1983 profits to the treasury during 1984. 62. Whereas 1984 revenues are now estimated to be an impressive 2.9Z of GDP higher than in 1983, it must be recalled that some of the increases are temporary, e.g., rehabilitation taxes, while others are new entries, e.g., profit transfers by public corporations, duties on government imports and CPC transfers: these add up to the equivalent of 1.2% of GDP. The remainder of the increase derives basically from administrative improvements and espe- cially from export taxes: the latter rise by 1.1% of GDP in 1984 over 1983. This illustrates the inherent high vulnerability of Sri Lanka's taxes. Income tax revenues (minus the rehabilitation taxes) are still lower than in previous years as a percent of GDP, as are "other" taxes, thus necessitating regular ad hoc rate increases or new measures to maintain a desirable level of revenues. -24- Table 8: GOVERNMENT REVENUES, 1983-84 Provisional 1983 Budtet 1984 Revised 1984 Rs Mn. Z of GDP Rs Mn. % of GDP Rs Mn. Z of GDP Income Taxes 3,366 2.7 4,500 3.1 4,500 3.1 of which: Rehab. Tax (-) (-) (600) (0.4) (600) (0.4) Turnover Taxes 5,030 4.1 8,225 5.7 8,020 5.5 Import Duties 4,836 4.0 5,285 3.6 5,585 3.9 of which: Govt. Imports - - (585) (0.4) (585) (0.4) Export Taxes 3,391 2.8 3,765 2.6 5,605 3.9 Other Taxes 4,465 3.6 4,923 3.4 5,405 3.7 of which: Transfer CPC - - (210) (0.2) (210) (0.2) Profit Transfer PC a/ - - (-) __..) (350) (0.2) Total 21,088 17.2 26,698 18.4 29,115 20.1 a/ Public Corporations. Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 63. The Rs 300 million decline in current spending (including advance accounts) in the revised estimates as compared with the November budget is the result of several substantive changes largely offsetting one another in the aggregate. The allocation for advance accounts has been increased by Rs 350 million. Supplementary current expenditure allocations have risen by more than Rs 1,000 million, much of it to grant additional subsidies to public corporations, including SLCTB, CEB, Textiles, Cement and Shipping, which runs contrary to the Government's stated policy of reducing such sub- sidies and encouraging more financial discipline. This increased allocation has been largely offset by a reduction in the Ministry of Finance's provision for contingencies. The net savings in current expenditures results from the Cabinet decision for each Ministry to identify 2% savings in recurrent expenditures, which comes on top of the 2% underexpe2diture provision. These savings in current spending may be difficult to obtain and could be undesirable. Items such as interest payments or wages and salaries are fixed obligations, while transfers and subsidies have proven hard to cut, leaving open the possibility that savings may be looked for in what is already a deficient level of operation and maintenance spendivg. 64. Capital expenditures are forecast to increat- by about Rs 800 million above original budget estimates, a sum roughly equivalent to the added appropriation for the SLCTB, which was omitted from the original budget, and an increased allocation for Randenigala. Both of these are ongoing aided projects. At the same time, some new allocations have been added (airport development, railways), but these increases have been offset by an even higher underexpenditure provision of 15.7%. The Committee of Development Secretaries has been charged with the task of identifying specific cases of rephasings of projects so as to avoid the need for across-the-board and uneconomic cuts in capital spending to achieve the underexpenditure target. The success in this endeavor will constitute a significant step towards improved budgetary practices. -25- 65. There have been encouraging institutional developments affecting budgetary management in recent weeks. A new committee on economic policy has been created, comprising the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance and Planning, empowered to enforce financial discipline and ensure that Cabinet decisions on economic policy are implemented. A comprehensive inter-ministerial exercise is ongoing, designed to ensure adequate expendi- tures on operation and maintenance which, st-iting in 1985, will appear explicitly as a separate category of spendi,., in the budget. Finally, the Cabinet has laid down criteria for project selection for inclusion in future public capital budgets which should remedy a major weakness. As discussed above, however, the 1984 budget does not yet reflect these promising develop- ments and still contains many shortcomings. Decisions during the coming weeks will be a test of the Governmentos resolve to improve upon its finan- cial programming. C. The Balance of Payments Outlook and Creditworthiness 66. The important features of the projected balance of payments, as derived from the "with adjustment" scenario, can be read from Table 9. The overall trend is one of significant improvement in 1984 being followed by a more gradual improvement based upon a higher real rate of growth in exports against a background of moderate import growth and gradually declining terms of trade. The Government should be able to add to international reserves in 1984 for the first time since 1979, as a result of both export volume (due to improved weather conditions) and terms of trade improvements. However, as Lhe effects of these short-run developments dissipate, further reductions in the current account deficit depend crucially on the growth of non-traditional exports plus the rehabilitation and stabilization of traditional exports. The following pages consider first the sector growth rates required if the economy is to grow at the targeted rate, then the implied aid requirements, followed by, in Chapter III, a discussion of the policy issues that the Government needs to confront to set the economy on a path towards sustainable medium-term growth. -26- Table 9: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROJECTIONS, 1982-90 (Millions of US$ at Current Prices) 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1990 EXPORTS (G+NFS) 1,305 1,354 1,652 1,749 1,984 3,277 Merchandise (fob) 1,014 1,059 1,326 1,379 1,561 2,580 Non-factor Services 291 295 326 370 423 697 IMPORTS (G+NFS) 2,205 2,136 2,269 2,472 2,726 4,314 Merchandise (cif) 1,990 1,922 2,038 2,207 2,434 3,852 Non-factor Services 215 214 231 265 292 462 bRESOURCE BALANCE -900 -782 -617 -723 -742 -1,037 -Net Factor Income -98 -135 -168 -151 -163 -262 Factor Receipts 44 44 47 78 84 107 Factor Payments -142 -179 -215 -229 -247 -369 (M&LT Interest Paid) (-68) (-80) (-88) (-99) (-113) (-206) Net Current Transfers 264 272 282 305 334 481 Transfer Receipts 289 291 305 333 364 517 Transfer Payments -25 -19 -23 -28 -30 -36 CURRENT BALANCE -734 -645 -503 -569 -571 -818 MLT Capital Inflow Net Direct Investment 63 38 50 55 60 89 Official Grant Aid 162 171 166 160 176 258 Net M&LT Loans (DRS) 416 360 397 412 427 522 Disbursements 484 445 511 550 596 741 Repayments -68 -85 -114 -138 -168 -219 Other M&LT (net) 0 0 2 30 20 17 Errors and Omissions 66 77 0 0 0 0 Change in Net Reserves (- indicates increase) 27 -1 -112 -88 -112 -82 -!Gross Official Reserves at Year End 352 298 408 458 508 708 Memo Items: Net Credit from INF -12 -17 -2 -39 -62 -32 Purchases 43 32 22 0 0 0 Repurchases -55 -49 -24 -39 -62 -32 bt Service Payments 241 247 286 333 406 566 Public M&LT Loans 136 167 230 264 318 530 105 80 56 69 88 36 Sources: Central Bank; and Bank staff estimates. BEST COPY AVAILABLE -27- 67. Merchandise Exports. Record tea prices, the general improvement in primary commodity prices, and volume growth in tea as a result of the rains in late 1983 and early 1984 should boost export earnings in the near term from the major traditional exports (tea, rubber and coconuts). However, the underlying volume growth rate for these commodities is expected to be fairly low up until at least 1988 due to the long-gestating nature of the investments. Although account has been taken of the expected volume decline in coconut exports of approximately 30% for 1984 (partly drought-induced and partly as a result of licensing restrictions), it is anticipated that, beyond 1984, the Government would implement policies to increase production and exports. 68. The overall trend in tree crops is that by 1985 total export volumes should be restored to their 1982 level, after bottoming out in 1983. Thereafter, a 3% real rate of growth is expected, due to favorable interna- tional prices, the adoption of taxation/subsidy measures designed to sig- nificantly increase producer margins, and in the medium term, direct public investment and management reforms designed to rehabilitate state plantations. 69. Two other major export activities, garments and petroleum, may also have limited growth potential. The further expansion of petroleum exports, which are basically re-exports of by-products, are constrained by tLe processing capacity of the domestic refinery. Some growth in the near term is possible as the refinery moves towards maximum capacity utilization and the new hydro-units reduce the domestic demand for particular by-products. But after the end of the decade the real level of petroleum re-exports can be expected to remain constant and then decline due to increased domestic demand. 70. Garment exports are currently constrained by import quotas in the final markets of the USA and EEC. Sri Lanka has, in the past, been treated favorably in the allocation of quotas; starting from a small base garment exports have grown at an average annual real rate of over 40% between 1978 and 1983. Even recent growth rates have exceeded the increase in quotas probably due to expansion into new markets..1 While it is difficult to see such rapid growth recurring in the future, assuming the costs of production in Sri Lanka remain competitive, a more moderate expansion of approximately 8% per year in real terms should be attainable. To the extent that Government policies help reduce Sri Lankans' relative production costs vis-a- vis competitor countries via restrained domestic inflation and exchange rate adjustments, garment exports may well exceed this fairly conservative estimate. 71. However, Sri Lanka must look towards growth in the "other" export activities of minor agriculture products, industrial goods and minerals if the overall rate of economic growth is not to be constrained by the insuffi- cient growth momentum provided by traditional exports. The past export record of both industrial goods and minor agricultural commodities has been fairly erratic, being heavily influenced by the performance of one or two 1/ In constant 1982 prices, garment exports grew by 10% in 1982 and 26% in 1983. -28- relatively large activities in relation to a fairly small total base figure. Nevertheless, both have registered some growth of about 5% between 1977 and 1983. Mineral exports, on the other hand, have remained stagnant, declining as a share of total exports from 4.3% in 1977 to 3.0% in 1983. 72. The positive record of some manufactured and agricultural commodities during a period when the overall incentive structure continued to favor production for the domestic market indicates that, given a more neutral incentive framework, higher rates of growth are possible. Although the present analysis reflects the fact that the short-run response to improved export incentives will be constrained by supply-side factors, the analysis also demonstrates that if the Government's medium-term growth objectives are to be attained, non-traditional exports must attain a minimum 8% to 10% annual growth rate over the next few years. 73. Merchandise L=morts. The significant slowdown in the rate of growth in merchandise imports achieved in 1983 is anticipated to continue in 1984 and 1985 due to further restraint in public investment and a continuation of the Government's more flexible exchange rate policy. Although, as discussed below, some imports will necessarily expand, the restraint in public spending coupled with adjustments in the overall incentive framework designed to stimulate efficient import substitution should restrain the growth in imports during the period of adjustment. 74. The real level of both capital goods and petroleum, the two most important import categories declined in 1983 by 5% and 91 respectively, with the level of intermediate goods, the next largest import category, staying constant. The restraint in investment in 1984 is expected to lead to some further decline in capital goods imports; however, much of this saving will be offset by an expansion in petroleum imports as the refinery is operated at increased capacity./ Intermediate goods should record some growth, but this is anticipated to be moderate due to a fairly low rate of growth in the manufacturing sector. 75. Beyond 1984 the level of capital goods imports should remain fairly constant in real terms until 1987 as the economy adjusts to a lower level of investment. As private investment is less importhapital-intensive than public investment, a reduction in the proportion of total investment accounted for by public expenditure should also assist in moderating the total demand for imported capital goods. 76. The demand for intermediate goods, however, is anticipated to expand in order to provide the necessary inputs to the existing capital stock. For example, fertilizer imports are anticipated to increase by more than 50% in 1984, largely due to the suspension of production at the domestic plant. Indeed, given Sri Lanka's natural resource base, any significant increase in economic growth will necessarily entail an expansion in imported intermediate inputs. This should not present a problem if the imported inputs are used in the efficient production of tradable commodities. IJ The refinery was closed for a few months in 1983 due to repairs and maintenance work. -29- 77. With regard to food imports (rice, wheat and sugar), the future is more uncertain. Due to the flooding of certain paddy areas, a provision to import approximately 50,000 metric tons in 1984 has been allowed for. However, .3iven more stable weather conditions and the utilization of the new Mabaweli lands, rice imports should become negligible beyond 1987.1/ On the other hand, wheat grain imports are anticipated to expand, but much depends on the availability and price of rice. The level of sugar imports, however, should decline as several new projects (Sevanagala, Pelwatte) come into operation. 78. The future growth in imports of "other" consumer goods (which accounted for 17% of total non-petroleum merchandise imports in 1983) is heavily dependent on future Government policy. Although the present analysis anticipates a 15% real increase in "other" consumer goods for 1984, this rate of growth is expected to decline subsequently due to a reduced budget deficit, coupled with a continuous review by the Government of the appropriate BTT rates and exchange rate. Without these policy changes the growth in consumer goods will exert continuous pressure on the balance of trade, eventually jeopardizing the Government's open economic strategy. 79. The overall trade deficit for 1984 is likely to show a significant improvement over 1983, declining from 16.6% of GDP to approximately 12.6%, although much of this improvement is due to the short-run increases in tea prices and volumes. However, the expected deterioration in the terms of trade beyond 1984 would make a further reduction in the trade deficit more difficult to achieve. In fact, the trade deficit is likely to widen again in 1985 and then gradually narrow towards the end of the decade if the Government implements a corrective policy package. 80. Net non-factor services should continue to make a growing positive contribution, as tourism recovers from the setback caused by the July disturbances. Total tourist arrivals in 1983 were 17% below 1982, but by the end of the year bookings began to approach the previous year's levels. Due to an increased advertising campaign, significantly reduced hotel rates, and exchange rate adjustments, total arrivals should increase in 1984 and steadily expand thereafter, given a stable political situation. 81. The trend in net factor income is also encouraging in the short run. Due to the anticipated reduction in short-term foreign borrowing plus the accumulation of international reserves in 1984, debt repayments should ease and factor receipts from reserves should increase in 1985. However, even the scenario described above generates a need for further foreign borrowing which will maintain debt service payments at fairly high levels in the medium term. On the other hand, the continued migration of labor, particularly to the Middle East, should maintain the positive growth in net private transfers. 11 In 1983 rice imports accounted for only 2.2% of non-petroleum merchan- dise imports. -30- 82. The overall result is a decline in the current account deficit from 15.2% of GDP in 1982 to 12.4% in 1983 and 8.9% in 1984. As noted earlier, deteriorating terms of trade beyond 1984 prevent a further decline in the current account deficit in 1985, with a very gradual improvement thereafter as volume growth more than compensates for continued adverse price movements. 83. On the basis of the above scenario for the current account in the balance of payments, Sri Lanka's creditworthiness should be strengthened considerably in the coming years. Some of the major indicators are shown in Table 10. As discussed earlier, between 1980 and 1983 the economy had con- tinned to grow and investment had remained at a high 30% of GDP largely because of a very high level of foreign savings, equivalent to 15% of GDP. Accompanying a poor export performance was a low level of national savings and excessive demand, especially investment demand. Much of the investment was also fairly low yielding, because of an inappropriate incentives' environment, or slow-yielding because of the preponderance of public sector infrastructure development. In addition, the composition of foreign savings, i.e., the financing of the current account deficit, deteriorated during those years. Earlier, in 1978-79 the current account deficit was not only fully financed by concessionary borrowing and grants but also international reser- ves were being built up. In contrast, during 1980-83, a breakdown of the financing of the current account deficit (plus debt amortization) was as follows: 521 was financed by concessional aid and grants; 131 by private direct investment and short-term borrowing; 101 by drawing down reserves; and 25% by commercial borrowing. By the end of 1983, net international reserves were negative, gross official reserves covered about two months of imports, and the debt service ratio had risen rapidly from 11.31 in 1980 to 17.7% in 1983. Debt service, as a share of GDP, amounted to 4.71 during the latter year compared to 2.91 in 1980. Given these developments, Sri Lanka's credit- worthiness had suffered. While the current improvement in the terms of trade is giving the country some breathing space, this- is not likely to last. Without a substantial shift in policies, both with regard to investment (level and composition) and with regard to the incentives' framework, economic growth would slow down significantly and the country-s creditworthi- ness would become marginal. On the other hand, the balance of payments projections in this report illustrate how such a shift in policies would result in an improvement in creditworthiness. 84. The first requirement is for economic stabilization through a reduc- tion in excess demand. As there are limits to possible or desirable reduc- tions in consumption, the major burden of the adjustment will have to fall on investment demand and must be initiated imediately. It is anticipated, in this connection, that the Government will not only use taxation to capture a large part of the windfall gain of high tea prices but also seize the oppor- tunity for a substantial build up of reserves from the precariously low level of end-1983. This is vital to reduce domestic inflationary pressure and to provide a cushion against future short-run adverse price movements. In the scenario in this report, future investment levels have been constrained by a feasible level of national savings (which among others will require addi- tional public sector resource mobilization), the likely availability of foreign capital and a manageable burden of external debt. -31- Table 10: PROJECTED TOTAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS AND FINANCING, 1983-90 1983 1984 1985 1986 1990 Current Account Deficit 645 503 569 571 818 Debt Amortization 86 127 151 188 284 Total Foreign Exchange Requirements 731 630 720 759 1,102 Financing Grants 171 166 160 176 258 Direct Investment 38 50 55 60 89 Concessionary Aid 283 291 380 465 546 Non-concessionary A/ 240 233 175 108 259 Reserves (- increase) -1 -110 -50 -50 -50 Memorandum Items: As % of GDP Current Account Deficit 12.4 8.9 8.9 7.9 7.0 Total Foreign Exchange Requirements 14.1 11.2 11.3 10.5 9.4 Gross Official Reserves in Months of Imports 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.2 Debt Service Ratio b/ 17.7 16.8 18.2 19.6 16.7 a/ Includes net credit from DIF (and errors and omissions in 1983). b/ As percentage of exports of goods and services. See footnote .f, para 25. Source: Bank staff estimates. 85. Of equal importance, future economic growth and strengthened credit- worthiness will depend on shifts in the composition of investments with more emphasis on quick-yielding and private sector investments. Public sector capital outlays should be confined to essential infrastructure and to invest- ments complementing past expenditures. In addition, as discussed in Chapter III, it is crucial that a number of policy measures are taken to improve the overall incentives' framework for the private sector. In particular, in the medium term, the maintenance of a sustainable total resource gap and debt service ratio is dependent upon the Governmfnt adopting policies now which will generate the required real growth in exports in the future, as illustrated by the balance of payments trends. The important medium-term trend for Sri Lanka is that export volume growth will have to compensate for both an already sizeable deficit plus a possible deterioration in the terms of trade beyond 1984, if the external deficit is to remain manageable. Moreover, much of this growth will recessarily fall on non- traditional exports due to the relatively low short-run supply elasticity of tree crops and the external market constraints on garments. To the extent that non-traditional export growth can exceed the 8Z to 10% growth rate used BEST COPY AVAILABLE -32- in the projections, then the external deficit will decline further, GDP growth wiLl be enhanced and Sri Lankas creditworthiness will strengthen. Thus, the projections in this report do not represent a target, but rather the minimum level of adjustment needed to sustain medium-term growth. 86. It is also clear that beyond 1984 Sri Lanka will require substantial foreign assistance in order to finance the near-term costs of adjustment. Even if the Government implements the policy measures needed to restore incentives, and thereby the growth potential of export activities, non- traditional exports will take time to react. If a rapid rundown of the international reserves accumulated in 1984 and a renewed build up of non- concessional foreign borrowing is to be avoided, foreign assistance should be maintained at high levels. The following paragraphs discuss first the past record on aid commitments and disbursements, and second the recommended future level of commitments that will be necessary if Sri Lanka's tight medium-term external account position is not to jeopardize sustainable long- term growth. D. Past Aid Flows and Requirements in 1984185 Aid Commitments and Disbursements, 1977-83 87. The aid community has responded enthusiastically to the Government's development efforts in recent years. The overall level of aid commitments increased from $250 million in 1977 to a record of $815 million in 1981, equivalent to $55 per capita. Disbursements grew much more slowly and there was a rapid build up of the aid pipeline to around $1,630 million by the end of 1981. With the need to curtail public capital spending during 1982-83, both because of implementation and domestic financial constraints, commit- ments declined to $550 million in 1982 and $370 million in 1983, halting further increases in the pipeline. There was also a significant shift in the composition of aid commitments: in 1977-78 project aid accounted for about 50% of total commitments, but this rose to 77% for the period 1979-83 largely reflecting the emphasis on increased capital spending in the Governmentos budget. The Accelerated Mahaweli Program has played a dominant role in the aid picture, accounting for 42% of all project aid comitments during the past five years. -33- Table 11: AID COMMITMENTS, 1977-83 ($ million) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Food Aid 23.2 57.5 38.9 39.4 40.2 63.5 64.4 a/ Commodity Aid 96.3 145.7 114.8 82.8 101.0 83.7 33.8 Project Aid 130.0 196.9 415.0 505.0 675.3 407.3 270.8 (Non-Mahaweli) (130.0) (183.6) (189.9) (386.8) (299.1) (246.2) (203.2) (Mahaweli) __-) (13.3) (225.1) (118.2) (376.2) (161.1) (67.6) Total 249.5 400.1 568.7 627.2 816.5 554.5 369.0 Memo Item: Aid Per Capita ($) 18 28 39 43 55 36 24 a/ Includes relief assistance. Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 88. Because of the long-gestation nature of the Mahaweli program, donors agreed that commitments to that scheme should be additional to normal aid flows, and to a large extent this objective was achieved. Non-Mahaweli commitments during 1979-81 averaged 11% in nominal terms above the 1978 level and 73% above the 1977 level. At the same time there was, also within the sub-total of non-Mahaeli aid commitments, a substantial shift from non- project to project aid. In other words, a rapid build up of the Mahaweli project aid pipeline during 1979-81 was accompanied by an equally rapid increase in the non-Mahaweli project aid pipeline. As initial underestima- tion of costs and subsequent high price escalation greatly increased the costs of the Mahaweli program, large financing gaps resulted, necessitating a squeeze on other investments so as to avoid inflationary finance. These other investments, however, had also gathered momentum and were also donor supported. As the financial strain on the economy intensified, the form of donor support had to change. There was limited scope for introducing new projects and it was clearly desirable to increase general budget and balance of payments support. New project aid conmitments did decline in 1982/83 but there was no corresponding increase in food and commodity aid. -34- Table 12: AID DISBURSEMENTS, 1977-83 ($ million) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Food Aid 62.7 58.1 36.0 38.4 37.4 34.1 63.2 a/ Commodity Aid 83.9 98.1 122.7 102.4 91.8 67.9 63.9 Project Aid 57.1 95.0 109.4 185.8 240.2 312.3 326.7 (Non-Mahaweli) (57.1) (93.7) (78.1) (106.6) (153.5) (155.8) (166.7) (Mahaweli) X) ) 1.3) (79.2) (86.7) (156.5) (160.0) Total 203.7 251.2 268.1 326.6 369.4 414.3 453.8 Memo Item: Aid Per Capita ($) 15 18 18 22 25 27 29 a/ Includes relief assistance. Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 89. Aid disbursements have grown steadily, from $200 million in 1977 to $450 million in 1983, or close to $30 per capita. The slow growth of disbur- sements relative to commitments through 1981 can be explained largely by two factors: the rapid acceleration in aid commitments themselves which proved beyond the country's absorptive capacity, and the relative shift over time from food and commodity aid towards slower disbursing project aid (Table 13). The overall disbursement rate declined markedly from 40% in 1978 and 30% in 1979 to around 20% recently, with less than half of the decline explained by changes in the composition of aid. The disbursement rates of individual types of aid have varied quite significantly. -35- Table 13: DISBURSEMENT PERFORMANCE, 1978-83 ($ million) Project Aid Non-Project Aid Non-Mahaveli Mahaweli Commodity Food TOTAL 1978 Opening Pipeline 353.7 - 98.9 12.9 465.5 Pipeline Disbursements 92.6 - 80.1 12.9 185.6 Disbursement Rate (%) 26.2 - 81.0 100.0 39.9 1979 Opening Pipeline 443.8 11.0 187.6 3.5 645.9 Pipeline Disbursements 65.7 11.0 110.0 3.5 190.2 Disbursement Rate (Z) 14.8 100.0 58.6 100.0 29.4 1980 Opening Pipeline 530.5 201.4 160.1 3.5 895.5 Pipeline Disbursements 74.7 48.8 81.6 3.5 208.6 Disbursement Rate (Z) 14.1 24.2 51.0 100.0 23.3 1981 Opening Pipeline 801.5 240.4 130.3 4.6 1,176.8 Pipeline Disbursements 118.5 59.4 76.0 4.6 258.5 Disbursement Rate (Z) 14.8 24.7 58.3 100.0 22.0 1982 Opening Pipeline 947.1 539.7 139.5 7.4 1,633.7 Pipeline Disbursements 131.7 136.5 49.9 7.4 325.5 Disbursement Rate (Z) 13.9 25.3 35.8 100.0 19.9 1983 Opening Pipeline 968.3 511.8 145.6 36.8 1,662.5 Pipeline Disbursements 142.1 136.0 56.3 36.8 371.2 Disbursement Rate (Z) 14.7 26.6 38.7 100.0 22.3 Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 90. In the case of project aid, the decline in the disbursement rate is basically attributable to non-Mahaveli project aid. During 1978-80, line ministries devoted most of their efforts to introducing new projects rather than implementing those which had already been approved; as a result, disbur- sements on ongoing projects suffered. Subsequently, when budgetary control was strengthened, disbursements have been constrained by large cuts in non- Mahaweli capital expenditures. Project aid disbursements have also tended to lag as a result of budgetary procedures related to the reimbursement by donors of local cost expenditures. There are many instances where work had been done by line ministries under budgetary allocations from the Consolidated Fund, but the reimbursement claims to donors tended to lag. Mahaweli aid, on the other hand, has generally disbursed well, an indication of the high priority being attached to the program and the fact that most of -36- the aid is going towards financing obligations to foreign contractors who are operating under tight schedules. 91. The declining disbursement rate for commodity aid during the last couple of years is cause for concern, especially because, in principle, this is the type of aid which Sri Lanka needs the most. Disbursements have slowed down so considerably that, even though (or because of it) new commitments have also declined, the undisbursed pipeline has nevertheless grown during 1982 and 1983. It is clearly essential that both Sri Lanka and donors take every measure to ensure that this vital type of aid can be used more rapidly. On the part of Sri Lanka, this means taking steps to ensure that whenever commodity aid is appropriate and available to finance certain imports, that it be used. There has been an increasing tendency in recent years for the end-users of commodity aid to avoid the relatively complex procedures associated with it by going directly to the banking system for foreign exchange. While this may indeed make importing easier for the individual importer, it is not in the best interest of the country as a whole. The Government should therefore continue to ensure that aid-financed imports are sufficiently attractive to justify their use. On their part, the donors should attempt to place as few restrictions as possible on their aid to allow Sri Lanka maximum flexibility and to ensure Lhat the aid can in fact be readily utilized. Food aid, in contrast, disburses very quickly due both to donors commitment procedures and the relatively few institutions involved in Sri Lanka, and continues to provide one of the quickest and most effective sources of budget and balance of payments support. Aid Requirements, 1984-85 92. Aid requirements during 1984 and 1985 are determined by a variety of factors, including the decline in the current -account deficit, the need to take advantage of the tea price boom to build up reserves, the declining reliance on commercial borrowing and the still relatively large aid pipeline. During 1984 non-concessionary capital inflows are still expected to be fairly substantial as a result of commitments already made. At the same time, because the proposed budget cuts fall mainly on aided projects, some slowdown in the growth of aid disbursements appears likely. Spending targets along with the need to accumulate reserves would indicate that the required gross disbursements of aid are $457 million, about the same level as in 1983. During 1985, however, required aid disbursements will rise. The Government should, in 1985, have more flexibility in determining where further cuts in public investment should fall. While it is hoped that a reduced level of public investment will contribute towards reducing the demand for commercial borrowing, it is assumed that this reduced level of capital expenditure will be achieved on the basis of economic criteria. This should result in an increase in the proportion of aid-financed projects in the total public capital expenditure target. The Government needs both to increase disburse- ments from the existing pipeline so as to complete ongoing projects and solicit new commitments for those priority investments that are currently underfinanced. If this is achieved, required gross disbursements of aid should increase substantially, to some $540 million. On average, about one-fifth of these disbursements will have to come from new commitments. -37- Table 14: FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS, 1982-85 ($ million) 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total Foreign Exchange Requirements -803 -731 -630 -720 Direct Foreign Investment (net) 63 38 50 55 Aid 414 454 457 540 of which: Official Grants (162) (171) (166) (160) Concessional Loans (252) (283) (291) (380) Other Capital 299 240 233 175 Reserves (- = increase) 27 -1 -110 -50 Source: See Table 10. 93. The aid pipeline, which built up rapidly during previous years, has declined marginally in nominal terms between January 1982 and January 1984, which by itself should result in an increase in the disbursement rate. Consistent with the temporary restraint in public capital spending, new commitments during 1984 are estimated at $486 million, but are projected at about $600 million in 1985. There is currently a moratorium on the introduc- tion of new projects during 1984, and the planned increases on spending for operation and maintenance purposes during 1985 will continue to put pressure on Sri Lanka's public finances. It may at first appear that this would argue for further restraint in the introduction of new projects in 1985, and that the case for food and commodity aid is somewhat weakened by the currently relatively strong balance of payments position. However, as project comit- ments now are primarily for disbursement in future years, the proposed com- mitment levels are fully justified in view of Sri Lanka's medium-term needs, but reflect the assumption that their composition responds to a well-defined set of priorities for public investment. With regard to food and commodity aid, Sri Lanka's balance of payments remains vulnerable to volatile tea prices. The build up of reserves in 1984/85 is essential and, as discussed earlier, the transition towards a more viable balance of payments situation through a strengthened export sector is bound to take time and will have to be supported through non-project aid./ The proposed commitment levels can also be considered realistic given the likely availability of foreign aid. On a per capita basis they amount to about $31 and $38 respectively for 1984 and 1985, below the levels of earlier years in nominal terms. 1/ The assumed total commitment levels imply that the aid pipeline by early 1986 would be at the same level in nominal terms as in early 1982. -38- Table 15: SUMMARY AID PIPELINE, 1984-85 ($ million) Non-Mahaweli Mahaweli Food and Project Project Commodity Total 1984 Opening Balance 1,005 419 151 1,575 New Connitments 216 200 70 486 Disbursement from Past Commitments 170 120 90 380 Disbursement from New Commitments 20 20 37 77 Total Disbursements 190 140 127 457 1985 Opening Balance 1,031 479 94 1,604 New Commitments 335 130 130 595 Disbursement from Past Commitments 196 150 60 406 Disbursement from New Commitments 45 19 70 134 Total Disbursements 241 169 130 540 1986 Opening Balance 1,125 440 94 1,659 Source: Bank staff estimates. 94. Expected commitments for Mahaveli downstream development during 1984 amount to $200 million and a further $130 million is recommended during 1985. The present outlook for non-Mahaweli project aid is for $216 million of new commitments during 1984, and a further $335 million is recommended during 1985. 95. If this aid is to support an appropriate public investment program, it is essential that the aid be directed towards those high priority invest- ments which the Government is already committed to undertake. These would include among others the development of the tree crop sector, rehabilitation investments, agricultural diversification, credit lines for the private sector and development of energy resources. -39- Chapter III: MAJOR DEVELOPMENT ISSUES Introduction 96. The preceding chapters have reviewed events in 1983 and considered, against the setting of developments in 1978-83 and the medium-term outlook, the main economic problems and policy issues now confronting the economy. Broadly speaking the Government is faced with two categories of policy issues. One comprises those problem areas which bear most imediately and directly on the central macro-economic problems which continued to be severe during 1983. These problems relate to the imbalance between investment and saving, the gathering inflation and the large deficit in the external accounts. The second major set of problem areas relate to the need to estab- lish long-term viability in the balance of payments through the development of the major productive sectors, so as to reduce dependence on imports, where economically feasible, and to expand export production. There is of course a close relationship between the immediate problem of economic stabilization and the longer tern need for structural adjustment, and in a very real sense addressing the longer term structural problems is an extension of the measures needed to achieve stabilization in the short run. 97. A successful attack on the short term stabilization problem facing Sri Lanka today requires a major improvement in public finances, including both an increase in revenues, as wei.l as restraint on the growth in public investment. Reduction in the budget deficit will permit an adequate supply of credit to the private sector sufficient to allow expansion in activity, while alleviating balance of payments pressure. Among the most effective means of reversing the large deficit in the balance of payments is a flexible exchange rate policy as well as appropriate pricing policies in the major sectors of the economy. As noted earlier, the Government made important strides during 1983 towards greater flexibility in pricing policy, for example in the areas of exchange rate policy and energy pricing. 98. Besides these stabilization problems requiring immediate attention, four broad problem areas have been identified as comprising the foundations on which restructuring of the economy must be accomplished so as to ensure long term viability of the balance of payments. The need for structural reforms applies especially to budgetary practices, as discussed in Chapter II, and to three key sectors: agriculture, industry and energy. 99. The three sectors are examined at some length in this chapter. For the budget, the central issue is one of fundamental reforms in current procedures. Following liberalization, and with the introduction of the program of so-called lead projects, public capital spending soared from 5.7Z of GDP in 1977 to over 19.3Z in 1980. While the Government has, in the last four years, recognized the impossibility of sustaining capital formation at these high levels, the budgetary process has not been adapted to ensure the most effective use of limited resources, given national priorities. Fundamental reforms in the budgetary process are essential if optimal use is to be made of the resources available to the economy in the next several years. Among the budgeting and investment planning requisites discussed in Chapter II is the need for a tightening of budgeting priorities, which presently weaken control over expenditures, and the introduction of a system -40- for establishing investment priorities. One of the principal requirements is the strengthening of the current inadequate process of preparing and approv- ing projects. At present the criteria for appraising and evaluating public sector projects are formulated rather loosely and implemented 'iaphazardly. There is an urgent need to introduce a rigorous and systematic process of evaluating project costs and benefits in order to maximize the benefits to the economy of each new public sector project. A. Agricultural Sector Policies Introduction 100. Sri Lanka-s natural resources and climate permit a wide range of agricultural pursuits, which makes agriculture an important element in any program for the economic development of the country. About 75% of the population lives in rural areas, and agriculture accounts directly for about 20-25Z of GDP, 50% of employment, 40% of government revenues and 55-60% of export earnings. In addition, much manufacturing, transport and service sector activity is related to the supply of agricultural iaputs, or to the processing and marketing of agricultural output. 101. Agricultural performance since 1978 has been characterized by a substantial and sustained increase in paddy output, bringing Sri Lanka to the verge of self-sufficiency in rice. The performance of other field crops has been mixed; their potential for diversifying the country's agriculture remains to be tapped. Development of dairying has also remained far below its potential for promoting agricultural diversification. Consequently, this important source of supplemental income for many small farmers and landless laborers has been underutilized. The output of tree crops, which is crucial to export earnings, has remained stagnant, while, with a few exceptions, the output of minor export crops has fluctuated considerably from year to year. 102. The differing subsector performance can be attributed largely to producer responses to prevailing economic incentives and, to a lesser extent, to factors such as the weather, the state of infrastructure and market conditions. Thus, the determined application of strong incentives for paddy production and marketing has elicited remarkably positive farmer response. For other field crops (coarse grains, pulses, tubers, oilseeds), farmer incentives as well as institutional support have been weak relative to paddy, thus resulting in their limited adoption. Moreover, potential substitutes for coconut products (e.g., sesame, groundnuts, soybean, cassava, maize) have generally been less attractive due to the competitive impact of low domestic prices for coconut products relative to world prices. Indeed, until the introduction of some pricing reforms in the 1982 budget, the domestic coconut market had remained tightly insulated by an elaborate system of export taxa- tion and quantitative restrictions. The aim of that system was tv stabilize not only local consumer prices for fresh coconuts and coconut oil, but also the local prices of milk via cheap supplies of poonac (coconut meal or copra cake) to the livestock feed and dairy industry. Milk prices, furthermore, were maintained at low levels through subsidized imports. As a result, dairy development was constrained by low producer prices, as well as by lack of infrastructure, and inefficiencies in collection, processing and marketing. For tree crops, delays in adjusting export taxes and development subsidies have resulted in weak and unclear signals to producers, leading to poor -41- performance not only in short-term production and exports but also in rehabilitation activities that are vital to the longer-term health of this subsector. In addition, the weak institutional base for the coordination of tree crop policies and programs has been a significant constraint, although the basic principles for improving the management of the public estate sector have been agreed upon now. 103. Essentially, the recent experience.of agricultural performance points to the principal issues which should be addressed in order to exploit the considerable potential for further growth and diversification. While Government policy is committed to promoting producer initiatives--and has been applied successfully in the paddy sector-the incentive framework and the institutional support system for other subsectors need to be strengthened, and backed with priority investments. A first step towards reviewing the overall effects of government policies on agricultural incen- tives was taken in November 1983 when the National Food Policy and Agricultural Prices Committee was formed. The Committee secretariat should accord high priority to organizing the data base and analytical methods for assessing agricultural incentives and formulating recommendations for Government action to remove economic distortions. At the same time, the Government will need to undertake a number of institutional measures, includ- ing the completion of management and organizational reforms of the JEDB and the SPC; a review of the role of other public enterprises in agriculture; rationalization of the multiple ministries and other government agencies involved with tree crops; the improvement of extension services for smaltholders, particularly in field crops, minor export crops and tree crops. In planning investments, the imbalance between Mahaveli and tree crops will need to be corrected, with more emphasis placed on rehabilitation and modern- ization of investments designed to obtain maximum returns from existing facilities. Furthermore, the wide range of investment subsidies now avail- able for tree crops should be reviewed and rationalized with a view to providing appropriate signals regarding the choice of crops, the choice between activities such as infilling, replanting and inter-planting, and optimal cultivation practices. 104. The rest of this section on agriculture first examines principal developments over the last five years, and then outlines key adjustment issues. For various reasons, the coverage of this section is necessarily restricted. Thus, for example, the highly technical nature of issues in irrigation design and management precludes its treatment in this report. Issues in agricultural research and credit are not addressed because cur- rently these are subjects of studies by the Government and some donors. Performance Since 1978 105. Agricultural performance over the 1977-83 period improved substan- tially with growth in value added averaging over 4.0% per annum, compared to about 2% per annum during 1970-77. This overall result was buoyed by an impressive increase in paddy output, averaging over 6% per annum, but was depressed by virtual stagnation in the tree crops sector. Some trends in principal agricultural crops are indicated in Table 2. -42- 106. The Government's wide-ranging initiatives in the paddy sector have boosted production to record high levels in virtually every year, despite below normal rainfall in some years. Most of the increase in production has been due to increasing yields. Between 1977-82, average yields rose by nearly 30% while gross area sown rose by 4-5%. Probably the major factor which has helped to increase yields has been the existence of strong producer incentives resulting from successive increases in the Government procurement prices, adjustments to the retail prices and continued fertilizer subsidies, especially on urea. At the same time, minimal charges were levied in respect of either the recurrent or the capital costs of government irrigation, and the paddy sector remained remarkably free from other direct taxes and levies. The Government, moreover, opened up paddy marketing and processing to the private sector--which responded favorably to the profitable opportunities-- and genuinely curtailed the role of the state in the rice trade. Through the Guaranteed Purchase Scheme (GPS), the Paddy Marketing Board now serves mainly to maintain a floor price for paddy while the Food Commissioner's Department effectively maintains a ceiling price by importing quantities equal to expected shortfalls and selling on a cost-incurred basis. 107. With increased availability of rice, and generally higher incomes, it was only to be expected that demand, and production incentives, for the less preferred substitute field crops (maize, sorghum, millet) would decline. Sri Lankan consumers have thus been well-served by the rapid improvements in paddy incentives, production and marketing. There are, however, a number of other nutritionally and economically viable field crops which could have been promoted with appropriate incentives and institutional support: for example, pulses, oilseeds and high-value cash crops such as onions, potatoes and chillies. The production of these crops was impeded by inadequate extension, marketing and storage facilities; by wide seasonal price fluctuations; and the occasional large imports, by the Cooperative Wholesale Establishment (CWE), intended to lower consumer prices. Thus, despite the operation since 1979 of a floor price scheme for some of these crops, producer response has been mixed. Producer response remained low also because of the relatively higher returns obtainable from paddy and, in the case of edible oilseeds and animal feed crops, because of the competitive impact of low-priced coconut products. 108. Table 16 below, which gives data for major growing areas, indicates that, with some exceptions, financial returns to paddy are generally more attractive in both rainfed and irrigated farming._/ Correspondingly, the data in Table 16 reveal the limited diversification of field crop agriculture which has occurred so far. Compared to paddy, which is seen to be grown in every district, the spread of other crops appears to have been very limited. Yet, as described in a recent study, there is considerable physical potential 1! The notable exceptions, which appear from the particular data for the 1982/83 Maha, are: potatoes and red onions in Jaffna and Trincomalee, where these crops are grown on a highly mechanized and intensively irrigated commercial basis; irrigated potatoes in Nuwara Eliya and Badulla, where the climate is particularly suitable and sound cultural practices have been developed; and irrigated chillies in Kurunegala, which obtain high yields from intensive and sound cultural practices. -43- for diversification through stabilized upland cropping in the longer-term, as well as through the introduction of these crops to irrigated rotation as a means of maximizing returns from limited Yala water supplies.1/ 109. Dairying also has considerable potential for diversified production in the Mid and Hill country of the Wet Zone, and could become a major focus for developing integrated crop-livestock farming systems in the Dry Zone. As yet, this potential has not been realized. By latest estimates, domestic milk production currently is about 400,000 litres per day, with imports of dairy products providing liquid milk equivalent of another 400,000 to 500,000 litres per day to meet domestic demand. Here again, pricing policies have been a major disincentive to development. Low milk prices for consumers were supported by subsidized imports while dairy producer prices (Rs 2.00 to Rs 2.80 per litre before March 1983) remained well below costs of production (Rs 2.55 to Rs 5.33 per litre). Meanwhile, low feed prices-particularly for poonac--over a long period encouraged dependence on purchased feed, and discouraged the development of grazing resources, production of alternative feed crops (e.g., maize, cassava) and the development of modern private feed industry. However, in March 1983, the Government took major steps to diminish the distortions in milk pricing. Producer prices were raised to about Rs 3.20 per litre; consumer prices for sterilized and pasteurized milk were raised, respectively by 35% and 39%; and the price of imported milk powder was raised (from Rs 36 per kg to Rs 47 per kg) to cover the full cost of importing and packaging this product. The process of economic rationalization of the dairy sector thus begun will need to be maintained and, furthermore, sector development will need to be strengthened with appropriate institutional and infrastructural support, as outlined in paragraphs 122 and 127. 1/ T. Sanmugan and S.M.P. Senanayake, "Prospects for Expansion in the Production of Coarse Grains and Grain Legumes", Agrarian Research and Training Institute (Colombo, 1982). Further potential is also being investigated under the Diversified Agricultural Research and Support Project (supported by USAID), particularly in the Dry and Intermediate Zones, the Mahaweli System C and other irrigated areas. Table 16: NET FINANCIAL RETURN PER UNIT OF FAMILY LABOR: Al SELECTED FIELD CROPS, KAHA 1982/83 (Rupees per Kanday) Paddy maize Greengram Soybean Groundnut Potato Chilli Red Onion R I R I R I R IR R I R VET ZONE Colombo 97 Gampaha 62 87 Kalutara 127 Galle 126 Matara 54 77 Kegalle 70 63 Ratnapura 33 52 21 Kandy 33 33 18 Nuvara Eliya 36 218 Badulla 58 18 108 DRY ZONE Puttalam 117 135 26 Kuruneg.la 46 111 45 75 Matale 62 77 42 69 Noneragala 82 20 41 20 Jaffna 98 241 351 112 77 Vavuniya 538 254 Mullaitivu 113 176 146 Mannar 131 725 Anuradhapura 71 69 10 46 12 Polonnaruva 126 1 Trincomalee 105 72 15 7 361 Batticalos 55 182 22 31 Asparai 91 67 23 -28 Hambantota 267 13 A/ (Net return excluding imputed cost of family labor) per (Manday of family labor input). Note: R denotes rainfed; I denotes irrigated. Source: Department of Agriculture, Peradeniya; Cost of Cultivation of ARricultural Crops - Haha 1982/83; Volumes I and II (December 1983). vT M7 0 WAILAB" -45- 110. The disappointing performance of tree crops has been cited and analyzed in several reports. Since 1978, the combined volume of tea, rubber and coconuts has been virtually stagnant. This has primarily been the result of cumulative past neglect of standing stock, factory capacity and market infrastructure emanating from the uncertainties associated with land reforms and poor management, and from the erosion of incentives associated with heavy export taxation. Rehabilitation of the production base has been encouraged through a wide range of investment subsidies since 1977, but progress in the various activities has been inadequate to cover current needs as well as the backlog. Producer margins have remained low as, in the absence of alterna- tive sources, the Government has had to rely on heavy export taxation of this sector for revenues (Table 17). While tax rates have been adjusted at various times, the adjustments have not been timely or automatic; and the subsidies on current inputs (e.g., fertilizer, transport) and investments have been variable and complex to administer. Table 17: TREE CROPS: RATIOS OF DOMESTIC TO EXPORT PRICES af, 1977-82 (Percentages) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Tea 86 43 40 55 52 67 Rubber 66 46 47 49 43 57 Copra 43 31 29 35 32 37 Coconut Oil 128 49 46 59 95 95 Desiccated Coconut 61 35 35 43 55 61 Poonac b/ V/ b/ b/ 102 86 a/ Domestic prices are Colombo market or auction prices; export prices are FOB prices. bh No shipments permitted. Sources: Central Bank of Ceylon; Rubber Control Department; and Coconut Development Authority. 111. Besides revenue considerations the Government has been reluctant to allow higher margins to the public corporations which were afflicted with a number of organizational and managerial deficiencies, and lacked a cohesive investment strategy and plan. Between them, these corporations, the JEDB and the SPC, are responsible for 67% of tea greenleaf production, 78Z of tea manufacture and 35% of rubber production. External consultants have recently recommended measures to improve the performance of the corporations. These recommendations include clear definition and delegation of authority, comple- mented with increased accountability; setting physical and financial targets; restructuring of corporate finances; improvements of accounting and informa- tion systems; and incentive pay to personnel. Incentive schemes for tea estate and factory workers, and salaried staff, have already been introduced. Also, an improved accounting system recommended by the consultants is being tested in the field. An estate-by-estate list of medium-term expenditures has been prepared and now needs closer analysis to determine the economic viability of the overall investment program. -46- 112. While implementation of the above measures would eventually set the public corporations on a sound footing, the incentives and institutions for the private smallholder sector remain to be strengthened. This also means that the coconut sector, which is a predominantly (90%) smallholder sector will have to be strengthened. Since 1977, the Government has made sig- nificant efforts to rehabilitate the coconut sector, first by stepping up investment subsidies, and then by a reform of the export duty structure to allow world market trends to affect local prices. However, as discussed later on, much more remains to be done in this vital sector, which, unlike tea and rubber, must cater to the highly competing interests of domestic producers and consumers. 113. From the discussion so far, it is clear that Sri Lanka's liberaliza- tion policies in agriculture, including its efforts to ensure adequate producer incentives, have been focussed primarily on the paddy sector, which has also benefitted from large investments in irrigation and other inputs, such as fertilizers, and has remained free from direct taxes and levies. Given the significance of rice to Sri Lanka, this focus was understandable. Nevertheless, in the interest of efficient further growth, some adjustments ought to be considered now even as the essential policies and investments for raising further the productivity of paddy are put in place. The process of adjustment might start with regular analysis and review of agricultural pricing policies; strengthening selected agricultural institutions and, in particular, orienting them to serving direct producers; and identifying efficient priority investments for the future. Adjustment Issues and Policies (a) Prices and Incentives 114. Like many countries, Sri Lanka employs a wide range of fiscal and administrative instruments in agriculture, which effectively constitute price intervention measures. Some of the better known measures (e.g., fertilizer subsidies, milk prices, tree crop export taxes, various tree crop rehabilita- tion subsidies) were referred to earlier (see paras 106, 109, 110, 112). The impact of these measures has been varied and can be expected to have produced significant efficiency and income distribution effects. For instance, the relatively strong incentives to paddy among field crops has probably affected cropping patterns and farm incomes; export taxation of tree crops over a long period has undoubtedly impaired incentives to invest in this crucial sector; and the availability of cheap coconut products has diverted output to domes- tic consumption and, at the same time, discouraged the development of promis- ing substitutes (see paras 107, 109). This is not to say that, in practice, any or all measures have been unqualifiably deleterious at all times. Thus, during 1978-82, the initial interventions in favor of paddy (see para 106) were quite appropriate to dismantle past policy distortions and, among other benefits, tended to narrow differences between domestic and international prices of rice. However, for reasons of efficiency and equity, it is impor- tant for policy makers to review periodically the economic and welfare impacts of the various intervention measures, and then make requisite changes. -47- 115. Sound decisions to alter price interventions, however, can only be made on the basis of careful analysis of the distortions arising from exist- ing measures and the consequences of changing them. Such analysis, in turn, requires an appropriate data base (e.g., schedules of agricultural prices, direct and indirect taxes, and subsidies; physical controls, if any; account- ing prices; elasticities and cross elasticities of demand and supply for the relevant agricultural products; cost profiles for agricultural products) and a suitable analytical framework. 116. In Sri Lanka, the National Food Policy and Agricultural Prices Committee, which was formed in November 1983, is the policy-level body desig- nated to review agricultural prices and incentives. The secretariat of this Committee would be an appropriate body for guiding and coordinating the analysis of agricultural price factors, and recommending specific action to phase out economic distortions. Some agencies already are compiling relevant field data in the course of their normal work, e.g., the Market Research Unit of the Agrarian Research and Training Institute (ARTI) (subsidiary food crops market information); the Division of Agricultural Economics of the Department of Agriculture at Peradeniya (district-wise sample costs of production for paddy and selected field crops); the SPC and JEDB (tea and rubber costs of production); the Sri Lanka Tea Board and the Rubber Controller's Department (tea and rubber market prices); and the Coconut Development Authority (coconut costs of production and prices). The Committee secretariat, therefore, might begin by developing an analytical framework, examining the available data, and identifying additional data requirements (e.g., demand and supply elasticities, accounting prices) and the means of generating them. 117. A comprehensive examination of agricultural price intervention mechanisms should also explore the role of various public sector corporations still involved in agricultural marketing and processing; for example, the Marketing Department, the Cooperative Wholesale Establishment, the Oils and Fats Corporation, the National Milk Board and the Sugar Corporation. Some such agencies might be sold to, or replaced by, private operations in the context of pricing and incentive reforms. Also in this context, the Government's agricultural policy and service agencies providing support to the private sector will need to be strengthened. (b) Strengthening Selected Institutions 118. Government administration in agriculture is characterized by a multi- plicity of institutions in virtually every subsector: tree crops, irrigation, livestock, etc. The variety of ministries and agencies makes it very difficult to formulate and coordinate sector policies and programs. While prospects for sector-wide rationalization, and better coordination and motivation ought to be examined at some stage, a quick and practical approach is needed to obtain rapid results. This approach would identify and resolve specific institutional obstacles that are constraining agricultural produc- tion in the country. Some illustrations are provided in the following paragraphs. 119. Recently, the World Bank's tree crop sector review identified key institutional problems constraining smallholder tea production, and recom- mended measures to reduce those problems. One of the recommendations was to formalize and spread the productive relationships between public tea estates -48- and private smallholders which occurs on an ad hoc basis in a few localities. The aim would be to spread, on a commercial basis, the practice whereby the estate superintendents assist neighboring smalliolders in obtaining fer- tilizer and planting material, and provide them technical advice on sound cultural practices. Another recomendation was to transfer the respon- sibility for smallholder tea extension services from the Tea Smallholder Development Authority (TSHDA) to the Department of Agriculture's Training and Visit (T&V) System,1/ and also to divest the TSHDA of its factory operations. This way, the TSRDA would be able to devote more energy towards serving small growers--in the administration of subsidy schemes, provision of input and credit, and organization of leaf collection. It was further recommended that the Greenleaf Collecting Societies, which are groups of small private growers, be accorded clear legal status to enable them to enter into formal agreements for credit with the commercial banks. In this way, the provision of credit and the distribution of input supplies could be organized more effectively by dealing with voluntary groups of farmers instead of a large number of individual smallholders. In addition, drawing on the experience of the very successful smallholder tea program in Kenya, it was proposed that smallholder participation in factory ownership and management be introduced on an experimental basis. Early decisions on such institutional proposals for serving the smallholder sector should be possible. 120. In another illustration, development of the predominantly smallholder coconut sector is also hampered by institutional difficulties, which seem to militate against the well-intentioned investment subsidies. The Coconut Cultivation Board administers five different subsidy schemes, which takes an inordinate amount of the time of Coconut Development Officers, distracting them from proper extension work. The process of obtaining a subsidy involves nine steps. A survey conducted by the Coconut Development Authority (CDA) in Gampaha District during 1981 found that, on average, the process of obtaining a subsidy took nearly 18 months. If an initial application is approved, payment is made in two to five installments, depending on the type of subsidy. The CDA survey found that only 13% of the permit holders who had obtained the first installment bothered to obtain the second installment; and less than 2% sought a third installment. The survey identified a number of administrative reasons for the excessive delays in the administration of these schemes; their resolution should receive priority. 121. A Ministry of Finance and Planning study of intercropping in coconut lands (December 1981) also identified the fragmentation of institutional support to intercropping to be a constraint to development. The Coconut Cultivation Board provided subsidies and, nominally, promotional/extension support for cocoa, coffee, pepper and pastures whereas planting material and research were handled by the Department of Minor Export Crops and the Agriculture Department. Unless the activities of the various agencies are merged, or properly timed and coordinated, the smallholders cannot be expected to adopt intercropping. Indeed, among other measures, strengthening the institutional support to intercropping would be necessary to stemming the decline in the Sri Lankan coconut crop. This is because studies in Sri Lanka 1/ A similar recommendation was also made for smallholder rubber and coconut extension services. -49- and elsewhere 1/ suggest that coconut planting or replanting is financially attractive only in cropping schemes which involve intercropping coconuts with a combination of annual or perennial plants. (Some simulated schemes, based on 1979 data in Sri Lanka, give internal rates of return of over 52Z.) As a monocrop, coconut planting/replanting is far less attractive (IRR about 19-20%) compared to monocrops of, for example, turmeric, ginger, pepper, pineapple, banana, or coffee (IRR over 30%), which may explain why farmers are reluctant to plant or replant sole crops of coconuts. 122. A last illustration of the need for strengthening institutions is drawn from the dairy sector, in which the responsibilities of the four separate entities within the Ministry of Rural Industrial Development (MRID) are not clearly delineated, leading to considerable overlapping of functions in some activities, such as the formation of dairy cooperatives. The four entities are (a) the National Milk Board (milk collection, processing and marketing); (b) the National Livestock Development Board (development projects, establishment and maintenance of breeding stations and farms, organization of dairy cooperatives); (c) the National Oils and Fats Corporation (principal supplier of compound feeds); and (d) the Department of Animal Production and Health (veterinary services, organization and manage- ment of dairy cooperatives). Still another agency, the Cooperative Wholesale Establishment under the Ministry of Trade, is engaged in the import of dairy products. The Government now has before it some proposals for sector-wide institutional reforms. These proposals would involve reorganization of dairy cooperatives; divestiture of the National Milk Board investments in chilling centers and processing plants to a semi-public or a joint private-cooperative company; and rationalization of the HRID fuctions aimed at providing a coherent sector policy direction and the technical inputs for improving the efficiency of milk production. (c) Future Investments 123. Agricultur-l investments during the last five years continued to emphasize paddy settlement schemes, occasionally without adequate reference to economic criteria. Expenditures on tree crops lagged behind for lack of resources and of an overall investment program. As the present phase of Mahaveli headworks is completed, the imbalance between paddy and tree crop investments will need to be corrected. Some general support will also be required to promote profitable expansion of other field crops and minor export crops through activities such as cropping systems research and development. 124. Although in principle general priority should be given to investments in tree crops, it is clearly essential that the level and composition of such investments should reflect economic priorities and economic returns. The detailed estate-by-estate review of public corporation investments, which 1/ National Planning Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning, "A Study of Intercropping in Coconut Lands", Colombo, 1981. Dan M. Etherington and K. Karunanayake, "An Economic Analysis of Some Options for Intercropping Under Coconuts in Sri Lanka", Sri Lanka Journal of Agrarian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1981. -50- has begun, is of major importance, while the associated problem of whether investment should be financed through the central budget or out of estate profits also needs resolution. With an appropriate investment program, and assured improvements in the organization and management of the public cor- porations (para 111), the Government should permit the corporations to assume greater responsibility for investment. 125. The wide range of replanting, inter-planting, infilling and other grants available to tree crops should ensure that the relative incentives for coconuts, rubber and tea have been considered in relation to each other. Since these very often are alternatives for the same land (especially in lowland areas), the signals being given may well be sub-optimum, both in relation to choice of crop and in relation to timing of replanting or other investments. 126. Rehabilitation and modernization investments should be designed to obtain maximum returns from existing facilities. Even in the case of Mahaweli, there are clearly high priority investments in System H and in non-Mahaweli schemes receiving supplementary supplies which are necessary to make best use of the major initial Mahaveli investment. In this respect, it is important to be aware that, even though a major project such as System H might be "completed", it may still require several years before all the balancing and other investments have been finally reduced to a purely "OWK" level. 127. Investment will also be needed to exploit the considerable potential of the dairy sector for agricultural diversification, and for raising sup- plemental incomes of smallholders and landless agricultural laborers. Investments are required to promote dairy cooperatives, improve the economics and logistics of milk processing, and provide the necessary infrastructural support to the sector, including training and research activities related to dairying. B. Industrial and Trade Policies Introduction 128. While the industrial sector has registered the lowest overall sector growth rate of the major sectors within Sri Lanka over the period 1977-83, it is difficult to establish a disaggregated picture due to data inadequacies. Table 18 does, however, provide some comparative estimates of performance within the sector based on data from the Department of Census and Statistics and the Central Bank.lI Although there are marked differences between the two series, probably due to different categorization, the trends are similar. jf The Census and Statistics data are generally considered to be more accurate largely because they do not operate under the same pressure as the Central Bank which attempts to provide up-to-date information. -51- Table 18: VALUE ADDED IN THE HANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1977-83 (Constant 1975 prices; Rs million) Dept. of Census and Statistics Estimates 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total Value Added 6.758 6,866 7,043 7,071 7.327 7,625 n.a. Export Processing (tea, rubber, coconut) 2,829 2,898 2,931 2,638 2,768 2,759 n.a. Factory Industry 3,198 3,230 3,348 3,543 3,604 3,856 n.a. Cottage Industry 731 739 764 890 955 1,010 n.a. Central Bank Estimates Total Value Added 5,372 5,791 6.06 6.110 6,427 6,734 6.788 Real Growth Rate Dept. of Census & Stat. n.a. 1.6 2.6 0.4 3.6 4.1 n.a. Central Bank -0.6 7.8 4.6 0.8 5.2 4.8 0.8 As Z of GDP (current prices) Dept. of Census & Stat. 25.9 23.4 20.7 19.0 17.3 16.8 n.a. Central Bank 23.1 20.0 19.1 17.7 16.2 15.4 14.3 Sources: Department of Census and Statistics National Accounts, 1975-82; and Central Bank. 129. The Department of Census and Statistics data indicate that, as one would expect, the real level of output of the export processing industries (tea, rubber and coconut) has declined steadily since 1977, with a sharp decline in 1980 bringing down the overall manufacturing sector average growth to an all time low. The stronger performance in the other two subsectors, factory and cottage industry, is largely due to the growth of the garments industry, coupled with the varying performance of a few large producers, in particular the Petroleum Corporation. In addition, both series confirm the relative decline in the share of GDP accounted for by manufacturing activity. 130. The same trend can clearly be seen in the behavior of industrial exports. The share of total industrial exports (including mining and quarrying) increased from approximately 17% in 1977 to 43% in 1982. However, if we exclude petroleum re-exports and garments, remaining industrial exports expanded from the relatively small base figure of $49 million (7Z of total exports) to only $115 million by 1982 (11% of total exports), with zero growth experienced in 1983. 131. There are, therefore, signs that the growth momentum which resulted from the 1977 policy package has recently begun to slow down. Although external factors, such as sluggish world growth and rising petroleum prices, and non-policy-related domestic constraints, i.e., the drought and consequent -52- power shortages, have had a negative effect on performance, the industrial policy of the Government has also been a concributing factor. While the 1977 reforms did significantly liberalize the economy in comparison to the pre- 1977 situation, the overall incentive framework was still biased in favor of import substitution at the expense of export activities. As has happened in other countries, some growth has occurred under this situation as inves- tors were e.rawn into producing for the domestic market. However, due to the small size of Sri Lanka's domestic market, the "easy" import substitution activities were quickly exhausted. In addition, the Government inherited a situation where public enterprises (PEs) accounted for a large share (over 40% of manufacturing value added) of total manufacturing activity. Although the Government has successfully resisted the further expansion of PEs, the poor performance of PEs has compounded the allocative inefficiencies caused by the trade regime. Thus, with the exception of the clothing industry, the realization of the objective of high rates of growth of manufacturing output and non-traditional exports has been less than expected. The following paragraphs discuss in more detail the policy measures which have contributed to the poor performance of the sector. The Present Policy Environment 132. The following analysis breaks the discussion of these policy measures down into those policies which define the trade and industry environment and those which determine the performance of PEs. (a) Trade and Industry Policy 133. The trade policy environment in Sri Lanka comprises of four policy instruments: the foreign exchange rate, the tariff structure, import licenses, and a number of export promotion measures. At this time the exchange rate and tariff structure are the most important policy instruments in the overall trade incentive structure. 134. Following a considerable devaluation in the nominal and real exchange rate in 1977, the nominal rate has been devalued several times since then by smaller percentages, while at the same time the real effective exchange rate has appreciated. The appreciation of the effective rate has reduced the competitiveness of local production and particularly that of exports. Under a recent IMF credit, some progress in implementing an appropriate exchange rate policy has begun. However, given the all-pervasive effect of the exchange rate on relative incentives throughout the economy, the importance of maintaining a flexible and appropriate exchange rate policy cannot be overstressed. 135. Regarding the tariff structure, the 1977 reforms established a six- tier structure with rates ranging from zero for certain essential imports to over 100% for luxury goods and imports competing with local production. Import duties on raw materials, capital goods and spare parts ranged from 5% to 25% while a 50% duty was levied on various imports not classified under any of those categories. 136. Several changes have been introduced in this tariff structure since 1977. Some of those changes were motivated by consideration of fiscal revenue while others were in response to demands of local interest groups -53- seeking favorable adjustments in duty rates. Most of those adjustments slightly increased the levels of protection with the public enterprises being the important beneficiaries. In any event, as documented in a 1979 study, the present tariff structure provides high and non-uniform levels of effec- tive protection, with an overall bias against exporting and in favor of import substituting activities.,/ 137. Changes in the tariff rates for fiscal revenue were implemented by the Ministry of Finance. Most of these changes reduced to a small extent the variance in the levels of protection among manufacturing subsectors. Piecemeal changes in the tariff rates were the result of appeals to and recommendation of the Tariff Review Commission, which in November 1980, became the Presidential Tariff Commission (PTC). For the most part, these changes reflected protective responses to appeals from manufacturers. The emerging conclusion is that most of the changes recommended by PTC have increased disparities in effective protection although by and large, such changes seem to have been small. Overall, the tariff structure has become a little more complex, a little more discriminating among import substituting activities, and capable of raising a little more revenues from a given value of imports. In sum, it would appear that there has been no narrowing of duty bands which might have reduced disparities in the levels of effective protec- tion among local activities. The exception to this is the list of tariff reforms passed on January 10 this year. While the direction of those tariff changes is appropriate and does represent some evidence that the Government is willing to consider broad tariff reforms, the tariff changes themselves were largely symbolic. The commodities listed were generally non- controversial items and many of the tariff rate adjustments involved reducing largely redundant tariff rates. Thus, while individual tariffs were adjusted, there was not a significant retreat from the trade reforms embraced in 1977. 138. The importance of import licensing in controlling imports was dramatically reduced by the 1977 reforms. Some import licensing remains either for protection purposes, primarily to support flagging PEs such as the Chemicals Corporation, Steel Corporation or Textiles Mills. In the absence of detailed price comparisons, it is difficult to measure the impact of import licensing as a trade barrier and the extent to which it discriminates among productive activities. However, as the incidence of import licensing has not substantially increased, this suggests that it has not become any more restrictive. 139. Export promotion measures have been an important part of trade policy in Sri Lanka in recent years. Their presence is a recognition that the prevailing trade regime, on balance, severely discriminates against export- producing sectors. Available estimates of effective protection for 1980 clearly show a concentration of manufacturing export activities within the groups of low protection levels while highly protected activities were dominated by import-substituting activities. 1f Cuthbertson and Khan, op. cit. -54- 140. The Export Development Board (EDB) is the coordinating agency for the implementation and promotion of export incentive policies. The EDB manages the Export Development Fund which is partly financed from general revenue and partly from a 10% cess on imports dutiable at more than 50%, and from a smaller cess on certain non-traditional exports. However, this mode of financing export development, by increasing the tariff protection on activities which are already highly assisted, contradicts efforts of reducing overall protection as a means of encouraging exports. The most important export promotion programs administered by EDB are various concessionary export finance schemes and the duty rebates. 141. Although the export promotion measures are useful, in that they partially correct for the anti-export bias of other policy variables, their effectiveness is limited for several reasons: assistance is restricted by design to particular sectors; credit ceilings on export finance schemes constrain access and confer rents; the discretionary judgement of officials often determines the incentives, reducing the clarity of investment signals; and the magnitude of the promotional assistance provided is dwarfed by the effects of the current exchange rate and tariff structure. In short, selec- tive measures, which are limited by financial constraints, are a poor sub- stitute for exchange rate adjustment and tariff reform. 142. With regard to industrial policy the most important instruments are the Business Turnover Tax (BTT), the income tax holidays, and investment licensing. While their effect on the structure of incentives has varied since 1977, due to several policy changes, the evidence suggests that these policy measures are not major factors in shaping relative incentives. However, the recent revision in BTT, introduced in the 1984 budget, appears to have further reduced its undesirable effects on production. (b) Manufacturing public enterprises 143. The poor performance of PEs continues to have a negative effect on the overall output growth of the industrial sector. Although data inade- quacies prevent rigorous analysis of PEs performance, Tables 19 and 20 provide some indication of the performance of PEs in relation to the private sector. Table 19 provides a snapshot picture of one year using the Census and Statistics Department industrial survey data for 1979. Table 20 provides an historical series indicating the relative movement of employment and outpnt in both the private and public sectors. -55- Table 19: CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR FACTORY INDUSTRIES IN 1979 Unit of Account Public a/ Private Survey of Findings 1. Gross Output Rs mil. 7,183 4,175 2. Net Output (value added) 1,440 2,738 3. Fixed Capital 2,883 1,395 4. Employment Number 83,816 77,000 Indicators a. Capital/Labor Ratio (3-4) Rs 34,400 18,100 b. Net Labor Productivity (2-4) Rs 17,180 35,560 c. Capital/Net Output Ratio (3-2) Percent 2.0 0.5 a/ Includes Government business undertakings. Source: Report on the Survey of Manufacturing Industries: Sri Lanka, 1979, Department of Census and Statistics, Ministry of Plan Implementation. Table 20: EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT TRENDS FOR THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INDUSTRIAL STCTOR, 1976-81 (1976 = 100) 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Public Sector Employment 100 118 134 159 150 146 Output 100 97 105 108 117 115 Private Sector Employment 100 97 112 109 129 146 Output 100 86 119 118 140 174 Source: Bank staff estimates. 144. The data presented in both tables indicate that Sri Lanka pays a fairly high price, given the relative inefficiency of PEs, in order to achieve the development objectives set for PEs by the Government. In addition, it is far from clear how efficient PEs are in achieving their non-financial objectives. However, what can be said is that, with reference to Table 19, the present combination of objectives and industrial policies appears to result in PEs requiring twice the capital per employee as the private sector in order to achieve half the labor productivity. Furthermore, Table 20 indicates that whereas in the p=ivate sector output and employment move in the same direction, as one would expect, no such trend is observable for PEs. Indeed, from 1976 to 1977, an increase of 18% in employment was accompanied by a 3% decline in real output, and over the period 1976 to 1979 -56- employment expanded by 59% whereas output grew by 8%. There is therefore considerable evidence that the policy framework within which PE investment and production decisions are made is extremely costly in terms of the effi- cient use of .he country's resources. 145. The Government realizes the high costs associated with using PEs to achieve social objectives and has recently instructed the managers of PEs to concentrate their efforts on credible financial performance and to de- emphasize progressively the non-financial objectives. The aim is to develop a more efficient, more competitive, and less subsidy-dependent PE sector. 146. This transition in objectives obviously will entail complications and ambiguity. To date, however, it does not appear that the policy intentions of the Government have been translated into an explicit action program. If the PEs are to meet the financial test of market competition, their manage- ment will need the same operational independence, and have to be equally accountable, as private managers. Currently, managerial independence in PEs is circumscribed in several ways. Almost all capital expenditures require government approval through a long and arduous process. Independence is further circumscribed by the political nature of managerial appointment and tenure, which dampens hopes of junior executives for advancement. Salaries and other financial inducements for performance are poor at all managerial levels. And even for recruitment of low level employees the authority of management is circumscribed by the priority that must be given to workers nominated by members of Parliament from their districts. Thus, employment becomes dependent on political connections more than job qualifications. The resulting high absenteeism, indiscipline, high turnover, and overstaffing are among the consequences of this system. 147. To meet their financing, PEs have access to all commercial banks, the National Development Bank (NDB), foreign suppliers' credit, and, of course, to the Government's budget in the form of transfers of both working and investment capital. To reduce its outlays to PEs and to instill in them the discipline of market operations, the Government has been requiring the enterprises to obtain commercial loans. In addition, in a recent Cabinet decision the Government introduced a claim on 50% of the after-tax profits of PEs in lieu of a dividend. PEs have responded to the push toward commercial financing by relying increasingly on commercial banks, suppliers' credit and the NDB, although they continue to depend on some budgetary transfers. The quality of their operations, at least in terms of financial profitability, has, however, remained unchanged. 148. The cumulative effects of ineffectual management, unrealistic salary and bonus policies, employment practices and the conditions under which PEs are financed and are expected to pay dividends has been highly detrimental to their financial viability and to the maintenance of their capital assets. In spite of the deterioration in their finances and capital assets, PEs have managed to remain in production on the strength of Governmental and commer- cial financing, and on pricing and protection policies that in many cases have kept their prices above the world level. -57- Adjustment Issues and Policies 149. The above would support the contention that the Government has not initiated many of the policy measures required to stimulate efficient industrial production. This relative inaction may well reflect the absence of a consensus on future strategy. On the one side, there are proposals to provide more protection for existing industries (particularly PEs) coupled with selective measures designed to encourage the production of particular manufactured goods which are considered, for a variety of administratively determined reasons, to be appropriate for Sri Lanka. On the other side, there are proposals to move towards a more uniform incentive framework which attempts to minimize the discretionary influence of public administrators. 150. Which strategy the Government is prepared to endorse may be clarified when the final report of the PTC is placed before the Cabinet some time in July 1984. The PTC report is expected to advocate an adjustment in all nominal tariffs to a ceiling of 60% and a floor of 5-10% as the first step in a phased program designed to move towards a low and more uniform structure. 151. While PTC's recommendations are in the right direction, the policy measures discussed below are considered to be necessary parts of a more comprehensive reform package. The underlying objective of the suggested reforms is to establish an incentives' framework which promotes production in those sectors of the economy where Sri Lanka has a comparative advantage. Should this policy objective be rejected in favor of protecting selected activities, the question of why one particular activity deserves to be protected more than any other must be confronted. The point being that by protecting one activity one necessarily disadvantages other activities, and unless the benefits associated with providing this assistance are identified and clearly shown to exceed the costs of discriminating against other activities, the end result will be an inefficient allocation of Sri Lanka's limited resources which will reduce the rate of economic growth. 152. Restructuring the incentives system will inevitably take time and involve some painful choices in the short run as the economy adjusts. Existing inefficient industries can be expected to seek protection from increased competition and, to the extent that displaced labor will incur adjustment costs, some degree of compensation should be considered. However, while a practical approach to the design and implementation of the needed policy reforms needs to be taken, this must be moderated by an equal concern for the potential activities which are unlikely to develop, unless policies are changed. As emphasized in the balance of payments discussion, the future growth of the Sri Lankan economy is dependent upon the expansion of non- traditional exports. And, to the extent that a share of these exports must come from industrial activity, this growth is unlikely to occur within the present policy framework. The following policy recommendations are intended to address this issue within a reasonable time frame. Political and social realities may dictate the pace of reform, but medium-term growth is dependent on a commitment to reform. 153. Firstly, with regard to tariffs, the Government should adopt a time- phased plan to reduce further the level and variability of tariffs beyond the first step advocated by the PTC. In addition, the desire to tax luxury goods at a higher rate should be accomplished via appropriate adjustments in the -58- BTT rate so as to avoid the production distortions resulting from disparate tariff rates. 154. Secondly, a lowering of tariffs without an adjustment in the exchange rate could exacerbate the short-run balance of payments problem. Thus, a simultaneous realignment of the exchange rate would need to be considered to restore the profitability of efficient domestic production, thereby reducing the bias towards the production of non-traded goods, and providing an impor- tant boost to exports. The larger the reductions in tariffs, the larger would be the realignment of the exchange rate to maintain equilibrium in the balance of payments in the short to medium term. 155. Thirdly, the current array of export promotion measures put forward by the EDB could be both rationalized into one or two simple measures and made available to all exporters in an automatic and non-discretionary fashion. Given the phasing of tariff reform, a continuation of export rebates and export tax holidays is useful as a means to offset the existing bias against export activities. 156. In addition, every effort should be made to eliminate distortions resulting from particular circumstances. Thus, e.g., if the Government considers it undesirable to auction the current quotas for garment exports to the USA and EEC, then it should at least allow them to be freely traded by recipients, with no restrictions placed on entry to the garment industry. This should ensure that quotas are filled and encourage, via competition, efficiency gains which may provide access to alternative export markets. For similar reasons, the Government should also limit the role of the Investment Advisory Committees to strictly advisory bodies, removing any association between their approval of a project and its subsequent access to subsidies, loans or any other preferential treatment. 157. With respect to manufacturing PEs, Government policy will have to be flexible in order to address the special needs and circumstances of a group of activities which span a wide range of potential economic efficiency. For the small number of PEs which are highly inefficient, unable now or in the future to cover even their variable costs, the Government should consider the possibility of shutting them down. The only obvious economic and social cost from closure will be the resulting unemployed labor as for most of them the physical capital is fully depreciated. It makes sense, therefore, for the Government to find ways to soften the impact of manpower displacement during the transition period partly for economic and social reasons, and partly to moderate opposition to the suspension of PE operations. Such compensation could take the form of lump sum payments, to be paid over time and regardless of whether or not the recipient remains unemployed or not, after he leaves the affected PE. Although precise estimates of the fiscal costs of such payments are not known at this time, in all likelihood, they constitute only a small fraction of the recurrent losses of ailing PEs. 158. At the other extreme, in the case of PEs which already appear to be able to meet the market challenge, the Government should consider the option of selling them to the private sector. This solution would have several advantages. Firstly, it would relieve the already overstretched government officials of monitoring, advising and controlling such a wide range of PEs, allowing these officials to concentrate their attention on the PEs which need -59- to be reshaped. Secondly, it would relieve the budget of the burden of providing the funds which will be needed in order to upgrade plants so as to maintain competitiveness. Thirdly, it would allow the PE management to become truly free of those government controls aimed specifically at them, while at the same time, it gains a greater responsibility for ensuring productive efficiency. Lastly, if for whatever reasons, the particular firm does not survive in the longer term, it would relieve the Sri Lankan taxpayer of the burden of subsidizing a loss-making activity. 159. However, for many PEs a transition period will be required in order to bring them to the point where private investors would find the undertaking attractive. PEs have operated under an enormous burden of ad hoc policy measures, the effects of which will take time to dissipate. Recent policy actions are pointing in the right direction, but their impact will need to be strengthened by streamlining various operating procedures. For example, establishing management contracts, as has been done in some cases, is a useful first step, but it may prove insufficient if the managers contracted have their actions unduly constrained by direct government controls on PEs. The introduction of firm-level experts to implement pilot schemes may also serve a useful demonstration function, but the effectiveness of these changes will be seriously hampered if managers are unable to buy inputs, hire staff or determine wage levels consistent with profit maximization. 160. Furthermore, PEs will not be able to attract the financial and management know-how of the private sector unless the rate of return on their investments becomes worthwhile relative to other investment opportunities. As has been demonstrated in the trade and tourism sector, there is no shortage of venture capital or entrepreneurial talent in Sri Lanka in the presence of incentives. Public share issues can be sold if the shareholders expect that the projects and their managers will be able to make profits. In sum, for those PEs which cannot be sold to the private sector in the short term, yet appear to be competitive in the medium term, a transition period should be allowed during which changes in the incentive structure are intro- duced so as to determine their long-term viability. 161. The changes required to put Sri Lanka's manufacturing PEs on a sound economic and financial footing have been discussed in a number of reports to Government. If a commitment to embark on a time-phased implementation of these broad policy measures is made, there may be a major need for assistance, in the form of technical, managerial and financial support during the adjustment period. C. Enerxy Policies 162. In the past two years, Sri Lanka has taken significant steps to strengthen the energy sector, paying particular attention to energy conservation, through appropriate demand management, and to institutional reforms aimed at improving coordination between agenciep and overall sector planning. With these steps, Sri Lanka has succeeded considerably in managing the short-term imbalance between commercial energy demand and supply, which was expected to persist through the mid-1980s until the first hydropower scheme of the Accelerated Nahaweli Program, Victoria, would come onstream. At the same time, the institutional reforms have improved Sri Lanka's capability for implementing a viable energy development strategy for the -60- future. In order to strengthen the prospects in the energy sector, it will be important to continue tne momentum which has been achieved up to this point, and to develop alternative sources of energy, in particular other renewable sources of energy such as fuelwood, solar power, small-scale hydropower plants and agricultural by-products. This section reviews major developments in recent years and then outlines some prospects and priorities for the future. Energy Supply and Demand 163. In aggregate terms, primary commercial energy consumption grew even faster during 1980-82 (11% per annum) than it did during 1977-80 (9%). In 1983, however, consumption is estimated to have declined by almost 8% in response to the drought, the mid-year civil disturbances, and the July increase in petroleum prices. As may be seen from Table 21, most of the growth in 1980-82 was accounted for by petroleum products. Hydro-electricity generation was constrained by supply limitations; consequently, there was a need to import larger amounts of petroleum to make possible increased thermal power generation. Table 21: PRIMARY COMMERCIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 1980-83 ('000 tons of oil equivalent) Average Growth (%) 1980 1981 1982 1983 a/ 1980-82 1982-83 Petroleum Products b 1,237 1,216 1,589 1,554 13.3 -2.2 Hydroelectricity c 447 474 486 364 4.3 -25.1 Total 1,684 1,690 2,075 1,918 11.0 -7.6 a/ Preliminary estimates. Vf Net of exports and foreign bunker and aviation sales. c/ Converted at the rate of 12,000 BTU/KWh and 39.68 million BTU/ton of oil equivalent. Sources: Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, Ceylon Electricity Board, and Bank staf. estimates. 164. Petroleum consumption grew at over 13% annually during 1980-82, compared to 10% per annum during 1977-80, reflecting its increasing role as the main source of primary energy. Most of the increase in consumption came in diesel and furnace oil for thermal power generation. As Table 22 shows, this rapid growth in consumption had a large impact on the balance of payments, where net imports rose to the equivalent of almost one half of non-petroleum exports. Partly in response to the July 1983 increase in domestic petroleum prices, consumption in 1983 declined slightly; in conjunc- tion with lower prices and improved freight arrangements, the net oil import bill fell by about 12% in 1983. -61- Table 22: NET PETROLEUM IMPORTS, 1980-83 (US$ million) 1980 1981 1982 1983 al A. Petroleum Imports 493 515 574 462 B. Petroleum Re-exports 188 175 158 98 C. Net Petroleum Imports 305 340 416 364 D. Non-Petroleum Exports 877 891 857 945 E. C as Z of D 35 38 49 39 a& Preliminary estimates. Sources: Central Bank of Ceylon and Bank staff estimates. 165. In 1981, the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation had been considering two major investments. The first was a hydro-cracker which would convert furnace oils, which were in surplus and currently exported, into middle distillates, which were in deficit and which Sri Lanka imported. However, detailed examination of the proposal revealed that it was not economically attractive and the proposal has been dropped. The second proposal considered was a single-point mooring buoy, which would enable supertankers to discharge their loads of crude oil via an offshore pipeline rather than continuing the prac- tice of lightering to smaller tankers which the Colombo port could handle. This project was found to have a high rate of return and would significantly reduce the cost of oil imports; its implementation is sched;led to begin next year. Another area where significant savings were possible was in the area of LPG distribution. Distribution through the antiquated pipeline (originally used for coal gas) was resulting in losses of 50% or more. In response, the Government has reduced the pipeline substantially, to the point where it is presently only 11 miles long, and serves only a few large users. 166. Electricity generation during 1980-82 grew at 11.3% per annum, or roughly the same rate as during 1977-80. However, as Table 23 shows, almost all of the growth was accounted for by thermal generation--hydro generation declined from 89% of total generation in 1980 to 78% in 1982; in 1983 it is estimated that this declined to below 60%. The bulk of this generation has been on the 120 MW of gas turbines that were installed between 1979 and 1982, although the addition of a second 30 MW generator at the Canyon project in February 1983 increased peak power generating capacity. Bank staff estimates indicate that the cost of thermal generation in 1982 amounted to around $50 million, including around $40 million to operate the gas turbines. Despite the additions to thermal capacity, overall generating capacity remains inade- quate to meet demand. Since February 1983, private generation has been encouraged, and about 6 GWh are estimated to be generated monthly by this means. -62- Table 23: ELECTRICITY GENERATION, 1980-83 (in GWh) Average Growth (%) 1980 1981 1982 1983 a/ 1980-82 1982-83 Hydro 1,479 1,571 1,608 1,206 4.3 -25.0 Thermal 188 301 458 907 56.1 98.0 Total 1,667 1,872 2,066 2,113 11.3 2.3 Memo Item: Total Sales 1,392 1,502 1,680 1,700 9.9 1.2 a/ Preliminary estimates. Source: Ceylon Electricity Board. 167. The situation in early 1984 is especially precarious because of the extremely poor rainfall level in 1983 which led to a 25% drop in hydro- generation. To help alleviate this situation, 80 MW of diesel generating capacity is being added to the system in 1984-40 MW in April and 40 MW in August. Unlike the gas turbines, used normally for peaking capacity, the new plant is designed for base-load generation and will be fueled by relatively low cost furnace oil. These should help provide a less hydro-dependent generating system over the longer run. The other two large hydropower projects under the Accelerated Mahaweli Program-Kotmale (180 MW) and Randenigala (132 MW)-are likely to be commissioned on schedule in 1985 and 1986 respectively, and should eliminate the need for major thermal generation through the end of the decade. Energy Conservation 168. Conservation to improve the economic efficiency of energy use was a major area for action. Not only was conservation warranted by the need to extend available energy supplies as far as possible in the current energy crisis, but given Sri Lanka's heavy dependence in the future on imported energy at considerable cost, efficient energy use would also be important for ensuring sustained, high rates of economic growth. Two avenues for tackling the problem were available--the adoption of energy prices that reflected the economic cost of energy supplied which would encourage more efficient use of energy generally, and specific measures designed to improve energy utiliza- tion by large consumers. 169. Since 1980, major adjustments have been made in the pricing of both petroleum products and electricity. Petroleum prices were raised in January 1981 and again in July 1983, the latter adjustment primarily dictated by the depreciation in the exchange rate. In the process of raising petroleum prices, however, a major improvement in the pricing structure was achieved by virtual elimination of the general subsidy on kerosene. This increase in the price of kerosene had the effect of discouraging the use of kerosene for -63- other than household purposes, and permitted the CPC to increase diesel fuel prices to their economic levels. To protect the purchasing power of the poor, for whom kerosene is an important energy source, the value of the stamps provided under the Kerosene Stamp Scheme was raised commensurately. As a result of these price changes, petroleum prices in Sri Lanka are now broadly in line with international prices. 170. In 1982, major changes in the electricity tariff were introduced which brought the price of electricity into line with long-term supply costs. The average tariff was raised by 36% to cover the costs of additions being made to the system, especially those under the Accelerated Mahaweli Program, and to allow a reasonable rate of return on the CEB's assets. Maximum power demand charges, V'.ich had been artificially low, were tripled to reflect the actual cost of delivering peak power requirements../ This encouraged major consumers to install power factor correction equipment, thereby improving their consumption efficiency.2/ In addition, the CEB has a fuel adjustment surcharge which is added on to the basic monthly energy charges to recoup the fuel costs associated with thermal power generation. In late 1983, these surcharges were increased to as much as 185%. 171. Among the large industrial and commercial users, a number of corpora- tions have implemented several (the easier and low cost) efficiency measures. One area of particular importance where energy savings are possible is elec- tric power transmission, where losses currently amount to about 20%. The CEB has identified a program of technical improvements which would permit losses to be reduced to about 15%, more in line with international norms. Also, a conservation program for the 30 largest energy consuming industrial and commercial corporations was initiated. These have included conservation training and a series of energy audits. These in turn were to be followed by feasibility studies and actual implementation of the conservation measures; it is estimated that the whole process will take two to three years. In the transport, small industry and household sectors, conservation programs are being initiated, though progress has been slower. Institutional Developments 172. In the past two years, considerable progress has been made in the organization and functioning of institutions in the energy sector. Prior to that, coordination between energy suppliers and consumers was limited and car- ad out on a purely ad hoc basis; in addition, there was no mechanism for tackling such important tasks as energy conservation. There was also little in-depth knowledge of the sector as a whole or long-term planning capability. In December 1982, an Energy Coordinating Team (ECT) was established in the I/ This affected mainly large industrial and commercial users who pay maximum power demand charge in addition to energy charges. 2f Although power factor correction equipment does not reduce energy consumed, it does, especially for users running large electric motors, reduce the amount of power that needs to be delivered. -64- Ministry of Power and Energy (MPE) under the supervision of the newly appointed Senior Energy Advisor to the Minister (who at present is the President). 173. The principal objective of the ECT is to coordinate work among the relevant ministries and prevent duplication of effort. The ECT comprises three coordinating task forces, descriptions of whose functions follow. (i) Energy Planning and Policy Analysis (EPPAN) is attempting to integrate all energy sector activities. EPPAN activities include identifying the overall objectives of national energy policy in order to define an energy strategy that meets these objectives within the goals of maximizing Sri Lanka's development in the coming decades. The setting up of a comprehensive -aergy data base, including energy balances which feed into energy policy analysis and modeling, is already underway. (ii) Energy Efficiency, Demand Management and Conservation (EDMAC) includes a number of activities that are of short-term importance in the area of energy conservation, especially in industry, but also in commerce, households, transport, and agriculture. EDMAC has also been instrumental in setting up a special cell in CEB to reduce system losses, and in reviewing electricity and petroleum pricing policies. (iii) New, Renewable, and Rural Sources of Energy (NERSE) aims at coordinating activities in the renewable energy subsector, assessing the economic and technical feasibilities of some of these technologies as they apply to Sri Lanka and promoting and financing the commercialization of these technologies. The three task forces meet on a regular basis and they include repre- sentatives of the major energy-related ministries, departments, and public corporations. The task forces also have access to a small technical staff who have been recruited for this purpose by the MPE. Prospects in the Energy Sector 174. From the above discussion, it may be seen that Sri Lanka has taken significant steps towards addressing the major weaknesses in the energy sector. Even though the current energy situation remains precarious, it -ias largely foreseen and should improve dramatically within a short period. During the 1984-86 period, hydro-generating capacity will more than double, with the addition to the system of the three projects under the Accelerated Mahaweli Program. As a result, electricity should once again be abundant and relatively cheap. Net petroleum imports should also drop sharply with the decline in thermal power generation. However, the progress presently under- way should not lead to complacency; in fact, the cost of meeting the country's energy needs is likely to rise considerably by the the late 1980s. -65- 175. It is critical that Sri Lanka not slacken its efforts to get energy conservation programs into place and to develop alternative sources of energy. Regarding future electric power generating schemes, it is important, given the long lead times required that planning and implementation begin soon. Otherwise, Sri Lanka could once again be placed in the early 1990s in the same situation it was in in the early 1980s, having to depend on short- term, costly thermal power generation. Historically, although Sri Lanka imported its petroleum needs, it had met almost all its power needs by domes- tic hydropower generation; by the 1990s, however, this situation is likely to change. With the commissioning of the projects under the Accelerated Mahaweli Program, Sri Lanka will have exploited almost all the large-scale hydropower possibilities, with the exception of the attractive Samanalaweva project. The country will thus have to begin relying increasingly on imported energy to meet its long-term power needs. Pre-feasibility and feasibility studies have already been conducted for a coal-fired power station, and detailed design work is currently underway. It is desirable that Sri Lanka should also convert some of the more energy-intensive industries currently based on petroleum to relatively less expensive coal. Despite efforts to shift towards relatively cheaper forms of imported energy such as coal, it is clear that in the long-run the cost to the economy of meeting energy needs is going to rise. In this context, efforts to conserve energy and improve the efficiency of its use are critical. 176. To help minimize imported energy needs, it is also important to strengthen further efforts to develop other renewable sources of energy such as fuelwood, solar power, small-scale hydropower plants (for instance, for tea factories in the hills) and agricultural by-products. Afforestation activities, in particular, warrant high priority. Not only is there sig- nificant scope for converting from oil to fuelwood in a number of industries (especially in the tea industry where fuelwood would also serve important shade and soil conservation functions), but fuelwood is likely to remain the primary fuel for cooking in rural areas for many years to come. Despite some donor assistance in the forestry sector, reforestation activity is still well below the level required to meet the country's long-term fuelwood needs. In this regard, the preparation of a forestry master plan, which is being under- taken with assistance from FINNIDA, is expected to define development targets for the next 20 years and include a detailed investment program for the first five years. -£·- 6 t -67- STATISTICAL APPENDIX Standard Tables Table 1: Sri Lanka - National Accounts Summary (Millions of Rupees at Current Prices) Table 2: Sri Lanka - National Accounts Summary (Millions ci US$ at Constant 1982 Prices) Table 3: Sri Lanka - Balance of Payments (Millions of US$ at Current Prices) Table No. 1.01 Population and Vital Statistics, 1963-83 1.02 Employment in the Tublic Sector, 1970-83 2.01 Gross Domestic Product: Composition ane Sectoral Deflators, 1970-83 2.02 Growth Rates of GDP and Its Coponents, 1970-83 2.03 National Product and Expenditure, 1970-83 2.04 Percentage of Total Income Received by Each Tenth of Income Receivers, 1963, 1973, and 1978/79 3.01 Balance of Payments, 1970-83 3.02 Composition of Exports, 1970-83 3.03 Industrial Exports, 1975-83 3.04 Composition of Imports, 1970-83 3.05 Selected Food Imports, by Source of Finance, 1970-83 3.06 Imports of Selected Consumer and Capital Goods, 1976-83 3.07 International Liquidity, 1970-83 3.08 Aid Commitments, 1970-83 3.09 Aid Disbursements, 1970-83 3.10 Aid Group Non-Project Assistance, 1965-83 3.11 Overall Aid Pipeline, 1982-84 4.01 External Public Debt Outstanding Including Undisbursed as of December 31, 1982 4.02 Service Payments, Commitments, Disbursements and Outstanding Amounts of External Public Debt as of December 31, 1982 5.01 Summary of Budgetary Operations, 1970/71-84 5.02 Budgetary Revenue, 1970/71-84 5.03 Current Expenditures, 1970/71-84 5.04 Government Budgetary Subsidies and Transfers, 1970/71-84 5.05 Capital Expenditure and Net Lending, 1970/71-84 5.06 Central Government Budget Debt Services, 1970/71-84 5.07 Government Enterprises, 1970/71-84 5.08 Current Transfers to Public Corporations, 1970/71-84 5.09 Capital Transfers to Public Corporations, 1970/71-84 Tabit No. 6.01 Interest Rates of Major Credit and Savings Institutions, 1970-84 6.02 Monetary Survey, 1971-84 7.01 Volume of Agricultural Production, 1970-83 7.02 Paddy Cultivated Area and Production; Rice Availability, Procurement and Distribution, 1970-83 7.03 Cultivated Area and Production of Subsidiary Food Crops, 1972-83 7.04 Tree Crops Production Statistics, 1970-83 7.05 Tea Producer Margin, 1970-83 7.06 Tea in the Public Sector, 1982-83 7.07 Rubber in the Public Sector, 1982-83 7.08 Fertilizer Issues by Crops, 1970-83 8.01 Growth of Industrial Output, 1976-83 8.02 Manufacturing Survey, 1981 and 1982 8.03 Performance of Major State Industrial Corporations, 1977-83 8.04 Annual Physical Capacity and Output of Major State Industries, 1976-83 8.05 Industrial Investments Approved and Contracted by Greater Colombo Economic Commission, 1979-83 8.06 Industrial Investment Approvals by Foreign and Local Investment Advisory Comittees, 1979-83 9.01 Petroleum Imports, 1970-83 9.02 Imports of Crude Oil by Country of Origin, 1970-83 9.03 Petroleum Product Exports, 1970-83 9.04 Domestic Production of Petroleum Products, 1970-83 9.05 Local Sales Volume of Petroleum Products, 1970-83 9.06 Production, Trade, and Apparent Consumption of Energy Petroleum Products, 1970-83 9.07 Petroleum Product Price Changes, 1970-83 9.08 CEB Electricity Generation, 1970-83 9.09 CEB Electricity Sales, 1970-83 10.01 Minimum Wage Rate, 1968-83 10.02 Colombo Consumer Price Index Numbers, 1976-84 10.03 Wholesale Price Index, 1977-83 10.04 Cost Indices for Selected Building Materials and Different Construction Activities, 1972-83 10.05 Administered Prices of Basic Consumer Goods, 1977-83 11.01 Selected Social Indicators, 1946-82 11.02 Major Social Expenditures in Relation to Total Current Budgetary Expenditures and to GDP, 1969/70-84 11.03 Health Statistics, 1969/70-83 11.04 Lducation Statistics, 1970-83 11.05 Tourism: Arrivals by Regions, 1975-83 -69- Table 1: SRI LANKA - NATIONAL ACCOUNTS SUMARY (Millions of Rupees at Current Prices) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1. Gross Domestic Product 42,665 52,387 66,527 85,005 100,140 122,322 2. Resource Gap (H-X) 2,044 6,305 15,012 13,645 18,730 18,424 3. Imports (G+NFS) 16,872 23,976 36,457 39,550 45,890 50,260 4. Exports (G+NFS) 14,828 17,671 21,445 25,905 27,160 31,836 5. Total Expenditures 44,709 58,692 81,539 98,650 118,870 140,746 6. Consumption 36,155 45,165 59,074 75,040 88,262 105,710 7. General Government 4,043 4,798 5,685 6,310 8,280 10,184 8. Private 32,112 40,367 53,389 68,730 79,982 95,526 9. Investment 8,554 13,527 22,465 23,610 30,608 35,036 10. Fixed Investment 8,521 13,246 20,845 23,279 30,360 35,246 11. Changes in Stocks 33 281 1,620 331 248 -210 12. Domestic Saving 6,510 7,222 7,453 9,965 11,878 16,612 13. Net Factor Income -234 -234 -430 -1,713 -2,019 -3,176 14. Current Transfers 343 747 2,249 3,907 5,494 6,400 15. National Saving 6,619 7,735 9,272 12,159 15,353 19,836 Average Exchange Rates: 16. Rupees per US$ 15.608 15.569 16.534 19.246 20.812 23.529 17. Rupees per SDR 19.541 20.115 21.527 22.693 22.982 25.161 Note: The exchange rates shown above are the official rates and were used in converting from US dollars to national currency terms, items 3, 4, 13 and 14. -70- Table 2: SRI LANKA - NATIONAL ACCOUNTS SUMMARY (Millions of US$ at Constant 1982 Prices) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1. Gross Domestic Product 3,849 4,092 4,330 4,580 4,812 5,050 2. Terms of Trade Effect 318 184 81 10 0 173 3. Gross Domestic lacome 4,167 4,276 4,411 4,590 4,812 5,223 4. Resource Gap (5-6) 176 456 851 664 900 837 5. Imports (G+NFS) 1,458 1,736 2,067 1,923 2,205 2,284 6. Capacity to Import 1,282 1,280 1,216 1,259 1,305 1,447 7. [Exports (G+NFS)] 964 1,096 1,135 1,249 1,305 1,274 8. Total Expenditures 4,343 4,732 5,262 5,254 5,712 6,060 9. Consumption 3,368 3,445 3,685 3,862 4,241 4,614 10. General Government 376 366 355 325 398 444 11. Private 2,992 3,079 3,330 3,537 3,843 4,170 12. Investment 975 1,287 1,577 1,392 1,471 1,446 13. Fixed Investment 970 1,260 1,462 1,372 1,459 1,455 14. Changes in Stocks 5 27 115 20 12 -9 15. Domestic Saving 481 647 645 718 571 436 16. Net Factor Income -15 -15 -23 -90 -98 -127 17. Current Transfers 30 54 128 190 264 291 18. National Saving 496 686 750 818 737 600 Rupee Deflators (1982 = 100) 19. Gross Domestic Product 53.3 61.5 73.8 89.2 100.0 116.4 20. Imports (G+NFS) 55.6 66.4 84.7 98.8 100.0 105.8 21. Exports (G+NFS) 74.1 77.5 90.8 99.7 100.0 120.1 22. Total Expenditures 49.5 59.6 74.5 90.2 100.0 111.6 23. Government Consumption 51.6 63.0 77.0 93.4 100.0 110.1 24. Private Consumption 51.6 63.0 77.0 93.4 100.0 110.1 25. Fixed Investment 42.2 50.5 68.5 81.5 100.0 116.4 26. Changes in Stocks 42.2 50.5 68.5 81.5 100.0 116.4 27. Exchange Rate Index 133.3 133.7 125.9 108.1 100.0 88.5 -71- Table 3: SRI LANKA - BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Millions of US$ at Current Prices) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1. EXPORTS (G+NFS) 950 1,135 1,297 1,346 1,305 1,354 2. Merchandise (fob) 846 982 1,065 1,066 1,014 1,059 3. Non-factor Services 104 153 232 280 291 295 4. IMPORTS (G+NFS) 1,081 1,540 2,205 2,055 2,205 2,136 5. Merchandise (cif) 999 1,450 2,051 1,877 1,990 1,922 6. Non-factor Services 82 90 154 178 215 214 7. RESOURCE BALANCE -131 -405 -908 -709 -900 -782 8. Net Factor Income -15 -15 -26 -97 -98 -135 9. Factor Receipts 20 40 47 33 44 44 10. Factor Payments 35 55 73 130 142 179 11. (M&LT --aterest Paid) (25) (28) (32) (49) (68) (80) 12. Net Current Transfers 22 48 136 203 264 272 13. Transfer Receipts 39 60 152 230 289 291 14. Transfer Payments 17 12 16 27 25 19 15. CURRENT BALANCE -124 -372 -798 -603 -734 -645 M&LT Capital Inflow 16. Net Direct Investment 2 47 43 49 63 38 17. Official Grant Aid 58 144 138 161 162 171 18. Net M&LT Loans (DRS) 178 138 236 337 416 360 19. Disbursements 242 187 286 380 484 445 20. Repayments 64 49 50 43 68 85 21. Other M&LT (net) 0 0 0 0 0 0 22. Net Short-Term Capital -3 - 157 31 7 32 23. Capital Flows NEI -7 48 26 -4 26 17 24. Errors and Omissions -10 43 -22 -4 33 28 25. Change in Net Reserves (- indicates increase) -94 -48 220 33 27 -1 Memo Items: 26. Net Credit from INF +20 +67 -4 +168 -12 17 27. Disbursements 48 105 39 235 43 32 28. Repayments 28 38 43 67 55 49 Note: Underlying data from Central Bank of Ceylon except for lines 18-20 which are from World Bank's Debt Reporting System, and lines 26-28 from the IMP. -72- TaLle 1.01: POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS, 1963-83 Net Annual Population Birth Death Migration Natural Year Mid-Year Rate Rate Rate Growth Rate ('000) ---(per '000)--- 1963 10,651 34.1 8.6 -1.0 2.55 1964 10,889 33.2 8.8 -1.0 2.44 1965 11,133 33.2 8.2 -0.5 2.50 1966 11,439 32.3 8.3 -0.5 2.40 1967 11,703 31.6 7.5 -0.6 2.41 1968 11,992 32.0 7.9 -0.7 2.41 1969 12,252 30.4 8.1 -0.9 2.23 1970 12,516 29.4 7.5 -0.8 2.19 1971 12,608 30.4 7.7 -2.7 2.27 1972 12,861 30.0 8.1 -3.2 2.19 1973 13,091 28.0 7.7 -3.8 2.03 1974 13,284 27.5 9.0 -4.0 1.85 1975 13,496 27.8 8.5 -2.3 1.93 1976 13,717 27.8 7.8 -3.8 2.00 1977 13,942 27.9 7.4 -3.7 2.05 1978 14,184 28.5 6.6 -2.8 2.19 1979 14,471 28.9 6.5 -3.0 2.24 1980 14,738 27.6 6.1 -4.6 2.15 1981 14,988 28.0 6.0 -3.4 2.20 1982 15,189 26.8 6.1 -6.0 2.07 1983 15,416 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - Not available. Note: Figures for 1980-82 are provisional; 1983 figures are projected by Ministry of Finance and Planning. Source: Registrar General's Department. Table 1.02: EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 1970-83 aL HIR Mf jfl971 1973 1974 S 1982 11183 Covernment Institutions Adainistrative. Technical and Profesaional Officers of staff rank 9,229 10,491 11,729 14,030 15,649 16,133 19,846 16,901 17,512 16,366 16,439 18,525 18,634 U.a. Subordinate Employees h/ 95,474 103,050 114,000 130,338 144,186 150,891 118,309 185,893 195,922 206,319 207,533 209,242 210,305 n.s. Minor Employees SJ 88,562 86,520 92,727 102,327 109,617 113,714 124,130 82,514 67,172 94,141 95,908 99,071 99,938 n.a. School Teachers 96,966 97,864 100,836 106,674 107,979 109,855 111,097 119.004 126,437 133,269 135,270 134,991 136,978 n.a. Others ..27,5A 30.738 309509 32i5. 4A,A ....1 ..L1 JA1. 1.2il J3.12Z 3.2369 1.iSA4i .I.09. .93 1,6 95A& TOTAL 317,817 328,663 350,242 386,021 412,284 425,865 406,381 422,647 446,085 470,188 476,086 481,475 485,812 489,472 SeaL-Government Institutions A/ Administrative, Technical and Professional Officers of staff rank 6,315 12,362 14,788 15,360 15,755 14,793 14,648 11,402 12,239 13,005 13,833 14,304 14,605 n,a. Subordinate Employees h/ 31,311 24,919 29,335 31,176 34,891 37,596 50,656 50,184 60,711 72,936 80,503 83,309 84,951 na. 4 Minor Employees S/ 122,680 85,152 111,828 120,342 155,669 169,930 455,899 516,806 548,672 621,760 627.656 631,563 632,849 n.a. Others 2j ..9j29 32,927 43A& 42,735 40..686 36.865 JI,81 .6A4I 37,7l8 41333 A7J.3 A9A023. ..&82 .s TOTAL 170,215 175,360 201,296 209,606 247,001 259,184 541,044 617,033 659,404 749,034 769,122 778,199 782,234 785,717 n.a. - Not available. A/ The employees are classified according to categories and status, and include temporary and casual workers. I/ Clerical workers. &/ Semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Al Growth of employment in this category (public corporations, universities, research institutions, etc.) was eSaggerated ia the period by the nationalisation of agricultural lands. A/ Principals, teachers and other education workers. maue: Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table.2,ls ROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTi COMPOSITION AND SICTORAL DEFLATORS, 1970-53 (Current Factor Prices) 9 1976 11 1 1 1951 al 9 1983 L Re Iof e 1ot Is S of as Sof Is ISof as lot a tot as ot . Is Sof Is sof C. DP Bsx GDP IL GDPl SLu ARLf HIL GOuP HA L GO I GOP &La SAL hL. 91.. ELL ML Agriculture 1/ 3,732 28.3 7,798 30.4 8,133 29.0 10,644 30.7 12,332 30.5 13,412 26.9 17,151 27.6 21,977 27.7 25,157 27.5 30,678 27.6 MNigs 95 0.7 450 1.8 639 2.3 595 I.7 732 1.8 947 1.9 1,249 2.0 1.514 2.0 1.734 1.9 2,168 1.9 Manufacturins 2,197 16.7 5,156 20.1 5,620 20.0 8,023 23.1 8,094 20.0 9,484 19.1 11,048 17.7 12,863 16.2 14,134 15.4 15,974 14.3 Construction 744 5.6 1,018 4.0 1,164 4.2 1,133 3.3 1,965 4.8 3,218 6.5 5,552 8.9 7,001 8.6 7,959 8.7 9.807 8.8 Services 6.419 48.7 11,267 43.9 12,476 44.5 14,289 41.2 17,356 42.9 22,721 45.6 27.246 43.8 35.962 45.3 42,659 46.5 52.708 47.4 Utilities 101 0.8 164 0.6 171 0.6 194 0.6 239 0.6 398 0.8 601 1.0 608 1.0 1,244 1.4 1,631 1.5 Transport/Comuolcations 3,258 9.5 2.079 8.3 2,286 8.1 2,723 7.9 2,994 7.4 4,744 9.5 5,293 8.5 7,307 9.2 8,536 9.3 10,704 9.6 Comercial services 2,533 19.2 4.975 19.4 5,456 19.5 6,239 16.0 7,536 18.6 9.435 19.0 10,898 17.5 14.197 17.9 16,059 17.5 19,616 17.6 Finaneal Services 152 1.2 336 1.3 419 1.5 542 1:6 845 2.1 1.243 2.5 1,785 2.9 2,463 3.1 3.192 3.5 4,201 3.8 Housing Services 399 3.0 639 2.5 726 2.6 832 2.4 969 2.4 1,293 2.6 1,457 2.3 1,765 2.2 2,052 2.2 2,128 1.9 Public Administration 517 3.9 796 3.1 948 3.4 1,177 3.4 1,516 3.7 1,664 3.3 1,965 3.2 2,350 3.0 2,876 3.1 4,195 3.8 Other services 1,459 11.1 2,276 8.9 2,470 8.8 2,582 7.4 3.257 8.1 3,944 7.9 5,247 8.4 7,069 8.9 8,696 9.5 10,233 9.2 Cross Domestic Product 13,187 100.0 25,691 100.0 28,032 100.0 34.684 100.0 40,479 100.0 49,782 100.0 62,246 100.0 79.337 100.0 91,643 100.0 I1,335 100.0 PilssA (Implicit Deflators) Agriculture I/ 100.0 214.2 208.9 247.6 272.1 290.2 360.0 431.2 obu.V 555.0 Mitiog 100.0 113.9 111.9 115.4 116.3 145.2 182.6 212.3 233.7 271.0 Manufacturing 100.0 227.9 237.0 340.4 318.5 356.7 412.1 456.8 478.3 536.4 Construction 100.0 156.9 169.9 183.0 247.5 335.2 520.8 677.1 785.7 958.7 Services 100.0 141.6 160.3 172.4 194.7 236.5 262.5 325.7 361.1 420.8 Utilities 100.0 140.2 140.2 146.1 151.3 209.5 287.5 345.3 484.0 595.3 Transport/Comunlestionas 100.0 138.9 160.4 181.8 186.3 276.5 287.9 373.4 410.6 492.8 Comercial services 100.0 172.4 193.2 208.0 230.7 265.7 283.1 351.9 375.6 435.7 Financial Services 100.0 121.7 170.3 183.7 265.7 355.1 444.0 533.1 617.4 766.6 mousing Services 100.0 100.0 155.5 175.2 194.2 249.6 265.4 305.4 335.8 340.5 Public Administration 100.0 109.5 124.7 148.8 177.5 183.9 204.9 235.7 261.2 291.5 Other Services 100.0 122.0 125.9 123.0 147.2 165.9 204.0 254.4 292.5 345.1 Groes Domestic Product 100.0 173.2 183.0 215.7 232.6 269.3 318.0 383.2 421.2 487.8 A/ Provisional. h/ InCides forestry and fishing. Rure.s Central lank of Ceylon, BEsI COpy AVAILABLE Table 2.02: GROWTH RATES OF GDP AND ITS COMPONENTS, 1970-83 (Re Million at Constant 1970 Factor Prices) 1970 1975 1I7 1976 1978 1979 89 81 A9 1981 A Agriculture b/ 3,732 3,847 3,894 4,299 4,532 4,622 4,766 5,097 5,231 5,498 Mining 95 395 571 515 619 652 684 713 742 800 Manufacturing 2,197 2,263 2,371 2,357 2,541 2,659 2,681 2,820 2,955 2,978 Constructinn 744 649 685 619 794 960 1,066 1,034 1,013 1,023 Services 6,419 7,833 7,910 8,288 8,915 9,608 10,378 11,042 11,815 12,525 Utilities 101 117 122 131 158 190 209 234 257 274 Transport/Communications 1,258 1,497 1,425 1,498 1,607 1,716 1,838 1,957 2,079 2,172 Commercial Services 2,533 2,886 2,928 2,999 3,267 3,551 3,849 4,034 4,275 4,502 Financial Services 152 276 246 295 318 350 402 462 517 548 Housing Services 399 463 467 475 499 518 549 579 611 625 Public Administration 517 729 760 791 854 905 959 997 1,102 1,439 Other Services 1,459 1,865 1,962 2,099 2,212 2,378 2,572 2,779 2,974 2,965 Gross Domestic Product 13,187 14,987 15,431 16,078 17,401 18,501 19,575 20,706 21,756 22,824 Annual Growth Rate (2) Agriculture h/ 3.8 -2.4 1.2 10.4 5.4 2.0 3.1 6.9 2.6 5.1 Mining 18.5 33.9 44.6 -9.8 20.2 5.3 4.9 4.2 4.1 7.8 Manufacturing 5.7 4.6 4.8 -0.6 7.8 4.6 0.8 5.2 4.8 0.8 Construction 14.4 -8.8 5.5 -9.6 28.3 20.9 11.0 -3.0 -2.0 1.0 Services 2.8 4.8 1.0 4.7 7.6 7.8 8.0 6.4 7.0 6.0 Utilities 21.0 8.3 4.3 7.4 20.6 20.3 10.0 12.0 9.8 6.6 Transport/Communications 1.4 2.4 -4.8 5.1 7.3 6.8 7.1 6.5 6.2 4.5 Commercial Services 2.4 4.2 1.5 2.4 8.9 8.7 8.4 4.8 6.0 5.3 Financial Services 3.8 29.6 -10.9 19.9 7.8 10.1 14.9 14.9 11.9 6.0 Housing Services 3.6 1.8 0.9 1.7 5.1 3.8 6.0 5.5 5.5 2.3 Public Adminiatration 3.0 6.0 4.3 4.1 8.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 10.5 J;.6 Other Services 3.9 5.0 5.2 7.0 5.4 7.5 8.1 8.0 7.0 -0.3 Gross Domestic Product 4.3 2.8 3.0 4.2 8.2 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.1 4.9 A/ Provisional. k/ Includes forestry and fishing. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 2,03: NATIONAL PRODUCT AND EXPENDITURE, 1970-83 (Ru Million at Current Prices) LROVTW9197 5 197 6 j~ 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 a/ 1982 h 1983 h GDP at Factor Cost 13,187 25.691 28,032 34,684 40,479 49,782 62,246 79,337 91,643 111,335 Indirect Taxes less Subsidies 477 886 2,171 1,723 2,186 2,605 4,281 5,668 8,497 10,987 GDP at Market Prices 13,664 26,577 30,203 36,407 42,665 52,387 66,527 85,005 100,140 122,322 Net Factor Income from Abroad -220 -213 -282 -252 -237 -240 -432 -1,868 -2,034 -3,164 GNP at Market Prices 13,444 26,364 29,921 36,155 42,428 52,147 66,095 83,137 98,106 IIQ,158 EXPENDITURE Consumption 11,505 24,422 26,012 29,816 36,148 45,169 59,084 75,061 88,289 105,724 Public 1,623 2,480 3,021 3,118 4,043 4,798 5,685 6,310 8,280 10,184 Private 9,882 21,942 22,991 26,698 32,105 40,371 53,399 68,751 80,009 95,540 Gross Fixed Capital Formation 2,359 3,699 4,595 5,035 8,521 13,246 20,845 23,279 30,360 35,246 Government & Public Enterprises 1/ 570 1,095 1,631 1,542 3,077 3,809 4,709 4,126 5,125 5,632 Public Corporations !/ 451 426 588 861 2,056 2,620 7,553 8,360 Private 1,338 2,178 2,376 2,632 3,388 6,817 8,583 10,793 ) 25,235 29,614 Change in Stocks 230 441 301 224 33 281 1,620 331 248 -210 Exports of Goods & NFS 3,478 7,306 8,773 12,311 14,835 17,660 21,434 25,892 27,148 31,830 Imports of Goods & NFS 3,908 9,291 9,478 10,979 16,872 23,969 36.456 39,558 45,905 50,268 Memorandum Items: Gross National Savings a/ 1,930 1,974 4,003 6,539 6,622 7,732 9,272 11,994 15,310 19,835 External Current Account Balance Ll -659 -2,166 -894 1,280 -1,932 -5,795 -13,193 -11,616 -15,298 -15,201 (Percent of GDP at Current Market Price) GDP (at market prices) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 External Resources (net imports of GNFS) g/ 3.1 7.5 2.3 -3.7 4.8 12.0 22.5 16.1 18.7 15.1 Total Resources Available (* total uses) 103.1 107.5 102.3 96.3 104.8 112.0 122.5 116.1 118.7 115.1 Consumption 84.2 91.9 86.1 81.9 84.7 86.2 88.8 88.3 88.2 86.4 Public 11.9 9.3 10.0 8.6 9.5 9.2 8.5 7.4 8.3 8.3 Private 72.3 82.6 76.1 73.3 75.2 77.0 80.3 80.9 79.9 78.1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation 17.3 13.9 15.2 13.8 20.0 25.3 31.3 27.4 30.3 28.8 Government & Public Enterprises s 4.2 4.1 5.4 4.2 7.2 7.3 7.1 4.9 5.1 4.6 Public Corporations d/ 3.3 1.6 1.9 2.4 4.8 5.0 11.3 9.8 Private 9.8 8.2 7.9 7.2 7.9 13.0 12.9 12.7 ) 25.2 24.2 Change in Stocks 1.6 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.5 2.4 0.4 0.2 -0.2 Memorandum Items: Gross National Savings _/ 14.1 7.4 13.2 17.9 15.6 14.8 13.9 14.1 15.3 16.2 External Current Account Balance LI -4.8 -8.1 -3.0 3.5 -4.5 -11.1 -19.8 -13.7 -15.3 -12.4 I/ Provisional. h/ Estimates. c/ Includes Railways, Ports, Harbor, Warehouse, Posts and Telecommunications. Since 1979, the Ports, Harbor, and Warehouse have becnme Public Corporations and are no longer included under Public Enterprises. 4/ Autonomous state-owned enterprises. e/ Equals Gross Fixed Capital Formation plus Change in Stocks plus External Current Account Balance. f/ External transactions during 1970-77 converted to rupee values using FEEC rates. Z/ Net imports of goods and non-factor services. Sogrcq: Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 2.04: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INCOME RECEIVED BY EACH TENTH OF INCOME AECEIVERS, 1963, 1973, AND 1978/79 Deciles - Urban Ryral Estates All Island 1963 1973 a/ 1978/7 1963 1973 &/ 197/79 1963 1973 a/ 1978/79 126I 1973 aL 1978/79 Highest 42.78 29.90 40.60 34.23 27.27 37.56 24.87 31.70 25.50 39.24 29.98 39.03 Second 15.64 15.42 15.07 16.51 15.44 15.42 13.31 13.51 14.58 16.01 15.91 15.27 Third 10.77 12.17 10.74 12.35 12.72 11.43 11.21 11.12 11.82 11.46 12.65 11.23 Fourth 8.31 10.25 8.52 9.96 10.68 9.39 10.42 9.53 10.41 8.98 10.56 9.12 Fifth 6.64 8.68 7.20 8.11 9.16 7.75 8.71 7.99 9.17 6.82 8.75 7.29 Sixth 5.13 7.45 6.04 6.45 7.79 6.36 8.71 6.91 7.58 5.55 7.10 5.93 Seventh 4.28 6.25 4.83 5.04 6.42 4.94 7.33 6.16 7.31 4.51 5.70 4.77 1, Eighth 3.16 4.75 3.66 3.73 5.18 3.66 (.86 5.58 5.90 3.56 4.38 3.60 Ninth 2.00 3.42 2.13 2.54 3.53 2.44 5.56 4.61 5.04 2.70 3.17 2.56 Lowest 1.29 1.70 1.21 1.08 1.81 _1.05 3.02 2.89 2.69 1.17 1.80 1.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 i/ For a variety of reasons, 1973 data are not directly comparable with 1963. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Survey of Sri Lanka's Consumer Finances, 1963, 1973 and 1978/79. _78_ BEST СОРУ AцAiLABLE �вЫе ].01: 8111J1ИС6 OF PAY[OSNTB, 1970-83 (5 Million) 34Z4 39i�. 19L4 197i �YI� l4ZZ 19?4. 3913 12� 1261 1443 в/ 1443 е1 CUR1[ЕП[ АССОUIГ[ 9eceiot■ �2 � `�¢ Ь�4 �W �У LQVi L�� 1.iY� L.��Y �� �4 Мегсhвддiве Ра�рогев, f.o.b. 3]9 367 5I1 555 556 747 В46 982 1,ОЬ3 1,ОЬЬ 1,014 1,OS9 Рог[, Тгадврог[асiод, 6 Inвurance 19 28 26 29 25 27 20 29 44 50 59 68 Foeeiga Тгвvвl 4 9 14 18 23 ЗЗ 48 68 99 !17 129 102 Corerumrn[ Евреддi[ита 5 5 5 6 Ь 6 7 8 8 10 1Э 15 ОсЬег Secvicи 10 16 16 20 17 26 29 4В 61 1D3 90 109 Imeвtseat Iвеове 2 З Ь 7 4 12 20 4D 47 73 44 44 Pтivace BmitCanceв З 7 8 9 1Э 1В 39 ЬО 152 230 289 291 Рвюеп[в 4�`� 4.� .7�4_ �1 L4 I� i� �L �2� З.�Is�. З�L3 �4 lkechaadire Iврог[в, c.i.f. ]92 413 70I 757 640 716 949 1,45D 2,051 1,877 1,990 1,922 Рог[, Тгадвротtвсiод, i 2nвигадее 5 10 10 12 11 12 20 2б Зб 38 47 56 Foreign Srвret 3 2 l 2 3 З 29 29 34 3б 40 Э9 Соvегдкдс Fxpendituce 5 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 7 В 14 12 ОкЬег Serviceв 20 18 18 24 21 20 2В 3D 79 96 l10 107 Noa-Nooetary Со1д - - - 1 - - - - - - 4 0.2 Iдvев[кп[ iocase 23 20 22 25 24 27 3S S5 73 130 142 179 Privвte 8вiссвпсе■ 5 7 8 6 Ь 8 17 12 16 27 25 19 Хес Сипеn[ Ассоипс -71 �@ �7� -187 -5� !38 -�24 -Э72 -798 _60] -7Э4 -баб САРТТА[. ACCOOIR Nод-МомСагr Cвoital (м[) 7�( �Ь 128 140 �2 1}12 27� � � �1 7�4 � Medium адд Lоы Тети Cвvital е i в � 104 17� � 212 214 � 418 ПЬ §� j�8 ]�,? Direct PrivaCe Inveвcкne 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 44 46 52 бб 39 Ceaat• 13 13 42 77 58 60 58 144 138 1б2 1б2 171 I.оадв 50 52 70 12б 111 136 236 186 262 ( ( ( 5uppliers' Ccrdit• 14 3В 65 52 42 17 - )9 60 (399 (5Т0 (502 Reoвvвent• �4 �i � 100 � � � .¢�. L §� �24 I4 Oirecc Privace Imescкoc 2 1 1 1 - 2 - 2 3 3 3 1 [.о.дв 19 гз хб 39 2а 47 аз и ( с с с 5upplierв' Crediu 1Э 15 32 6D 54 34 25 16 {124 (80 (121 (113 56огс Тего (мt) +2б •21 + 8 -1б • 2 -29 - З - •157 +Э1 •7 +32 S1Mt А1lосаtiодв +13 - - - - - - •16 +16 в13 - - Capical, n.e.i. J в 2 -11 - 7 -10 -10 + З - 7 ь48 +26 -4 +26 •1Т Оrетвl! 8а ад � .14 !� �7 � !� •183 +�4 +� -220 � -� ь1 модесвтr мoremenu -14 -� � !�,t � -1�� � � +2zo +Э� +Т. =j Mesoraaduo itms• I[tF Тгвдие[iодв д_/ - 4 - 5 •ЗЗ •28 •10 +47 +20 «67 -4 +168 -12 -12 Dravingв 2Э 21 57 52 Э2 70 48 105 39 235 ЬЗ 38 ПеригсЬавев 27 26 24 24 22 23 28 38 43 67 S5 50 �! Provialoul figurн for 1982р ев[isв[ев far 198Э. � Iвеlидев егтоsв адд овiиiодs. g/ 8qw1■ ehao8e in мс iд[егыгiоыl кеветvев. д/ I10' Ткивс Fund бorrovia8в аге вЬаvд ипдег lовав iд аоа-вомtагу eapital; сЬеве тадсед to 5S1 вilliод ia 1978, 5З8 aillioд ia 1974, 533 вillion iд 1980, впд 50.4 sillioo iд 1981. 8otr. Tбfa саЫе iв ргервгед Ьу tЬе СедСгвl Ьвдk ивi�ц идвдjивСед Сивtоы дв[а for векеЬвддiве iaport адд екрогС ев[lавtев. 7.Ъе сгвде дивbекв in C6i■ tвЬlе, вв ve11 вв tЬose io СаЫев 7.02 адд 3.03, [hив di[fer fтоо СЬове ивед еlвеvЬеке Ьу tЬе Сео[та1 8адk. Sоиг[ев: Седствl Dank of Сеуlоир адд IIfF Iaterыtiaыl Fiдвд[iв1 Statiвt'�в Еог IMF Ттвдисtiоы двtа. Table 3,02: COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS, 1970-83 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 It _ 1978 1979 1M V 1981 _&/ 1982 a/ 1983 a/ VALUE ($ Million) Tea ISO 193 194 197 204 274 24B 410 411 367 373 335 305 353 Rubber 74 52 44 92 111 93 lui 107 130 160 157 ISO 112 121 Major Coconut Products 40 47 44 22 59 55 44 36 62 83 46 53 48 60 Copra (4) (4) (9) (1) (1) (1) (-) (1) (1) ( ... ) (3) (3) (3) Coconut Oil (20) (25) (22) (4) (21) (27) (22) (4) (21) (33) (3) (10) (17) (18) Desiccated Coconut JU) LLB JL3 07) M) LZ-7) (21) LL2 SAJ) M) -02) (40) 111) j3S) Sub-total 302 292 282 311 374 422 397 553 603 610 576 538 465 534 Other Exports b/ 40 36 53 98 148 136 171 188 245 369 488 555 566 533 of which: Precious 6 Semi-precious stones (1) (1) (2) (22) (16) (26) (31) (34) (34) (31) (40) (33) (33) (40) Petroleum Products _U) (4) LL2 IL) JL2) (50) Lkll) 1W M) (M) (189) (175) (158) (114) TOTAL EXPORTS 342 328 335 409 522 558 568 741 848 979 1,064 1,093 1,031 1.067 (Percent of Total Export Value) Tea 55.0 58.8 57.9 48.2 39.1 49.1 43.7 55.3 48.5 37.5 35.1 30.6 29.6 33.1 Rubber 21.6 15.9 13.1 22.5 21.3 16.7 18.5 14.4 15.3 16.3 14.8 13.7 10.9 11.4 Major Coconut Products 11.7 14.3 13.1 5.4 11.3 9.9 7.7 4.9 7.3 8.5 4.3 4.8 -L6 5.6 Sub-total 85.3 89.0 84.2 76.0 71.6 75.6 69.9 74.6 71.2 62.3 54.2 49.1 45.1 50.1 Other Exports 11.7 11.0 15.8 24.0 28.4 24.4 30.1 25.4 28.9 37.7 4S.$ 50.9 54.9 49.9 TOTAL EXPORTS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 VOLUME Tea (million kg) 20B 207 190 206 175 213 200 186 193 188 185 183 181 158 Rubber (million kg) 161 129 130 128 161 137 136 136 138 128 121 133 131 125 Major Coconut Products (million kg) E/ 123 140 ISO 59 65 114 108 39 71 73 35 56 79 81 Copra (mUlion kg) (16) (17) (44) (3) (-) (1) (1) C-) (1) (1) ... ) (2) (3) (4) Coconut Oil (million kg) (56) (70) (87) (18) (22) (54) (61) (9) (30) (32) (3) (17) (34) (35) Desiccated Coconut (million kg) (49) (53) (49) (38) (43) (59) (46) (30) (40) (40) (31) (37) (42) (42) IL/ 1980-82 data revised, 1983 data are provisional. 1L/ Other exports include coconut by-products, spices, minor agricultural crops, precious and semi-precious stones, manufactured goods, minerals, sad petroleum re-exports. c/ The approximate conversion ratios for nuts into kilograms for major coconut products are as follows: 4.93 nuts - I k& of copra; 13.33 nuts - I kg of coconut oil; and 6.60 nuts - I kg of desiccated coconut. Note: Due to rounding off, components may not add up to totals. Data not necessarily consistent with exports data as compiled on payments basis (Table 3.01). Source: Adjusted Sri Lanka Customs data as reported by the Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY ANUBLE Table 3.03: INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS, 1975-83 ($ million) 1975 19i 1977 1978 1979 1980 a/ 1981 a/ 1982 A/ 1983 a/ Food, Beverages and Tobacco 5.64 11.17 11.93 16.42 23.60 18.98 22.88 30.20 22.97 of vhich: Fish and Fish Products (3.13) (8.88) (9.30) (14.89) (19.75) (14.95) (17.99) (20.79) (17.89) Textiles and Wearing Apparel 3.49 8.24 12.70 30.66 71.18 110.45 157.05 168.27 201.36 of which: Garments (3.30) (8.12) (11.81) (30.39) (70.88) (109.38) (153.68) (165.49) (197.02) Essential Oils 0.96 1.24 1.29 1.63 - - - - - Chemical Products 1.58 1.39 1.06 1.43 3.15 4.25 3.54 10.80 4.89 Petroleum Products 50.03 60.27 63.74 59.38 123.72 188.86 175.39 157.62 113.99 of which: Naphtha (8.09) (12.47) (10.53) (9.72) (28.01) (38.71) (29.30) (20.70) (14.61) Bunkers and Aviation Fuel (41.74) (43.77) (42.77) (41.62) (87.56) (119.79) (104.41) (102.03) (79.11) Fuel Oil (0.20) (4.03) (10.44) (8.04) (8.15) (30.36) (41.64) (34.89) (20.27) Leather, Rubber, Wood and Ceramics 3.10 3.73 1.67 4.49 8.42 15.00 14.83 22.03 21.69 Other 2.12 0.33 0.45 1.14 1.30 4.56 5.55 8.52 10.01 TOTAL MANUFACTURING 66.92 $6.37 92.84 115.15 231.37 342.10 379.24 397.44 374.91 Natural Graphite 1.76 1.89 2.20 3.80 4.79 4.82 4.56 2.87 2.59 Metallic Ores and Iron Pyrites 0.96 0.58 - 0.76 3.36 2.89 1.57 2.45 3.01 Ilenite 1.04 1.05 0.57 1.52 0.53 0.39 0.82 0.78 0.54 Precious and Semi-precious Stones 25.56 30.90 28.92 34.02 31.48 40.17 32.95 32.91 39.97 TOTAL MINING AND QUARRYING 29.32 34.42 1.A9 0 40.16 48.68 41.14 41.28 48.12 TOTAL INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS 96.24 120.79 124.53 155.25 271.53 390.78 420.38 438.72 423.03 A/ 1980-82 data revised, 1983 data are provisional. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. M BPY AVAILABLE Table 3.04: COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS, 1970-83 I./ ($ million) 191l 1211 1972 1973 .A 111 191 1977 I.= 1171 1.i A M 1.11 .11 h I/ CON6,UMER GOODS 21.5 D.I.$ Jj J 2 3_12 2 376.0 UAd a 358. 3nU JIAtA Q.W i" AbLa of which: food and Drink 179.7 154.8 152.8 195.0 293.2 357.4 181.3 255,4 263.1 307,5 387.6 254.1 171.1 228.5 Rice 53.4 32.9 26.8 42.2 108.3 150.6 75.9 107.6 44.1 57,2 53.3 51.6 44.4 32.5 Flour 43.7 34.7 32.2 70.8 128.9 142,1 80.7 109.4 145.8 107.0 110.4 1.5 3.0 4.b Refined sugar 28.6 50.0 41.3 50.2 28.6 35.2 7.6 21.4 32.9 60.1 122.5 146.9 46.6 84.4 Milk and milk products 9.2 7.9 9.5 10.9 10.5 11,6 9.6 11,7 25.4 30.8 32.5 25.1 24.7 41.6 Fish 11.4 12.1 13.7 8.1 7.5 6.2 3.0 2.1 2.1 12.2 17.8 5.3 15.6 14.9 Textiles (including clothing) 20.8 17.4 8.0 8.6 8.9 2,8 5.8 17,3 34.0 98.7 104.1 121.3 104,1 115.8 Other Consumer Goods 12.1 13.7 10.5 13.1 12.8 5.9 10.6 25.2 49.8 78.9 107,1 93,8 138.8 150.3 Medicinal & pharmaceutical products 4.9 5.7 6.8 5.6 6.6 9.8 7.0 10.5 11.7 16.2 15,7 10.0 17.1 17.3 INTERMEDIATE GOODS 2.f LW 12sI 3.. 1 28 7 26 0 586 938.8 V 32. 1.039,8 1L1 of which: Wheat and meslin 3.8 5.9 7.3 9.5 17.6 19.3 17.1 17.7 8.7 19.0 34.8 98.2 85,9 99.5 Fertiliser 13.6 9.9 10.5 17.3 33.2 29.5 11.7 31.5 16.1 43.2 81.0 62.6 26.9 26.4 Petroleum 9.9 4.4 6.3 46.1 136.1 123.7 137.6 160.4 154,1 251.2 489.4 448.4 589.7 466.5 Chemicalt, elements and compounds 9.4 11.1 12.2 16.7 34.9 16.3 10.6 16.3 28,6 32,2 32.9 34.5 35.0 35.4 Dyeing, tanning and coloring materials 1.7 1.9 2.3 1.9 3.3 2.7 3.1 4.5 7.7 9.6 12,3 12.0 11,8 9.4 Paper and paperboard 7.6 8.1 7.0 6.2 9.8 9.9 6.6 7.4 15,3 25,6 27.6 38.1 32.4 29.2 p INVESTMENT GOODS 21A .17 X&A Ad. UA A& ILI INA.L AIL. UA5.)A AsI ,I of which: Building materials 20.0 19.9 20.2 16.7 22,1 24,0 12.3 9.8 9.6 23.6 36.9 27.3 26.8 50,0 Trausport equipment 21.1 12.8 17.8 14.8 13,7 16.4 20.7 27,3 63.3 103.7 146.5 115.9 265.7 162,6 Machinery and equipment 46.4 33.7 30.2 35.0 27.5 45.7 43.0 37.0 118,4 186,2 254,7 201,5 190.5 223.6 UNCLASSIFIED IMPORTS Ll 2A W, MI I LA LA 1A ZA A LI Ui bA .... TOTAL IMPORTS JL 334 9 A. A34.. QiLA LJ J.A 1LA 7A. 1.44ZlA .220.1 ,LA .2 2..01.A 19.3.1 ......................................****R-C-N- T PRCENT OFTOTAL IMPORTS ------------------O-RT..............----------- Memorandum Items A. Consumer Goods 55.9 57.2 51,8 52.4 46.9 50.5 36.9 42.8 38.1 34,7 29.9 26,2 20.5 25,6 B. Intermediate Goods 19.5 19.5 24.3 30.0 42.2 36.0 48,2 44.4 38.1 40.5 45.7 50,9 51.6 477 C. Investment Goods 23.6 21.1 21.2 16.6 10.0 12.4 13.7 11,4 22.9 24.2 24.2 22,6 27.6 26.5 D. Food and Drink 46.2 46.2 44.4 46.0 42.8 48.0 32.7 354 28.0 21.3 18.9 13,9 8.5 11,8 E. Food, Fertilizer and Petroleum 52.3 50.5 49.3 60.9 67,5 68.6 59.7 62,0 46,1 41.6 46.6 41.8 39.0 37.4 F. Imports other than "1" 47.7 49.5 50.7 39.1 32.5 31.4 40.3 38.0 53.9 58.4 53.4 58.2 61.0 62.6 A/ Based on customs data and, therefore, not necessarily consistent with balnce of payments data in Table 3.01. k/ Provisional. Note: Due to rounding off, components may not add up to totals. SoMS: Adjusted Sri Lanka Customs data as reported by the Central Bank of Ceylon. 7r,7 rlPY AVAILABLE Table 3,05: SELECTED FOOD IMPORTS, BY SOURCE OF FINANCE, 1970-83 A/ VALUE ($ million) 12- 1971 I1.1 1 197.4 121 .197 1 5ll 12A 1l. 12. Lt9. 1. 1211 / Ris, Commercial Purchases 50.4 26.7 18.6 49.0 88.2 137.4 83.8 108.1 40.1 56.5 51.9 48,5 39.4 15,1 Aid-financed 8.2 3.8 4.1 - 29.9 - 1.1 4.6 - 0.1 - - - 3.5 Total 58.6 30.5 22.7 49.0 118.1 137.4 84.9 112.7 40.1 56.6 51.9 48.5 39.4 18.6 Wheat Grain Commercial Purchases 3.8 5.9 6.4 8.3 19.5 14.4 20.6 16.8 8.6 16,0 11.0 74.3 61.2 19.9 Aid-financed - - - - 1.8 6.2 - - - 34.3 33,9 27,0 40.1 Total 3.0 5.9 6.4 8.3 21.3 20.6 20.6 16.8 8.8 16.0 45.3 108.2 88.2 60.0 Flour Commercial Purchases 19.7 20.0 13.5 56.6 129.0 98.0 57.7 56.9 78.5 72.0 103.7 - - 1.4 Aid-financed 17.7 13.2 20.9 14.9 18.2 48.0 33.8 41.9 54.0 32.8 3.4 - - 2.5 Total 37.4 33.2 34.4 71.5 147.2 146.0 91.5 98.8 132.5 104.8 107.1 - - 3.9 Suitar Commercial Purchases 25.4 37.0 39.9 51.0 20.1 33.7 14.1 22.2 37.3 59.4 116.7 106.4 2,3 16.3 Aid-financed - 1.5 - - - 4.5 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1 - - - - Total 25.4 38.5 39.9 51.0 20.1 38.2 15.0 22.8 37.6 59.5 116.7 106.4 2.3 16.3 TOTAL Commercial Purchases 99.3 89.6 78.4 164.9 256.8 283.5 176.2 204.0 164.7 203.9 283.3 229.2 102.9 52,7 Aid-financed 25.9 18.5 25.0 14.9 49.9 58.7 35.8 47.1 54.3 33.0 37.7 33.9 27,0 46.1 Total 125.2 108.1 103.4 179.8 306.7 342.2 212.0 251.1 219.0 236.9 321.0 263.1 129.9 98.8 VOLUME ('000 tons) Commercial Purchases 443 287 207 344 255 457 416 498 160 211 190 157 161 70 Aid-financed 91 52 59 - 77 - 3 28 - 1 - - - 16 Total 534 339 266 344 332 457 419 526 160 212 190 157 161 86 Wheat Grain Commercial Purchases 55 83 92 83 91 65 130 115 84 112 63 374 352 126 Aid-financed - - - - 9 28 - - - - 164 170 170 242 Total 55 83 92 83 100 93 130 115 84 112 227 544 522 366 Flour Commercial Purchases 172 164 84 261 380 261 224 237 338 323 353 - - 5 Aid-financed 205 159 243 110 68 201 157 279 268 143 8 - - 12 Total 377 323 327 371 448 462 381 516 606 466 361 - - 17 Sugar Commercial Purchases 244 276 217 194 43 48 45 94 165 245 200 168 11 73 Aid-financed - 12 - - - 14 2 2 1 - - - - - Total 244 288 217 194 43 62 47 96 166 245 200 168 11 73 A/ Based on information supplied to the Ministry of Finance and Planning by the main food importing agencies and, therefore, not necessarily consistent with Table 3.04, which is based on Customs data. k/ January to August only. S.oue: Ministry of Finance and Planning. SFsT COPY AVAILABLE Table 3,06: IMPORTS OF SELECTED CONSUMER AND CAPITAL GOODS, 1976-83 196 1.921 lA 119. 10 1919 1982 11 -------------------------------Number------------------------------ Transport Equipment Motor Cars, etc. 2,297 2,576 7,149 10,248 6,214 5,029 4,539 16,548 Lorries, Vans 275 1,200 3,003 4,671 10,714 6,420 10,907 11,545 Buses 141 410 747 2,804 2,836 2,278 2,845 3,109 Tractors (including agricultural) 305 1,251 8,134 3,555 4,822 1,981 2,104 3,761 Motorcycles, Auto-cycles and Cycles fitted with auxiliary motor 306 708 8,133 18,085 50,769 11,212 8,711 18,359 Cycles not motorized 91 612 12,351 33,206 289,863 48,007 45,494 23,636 Ships, Boats and Other Vessels 8 242 16 30 31,433 289 52 227 Machinery and Mechanical Appliances Steam and Other Vapor Generating Boilers 8 120 185 129 42 96 101 702 Air Conditioning and Refrigerator Equipment (i) Air Conditioning Machine - Complete Portable or Fixed Window Type and Other 1,097 431 2,157 3,579 6,454 3,716 3,682 6,926 (ii) Refrigerators and Refrigerating Equipment Complete 16 cu. ft. capacity and Other 621 472 2,467 3,612 7,935 8,316 8,620 13,057 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(V a lu e s in $ M i l l io n ) A!/"-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TransDort Eauipment Railway Locomotives, Wagons and Coaches 3.4 4.9 6.4 30.2 18.2 6.3 21.5 4.7 Motor Cars, etc. 1.0 6.4 62.6 43.5 32.6 16.9 14.1 16.2 Lorries, Vans 7.8 10.7 28.5 32.2 57.3 43.1 34.8 43,7 Buses 2.2 3.0 9.3 21.3 30.8 18,0 24.7 26.1 Tractors 0.9 4.4 21.1 23.5 22.4 6.0 4.1 9.0 Lifting, Handling and Loading Equipment 1.0 1.5 4.3 10.8 n.a. 14.3 17.6 20.1 Motorcycleb, Cycles, Carriages, etc. 0.9 1.2 6.6 13.4 38.0 13.0 8.4 7.2 Machinery and Mechanical Appliances Boilers and Engines, other than Internal Combustion Piston Engines 0.2 0.2 6.7 5.2 2.5 7.2 2.0 9.5 Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Equipment 2.0 1.0 3.4 6.3 9.4 7.7 8.3 11.8 Hand Tools and Implements 1.8 1.4 6.0 6.6 7.9 3.6 4.3 5.7 Excavating, Levelling and Turfing Equipment 2.8 5.9 5.9 10.5 24.6 18,2 17.4 16.8 Agricultural and Horticultural Machinery - Other 1.7 1.3 2.5 10.0 8.8 2.6 1.3 1.0 Communications Equipment 5.1 2.0 5.1 14.6 n.a. 14.7 11.4 16.4 Electrical Machinery and Equipment (including accessories) 9.0 8.2 21.9 31.2 n.a. 28.3 26.0 35.4 1 The exchange rates used for 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983 were US$1.00 * Re 8.46, Re 9.15, Re 15.61, Re 15.57, Rs. 16.53, Re 19.24, Rs 20.81, and Re 23.53, respectively. n.a. - nc available. Sources: Sri Lanka Customs and Ministry of Plan Implementation except 1980 data which are Bank staff estimates based on Customs data. Fr? PPOPY AVAILABLE Table 3.07: INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY, 1970-83 ($ million) End of Period 1970 1971 1972 1973 194 1)] jj2 19Jj J j .iZi J12g J 1982 l Gross Official Reserves a/ 43 50 60 86 57 58 92 293 398 517 246 337 352 309 Net International Reserves -108 -69 -48 -11 -68 -124 -67 116 210 258 38, 5 -22 -21 INF Position . Use of IMF Credit 79 78 81 89 125 146 156 206 242 309 269 404 377 347 of which: Compensatory Drawings 39 21 23 46 54 42 47 30 21 21 10 29 71 40 Oil Facility Drawings - - - - 42 76 90 93 87 63 37 12 1 - Extended Facility - - - - - - - - - 105 140 303 287 269 Credit Tranche Drawings 29 42 40 21 6 4 - 59 107 97 68 60 18 - Other - - - - - - - - - - - - - 32 Buffer Stock - - - - - - - - - - - 6 Trust Fund Loans Outstanding - - - - - - - - 53 93 122 111 106 98 A/ Excluding international reserves held by commercial banks. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. BEST Copy AVAILABLE -85- Mable 3.08: AID OMOlUETS, 1970-83 (S millions R19 1971 1972 1971 1974 12. 1976 1977 197B J.79 19 12!A1 12M I AID GROUP Australia - 2.1 2.1 0.4 7.8 6.1 2.0 1.6 7.3 3.7 2.1 1.2 6.1 4.5 Belgium - - - - - - - - - - - ..6 0.7 0.8 Canada 4.9 8.7 4.6 9.7 5.2 19.2 12.4 16.6 27.5 10.0 70.2 39..8 12.6 19.6 Demark - - 2.8 - - 3.7 - 0.5 - 5.6 - 2.3 0.4 8.0 EEC 1.2 - - 1.4 7.4 6.5 5.4 6.9 6.7 9.5 9.9 27.8 9.2 0.2 Finland aJ - - - - - - - - - - 1.0 3.3 4.6 7.8 France 0.5 6.5 0.7 6.4 7.2 8.2 7.7 6.3 1.0 22.9 15.6 25.6 19.0 - C-rmany 0.9 5.9 1.5 18.1 18.8 29.7 8.4 3.3 23.0 24.5 13.3 186.6 6.0 10.8 India - 7.2 - 7.9 0.6 1.0 7.8 8.0 12.4 12.4 - 12.7 2.0 1.1 Italy - 1.3 - - 1.4 - - 0.7 - - - - 1.1 - Japan 0.1 8.3 11.4 14.0 14.7 16.6 16.7 25.6 66.6 36.7 105.2 96.7 97.1 29.9 Netherlands - - - - - 9.5 11.5 16.0 35.7 19.9 35.8 16.4 21.2 13.3 Norway A1 - - - - - - - 2.8 6.2 7.9 10.7 8.7 10.2 9.4 Sweden - 1.6 - 2.5 10.8 12.6 13.5 16.6 19.1 20.6 22.8 22.1 21.9 26.7 Switzerland - 0.2 0.2 0.1 - - - 0.5 - 18.1 0.9 - - 0.9 United Kingdom 9.5 16.0 0.1 4.6 6.3 7.6 5.7 23.9 41.1 209.1 jt 6.2 - - 0.1 United States 15.3 17.2 14.7 7.0 3.2 37.4 67.4 14.0 78.9 51.4 66.5 70.3 85.2 g 94.2 of which: CARE (1.3) (1.8) (1.5) (1.1) (3.2) (4.9) (5.5) (5.0) (5.5) (5.4) (7.8) (6.3) (5.9) (5.4) Asian Development Bank 6.3 7.8 9.3 2.8 2.5 30.0 - 22.6 20.2 36.9 55.0 50.5 45.4 51.0 UN Group 0.3 4.6 0.9 6.6 2.6 22.3 19.6 15.1 6.4 10.1 13.4 12.2 13.2 18.0 of which: UFP (0.2) (1.7) (0.6) (0.4) (1.5) (12.4) (16.4) (8.9) (0.8) (2.7) (1.6) (1.5) (2.5) (4.0) FAo C-) C-) C-) C-) (-) C-) (0.8) (2.2) (0.8) (1.4) C-) (-) C-) (-) World Bank Group 29.0 60 24.0 2 - 46.0 2.5 _68.0 151.5 161.0 1J6,9 6.7 Sub-total Aid Group 6B.0 87.4 48.3 87.5 112.5 249.7 178.1 227.1 377.6 567.6 580.1 736.8 486.8 353.0 NON-AID CROUP Centrally Planned Economies 24.2 38.2 84.6 - 37.2 60.2 3.5 4.1 10.4 - 32.7 - - 0.5 IEAD - - - - - - - - 12.0 - - 14.5 13.6 14.1 Kuwait Fud - - - - - 25.5 0.3 - - - 2.1 - 45.0 - Iran - - - - - 32.0 - - - - - - - - OPEC Peed - - - - - - 8.1 3.2 - - 6.0 14.0 11.0 - Saudi Twd - - - - - 6.7 - - - 1.011 - 50.0 - - UAE - - - - 12.0 - 5.2 - - - - - - - Libya - - - - - - - 15.0 - 0.1 - - - - Others A/ - - - - 0.1 2.7 3.0 0.1 - 0.1 6.6 A/ - - 0.7 Sub-total to-Aid Group 24.2 38.2 84.6 - 49.3 127.1 20.1 22.4 22.5 1.1 47.4 78.5 69.6 15.3 rorTA coN9U TS 22.2 125.6 132.9 87, 161.8 376.8 123.2 249.5 I00.1 Mn. 627.5 Is. Ia- 3LI3 gJ Annual comitments of Pm 4. 13, 25. 45 and 50 million respectively during 1980 through 1985. h1 Annual comitments of Shr. 15. 32, 40. 45, 50 and 65 million respectively during 1977 through 1982 and akr.65 million each year during 1983 through 1985. An additional comiment of Mkr. 45 million (1SS7.0 million) was made during 1982 for Reral Developma Project, Habantoca District, with annual allocation of Ikr. 12 million (1982) Mr. 12 million (1983) and Mr. 15 million each year during 1984 through 1986 including the carry forward balace of Nkr. 24 million from previous year's comitments. J Ecluding the debt cancellation of USS51.7 million. If Excluding the following comitmesa: Euro-currency Loan of USS50 million in 1979 Euro-currency Loan of US$75 million in 1981 Euro-currency Loan of USSIOD million in 1982 Swedish Export Credit for Kotmle Project. Sr. 256.2 million in 1980. Nenufacturer's Manover Trust Company Loss for Victoria Project, L 20 million in 1980. Jarsoese Ten Bonds amounting to Ten 3,000 million in 1982. If Including Iraq oil subsidy loan of $5.5 million. 11 Cycloe relief assistance. A/ Ezcluding the Wousing Guarantee I.es and IMS Loma of US321 and US$2 million, respectively. 11 Including emergency relief assistanca, USS11.8 million. fOSM: Department of External Resources. Ministry of Finance and Planning. BEST COPY AVAILABLE -86- Table 3.09: AID DISSURSENEVIS. 1970-83 CS million) 1970 1971 1972 1973 174 "ZI 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 3981 9 1983 AID GROUP Australia 0.9 1.0 1.1 2.2 4.2 8.3 2.0 1.7 1.7 2.9 4.2 6.6 8.8 6.4 Canada 8.4 5.5 5.6 3.7 5.1 11.5 11.5 14.7 14.0 16.6 27.8 28.9 29.2 31.5 Deusark 1.2 0.4 0.2 2.1 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.5 3.5 2.5 2.9 0.1 EEC 1.2 - - 3.4 2.2 13.1 0.6 6.2 3.0 4.4 0.3 16.0 9.6 10.3 Finland - - - - - - - - - - 0.6 2.4 4.4 4.5 France 4.6 2.9 5.6 5.3 3.2 7.1 11.2 3.4 4.5 7.1 5.3 18.5 10.7 11.8 Germany 3.3 2.3 4.3 9.3 17.7 12.3 8.7 11.5 28.2 24.2 13.4 5.8 19.9 47.0 India 4.8 2.9 2.4 2.3 3.9 2.4 4.7 6.2 13.0 9.5 9.1 1.5 3.1 7.7 Italy 1.7 0.9 1.8 0.3 0.3 1.3 - 0.7 - - - - - 1.1 Japan 5.1 7.6 5.5 9.2 9.2 18.1 11.3 17.2 38.1 37.9 37.7 49.9 52.9 54.3 Netherlands - - - - - 3.3 4.3 9.6 28.3 19.8 11.3 62.4 16.4 14.1 Neway - - - - - - - 1.1 5.5 8.3 12.3 16.7 11.8 4.4 Sweden - 1.6 - 2.4 3.5 8.6 6.8 9.4 7.4 34.4 22.8 22.1 21.1 a/ 26.4 Switzerland - - - - - - - - - - 0.1 0.6 - 6.9 United Kingdom 10.3 16.1 7.4 4.6 3.0 4.7 7.4 2.7 8.9 19.1 63.0 43.6 52.6 37.4 United States 9.9 10.9 25.6 8.5 8.4 26.6 32.7 40.6 39.9 46.2 61.2 37.8 62.6 b/ 65.5 cl of which: CARE (1.3) (1.8) (1.5) (1.1) (3.2) (4.9) (5.5) (5.0) (5.5) (5.4) (7.8) (6.1) (5.9) (5.4) Asian Development Bank 1.5 2.8 4.0 3.8 3.0 5.0 8.2 7.7 28.2 10.3 5.3 10.2 18.0 18.5 Un Group 0.3 2.3 0.9 0.6 2.6 19.1 16.6 15.1 6.4 12.0 13.4 12.2 13.2 18.0 of which: VP? (0.2) (1.7) (0.6) (0.4) (1.5) (6.9) (13.3) (8.9) (0.8) (2.7) (1.6) (1.5) (2.5) (4.0) FAD C-) I-) (-) C-) C-) (-) (1.9) (2.2) (0.8) (3.3) (-3 (-3 C-) (-) lurld Sank Group _.9 7.5 _.8 10.5 1. 18.7 6.4 1. 12.8 12.2 20.2 28.0 "J 74.7 Sub-total Aid Group 55.1 64.7 70.2 66.2 82.6 160.3 133.0 162.0 260.- 265.4 311.5 335.7 396.9 40.9 MO-AID GROUP Centrally Planned Economies 8.8 35.0 13.2 1.2 29.1 3.9 14.9 12.3 5.4 0.8 0.1 16.8 5.4 1.5 IFrD - - - - - - - - - - 2.7 3.4 2.0 1.6 Kuwait Fund - - - - - - 9.6 5.3 3.9 1.7 4.7 3.1 1.2 - OPEC Fund - - - - - - - 8.0 1.0 - 1.4 9.6 6.0 3.0 Saudi Fund - - - - - 6.7 - - - - - - - 3.0 Others A/ - -5 -r4 J 126 l 16.1 g/ 0.1 0.2 _A h/ 1.1 _2. 2A Sub-total Mon-Aid Group 8.8 35.0 13.2 1.2 29.1 45.1 37.1 41.7 10.4 2.7 14.4 34.0 17.4 12.9 TOTAL DISBURSEHEES 63.9 99. 63.4 67.4 111.7 205.4 170.1 203.7 251.a 268.1 325.9 369.7 414.3 4i j A/ Excludes USS2.92 million disbursed under Swedish Export Credit for Kotmsle Project. / Excludes USS14.43 million disbursed under Soloman Brothers Incorporation (USA) loan for low cost Hosing Programe. 5- Excludes USS6.18 million disbursed under Soleman Brothers Incorporation (USA) loan for low cost Housing Programme. 4/ Excludes the following loans: Euro-currency loan of VSS50 million disbursed in 1980 Euro-currency loan of USS75 million disbursed in 1981 Euro-currency loan of USS109 million of which USS40 million was disbursed in 1982. Japanese Ten Bonds of Ten 3.000 million ($2.14 million) disbursed in December 1982. gl Includes Iran loan of USS32.0 million. V1 Includes 9AE convertible currency loan of USS12.0 million. Al Includes Libya! loan of USS15.0 million. 8f Represents the Iraq for oil subsidy. Ji Including emergency assistance of US$11.8 million. SumAHe: Department of External Resources. Ministry of Finance and Planning. RrsT COPY AVAILABLE page I of 4 pages Table 3.10: AID GROUP NON-PROJECT ASSISTANCE, 1965-83 VALUE OF COHNITMENTS, INTEREST RATE, GRACE PERIOD, AND SEPAYMENT PERIOD COHNITHTS ( million) Contry ILsA IIRI 1 A 11. 1WIl 969 1L0 j=1 1972 1971 1974 197 121 1.917 191A 1177 1M AM 11W. 1281 111 lsa1l Australia Grant 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.9 0.9 1.1 2.0 3.0 4.0 6.4 2.0 1.6 3.2 2.3 2.2 4.8 8.1 4.4 53.1 Canada Loan 0.9 0.5 1.2 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.4 1.0 1.0 4.3 12.0 4.1 9.0 17.0 - - - - 9.3 Grant 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.5 2.5 3.0 4.3 2.0 7.6 7.1 9.0 - 30.8 8.1 82 103.8 Denmark Loan * - - - 2.7 - 3.0 - - 3.7 - - - - - - -4 Vinland Loan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - Grant - 1:- - - - - - - - * - - 1.0 3.2 A/ 1*3 2.6 6.1 France Loan - 7.7 - 7.0 8.1 - 7.6 - 6.1 7.2 6.8 6.7 -6.2 - 21.0 h/ 16.6 L/ 25.6 A! 19.0 1/ - 145.6 Grant - * - - 0.8 0.5 - 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 - -1.0 1.8 0.9 - - - I1.0 Germany Loan 8.0 6.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 4.1 - - 12.4 - - 2.7 - 7.1 4/ 2.9 - 3.5 3.7 S5.2 Grant - * - 0.6 1.1 1.9 0.1 1.4 2.9 4.7 1.5 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.3 1.5 - * * 27.9 India Loan 2.7 - 6.7 - 6.7 * 7.2 - 6.1 - 5.6 7.9 12.3 12.4 1 12.7 - - 80.3 Italy Loan - - - 4.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - 4.2 Grant - * - - 1.3 - - - - 1.3 - * 0.7 - - - - 1.1 4.4 Japan Loan 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 8.0 11.6 - 12.1 14.0 15.3 15.6 16.8 29.1 13.5 16.1 25.4 24.7 - 227.2 Grant - * - - 0.5 0.3 - - 0.6 - 1.1 0.8 2.2 15.5 13.8 i/ 13.7 Ll 1.6 A/ 24.8 h 14.2 1/ 89.1 Netherlands Loan - - - - - - - - - - 4.3 3.5 9.4 28.1 1/ 13.4 15.2 11.6 M 81.3 Grant - * - - - * - - - - 4.1 2.6 2.9 1.5 6.5 19.9 4.8 20.9 10.2 73.4 Norway Grant - - - - - - * - 3.1 4.2 6.6 8.4 6.6 8.9 7.4 43.2 Sweden Grant - - - - - - 1.6 0.8 2.5 6.8 12.4 10.1 11.9 14.0 k/ 16.0 L/ 18.8 L/ 17.8 kI 22.1 k/ 26.7 ]I 161.5 Suitserland Loan - - - - - - - - - - 18.1 - * - 18.1 United Eingdom Loan 10.0 10.0 8.6 6.0 10.. 12.0 6.4 - 3.4 7.2 - * * * * * * * - 74.2 Grant - - - 2.4 2.5 2.4 - - - - 7.6 4.9 5.6 4.5 S1.7 I1 - - * - 81.6 United States Loan 7.5 7.4 - * 5.0 - - - - 8.0 - - - 12.0 14.0 5.0 - * - 58.9 Loan (PL 480 1) 4.5 7.6 13.8 17.5 1A.0 - 15.4 10.0 5.9 24.5 22.0 30.9 * 35.4 17.0 25.0 18.2 32.6 32.5 326.8 Grant (FL 480 11) * - - - 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.1 3.2 4.9 5.5 5.0 5.5 5.4 7.8 6.1 6.2 S.4 60.7 SEC Grant - * - - - 1.1 - - - 7.4 5.2 0.8 6.9 4.1 2.5 3.6 6.3 6.7 - 44.6 IDA Loan - -1.0 - - - - 15.0 UN Group a/ Grant J_A- - I . A2 0 6 JA. 3 4 LLA 13-9 -JAI --U 1 4 ..= .z 02 TOTAL 42.2 47.4 40.7 50.7 68.3 38.0 63.1 22.2 61.3 119.0 126.3 111.2 100.1 205.6 232.6 155.7 179.0 184.15 115.3 1,967,2 Al $2 million classified an project aid in Tables 3.06 and 3.11. 1/ $12.2 million (FF 50 million) for Telecomunication project is classified as project aid in Tables 3.08 and 3.11. r/ Classified as project aid in Tables 3.08 and 3.11. 4/ Under 1978 Loan of Do 31 million, De 26 million used for Import of locomotives and classified as project aid in Table 3.11. Ay Including debt relief grant of $1.6 million. V Including debt relief grant of $1.4 aillion. Represent@ debt relief grant of $1.6 million. Includes debt relief grant of $0.66 million, food production grant (1981/82) $9.7 million, food production grant (1982/83) $10.22 million. 1/ Includes debt relief grant of $1.29 million and emergency assistance $2.38 million and Food Production Grant (1983/84) of $10.3 million. J1 Hit 5.5 million out of Hit 34 million loan claseified as project aid in Table 3.11. k/ Import support which is being utilised for projects., and clasifted as project aid in Table 3.11. J/ Debt cancellation. g/ Eacluding VFP and UN Technical Assistance comitmants which are classified as project aid. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Ialea.JA Page 2 of 4 pages OffTSEST RATE (Z) Contzy ILIA 196 1%7 IM 1 6 nM I= n M 'IM IM In 197 In 7 'M IMa LM 'il Canada Loan - - - - - * * - - - - - - - - * * - Denmark Loan - - - - - - - - - - - * * * - - - - * * France Loan - 6.0 - 5.5 5.5 - 3.5 - 3.25 5.4 tl 5.4 / 5.9 a/ S.9 IL 5.5 #/ 6.64 j/ 5.88 5.75 a/ 5.75 p/ - Cermany Loan 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 - - 2.0 - - 0.75 - 0.75 0.75 * 0.15 - 0.75 India Loan 3.0 - 5.0 - 5.0 - 5.0 - 5.0 - 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 - 5.0 - - Italy Loan - - - 4.5 - - - - - - - - - Japan Loan 5.5 5.5 5.25 5.25 3.25 5.0 4.75 hI/ - 4.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 - Netherlands Loan - - - - - - - - - - 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 - - Switzerland Loan - - - - - - - - - - - * - - 2.525 A/ - * - United Kingdom Loan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - United States Loan 2.5 g/ 3.5 - - 3.0 4/ - - * - 3.0 S1 - - - 3.0 d1 3.0 4/ 3.0 * - Loan (PL 480) 2.5 g/ 2.5 S/ 2.5 3/ 3.0 d/ 3.0 / - 2.0 3.0 1 3.0 3.0 4/ 3.0 o1 3.0 4! - 3.0 d1 3.0 i1 3.0 3. l 3.0 4/ 3.0 4/ IDA Loan - - - - - - - - 0.75 V, - - - - - - - IDA ~ ~ ~ ~ Loan--- ---- 07 /-- --- A/ Represents weighted average of the interest rates of the public and private components of loans. hi Rate of interest during grace period is 4.15%. t/ Rate of interest during grace period Is It. 41 Rate of Interest during grace period ia 22. t/ PL 480 food assistance against local currencies. Ll Service charge. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table . .9 Page 3 of 6 pages GRACE PERIOD (Years) CountyZz ILM 1. 13 h 11 JW. 1I9 190 1.71 1972 W.? j2A 1.W 1176 1977 2.A 112 lil Hi 1.2 U1 Canada Loan 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 - - - - Denmark Loan - - - - 7.0 - 7.0 - - 10.0 - - - - . . France Loan - - - 0.5 0.5 - 2.0 a/ - ,75 1/ 2.25 al 3.25 Ll 3.25 a/ 3.75 ./ 3.75 1/ 4.60 A/ 3.25 A/ 5.25 i/ 5.25 i - Germany Loan 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 8.0 - - 10.0 - - 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 India Loan - 1.0 1.0 - 2.0 - 2.0 - 3.0 - - 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 - 2.5 - - Italy Loan - - - 2.0 - - - - - - - - - . Japan Loan 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 5.0 7.0 7.0 - 7.0 7.0 7.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 - Netherlands Loan - - - - - - - - - - 8.0 8.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 - - Switzerland Loan - - - - - - - - - 6 - - - 6.5 I./ United Kingdom Loan 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 7.0 - 7.0 8.0 - - - - - - . - . United States Loan 5.0 - - - 10.0 - - - - 10.0 - - - 10.0 10.0 10.0 - - . Loan (PL 480) h/ 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 IDA Loan - - - - - - - - - 10.0 - - - - - . - - --------. ..-....... . -. . ........ ... I/ Represents veighted average of the public and private components of loans. h/ See footnote g/, page 2 of this table. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Page 4 of 4 pages REPAYMENT PERIOD_fLER_GRACE PERIOD (Yeal) gghz Item 1965 3A U] Jj 1969 1910 1911 19 1911 912 1973 1974 1975 11 171 1 312 [3D 1311 192! 1l2! Canada Loan 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 .C.0 40.0 40.0 - - - Denmark Loan - - - - 18.0 - 18.0 - - - - - - - - - - France Loan - 4.0 - 8.0 8.0 - 13.25 AL - 16.0 I 15.5 aL 14.5 I] 14.5 a 1'-.0 a/ 15.0 g/ 14.4 a/ 15.0 a/ 15.0 a/ 15.0 g/ - Germany Loan 13.0 13.0 18.0 16.0 22.0 22.0 - - 30.0 - - 40.0 - 40.0 40.0 - 40.0 - 40.0 India Loan 3.0 - 9.0 - - - 10.0 - 12.0 - - 12.5 ;-.5 12.5 12.5 - 12.5 - - Italy Loan - - - 12.0 - * - - - - - - - Japan Loan 5.0 5.0 6.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 - 18.0 38.0 18.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 - Netherlands Loan - - - - - - - - - - 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 - - Switzerland Loan - - - - - - - - - - - . * - 8.5 a/ * - United Kingdom Loan 22.0 22.0 .2.0 22.0 22.0 18.0 18.0 - 18.0 18.0 - * . - - - . - United States Loan 20.0 20.0 - - 30.0 - - - 30.0 - . - 30.0 30.0 30.0 - - Loan (PL 480) h/ 19.0 C/ 19.0 !L/ 19.0 / 19.0 G/ - 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 - 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 IDA Loan - * * - - - - - - 30.0 - - . - . - - - j/ Represents veighted average of the repayment periods for public and private components of loans, h/ See footnote r), page 2 of this table. r/ US$100,000 each during the first three years and the balance in 16 equal installments. Sggrge: External Resources Department. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 3.11: OVERALL AID PIPELINE, 1982-84 (US$ million) Hahaveli Non-Mahaweli (Accelerated) Of which: Project Project Commodity Food Total Non-Hahaweli 1982 Undisbursed Balance 12/31/81 947.1 539.7 139.5 7.4 1,633.7 1,094.0 New Commitments 1982 246.2 161.1 83.7 63.5 554.5 393.4 Disbursements from Past Commitments 131.7 136.5 49.9 7.4 325.5 189.0 Disbursements from New Commitments 24.1 20.0 18.0 26.7 88.8 68.8 Total Disbursements 1982 155.8 156.5 67.9 34.1 414.3 257.8 1983 Undisbursed Balance 12/31/82 1,031.9 A/ 544.5 155.3 36.8 1,768.3 1,224.0 Less Adjustment due to Fluctuations of Exchange Rates -63.6 -32.5 -9.7 - -105.8 -73.3 Corrected Undisbursed Balance 12/31/82 968.3 511.8 145.6 36.8 1,662.5 1,150.7 New Commitments 1983 203.2 67.6 33.8 52.6 369.0 b/ 301.0 Disbursements from Past Commitments 142.1 136.0 56.3 36.8 371.2 235.2 Disbursements from New Commitments 24.6 24.0 7.6 14.6 82.6 &] 58.6 b/ Total Disbursements 1983 166.7 160.0 63.9 51.4 453.8 k/ 293.8 k/ 1984 Undisbursed Balance 12/31/83 1/ 1,004.6 4/ 419.4 113.3 1/ 38.0 1,575.3 VI 1,155.9 New Commitments 1984 q/ 254.8 225.5 70.0 42.9 593.2 367.7 Disbursements from Past Commitments &] 174.8 144.4 65.3 38.0 422.5 278.1 Disbursements from New Commitments -C - - 19.6 15.2 34.8 34.8 Total Disbursements 1984 c/ 174.8 144.4 84.9 53.2 457.3 312.9 1985 Undisbursed Balance 12/31/84 1/ 1,084.6 500.5 98.4 27.7 1,711.2 1,210.7 &/ Cancellations during 1982 amount to $5.6 million. b/ Includes $11.8 million in relief assistance. _q/ Estimates. d/ Balance of US$0.1 million treated as lapsed under ADB for Urea Fertilizer Project. A/ Following balances treated as lapsed: US$0.66 million under Netherlands Grant No. 77/02 (HFL 35.0 million) US$0.584 million under UK Grant for import of lorries. U840.942 million under UK maintenance Grant No. 6 of 1977 US$2.186 million f Balance of approximately US$2.4 million treated as lapsed under aid lines described in d/ and e/ above. A/ Forecasts. Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning. BEST COPY AVAILABLE -92- Table 4.01: EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1982 INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED uAN. 1. 1900 - DEC. 31. 1982 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) DE BT 0 UTSTANDING IN ARREARS TYPE OF CREDITOR ------------------ CREDITOR COUNTRY DISBURSED :UNDISBURSED: TOTAL PRINCIPAL INTEREST SUPPLIERS CREDITS AUSTRIA 600 - 600 - CZECHOSLOVAKIA 967 - 967 - FRANCE 5.630 72 5.702 - GERMAN DEN. REP. 23 16 39 - GERMANY. FEO.REP. OF 240 3 243 - HONG KONG 261 - - 281 INDIA 469 - 469 - ITALY 320 - 320 ROMANIA 18.790 - 18.790 - SWITZERLAND 2.049 - 2.049 - UNITED KINGDOM 8.030 10 8.040 - UNITED STATES 1.121 - 1.121 - USSR 193 5 198 - YUGOSLAVIA 499 84 583 - UNKNWN lt7.570 - 117.570 - TOTAL SUPPLIERS CREDITS 156.782 190 156.972 - FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARGENTINA - 45.441 45.441 - AUSTRALIA - 1.450 1.450 - AUSTRIA - 1.650 1.650 - FRANCE 28.677 1.682 30.359 - HONG KONG 13.274 - 13.274 - JAPAN 12.765 - 12.765 - KOREA. REP. OF 33.536 - 33.536 - SWEDEN 2.598 32.524 35.122 - SWITZERLAND 232 7.289 7.521 - UNITED KINGDOM - 32.290 32.290 - UNITED STATES 16.329 6.566 22.895 - MULTIPLE LENDERS 280.000 76.000 356.000 - TOTAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 387.411 204.892 592.303 - MULTILATERAL LOANS ASIAN DEV. BANK 95.261 186.061 281.322 - IBRD 31.507 38.100 69.607 - IDA 179.157 406.800 585.957 - IMF TRUST FUND 105.644 - 105.644 - INTL FUND ARG(IFAO) 8.290 32.109 40.399 - OPEC SPECIAL FUND 25.335 16.048 41.383 - TOTAL MULTILATERAL LOANS 445.194 679.118 1.124.312 - BILATERAL LOANS CANADA 102.697 24.586 127.283 - - CHINA 37.829 27.692 65.521 - - DENMARK 8.957 331 9.288 - - FRANCE 17.269 27.530 44.799 - - GERMAN DEM. REP. 735 24 759 - - GERMANY. FED.REP. OF . 108.034 191.477 299.511 - HUNGARY 221 - 221 - INDIA 30.402 18.201 48.603 - - IRAQ 5.208 - 5.208 - - ITALY 114 114 - - JAPAN 205.968 111.545 317.513 - - KUWAIT 21.559 45.819 67.378 - - LIBYA 8.912 - 8.9t2 - NETHERLANDS 73.048 i1.159 84.207 - SAUDI ARABIA 30 48.442 48.472 SWITZERLAND - 7.521 7.521 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 12.190 3.408 15.598 - UNITED STATES 334.811 123.554 458.365 USSR 11.444 59.754 71.198 TOTAL BILATERAL LOANS 979.428 701.043 1.680.471 TOTAL EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 1.968.815 1.585.243 3.554.058 NOTES: (1) ONLY DEBTS WITH AN ORIGINAL OR EXTENDED MATURITY OF OVER ONE YEAR ARE INCLUDED IN THIS TABLE. (2) DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDES PRINCIPAL IN ARREAQS BUT EXCLUDES INTEREST IN ARREARS. (3) THE FOLLOWING UNCOMMITTED PARTS OF FRAME AGREEMENTS AND STANDBYS ARE NOT INCLUDFD IN THIS TABLE. BILATERAL LOANS CHINA 30.044 GERMAN DEM. REP. 17.215 USSR 12.040 TOTAL 59.299 TOTAL UNCOMMITTED FRAME AGREEMENTS AND STANDBYS 59.299 Source: World Bank. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 4.02: SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1982 INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED JAN. 1. 1900 - DEC. 31. 1983 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TOTAL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT TRANSACTI 0 NS DURING PERID 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD ******** :..........-.- - .----- ---------------------------------------------------------*:----------------------- DISBURSED : INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- 5 E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS MENs :T--------------------------------: LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1978 784.365 1,198,368 311,852 242,353 64.375 24.908 89.283 11.906 80.756 1979 1.023,616 1.514,695 350.883 187,485 48.717 28,299 77.016 53.351 -14.117 1980 1,096,987 1,749.393 736.078 286.463 49,837 32,454 82.291 24.630 -4.597 1981 1.333.404 2.406.407 871.892 380.135 42.867 48,779 91.646 8.070 -135.206 1982 1,600.498 3.092.156 642,334 483.851 67.551 68,353 135.904 6,418 -106,464 1983 1,968,815 3.554.057 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * 1983 1,968,815 3.554.057 132.919 452.879 85.793 79.787 165.580 - 8 1984 2.335,903 3.601,191 - 417.531 114,484 88,176 202.660 - 9 1985 2,638.956 3.486.716 - 336.697 137.468 90,027 227,495 - .3 1986 2,838.184 3.349,245 - 225.012 163.352 87.386 250.733 - 6 1987 2.899.845 3.185.899 - 121.488 197.093 79,553 276.646 - 3 1988 2.824.247 2.988.809 - 69,597 195,109 69,498 264.607 - 15 1989 2.698,749 2,793.715 - 42.917 173,627 58,947 232.574 * 11 1990 2,568.051 2.620,099 - 27,810 128.827 50,516 179,343 - 3 1991 2,467,037 2,491,275 - 9.542 105,590 47.005 152.595 - 4 1992 2.370.989 2,385.689 - 6.805 111.499 43.781 155.280 - 7 1993 2.265,303 2.274,197 - 4.531 107,297 41.116 148.413 - -1 1994 2,162.535 2,166,699 - 4.364 106.956 38,460 145,416 - 5 1995 2,059,948 2.059.948 - - 92.133 35.818 127.951 - 13 1996 1,967,821 1.967.828 - - 90,280 33,357 123.637 -1 1997 1,877.549 1.877.549 - - 87,055 31.055 118,i o - -2 1998 1,790,492 1,790,492 - - 87.153 28,943 116.096 - 14 1999 1.703.353 1,703,353 - - 86.770 26.855 113,625 - 5 2000 1,616.588 1.616.588 - - 85,926 24.829 110,755 - 11 2001 1.530.673 1.530,673 - - 84.088 22,912 107.000 - 5 2002 1,446.590 1,446.590 - - 86,062 21,069 107,131 - 7 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE. Source: World Bank. BEST COPY AVAILABLE твыв s.a1s svюws от еи0и:7д1кт оесмтs0иs, 197о/71-ел �I (к■ M�.11ioo) 1910/71 1971/72 � Zy�, у,рц }� � ур� l9�р }94Q � 196: 19е3 е9еа еидегс eudeat кевiид troviвloыl !■ hoвtвiaual евеiвие•в бвеiви[е■ !. Сиггие lиввие к,s7ь к,9:е 3,ьо! ь,кбд 4,s1ь s,o97 ь,о:1 to,979 11,е1ь u,1s6 1s,а7з 16,ая: ::,us :о,я:я кь,sье :e,e9s к. Сиеггое �врвед(еигв :,е4ь 3,оо7 3,so7 4,:о9 •,eat s,1eo ь,оs3 9,9ы 1о,ее7 1к,г3о 1s,a3 1е,я07 :3,9a т:,7от :ь,з0о a,ьs7 з. Adr■игв Асгоипе lувеесв 7е 1ы ы 1: -аа 37д ьь 1,7и l,о:! 3,о4о 1,4ее -е79 sa 1,1:о зоо ьsо б. сиггюе еигрlив (l-к-3) 34е -к:: :7 43 -ке9 -ья -9е -7зо -я: -к.ь1ь -1,ьбе -1,ssь -1,9п -:,в93 -3к :,see s. Сврiевl еевваиг t9 ке ь4 69 6s ев 74 1sв к13 10е 1еь 117 :3s 1s9 13о ::о ь. apie.l ирвпд(еигв вед М.е lеид(ае 74к еее 1,173 1,но l,9ге :,ы 1 :,о9з s,:ьь 7,347 1:,es7 и,7s7 1s,eas п,9аь 1s,s7e 1ь,и] и,3оя 7, сиь ииеlе сь-4-3) 1,о7: l,ое: l,ое4 1,к9е т,кlе 3,о44 :,117 s,eu 7,к:ь 1s,3ьs 13,:3я и,зоь 19,70к lе,31: 1ь,37s 14,sa1 ►tеадевд Ьгк Fогв[ее 6neu вва ьоввв сиее) 4ы . tь: s1• ы4 1,::е 1,oos 1,о70 э,е3е 3,73е ь,13ь 7,ьох в,1:1 13,боь lо,974 lо,ьs3 1о,1sз Doвueie Мае•Мвгkве eorreuioe (eetl -9е 267 - 113 -19 Sье 660 к3е 535 103 744 1,469 - l - - Dorueie Мвгltве eorrorioe [rw l 5,731 nee-eвnk lеигаев (в.е) .9: и: ьк3 ьеь е:7 еы 1,ое: l,s9s :,3zo :,о94 1,44ь 4,о:о д,кзs � к,м1 3,би eorroviee [гов eвatiae еrвеев (Мее) 94 к26 -llб -1S 137 6]9 -224 11S 662 7,10к 3,ее5 3,990 l,361 S07 бе1 -1,443 caer.t евеЬ рго[ie. р/ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - 1,soo 1,soo 1,7оо 1,ьsо � lote[нt еlоцое Гиnд Ы - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - SОП 500 � ивг ог авь евlввен 1:3 -11s ы 39 3! -]з -49: se -:е -7: -эе -31s - - - - ° Миогвадивг кеtгвЬидрtву eeceiptв вед Iуввеи ieeludN (а: Сиеевеt Rввваиг (Liee 1) l43 126 к0е :3S 33S ]64 941 - - - - - - - - - Сипие lspesd(еигв (Lieв t) 99 73 117 117 92 100 ta - - - - - - - - - hp(tв! tapeaditure вад Ret Leadiee (L(пв 6) И S7 9! 1к0 к43 кб• 723 - - - - - - - - - �/ ев[оЧ ll71/72, tht ГiвЧl Тввг wв [ее� ОеtаЬвг 1 to еврtевЬвг 30. tiыaeiвl гввт 1971I71 ееvегвд в 15-воаtЬ рвгiод [тов ОесоЬег 1, 1971, throueh DееевЬег ]1, l97к. Ав [rи Н1], tбe Eiru1 Теаг еопевреедв ео the ealгsdar гиг. Ie еЬiв аад еЬе [ollovIue uЫu, еЬв дасв Lee 1911/7к Ьввв Ьвве рге-гвед т■ 1к-вооtЬ period. Ca1ws tоtвlв вq eot вдд ир enetlr дие со rouedine о[[. �/ ТЬе ■ucбoritИ• tсвв[ tЬем и гевеые, hut tЬу вге вЬакп Ьеге ав [iыseiee [еевв [ог риероее о[ еоврагiвее uich рнвiоив гевгв. lаигев: �oetrrt евоЬ et Со�1оа. I � i �е I�!si'�� � I�� I� �,� i�I к гц•1оf2рц.е tвыв s.or, еиосsтмТ ееvенис, lяюlп-е4 �l (ев М111lод) , 1.414L.гА 191�l11 е/ 192.i 1?]4 13(.! 1914 1.42.! 1.4i! 1?]3 14l.4 1.4.4.t . 1ае2 �ее1 I4u eudeet lидре RwleN �yviвlo°в! евtlУ[вв lcevlвleцl евеl�ев• вlLue■■ l. Твw оо 11ае lдеово вод ггоlitв �ц � jgQ }р,р jjQ р�¢, p�j I.1o] 1•IS1 j�Qe,` 2.019 2•9f] � 7.ь2ь l.7ь1 4.5оо ь.sоо Соrроевег гвео.. Т.а с si si ) 4se 4оя s1: ье2 ьsо пе яп 1,lое 1,4sя :,11s 3,ое4 :,ыs 3,as Моо-Согроиев 2.го.. т.. с ) 24ь 1яо ae a4 2е2 �es �еь »е s�o еое s4o е12 еьs �дJивевгоt •4 ' - ' ' . . . - ' ' ' - - 2. Тии an rrop.rq впд ггорпеу Тиоеlвгв �/ 14 Stll 1I 14 4l !! 144 1S4 1l�. i1L 1�i ]11 111 цZ 114 �iII ]. Sвие оо ооодв впд eervlcoв � 1•оея 1•1Sl 1.44] l.5)S j,j,�,� Zt14 ].1о2 ].7о9 Ljyj) ь•9S! k.1ь9 1о.ь11 е.+16 1:.IOe ,ц,3,�Q, еивlаввв Turoewr Та■ иь �я4 s3ь w4 ь4ь �и ьы 1,о�3 1 ws 1 е4а 2,е:я 4,os1 i,+я� s,o�o e,2a е,о2о тиев .оа ггоа.вlоо с�i s,� ) ия) сlоя) u1s) и4:> c:1n с24и is3o) iseea с1,оо1) л,s24� с2,яоы с..) л,яsо> сl,ьsо) wоиtвее�ггие с ) us2) с4яs) cs�u tsья) asu сии саьs) u,os2) и,иа г2,s22) с4,sя1> с.,) сь,4�s) сь,�)о) e.l.eeir. т.ив ои сооае !I 4s1 ы4 ь:е 1so ы1 я1е 1 4о� 1 е�ь 1 яо2 1 ые :,о2е ::» 2»о � 2�о �,�:о s 12о Ы1иог иеtЧ j/ пьы с:ы ) t:ы) с:1ь) с2оы сио) i:u) t3ss) i4яи iau) с24я) теое) Еяsо) iеы ) ся)о) iяlо) тоиеео тв. с24е) а1и cs+a) cs») иsэ) us:) сsэи 11su иои t1 ооы и,1:�) tl �23) и мо) с1 +31) с1,по) с1,�:ы т.. т.., .а..lоге. j� г�» см) с�я) с)ь1) иьы с22ы csls) tslo) с::�) i1o2) иы ilso) t)3о) iя):) с1,о�о) г2,ио) A6ieiвteвtivв 4or2 од Coeoout o1l (-) i-) (•) i-) (-) (') (ье) beS) 193) (ья) �-) (-) (-) (•) �-) eol.eetv. тиа о. e.ry1r.. ц� 1s 2ь 2я п �4 �е ья ья :о - - - - - . . ь1а.... г.ее +ь я se sя ь4 ь4 s4 24 еа и яs 24s 1ео 1ее 1ы 2оо еивisви ь Гго!•uloмl Llегои. j/ с2ь) иы с:я) с3:) 1�ь> с�3) с2е) с2я) cw) cw) t1» си> с2» t1e) i21> .. ..ек2. ьlе.ов. Тв. в.а оее.г с2о) с:я) ае) с2» г:е) с:» с:ы c+s) с4» се3) cie) с12ы tlsu иlоа Ч42) ., � 4. Твевв оо Lроги 2ei Т},� цj ]jj � � }}р 1.•69 7.г)1 t.9l3 ].776 Ljei 4.6•б ;�� �� S.SeS У' Сивеавв еисИв оо, vоневыо ггоав•ев �2 rs я 2ь 2е 2ь s4 �е 2s 2оя so и2 1s> >13 24о ,. Ггорагод /оодвtиllе, epirlt., а►оцве во1 ТоИеео �а » ц 2о ьо 2и 12I 2» sн 4о1 414 ия яsо 2и еоо ., иt.огвl ны.еев 1ь :о � ь 4 4 я 2� и :е 4е ьs sao 23) еоо ., ce..tr.t ггое.еее �) а1 �ь ы s: �о :я и и ио us и2 1ео :2� )ео „ ' p.pee..ttaь warte2. е 12 11 и 1е 1е 21 ss ы es пе ио яs ие 2ьо ,. товеtи веа товеll. Areleto. �s и ц �е » so sь 141 :ь2 �2о 4so 4es аоо ь:1 ыs „ евв. Мвtви .о� ии wиt �геtеlн 1ь ю 1ь :3 a �3 3: us ие 2s� ц� зоь �is ць 4ео ' wеы .ог,�, и�1р...е воа гвгев :3 a :1 2> >4 s1 ы 2ео �2о »ь �2s sп 2so е2е �во :� тг...роге <а.1р.в.е 2о a 2s 3о �ь ь: я2 2ео �4ь 3�) +ы �s1 soo s21 ьsо ,. оеиг 3о :я 21 31 41 4s +s 1еь 21о 43о 4ья ы я 1,о2я ьоо �w ,. 4lеваев гоЧ оо �11 i О!(t IrporЧ 1 l 1 ! 1 3 7] 1S 9 1 1 . п ... ... .,, .. S. Твtи оа eapotts j�§, j}�, 3l7, j¢Q .j�Q, yj,� �Q, ь.l26 �в]� 3.ь3е �.ees 2.4е4 2,ьо1 л..sэ 2.�15 �,.1ц Саеоеие веь Coeonut trelueea SS 21 !1 1ы ь3 3 21 74S )�S 211 241 И1 209 211 )S3 2S1 т.. � Iu 2ы 2п 1se 1яе 1ы 2ео 2,и1 2,иs 1,я2о 1,еlя 1,Ч4 1,4w а,2яо 1,sso 1,мо е.►ыг у 14 и и: :е4 1+о 1я) 2ы 1,оо1 1,23я 1,3еь 1,а3 )s3 2и е32 я1о 1,2ао ер.еи2 еароге aer .. - - - - - - оее.г ц �1 4i së 4� s1 ьs 1оя яя 22i ui +е 1ы �ь ui )2i ь, п�с Ч2в how.1., ме у �ю 4ы ses еьь я3о я�е 1,оьь ия � - и - - - - - гго. aatao e.eeol 1/ 3эТ ]i7 l7з iii i1T i3i �/ �iя sl . - - • - - -- lгов tudpe k/ l41 124 206 2ц S7 100 f - - - • • • • • • . �, тоевt твs е.�г..о 2,2�1 :,sse �,22: �,цл 4,)34 4,sяо s,ььо 1о,3и 21,1ss 12,sot 14,1яь 1s,uo 2i,ееь и,3о) :4,v�e :),о3о BEST СОРУ AVA�LAB�E 1вЫо 5.02 hp 7 о[ 7 рци 19)о/11 19f1/77 �,/ jtj,; j,'j� jpj,� jpj� j�j,( 14j,0 jpj: � j�,� 1е/! 1YSi 19б� lедре /dtpe еwlид ГreviNaыl /в!lавtвв ргеviв(еи1 lвеlав!■■ jpjj�a /, егерlty {вееЧ ii! 2!1 цУ цQ. 1!! lia ц2 i1l, i1�. liS !]i !4! „ ♦, в, вв hтивt 1егрlио о[ Wввговоее дtвгрг/ви 7s бе 16 бб s6 s1 и 7: е/ 9 ия 1е ., „ ., „ СоlавЬо роге Савlввiеs (7S) (i9) (2l1 �22) рб) !7Ч 111) !7о) 1!S) (-) (21 (l) � ., ,. „ [еее � lвlqгврЬв /врвтеиее (-72) (-7) г-1S) (77) (16) (l6) (Ч (36) �37) (19) (779) �746) ,. ,. „ ., �L1r., с::) а7) с1о) с7и иб) с1и с-�st с-и с•1+) с•ео) с-117) с-1яя) ., .. ., .. ho[1ео [гов роод евlи /I 71 И 72 - - - • - - • - „ .. „ ,. ho[ieo ot lhвеев �ееооее leei�lelое 76 12 10 1l 1 1 7 SO И l9 l� - „ ., „ ., 7витове, ot.tи.a, м.е яs 1о2 и: 1�s и1 7so 2v1 t77 7ss 7ег 7п 11э „ „ ,. .. о[ rhleht ltввв !аеlедод !а Гоевд /крввдiеегв (7) i21 (7) 11) (Ч (S) (б) (7) (/) (101 (l7I (11) ., .. ,. „ lгвеlеиl Ьоее.г7 10 !0 9 1 17 l6 l7 Н 70 И И !7 „ ., „ „ /. оеь.е Мае-7вв Corese /втиw ц1 цQ 1�},Q, j�Q j,1,4 j� �l,Q jц j]1 i1�, �g,4 ц�, „ ., ., ., hoeмU [еов Moe-Ialoвtrlвl [в1Ч а/ 71 S6 11 7/ 1! И 60 117 61 107 l11 712 ,. ., . Адвiаlвегвсlrв СЬае/и ввд lввв 4/ S7 1l Ч S6 S7 S6 б7 71 !ol 106 1!1 !!7 . , „ iisм вед рог[oite 10 12 11 1! 17 77 1I 71 !1 17 77 И „ �� „ „ Совстl►вtiево ео ►еевiое беЬвр pJ �, � �, � „j¢, ,32 �,Q � ,,,�, _уу, � �! „ „ „ „ 10. /еs-!вх Ситтваt /neaw (1Н) !6S ]77 ]t! 7so зее веч бо! S96 661 661 е�в 1.077 „ ., .. .. � 11, Теи2 с.гг.ве /.ввоио 7,s76 :,97е s,6o1 1,761 ь,цб s,ояг а,о71 1а,я7я )1,пб 12,1s1 1s,o7� 16,1э1 u,17s 7о,97я 76,6s/ 2е,иs 17. Gpital Чrвsw а/ _ji ___ц „ 64 , 69 _� �, _j,4 _� 21] !ое !ев l11 к]S �}: 170 f70 и, тееоl eaesa• :,sfs :,1s6 7,66s 1,�з7 1,s6s s,1Ч б,ояs и,и7 и,о:! 1�,:6[ 1s,ия 16,ыо ::,71о 71,ои 76,И/ 7�,us .. be а•.il.Ы•. .., Lви tЬво /е ! вlЧlов, �/ flци ва tооевоев �J ео lвЫв S.o1 toe [lвевl 7овn. у ti/игве вгв рго иев вдJовЧд [ег а 17-�овеЬ prtod, �,,/ tгввЬдевав вее вrвilв►1в, � j/ /овввив рвlв 1.1 (вкеlодlц 1.7,5) вод !0, �/ 2ееlодlа/ eio рге[!а о[ дггаеЬ lfoooplp вад вв/1!/1Ыв rаоаев [та ввtсЬ tв+, j/ lfвisl7 рто[Lев о[ Агиаk fаворl7 еЬгооеб е173, в[tвг vlle► tЬв resepl7 rвв wd. ielopoodвet о! еЬг tseiгo Dврагев.аt и е6. lсвев D!вlilloeiu Соериеiов, V Lвtiod ое бoth вlреtв ввд 1аев1 гв1в. �/ lfвiвLp 1воЬв двЫte tвs (iев.вw lовд 1,1.5). j/ lhidy 1[`иое liеиви, �/ Iaetodiolf еЬо eвruw. [га а:рте доеlее ийвг tЬв 1(адlевl Уаtв огдiиоЧ, вЬiеЬ вео игввйод [ог huleh ипiнв [ог овеасв rегlиев. kJ [Чiutoo вррsовiввtе УтввЫеrвв. j/ /selydiц пtСв рмневд 1� {еввtеwве tои!/в Ч►е иrvieiвe, � hior to 1!1lI12, рго[ie. wro kвpt ts еЬв вдввsев вееоивt.. /аv.в.г� рге[it. [or tЫ е prlol вте вlво Iadiнtвd, lввввов даlв 5.2.6 ввд 6,1. 4/ tвв.авв рвд. 6,7 ввд /.l .кеlодiц /.l,7.2. ввд е,1,�,1. �/ hвоаов i<овд. 7 ввд 1.l.1.l. � �/ tвивав раде ! вЧ !2. 1�tfllt Gвtтв! /ввk о[ G71ee1 овЧгв! lиввоsр. BEST СОРУ AVA�iA�L� тсы. s.o7� wмеит [ueи0lsvese, и!О!!1-еь е/ . fN Millionl 1.914/11 1tгlLц 1l11 1!]! 1.l1! 141.4 14ц 1!1! 1.�L� 1!!4 1!ц 1яе: 1+еь 1е евt 1oleet RW1ЧI hогiв{еы1 tвеiввеев ►говlвlеыt [веlrвевв jej,j�je1 1. еьlвlвег.еlов sos sw s7я е70 � >а7 у эо9 я[я 1,ббе 1,1ы �:,ие >э/ l,eso � , ., .. .. ,. !, мсиl еепlс.в ти wo ея э1: 1,о71 1,117 1 7ы 1 sы 1,и� :,11е :,sб1 .. .. .. . .. о[ rЬlеЬг Чигвсlое си» tsи! сsб7! cse7� tas31 сlее> iеб0� iяе:� с1,171� c1,7eq и,sяя� .. .. .. . ., �ввlеь с:7е1 саы с:ы 1[:я:� а:и сиы иs3> снеа [б7:1 с�ь0! usu .. ., . . .. 7, tcaaie евгвlив �i �!! ._LЯl4 _.1l1 �!1 �L4 �11 ._i!1 ...1�! ...lц �ц •• .• .. •• •• 1,w4 1,s1s 1,ео1 1,я0� :,оея s,77ь :,3�е 7,4�0 4,7б: s,0�7 s,ao7 ,. .. .. .. ., ь. e.1.rt.. .ва v.e.. о[ 1, ! б 7 вЬоvв се...) (о...) (е.вJ св...� с.л.> г1,ы11 и,еоб! с:,:яи с1,я037 с7,1я7! 17,ы :) t4,41б� c3,1vs> и,�яя1 cs,t11� cs,a17 s. :даевп 77б ы 7 s14 seo бяя ею 1,о17 1,76е 1,бяs :,:�r 7,esa s,tu �,7бя е,боб 1,vu 1,иs oe..•etr о.ы иы ! <s1ы аяэ� ыби сsби te6u се::! t1,0е7э t1,»я� t1 еб4� с7,и71 а,1яи ts,яul а,77и сб,:1и сб,11и �егеlр Оеье !,/ cw! сея! u1s! с11э1 сии с1�1� ия1� с:е3) а37) iu7) сп7) ся1s� с1,ь3и с1,:�о� с1,�7и с1,�1ы б. Оsовв /еод lиЬвil� �/ 611в S14• 701е 9Slc 1,170в 971 1,414 1,1Че 1,71бв 70Sв 710 177 100 6S 100 !00 �. r.,.te.. us 13ь :�о 1и 771 7�е нь 4s� яя пе м7 1,цб 1,е43 1,iяб 1,1ое 1,1s7 •, oeLer тиицен ео foauЫe. �/ 1о! 1а 1:: 1е3 1ьs и: 717 1,:34 пе :,7�е 1,sl7 ,. 9. тsвавtвгв ее toeal ьаееоеiецг бо и бs �о 77 еб я1 ut 1�о 1so 1б4 7oi 4ië 7si ь7б йi l0. Свгrое irru[вгв ео 1uбie Сеqогвсiоов 11 17 !бб 16ь !71 119 146 1,0e1 910 1,Se] 1,750 1,697 1,519 1,е17 1,ь11 1,l11 ц, ОеМвг тnевtп tв�ееев ы 7s 3е н s: ю ss so э� :1е иб ws .. .. .. � 11, Овеlегвftlсб _iQ � ._� _11 -,1l Jj _4 Jj �Q .�1 ,-,J.R �„J,L !7. теtвl Согwвt [qeoбitun Ьт Сеоегвl �� �� �� � � иа O.ttsleios г,е46 7,оо� 7,so� ь,1о9 4,ut s,1eo б,о37 я,9ы 1о,иг 11,г7о 1s,137 1б,vо� 17,т:1 ::,7о: 1б,7оо a,6s� 4и� Овбег 6[гоUtun [гпiвiоов j/ .. .. .. .. ,. 14. Оейг АбJиееивtв б;! .�4 __I _ц -11 _.19. ...i1 �� �l �4 _!.R 111 .. . .. .. .. 1s. l�jыtвl тоевl l,иs 7,ооя 7,s1e ь,11о ь,еея s,:oe 6,17о 1о,о1� 1о,яы 1:,eto 1s,7бs . .. .. .. [lов� аhиев ьеееrве Iвlасеев �,_j( 1ьf ,�г Jj �¢ _aL �4¢ _.1,Zц .1вQ11 .3.4.4Q 1.ьее .. .. .. .. .. и, тоиl Сиггnе espaaleara l,tu 7,ц: 7,3es 4,1�: б,е17 3,su 6,1яб и,�бя и,яи ц,еsо 1б,ея ., .. ,. ,. .. • .. /ot вwilвЫе. � е/ [ео lооевен е/ to тв►1в 3.01 [вг [iвгвl fuu. �/ еваlвевв в nв о[ ев 130 в1llLa■ iв 11Н, tв 11S вllliaв 1д И1S, 11в 363 в1111оа io 1!1! и1 tв 76е в1111ое iв 1110 ва� tв 100 вllliее iв N1l уяемИ авtlавt:в, Rв 4l1 alllioe la llel рrавИ(оиl, аед И 1,000 dllioe 1е 1!б! еа весеввt о[ еУв вреlвl вllеvввсв te вtвев s�lе�ввв, все. 9/ евеiЧlее RiCв ве lollavвi 1l70/71 1ef1�11 Jlj,г jtj�, j:j,Z jцL 1,l1i JlI,( !б 7! Ч 6S S7 f1 �S 7б �/ Ii�енв вitt ввtвгitУв !в1 iвгtаlв в prt еМагрб ее Чvвоее Aeeewb. а/ [веlrЧв варве�itrгв ов /ее1 еtмев lгов 1f7! owcrl• [ив твЫо 5.04). j/ Ов1и apa�ttы о ев геапгое веЧв ад cqieвl гоевв Уввв Ьцо вбJивЧ1 [ег ltмв сгвав[пид [rав ЧР1Чl vоевв ваб вiее гпи. е/ Оргвtiвб te[ieitв et ти�lве hqqeiцв. /erreli Gвегвl euL et Су1ев. BESi СОРУ AVAli.ABLE т.ы . s.оьк соvеенlант еиосетмТ sueel0lee ен0 тмesraes, 1970I71-ee . (8а Mlllloa) 1970/11 1971/72 1Z7] 7е � � �рц � }�,4 jp�,Q ц4,� l9е: 1ле] lgеь евдрс еидgге pviu4 Provlвloeвl 'еве{ие•в Peeveвioaвl еасiвае•а Rвtiutвa гоод euбatdy ы].б пе.е ь9е.9 9s1.e 1,:]О.ь 9]7.ь 1,ь:б,1 :,1ь:.7 г,]a.9 аае.е ]о9.е я2.9 1оо.о ьs.о 1оо.о 1оо.о ot rЬiеЬк еiев (607.0) (658.0) fSы.O) (744.1) (7BS.S) f679.]) (94].0) (1,066.1) (1,215.6) (74.1) i7S.0) (79.7) i-) (-) (-) (-) rlour t-) cse.x) с11о.о) иа7.и схlе.о) cs:.0) с]ы.ы c1,az7.9) се9ь.!) t:71.r) сlоs.ы с-) с-) t-) с-) с-) а�е.г с-) с-) с-) саб.о> c2ts.o) льs.и с7о.о) с-) сие.ы с-) ce7.s) сlоо.п) с-) г-f с-) с-) Ia[ваt Mi1k taod (-) (].2) (4.0) (e.S) (11.9) (16.t) (lS.]) (68.7) f77.7) (105.0) (В1.5) (97.0) f100.0) (65.0) f100.0) (100.0) Оебае е1о.ы t:е.Ч еп.9) иь.Ч е-) us.o) ец.:) е-> е-> е-) е-) е-) е-) е-) е-) е-) lоод Btupa - - - - - - - - 50В.0 l,бl].6 l,StO.� l,475.0 l,S10.0 1,4t1.0 1,510.0 1,510.0 Квгоидв 8сирв - - - - - - - - 59.г 1ы.1 )ье.о lп.о 177.о :er.o ]е7.о ]ы.о Iаеаве 8иррlмаое - - - - - - - 127.0 24].0 115.0 - - - - - - Cuerвot Тгаодвn ео Puбie Согрогасiоав s:.o :].ь lбь.1 1ы.s и4.] 129.1 1аь.] 1,ое1.] 92о.ь l,se:.7 l,эsо.4 1,ы 7.1 1,sse.e 1.е9].1 1.4го.е 1,9:о.е о[ vЫеhк � Cq1oa Рвега Иив Corporaeioo (-) (-) (-) (-) i-) (-) (-) (528.0) (В7.0) (-) (-) f-) i-) i-I i-) (-) к� с.уlоа Гвгеillавг Согрогае(оа с-) е-) с-) esь.s) е-> е-> с-) г-) ез9s.o) (sso.ы еы 7.о) с:е1.ы и,ооо.о) Uei.ei и,о0о.о) сеоо.о) ис1Ь eo.ra с-) с-) сs4.ь) сье.о) ro6.o) саб.о) с79.и се:.е) сsл.о) cs].о) t4а.з> cos.9) спs.о) с:1.]) ca.o) ca.o) с.аенl тгаовроее еоагд с-) t-> е-) е-) е-) е-> с-) еааа.о) tes.o) eesб.9) е-) u2s.o) t-) ие].о) с-) esso.o) оеЬ.г гиыlс согрогаеtоа. е2:.о) е:з.ы и1.7) ео1.о) ив.]) а].1) еы .г) пьь,s) е:99.а) es2:.o) ебь9.и е1,:ал.е) cso].е) и,sбl.ы a9s.e) е7аs.в) Си[гмс Тладпв ео Свуlод Соvвгавваt 8а{lvay - - - - - - ]5.о е.о 19.о ео.о 11t.2 19в.9 ]77.а te].о ]7е.7 4]s.� Iateeввt Buбaidy to Natlоавl е.�гае. е.а>< - - - w.� 1п.б 1п,ь и.б 1и.ь 91.ь a�.• ]ее.о еоl.о ы о.о soo.o soo.o soo.o ТвьеЬооk еиЬв{ду - - - - - - - - - 5].0 50.0 67.0 65.0 65.0 60.0 60.0 � тоеаl ыs,б 7]е.ь еьs.о !,1]s.o 1,]77.] 1,о7я.] 1,ые.е s,оы,ь 4,1ы .! о,]!].б ],e9s.I о,:е:.9 ь,е:е.: a,s:o.o е,ць,s •,9u.s еаиеее■е СвоегаL Тгвввигук аад Ceotral ьаоk о[ Сеуlоа. BEST С®P1f AVAlLA��E fаЫа S.OS; Gl1ТА1 CЯCND1Nte A11D ее7 L6eDIN0, 1970/71-14 i/ (ег в111iеп) J,y]S/ц 14�цti 191�, ц1! }.41! 1.4i.4 1у,ц 19ц 1}1р 19lр 1921 1яе: 19ез :+е• еидбес еидб.е боvlид Praviвioaal егеi..евв Prorieioыl евеiвв[а■ La iucвв Ае/и1в1t[оо о! еевl евввt. �,j,� � ¢,Q} jJ,Q J.062 1.425 1.11I j,)j� э.74е �,,ypq �,�р! �,g},1 r.7S6 .. .. .. с1вi1 ддвiоiпиеiае 2: 4: s1 ы ее 91 я0 23е боо б:б 319 1,а0 1ья .. .. .. � боеiаl eoerieee 10] 1ээ l]] 127 199 э01 2э9 6 U 1,781 1,749 7э2 900 ' 1,471 .. .. .. бдиевеlоо сьэ) с19) (]я) аи сsэ) (123) (1te) с137) ca9) иsе) с1: и и7и сы :) .. .. .. w.teь иы (:ы (]ы tэ7) (еы и1и (1э) си9) ае1) сбо:) иы ) си4) сеы ) .. .. .. eouelse (11) с:ы (1:) ае) с11) (ь3) с13) ust) (97s) (7эt с7:) с137) cw2) .. .. .. оеь.г (1е) (э2) (1б) иы cw) t7Ч а7� t27i сы ) сиб) ся7) ся» сеы .. .. .. ееоео■1е еог.lеае ]w эб: 4w 3:3 77s 1,oso 7е1 1,]о: :,оы :,т2э 2,эи 2,п1 2,е1о .. .. .. Аееlеиlеигв е 7гг!{вtlоо (1э2) (1)]) (160) (2S]) (э07) (rl1) (]]61 (э60) (S67) (9l0) (6S1) (1 0]б) (1 131) .. .. .. Pleheeiee (]) (1) (]) (1]) (э1) (]б) (2l) (]]) (71) (172) (119) �1]1) F11SI .. .. .. Мвеиtвееигlеб ь M1eioб cs) м) n:) п0) с9) us) (и) (:я) csu cs1) roe) аб> c2os) .. .. .. тг.а• (w) c1s) (7) (э) (7� с:Ч (1о) (17ь) an (1б) сб) сця) c2s) .. .. .. Со�иоiеасlоав (lSl) (701) (731) (74б) (421) (544) 1404) (704) (1,340) (1,513) (1,211) (1,215) <1,573) .. .. .. СврiЧ1 7гваеtвг. �2Q j�Q¢ j� }Oi 4Q¢ 1.02э �j 2.Sfl6 �,,4]В 6.251 7.747 )Q.64] 12.041 .. .. .. гиеие Coepontloee 7е) ae 3еб ]7е 77о яы ебе :,абе э,11: ь,оеь 7,и4 1о,ьы 11,so: .. .. .. оеь.г ]я 4е б1 74 ]ь ьо б9 sao зэь 11в и3 162 ss9 .. .. .. сго.в Lвodiaб 1!I �. � � ii.� i4i 2� � �. �SI �LL S�i 1� LiS1 •• •• •• ot vбieб вeauleltioo а[ [iмоеИl ике. oti 8ri Irokв eleetrieiep еовгд (-) (-) (-) (-) (4S1 (4]) (б]1 (l69) (160) (149) (195) (166) (695) .. .. .. Су1оо 7гваероге lоагд (-) (-) (-) (бб) (-) (!0) (-) (-) (2Ч) (269) (17U (э71) (450) .. .. .. Оавllоевtвд eap.editurв £/ � �¢ _4 ,�Q �Q _¢ � _ �j 2яе 167 �гZ �,4¢ .. . .. .. ,'е fatвl Capltol бtрведiеигв аед Na Иодiоб `� ь7 с.аекаl ьавt с1■ецtlе,еlов � еоо 91: 1,1ы 1,24s 1,яе) 2,б7б :,194 s,ь:4 7,729 и,937 и,77б 1ь,оь0 19,911 .. .. .. Iлen Оедве еарвадitигв Provi.loee - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,91е .. .. .. Lвut foenвu 1а Dвровlb о[ болго>виt Corporaeiooe !/ 56 2ь -1ь -165 9 5 l01 lS7 ]б] -592 19 17S - .. .. .. . сарlе.l еер.едlсиго б М.е иодlое 71: еее 1,17s 1,41о 1,я7е :,б71 :,оя] s,:ьб 7,э17 12,е37 �/ )),737 1s,ees и,9ьь 1s,s7e 1б,и] и,]а9 .. Мое .vвil.бo. е/ еЧ Leetootв е/ to 7вЫв S.OI (ог [1воа1 7ии. �/ eequieitloo о[ lloaaeial аеиtв. £/ Oeallaeвtвd еоее ot RlСе вод tЬв deeeotcв3ie.d !ид{et. Гог 1980-61 рогlод, eht dвtalle огг и[olloret 19е: t9e: t9e] 1яе4 j�Q j�1 Aeeeerad Prдviвiaыl Aeereved jy�tej О.ео.ег.иид еидбое ие 4б 47о 46 ь2о 1:о еиррlвв.оtае7 hpieвl 7erмtиet Ргоеги 24 - 300 - SSO 30 [seqrвeN lorвl Овввtериее 9гобт►w 1�е ::1 э1s - 139 еtв Oeelвeellied - - 12i 1 477 1,230 j/ Могв aeeueetel�, "Gpieвl бвроадlеигое" 67 Свеегаl 0аеУ oL Cq1oa dвplsleioo 1ме loao гора7в.пе гоевiре.. ТЬо Coetral бвеk дои • eot Уев tЬа eaR "ре L.бд1ц." е/ еврrо ео овt ебеабв 1о 7сиеиq дерееlи (1.е. 7noaler. oet ot дtЬдиrвlв). j/ 2аеlиlи ев э06 вllэiоо бeiee tбe герарвоеt оЕ epwiвl вдввеево Ьр еbв Сгоtгаl eaek. ��t CвateaL бваk е1 Gp1ee. BEST С�РУ AUAILABLE Table 5,06: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET DEBT SERVICES, 1970/71-84 A/ (as Million) 1970171 1971/72 1973 1974 1976 1977 1979 IM IM IM 1982 1993 1984 Budget Budget Revised Provisional Estimates Provisional Estimates Estimates Domestic Debt Amortization 107 135 197 290 248 293 422 644 683 903 1,002 11939 3,765 3,860 709 709 Interest 267 324 399 461 561 668 822 1,083 1,339 1,864 3.143 4,196 5,915 5,354 6,261 6,261 roceigo Debt Debts hold by Sinking Fund Amortization 2 2 2 2 38 - - - - - - - - - Interest 4 5 5 5 3 - - - - - - - - - - - Iroceigo Governments and International Organizations Amortization 134 192 231 269 306 356 $25 502 499 600 607 673 1,418 1,165 1,659 1,659 Interest 65 84 110 114 135 172 191 285 357 413 713 915 1,455 1,270 1,734 1,734 Total IForeign Debt Amortization 136 194 233 271 346 368 525 502 499 600 607 673 1,416 1,165 1,659 1,659 of which: FREC Cost (46) (69) (89) (93) (125) (136) (91) (-) (-) (-) (-) Interest 69 89 115 119 138 172 191 285 357 413 713 915 1,455 1,270 1,734 1.734 of vbich: FERC Cost (24) (32) (44) (45) (52) (64) (55) &I See footnote IL/ to Table 5.01 for fiscal years. Sources Central lack of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE 3аЫа S.07к СОУВд11МВИУ СМ'teдPRI868, 1970/71-84 �,/ (Rв М[111оо) 12Z4I11 71 1�3? lYZ4 }41� 14L¢. 19,Zi, 13i¢ 13Z4 jS4,Q 14а1 1982 198э 1984 ' R.61iYlУ Pгoviвiooal ВидЕвеtваеав Peoviвieыl БвеиLаеи Евеiввtвв А. Reveauв 1а0 169 17В У18 272 2э7 У39 192 171 473 488 514 S11 58S 691 бэб е. Eeouer.ne вдрводiеитв �/ це и7 ив 197 s16 :пб sбe зоо s9x sоэ боо 7эп 908 ебе 1,о7: 1,о7г of vhep; lotareet, Divldвad, двиt раlд ео Соvеговвоt (2) (х) (х) (э) (а) (3) (б) (7) (8) (10) (12) (14) (15) (160) (16) (а.а.) оеь.г Рауварев ео covaro.eac (1г) (2s) cs6) с29) еэs) сэа) сэ5) са5) (sэ) (5а) са7) с93) е1о9) сlзо) с1а5> еп л.) С. Curreat еигрlиа fA - 8) 12 42 40 21 l6 11 -75 -В -19 -80 -112 -199 -э71 -18э -э79 -4эб n. сарlиl Е:раодllига а1 хб а7 5о 1sx 1яь 1эх г97 sas sos аб: эао аеа эб7 аsэ аеэ PorL УвеЕог. Увм ливе S/ i Е. Rвьееив S1 5а а7 S3 ба 59 80 75 79 - У.О 0.7 - - - ' ° .- Р. teeurreot Espвoditure �J 46 2S 3а э1 74 э5 э9 4S 44 - - - - - - - ' 0. Сигквес 8икрlив (Е - F) 15 29 21 1t 10 2а 41 э0 3S - 2.0 0.7 - - - - б. Capital Rspвodieure 17 19 11 8 9 10 11 15 54 - - - - - - - Ров! and lаlвеоввиеiввеiоав i. lеvв¢ив 8S 10S 11� 1S1 1Sa 178 202 262 э17 э92 бУ8 11э 778 870 1,074 1,074 .1. ввеиегвое tкрведiеигв а/ 107 1ое 1хе 1па 1аа 1аг 1яь :11 aбs эоз 169 аб7 61s 5sэ 7ао 7sв Е. сигга¢с еигрlиа ск -�) -sx -1 -15 sэ 1о 1а а 51 ss е9 a9 паа 161 з1r зза 116 ь. сарlиl tspaadleura 7 s1 :9 зо аа ss а9 ае sэs е1е :ев 157 5а9 а77 as6 ьsб !/ Оп а еавА аавiв. Рое fiвeal уввrв, rев tооеооев !,/ ео iвЫв 5.01. ¢f 8авsд on thв гвеlаввlllвд даtв ивед ia the Своегаl 8веk Anoual laport. f,,/ tврlаевд 6r 8ri Lвeka ?оее Auehortey and Bri Lвaka Свг8о Corporatioo in 1979. е.а. - aot аvаilаЫв. 8аиеев: Св¢esal taak ot Свуlое. BEST С®РУ A�IAOLABLE т.ы. s.oe: сvиеит тииs}ие то Ри�ьес w�roмтl0иs, 1970/71-еь l/ (�в Mil1[ов) 1970/7l 1971/72 ур� }pt,�,, �q2,�, � �ц � � � ц�у, lяех 19еа i9ы lид�ве Dud`•е �•vteed Proviв[оы1 двеisаевв }гоviв(еввl jpjJg� бвtiввtвв Авгiеиltигв б Iггiввlleo Cy1os Рвгеiциг Сагрогвеiов - - - sб.s - - - - з9s.о sso.e бз7.о 261.4 1,ооо.о и7.: 1,ооо.о боо.о livвe Ув11в7в Dвrвlорввв! lовгд 9.7 12.6 9.2 - - - - - 21.6 - - - 20.0 - - Увсве Ивоикы ео.гд о.з о.з ол о.4 о.а о.а o.s o.s л.о 4,о 7.е s.o :.о 2.о - - Маtlоввl Уаевг 8ирр17 6 Drвiaa`в lовгд - - - - - - - t,4 0.8 l.S - Lз6.S 102.1 119.6 21.5 2l.5 lцгагlво 2иввгеЬ б тиlоlоб io.eleute - - - - - - 1.9 1.4 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.2 7.2 1.2 S.0 S.0 d+rieulturвl lевигваее Ward - - - - - - 2.4 т.! 6.1 J.5 4.1 9.S 5.1 S.1 7.0 7.0 1цг1еиlеигаl Dваеlерввае AuthoritP - - - - - - - - 2.7 з.0 9.7 1з.0 20.0 19.4 22.5 22.5 Cooeelбutioe to Aarвriвo lвгвiевв - - - - - - - - 1.0 l.1 0.4 1.7 - - - r.s.0.e. - - - - - - - - s.: 1аб.4 9i.s 7е.7 - 20.i - - бtaee Р1ввЧсiов Согрогпiоа - - - - - - - - - - - 50.0 - .. - » lil.hliiц • G71ee 1iаЬвгiвв corporвtioe - - 9.S 8.2 9.4 6.5 4.7 20.1 21.0 Sp.O з.S ' - 2.0 - - Ивеиlве ueiea L Mleiea еевее Рвееillиг Мввиlaeturied Carpoutloe - - - - - - - - - - 267.0 541.0 - 494.7 - - бtae• Ilour M111ie6 Согреевеiее - - - - - - - - - 21.5 - - - - - ри(ldiet; NвcвelaL Сокрогвеiов ' - - ' ' - - - - 15.0 - 2.0 - 2.0 - ' Cerlon QЧев lвгдrвгв Corporвtiae - - б.б 7.7 S.7 - 6.2 - 26.6 - - - - 0.4 - - weleo.I м11k мпд - - s4.4 ьь.о бб.о бь.о 79.: е:.7 sa.o sз.о 44.1 45.9 2s.o п.з 2s.o 2s.o CePloo Pвtrolвua Carporвtioo - - - - - - - S2l.0 l7.0 - - - - .. - - Рврвт Coкpeutioe - - - - - - - 10.5 - 2В.7 11.2 10.0 - - - Iaduвtciвl Dвwlopввot еавгд - - 2.в 1.4 - - - - s.o - - 7.9 е.о е.о 1о.о 1о.о C.I.l.I.l. - - з.4 !.5 - - 7.9 4.4 S.7 6.0 6.�1 7.l 6.S 7.7 7.2 7.2 sri 4вkв Cuher Согроиеtоо - - - - О.з о.з о.4 о.4 2.о 2.2 1.s 4.2 7.9 7.9 7.е 7.е lL1k i A11ied Ртодиеt■ Dev. Auchorie} - - - - - - 0.5 2.з 4.0 S.6 6.5 з•р 1.4 1.4 5.7 S.7 011■ i}вев Сагрекаеlев 2.2 2.2 - - 9.0 2.0 - 16.4 27.0 41.9 • - - - - Тввtllв Corporвttoa - - - - - - - - 11.4 26.6 - - - 12.7 - 100.0 '�, ОсЬгн J 6.2 - - - 3.2 0.] 2.7 0.6 0.2 - - - - .. - - ~ 1 iZi11iL ' РаддР МвгЬвеiаб bвгд - - - - - - 6.0 !.• - ' - - з7.7 в7.7 - ' СвР1ов Coeoout Aueбoric7 - - 19.6 2.2 - - 7.0 2.! - О.з 2.l 27.6 S.6 4.1 - - Cerlos Тоигtве ео.гд - - ь.о - 9.6 1).о 16.7 19.л :ь.о и,е ц.е ss.o бs.o 7s.o ьs.о бs.o Свееиl Тгаавроее lовгд 4.о 4.е n.9 :.s - - - Эо4.о вs.о 4s6.9 - 12s.0 - 1е1,о - 1so.o Port Ge�o Согрогвеlов - - 7.0 O.S - 2.0 S.0 - - - - - - - - lевев Се`ieeвrlos Corpoeaeioe - - 16.2 4.6 4.7 2.1 - - - - - - - 24.0 - - lигави о! Се}loe 8еведвгд■ 1.5 2.6 2.0 - - - 2.5 1.9 2.S 2.7 з.5 4.7 4.5 4.S 9.0 9.0 Мвtlоовl loutб Berrieвa Couaeil - - - - - - - 1.♦ 20.0 10.0 29.7 Э2.0 ]2.0 з2.0 ц.0 з2.0 . Nвeiooal �ррtвдtiсгвЫр Rовгд - - - - - - - 19.0 з0.0 41.0 48.5 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 R.e1oo.1 Oewlop..o! p.s„iee - - - - - - - - л.о 1s.o 1з.о и.2 1е.о 1е.о 1е.о 1е.о Соорвеаеiгв Маы�еиее бм[ев Севtвг - - - - - - - - - l.0 !.2 1.S б.б 2.S 5.l 5.1 . Соввrевввt Овввд tu■leeu Oadertвkletв ' ' - - - - ' - - - - - - 5l.7 - ' tеlаЬигвевеаt о! Lовив w lиев Сегрогвеiов■ - - - - - - - 42,g - • • - 105.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Отевtее СоlавЬо бeoeorie Соввiввiоо ' - - ^ - - - 12.1 - - 1.S - - .. - Соорвгаtiвв УЬоlеевlв lвевЫlвЬаеве - - - - - - - - L9.6 2.7 75.5 12.2 - .. - 50.0 AirPort Dеrвlорввоt AulЬoritP - - - - - - - - 21.0 - - - - •• ' - Са}Ioa RLaeCrieieT toard - - - - - - - - - - - 137.2 - .. - 150.0 Св71ов rhlppio� Cerporвtioe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - So.O ось.г. !*/ _ ,_J,,1 9.1 12.5 6.0 17.9 __6.7 2.е 19.0 :6.4 72.7 з2.е :о.б 1.♦ зо.о 1о.о ттдг 2з.9 :з.б 16ь.) 16з.s 1з4.з 12e.s i46.з 1,ое1.1 9:о.4 1,sa2.7 1,зsо.• 1,697.i 1,s:e.6 1,691.1 1,42о.е 1,9:о.е .. tee ar.I1■ыв. �/ Р1вви вее toatootв �/ te ТвЫв S.o1 Lor ltвевl 7ввгв. ¢/ t;atltiЧ rhleh reeeire 1еи tЬвв И l0 вilltos вrвг} 7ваг 1о еЬв рвгlед еаvвгвд. �!: Mieiete} о! tiвввев вдд Р1вавlаб. BEST С�Р1( AV��1� �, , т.ы. s.oo, еАретА1. тмибгlбs то vu611e Соеромт70ыs, 197о/71-еа 1/ (Ув Xi111oo; 1910/71 1971/72 уц� ур� �уу� � 1эn 1э7е 1�_�_q �р"ео �9,� 1яе: 19и 1яе4 tudpt бид{et еегiвед Peeviвieeal Iвгlваее■ leeviвieeal Qвtiutu Чtlввtвв е{гlеиlеии б teeioetoo 11е.1 116.1 1а1.7 ►9s.e 2]4.2 197.1 165.2 �,,� j,}j,},,,s з.бо:.о а.аев.б 1.97а.6 е.бьа.е е.::].1 I.729.1 7.9ое.1 wьвгцl Овrвlор.еве еовгд а7.ь sа.з s9.9 1и.9 1ы .1 и1.о 1а.е ы s.9 1,и7.1 ],;ео.9 а,е1ь.1 7,1ао.б б,т.о ь,9п.е ь,о17.о ь,lяь.о игег v.t1.r. оегоlор■еее еовгд ье.s бе.: 7я.7 7:.о еа.е se.e u.s аs.ь бо.о и.1 з5.о п.s - - - ееви гlвоевеlоов Сегреиеlоо 1.о 2.6 е.ь я.9 :.з з.о - - б.: ие.1 ео.а 2а2.э з:е.э 1ае.5 2]9.6 ];9.ь еае. Аег. Dlгвкв(liевеiоо вод апеt..вое Аиебогlе� - - - - - - - - - 7ь.s 1е.9 15.е 1s.o :4.о :о.о :о.о Соеооие llввввгеЪ еевгд - - - - •.б 1.) а.е 9.а 11.7 12.9 10.• 11.2 9.7 17.1 17.е 17.е Соеооие Culeivвeloe еовгд - - - - - - - - 12.л :7.7 ]э.9 е.а s.ь s.o .;.� ,у.ч Увеег еиоигеи бовгд - - - - - - - 2.е 10.6 ♦.е 4.а 5.0 2.5 2.S ].2 7.2 JвsвеЬв lвевев Derвlepиoe еовед - - - - - - - 2.0 176.7 Т9.6 11;.0 102.6 75.а 115.0 1aS.0 Тев ева11 Celdio{ bеvвlорввое Autpori[� - - - - - - - - O.S 2.S 11.9 27.0 •5.9 16.е 75.6 ]S.6 vпм еиррl� б Dгвlов{е еовгд - - - - - - - - - - ]а2.5 лб.] 1,]7я.9 яаб.7 1,1оа.б 1,1оа.б аеьеn � 1.о 1.1 а.1 - 1.а ;.о и.1 е.ь ь.5 а.е s.s ].s :.] :.з :.а :.• цlйкц9t 1L4 1L�. L! � �2 Lь4 l3s4 l.г,.i !l,.4 44,.4 l4.4 ]L.t , 1.1 Q 1l..2 1l3 1�,£ Cq1eo гiвЕвеlи Согрогцlод вод tiвheeT ввгЬои ц.о п.б 7.е 9.о 2e.s 17.9 1ь.я зs.а а5.9 9а.б :е.е 1:.7 11.о 1а.7 1].о и.о Мвеиlвеtиi(Ое б Mislea 11е.: �fy� 120.1 §�,,�, 29е.1 s;s.e да7.2 1.2Ч.7 ]J9�§,f/ 577.2 2е].е 510.1 ]20.7 :v.e 622.0 622.0 e.rloo слоое Cospoueioo 7.о е.е - - s.2 :].9 19.о :е.1 - - - - . _ _ _ Су1ое Свюlев Соероевеiоо - 2l.9 2.S 1S.I 49.0 19.0 - - - - - . - . Су1оо Мlовгвl lведв Corpeлtleo - 1.2 7.7 0.7 1а.6 2а.е 2е.9 27.7 - -0.9 - - - - - - Су1оо еlТгоод Сегрегвtlоо 2а.9 9.0 20.1 S.2 2.6 6.1 е.7 0.] - - - - - . - - Сеуlао etael Corpoeвtioo 1.2 O.S S.S а.2 7.7 Se.] а2.2 67.5 - 10.7 7.9 - а.0 79.! 2.7 2.7 4rtвrs рврег Mi1lв Corpoucioo и.б е.7 29.: а7.з 17е.• 7е.9 и.7 ]з.7 - ао.• ь.е - - - э7.о а7.о eaeioыl М11У еавгд 1.S 11.а 1a.6 1.9 1.9 2.0 ].7 - l2.8 15.5 50.5 62.7 9.0 9.0 S.0 3.0 1lвеiоовl твгсllе Согрокаеlое :т.а 1е.7 я.о з.я зо.1 s1.e ]:.з а.: 1о.] -:.о - - б.о э1.s as.: as.: бri Lвоtв 8иевг Согрогвсiее - - - 7.1 э1,а 1о.о - - а.5 е.о аб.е 7s.a :7о.о 12:.s as.o аз5.о ес.е. p.eeiliser Мвоиtвсеигiо{ Сагр. - - - - :.7 ц:.е 2эе.е 1,оы .А - ]я7.5 ee.s ]оо.о - - - - ЬЧег Ол Согрогвеiое 1S.o - ' - ' ' ' ' - ' - ' ' - ' - еевев тLlег corpaиtleo 7.7 - 12,2 2.6 1.7 -l.] О.а -1.е - 0.1 - - - - - - ttвег Овvа2орвгоt б Coortгueeiee Сегр. - - - - 0.6 а5.5 - 6.0 - - - - - - _ _ Су1оо ееtгоlеив Cerpoиtien - - - - - Ьо.0 - е.2 - 10.7 - - - - - . 011 вед Iвев Сегрегвеiеа - - - - 1.0 4.1 - - - 25.1 ]а,7 10.9 25.7 25.7 15.0 15.0 еtвев ►вгеllisвг Сегроевеlоо - - - - - - - - 25.0 9.7 ]].1 61.1 б.] 6.7 25.0 25.0 , виЬМг квоиlвееигiе{ Corpoutlos ' - - 7.2 5.а 5д а.5 а.б - - - - - - - - о еtвСо ргlаеlев Cerpoeвtiee - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - 51.6 51.6 � оеевгв � 1о.] и.о а.] о.7 ].s а.5 ].9 е.е 1е.1 2s.e u,s - о.1 о.1 s.s s.s 9311lг il+� �:2 lL,.l J91ь4 1О3.ь2 3J�..! 1!!ь4 l4}��. 4Q1.ьS f/ 1+4}i..! 1+�ZL3 1.9!!Ll 2�.SO�r.� �ь]!L3 2.У!?i ]у?�3 G71oo АрргвоtlсввЬlр bвгд - - - - 7.7 11.0 - - - - 7.6 10.0 29.2 12.0 2а.0 2а.0 еуlое еиеегlеlq еовгд - - 25.6 1о.о 1о.о 15.о 6.s ь:.] ]:.• иб.7 ы 2.s 2в7.а е1.о ио.о 1e2.s 1e2.s Свуlоо еlippie{ Согрегвсiое - - 12.1 1S.S - - - - - - - - - 1SS.6 200.0 200.0 С.тtев Тгвовvоге еовгд 17.7 - - - а2,о 1.о 7s.o и2.е - ь.: 1,] _ _ - - ьоо.о Iвдивегlвl Dевеlориое bвед 7.S 9.1 12.5 - - - - - - г1.2 10.0 1д0.7 4.4 ♦.♦ а.а А.а 4ад евlел Сооlввiао - - 2.S 52.0 S7.S 47.5 115.0 225.0 16е.1 150.0 150.0 125.0 125.0 бtгueoet Wwlopиee �евгд - - O.s 1,о ц.: зь.з u.s - е.о 1s.e :о.б e.s 9.о е.7 9.о 9.о • идду wr6ecloe бовгд 7.: 1з.о e.s ::.: :.о з.7 1е.1 - 12].б 97.е 1ь.5 :.7 :.7 - - еиавггь ь ееlвоеlпе 2o.eieuee 1.i 1о.1 :7.е и.9 - о.1 - - 2.0 - - - - - - - еевtе taeiaмeia{ Weporвeioe - - 0.5 ао.0 - - - - - - - - _ - _ - D[riвioыl Dвгвlерввое CouoelL - - - - - 47,7 а0.А - - - - . - _ . _ h�1oe бговдеввеiое Согрогвtlоо 2.6 0.е 7.) 1.0 2а.а 2.е 2.0 1.0 6.0 - - - ].5 ].S - - Се11оо 8оевlв Согроевtlее - - - O.S 7].] 9.9 - - - 2.2 2.9 - - - Ср1ое Согеоие АиеЬо.iеу - - - - 29.7 21.2 - - 0.4 6.S 17.б 112.6 26.0 129.2 129.2 Огове.г СоlовЬо [геоовiе Совiввlоо - - - - _ - _ 2,1 122,в 1о.о ss.e ьо.о ьо.о бо.о бо.о бо.о Аlгроге. Aueposler ot ег1 Laakв - - - - - - - - - 16.6 ]1.9 ее.а - - - зое.о rвеlеsвl Уеивiе{ О.геtорввос Аиеьогlе� - - - - - - - - - 976.о 1,о:о.о 7о2.е s71.o s71.o ss2.o ss2.o Соlовбо 0lвt. tееlаввеlоа 6 Oeve{орвоае мвгд - - - _ _ - - - ее.9 1os.o зь.] ае.е ]7.s 1е.а 6.s ь.5 Оебве Овиlерввое Аиерогlе7 - - - - - - - - 2а.1 ео.о 2оо.о - :9.s ез.о :9.5 29.5 А1е Чеkв - - - - - - - - ]00.0 - 0.5 ;00.0 700.о 90о.0 1,000.0 1,000.0 8е( 4ебв роге АиеЬогlе� - - - - - - - - - - - 16.7 :ы .1 :.9 :и.е :12.е Мiво toeвU Сегролеtое - - - . - - - - - - а9.1 - - - - - o.OJ.o. - - - - _ - - - - - - 1U.0 l50.0 2а.5 100.0 100.0 tspeet Свввlорвввt �овгд - - - - - - - - - - - - 252.д -° 4 252.0 252.0 Оебвгв !/ 7.9 jZьd �4. JSL.�. 1Q.a1 .I1.ь� .�.4� ... �I..e4 �1 r1 _3Sa1 �Sг� �aL �!91�. �Оа� �S�.d �4,.4 тоти, 2е1.а 25е.1 зм.2 27е.: 77о.о 9ь].: ебе.2 2,о7о.о э,1и.е ь,оеб.: 7,17а.1 10,4ьо.7 11,s01.e 1o,es2.9 и,2ая.д 12,]яь.а Е/ рlиве вее [еоеооев {/ ео Твl1о S.O1 !ег liвевl Тин. �/ totleia rA1eh геевlид Ии tрве Rв 10 вillioe виееу уевг ie ебе pesiad еоинд. g/ Севрlвtо бrulde.e оее аrвilвЫе. )<уу�евк Свеtлl tвоЬ о! Св�lеа. BEST СВРУ А�lA11ABLE таы. б.о1: [пrиеет итд8 Ог и/цод с8801т Ад0 влvlдс8 1д8птитсодs, 1я7о-84 � (3 рет адп:л ве едд оЕ рвгlод) 14Z4 ].S1k 1� !4ц � 19]3 19l4 14�! 1яе2 l.р� 1L J coveesr..ne тиавигу e11ta k/ 4.7s s.oo s.0o я.оо 9.оо я.ао и.оо и.оо 1з.s0 12.Оо 12.оо е.оетаl e.nk еаео s/ б.so 6.3о 6.so 1о.оо 1о.оо 1о.оо 1:.оо ,~.оо 1].оо 12.оо 12.о0 oeroslr итее Саввгеl■l Вапkв 12 Neдthв Ilкгд Dвров[е• 4.50-4.75 7.00-7.50 7.00-7,50 14.00-lS.00 14.00-13.00 14.00-15.00 20.00 10.00-22.00 15.00-22.00 16.00-23.00 16.00-25.00 еаviодв Dapoвitв 4.50 3.30 3.50 7.20 7.20 3.00-я.00 10.00-14.00 10.00-14.00 10.00-l4.S0 10.00-15.00 10.00-13.00 8avioiв Ioвtitueiooв Nae{одвl eвvinp Ввдk a.vtne. Mpoaiu з.sо-4.оо �� 7.2о 7.2о е.ао б.ао 8.4о и.оо 12.оо 12.Оо и.оо и.оо 11 lbntbв Вiк.д Dвравitв 4.30 �/ 7.30 7.50 13.00 15.00 15.00 20.00 20.00 70.00 20.00 10.00 10-Т,вг BвviaBa Свгt1liеаеев 3.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 ' 11.00 L1.00 1l.0о 11.00 11.00 11.00 ' g : ><ед0lде итее Соввксiвl евпtв Ввеигед 6.50-12.00 6.S0-17.00 6.30-14,00 10.00-Z0.00 10.00-20.00 10.00-20.00 11.00-2].00 11.00-]0.00 11.00-]0.00 11.00-70.00 11.00-]0,00 Uдевеигед в.sо-12.оо 9.3о-14.оо 9.3о-14.оо 1е.оо-по.оо 16.оо-2о.оо 16.o0-s1.ao 1я.оо-эо.0о 19.оо-з:.оо 1а.оо-з2.оо 11.оа-зо.оо и.о0-]о.оо Lапв-тв л Ceвdit Iдгеlеиеiад■ ене. Иогt8цв e.nk �/ s.oo-1o.s0 s.oo-1:.0o s.ao-12.0o s.oo-12.0o s.oo-1:.ao s.oo-16.00 3.оо-:о.оо 1:.оо-24.оо 12.оо-:а.оо 12.оо-:а.оо 12.оо-24.оо Aдrieultural аад lодивtтiвl Cradit Сотросвtiоав !( 9.00-12.00 9.00-11.00 9.00-13.00 32,00-13.00 11.00-14.00 !Е � !� !) 1� S� Derelopв.ot •iдвдев Сотрогвеiопв 9.50-10.30 9.30-12.30 9.30-12.30 9.50-13.00 9.S0-1].00 10.S0-1Ь.00 10.50-17.00 1Э.00-17,00 17,00-17.00 1Р.00-14.00 12.00-14.00 Мвtlоеиl 9оиаiпд Dapartв.at 11.00 6.00-9.00 6,00-9.00 6.00-9.00 6.00-9.00 6.00-9.00 6.00-9.00 6.00-9.00 6.00-9.00 6.00-9.00 6.00-9.00 даеiопаl eav[д`в е.д>< 10.oo-1s.oo :;/ 1о.00-12.оо 9.Оо-1:.оо 9.оо-1:.оо я.оо-17.оо 9.оо-1].оо я.00-17.0о 12.оо-17.оо 1:.оо-17.оо 1:.оо-17.оо 12.Оо-17.оо �/ бдд о[ ввЬеивеу 19б4. k/ Rвi8Ьевд вvетвее ot billв iвеивд од евддвг. g/ 4tв ве vbich hдtral Ввдk providu вдvвдееа to еоавгаiвl banb ■ееиевд Ьу Соvвгптвпе ■дд Сеvоrпввпе guвranteed eeeuricies. деfiдвпее Eвailieieв toc produetire ригроив агв еикеедеlу аvв цвЫв вt гвtм rao8ie8 Егав 1.S0-17.00x. д% lдевтмt таtве !от thв Сеуlод Bavinef Ввд1<, the Уове Oi11ee 8avin8в lапУ, апд tlte 8вviп8в Certllieвte Fuad. Theae inвtleueiona иеге игrед vieh ehe двеiооаl Ваvlд8в eank од Арг11 1, 1972. !/ Оп �впwсу 1, 1979, tЬв АВНеиltиевl впд Iддицтiаl Credit Corporatioas vагв wl8шtвд inco eha Bcate Xortgцe Ввпk. длигсв: Свпtrвl еадk оЕ Сеуlпд. 1 ���►?с C�DP� AVa1LA�LE Table 6,02: MONETARY SURVEY, 1971-84 1/ (Re Million-, end of period) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 127 1977 1978 1979 MBO 1981 1982 n83 1984 h/ Hot Foreign Assets -455 -376 - 28 -211 -429 8 24.U I.JAO 6.706 3.477 2 780 1 2.749 A" Central lack -572 -551 -250 -530 -738 -432 2,517 4,408 5,362 1,602 1,049 131 480 1,705 Commercial Banks 117 175 222 319 309 470 1,108 1,092 1,344 1,875 1.731 1,980 2,269 2,745 Not Domestic Assets 5.010 6.016 5.426 64450 §,224 8.365 10,258 12,848 17,963 32,040 39,618 48,313 26.§20 53,981 Met Credit to Government 2,724 2,900 2,679 2,532 2,831 3,316 3,009 1,889 2,962 cl 9,100 12,889 17,236 17,639 16,268 Credit to Private Sector 1,760 2,187 2,165 3,239 3,404 3,985 5,785 8,812 11,082 16,208 20.763 24,934 31,345 31,822 Other Credit 29 13 is 86 20 15 21 -100 142 -166 -142 14 514 -116 Other Assets 497 916 567 593 669 1,049 1,443 2,247 3,777 6,901 6,108 6,129 7,122 6,007 Central Bank (excluding Guarantees) (68) (71) (81) (78) (149) (278) (681) (681) (1,462) (2,938) (1,857) (884) (948) (519) Commercial Banks (429) (845) (486) (515) (520) (595) (1,165) (1,566) (2,315) (3,963) (4,251) (5,245) (6,174) (5,488) Monetary Liabilities 3.379 3.917 4.094 4.504 4.712 6.250 J...W 10,803 14,957 19,709 24,287 30,249 36,818 38,583 Money 2,128 2,461 2,757 2,922 3,064 4,133 5,332 5,895 7,643 9,333 9,950 11,673 14,589 14,772 Currency (1,115) (1,202) (1,437) (1,539) (1,610) (2.080) (2,792) (3,015) (3,774) (4,181) (4,823) (5,988) (7,200) (7,229) Demand Deposits (1,013) (1,259) (1,320) (1,383) (1,454) (2,053) (2,540) (2.879) (3.869) (5,152) (5,127) (5,685) (7,389) (7,543) Quasi-Money 1,251 1.456 1,337 1,582 1,648 2,117 3,303 4,908 7,314 10,376 14,337 18,576 22,229 23,810 Other Liabilities 1 176 1 723 1_1_3_02 1 735 1 783 2 153 54,247 7 546 9 713 15,808 18,111 20,175 22,550 19,849 Central Bank (excluding Guarantees) 456 490 522 634 708 957 2,806 3,970 5,329 9,124 9,572 10,352 10,471 8,843 Commercial Banks 720 1,233 780 1,101 1,075 1,196 2,441 3,576 4,384 6,684 8,539 9,823 12,079 L1,006 I/ This table is not consistent with the Country Data sheet, which uses as a source the IMF's International Financial Statistics. Jl/ Eod-February 1984. .q/ Adjusted for amounts in Suspense Account Paddy Marketing Board and/or Goods Receipts. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 7.01: VOLUME OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, a/ 1970-83 (Indices, 1968 * 100) 1970 M 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 k/ 1983 h/ Tea 94 97 95 94 91 95 87 93 89 92 85 93 83 79 Rubber 107 95 94 104 89 104 106 98 104 103 89 83 83 90 Coconut 97 100 114 82 85 92 80 74 86 91 81 90 100 92 Paddy 120 100 94 94 118 82 90 123 139 141 158 164 159 182 Highland Crops 130 157 164 222 254 284 295 310 310 286 298 316 354 357 Livestock and Livestock Products 104 109 129 125 118 113 111 120 124 131 138 148 156 172 Minor Export Crops 93 64 78 113 121 88 158 251 211 222 212 293 288 325 TOTAL 105 102 105 105 112 109 111 123 129 131 135 144 147 155 I/ These indices are calculated on the basis of value added figure. h/ Provisional. Sogrce: Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 7.02: PADDY CULTIVATED AREA AND PRODUCTION; RICE AVAILABILITT, PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION. 1970-83 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 EJ 1976 121 M 1912 .lli 1181 119.1 # 1911 k1 Cultivated Area ('000 hectares) Extent Asveddumized S, 570 575 586 583 607 622 621 643 659 684 653 702 706 724 of which: Major Irrigation Scheme (179) (181) (184) (188) (196) (203) (205) (208) (217) (226) (243) (258) (258) (270) Minor Irrigation Scheme (162) (163) (166) (165) (168) (173) (177) (181) (185) (184) (177) (177) (178) (180) Gross Area Sowa 760 726 727 725 825 696 724 828 876 839 845 87) 61#5 825 Net Area Harvested ('000 ha) 611 590 543 571 661 509 541 666 724 697 728 740 661 689 Kab 384 375 356 373 447 302 363 431 471 494 496 501 424 495 Yale 227 215 187 198 234 207 178 235 253 203 232 239 237 194 Paddy Production and Yields Paddy Production ('000 tons) 1,616 1.396 1,312 1,312 1,602 1,154 1,252 1,677 1.891 1,917 2,133 2,230 2,156 2,477 Naha 1,033 867 883 876 1,098 719 882 1,144 1,286 1,393 1,453 1,523 1,363 1,786 Yale 583 529 429 436 504 435 370 533 605 524 680 707 793 691 Average Yield (kg per hectare harvested) 2,664 2.366 2,416 2,298 2,353 2,270 2,315 2,521 2,613 2,750 2,927 3,014 3,260 3,591 lice Availability ('000 tone) Rice Production 4/ 1,131 977 918 918 1,121 808 876 1,174 1,286 1,304 1,450 1,516 1,509 1,734 Net Domestic Supply aJ 995 860 808 808 958 711 771 1,033 1,132 1,148 1,276 1,334 1,328 1,526 Opening Stock of PC 1/ n.S. 259 180 74 73 63 98 61 173 116 129 68 105 115 Opening Stock of PHB I na. U.S. n.a. na.. 12 49 17 15 103 128 65 38 32 33 lice Imports h/ 534 339 266 344 332 457 419 526 160 212 190 157 160 123 Total Consumption j/ 1,228 J/ 1,245 J/ 1,150 1/ 1,109 .1 1,255 1,134 1,197 1,316 1,320 1.420 1,394 1,521 1.487 1,627 Procurement and Distribution lice Procured by PKB ('000 tones) 379 473 383 332 303 169 188 358 469 378 142 85 59 227 lice Distributed by FC ('000 tons) 650 893 805 696 567 629 634 722 671 447 327 159 161 190 Kemrandum Items (as a percentage) Imports/Rice Consumption 43.5 27.2 23.1 31.0 26.5 40.3 35.0 40.0 12.1 14.9 13.6 10.3 10.8 7.5 Imports/lice Distribution by FC 82.2 38.0 33.0 49.4 58.6 72.7 66.0 72.9 23.8 47.4 58.1 98.7 99.4 64.7 Procurement/Production 34.5 49.8 42.9 37.2 27.8 21.5 22.1 31.4 36.7 29.0 9.8 5.6 3.9 13.0 rC Distribution/Rice Consumption 52.9 71.7 70.0 62.8 45.2 55.5 53.0 54.9 50.8 31.5 23.4 10.4 10.9 11.7 A/ Revised. Provisional. Leveled and bunded land suitable for paddy cultivation. Based on conversion factor of I metric ton of paddy = 0.68 metric tons of rice. A/ Equals rice production less seed and wastage, estimated at 122 of total production. 11 TC * Food Commissioner. aj PKB * Paddy Marketing Board. i Total rice imports not adjusted for 2.52 slackage lose. L1 Apparent consumption, estimated as net domestic rice supply plus imports, adjusted for slack, plus change in the stocks held by TC and PHB. Change in stocks of private traders is ignored. j/ Does not take into account changes in stocks of PmB. SiMEAAs Food Commissioner; Agricultural Implementation Programme; and Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 7,03: CULTIVATED AREA AND PRODUCTION OF SUBSIDIARY FOOD CROPS, 1972-83 1972 1973 1971 1917 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 A/ 1983 h/ Cultivated Area ('000 hectares) Manioc (cassava) 31.3 51.5 91.3 79.2 69.4 54.6 39.9 33.5 27.0 37.1 52.9 37.5 Maize 16.3 24.2 38.5 40.1 30.4 36.7 28.6 23.6 23.4 28.0 44.9 47.2 Chillies 24.2 36.5 41.6 33.0 43.3 44.1 33.8 20.1 25.5 24.1 28.4 32.0 Red Onions 5.7 7.0 6.5 6.3 7.7 8.2 6.3 5.9 7.4 8.1 8.2 11.4 Groundauts 4.8 6.2 7.7 7.8 6.7 6.5 8.3 5.1 11.2 12.0 14.4 13.6 Green Gram 2.9 5.3 10.7 9.3 8.4 12.3 12.2 12.2 14.2 18.1 21.2 28.5 Sorghum 0.1 0.3 2.2 3.8 1.0 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.1 c/ 0.1 0.1 ... Soyabean 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.1 0.7 1.0 1.9 1.2 1.1 2.2 17.4 14.6 Potatoes 3.2 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.8 3.2 2.6 4.2 5.2 4.6 5.7 6.6 Sesame 12.3 9.7 13.0 12.7 19.0 13.5 17.0 16.7 31.5 25.1 32.7 35.1 Cowpea 0.5 1.3 3.0 8.7 19.2 30.2 27.6 30.3 25.5 38.8 35.7 45.8 Black Cram 0.5 0.5 1.4 2.0 5.1 13.9 14.1 8.7 8.4 10.1 10.0 17.5 Dhal 0.03 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.07 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.s. Sweet Potatoes 6.0 11.9 23.1 21.2 15.0 12.8 8.8 6.4 6.3 9.0 9.1 7.9 Production ('00 tons) Manion (cassava) 390.5 610.7 848.3 767.0 683.7 544.8 497.5 365.1 334.5 440.2 637.8 737.6 Maize 13.7 13.6 23.8 34.6 31.2 42.0 35.3 26.1 31.4 35.3 44.6 51.0 Chillies 12.0 19.6 18.5 16.4 19.1 32.1 28.3 21.9 25.5 21.4 26.8 29.4 Red Onions 59.0 68.2 71.0 72.8 76.7 66.3 72.3 62.8 79.1 92.2 92.7 134.8 Groundauts 5.5 5.7 7.5 7.6 6.1 5.7 7.5 5.4 14.1 14.5 13.8 17.3 Green Gram 1.4 3.0 5.9 6.0 5.1 7.8 8.4 9.7 12.9 18.9 17.7 15.1 Sorghum 0.03 0.6 3.1 6.3 1.7 2.0 0.6 0.2 0.1 c/ 0.2 0.06 Soyabean 0.04 0.2 1.3 1.2 0.7 1.1 2.9 1.3 1.1 2.4 11.1 10.6 Potatoes 46.9 39.6 30.4 27.3 38.7 33.4 38.4 52.7 75.9 63.4 65.2 82.5 Sesame 7.1 4.6 4.9 6.4 8.6 7.4 9.7 17.2 23.5 14.0 23.2 19.8 Cowpea 0.5 0.6 2.4 7.6 12.0 21.3 22.6 18.8 23.5 39.3 35.6 26.1 Black Gram 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.0 2.4 11.7 8.7 6.1 5.5 7.3 9.0 12.8 Dhal 0.04 0.2 1.6 0.2 0.04 1.4 0.4 0.05 n.S. n.. n.S. U.B. Sweet Potatoes 50.8 71.2 144.8 142.2 125.8 97.3 82.0 42.6 66.8 77.5 85.8 86.7 IL/ Revised. k/ Provisional. f/ Naha only. na.s. not available. Sources: Ministry of Agricultural Development and Research; and Department of Census and Statistics. BEST COY AVAILABLE ,ailt,94 TRE. CROPS PRODUCTION STATISTICS, 1970-83 1910 1911 I 21 12ZA 1.2 9l 1911 12m8 I2 M W1 J.l1.1 111t/ im Production (milllion kgs) 212 218 214 211 204 214 196 209 199 206 191 210 185 179 of which: High grown 81 65 81 81 80 80 76 79 72 17 73 81 72 68 Medium grown 72 16 15 70 71 73 65 67 61 63 55 59 52 48 Low grown 59 57 57 60 53 60 56 63 66 67 63 70 64 63 Exports (million kas) 208 207 190 206 175 213 200 186 193 18 185 183 181 IS8 Planted area ('000 hectares) 242 242 242 242 242 242 241 242 243 244 245 245 242 242 Average yield (kgo per harvested tecte) 1l 909 933 914 902 988 1,031 940 1,007 958 993 922 n.a. n.e. n.a. Replanted Annuals (hectares) 2,776 1,688 2,598 2,410 1,734 1,764 1,116 1,242 1,709 2,491 2,156 2,677 2,004 1,367 Replanted Cumulative (hectares) 16,310 18,998 21,596 24,006 25,740 27,504 28,619 29,861 31,570 34,061 36,217 38,8, 40,898 42,265 Production (million kas) 4/ 159 162 140 155 132 149 152 146 156 153 133 124 125 135 of which: Sheet rubber 96 80 84 92 72 87 87 85 92 8Z 72 62 62 n.a. Crepe rubber 63 61 56 62 58 59 62 59 59 517 S 47 49 'e, Exports (million kgs) 161 129 130 161 128 161 137 136 138 128 121 133 131 125 Planted area ('000 hectares) 230 230 230 229 228 228 227 227 226 221 227 206 206 206 Average yield (kgas per harvested hectare) 792 736 137 778 710 774 790 773 845 820 718 105 729 823 Replanted Annuals (hectares) 4,145 3,432 3,539 2,946 2,865 3,231 2,550 2,617 3,226 4,166 5,434 6,442 5,806 5,119 Replanted Cumulative (hectares) 115,940 119,372 122,911 125,857 128,721 131,952 134,502 137,119 140,346 144,514 149,948 155,795 161,661 166,780 COCO.UT Production (million nuts) 2,510 2,610 2,963 1,935 2,033 2,398 2,330 1,821 2,207 2,393 2,026 2,258 2,521 2,313 of which: Coconut Oil 1/ 829 1,008 1,032 488 520 960 800 393 641 803 500 605 820 619 Desiccated Coconut j 373 314 333 258 292 354 313 206 283 272 217 276 286 296 exports (million nuts equivalent) 873 1,010 1,248 417 460 845 803 281 595 537 239 403 577 88 l Revised. I/ Provisional. g/ Harvested area excludes area under immature tee and, effective 1974, abandoned tea lands. Data for 1974 onwards are calculated on the basis of the new definition of harvested area and thus are not strictly comparable with those of earlier years. At Total includes "other" rubber not shown separately, I/ In out equivalent converted at I st. ton oil * 8,000 nuts. I et. ton Desiccated coconut * 6,800 nuts. n.s. * not available. Suce: Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 7.05: TEA PRODUCER MARGIN, 1970-83 (Ra per kg) 12Q 1915 Jimi 1911 1978 1919 1980 1981 1982 .1 al/ A. Average Export Unit Value 5.37 9.08 10.50 18.86 33.22 3LLI 33.41 34.00 3. 52.52 Less: Export Duty 0.86 0.86 0.86 1.98 j/ 15.50 13.27 k/ 10.50 10.20 h/ 8.00 8.00 Ceases 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.42 0.70 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.00 FOB Charges, Exporters Margins, etc. S/ 0.52 1.09 0.13 0.15 2.76 4.04 3.68 3.35 2.69 0.25 B. Colombo Auction Gross Price 3,1 6.90 211 "jJ2 14.36 12.30 1.3i3 19,. 23.44 A3.27 C. Sales Tax j/ 0.22 0.86 1.52 3.07 2.82 1.19 0.59 1.84 0.92 6.31 D. Colombo Auction Net Price (B-C) 3.59 6.04 7.73 13.24 11.44 11.11 jjj 1 7.1 22.52 36.96 E. Cost of Production 3.55 6.73 7.44 ,AlII 1.70 J..1 18.66 2. 1 of which: Transportation/Fuel Oil n.a. 0.54 0.56 0.67 0.5 1.10 1.82 2,25 2.30 n.s Fertilizer n.a. 0.78 0.86 0.56 0.85 0.85 0.79 1.11 2,12 n.a. Tea Chests n.a. 0.65 0.71 0.71 0.84 0.95 1.19 1.45 1.62 n.a Labor n.a. 3.06 3.29 3.74 5.98 7.20 7.59 8.40 11,51 noa. Other Costa/Depreciation n.a. 1.70 2.02 2.95 3.57 3.60 4.06 5.45 5.50 n.a. F. Producer Margin (D-E) 0.24 -0A6 0.29 4.61 -0.75 =i 22 =An -i0.41 A/ Provisional. b/ The specific export duty on tea was raised to Rs 15.50 per kg in November 1977 and then lowered in July 1979 to Re 10.50. The average specific duty shown for 1977 and 1979 is calculated by dividing revenues from the specific duty by total exports. On November 13, 1981, the export duty was lowered to Rs 8/kS. The figure shown above is the estimated average for the year. ./ Residual. A/ Ad valorem tax receipts divided by total amount of tea sold at Colombo auctions. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 7,06: TEA IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 1982-83 Cost of Extent in Yield per Production at Net Sales Producers' Bearing Total Output Hectare Aj Estate Level Price Margin (ha) ('000 ki) (ki) (Re/k) (Re/kg) (Re/ke) 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 J982 1983 JEDB: b/ Avissawella 1,592 1,592 2,365 2,318 1,214 1,302 21.81 23.22 24.19 40.73 2.38 17.51 Hatton 8,371 8,350 10,443 10,281 1,172 1,178 21.84 24.16 23.35 38.12 1.51 13.96 Kandy 5,364 5,311 6,040 5,547 968 932 21.41 24.27 22.35 36.28 0.95 12,01 Nuwara Eliya 15,023 15,019 21,000 18,592 1,366 1,211 19.64 22.51 22.57 37.17 2.93 14.66 Badulla 15,477 15,185 20,936 19,724 1,263 1,179 21.28 23.75 22.73 38.96 1.45 15.21 Kegalle 1,401 1,401 2,167 1,924 1,063 1,020 21.55 26.00 23.68 39.75 2.13 13.75 Nawalapitiya 5,952 5,939 6,960 6,397 962 926 21.81 25,88 22.12 34.36 0.31 8.48 Total/Average .53180 52.797 69.911 64.783 1.207 LM 20.96 23.76 22.76 3.71 .M 13.95 SLSPC: Hatton & Matale 19,424 19,277 19,428 17,563 986 845 22.85 24.99 23.53 37.49 0.68 12.50 Nuwara Eliya, Haputale 6 Balangoda 24,612 24,171 29,840 27,516 1,075 1,025 21.08 25.01 23.07 37.62 1.99 12.61 Kal-tara & Ratnapura 5,618 5,663 8,001 7,930 1,050 968 21.16 27.53 23.58 40.80 2.42 13.27 Galle & Matara 5,999 6,143 13,170 12,198 1,205 1,075 20.92 28.36 23.63 41.14 2.71 12.78 Total/Average 5 55.254 70,439 65.207 1.061 962 21.5 25.94 2 33 .63 1.81 12.69 Grand Total 108.833 108.051 140.350 129.990 A a. n.a n.a. n.a. a.a. a n.a. Memorandum Items: Uprooting/ New Planting In filling Replanting Fertilizer Application Cleaning (ha) (ha) (he) (ha) Quantity (tons) (ikaa) 1982 1983 1982 198 1982 IM~. 1982 1983 12L2 12n1 JM2 1983 JEDB - 440 46 45 - - 596 428 - 38,082 - 721 SLSPC - - 181 239 3,997 3,469 747 487 35,990 35,120 - - A/ Derived from yields obtained at the production level and differ somewhat from the output data indicated above. k/ For 1983, thiu does not include details of Estates which were transferred to Lanka Estates Development Ltd. n.a. a not available. Note: 1. C.O.P. is at estate level. 2. Excludes administration charges interest, lease rent to LRC, depreciation, audit fees and bonus. 3. Includes a crop charge of Rs 0.35/kg. JEDB a Janatha Estates Development Board. SLSPC - Sri Lanka State Plantation Corporation. Sources: Ministry of Janatha Estates Development; and Ministry of State Plantations. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Tabie 7,07: RUBBER IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 1982-83 Cost of Extent in Yield per Production at Net Sales Producers' Bearing Total Output Hectare A Estate Level Price Margin (he) ('QQ0 kR) (ka) (Rsfkp) (Re/ks) (Ra/le) 1982 198 1982 1.981 1982 1.21 192 1283 1982 1983 1982 1.98 AEDS: ]I Avissawella 8,672 9,380 10,895 11,157 1,112 1,152 10.30 11.46 11.38 16.27 1.08 4.81 Badulla 306 306 243 257 812 842 9.80 10.35 9.73 14.03 (0.07) 3.68 Chilaw 40 40 23 29 552 722 9.84 9.94 9.29 13.55 (0.55) 3.61 Kegalle 5,240 5,187 7,371 6,607 1,144 1,176 10.11 11.25 10.58 15.75 0.47 4.50 Kurunegala 73 32 85 30 860 698 10.81 14.50 9.37 12.80 (1.44) (1.70) Total/Average 14,111 14,945 18617 10i080 1.117 1.127 10.22 11.37 11.0 11,9A 0.8 AZ. Matale 1,174 1,198 637 621 532 519 11.15 12.33 9.15 13.77 (2.00) 1.44 Balangoda 2,258 2,001 2,046 2,092 903 1,043 10.20 9.94 10.14 15.77 (0.06) 5.83 Kalutars & Ratnapura 16,657 16,485 16,413 15,910 985 925 10.20 11.22 10.63 15.64 0.43 4.42 Calle & Matara 5,265 5,057 5,341 5,386 981 1,033 9.92 10.52 10.61 15.41 0.69 4.89 Total/Average 25.354 24.741 24,437 24009 2U 937 l1j 9,M 104 1.5 0 Grand Total 32.6§2 39.686 43.054 42.0§ n.a. jua. n.a. n.a. 0.4. _-a- n a n.a. Memorandum Items: Uprooting/ New Planting In filling Replanting Fertilizer Application Cleaninia (ha) (ha) (b) (hs) Quantity (tons) (kit/ha) - 1982 191 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 192 1983 JEDB - 568 53 87 - - 755 871 - 3,054 - 205 SLSPC - - 378 235 - - 812 1,030 8,542 7,628 - - a/ Derived from yields obtained at the production level and differ somewhat from the output data indicated above. ./ For 1983, this does not include details of Estates which were transferred to Lanka Estates Development Ltd. n.a. * not available. Note: 1. C.O.P. is at estate level. 2. Excludes administration charges interest, lease rent to LRC, depreciation, audit fees and bonus. 3. Includes a crop charge of Ru 0.35/kg. JEDB a Janaths Estates Development Board. SLSPC - Sri Lanka State Plantation Corporation. Sources: Ministry of Janatha Estates Development; and Ministry of State Plantations. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 7.08: FERTILIZER ISSUES BY CROPS, 1970-83 ('000 tons) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 98 A Paddy 88.5 96.9 89.8 127.5 98.0 97.9 72.4 128.7 136.1 130.4 190.0 155.6 167.1 162.2 Tea 108.4 112.8 98.9 93.4 102.1 106.7 95.3 80.1 115.5 105.2 109.9 103.3 102.7 115.5 Rubber 20.7 17.4 11.7 14.8 12.4 20.3 13.0 12.4 20.9 23.2 22.0 16.8 16.5 18.5 Coconut 64.8 59.1 49.0 39.2 40.1 40.6 30.7 29.1 42.6 49.6 55.8 37.7 30.3 35.7 Others _ 61.2 49.7 5.0 46.5 50.8 52.9 53j 641 64.0 62,0 52.9 62.8 73.2 TOTAL 339.8 347.4 299.1 329.9 299.1 316.3 264.3 303.5 380.0 372.4 439.7 366.3 379.4 405.1 jl Provisional. Sources: National Fertilizer Secretariat; Ceylon Fertilizer Corporation; A. Daur & Co. Limited. qrg qovavaila BRI Table 8,01: GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, A/ 1976-83 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1 1976-83 (RU million) Annual Increase in Constant Prices Gross Output at Current Prices Food, Beverages. Tobacco 1,715 2,295 2,609 2,856 3,899 4,496 5,246 6,998 8.0 Textiles, Clothing, and Leather 680 698 1,008 1,128 1,923 3,040 3,863 5,136 20.6 Wood and Wood Products, including Furniture 129 127 124 166 289 315 361 522 9.7 Paper and Paper Products 203 270 376 445 476 626 725 901 6.9 Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products 2,336 2,469 3,279 4,508 9,416 12,015 13,099 11,888 14.1 Non-metallic Mineral Products (except fuels) 360 411 592 710 1,156 j/ 1,250 q/ 1,370 1,468 11.0 Basic Metal Products 138 132 219 349 478 428 262 302 -0.8 Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 474 571 590 569 620 782 904 1,129 -0.7 Other Manufactures 26 __ ___50 54 58 74 ___0g 11-C Total Manufacturing 6,061 7,007 8,852 10,781 18,311 23,010 25,904 28,434 12.1 All Kanufacturia Value Added, Current Prices 2,462 2,688 3,109 3,437 4,893 6,030 6,760 n.a. 4.8 Value Added, 1970 prices Al 1,039 790 953 964 1,187 1,320 1,413 n.a. 4.8 A/ As covered in the Central Bank's Annual Survey under which questionnaires are sent to all firms believed to have an output of Re 500,000 or more. Around 5,000 questionnaires are sent out, but there have long been around 1,500 responses only, employing in 1978. 136,000 (almost half of these in the public sector), or approaching 40Z of total manufacturing employment. b/ Provisional. c/ Revised. !I Implicit deflator for manufacturing, 1970 - 100. n.a. - not available. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE ТаЫе д,п2= HAN1'РАС��'Rl�C ti1�R��FY, 1991 АЧП l982 Чвпеv Рлl.1 Уа1ив оЕ Vдlие 1•�lпе Аддед пв t оГ Сдрлеlеу of iпрпrь �:oneene !п Nolо[ Ftrme Ет 1о ent Produceton АддеА �ог �Woeker Уе1ив АдАед 1�et1lsaelnn а/ Раи llaterlsl 1'ве ('ООП persons Rs М(1 1оп Rs ?fITTTo� (AS "пао) ' l9д1 1982 19д1 l?82 19д1 1982 19д1 19В2 19Ч1 14Р2 1981 1982 1981 19д2 19A1 19д2 induвtrlаl Сгоир Роод, ееvеглgез 6 ТоЬвссо 184 187 п,д, п.а. 4,496 5,246 I А91 2 2S9 п.д. п.а. n.a. n.д. А7 77 54 lR (19.5) (20.2) (�1.4) (�).4) Textllев, Чеягing Аррлгвl 6 Leдthae Induetelев ]l4 3lR п.д. n.a. 7,040 ],ЯЬS 51] йЯЯ п.е. п.д. ^•л• п.�, 9Т Ъ/ 94 Ы 9I бб (lз,2) с1а.9> (9.s) (7,2) Чоод б Чоод Ргодие[s 27 25 п.д. n.a. 715 76l 169 1]4 п.а. п.а. п.л. п.д. д1 92 19 29 п ,а) с1.4) (z.я) (г.0) Рараг б Paper Producee 74 А1 п.а. п.а. b26 725 264 237 n.n. п.в. п.а. п.а, 75 70 б7 SO (2.7) (2,В) (4.4) (3.8) Chamlcale, РеСгоlеит, Сов1, RиЬЬег, Plaeete Peoducts 2Э2 22S п.а. п.п. 1t,OlS t7,099 2,П9д 1,927 п.а. п.д, п.д. п.а. 76 77 96 99 (52.2) (50.6) (74.8) (28.5) � Non-maealllе Мlпвгаl Peoduees ;; {a;ccapt Раtтоlеил 6 Соа1) 12R 129 п.д. n.a. ) 2SП 1,770 S97 В62 п.д. п.в. п'д• л•д• 8� 8S 76 67 � t5.4) (5.7) (9.R) (12.8) Raelе Чеtа1 Producte l 1 п.а. n.a. 428 7.62 д0 !4 �.д. п,е, п.д, n,s, 57 Э7 1П0 9: (l.9) (l.П) (1.]) (0.2) Fsбrleated WetяL Producte, Mдchlnary 8 Traneport Equlpmane ]97 ]79 п.я. п.а. �82 9П4 406 790 n.n. п.а. п•"• п.а, 69 8) 75 44 (7.а) (з.s) (ь.7) (1l.7) Oehar !lanutaetueed Ргодисе■ 82 79 п.е. п.а. 58 74 16 29 п.е. п.а, п.а, п.а, 69 7] 74 77 (0.'!) (0.9) (0.1) (0.4) TOTAL/AVERACE 1,4)5 1,426 п.а. п.а. 27,010 25,004 b,030 6,760 п.д. n.д, п.а. п.д. 74 76 87 В1 (100.0) (100.0) (10П.0) (1П0.0) е/ Вавед on деев penvlдед hy msJoe pelwee eactor flcma ппд 8ед[е Induвerlal Соерогаеlом. Ь/ Ексlидlпд eha Inveetmene Рготоеlоп хопе. п.в. � пое avallаЫе. Notas 1. Due ео гоипдlпд off, eomponente тау not адд ир to eotдls. 2. Рlдиевв !n рагвпеhевев sre percentвge дlтсеlЬисlопв. Soueeet Central 8ank о[ Сеуlоп, � BEST СОРУ AYAIL��LE . Page I of 2 pages Table 8,03i PERFORMANCE OF MAJOR STATE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS, 1977-83 Corporstion -- Value of Production (Rs Million) Nit Profit (Re million) 1952 Hot Profit as 2 of: Capital 1977 1978 1979 1960 M81 1983 1/ 1977 1978 1979 1980 1991 1982 1983 i/ Investment b/ sales Ceylon Petroleum 22.165 2.169 3,735 8,392 10,083 11,066 8,277 -176.9 -374.1 192.0 90.3 -23.2 -565.0 800.0 Ll -59 4 National Textiles 331 459 458 350 Ll 558 678 n.s. -6.1 -24.7 -87.3 -138.4 -105.2 -61.7 n.s. -9 -9 1/ State flour Killing 147 182 264 315 391 n.a. ".a. -15.3 45.5 10.2 8.1 -41.7 n.s. n.s. - - Sri Lanka Cement 140 209 293 756 677 755 904 -24.1 15.6 7.8 134.9 7.4 5.7 28.7 1 1 Ceylon Steel 132 219 349 476 429 262 257 1.5 25.5 31.7 24.3 5.5 -24.6 -48.5 -7 -5 Sri Lanka Tyre 91 161 152 209 221 221 n.s. 2.4 42.9 32.9 52.2 17.6 51.8 n.a. 29 19 National Paper 111 204 210 249 355 373 n.s. 12.3 14.0 -0.9 1.1 - -15.4 n.s. -2 -4 Ceylon Ceramics 62 79 115 120 ISO ISO 160 2.6 13.6 26.3 41.9 34.1 10.6 O.S. 2 5 Ceylon Plywoods 81 68 87 160 112 164 161 -12.0 -3.1 7.0 30.7 9.1 3.1 n.a. 12 3 Sri Lanka Tobacco 35 42 60 46 54 4 n.a. 11.0 30.6 33.3 10.2 19.6 5.3 n.a. -45 16 National Wt 8 12 11 32 44 74 13 5.6 6.7 8.3 14.2 23.9 19.4 23.9 40 40 State Hardware 22 26 27 46 44 44 39 -9.2 -1.3 -0.5 2.1 -3.0 -10.1 -18.6 -21 -24 Ceylon Leather Products 14 20 24 32 30 40 39 0.7 3.6 6.8 4.2 2.8 3.2 2.3 5 9 Paranthan Chemicals 13 18 27 39 37 36 3.4 ).9 6.2 7.6 __Lj 1.6 ft.A. -1 -A TOTALIAVERAGE 33,347 3,863 5,803 11,212 13,187 13,190 9,886 IL/ -208.1 -201.1 273.8 283.4 -51.8 -568.2 ji 787.8 -4 4 Excluding Petroleum 11,182 1,694 2,068 2,820 3,104 2,124 1,609 e/ -29.2 173.0 $1.8 193.1 -28.6 -3.2 -12.2 -8 4 . ... . ................ Copy AVAILABLE Table 8.03 Page 2 of 2 pages Employment (Nos.) 1982 Production Capital Investment Capacity Corporation 1980 1981 182 1983 A/ Per Worker Per Worker b/ Utilization _/ (Rs '000) (RO '000) Ceylon Petroleum 5,190 5,809 5,944 6,185 1,861 137 75 National Textiles 8,573 8,842 8,816 n.a. 76 51 n.a. State Flour Milling 665 617 600 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Sri Lanka Cement 5,959 7,507 5,512 4,875 146 141 68 Ceylon Steel 2,243 2,214 2,305 2,230 114 149 26 Sri Lanka Tyre 1,921 1,888 1,959 n.a. 113 88 76 National Paper 4,604 4,383 4,562 n.a. 82 196 58 Ceylon Ceramics 5,819 6,136 6,161 n.a. 24 79 85 Ceylon Plywoods 3,684 3,519 3,547 3,700 46 46 51 Sri Lanka Tobacco 956 959 939 n.a. 4 33 n.a. National Salt 1,008 1,055 1,778 1,939 42 35 135 State Hardware 1,578 1,439 1,385 n.a. 32 34 47 Ceylon Leather Products 1,087 1,062 1,070 1,155 37 42 78 Paranthan Chemicals 424 435 543 n.a. _A6 88 43 TOTAL/AVERAGE 43,711 45,865 45,930 20,084 287 101 - Excluding Petroleum 38,521 40,056 39,986 13,899 55 96 Al Provisional. b/ Capital investment is defined as capital reserves and long-term liabilities - accumulated losses. c/ Physical production as percent of nominal physical capacity, main products only (where appropriate, weighted) according to their contribution to turnover. d/ Less than one percent. g/ Excludes National Textiles Corporation and State Flour Milling Corporation. For Textile Corporation complete data are not available. State Flour Milling Corporation ceased milling activities from end-August, 1982. V Estimates. jL Excludes State Flour Milling. n.a. - not available. Sources: Central Bank of Ceylon; and Ministry of Industries and Scientific Affairs. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Tabilt...,04: ANNUAL PHYSICAL CAPACITY AND OUTPUT OF MAJOR STATE INDUSTRIES, 1976-83 a/ SCapacity _____-- - - - --Output 1a7 1977 IM 19179 190 1981 11 183 h/ 19U7 UU a7S 1 291 IM 1m = Ceylon Petroleum (GuO tons) n.A. n.a. n.a. 1,490 1,749 2,300 2,350 2,350 1,296 1,330 1,34b 1,269 1,713 1,501 1,769 1.327 National Textiles (million meters) 105 101 106 120 n.a. n.a. 91 n.a. 58 57 62 36 28 46 59 n.a. Ceylon Steel ('000 tons) 84 84 84 107 131 109 109 109 34 30 43 56 65 49 27 27 Ceylon Cement ('000 tons) 803 803 791 815 810 838 838 n.s. 423 356 573 592 621 706 574 507 Sri Lanka State Flour Milling ('000 tons) 126 129 93 101 112 126 n.a. n.a. 131 101 88 100 87 83 55 n.a. National Paper ('000 tons) 23 23 38 38 38 38 23 n.s. 18 20 26 22 21 27 19 n.as. Sri Lanka Tyre (1000) 182 1/ 182 182 198 220 204 218 n.a. 367 331 498 544 475 370 405 n.s. National Milk Board (million litres) 16 26 26 14 27 23 30 38 12 16 17 19 20 20 22 18 Sri Lanka Sugar ('000 tons) 44 44 40 52 45 n.a. 30 n.s. 24 23 32 20 27 25 24 n.a. Ceylon Ceramics ('000 tons) 11 15 IS 15 11 14 15 n.e. 8 10 12 12 13 13 13 13 Ceylon Oils and Fats ('000 tons) 99 99 80 80 91 91 91 81 49 44 43 64 62 50 53 61 Ceylon Plywood ('000 sq. meters) 9,320 6,969 6,969 8,177 8,177 8,826 8,826 n.a. 4,421 3,572 3.094 3,154 3,475 3,455 4,497 n.a. State Distilleries (Seeduva) ('000 litres) 2,730 2,503 2,503 2.503 n.s. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,075 1,901 2,343 6,561 n.a. 29,994 68,456 n.a. State Timber ('000 cu. meters) na. n.e. n.e. 93 85 193 127 157 82 85 70 103 195 159 155 176 Paranthan Chemicals (tons) 5,060 3,680 7,980 6,850 7,200 7,400 7,200 5,830 2,838 2,739 3,992 4.555 4,786 4,545 3,241 3,410 Al In the case of those industries manufacturing more than one product, capacity and output data are presented In respect of major products only. hi Provisional. r/ Capacity based on standard tires. oa. - not available. SouESat Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COP' D ' таые 8.о5: 1н0иsтЕlАь lиvеsтинитs APPEOVen Axn с0иrlистсп Еи сЕглтеЕ w1.Охв0 ес0нОмlс cOгmisslon, 1э7ч-еэ пl Свееттv ИтЬег of Uд1и Poeei:p 2дvввеовпс (В■ М1 Тоtв1 lavsitaeat (8в l1L_ _ Esolar.eoe Pacept ■1 (Nos.) 1�Z� �� 81 �g �у� �Э1Z 1444 l241. Z 1.�� i.9T� 124R 19l1 1.2� 13.�� �412 1.@.44 l9�1 1.9.0? 19� �1'!�$ • Роод, 8wвгце, аад тоыоео 1 з - - - хо :8 - - - хб 49 - - - 351 1,78х - - - Текtilвв, Уевгiа8 Appsrel, вдд Leat6вe Peoduet• 18 6 4 3 ! S49 207 210 4В 13 704 282 272 7х 34 В,845 а,172 S,1x9 1,104 8]В Моод аад Моод Pcoducts Iiacludia8 Furoiturв) 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 - 1S - 1 3 - 26 - 44 250 - 200 - Рарвг аад Рарвг Ргодиеtв 1 - - - - 3 - - - - 5 - - - - 163 - - - - Сhевiевlв, Peerolau., Соа1, ЕиЬЬег аад Plвatie Peoduet• 1 6 S 1 х 11 117 118 78 1S 1S 1бВ 164 l00 26 бб В99 686 290 1,OS2 Nод-ввtв111е Мiдаеаl Реодиееа (вкеврt lвtгоlеив вад Соа1) 6 6 1 1 1 В8 156 18 23 2 107 224 3S 27 3 1,525 1,898 649 159 230 РаЬкiеаевд Ивtв1 Реодиесв адд тг■аврог[ Еуиlр..пе 2 б х з 1 хэ 1xs sa хо7 1а 33 1es ео xso хо ах7 1,7бs а1а s93 1ох 1Sваиlаеtиевд ?roduets (д.е.в.) 9 14 6 6 8 118 536 579 50 92 177 709 1,11х 1l0 !20 х,683 7,463 4,530 1,438 1,7i9 8вгviеев � 3 = 1 _ �. LS�.$ _ � .� -� L�4� = L.4l.f 93 _StQ ..3+i� �_ L44f _.1�4 TOTAL 40 44 18 16 l3 В14 х,69В 979 1,171 190 1,069 3,262 1,б63 1,600 х84 14,164 20,632 11,40В 4,789 4,147 COMTBACiED � Роод, евvега8е, аад 7оЬаесо - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ТекСilев, Mвasia8 Apparel, аад lwaehгr Ргодиееа а 7 х э х 1хб зsо 111 1об ьб и9 аsв 1s3 1х8 91 х,7вх s,oбz х,914 2,sоб еьs 11оод аад Уоод Рсодиесв (iaeludla8 Puraiture) - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 250 - - - Рарег аад Рарег Ргодиеtа - - - - - - _ . .. _ . - - - . - - . - - СЬев[еа1в, Рвегоlеив, Соа1, RибЬвг аад Р1авtlе Ргодиеев 1 2 3 2 - х 6В 3S S9 17 4 94 55 79 20 х34 577 S39 339 l7B Иеа-ввеаlliе Мiавеаl Produetв (ековре Рв[гоlеи� �дд соаl) 1 б 1 1 х зет s7 18 т х5 аха еб 3s 1а 3о боь 2,sоь вья 3s8 se9 Paбrieaeed Меса1 Ргодиеtв вад Тгаоароте Еаиiриде - х 1 1 - - 60 6 1 - - 97 12 2 - - 804 140 99 - Иааи[аееигвд Ргодиеев (p.e.s.) 3 6 х 4 4 10 389 l42 294 2б 19 497 23В 461 36 598 4,660 51l 2,334 1,368 Eervieм � 1 .� 1 � � 18 � 1�i4£ $14. _ _�i � LSг1�. ..� - -�i4 ^ �Я� 1�.#3Q ТОТА1. 13 2S 9 12 10 525 943 312 1,916 948 626 1,хбб 493 2,296 177 4,218 14,037 4,8l3 7,б61 4,190 �/ {eviвed. Sаигев: Стнеег Colorbo Eeoaorie Сомiввiод. } BEST СОРУ AVAILAALE т.ы. е.бб� иооsтиАl. кеvls?заlп APPeovua е? roalce Ан9 1.осА1. levcsnnит Аеvlаоб? wю�1?пее, 1я7я-е� Свевеее• е,вбвг а( eeltв глгдве [евиtвгоt (tв вlllieel тоевl leveauet {lв в[lliee) Ьлlв�ввее teeвeeial (ее■ ) 1414 i9l4 19�1 1l�2 14l1 !/ 14Z4 1144 14l.1 J1Qi 1441 в! 19ц 1L Sl11 144I 3�l1 ll ' UIY !}44 1l41 1У11 11D.2 !/ !OltICM l11УlеЛLLУг АDУ160ет QOjqJ[lгее ,SfLC) Рооа, и.еоев, вид ?е6вeге е s ь s • �е иб )о9 1+: :: 7ь м9 119 sse :ys и: еа7 з4о s:7 Ioe ?ввlLlu, Уввеlоб Аррвевl, ■вд и+е6вг гкодигев te е е 1: ее as� и зо �9 so бе: х7 sy 7ь: 1.о ь,7зб 7,s�o t,I91 �,:ы е,)79 Уоед вад Уоод Ргодиеtв ( (ioeludloe П�го{wr.) { э п � з б s 1 бу у :а 1: б 1so 7 1:� ьь: s: аи 1,о:е se: hper вод Нрве ►гsдиеев { Сbмlевlв, htrolв�, 7...ь, lиьь.г вва nв,etr ргодигев 7 по 1s )о � �9 a1 1оь и :� е: sa 1v 1s1 б� 7,1б� :,ь:з 79е ),озо )9е Кее-веtвlliе Мtаегвl hодиеев {ввeвре Геегеlвю .иа се.и б б • � б б sm бь :� ье 1л хье 91 7о tб� 1е� е,о�: »о уы �ts ►вбгlевевд 11вЧ1 9гедиeи, Уве6(nвгу вед тгвевроге lqиlрвние е 9 )1 s 1: п :1 :�• бе зе ь9 �7 з91 1эь ��: 497 ы1 7,s�o �е9 1,у:� Мвеntвееиид ргедиеев {е.е.в.) 3 � 1 1 � �Q „j,j _._Lг � �1. .�,� �7 �1 17 �г SOI ]]) ее7 ]76 :.е9е тотА1. ы ss у1 �s sб з9: 9ot ы> »7 :yt 9�9 1,юе 1,osy ео1 1,оа1 9,бьs б,я1s s,99o 7,1яs е,91• � 1дси. lпеаraп Аеvиаат ' еою�гпtt еьlАе) Гоод, е.г.гц., аед ?ебвеге ` 10] ьо :к 1� 17 - - - - - 1оэ з� at 1s б1 1,:еэ se7 1.а:з �9� бб: lввtllев, УЧе1ае Аррвгвl, вад и.еь.г hoduetr 99е 1бе 7е �а ы - - - - - sa у1 :г ьо п 17,б�б з,7еб :,s�б r,os� �,ця Уоод вед Уаод Ргодиеев { ([иеlид[ее Гига{еиге) 1 бе sб ss �7 ьб - - - - - :1 1е 1е 9 » I,1бе 1,��s бео мб �бs hрвг вед hрвг Ргодиеев { СЬа1гвU, lвеwlвю, Сов1, еиьыг вид рlиеlе гrоаиесв :1: еб: 1а7 п 7s - - - - - 7� )os ее е: иб s,бэб �,1as :,ои 1,м: 1,9у: eoe-вeullie Мlиегвl trodueи (еваре Ригоlею веа Сов1) 1:е бб и п я: - - - - - ds .. :: 1� 7 ♦,:е1 :,oos 1,ио 1,оц 1до1 lвбгlевеед Меев1 Predueea, Мвебiеек7 вид ?гвеврегс еqиlрвеее �уб 17l 117 уб бб - - - - - !27 67 69 у1 бб 4,717 t,971 2,yS9 1,007 1,��7 Nвии[вгеигвд hодиеев {а.е,в,) � � �¢ �, � - - - - _ � � � ... ... -� dI -у� -31 -__L!! ттАь 1,еб� б9я �se s97 цб - - - - - e7s »7 кsь :зI •1s �:,ли еs,я1 1о,и1 а,�Iя 9,е9� l/ hевiвiеыl. � Mote: ). Due te тиедlее otl, еоароавеев виР еее адд ир ео еоевl■ tn еьв l1AC tвыа, �. ?Ье рцС двtв вкеlидвв eir11 вееiоввгlае вед woвtruetios uetor. еsигеввг роЧ1р iиvввtвгое Advlwry Соввlеtее; Lесв1 Iеwпиое Ad�riвerr Coriteeeв; вед Сееенl евеk ее СеР1еа. BEST СОРУ AVAILA�LE Table 9,01: PETROLEUM IMPORTS, 1970-83 = 1975 1276 1977 1978 1979 1980 81 1982 .1983 a/ Value ($ mLLlion) Crude Oil 22.0 132.6 135.9 139.2 143.7 201.6 435.8 448.4 488.9 332.9 Gasoline 0.6 - - 0.3 0.6 1.2 - - - 4.4 Avtur - 0.5 - 3.3 8.2 22.3 22.5 16.4 1.8 3.2 Kerosene 3.2 - 1.3 4.9 3.6 12.1 - - 15.2 15.5 Automotive Diesel 1.6 - 1.1 2.8 10.7 51.9 14.8 35.5 56.6 102.0 Other 3.7 8.6 5.8 6.4 8.3 8.6 20.3 14.9 11.4 _.LO.2 TOTAL 31.1 141.7 144.1 156.9 175.2 297.7 493.4 515.2 573.9 468.5 Yolume ('000 tons) Crude Oil 1,819.5 1,464.6 1,447.1 1,529.6 1,443.9 1,444.0 1,861.1 1,710.5 1,940.5 1,492.0 Gasoline 32.9 - - 2.2 3.7 6.5 - - - 15.0 Avtur - 4.2 - 15.8 55.7 65.3 58.4 45.0 5.4 10.9 Kerosene 99.0 - 9.6 32.2 25.4 41.9 - - 43.4 55.8 Automotive Diesel 69.8 9.2 26.7 82.7 198.6 42.6 110.9 183.9 405.9 I/ Provisional. Note: 1. Totals may not add up due to rounding. 2. Data may differ with Customs data used elsewhere in this report. jource: Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 9.02: IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1970-83 ('000 tons) 170 1 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Saudi Arabia - 1,145.3 796.6 849.0 939.1 787.0 950.0 1,248.8 866.3 346.0 Iran 1,819.5 319.3 650.5 680.7 504.8 293.4 629.7 432.2 838.7 969.1 'I Iraq - - - - - 304.7 281.5 - - - 3 Libya - - - - - 58.9 - - - - Malaysia - - - - - - - 29.4 235.5 177.0 Source: Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. BEST COPY AVAILABLE Table 9.03: PETROLEUM PRODUCT EXPORTS, 1970-83 1970 1971 1976 19.21 1978 1979 198 1981 1982 1983 AVIATION AND MARINE SALES Yau. ($ million) Avtur - 7.8 7.5 12.5 14.6 27.5 43.0 47.7 41.9 31.1 Marine Gas - 1.8 1.8 2.9 3.7 7.7 7.7 6.8 7.9 6.0 Marine Diesel - 3.4 3.2 7.1 6.1 10.9 12.3 7.3 8.9 7.2 Furnace Oil - 12.8 12.3 27.2 20.9 42.9 55.8 42.1 39.4 35.0 Other - 0.3 ... 0.1 .6 0.8 0.8 -M _qA TOTAL 6.4 b/ 26.1 25.1 50.7 45.3 89.6 119.6 104.7 98.9 80.1 Volume ('000 tons) Avtur - 84.7 68.2 68.1 81.1 73.8 193.0 104.0 91.7 74.1 Marine Gas - 24.5 20.2 22.1 25.3 26.2 19.1 17.8 20.8 16.8 Marine Diesel - 45.2 47.9 52.3 43.0 33.5 30.7 19.0 24.2 21.4 Furnace Oil - 340.9 316.4 359.7 263.2 316.6 306.9 203.3 219.0 194.6 DIRECT EXPORTS I Value ($ million) Naphtha 1.9 7.2 7.5 10.6 9.2 28.1 38.2 28.4 20.7 14.2 Gasoline - neg. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 Furnace Oil 1.4 - 3.3 4.4 5.8 8.0 30.1 41.2 34.9 11.2 Other - 0.J 0.3 0.1 nei. a nea. 0.1 .Q 0.7 TOTAL 3.3 7.3 11.2 15.2 15.1 36.3 68.5 69.9 55.9 26.4 Volume ('000 tons) Naphtha 115.0 127.7 108.8 101.0 75.0 99.3 130.3 91.2 75.6 54.6 Gasoline - 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7 Furnace Oil 161.0 - 92.5 59.1 87.5 55.5 182.9 236.5 212.1 121.5 TOTAL EXPORTS ($ million) 9.7 55.1 60.1 95.8 60.4 125.9 188.1 174.6 154.8 106.5 A/ Provisional. j/ Details not available. Note: 1. Individual columns may not add up due to rounding. 2. Data may differ from Customs figures used elsewhere in this report. Source: Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. Table 9.04; DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, 1970-83 (tons) 1912 11 1979 1 1981 192 9 A Gasoline 143,441 86,788 99,448 103,348 120,623 97,843 109,371 99,553 113,927 94,800 Diesel, Automotive 266,636 255,178 276,336 276,620 242,200 246,002 384,311 309,583 336,232 175,528 Diesel, Other 158,331 87,259 88,318 91,708 117,243 90,196 95,758 107,186 135,104 213,130 Furnace Oil 698,461 537,473 513,678 545,349 547,377 534,756 744,877 701,419 715,302 492,549 Kerosene 266,990 195,470 188,311 185,447 211,318 186,936 179,341 148,811 155,233 132,473 Naphtha 113,263 107,391 103,484 102,197 82,372 90,237 150,850 137,653 157,616 119,638 Bitumen 30,467 20,721 26,921 25,202 24,872 24,100 26,174 15,516 24,871 23,022 LPG 32 1,030 2,130 3,101 5,355 6,199 7,477 6,425 8,197 7,074 Avtur - 54,879 76,884 71,482 34,465 31,325 62,171 83,772 114,985 65,450 Solvents - 1.700 1,863 2,130 2,565 _3.374 2,350 3,386 2,549 2,983 Total 1,677,621 1,347,889 1,377,373 1,406,584 1,388,390 1,310,968 1,762,680 1,626,565 1,785,479 1,345,422 Memorandum I;ems Energy Products 1,533,891 1,218,077 1,245,105 1,277,055 1,278,581 1,193,287 1,583,306 1,457,067 1,600,443 1,199,779 Non-Energy Products 143,730 129,812 132,268 129,529 109,809 117,681 179,374 169,498 185,036 145,643 Light Distillates 256,736 196,051 205,968 209,782 209,629 195,954 268,986 258,292 302,279 241,529 Middle Distillates 691,957 593,644 630,806 626,251 606,512 556,158 722,643 651,338 743,027 588,322 Heavy Ends 728,928 558,194 540,599 570,551 572,249 558,856 771,051 716,935 740,173 515,571 &/ Provisional. Source: Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. Table 9.05: LOCAL SALES VOLUME OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, 1970-83 (tons) 1970 12217 1977 198 1980 1981 1982 1983 L. LPG h/ 35 582 807 3,108 2,432 6,404 7,110 6,663 8,197 7,150 Gasoline 148,411 95,057 101,065 111,491 129,994 115,146 107,691 109,028 114,217 117,477 Kerosene 272,514 209,764 206,593 212,886 244,832 229,918 188,288 168,266 174,098 159,146 Diesel, Automotive 254,530 245,515 257,557 261,988 308,792 349,404 397,710 420,912 464,594 464,268 Diesel, Marine c/ - 5,232 5,183 5,497 5,869 3,726 3,027 2,585 5,515 7,829 Diesel, Industrial 87,831 37,314 35,663 46,245 62,015 64,188 63,953 105,000 143,121 295,885 Furnace Oil, Domestic 208,810 143,664 125,578 135,530 162,556 183,539 259,731 240,326 247,138 253,098 Furnace Oil, Marine - 20,108 20,088 18,762 21,233 16,099 12,887 22,884 26,974 26,881 Avtur - 13,571 8,614 16,499 6,749 8,169 22,843 30,967 31,415 34,262 Lubricants d/ 16,128 15,648 19,696 14,933 17,345 18,899 21,312 20,430 20,614 20,715 Bitumen 30,924 22,444 26,023 25,152 26,190 24,265 10,259 16,477 21,116 24,423 Naphtha - - - - - - 33,642 66,063 98,021 75,044 j/ Provisional. h/ Since March 1977, reflects transfers to Colombo Gas & Water Company. c/ Includes Marine Gas Oil, Marine Diesel Oil and Heavy Diesel. 4/ Other than marine and aviation lubricants. Source: Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. Table 9.06: PRODUCTION, TRADE, AND APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, 1970-83 ('000 tons) 1970 1221 1972 1973 1914 191 1976 1977 1978 1911 1980 121. 192 1983 al Production 1,534 1,334 1,519 1,489 1,304 1,218 1,245 1,277 1,279 1,193 1,583 1,470 1,600 1,200 Imports 321 208 46 33 20 6 20 78 168 312 102 156 270 488 Exports 276 121 223 184 120 129 203 160 163 155 314 328 288 179 Bunkers 565 510 410 462 358 412 385 435 332 377 357 241 264 233 Aviation 12 105 84 95 74 85 69 68 81 74 93 104 92 74 Apparent consumption 1,002 806 848 781 772 598 608 692 871 899 921 953 1,226 1,202 Per Capita consumption h/ 80.07 63.51 65.94 59.66 58.12 44.31 44.32 49.63 61.38 62.12 62.41 63.58 80.72 77.97 a/ Provisional. h/ In kilograms. Source: Ceylon Petroleum Cerporation. Table 9.07: PETROLEUM PRODUCT PRICE CRANGES, 1970-83 L/ (Ra per Liter; Rs per Imperial Gallon in Parentheses) h/ Gasoline Automotive Industrial Diesel Furace Oil illm. ReglAr L/ Knmn D1iesel Lolohur 1/ ligh Sulohur 500 Sececoands 1,000 Seconds Prevailing Price January 1, 1970: 0.78 (3.56) 0.70 (3.16) 0.18 (0.80) 0.37 (1.66) - - 0.22 (1.00) - - 0.15 (0.70) - Subsequent Changes: 1970 - October 26 0.84 (3.81) 0.75 (3.41) - - * - - - - - - - - - - - 1971 - March 1 0.90 (4.10) 0.82 (3.75) 0.20 (0.92) 0.40 (1.81) - - 0.25 (1.15) - - 0.19 (0.85) - - - October 28 1.10 (5.00) 1.00 (4.55) - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1972 - February 22 1.15 (5.25) 1.06 (4.60) 0.24 (1.08) - - 0.29 (1.30) 0.26 (1.20) 0.21 (0.95) 0.20 (0.90) 0.14 (0.65) - December 31 1.26 (5.75) 1.17 (5.30) 0.29 (1.32) 0.47 (2.14) 0.36 (1.63) 0.34 (1.53) 0.28 (1.28) 0.27 (1.23) 0.26 (1.18) 1973 - August 24 1.44 (6.55) 1.34 (6.10) 0.42 (1.92) 0.60 (2.74) 0.49 (2.23) 0.47 (2.13) 0.41 (1.88) 0.40 (1.83) 0.39 (1.78) 1974 - January 9 2.75 (12.50) 2.64 (12.00) - - * - - - - - - - - - 0.84 (3.80) . - January 10 - - - - 0.79 (3.60) 1.06 (4.60) 1.08 (4.90) 1.01 (4.60) 0.88 (4.00) 0.86 (3.90) - 1975 - October 3 2.93 (13.30) 2.82 (12.80) 0.90 (4.08) 1.17 (5.30) 1.19 (5.40) 1.12 (5.10) 0.99 (4.50) 0.97 (4.40) 0.95 (4.30) 1977 - March 15 - - - - 0.77 (3.48) - - - - - - - - - - - - 1978 - December 21 4.40 (20.00) 4.07 (18.50) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1979 - June 13 6.60 (30.00) - - - - 2.31 (10.50) 2.64 (12.00) 2.27 (10.30) 2.13 (9.70) 2.09 (9.50) 1.98 (9.00) - September 1 - - - - 2.35 (10.68) - - - - - * - - - - - - 1980 - January 26 6.25 (37.50) - - 3.01 (13.68) 2.97 (13.50) 3.41 (15.50) 2.93 (13.30) 2.79 (12.70) 2.75 (12.50) 2.64 (12.00) - June 20 8.80 (40.00) - - 3.34 (15.18) 4.62 (21.00) 5.06 (23.00) 4.58 (20.80) 4.44 (20.20) 4.40 (20.00) 4.29 (19.50) 1981 - January 19 9.35 (42.50) - - 3.89 (17.68) 5.94 (27.00) 6.60 (30.00) 5.68 (25.80) - - - - - - April 4 10.00 (45.50) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1983 - March 2 12.00 (54.58) - - 5.20 (23.68) 6.75 (30.69) 7.90 (35.91) 6.45 (29.32) - - - - - * July 22 13.50 (61.40) - - 6.58 (29.97) 8.13 (36.98) 9.28 (42.20) 7.83 (35.61) 4.89 (22.22) 4.84 (22.00) 4.72 (21.45) Al Prices are Colombo spot prices; a margin to cover transport costs is added to out-station prices for all products except gasoline, which as of April 1981, sells at a uniform price island-wide. h/ Although Sri Lanka has officially gone metric, prices for petroleum products continue, for the time being, to be specified in imperial gallons terms. Liter prices have been obtained by dividing imperial gallon prices by 4.5461. i/ Marketing of regular grade gasoline was discontinued in early 1979. SL Industrial diesel is often referred to as heavy diesel; the two terms are used interchangeably in Sri Lanka. Prior to 1972, low sulphur industrial diesel was not marketed. gI Differentiated furnace oil was not marketed prior to 1972. V/ As of January 1981, low sulphur industrial diesel is marketed as Super diesel. Bour.e. Ceylon Petroleum Corporation; and Central Bank of Ceylon. WRFT COPY AVAILABLE Table 9.08: CEB ELECTRICITY GENERATION, 1970-83 Generation Capacity (W) -------------------------Energy Generated (GWh)----------------- Thermal Energy Components Installed Effective Hydro Thermal Total Kelanitissa Gas Steam Turbines Other a/ 1970 262 243 740.3 41.6 781.9 2.0 - 39.6 1971 262 243 825.2 23.8 849.0 17.9 - 5.9 1972 262 243 848.3 93.7 942.0 87.5 - 10.2 1973 262 243 698.3 281.9 980.2 260.9 - 21.0 1974 362 339 997.9 14.3 1,012.2 12.5 - 1.8 1975 362 339 1,077.8 1.2 1,079.0 1.2 - 0.1 , 1976 402 377 1,108.5 24.3 1,132.8 23.9 - 0.4 2 1977 402 365 1,214.5 2.1 1,216.6 1.7 - 0.3 1978 402 365 1,365.7 19.3 1,385.0 14.0 - 5.2 1979 402 365 1,461.2 64.0 1,525.2 58.0 - 6.0 1980 422 399 1,479.4 188.8 1,668.2 140.1 18.4 30.3 1981 522 519 1,571.3 300.3 1,871.6 98.0 182.7 19.6 1982 562 539 1,608.1 457.6 2,065.7 89.1 352.6 16.0 1983 592 569 1,217.2 897.2 2,114.4 147.1 734.5 15.5 a/ Primarily Chunnakam (6.0 MW) and Pettah (5.1 MW) diesel plant. Note: Capacity figures are end-year. Sources: Ceylon Electricity Board; and Central Bank of Ceylon. BEST COPY AVAILABLE -129- Table 9.09: CEB ELECTRICITY SALES, 1970-83 (in Ggh) Street Domestic Industrial Commercial Authorities Lighting a/ Total 1970 62.5 343.0 88.0 167.5 10.5 671.5 1971 64.6 373.2 92.8 180.5 11.0 722.1 1972 72.5 436.4 96.8 193.1 11.5 810.3 1973 81.5 466.6 107.6 198.4 12.0 866.1 1974 82.6 477.2 118.1 201.9 12.5 892.3 1975 84.9 522.6 122.5 222.2 13.0 965.2 1976 95.2 516.3 137.4 237.3 13.5 999.7 1977 106.5 519.4 147.9 252.8 14.0 1,040.6 1978 119.2 592.0 158.9 275.9 15.0 1,161.0 1979 153.2 629.9 203.0 296.3 16.0 1,298.3 1980 190.8 625.6 223.2 335.5 16.5 1,391.6 1981 216.6 647.5 219.9 380.6 8.5 1,503.1 1982 258.3 739.2 262.5 417.5 8.6 1,686.1 1983 304.8 752.0 291.8 433.0 9.0 1,790.6 a/ Estimated. Source: Ceylon Electricity Board. -130- Table 10.01: MINIMUM WAGE RATE, 1968-83 (December 1978 = 100) Year Private Public Money Real a/ Money Real a/ 1968 30 60 55 109 1969 30 56 57 105 1970 31 53 62 108 1971 31 53 62 105 1972 34 52 62 99 1973 36 53 65 95 1974 46 59 74 95 1975 52 63 82 98 1976 54 64 86 103 1977 66 78 87 103 1978 95 99 100 105 1979 120 113 117 111 1980 1st Qtr. 147 120 126 103 2nd Qtr. 147 112 126 96 3rd Qtr. 147 108 126 93 4th Qtr. 148 105 138 97 1981 1st Qtr. 148 100 143 97 2nd Qtr. 150 97 143 93 3rd Qtr. 155 97 143 90 4th Qtr. 157 94 155 93 1982 1st Qtr. 174 102 184 108 2nd Qtr. 174 101 187 108 3rd Qtr. 176 101 190 108 4th Qtr. 179 101 191 108 1983 1st Qtr. 181 99 203 111 2nd Qtr. 189 97 219 113 3rd Qtr. 191 95 220 109 4th Qtr. 194 91 221 104 A/ Money wage deflated by Colombo Consumer Price Index. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. -131- Table 10.02: COLOMBO CONSUMER PRICE INDEX NUMBERS, 1976-84 (By Commodity Group) All Items Food Clothing Fuel Rent !/ Misc. Weights 100.0 61.9 9.4 4.3 5.7 18.7 Index (1978 = 100) 1976 88.1 85.1 93.6 101.1 100.0 90.7 1977 89.2 85.6 98.9 98.3 100.0 92.7 1978 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1979 110.8 153.0 102.2 125.3 100.0 112.3 1980 139.7 143.0 106.1 215.1 100.0 130.7 1981 164.8 168.3 114.0 293.0 100.0 153.8 1982 182.6 189.7 121.0 311.4 100.0 167.8 1983 208.2 213.2 128.7 414.9 100.0 192.9 1983 January 188.9 February 190.4 March 197.6 April 202*.0 May 204.9 June 207.5 July 209.5 August 212.0 September 214.6 October 219.7 November 223.7 December 227.3 1984 January 229.9 February 234.3 a/ Movement of this index reflects controlled rents. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. iвЫe_10�03к MNOL68AL6 P8IC8 1NDBX, 1977-83 (1974 � 100) �4ZZ �L �Z� � � � 1L� 1982 , • 1вt 2дд Этд 4еЬ 1ве 2дд 3тд 4th ЧаiпЪt■ оет. f,�,�,�, g�,,, tr te. Q��, Оек. Oer. А11 Itавв 100.0 175.3 156.7 171.6 229.6 268.5 283.Э 354.1 284.2 276.1 285.5 287.4 315.0 341.8 355.8 403.8 gfr co�oditvt Food 67.8 140.8 155.5 161.3 214.2 249.5 46Э.7 Э42.9 266.0 253.3 265.3 270.2 302.6 Э?8.5 338.0 402.6 Alcoholie дтfдkв 2.9 125.8 136.2 156.4 202.1 252.9 267.6 281.2 267.9 267.9 267.6 266.8 274.6 281.9 274.4 294.0 ia:tile адд fooevaar 4.0 168.6 238,4 245.6 249.0 279.Э 308.9 290.6 Э19.7 325.1 299.9 291.0 293.0 291.8 289.4 288.1 рарвг ргодисев 1.4 117.6 152.8 194.1 279.0 28В.3 289.1 340.7 289.1 289.1 289.1 289.1 29Э.2 302.5 Эб8.6 398.5 СЬевiсвlв адд chaвieal рсодиеtв S.1 62.7 80.5 91.5 108.5 173.2 183.2 213.4 182.9 183.6 183.1 183.0 186.4 207.3 223.5 2Эб.7 Уаскоlаит product• 6.4 109.4 109.4 183.1 355.6 467.3 473.3 608.8 473.Э 41Э,Э 473.3 473.1 506.1 585.Э 658.9 685.1 Noa-вstallie ртодиеtв 1.8 172.7 254.1 282.2 407.4 412.6 444.6 517,2 427.1 433.2 441.7 476.2 490.1 501.3 510.1 567.2 Мееа1 ртодиеtв 0.9 95.1 116.9 151.5 174.0 20b.0 229.9 246.1 230.0 230.0 229.9 229.8 270.3 230.8 236.4 286.9 iквдвротt aquipaaoe 0.8 127.4 141.6 148.1 171.0 193.9 200.6 279.5 19б.5 201.9 202.0 202.0 218.3 232.4 273.6 279.5 Blaetrical аррliадсав адд виррliав 1.0 117.3 123.6 138.Э 154.4 185.3 432.4 265.5 218.5 233.б 236.7 240,В 247.4 249.1 253.3 265.5 Naehinasy 1.3 102.6 109.2 12b,2 139.2 161.7 167.6 192.4 166.9 167.2 168.2 168.2 172.0 184.3 190.3 192.4 уивl адд light 1.8 179.5 25Э.8 319.5 Э88.9 4ог.5 409.2 419.6 407.6 407.6 407.6 414.р 432.1 441.2 418.7 419.6 �, Niвеаllадеоив 4.8 150.8 222.9 260.8 328.7 337.9 359.5 452.0 346.2 Э47.6 390,8 353,4 398.4 442.8 461.3 452.0 � 6v ваеtок• ( Doвaвtie 50.3 115.4 1Э3.9 144.5 177.0 217.0 239.6 253.7 238.3 2Э5.4 242.7 241.7 247.4 256.5 250.9 260.1 Iвротtв 27.2 9Э.0 138.8 164.9 237.6 301.4 295.2 325.4 310.3 298,1 286,9 285.7 298.2 318.7 940.6 344.0 Вкротев 22.5 229.9 229.1 241.3 Э37.0 Э43.7 365.8 612.9 354.8 Э40.8 382.4 385.0 486.3 559.8 608.4 797.1 рУ вес[оr• Содвивеr 75.Э 140.7 157.2 167.6 227.1 2SZ.8 268.3 345.8 269.0 258.Э 270.7 275.0 Э06.8 332.4 Э41.9 402.1 Iaearвediвee У0.3 116.7 152.4 184.1 249.5 318.2 329.8 361.9 332.6 332.7 371.4 Э22.3 337.8 Э71.8 402.6 415.5 Ioveвtвeae 4.2 1Э0.б 169.2 195.У 264.7 305.1 325.1 367.0 319.0 320.3 Э2Э.3 Э37.7 Э49.5 363.1 Э75,3 380.2 8оиееак Ceatral laak of Ceylon. � BEST СОРУ AVA��.A�LE � Table 19,94: COST INDICES FOR SELECTED f DING MATERIALS AND DIFFERENT CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES, 1972-83 (1969 - 100) Item 1972 1973 1974 1975 12-6_ 9 _8 M_7_9 M80 1981 1182 1983 jj Cement 100 111 164 164 164 164 199 292 636 723 814 824 Steel (H.S. Bars) 139 161 279 261 261 255 274 458 504 572 573 573 Bricks (Hand molded) 89 124 156 156 156 156 268 285 393 388 442 456 Asbestos Sheet (Corrugated) 111 144 213 254 295 286 327 411 607 627 706 767 Timber (Sawn) 100 100 129 129 129 129 217 378 634 814 814 827 Metal (3/4") 100 100 120 124 148 168 338 533 617 551 557 597 P.V.C. Pipes (3/411) 153 227 267 237 237 284 362 459 520 520 520 520 Housing Construction 110 123 149 160 163 173 252 347 519 617 645 673 Non-Residential Buildings 117 134 174 181 186 199 254 320 463 548 586 611 Other Construction Works 115 130 166 169 175 187 220 278 386 457 493 514 All Construction Activities 114 129 164 171 175 186 247 327 469 558 592 618 January- une. Source: Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Consti Table 10.05: ADMINISTERED PRICES OF BASIC CONSUMER GOODS, 1977-83 (Ra) Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. Unit 1977 1978 179 1980 1981 1981 1982 1982 1983 1983 Rice for Food Stamps kg 2.15 2.15 3.48 4.48 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.16 6.25 Rice (Open Market) kg 3.70 4.24 5.13 6.72 6.07 8.60 7.69 7.87 7.74 8.94 Flour kg 1.32 2.47 3.00 5.23 5.50 6.65 6.65 5.95 6.82 6.82 Bread kg 1.32 2.21 2.76 4.52 5.06 5.95 5.95 5.51 6.17 6.17 I Kerosene liter 0.76 0.76 2.35 3.34 3.89 3.89 3.89 3.89 5.20 6.58 $ Electricity unit 0.12 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 Bus Fare journey 0.50 0.60 0.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 2.00 2.50 Coconuts each 1.42 1.00 1.82 2.48 2.02 2.58 2.41 2.47 2.54 4.13 Coconut Oil bottle 4.58 4.24 7.06 8.38 8.43 8.50 8.23 8.07 10.00 20.80 Milk Powder kg 12.13 12.13 18.74 26.28 32.50 31.25 34.47 35.88 52.00 52.00 Sugar (Open Market) kg 6.62 6.62 6.62 14.55 16.50 13.50 12.63 11.90 12.50 13.00 Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. твыг 11.о1: seьecrEn soclAl. lнагслт0аs, 19аь-в2 �.S�.Q �� �$ �� 1971 � �ZZ� �.Y.Zg �7.. 1916 !� �YL� �Z� �Q �L 1� !/ BDUCA?ION Ади1С Litaeaey (х) 58 65 72 - 78 - - - - 85 - - - 88 g7 - 8ehool бnsollrent Rac1o (вgев 5-14) 41 58 65 99 l00 89 86 - - 80 - 94 - 94 9в g/ - NEALiB AND DBNOCRAPёY Litг a:paetaney 4� 56 6Э - 66 - 65 - - - 69 67 бб 69 бб - Inlant lfortslity fper '000) 141 71 S6 48 45 46 46 51 45 44 42 Э7 ЗВ 42 3В - Crude eieth Rate (ргт '000) 37.4 78.7 �4.7 29.4 Э0.4 90.0 28.0 27.5 27.8 27.8 27.9 28.5 28.7 27.8 !/ 28.0 26.8 Стидг Daaeh Raee (рет '000) 20.2 10.9 8.6 7.5 7.7 8.1 7.7 9.0 8.S 7.8 7.4 6.6 6.5 6.1 �/ Ь.О 6.1 Rat• of Natusal Рориlвсiоо Iпоти.г ск) 1.7 z.в 2.ь 2.2 2.э 2.2 z.o 1.ч 1.9 2.о 2.1 2.г 2.z 2.2 2.2 7.1 ; � И•с Nigr.eion (рет •о0о) s.2 s.2 -1.0 -в.о -z.7 -з.z -э.е -4.о -2.з -з.е -э.7 -z.a -з.о -а.б -з.а -б.о � Avгsage Авг вt Massiaae: Ча1г 27.0 27.t 21.9 - 28.0 27.9 27.4 27.Э 27.� 27.б 27.5 27 - - - - г...1. 2о.7 2о.9 22.1 - 2з.s 2з.о 22.7 :2.7 2х.в 2э.з :з.а 2з - - - - ИивЬвс о! Nev PuI1y Plaonin¢ "Аnсерсотв" (ргг '000) - - - 55 49 71 96 72 71 88 75 7б 92 153 110 104 Реваlг (Стиде) LвЬог Рртее Pastieipвeioo Rвее (а11 вgгв, �) - - 15.5 19.3 19.1 - - - 20.� 20.6 - - - - - - 1/ Psoviгional. 8оитее: Сепетаl 8ank of Сгуlоо. BEST СОРУ AUAfLABLE � I Table 11,02: MAJOR SOCIAL MENDITURES IN RELATION TO TOTAL CURRENT BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES AND TO GDP, 1969/70-94 2 of Total Current Expenditures Adiusted Total Social I of GDP (current market price) Total Social Total Current Total Services and Total Services and Expenditure social Net Food Not Food Health Education Social Not Food Net Food YM (MI11111") R61 Health h/ Education ki Services b/ Subsidies I/ Subsidies h/ Total He JI/ Total IV Services b/ Subg1dies SJ Submi ies k/ 1969/70 2,577 9.15 18.33 28.44 12.66 41.10 2.00 4.01 6.22 2.77 8.99 1970171 31019 7.89 16.01 24.74 17.76 42.49 1.99 4.03 6.23 4.43 10.71 1971/72 4.023 6.31 16.13 19.88 16.34 41.20 2.47 5.06 7.80 5.13 12.93 1973 3,777 6.94 14.90 22.69 17.96 39.82 1.42 3.06 4.48 3.62 8.17 1974 4,565 6.40 12.77 19.98 20.86 40.02 1.23 2.45 3.68 4.00 7.69 1975 5,265 6.15 12.43 19.39 23.37 41.95 1.23 2.48 3.71 4.66 8.37 1976 5,602 6.89 14.07 21.83 16.73 37.70 1.29 2.63 3.92 3.13 7.05 1977 6,553 6.94 13.13 20.86 21.73 41.79 1.26 2.39 3.65 3.95 7.60 1978 10,491 4.95 9.37 14.89 20.33 35.21 1.22 2.31 3.66 5.00 8.66 1979 10,887 5.81 10.40 16.87 21.36 38.24 1.21 2.16 3.51 4.44 7.95 1980 12,730 5.81 10.90 17.42 2.40 19.82 1.11 2.09 3.33 6.46 3.79 1981 15,025 5.71 10.64 17.04 2.06 17.59 1.00 1.87 3.00 0.10 3.09 1982 SI/ 19,112 4.99 10.53 16.21 0.49 16.70 0.95 2.01 3.09 0.09 3.16 1983 A/ 24,499 5.04 9.85 15.61 0.41 16.02 1.02 2.00 3.16 0.08 3.24 1984 _4/ 27,613 5.49 9.68 15.84 0.36 16.20 1.09 1.92 3.15 0.07 3.22 IL/ Total current expenditure adjusted total current expenditure gross food subsidy + net food subsidy. k/ Expenditures an current account only. el In 1963/69, Sri Lanka introduced a dual exchange rote. However, food imports, which determine much of of the cost of the food subsidy, were valued at the official exchange rate and not at the FEEC rate thus understating the true cost to the budget. The gross food subsidy. valued at the now He 16 exchange rate, would amount to 6.42 of GDP in 1977. A/ Not consistent with figures shown in the budget tables (5.03-5.04). Source: Calculated from Statistical Appendix Tables 2.01. 5.03. and 5.04. Lit BEST COPY AVIRM-LE т■ыа 11.о3, иаАьтх атАтlатlса, 1969/70-83 1444114 13Z41.Z1 !.l.L !!1� �934 l41.� l3i4 1.81.L J.91.4 1.414 1�4.Q �. ]9l�. 14l1 9овр1tвlв (prвeCieioB УваСагд идiеlдв) А/ 45S 459 4S7 4Sб 457 4S8 4б0 467 484 483 480 А88 493 а93 � Рвr.одв per еоврiсвl 47,503 27,617 YB,14Z Z8,70B 19,068 49,4б1 29,819 49,850 29,ЭОб 49,961 30,704 30,713 30,874 з1,270 Рвевоов рвг !вд 3Z0 3Z0 325 319 331 331 334 336 341 341 340 340 э50 д.в. Свдtеаl Diвpвoвariu 334 336 347 349 356 355 3S1 35б 379 369 747 740 338 353 Рвт.одв рвr Diврвдыгу 37,692 J8,000 31,495 37,510 77,315 3В,017 39,080 39,157 77,445 79,217 а3,а73 4q,OBY а4,938 А3,б71 ИивЬвr of Dосеогв 1,9Э2 1,693 1,03В 3,089 1,117 1,13В 1,248 1,168 7,358 У,763 2,051 7,133 4,0]б 1,BOS Р.г.од. р.г Ооаеог б,а77 8,7аа б,310 б,пы б,аsо б,312 ь,10а б,аs9 б,sы 6,39а 7,186 б,пs 7,або е,541 иvаьег ef А..с. Мадlовl Praoclciouar. 1,гss 1,ss5 1,яо5 1,1ss 1,111 1,о75 1,о59 1,o1s 1,178 931 1,оое 9яs ееа ,я,/ 1,os7 Рагаодв рег Аввt. Nadicвl Peвctieioдee 10,2lS 10,442 10,673 11,636 11,966 11,SS4 14,953 13,733 12,041 17,384 14,611 16,303 17,1В3 14,SBS ИивЬвг о[ Nuc.ea 5,344 S,54i 5,00Э 6,945 5,288 5,695 5,772 5,640 6,1б9 6,848 6,117 6,805 7,574 7,114 Ренодв рве NикЧ 4,4б9 г,303 2,571 1,890 4,514 2,369 s,393 2,472 s,Y99 п,113 4,767 Y,18Z Z,005 2,137 w � МивЬве ot Iдрвtiвдев ('000) 1,05а 2,007 4,051 2,03В 1,9Z6 7,146 3,281 7,188 1,17р 2,425 7,334 Z,783 3,a4S д.в. Ми.Ьвг о[ оиервсiеди (•ооо) г9,б9о 4а,а73 s1,Ог9 п0,s77 s0,з1ь п7,ьsа 31,бая ss,7бa ае,а19 п9,а00 31,ея1 з0,sа7 31,бяб д.., Nвv Аеарtон о! Faaily Рlаддiдg Mathod■ 55.469 А9•323 71.044 95.931 11.927 jj.308 88.215 74.890 76.1В0 92.156 171.160 141.797 д11.бе3 ц9.б41 в,/ тАор. 15,799 11,ааб 1a,s99 п7,sге s9,б9з зп,lаа s7,оэ0 пе,3х1 пз,ов5 s0,1e7 19,s3s 1а,е3з 1s,б78 1а,961 Вевеillвасiоо А,971 245 9,576 10,248 4Z,434 39,164 35,588 l9,O5S 41,949 35,643 112,92б 7б,б3э 60,164 l01,446 Оедвг Nведодв 34,а99 37,631 а2,В69 48,155 - - 25,597 27,514 91,146 эб,3Zб ]9,OOZ ]0,Э71 7S,B43 43,234 евеиrндс вкрвддlсиrв сRв �11иод) s36 пэ8 ssa пы i9s 3sa 3еб ass s1в б31 7ао в53 953 �/ 1,Опа g! Capltal Екрведltин (Rв ■111iод) ,..� �,$ 3¢ ,,.�¢ ,,.2,г �4, ,lj,� ,9,�, ]]s ,34J, �1 J�J� J]4 jj1 s,,/ ?освl (ее ■illioa) 214 166 280 Z98 319 4!0 500 498 697 1 J13 1,341 994 1,127 1,775 R:p.дdleura р.г евтвод cR.) ¢J 1е,о 1в,о я7,s s:.e па,в ]о.а зб.а эs.7 a9.s 7о.о 91.1 бб.9 та,п 11s.ss iосвl ввраддltиrев вв i of CDP 4.1 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.а l.6 1.8 l.4 1.7 г.0 Z.4 1.3 1,t s,/ 1.4 �,/ �/ Iдсlидав ваtвгдiеу hовев. ¢f Iдеlидвв арlевl вврвnдlеисвв, 8гвпtв вдд еодtгlЬиtiодв. � Proviвieдal. Bouree■г Dapartвeдt о[ 9aвlth 8вгviевв аод Dврагtведt о! Свдвие апд 9tвtietieв. BEST С�РУ AUAILABLE �• • ' � ' � " ' � • � . ,. ' , . � , т.ы. l1.ов, ьоис.ьтl0и бтьтsатlсв, 1970-ез l9Э3 !!.гl. 1.2L 12i� !41l. 19ц 14г! 19ц 1914. 1972 1249 1241 • ]9�2 1Р� lоtвl 1haбo! е[ белооlв 9.921 9.777 9.697 .б60 9.645 9.675 я.ббэ 9.671 4.i26 �1626 9.794 9.ь79 9.901 9.966 1/ ие..де.е� е,1ев г,яs7 6,s49 а,:еб 7,ьеа 7,6sa г,б37 7,ьэб а,026 э,б�э 7,з9я э,91а а,ь:э пл, е.аедавтр 1,44ь 1,sэ7 :,еьв з,102 1,7о1 1,7эо 1,7ь7 1,»э s,4м s,пэ 1,пе s,ao7 4,921 п,., ось... :еэ 2ез :бо :�о :ьо :б9 2s9 2ео 2sь 2э4 677 эsе 2s7 п.,. xv.e.r о! Oovвr�r.at feAoolв 6,74s e,ses в,ss1 7,бьб е,sп 9,зеь e,бss б,ы з 9,о72 9,os: 9,117 9,s21 9,s44 9,s2a � тоаl N�raг о[ lupil! j..]16•1е7 j,цp,�Q �,gi4,�14 �,.¢эвпеs4 1.622,в74 2.sаl.вы 2.571.9б4 2.sьl.эе� L4l2�3� L39�,141 L]44�ii4. l,!li�53� 1.!l5.,4,4,L д,,ь, стваео 1 ее 6 2,ь) ,�so5 :,4a:,7s4 2,sэ9, эs 2,ы s,ьз7 2,4э1,ь:ь 2,4ь1,sоэ 2,4ьх,147 2,990,1os з,иs,пь п.в, 2,7эб,:2а п,о, п,о, п,в. Севди 9 to 12 174,567 1ээ,972 139,419 146,991 112,O1S l10,46! 104,274 9э,620 72,475 п,о. 6S1,SS0 п.а. п.в. п.в. lгivвев lеЬооl тввlАвев S,7S4 ♦,2ц о.в. 1,122 о,а. п.в. п.а. п.а. п,а, э,719 2,276 4,217 4,592 2,эб1 1/ , Сеевге.ве! ееьееl тиеьвео 9о,ы: 9o,62s 92,ss6 9ь,70э 96,691 99,Оь7 1os,9s0 1и,эг9 l2s,466 ие,аеб 1зб,714 lэl,б5б 1:9,21о и1,221 � pupil/lиеkвт 4eio 26 29 26 26 2S 2S 2э 22 2S 24 26 46 26 п,в. 1�.м. ot ontves■1с7 ьеиа.ас. u,s4s 11,би и,п7 11,7os и,мо и,:ь0 u,2so 1:,7i9 16,1ь4 1в,sвэ 1ь,зва 1е,1и 1e,1s7 16,26е a,I rv.ыг ос uдt..e.ie� ти�е.�. 1,о11 1,1ьз 1,:97 1,зяе 1,4я0 :,ооо 2,o2s :,о46 2,о79 1,ьэ9 1,ь0а 1,sэ9 пл. 1,e4s к.в вь1..lоn. з,1:9 з,4s7 7,ззе э,4:о э,сsз э,4е: э,бsа а,1ьб а,717 а,2еь а,ы е а,боь s,1a6 s,24s и�ы� а..еwна 4,1э7 з,9ц а,941 4,ое7 з,эа э,146 s,эso з,бо: э,еsо э,эт: э,а: :,б9э п.в, � 4,24з Recurrenc С:реааlсиге сь..1111оп) 47: 4ы s1я sбэ 5еэ бss re6 або че2 1,1э2 1,эбб 1,sя9 1,99s :,sаз Gpitвl tapeoditueвo (Rв вillioo) 1Q � � �, � „j,�, 1� 1J,§, 1S7 259 656 й21 ь71 ЬОВ ree.1 (�о .tuloo) s1: s:e sae ьо2 ь:ь 7ое 911 э7ь 1,1э9 1,э91 1,64ь 2,о:о 2,466 :,9s1 тоевl t:рведiеикв вв f ое cDe э.я э.б э.э э.4 2.7 2.7 э.2 2.е 2.7 2.7 2.в 2,а 2,s 2,а �/ hovtвioaвl. о,в. � aot вввilвЫе. Dеигев� Gееевl ввпk ot Свуlоs. B�Si' СОРУ AVAILABLE � � Table 11,05: TOURISM: ARRIVALS BY REGION, 1975-83 (Number) 1975 1976 1977 i = 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Western Europe 60,187 72,624 103,807 125,664 160,664 213,482 245,785 232,290 176,668 Asia 24,604 25,417 27,447 38,560 58,975 74,676 88,744 135,088 124,564 North America 6,823 6,279 8,907 10,729 11,701 12,878 13,946 15,528 14,740 Eastern Europe 4,957 5,825 4,480 6,102 5,496 4,906 5,311 4,160 4,456 Australia 3,683 4,199 5,415 6,629 7,374 8,724 9,584 12,834 10,042 Others R.950 4,627 3,609 4,908 5,954 Z.114 7,372 1,330 6,872 TOTAL 103,204 116,971 153,665 192,592 250,164 321,780 370,742 407,230 337,342 Memorandum Items: Tourist Nights ('000) 1,015 1,194 1,645 2,061 2,777 3,548 3,907 4,048 3,373 Guest Nights A/ ('000) 656 847 1,109 1,350 1,637 2,008 2,097 2,056 1,652 Rooms in Graded Accommodation 3,632 4,581 4,851 5,347 5,599 6,042 6,891 7,539 8,643 Tourist Receipts k/ million) 22.4 28.2 40.0 55.8 77.7 110.7 132.4 146.6 116.0 I/ Tourist nights in Graded Accommodation. h/ Data not consistent with the foreign travel receipts date presented in Table 3.01 which are based on Central Bank of Ceylon data. Source: Ceylon Tourist Board. BEST COPY AVAILABLE , �1 д � 't �t . ' �1г; D . . _ �`�� ��������r�� • s��}�.�ft „ о { �l�ëg; �а�� .� +. , ..� D /�� �����i����� � � g • • . . ��� т i a�f • � г`('� а � � ` � � � � _� � � � � � � � � �� - �, � � 1--ti�., ь� ( ^ ! ,-.у , � �Е � � � Г-?� = г � . ` �и, � `. �` / \�. �.. 'О L' � ., . �, � / l� � � ,ГLJa ..) t ��, � � �и � �' . . '' i ,. ���; %, ;.�:, N � -у �. `� t.. ' �< ... .. '• _ _� - � '( � ; ; �� 1 � `�� д ;_ ь' у�� •,ч•fS ; � г . � •, l'� ��' 1 1/ r' � � + � '[ f �. г , 1: " �.��.). / �'� rn � � �- '�` � ; R ,;� , � . =� � � �• f г�`�3 I �� ) �-"�� �т� � �/�r ^ .6•'�S '� i� rn, .. �. � ° � � �г�'� �j �(f � � �'� � ��,� " ,,,_ �7 w�, г �•.) с_ Г � •1 ` � /�, � ' ? '� � �1` `�г , '.. С � (�_i а ` � � , � � Г % i, i ъ� �ir� ��Л ,�� � 5 у, � f� � ;... �. '�. ��. - �� . i i/ -7 ' [/ �г �r! '-�� Г �' �r-C7 �� . г,�.. �(` � %//j' � �.�'�' у г � � .�Т-,� � �� -� 4`. �� '1 �"� ' С� �..�,. ,� - �L �'� j:, ;;�-'�� � � j�� �1�,� %� n � г п � __ r, � (� . V rry .. / � `с J / уг ' Т � '1,!`� С � � у / � � I �• C:J `,'� � i � �,� \ � � / �`" _� , ��' z� _, 1 ` _�- �� ,, Lj <�,� •;��{s �•'�,� ,/ ) ,,,r ;�. г� . Г� • � ��.. а � �' �}\Uj �' r_---._у1� `l� t� ;1- lf � ��ь�: �"�:.. в .• � '-\. �г (у • ( _ \г� ) , � 1'�j ��ь`7у, � 1 .,� ��..у� ,` (`'.\J �.Г � /'L � .:.�;.г� . , � `�. ��-�', ; .r..l.,,.. t '� b � .f r � � .�r'GЪ• r: �. ••^-#�" � r{r' � х ��i ) � ` � \у. , �/./+� t�� � (1t' /.., / (� 1' , /���1i°V ' � /Jf• ' ; ` � ^ �� л �+� � �..h�..J �.. • � � _/ _ '��-�. п � �• � ° �, � ✓г'' 1 т; ' � �. t' г ._..�: �� , ��� -с С :�г � � � � °_° ��-� . (Л п � "'� � � � � . . � о о Q I Lr Т �'� у _ �� / ` уг =� � $ � � I i ® О т ( /`�V ,, ,.� � �l-TTT � r . О � Я ТТ , i С) ' � � О $ �`������� 1"" � .. .! � у �.. � � � �$�� � �' $ � � f• �•�• ..N�'' , � о, \ ' - s � � � ��� ��.� й „ � jf у `, � а ���.� z .� �! � � � 7С Л � •� 1 ii М 3, � S о � 8 й Е _ • Е1g � . .. � а - � 4о � � � i W - � fb а f.�1 о q q �