Liberia - Bong County Agricultural Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 5331 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LIBERIA BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 700-LBR) October 30, 1984 Western Africa Projects Department Agriculture Division B This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its cotents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoriation. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = United States Dollars Currency Exchange Rate = US $1.00 - Appraisal Year Average = US $1.00 - Intervening Year Average = US $1.00 - Completion Year Average = US $1.00 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 Metric ton = 0.98 long ton 1 long ton = 2,240 lb = 1.016 metric ton 1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres 1 acre = 0.405 hectare 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile 1 mile = 1.609 kilometer ABBREVIATIONS ACDB = Agricultural and Cooperative Development Bank ADPs = Agricultural Development Projects BCADP = Bang County Agricultural Development Project CAO = County Agricultural Officer CARI = Central Agricultural Research Institute CDA = Cooperative Development Agency CMEU = Central Monitoring and Evaluation Unit CS = Cooperative Society GOL = Government of Liberia LBDI = Liberian Bank for Development and Investment LCADP = Lofa County Agricultural Development Project LPKC = Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation M0A = Kinistry of Agriculture M = Ministry of Works PKU = Project Management Unit PSC = Project Steering Committee TCU = Town Cooperative Unit USAID = United States Agency for International Development FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LIBERIA BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Cr. 700-LBR) COMPLETION REPORT Table of Contents Page No. PREFACE*......... ............. ..................... i BASIC DATA SHEET................... ........ ........... ii HIGHLIGHTS................................................. iv BANK OVERVIEW OF THE COMPLETION REPORT...................... 1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREPARED BY THE PROJECT MONITORING AND EVALUATION UNIT.................... 9 I. INTRODUCTION...................................... 9 II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL ... 10 III. THE PROJECT.... o....................o............. 11 IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION............................ 14 V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS.................................. 23 VI. PROJECT IMPACT.................................. 25 VII. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION........... ............... 29 VIII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT............ 31 IX. PERPORMANCE OF THE BANK..... .................** 35 I. CONCLUSIONS........... o ................... ......... 35 ANNEXES ANNEX 1 KEY INDICATORS ANNEX 2 INCREMENTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS APPENDIX I: Comments from the Borrower. MAP: IBRD Map No. 12366 Liberia Bong County Agricultural Development Project. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. LIBERIA BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Cr. 700-LBR) COMPLETION REPORT PREPACE 1. This is a completion report (PCR) on the Bong County Agricultural Development Project (BCADP). The Credit for the project was approved by the Board of Directors in April 1977, in an amount of US $7.0 million, and was closed in December 1983, in accordance with the original closing date. 2. The report consists of a Project Completion Report prepared by BCADP (BCADP/PCR), and a Bank Overview of the BCADP/PCR prepared by the Western Africa Region Projects Department. This project has not been the subject of an audit by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). However, OED expects that it will undertake an audit of Bang County Agricultural Development Project Phase II, when it is completed, and, at the same time carry out an impact evaluation of Bong County Agricultural Development Project Phase I and Lofa County Agricultural Development Project, which was the subject of a PCR prepared in 1983 (Report No. 4517 dated 27 May, 1983). 3. Western Africa Region finds the BCADP/PCR to be a satisfactory review of the project and, generally, is in accord with its major findings and conclusions. Any significant differences of opinion between the Bank and BCADP, and any relevant additional information on Bank files which may not have been available to BCADP are reflected in the Bank Overview. 4. The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower for comments in July 1984. Comments received from the project are attached as Appendix I. 5. The Western Africa Regional Office gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance provided by Government officials involved in the project and project staff. Their assistance contributed greatly to this report. LTBiU mm o00my ARICUmmDL DwwOW BETT (cr.7a)-Lm) PR3M COMnEIC( RWW R BSIC DATA MWXI Key Pmject Data Actual or Actual as % Appraisal Current of Apprainal Item Etimate atiMte atimate Project Costs (US$ Er.ion) 2D.3 21.9 1 iCB Credit Amunt (USS willicn) 7.0 7.0 100 Disbuzued to Narch 31, 19B4 7.0 6.9 99 Institutinal Performnce Good Saifactory - Agrani.c Perfomrice-Coffee (Ig/ha) 1,000 561 56 Agranomic Perfammnce-Cooa (kg/a) 1,000 392 39 Agaad. Perfo RLce (kg/ha) 3,000 2,500 83 Agmmi.c Perfmam-Upland Rice (Ig/ba) 1,300 2 1,500 115 Baamic Rate of Return (%) 21 4 19 Inber of neficiaries 9,000 8,200 91 Project Dates Date Board Approval April 1977 April 1977 Effectiveness Date March 1978 March 1978 Completion Date June 1983 June 1983 Closing Date December 1983 December 1983 Project Disbursements Schedule (Cnnlative) FY7/78 FM7879 - f9/80 F80/81 FIB1/82 F2/83 1M3/84 SAR btimate 0.4 1.9 3.4 4.7 6.2 7.0 7.0 Actual/Current Ebtimate - 1.3 2.4 3.8 5.2 6.1 7.0 % A/E - 68 71 81 84 87 100 Date of E-mal Disbursement: There is still a swell anmunt of US $3,874 still to disbUse. 1 This is the latest estimate as at February 1984 and, therefore, it differs from the actuals shown in Tables 7 & 8, which were as at 30 September & 31 December 1982, respectively. 2 Without fertilizer. The SAR estimated that with fertilizer the yield of upland rice would reach 1,800 kg/ha, in which case actual would be about 83% of appraisal estimates. It turned out that very few farmers used recommended amounts of fertilizer on upland rice. Speia- A/ 2 / Date of No. of No. of izatim 1erfanme SPN. No. R Persms Yeeks ating Trnd Problem Identification by GOL 6/74 Preparation 5/75 Appraisal 5/76 10 1 4/78 1 1/2 c 1 1 - 2 1/19 2 2 a,c 1 1 - 3 8/79 2 2 a,c 2 1 1,0 4 1/80 3 4 a,a,c 2 1 7 5 7/80 2 2 b,c, 2 1 ,F 6 12/8D 1 1 b 2 1 X,F 7 6/81 5 5 b,d,c,a,c 2 1 M,P.0 8 9/82 2 2 a,c, 2 1 F,T 9 1/83 1 1 a 2 1 F,T 10 5/84 2 2 a,f 2 1 F,T Total: W.12 Other Project Data Borrower - Government of Liberia Executing Agency - Ministry of Agriculture Fiscal Year - July 1 - June 30 Name of Currency - United States Dollar Follow-on Project - Bong County Agricultural Development Project Phase II (Credit 1447 LBR - Approved by the Board 13 March 1984) a = agriculturist; b = agricultural economist; c = financial analyst; d = operations assistant; f = credit specialist. 2/ 1 = problem-free or minor problems; 2 = moderate problems. / 1 = improving; 2 = stationary. 4/ F = financial; M = managerial; T = technical; and 0 = other. - iv - LIBERIA BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Cr 700-LBR) COMPLETION REPORT HIGHLIGHTS 1. The Bang County Agricultural Development Project was the Bank Group's second major integrated agricultural development project in Liberia. It was modelled, basically, on the earlier Lofa County Agricultural Development Project (Cr 577-LBR). The project, which was identified by GOL/IDA, was prepared by consultants as part of the Liberian Agricultural Development and Technical Assistance Project (306-LBR) financed by IDA, USAID and the Government of Liberia. The primary objective of the project was to increase production of smallholder rice, coffee, and cocoa, in three districts (Gbarnga, Kokoya, and Sanoyie) of Bang County by means of an extension system with supporting services such as credit, input supply, marketing and cooperative development. In addition, the project included the construction of new feeder roads, feeder road rehabilitation, well construction, and the provision of buildings including the expansion of a training center. 2.. The agricultural targets attained by the project compared to those at appraisal, in terms of hectarages developed, were about 24% for swamp rice, 114% for upland rice, 92% for coffee new plantings, and 113% for cocoa new plantings. 3. Incremental yields are difficult to assess because of the long gestation periods for coffee and cocoa. Best estimates as a percentage of appraisal targets are 83% for swamp rice, 115% for upland rice, 56% for coffee new plantings, and 39% for cocoa new plantings. About 7,500 farm families, or about 83% of the appraisal target of 9,000 farm families, participated directly in the project. Through its unit designed to carry out small road maintenance and the construction of access tracks, the project completed a substantial program of construction and reconditioning of about 650 km of feeder roads, 383 culverts, 44 bridges, 91 village wells, and 26 latrines. Although there were four changes of project manager, overall management of the project was satisfactory with local staff taking over complete responsibility from expatriates by project year 5. 4. Revised estimated total project cost is US$21.9 million, about 108% of appraisal estimates. Expenditures up to the end of September, 1982 (PY5) for IDA-financed components totalled US$6.5 million, USAID components US$3.6 million and Government of Liberia contribution US$7.8 million. The actual costs exceeded appraisal estimates in building and construction, vehicles and vehicle operating costs, furniture and equipment, salaries and general administration, and village wells, but were less for farm inputs, feeder road -v- construction, research and feasibility studies. 5. The revised economic rate of return is estimated at 4%, much lower than the appraisal estimate of 21%, due mainly to the late start up of crop activities, lower than estimated crop yields, benefits from tree crops accruing much later than expected, and large areas planted with cocoa on unsuitable soil. In line with observed yield performance, future expected yields have been adjusted downwards. New cocoa planting has also been excluded from the follow-on Bong ADP Phase II. 6. As the designs of the Lofa ADP and Bong ADP were basically the same and the timing of the two projects overlapped considerably, the conclusions of the two Project Completion Reports, not surprisingly, are very similar. The project had only limited success. It has been reasonably successful overall in effecting improvements in the agriculture of Bong County. Although problems were encountered in farmer adoption of improved swamp rice techniques, cocoa planting on unsuitable soils was close to disastrous. The physical achievement, mobilization of farmers, institutional performance and development of a trained and motivated management and extension staff have been satisfactory. In addition, the feeder road network has been extended enabling goods and services to reach villages not previously served by road transport, and the foundation for good input supply, credit and marketing systems have been established. 7. The main lessons which emerge from the project's implementation experience, and which have been taken into consideration for the Bong ADP Phase II, include: - technological packages in projects should be kept under constant review (BCADP/PCR para 4.06); - care needs to be taken in project design to take into consideration indigenous farming systems (BCADP/PCR para 4.07); - appropriate assessment of soils is a key factor prior to recommending tree crop development (BCADP/PCR para 4.08); - monitoring and evaluation units have an important role to play in project implementation and policy changes (BCADP/PCR para 4.21); - monitoring of staffing, organization and management is essential to avoid over-staffing and to improve cost effectiveness of projects (BCADP/PCR para 8.05); and - adaptive research closely associated with the farming community is important (BCADP/PCR para 10.03). LIBERIA BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CR 700 - LBR) COMPLETION REPORT Bank Overview of the Bong County Agricultural Development Project Completion Report Prepared by the Project Monitoring and 0valuation Unit 1/ A. Background 1.01 The Project Completion Report was prepared by the Project Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, assisted by the Ministry of Agriculture's Central Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The report is thorough and appropriately critical. Except for some information in Bank files, which was not available to the Liberians, the report covers all relevant information concerning the project. Gaps in the report have been filled by reference to the files and are covered in this Overview, as are instances where the judgment of the Bank differs from that in the report. 1.02. The project, which was modelled, basically, on the earlier Lofa County Agricultural Development Project (CR. 577-LBR), was identified by the Government of Liberia in 1975, prepared by consultants in 1975, and appraised in 1976. Board approval was in April 1977 and the Credit became effective in March 1978. The Credit closed in June 1984 in accordance with the original closing date. 1.03. The project was designed to increase farm incomes and agricultural production, particularly that of smallholders, in three districts (Gbarnga, Kokoya and Sanoyie) of Bong County, which has a total area of 650,000 ha and a population of about 140,000 of which about 100,000 (19,000 farm families) are engaged in farming. In order to achieve that objective, the project provided for: - development and seasonal loans to increase production of about 6,000 ha of upland rice, 2,000 ha of swamp rice, 3,000 ha of cocoa, and 1,500 ha of coffee; - construction of about 65 km of new feeder roads and reconditioning/upgrading about 210 km of feeder roads; - construction of project offices and accommodation for senior staff; 1/ Minor editorial changes have been made to the BCADP/PCR. -2- - recruitment of qualified Liberian and expatriate technical and administrative personnel, and training of Liberian senior counterpart staff to take over the executive and technical functions from the expatriates; - establishment of farmer cooperatives to facilitate farm input, credit supply and marketing; and - construction of schistosomiasis and crop research laboratories, and about 300 village wells for improved water supply. 1.04. Total project costs were estimated at US$20.3 million; IDA would provide US$7.0 million, USAID US$6.6 million, and the Government of Liberia US$6.7 million. The economic rate of return was estimated at 21%. B. Implementation Staffing and Organization 1.05. Staffing, particularly senior staff, has been a major problem throughout the project period. Credit effectiveness was delayed for some considerable period due mainly to the time taken to appoint a project manager and a manager for the Finance Division. The project manager, an expatriate, resigned after a year in office; he was replaced by another expatriate who stayed with the project for only eighteen months. The third project manager, this time a Liberian, remained with the project for only eight months when he was then promoted and transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. Three project managers within such a short period, each with his own style of management and ideas on priority components, clearly had an impact on project progress and on staff morale generally. The other major senior staff changes that took place were the expatriate manager of the Commercial Services Division who served for about one year, and the expatriate swamp development officer who stayed with the project for only three months. It was not until the fourth, and current, project manager, a Liberian, took office that the project really began to settle down. The prcject has now taken shape; several past mistakes, particularly the planting of cocoa on unsuitable soil, have been corrected, and staff morale is good. Under local management, the project continues to operate satisfactorily, therefore, the organizational and staffing aspects of the project were implemented successfully. Crop Development 1.06. Overall, about 95% of the planned hectarage benefitted under various crop development programs. Coffee and cocoa new planting of about 1,380 ha and 3,380 ha respectively, were about 92% and 113% of appraisal estimates. Upland rice with about 6,540 ha was 114% of appraisal estimates; but swamp rice, about 420 ha was only 24%. 1.07. All the cocoa farms were newly established and during PY1-PY4 - 3 - farmers increasingly showed interest in cocoa development. However, by the end of PY4, the position had changed dramatically; it was discovered that cocoa seedlings were being planted in areas where the soil was unsuitable and also that the low tolerance of cocoa to the heat of the sun was causing considerable losses on those farms with insufficient shade. About 50% of the area planted to cocoa is estimated to have suffered from those causes. In an effort to help those farmers who, on the advice of the project, planted cocoa which later proved to be in unsuitable areas, the project is helping by replacing the cocoa seedlings with free coffee seedlings. Soil is being more thoroughly tested and new cocoa planting has been excluded from Bong ADP Phase II. 1.08. New coffee planting was about 92% of target; the main constraint was the shortage of seedlings. The Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation (LNC) was unable to maintain the supply to both the Bong and Lofa projects as LPNC encountered difficulties in obtaining coffee seed on time and in adequate quantities. Tn the end, both projects were forced to set up their own nurseries. 1.09. The original upland rice package of improved seed and fertilizer evoked little response from farmers. They felt that fertilizer was too costly and that the technical package of effective application had not been proven. If the bush fallow is more than eight years, good yields could be obtained without fertilizer. The more popular package was improved seeds alone which was generally provided through seed exchange. By the end of the project, about 114% of appraisal target had been achieved. 1.10. Swamp rice achievement was only about 24% of target and, to a certain extent, that reflects the policies on swamp development which varied from one project manager to another. In the earlier years the project was not successful in encouraging farmers to work in swamps because of the danger of schistosomiasis and other diseases associated with them. Some farmers who did develop their swamps, achieved greater production and higher yields; the majority, however, could not cope with the demand for greater care and maintenance in view of major labor constraints, with the result that swamp farms were either reduced in size or the swamps were allowed to revert to their underdeveloped state. 1.11 The quantities of inputs actually distributed to farmers over the project period are shown below: Appraisal Actual as % Input Estimate Actual Appraisal Estimate Rice Seeds (mt) 1/ 390.0 379.3 97 Coffee Seedlings ('000) 1,889.7 1,889.7 100 Cocoa Seedlings ('000) 3,790.0 3,840.3 101 Fertilizer (mt) 3,732.1 212.8 6 1/ Both swamp and upland of which 94% was upland. -4- Cooperatives and Credit 1.12. The project attempted to build up a viable cooperative system to handle credit, input supply and marketing. At the end of PY5, the cooperative structure consisted of 230 Cooperative Service Units affiliated to six District Cooperative Societies; total membership was about 7,500 (81% of appraisal targets). By the end of PY6, membership had grown to about 8,300 (92% of appraisal targets). The six District Cooperative Societies formed a federation licensed by LPNC to buy directly from farmers. The project played a prominent role in the development of the cooperative structure; however, mainly because of management and staffing constraints, the cooperatives were not able to discharge their input supply and credit functions satisfactorily. Although some success was achieved in marketing, and strengthening of the cooperatives is an on-going process, the Bank does not agree with the statement in the PCR prepared by the project that the cooperatives were strengthened in the area of input supply and credit. Throughout the project period both input supply and credit were handled by the project Commercial Services Division. At the end of the project it was agreed that cooperatives sould have responsibility, supported by the project Commercial Services Division, for input supply and marketing, but that credit should be taken over by the Agricultural Cooperative and Development Bank (ACDB). In preparation for Bong ADP Phase II, ACDB has already taken over, successfully, all the Bong ADP farmer loan accounts numbering about 8,000. Seasonal loan recoveries by the project were satisfactory (90%); development loans are only just starting to fall due for repayment and data are not yet available on recoveries; they are, however, expected to be low because of the loans granted for cocoa in unsuitable areas. Those loans are not necessarily bad debts as coffee seedlings are being offered free by the project to replace the cocoa plantings. Civil Works 1.13. Generally, this component was implemented successfully, but not without considerable difficulties. The political upheaval in 1980 and the resulting uncertainties were the major factors which disrupted, among other project activities, the construction of the administration building. Civil works undertaken by the project included, in addition to the administration building, an annex to the training centre, four houses, a workshop, a schistosomiasis laboratory, three cooperative input sales centers, about 90 village wells and 26 latrines. A substantial program of construction and reconditioning of about 650 km of feeder roads, 380 culverts and 45 bridges was also carried out successfully. 1.14. There was considerable community self-help assistance in the construction of feeder roads, wells and latrines. Latrines were included in the project at the request of the Head of State during a visit to the project area. However, unlike the village wells program where utilization was satisfactory, the latrine program was slow in gaining acceptance at the village level. -5- Disease Control 1.15 The Schistosomiasis Surveillance Unit was established to determine and monitor any presence of a prevalence of schistosomiases in swamps to be developed for rice production in the project area. About 170 swamps and 50 contact sites were surveyed, and 2,700 farmers tested for S. Reamatobrium and S. Mansoni. Children and villages were also tested. In the beginning, the analysis of specimens showed a wide range of infections. Drugs were given for treatment and by PY 5, the range of infection among swamp farmers was down to about 9% with S. Heamatobrium to about 14Z with S. Mansoni. This component was successfully implemented and contributed greatly to the implementation of the swamp rice program. Monitoring and Evaluation 1.16. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was set up late 1979. The Unit carried out farm business surveys similar to those carried out in LOYA ADP, and also produced a number of reports. The subjects covered: crop yields, feasibility of farm models, benefits from roads, labour supply and demand, food consumption, etc. The Unit has been a valuable source of information for project management and has been able to influence several policy changes made in the project. The Unit, with the assistance of the Ministry of Agriculture, Central Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, also prepared the BCADP/PCR. Financial Aspects 1.17. Estimated total project cost is US$21.9 million as compared to US$20.3 million estimated at appraisal. The cost of buildings, vehicles and vehicle operating costs, general administrative services, furniture and equipment, and village wells, exceeded appraisal estimates; whereas farm inputs, roads, construction and research costs were much lower. Farm inputs were only about 74% of appraisal estimates since fertilizer was almost excluded from the rice package, and swamp rice development was well below appraisal targets. USAID, as a cofinancier, financed the cost of farm inputs, road construction, some local staff salaries, and general services. Procurement 1.18. No major procurement problems arose during project implementation. Extension and Training 1.19. The project recruited its own extension staff and exercised a high standard of selection. A modified version of the Training and Visit system has been introduced and so far both project staff and farmers appear to be enthusiastic in its use. Further refinement of the system will, however, be undertaken under the second phase project. -6- Crop Yields 1.20. A Liberian National Agricultural Production Survey carried oaut In 1978 indicates that rice yield in Bang County was about 1,235 kg/ha. Wo further survey data are available. BCADP Monitoring and Nvaluation Unit started collecting its own data in PT2. The appraisal estimated that yields of upland rice would increase from about 1,000 kg/ha- without develolment to about 1,800 kg/ha with the adoption of a package comprising improved seed and fertilizers or about 1,300 kg/ha without fertilizers. Seed exchange proved to be more popular than the seed fertilizer package and, in addition, project staff concluded that in the shifting cultivation system of agriculture where planting takes place after a normal fallow period of between 10-15 years, there is little advantage gained in applying fertilizer. Upland rice yields are about 1,500 kg/ha (about 115% of appraisal estimate). If the National Agricultural Production Survey estimate of 1,235 kg/ha is taken as the base yield instead of the 1,000 kg/ha estimated at appraisal, the incremental benefits to the project may well have been lower than estimated. 1.21. With regard to swamp rice, the appraisal estimated an increase in yields from 1,750 kg/ha to 3,000 kg/ha using a package of proper water management, timely planting and fertilization and use of seed varieties resistant to iron toxicity. Actual yields are estimated at about 2,500 kg/ha (83% of appraisal estimate). Farmers tended to reduce the quantities of fertilizer applied and paid little attention to proper maintenance. Project extension staff supervised closely the development efforts in the beginning but in the succeeding years, as farmers generally became less interested in proper care and maintenance, or in following recommended practices, the level of supervision diminished. 1.22. It was estimated at appraisal that new coffee plantations would start bearing fruit in the fourth year after planting, yielding a harvest of 300 kg/ha rising to 1,000 kg/ha in PY6. During project impementation these figures were revised downward, and recent project surveys show an average yield of 108 kg/ha for PY4 rising to 163 for PY5. Estimated yield for PT6 is about 560 kg/ha (56% of appraisal estimates), rising to about 600 kg/ha in peak year PY7. 1.23. Appraisal estimated that new cocoa plantings would start bearing fruit in PY5 with a harvest of 200 kg/ha rising steadily to the peak year PY10 when yields were expected to reach 1,000 kg/ha. In PY3 some cocoa plantations had already begun to bear fruit and the average was 56 kg/ha; this rose to 224 kg/ha in PY5. However, the present method of yield data collection (which is being improved) is still very crude and is too small a sample to be reliable. A mid-term project review reduced estimated yield to a peak in P7 of about 450 kg/ha (45% of appraisal estimates). 1.24. It is clear that crop yield estimates for both coffee and cocoa were very much overestimated at appraisal. -7- Economic Re-evaluation (ERR) 1.25. The economic rate of return is estimated at a little over 4% as compared to 21% at appraisal. The main reasons for the shortfall are : (i) late start-up of crop production activities; (ii) a large area of cocoa (and to a lesser extent coffee) was planted on unsuitable soils; and (iii) crop yields were much lower than estimated at appraisal. In line with observed yield performance, future expected yields have been adjusted downwards and new cocoa planting has been excluded from Bong ADP Phase II. The ERR could be improved considerably if all recomended technical practices for tree crops and swamp rice are followed, thus increasing production. Bank Performance 1.26. In view of the general lack of experience and knowledge of the sector at the time of appraisal (the first project - Lofa ADP - was declared effective at the time of Bong ADP appraisal) Bank performance was reasonably satisfactory, particularly in designing a package which integrated feeder roads, inputs, extension and training, and schistosomiasis monitoring. Adequate resources were provided to help the project meet its objectives and targets. The major flaw in project design was related to the lack of experience with the understanding of Liberian conditions. Principally, the project was least successful in the development of swamp rice and cocoa, and in the development of cooperatives to take over responsibility for credit and input supply by the end of the project period. Although Bank supervisions were adequate in number (10) and frequency (two per year), it would have been advisable to have included a cooperative credit specialist during the early supervisions. Bank supervision missions should also have focused more seriously, at an earlier stage, on problems of cocoa development especially soil testing requirements. The missions were, however, instrumental in guiding project staff in areas of procurement, project planning and implementation, accounting pro- cedures and, eventually in the transfer of farmer loan accounts from the project to the Agricultural Cooperative and Development Bank. Conclusions and Lessons Learned 1.27. While major problems were encountered due to inadequate knowledge at appraisal, a political upheaval during 1980, and irregular funding by Government, the project was reasonably successful in effecting improvements in the agriculture of Bong County. Institutionally, the project has established a sound base with experienced and dedicated management and staff, that will provide a good start-up for Bong ADP Phase II. 1.28. The main lessons learned from project implementation and which have been taken into consideration in the design of the follow-up project include: - technological packages in projects should be kept under constant review (BCADP/PCR para 4.06); - 8 - - care needs to be taken in project design to take into consideration indigenous farming systems (BCADP/PCR para 4.07); - appropriate assessment of soils is a key factor prior to recommending tree crop development (BCADP/PCR para 4.08); - monitoring and evaluation units have an important role to play in project implementation and policy changes (BCADP/PCR para 4.21); - monitoring of staffing, organization and management is essential to avoid over-staffing and to improve cost effectiveness of projects (BCADP/PCR para 8.05); and - adaptive research closely associated with the farming community is important (BCADP/PCR para 10.03). -9- LIBERIA BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Cr. 700-LBR) Project Completion Report 11 I. INTRODUCTION Sector Background 1.01 Liberia has two major sub-sectors in the agricultural economy, namely: (i) the more modern export; and (ii) the subsistence traditional sector. Agriculture as a whole contributes about 32% to the GDP (14% from monetary and 18% from the traditional sector). During the period 1974-79, the agricultural sector maintained an average growth rate of about 4% but fell to almost zero growth in 1981-82 due possibly to depressed prices of the export commodities, including, rubber, cocoa and coffee. The yields of farm crops in the traditional sector (which is still a larger portion of the total) are held at significantly lower level than those of the Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) because of the lack of capital, technical know-how and the inability to get incentives vis a vis prices at farmgate. Even project farmers cooperating with the ADPs are sometimes held back from producing more by the inability of the Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation (LPMC, the only marketing agency in Liberia) to buy on time and at prices - acceptable to farmers in general. The military coup in 1980 also affected slightly the performance of agriculture more specially in the ADP areas. 1.02 During the project years (1977-78, a pre-operation, and then 1978-1983) the Government's sector objectives were mainly to increase productivity, employment and income in the rural areas, most especially of the small farmers. The Government also aimed at establishing large plantations of coffee, cocoa, oil palm, coconut, sugarcane and even rice by public corporations. To be able to achieve the planned objectives, the Government increased the agricultural budgetary allotment from 4% in 1970 to 21% in 1980. The appropriation of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) was in the vicinity of about $20.5 million in 1982-83. This is about 6.0% of the Fiscal Year Budget. The Government has pursued the 1/ Prepared by the project's Monitoring and Evaluation Unit assisted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Central Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. Minor editorial changes have been made. - 10 - policy of decentralization, hence, created three regions in order to improve the administration of agricultural programs including research, extension and training. In the case of the strategy for the smaliholder farms, extension services were categorically implemented by two major groups: (i) Ministry of Agriculture's extension service which has always been hampered by the lack of funds and logistic support-making its effectiveness questionable in spite of the "free" material; and (ii) the ADP extension which proved to be more effective because of the availability of inputs and farm tools at reasonable prices, i.e., fertilizers at subsidized price and on credit. II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION, AND APPRAISAL Preparation and Appraisal of the Project 2.01 The initial preparation for the Bong Project was carried out in 1971 as reported in the Upper Bong Rural Development Project Feasibility Study (1975). Hence, the project was identified by GOL and feasibility report prepared by consultants with funds from the Liberia Agricultural Development and Technical Assistance Project, Credit 306-LBR. The Appraisal Report No. 130a-LBR (1977) was finally produced based on the findings of a joint IBRD-USAID appraisal mission that visited Liberia in May-June, 1976. 2.02 The original proposal (feasibility study) included the improvement of extension services, setting up of cooperative societies, revolving credit funds, strengthening of Central Agricultural Research Institute (CARI) operation, provision of infrastructures particularly roads and setting up of a health unit to monitor the incidence of diseases. Generally, all these were approved and considered by the appraisal mission. Hence, the appraisal mission considered further the extent of 9,000 farm families to be assisted and provided farm support services such as extension advice, input supply, credit arrangements, land development and soil selection. To be able to implement all these, as in the Lofa Project. a special administrative entity, the Bong Project Management Un' (BPMU) was created and headquartered in Suakoko. A Project Steering CoL-ittee (PSC) was created to determine project policy, exercise budgetary control, financial control, approve appointment of professional staff, determine conditions of service and ensure inter-agency cooperation and coordination. To be meaningful to the local people and community, a Project Consulative Committee (PCC) was organized; it would facilitate communications between project and farmers and would also assist in loan recovery. Other support services included the Agricultural Cooperative Development Bank (ACDB) providing banking facilities and the Rural Development Unit of the Ministry of Public Works to help in well construction and farm to market road construction. 2.03 The Development Credit Agreement No. 700-LBR between the Government of Liberia and the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank was signed on December 29, 1977 and the Credit - 11 - was made effective on March 15, 1978. The USAID Loan No. 669-T-035, which also supported the project, was signed on January 16, 1978 but was made effective after two conditions were met: (i) appointment of an evaluation officer; and (ii) registration of small farms aligned with the national laws of Liberia. 2.04 Total project costs were estimated at US$20.3 million of which about 48% was expected to be foreign exchange component. The total financing was split into three sources IDA (US$7.0 million), USAID (US$6.0 million) and GOL (US$7.3 million). III. THE PROJECT 3.01 Project Area. The project area is located in Upper Bong County, north of Monrovia. It is lying between Montserrado, Nimba, Bassa and Lofa Counties. The project area covers 650,000 hectares and a population of about 140,000 of which about 100,000 (19,000 farm families) were farming. The project area has averaged rainfall ranging from 1,650 mm in 1979-80 to 3,768 mm in 1982-83. The land is generally rolling with some isolated hills and mountains but about 12% is in poorly drained swamps. The upland is characterized by low fertility whereas the lowland, while fertile, has some problems of iron-toxicity and sandy contents. 3.02 Of the total land in the project area a very small percentage was considered under cultivation. There were many large-scale farms devoted to the production of rubber (almost 2/3) and the remaining 1/3 occupied by peasant farmers with diversified croppings. The latter were normally used for shifting cultivation with fallow periods ranging from an average of 6 to 30 years. Most, however, were observed to be in the range of 7-15 years for upland rice farming. About 90 percent of the farmers in the area cultivate upland rice as the primary source of livelihood because it allows for intercropping of other minor crops for family consumption. Cassava and such vegetables as pepper, corn and eddoes constitute these minor crops. Before the project, the Government had already put emphasis to coffee and cocoa as part of the diversification program among small farmers. However, the project came in to introduce better seeds and seedlings (technological package component) and new methods of husbandry and culture. 3.03 The project was mainly conceived and implemented on the basis of increasing farm income and welfare of the farmers and to strengthen and develop the support services. Thus, the project comprised of farm and crop development, development of infrastructure, institutional support and other assistance. There were two major types of loans granted to tree crop farmers, development loans and, after establishment, maintenance loans (mainly for labor payments). Seasonal credit included fertilizers and farm chemicals in swamp, and seeds for both upland and/or swamp. - 12 - 3.04 Farm and Crop Development. The project intended to provide credit for farm inputs. During the first year, development would be confined to upland and swamp rice and, thereafter, the tree crops. In the upland, 5,750 hectares would be primarily planted to LAC-23 and replaced with new seed every 5th year; fertilizer (22-40-j) and better management practices would be applied. The project would also develop 3,000 hectares of cocoa and 1,500 hectares of coffee and development would consist of new plantings of high yielding materials; fertilizers, pesticides and fungicides would be used and better husbandry practices introduced. Better ways of processing/fermenting cocoa would be taught to maintain high quality. In the swamp 1,650 hectares of inland swamp would be redrained and 400 hectares of existing swamps improved. Of the total swamps targetted only 300 hectares would be double cropped. 3.05 Supply of Inputs. About 500 tons of rice seeds would be issued to farmers, 7.0 million cocoa and coffee seedlings distributed, 5,000 tons of fertilizers, insecticides, chemicals, shade crops, power tillers, sprayers,-hand winders, chain saws, fermentation boxes, etc. provided. All inputs and farm equipment would be rented/sold at full commercial cost with provision for credit. 3.06 Staffing. A smallholder development project requires staff with high levels of managerial efficiency, technical competence and innovation. Where possible the BPMU positions would be filled by Liberians. The project would also provide funds for six recruits from other countries. About 359 personnel and staff were expected in the last year (PY-5) of the project financial period. 3.07 Training. Manpower at all levels was a problem. No one educational institution in Liberia seemed to produce the immediate needs of the project. Hence, the Lofa Project would proviLe facilities for all extension, cooperative and credit field staff training. Some staff were to be trained abroad specially in tree crops proC.iction and management. Others would be trained in project management and rural development administration. The project would prepare its own training program which would consist of short courses plus practicum. Technical training for field staff would be at CARI (funding of center under 306-LBR) and close cooperation with WARDA would be sought. Short refresher courses would follow. Farmer training would also be aimed at and audio-visual aids provided. 3.08 Farm Inputs - Procurement and Distribution. The input supply and marketing section of the cooperative and credit services division would organize the farm input delivery system. Village level cooperatives would estimate the requirements of farmers (members) then the chiefdom cooperatives would collect the bigger cooperative requirements for delivery by LPMC; and latter would provide space for storage before actual distribution. All importations and warehousing at the port would b- either rented out or held at full cost. Basic inputs like seeds, seedlings and fertilizers and chemicals would be under the BPMUs development section. CARI would supply breeder rice seeds to be multiplied by selected farmers and on project seeds farms. Hybrid cocoa - 13 - and coffee seeds would be raised in project nurseries and some farmers' nurseries would be supervised by the project. 3.09 Village Wells and Latrines. The original project appraisal did not specify latrines as components of the project. However, the need was felt during project year two (PY-2) for the inclusion of this program as a source of incentives to the farmers. 3.10 Schistosomiasis Surveillance. Monitoring if project farmers was deemed important and the project would strengthen the Schistosomiasis Surveillance Unit (SSU) established under Credit 577-LBR. It would also undertake limited testing of vector control techniques. Additional staff, vehicles and laboratory facilities would be provided for the unit. However, administratively, the unit would be under the Liberian Institute for Biomedical Research. 3.11 Roads. The project would construct 170 km of new farm-to-market roads, upgrade 130 km of existing roads and maintain 540 km (including new ones) within the project area. The Ministry of Public Works-(MPW) would work closely with BPMU, since MPW has the primary responsibility of building roads. 3.12 Monitoring and Evaluation. The Lofa MEU would be strengthened with additional staff and equipment in order to cover Bong Project. 3.13 Project Benefits. Based on the World Bank Appraisal the incremental benefits would be from the following: TABLE 1 Anticipated Crop Yields (kg/ha) Crop Without Project With Project Upland Rice 1,000 1,500 2/ Swamp: Improved 1,400 3,000 (at PY-3) Advanced 3/ 1,400 5,250 (at PY-4) Coffee (new) 200 1,000 (at PY-6) Cocoa (new) 250 400 (at PY-6) The project benefits include the provision of basic farm inputs and tools on credit to make farming more wholesome and enjoyable. The secondary benefits were expected from the infrastructure, mainly roads and health facilities. 2/ Based on average of semi-improved and improved scheme. 3/ Pilot - 14 - IV. IMPLEMENTATION 4.01 Effectiveness. The credit was expected to take effect on March 15, 1978. 4.02 Organization. A Project Steering Committee (PSC) was appointed by the Government of Liberia in 1978. The committee was chaired by the Minister of Agriculture and the members comprised of representative from the Ministries of Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs, Internal Affairs (Local Government), and the Project Manager as secretary. This committee had the responsibility of overseeing the project and its operations. An advisory committee on the local level was also organized to coordinate community leaders and project at county level. The PCC, headed by the Superintendent, provided all the local support services needed to facilitate the effective implementation of the project activities. Members of the PCC included the Paramount Chiefs, Cooperatives Presidents, Clan Chiefs and other local leaders. The BPMU was headed by the Project Manager who in turn was responsible to the Minister of Agriculture. Nine divisions were established: Administration, Agricultural Services, Commercial Services, Finance, Land Use Planning, Roads and Workshops, Training, Schistosomiasis Surveillance Unit and Monitoring and Evaluation. Historically. the project had undergone some organizational changes. During the initial stage, in the absence of the appropriate person to man the new Land Use Planning Division (LUP), the head of the Agricultural Services had the added responsibility of running the Division. LUP became autonomous only in project year three (PY-3). Similarly, Workshop which is now headed by a Liberian, was under the Administration Division until PY-3 when an expatriate (British) was recruited to head it. Similarly, the activities of the Roads and Wells Division were administered by LUP until project year three (PY-3) when it was separated. With regard to the suitability of the project staff, recruitment of Liberians to replace expatriates has been on a purely competitive basis. Thus, the project had been fortunate to attract and maintain some of the good talents in specialized areas, even though there were a few who needed to be upgraded. Liberian counterparts started taking over most of the various sections in 1979 (PY-2) and 1980 (PY-3). Prior to this time most of the Divisions, including the position of the Project Manager were occupied by expatriates. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was organized only in the latter part of 1979 although the unit manager was in Lofa. 4.03 Staffing. The trend in staffing the project was increasing participation of Liberians. From PY-1 to PY-5 there has been an increase 'from 54% to 88%. By PY-5, only 12% (2 expatriates) were left in the project (Table 2). Staffing in 1981-82 shows that out of 21 local staff, 6 including the Project Manager were newly recruited and the balance (15) had been with the project for 1-3 years. With the coming of a new Project Manager in PY-4, some key senior positions were created and/or filled up. For example, the Plant Multiplication Section was created only on February 8, 1972. The other positions were the Sr. AEO, Sr. Soils Surveyor, Deputy Manager for M&EU and Sr. Marketing Officer. Liberians started taking over senior staff positions in the beginning of PY-4. - 15 - Senior Staff The turn-over of expatriates was noticeably fast in the early years of the project. In January 1978, an expatriate assumed the PK position. After a year he resigned and was replaced by another expatriate on November 24, 1979 who served the project for about 18 months. He resigned on April 4. 1981, almost one year after the coup. A Liberian then took over for 8 months and by December 4, 1981, he was promoted and transferred to MOA. Then, the fourth handover was made to another Liberian. These turn-overs, which were due to various reasons, affected the operations and resulted in different reactions from within and outside. In addition to the turn-over in major positions, the manager for Commercial Services Division (an expatriate), served only for about a year (May 1978 - May 1979) and resigned. The Swamp Development Officer, also an expatriate, served only for three months (November 1978 - February 1979). Table 2 Senior Staff * Category PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 PY-4 PY-5 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 (number) Local 6 9 16 23 21 Expatriate 5 5 8 7 2 Total 11 14 24 30 23 (percent) Local 54 64 67 77 88 Expatriate 46 36 33 23 12 Total 100 100 100 100 100 * As of September ending each year. - 16 - 4.04 Physical Implementation. The project achieved physically some of the targets, see below: Table 3 Physical Achievements Component Appraisal Estimates Actual Crop Development (ha) 12,300 11,723 4/ Civil Works Village Wells (No.) 300 91 5/ Latrines (No.) Not specified 26 Feeder Roads 275 (65 new,210 upgrade) 287 Culverts (No.) Not quantified 383 Bridges Not quantified 44 Cooperative & Credit (US$) 2.8 million 1.4 million Note that the actual operations of the Project did not take place until after nine months because of the difficulty of recruiting an expatriate project manager. 4.05 Crop Development and Improvement. Overall achievement was about 95% of plan 12,300 hectares. The actual below is based on the total area at PY6, the completion date and/or interim period in preparation for Phase II, if any. If we compute the achievement on the basis of PY5 actual, the rate would be 85% only or 10,462 hectares. Details are found in Annex 1, Key Indicators. Note that in upland rice, the scheme without fertilizers finally succeeded from PY4 although the project was flexible enough to issue fertilizers if farmers asked for it. From PY1 to PY4, cocoa should have showed an increasing trend (area) but soon after discovering that many farms were not planted in the right soils and crops were not vigorously growing, the project took steps to minimize its disastrous effects, physically and psychologically. 4/ At PY6. 9/ At PY5. - 17 - Table 4 Crop Development Program Appraisal Actual Program Estimate at Completion Percent (ha) (at PY5) (%) Upland Rice 5,750 6,541 114 Swamp Rice: Improved 1,750 417 24 Advanced (Plot) 300 Nil Nil Coffee (new) 1,500 1,382 92 Cocoa (new) 3,000 3,383 113 Total 12,300 11,723 95 Although the figures on cocoa area planted were high, indications of deterioration due to unsuitable soils condition were observed in certain districts and to a small extent, the poor performance of the cocoa was attributed to farmers' failure to conform with recommended maintenance practices. Similarly, coffee actuals were generally not far from targets specially in PY4 and PY5 and in fact, cocoa farmers with unsuitable soils for cocoa were encouraged to replace cocoa with coffee. In the case of swamp rice, there was extreme difficulty of convincing the farmers that it is a possible source of greater benefits than upland rice. However, the trend in area cultivated had been increasing in spite of the obstacles farmers had to surmount, i.e. specially in the initial development stage (see Annex 1, Key Indicator). The project tried to rationalize the strategy by allowing more farmers to get into swamp no matter how small the area was, say two plots 0.08 hectare only. In this way, the project could show the farmers the actual benefit from the use of the package. For this reason, the appraisal credit package for swamp was revised into even smaller ones. But, as the farmers get the experience they could expand to as big as 0.40 hectare. 4.06 Upland Rice. The original schemes conceived by the project included: (i) semi-improved (with LAC 23 seeds but without fertilizers); and (ii) improved (with both KYV and fertilizers). During the first two years (FY1 and PY2), 40 out of 360 hectares and 45 out of 860 hectares respectively, were planted using "improved package" with fertilizers. Based on the studies of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (MEU), farmers showed little interest in using fertilizers partially because it was too costly, and they had not acquired the requisite technical know-how for effective application. They could get good yields even without fertilizers if the bush fallow is above 8 years. Crop-cutting surveys conducted by MEU show that the difference in yield between "with fertilizers" and "without fertilizers" was about 38 percent. However, many of the farmers who adopted HYV and fertilizers - 18 - had only a small cropped area. On the other hand, the "without" fertilizer scheme became more successful when farmers would just exchange their local rice seeds for project LAC-23. They felt that they had no burden on repayment of loan. Some farmers complained that after three years the yield of the seeds tend to decrease. Many farmers could not offer rice seeds for direct exchange, hence, repayment in kind was usually deferred to the end of the crop year with five additional lbs. per every 100 lbs. of LAC-23 being returned to the project. 4.07 Swamp Rice. There was no swamp controlled irrigation. Hence, the concept of advance was a misnomer. Swamp rice farms could be considered improved even though the land use intensity reached only 1.2 or 1.3 that is 20 to 30 percent of area double cropped. Considering that many swamps are characterized by high iron-toxity, IR-5 and S-8 varieties were recommended and distributed. They mature in five months. Earlier, the project was not very successful in encouraging farmers to go into swamps because of the many arguments of schistosomiasis and other diseases associated with swamps. But the few old farmers who had sustained efforts and had bigger farms were happily reaping the benefits from greater production and relatively higher yields. However, a good number of swamp farmers could not cope up with the demand for greater care and maintenance, hence, the following consequences: (i) either they fall back temporarily to traditional culture; (ii) stop permanently and let the developed swamp revert to its former state of undevelopment; and/or (iii) reduce the size being cultivated. Policies on swamp rice varied from one Project Manager to another. In 1980, the policy to de-emphasize nurseries and transplanting was apparent. The reason was mainly due to labor constraints. However, experience showed that yields/production were not encouraging with direct seeding or broadcasting in the swamps. MEU observed that transplanted swamps yielded significantly higher if properly maintained, i.e. fertilized and weeded according to recommendations. Also, the proportion of farmers who double-cropped was only about 40 percent in 1980 and may be less in later years because of the lack of water in the swamps and in some cases, laziness on the part of some farmers. 4.08 Cocoa. All cocoa farms were newly established. Many farmers got so interest in cocoa as is shown by the increasing trend in participation and area planted over the first four years. But this trend stopped and the enthusiasm damped by the late discovery of the low potential in Bong County because of poor soils. Some areas more suitable for coffee were also planted to cocoa. Coupled with the big decrease in price of cocoa, the project had to divert its tree crop production away from cocoa. The low tolerance of cocoa to heat (sun) caused many farms without sufficient shading a great disaster. Damage to the extent of more than 50% of the trees was observed specially where maintenance was not followed. 4.09 Coffee. The actual area achieved in coffee (new) was 92 percent by the end of PY-5. The constraint in the effective implementation of the coffee program was partly due to the inability of LPMC to deliver the seedlings ordered by the project. Hence, until - 19 - later on, the project had to put up its own nurseries for both coffee and cocoa. The demand, nevertheless, increased over time. Earlier the project made it a policy to set a minimum area for tree crops at 1.5 acres (0.61 hectares) for a development loan but later this was decreased to only 1.0 acre (0.4 hectares) so that more farmers could be served. The quantity of seedlings available became a constraint. 4.10 Input Distribution. The project distributed to farmers during the project years the following: Table 5 Input Distribution Input Appraisal Actual (5 years) (5 years) Rice Seeds (m.t.) 6/ 390.0 379.3 Coffee Seedlings ('000) 7/ 1,889.7 1,889.7 Cocoa Seedlings ('000) 3,790.0 3,840.3 Fertilizers (m.t) 3,732.1 212.8 4.11 Cooperatives and Credit. The growth of cooperatives in the area was apparent with the implementation of BCADP. However, three places were cited as the forerunner of cooperative movement in Bong: (i) Kpartwee; (ii) Kilebei, and (iii) Zota. Unlike in Lofa, the movement in Bong was clearly strengthened by the project in the area of input supplies and credit and marketing of farm produce. The effective utilization of the cooperative as a tool for agricultural development was indicated strongly in the produce buying made by Tungban Federation of Cooperatives in BCADP area. The buying of farmer's produce started only in PY-4 when six district cooperatives formed a federation and were licensed by LPMC to buy directly from farmers. The federation was registered and officially designated as agent of LPMC. By the end of PY-5, the membership of the cooperatives rose to 7,489 (or 81% of appraisal target) in 230 CSU (Cooperative Service Units) in villages. By PY-6 the total membership had grown to 8,321. It is still 8% below the total projected cooperative members. 4.12 The cooperatives experienced great difficulties due to the lack of competent leaders and officers to implement the operations of the organizations. The project took on the responsibility to help the Tungban Cooperative Union (Federation) in its function as buying agent because of the problems inherent in a new venture. However, there were many limitations, e.g., from finance to personnel. 61 Both swamps and upland of which 94% was upland. 7/ All new plantings. - 20 - 4.13 By the end of PY-5 the total loans actually disbursed by the project had reached $1.3795 million of which 87 percent was given as development loans to farmers, and the balance of 13 percent as seasonal credit. Repayments of seasonal loans fluctuated over the project period. The tremendous effort in 1980-81, offset the previous years' collection. Overall, the recovery of seasonal loans from PY-1 to PY-5 was 90 percent (seasonal loan disbursed was $178,000 against $160,400 recovered), (see Annex 1 Key Indicators). Below shows the trend. Table 6 Seasonal Loans Disbursed) and Recovered Seasonal Year Loan Extended Amount Repaid Balance % Recovery (1,000 dollars) 1978 11.2 9.0 2.2 80 1979 24.8 12.5 12.3 50 1980 44.9 27.5 17.4 61 1981 50.2 77.4* (12.2) 96 1982 46.9 34.0 12.9 73 Sub-total 178.0 160.4 17.6 90 1983 22.8 n.a *Includes repayment for old loans and not necessarily for 1981 loans alone. Hence the % recovery was computed on the basis of total loans extended from 1978 to 1981 against recovery for the same period.- The coup in 1980 affected psychologically the mental attitude of the farmers for repayments. Collection, therefore, was adversely affected and recovery was relatively low. Immediately after the coup while the situation was tense, the Tungban Cooperative Federation was conceived and registered. About $100,000 was borrowed from ACDB for the produce buying. Hence, in the 1981-82 produce buying season, the Union made a profit of about $6,846 after paying ACDB on its principal and interest plus other expenses. Such profit was divided and 45% went to the Tungban Union and the 55% balance distributed among the six cooperatives according to their cecutributed sales value. 4.14 Revolving Credit Funds. The amount of money paid back by farmers (principal plus interest) is put back into a Revolving Credit Fund (RCF) in ACDB. Of the 10% interest paid on the farmer's loan, half of it should go to this fund. By the end of PY-5. the total cash in the RCF was $108,554 or 32% of the cumulative "surplus" targetted in PY-4. 4.15 Civil Works. The project experienced a long "pre-operation" period, hence,land development and building of residential staff houses were started on the site of the Headquarters in Suakoko. Of those staff houses, three were built in PY2. The other buildings constructed - 21 - included one store house and training building in 1979; the workshop, three sub-centers, one SSU Laborator;, one shed, and one recreation but in 1980, one administration building, one 3 room guest house in 1981. two toilets (serarate), one pump, two sub-center sheds, and one gas station house in 1982. Delays were generally experienced specially in the construction of the administration building because of the coup in 1980. Financial constraints were also experienced. As in Lofa ADP, the EPWT was supposed to complete and rehabilitate roads. A lump sum was funded by USAID to MPW to buy and maintain heavy road building equipment. However, the agreement between BCADP, USAID and MNPW was not successfully adhered to. In the end BCADP had to take full responsibility for constructing these roads. With the assistance of USAID, BCADP got all the equipment from MPW in 1982 but much repairs were needed on some, while others required complete overhaul and/or new replacements. The details of accomplishments are shown in Annex 1. Key Indicators. 4.16 Wells and Latrines. Originally, latrines were not in the project proposal. However, in 1979 the Liberian President visited the ADPs and saw the need and consequently suggested that latrines be included as part of an integrated approach to rural development. The wells were solely handled by the project but latrine was a semi-self-help with some assistance from the project. The wells were received with interest but not latrines. People were reluctant to help dig pits and produce mud blocks. Over a period of five years (1978-1982) about 100 wells were installed. Of these wells about 40% were inoperational after two or three years. No problems were observed in the proper maintenance and in some cases a big drawdown on water table caused breakdowns for overstressing the pumps. Latrines, on the other hand could have been more successful if the felt need was well defined in the community. Only 26 units of latrine were built but utilization did not seem to be at maximum. 4.17 Schistosomiasis. The SSU became fully organized with the appointment of the supervisor. By 1982 (PY5) about 174 swamps and 49 contact sites were surveyed. About 2,696 farmers were tested for S. Heamatobium and 2,612 tested for S. Mansoni. Children and other village people were also tested. In some places, the children were the common carrier and victim specially of S. Heamatobium (urinary form). Later on, the SSU started engaging in treating victims specially swamp farm families. Monitoring of old and new swamps and new contact sites were conducted also. On the last year, a health officer was hired to treat people not only of schistosomiasis but also other kinds of infection. It was becoming a financial burden to give drugs to treat patients. In the beginning, the analysis of stool and urine specimens showed a wider range of infections but by the end of the project period the range of infection among swamp farmers reduced to about 9% with S. Heamatobium and to about 14% with S. Mansoni. 4.18 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). The M&E was not organized until the latter part of 1979 when a Deputy Manager was recruited on August 15, 1979. The Unit was functioning under the direction of the - 22 - Lofa Project M&E Manager who finally moved into BCADP in February 1980. The very first survey conducted was a Farm Business Survey (FBS) similar to the one in Lofa. Crop--cutting of rice for yield estimation was also started and conducted yearly, thereafter for upland and swamp rice for both project and traditional farms. The weekly interviews were started only after the preliminary analysis of the FBS data to know the critical areas for observation. 4.19 Many ad hoc activities were also undertaken including the assessment of the seedlings production and distribution (tree crops), updated economic and financial returns studies for both Lofa and Bong Projects, feasibility of loan repayments and benefits from project roads. The joint WB/IDA/IFAD evaluation team that visited the project in 1981 considered the works being done by the MEU were the appropriate types of activities and the only limitation (for which suggestions for improvement were advanced) was the selection of samples. However, this problem was brought about more by the limited number of staff to perform independent studies. 4.20 Among the documents produced by the Unit were discussion papers for the Project Managers and other division managers which provided data on rice yields and input analysis, labor supply and demand for labor at critical periods, farm enterprise costs and returns, case study of seed rice production, maintenance of cocoa/coffee on Bong Project farms, food consumption and expenditures of farmers, food cash expenditures for Kuu labor, cash flows and budget of a swamp rice farm (case), and marketing of produce. 4.21 Some major policy decisions were influenced by the M&E results and recommendations including the emphasis on the use of transplanting of rice in swamps in favor of broadcasting, and restruction of loan repayments to postpone the first amortization of loans on tree crops and to prolong the grace periods. 4.22 Consultant Services. Except for the expatriates who were recruited to manage the various divisions including the position of the Project Manager, no specification was made at appraisal with respect to the quantity of technical man-months that would be recruited to up-grade or oversee any specific component of the project. During project implementation, local consultant services have been employed to assist the Schistosomiasis Surveillance Unit. A management accountant (Indian) was also recruited to review, reorganize where necessary and set up an appropriate farm record keeping system and related services to facilitate easy monitoring of the general accounts of the project. Lessons from implementation tend to suggest that project benefits would have been significantly improved if consultant services were utilized in both the swamp development and the tree crops programs (cocoa/coffee specialist). 4.23 ACDB Services. The bank in Gbarnga City operated not only for general banking services, and extension of credit but also provided services to the project. The RCF was kept by ACDB. As in Lofa, ACDB - 23 - experienced cash shortages and this affected the timely delivery of wages and salaries for project employees. In fact, even the RCF was badly affected as a result of the 1980 coup. V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS 5.01 Costs. The project costs reached $16.9 million by the end of 1981 crop year September 30, 1982 against the appraisal estimate of $20.3 million. Breakdown of the project costs up to September 30, 1982 are as follows: TABLE 7 Project Costs ($ '000) Appraisal* Actual** Z of Appraisal Buildings 542.0 1,223.2 225 Vehicles 488.1 1,025.4 210 Furniture & Equipment 371.0 683.9 184 Salaries & Wages 5,424.0 5,621.0 104 Vehicle Oper. Costs 676.9 1,972.9 291 General Services 561.0 1,735.7 309 Farm Inputs 2,775.7 2,060.7 74 Hired Labor 660.1 249.4 38 Road Construction 2,312.5 1,881.5 81 Research 650.0 259.2 40 Consultant 150.0 - 0 Feasibility Study 200.0 90.5 43 Village Wells 100.0 168.1 168 Dev. of Banking Inst. 150.0 - 0 Contingencies 5,194.5 8.2 0 TOTAL 20,255.8 16,979.7 84 * Over 5-years ending June 30, 1982 (FY) ** Up to September 30, 1982 5.02 Without contingencies the actual costs exceeded the appraisal's costs of about $15,06 million ($20.25 less $5.19 million contingencies). Hence, the figures under actuals have built-in contingencies. The actual costs incurred for buildings, vehicles, furnitures and equipment, vehicle operating, general services and village wells were significantly higher than what the appraisal estimated. Hired labor and farm inputs fell below those of the appraisal. The cost overrun in the vehicle operating and general services were partly due to the unrelated use during the 1980 upheaval, and in buildings the overrun was due mainly to the unusual increase in price of construction materials not expected by the appraisal. The problem was also exaggerated by the delays in the construction of -24- buildings specially the Administration which was completed in PY-4 (1981). The contractors failed to fulfill their obligations as per contract. On vehicles the over-expenditure was mainly due to the unexpected useful life, that is, shorter than the assumed 4-5 years; costs of maintenance was also higher than expected. The budget for consultants should have been used in areas where the operations were weak specially in the area of land use planning and commercial/credit. The cost of farm inputs was only 74 percent of the appraisal. The inability of the project to receive the bulk of fertilizers from abroad through LPMC in 1980-81 set back the proper maintenance specially of tree crops. Hence, while the physical area targets for tree crops were met, the quality of the plants was affected. Even the area in swamp rice never increased even to 50 percent of the target. MEU studies showed that farmers in general were using less fertilizers than recommended particularly in swamp rice. What quantity the farmers received from the project was used for two or more seasons to allay their fear of high-cost production. 5.03 Financing. Funding for the first phase of the project was jointly done by IDA, USAID and the Government of Liberia in the tune of US$7.0, US$6 and US$6.7 million respectively. While IDA participated in financing all components except farm inputs, hired labor and the feasibility study, USAID's participation was limited to only three activities: PMU salaries, farm inputs and road construction. This plan experienced some modification during implementation. Table 9 below has the breakdown of the project funding. Table 8 Project Financing From April 1, 1977 to December 31, 1982 Co-financier Appraisal Actual % (US$ million) IDA 7.0 6.5 93 USAID 6.6 3.6 55 GOL 6.7 7.8 116 ALL 20.3 17.9 8/ 88 5.04 Procurement. The project, during its first Phase implementation, adhered to the procurement guidelines agreed upon with the co-financiers at project appraisal. All of its procurement (both local and foreign) have been done on a competitive basis. The project's 8/ Note: This figure is at 31st December, 1982; therefore, it differs from the figure shown in Table 7 which is at the crop year ended 30th September, 1982. - 25 - experience with foreign procurement has been mixed; going from occasional shortage on the International Markets to delivery of inconsistant materials - (spare parts) and to escalating International prices, thus making it difficult to adhere to budgetary appropriations. For local procurement, the project closely followed the competitive bid system. Except for a few internal structural changes, there was no significant deviation from plan. 5.05 Disbursement. Disbursement for Phase I implementation commenced nine months earlier (pre-operational period) than the date for actual productive activity. The recruitment of expatriate personnel to man the project and the erection of office and residential quarters were carried out during this period. Throughout the life of project, disbursement has most often lagged budgetary timetable. 5.06 The financial crisis that has plagued the National Economy has had some adverse spillover effects on the project. The inability of the Government to disburse, on time, its allotment seriously hampered project activities during the latter years of implementation. It is management's fervent hope that the creation by Government of a special budget for development projects along with the participation of the African Development Bank will improve the situation for the future. VI. PROJECT IMPACT 6.01 The main program of crop and farm development was to develop 12,300 hectares of upland rice, swamp rice, cocoa and coffee. All these areas were new and no rehabilitation was implemented even in swamps. In spite of the difficulty of compiling data over time, specially on production and area, it was made possible at least with rice in the last 4-5 years. Therefore, it is quite possible to measure roughly the impact of the project. But in the case of tree crops, the gestation period is longer because fruiting and income generation come much later than with rice, it is not possible to view its impact in a short run. Given the revised yield projection specially for tree crops; there is good reason to be hopeful for increased production. 6.02 Crop Yields. The National Agricultural Production survey carried out in 1978 shows that the yield of rice was about 1,235 kg/ha. On the other hand, the MEU in BCADP started crop-cutting surveys in 1979 (PY2) and conducted surveys every year to find out any trend in yield and area cultivated specially in swamp rice. In order to assess for any possible increase, traditional farms were also surveyed for yields and inputs-basically seeds and labor. In PY5 and 6, attempts were made to estimate yields on project tree crop farms. However, the data obtained during these two periods were too small to make any meaningful statistical inference. 6.03 Upland Rice. The appraisal estimated that the yield of upland rice would improve from about 1,000 kg/ha without much development to 1,800 kg/ha with development. This means that the project package of 26 - inputs LAC-23 (RYV) and fertilizers (minimum package)v the benefit due to these would be about 800 kg/ha. In the first two years this package called "Improved" scheme (without fertilizers) was introduced. Comparatively, the yields of the "Improved" farms were higher, on the average, than "Semi-Improved" but not appreciably, about 300 kg/ha and not 500 kg/ha as estimated in appraisal. Hence, for most farmers, it was better for them to do without fertilizers because with LAC-23 (ETV) rice seeds and cultivating old bushed land, (10-15 years) could give as much as 1,560 kg/ha, on the average, or an incremental yield of 560 kg/ha. For this reason, the project promoted the HYV without fertilizers and to stop it all, the Seed Exchange Program was launched with ease in 1980. Farmers were allowed flexibility to decide whether to take HYV seeds plus fertilizers or not. The farmers felt freer to just get the project rice seed with no financial obligations. In the last two years (1981 and 1982) almost 95Z of the cropped area was on Seed Exchange Scheme and 5Z on credit (seed only). Table 9 Yields of Upland Rice Project W/Out Project With Year Traditional Fertilizers Fertilizers 1978 1,000 N.A N.A 1979 1,038 1,100 (39) 1,421 (11) 1980 1,206 (121) 1,558 (63) N.A 1981 1,200 (74) 1,417 (80) N.A. 1982 1,234 (40) 1,540 (41) N.A. Weighted Average* 1,171 (300) 1,424 (223) XXX * From 1979 to 1982 based on crop-cutting surveys conducted by MEU; all numbers in parentheses are size of samples in-farm. The incremental yields show difference of about 21 percent between traditional and project (without fertilizer) which was not any different with fertilizer. The age of bush must have contributed significantly to the good yields of project rice seeds. With proper timing in brushing, broadcasting and harvesting, performance of project farms could be as' good as with fertilizers in older bush. 6.04 Swamp Rice. In the appraisal, there were two schemes, namely (i) Improved with Minimum Package (HYV Seed and Fertilizers) and Cropping Intensity of 1.0/Year; and (ii) Minimum Package (HYV Seeds and Fertilizer) and cropping intensity of 1.75/year at full development. In the latter case, it is considered advanced and by PY-3 the cropping intensity would be 1.2 and by PY-4 onward it would be 1.75/year; thus, expecting yield of 5,250/kg for two seasons. In the actual experience of the project, however, farms could hardly with double crops reach an average of 1.75 cropping intensity because of the inadequacy of irrigation water. In 1981, MEU reported 1.3 cropping intensity - 27 - (average) and in 1982 the special survey reported 1.2 cropping intensity. Less than half of the swamp farmers were able to double crop and only to a very limited area. With the project the package also included labor payments chemicals and tools. Sprayer, power tiller and thresher were optional and in most cases only served as demonstration. With the package plus the extension advice, production in the swamp was observed to be higher than the traditional where cultural practices were that of the upland. Land development in project farms included a definite sequence of work such as: (i) cutting the main canal from the bottom of the swamp to the top, throwing the earth between the lines marking the floodway bunds; (ii) from the top work down the swamp constructing the floodway bunds, sloping the sides of the bunds; (iii) construct the head dykes to the correct dimensions, ensuring it is well constructed over old stream channels; (iv) construct the tail dyke the same way but last; (v) construct the peripheral canal from the top to the bottom, ensuring that water came in one way; (vi) construct the return canal from main drain to peripherals; and (vii) level paddies. In addition, bunds must be built slightly highly than recommended to allow for settlement; clay must be used, bamboo cane used in bunds for cutting holes. b.05 In the beginning, the project extension staff were able to closely supervise the development efforts in the farms but in the succeeding years the level of supervision was diminished. In the latter years, the swamps further away from the road were not given adequate supervision. The works in the first year are usually not done with finess and development works tend to continue, when necessary, in the second year. The engineering works are never perfect and, therefore, supervision is still needed. But since project did not have provision for further development loans to farmers, everything was left to the farmers and more often they lost the drive and incentive to work hard. 6.06 Input and labor utilization in swamp rice farms were observed to be below optimum. Surveys conducted by 1EU for four years showed very small difference between farms with fertilizers versus farms without fertilizers. In fact, with an average rate of 43 kilo/ha of urea, the average yield was only 2.42 tons/ha against 2.47 without fertilizers. However, the experience in 1980 and 1981 shows a difference in yield of 319 kg and 286 kg per hectare, respectively, over those without fertilizers. Over the four years 1979-1982 the overall' average rate of fertilizer use was only 144 kg/ha against the recommended 247 kg/ha beginning 1980. The appraisal estimated 300 kg/ha as the requirement (200 kg of urea and 100 kg of TSP). In well developed farms where farmers gave full attention and higher level of care and maintenance, the yield could easily go as high as 3.5 tons per hectare. In general, the average yields were lower than expected because weeding was done only once and partially by most farmers. Only about 6 to 8 percent of the farmers did weeding twice. Also, the assumption in the appraisal is that the yield in the first year would be lower than the succeeding years and continue to increase as years go by. This was observed to be untrue and not realistic in the case of Bong and Lofa. In the first year, the yield was high and then decreased in the - 28 - following years because of the inability of the farms to replenish the nutrients taken up by the rice plants in the initial year. The survey by MEU in 1982 shows that there was a decreasing trend among farmers in the use of fertilizers. More new farmers also tended to use urea than TSP. Perhaps the bias for urea was its immediate good effect on the physical look of the plant. 6.07 There was suspicion, in fact, apprehension that many farmers were dropping out from the swamps. However, the survey of the CMEU (1983) and the Special Survey in 1982 suggest that many farmers were only temporarily absent and had no intention to abandon their swamp farms. The only problem that could be brought about by temporary absence is that the growth of weeds and regrowth of some tree stumps could bring back the "developed swamps" back to underdevelopment. This, in effect may need fresh development capital. There were also problems of tenure where the previous farmer stopped cultivating and a new farmer is registered as new in the project but correspondent to the same old project swamp farms (previously registered in the project, hence being counted twice). 6.08 Cocoa. The appraisal assumed that cocoa (new) could start bearing fruits in the 5th year after planting with 200 kg/ha yield. However, PMEU observed sixteen farms that produced an average of 56 kg/ha in the third year (as observed also in Lofa). The yield in the 4th year of six 1978 farms surveyed by MEU was estimated at 224 kg/ha. In 1981 when the preparation team for Bong II came from Abidjan, the yields of cocoa was revised and brought to a much lower level than the appraisal estimate because of the alleged poor soil conditions on the project farms. The peak yield was expected in year 7 with about 450 kg/ha only and then decrease to 392 kg/ha in year eight onward. Present method of yield data collection is still very crude but it is expected to improve as time goes by. 6.09 Coffee. In the appraisal.report, coffee (new) would start generating income four years after planting. PMEU to date has not produced reliable estimates of yield. Very few were observed in year 4 to merit the validity of the results. The maximum estimated appraisal yield occured in year 6. The optimism shown in the appraisal was hampered by the 1981 expected, year 3 yield at 56 kg/ha, 280 kg/ha in year 4 and a peak of 674 kg/ha in year 6 and then decrease to only 561 kg/ha for year 7 onward. In recent years coffee has proven to be more resistant to drought conditions than cocoa. However, the yield capacity is also affected badly, it seems. Recent (1983 cropcut) survey of PMEU shows an average yield of 163 kg/ha for year 5 farms and 108 kg/ha for year 4 farms. 6.10 Prices. In the appraisal the Bank forecast prices were used in the economic and financial analysis. In constant 1982 terms the prices were: - 29 - Table 10 Economic and Financial Prices Economic Financial 1980 1985 1980 1985 (US $M.T) Rice (paddy) 237 239 248 253 Cocoa 991 814 744 613 Coffee 1,548 1,260 1,179 956 6.11 The LPMC purchase price of rice (paddy) at 14% moisture was 12 cents per lb ($264 per M.T) from 1978 to 1981 and 18 cents per lb ($396 per M.T from 1982 to date). With the institutionalized increase in the price of paddy rice from 12 cents in 1978 to 18 cents in 1982, farmers were expected to immediately take advantage of the substantial price differential through increased production. Analysis of the Phase I crop development shows that total paddy production started 87% below the target (63 M.T against target of 370 M.T). This trend increased eratically from one year to another, except between PY4 and PY5. The highest production was achieved in PY5 1,490 M.T, a little over 8% increase above the previous year (1,374 M.T). The increase in price really did not stimulate any substantial increase in production. VII. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION 7.01 The annual incremental costs and benefits data used in computing the economic rate of return to the project are presented in Annex 2. The data on crop year yields, areas and costs of production came from the Bong Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The following assumptions and methods were used in calculating the benefits and cost stream: (a) Project Life: The life of the project is assumed to be 30 years from Project Year 1. (b) Project Cost: (i) The opportunity cost of family labor was valued at $1.00 per manday at 1982 constant prices. Hired labor was valued at $2.00.per manday. Family labor have been costed at 50% of the market wage to reflect the average opportunity cost and productivity in the area. Experience shows that the opportunity cost of family labor in the project ranges from as low as $0.75 per manday around the Guinea-Liberia border to $1.50 in the Central and Southern Regions. At appraisal all hired labor was priced at full - 30 - market wage rate and family labor at 502 of the market rate. Family labor participation is 382 in the first year development in the awamp and from PY2 onward, family labor participation is 85Z. In the case of upland rice, family labor participation is 94% and the remaining 6% is hired labor. (ii) All actual project costs were considered from January 1978 through January 1983 and converted into constant terms. Project costs were not separated into foreign and local. (iii) All material farm inputs (seeds, seedlings, fertilizers, chemicals, tools and equipment) were costed at full landed price in the project area. (iv) 60% of the feeder roads investment costs was included in the economic costs since the improved road network will also be used for non-project activities, and benefits derived from such uses will be sufficient to offset 40% of the costs that have been omitted. (v) All of the village wells and latrine costs and related infrastructural, research, consultancy, studies and banking investment costs were excluded in computing the economic cost. At appraisal, similar deductions were also made. (vi) Only 85% of the training cost was considered. At appraisal, an amount of US $0.60 million out of the investment and staff training was excluded from the economic costs as they represented investments and technical assistance for development of socio-economic infrastructure. (vii) Unrelated Costs: (i) 10% and 3% of the Vehicle Operating Costs for 1979/80 and 1980/81 respectively, were deducted. Similarly 30% and 21% of the General Services Cost for the same periods above were also deducted. The justification being they were associated with the coup and have no bearing to production. Military Personnel seized and used project vehicles for activities not related to project. This situation - 31 - persisted until project year 4 and finally subsided by end of the year. (C) Benefits: (i) Swamp - the area for the main crop was reduced by 5% in the second and third years after development and then increased by 5% in fourth year. The assumption is that about 5% of the swamp farmers only abandon the swamps temporarily (about two years) and return thereafter. The 5% abandonment is not permanent so the idle area is brought under production in about the third year after abandonment. (ii) Double crop - area double cropped is 25% of the main crop area. This represents a land use intensity of about 1.25. At appraisal, cropping intensities of 1.0 for PY1, 1.0 for PY2, 1.2 for PY3, 1.75 for PY4 and onward were assumed. The current computation of the project benefits assumes that double cropping started from project Year 1 instead of in Year 3 as proposed in the appraisal. (iii) Tree Crop - the area of the tree crops were adjusted (reduced) to account for mortality. The four years mortality rate average is 19% for cocoa and about 7% for coffee. These are all first year mortality figures. 7.02 Using these assumptions, the economic rate of return (ERR) is estimated at a little over 4% compared to 21.35% at appraisal. The poor performance is attributed to the wide spread distribution of unsuitable cocoa/and coffee soils in project area. The yield figures used in the economic benefit estimation were based on recommendations made during a World Bank supervision mission in May, 1982. These yields which were based on good farms are 50% lower than the appraisal figures. Benefits from tree crops are shifted much later than the timetable proposed in the appraisal and the expected yields have correspondently been adjusted downward. Additionally, only 20% of the swamp target was achieved, and yield levels were not as high as anticipated at appraisal. The creation of an Infrastructural Division separate from Workshop and the creation of the Plant Multiplication Division are contributing factors for the increase in costs. It is necessary to point out that the ERR could be improved if all recommended cultural practices for tree crop are closely followed thus increasing the per unit area production. VIII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 8.01 Project Management/Staffing. Given the broad spectrum of responsibilities and functions with which the Ministry of Agriculture was charged and the serious resource constraints that prevailed at - 32 - appraisal, the proposal for a semi-automous body (Project management Unit, PMU) to handle the implementation of the project met no opposition from the Government. This proposal has the dual advantage of relieving the Ministry of Agriculture from worrying about the day-to-day implementation of the project and secondly minimizes the risk of having special project funds diverted to other activities. It was also agreed at Appraisal that staffing of some of the various components including the position of the Project Manager be done through international recruitment, since the availability of local personnal with the requisite training and experience was limited. The following nationals constituted the composition of the initial management staff: British, Phillipino, Indian, Sierra Leonean, Sri Lankan, Australian and Norwegian. For the most part, it was envisized at appraisal that the management staff (foreign) would remain through the life of the project, after which the project's extension staff - better trained, equipped and more experienced would be turned over to MOA for continuation. 8.C2 The day-to-day running of the project was the sole responsibility of the Project Management Unit with little or no connection with any Government Agencies except MPW and MRD regarding the feeder road and well construction respectively. At the local level, the project affiliates with the Project Consultative Committee (PSC), a body chaired by the Superintendent of the County and is composed of Paramount and Clan Chiefs. The primary function of this committee has been to facilitate the promotion of the project's concept and assist in the recovery of the loans from farmers. The Management Unit approach to running the project received little objections from Government and the idea was generally welcome by most agencies. The misconception on the part of some Government Administrators wherein they held such views that the special nature of the project would leave littls or no room for Government's input, was corrected through the periodic invitation of Government officials and the public to expose and acquaint themselves with project activities. These efforts have proven very helpful in bridging the apparent gap between the public and the project. It has also helped in winning and returning the confidence of the poor peasant farmers. 8.03 MPW's affiliation with the project was brief because of the bad experience the project had with the Ministry in relation to the feeder road program. The Ministry crew just could not achieve the project feeder road targets which made it extremely difficult (if not impossible) for the distribution of farm inputs and effective field supervision. In three years, MPW had completed only a little over 25 km of roads. At this junction, the project saw fit (after recruiting the appropriately trained personnel) to take over construction of the feeder road program. This move enjoyed the support of USAID (primary funder of the road program) and the Government. The project association with MRD was contractual (specifically to construct village wells). The action of PM in the implementation of the project is accountable to a body called the Project Steering Committee (PSC), which represents the Government. All policies affecting the project must meet the approval of this body which is chaired by the Minister of Agriculture. - 33 - 8.04 The inherent complexities in these smallholder development projects requires staff of high level managerial efficiency, technical competence and innovation. In view of this, it was agreed at the start of the project that all technical divisions (Finance, Agricultural Services, Training Cooperative/Credit Services and Land Use Planning and Swamp Development) including the position of the Project Manager, be occupied with international recruits working along side their Liberian counterparts. It was only by the end of project year four, that most of the managerial positions were taken over by Liberians. National Political developments in project years two and three, coupled with inadequate field supervision and escalating indiscipline, orchestrated by a few difficult field staff, almost resulted into a stagnation of project activities. However, the Government, realising the grave consequencies that such deteriorating situation could bear cn the project and ultimately the agricultural sector- immediately arrested and corrected the situation by instituting some strict structural transformation. The elevation of the first Liberian Project Manager to the position of Deputy Minister and his subsequent transfer to MOA coupled with the weeding out of some difficult employees were among the rescue measures taken by Government to save the project. Since he took-over, the current (fourth Project Manager) Project Manager demonstrated tremendous managerial capabilities in improving the morale of the field staff and cementing the working relationship of the office and senior staff. In 1980-81 the Project Management experienced great difficulties with USAID. The refusal of USAID to grant a waiver for the purchase of tools, farm supplies including fertilizers, seriously hampered project operation. In May of 1982, a six-man World Bank-Team visited the project and conducted an indepth evaluation of the tree crop yield assumptions. The reporting system for the project is based on two periods separated by three months, there is the fiscal period which runs from July 1 to June 30 and the crop year which goes from October.1 to September 30 (used by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit). 8.05 Staff;yg in the project by and large exceeded appraisal estimates, 471 - compared to 255 in the appraisal. At appraisal, Agricultural Services Division and Land Use Planning were placed under one manager. It was decided during implementation (1979), to separate the two to facilitate effective supervision and easy monitoring. Similarly, Workshop which was initially a part of Administration, was separated and decentralized into two components in 1979: (1) a heavy duty unit; and (2) a light duty unit both headed by a Deputy Manager. By 1982, the heavy duty unit had been elevated to a fr.11 diz-&ion status with the requisite increase in staff and logistics to handle all civil and infrastructural activities of the project. By the same year, 1982, it was deemed necessary to separate the nursery program from Agricultural Services Division and elevate same to full livision status (Plant Multiplication and Research Division) with the requisite increase 9/ As at December 1982. - 34 - in staff logistics to run the program. The World Bank hass in the last year of the project life, recommended an adjustment (downward) of the personnel of Administration and other divisions and the need to strengthen Training, and Agricultural Internal Audit Divisions. 8.06 Extension Training. Because Liberia did not have a pool of manpower, especially at the intermediate lower technical levels, nor could it turn out trained personnel for immediate project use, substantial staff training funds were provided under the Lofa ADP to be used by Bong ADP. It was also envisaged at appraisal that in view of the shortage of cocoa/coffee specialists in the Liberian job market, provisions would be made for additional senior Liberian technical and managerial staff to be trained in project management and rural administration. A technical training center financed under Credit 306-LBR was constructed at project headquarters. This facility has been extensively used in training junior project staff, personnel from several agro-organizations, and participating farmers, through farm visits - Training and Visit (T&V.), discussions and audio-visual aids. Short refresher training sessions are periodically held for field staff and farmers at this center. The newly introduced concept of training and visit (herein referred to as Training and Kuu) has substantially facilitated and aided the extension st=ff in reaching farmers. 8.07 Cooperative Credit and Marketing. Unlike Lofa, Bong County did not have a local credit institution. The BPHU Commercial Services Division was given the exclusive responsibility for the credit program: estimation of farmer or village group credit needs, distribution of inputs, repayment of loans, and documentation. To date, the project still handles the extension of credit to farmers and the recovery of loans. The responsibility of keeping the accounts of the farmers has been transferred to ACDB. The marketing of produce has also been taken over by Tungban Union of Cooperatives for the county. There exists currently six district level cooperatives each being composed of many small village level cooperative society units (CSU). 8.08 Accounting and Reporting. All efforts were made to adhere to the requirements of the Credit Agreements, with regard to the size of the credit packages and record keeping of farmers' accounts. All records of farmers' accounts are kept by the Commercial Services Division except for the recent move to transfer them to ACDB. The Division, which is responsible for designing and releasing credits (farm tools, fertilizers, farm chemicals, seedlings and cash for labor payment) to farmers, organizing cooperatives and marketing of produce, was headed by an expatriate up until 1981, when a Liberian took over. Given the paperwork involved with keeping small farmers records, the Commercial Services has done a good job. Nevertheless, the need to improve the sy:tem of record keeping in the Division still exists. To date, it is still difficult to easily extract such information as the number of farmers and a breakdown of number of farmers who paid their development loans by year of establishment. With the improvements introduced, the unit will be a bank of valuable information for future planning. The Division reports periodically on debts and repayment - 35 - status. Financial statements and budgetary matters are handled by the Finance Division. Monitoring and Evaluation Division has been reasponsible (in addition to other information gathering activities) for compiling periodic reports on project activities. IX. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK 9.01 Project Design. With all due respect, the Bank must be commended for piecing together an integrated rural development project capable of providing such valuable services and inputs as extension, cooperative training, feeder roads and the monitoring of the incidence of schistosomiasis. The design included provision for adequate resources to facilitate the achievement of project design. Sufficient flexibility was built in the design to allow for unforeseeable events. 9.02 The primary shortcoming of the design came as result of inadequate knowledge about the expected response of the intended beneficiaries and the prevailing soil condition in the proposed project area. This lack of knowledge was manifested in the unrealistically high targets (yield) set for tree crops and swamps programs. Only about 20% of the swamp target (area) was achieved. The yield assumptions at appraisal were discounted by over 50% for the unsuitable environmental and soil conditions. The expected response to the swamp program was highly inconsistent with reality. Traditionally, the small rural farmers are not swamp farmers, rather upland farmers. Encouraging them. to move into the low land meant breaking a long standing tradition. Such change is viewed as being risky. Hence the program was received with caution and skepticism. 9.03 Supervision. Generally, the Bank's supervision teams performed satisfactorily. These teams were very instrumental in critically assessing the performances of most of the technical arms of the project and in recommending possible means for improvement. Their experience was very useful in either improving already existing systems or designing new ones. The flaw in the manner in which the farmers accounts were being kept was unearthed during one of the team's visits. Areas which enjoyed much benefits from the supervision missions are cooperative and marketing, procurement procedures, monitoring and evaluation and finance. The critical manner in which issues were handled often resulted in improvements in the system. X. CONCLUSION 10.01 From appraisal through completion, the project enjoyed a relatively smooth journey. By and large the farmers in Bong are not as difficult to work with as it may have seemed during implementation. They were generally receptive to extension advices and supervision of the project. 10.02 During implementation, the difficulties associated with changing the lifestyle (from traditional to improved) was appreciated although grossly underestimated at appraisal. Traditionally, farmers - 36 - produce rice for family consumption as a primary objective, and marketing has a social significance which bears little relationship to socio-economic improvement. Farmers view rice and cocoalcoffee different as far as marketing is concerned. Rice is traditionally not viewed as a cash crop. So price and other marketing facilities must provide some incentive for farmers to accept the concept. The overall education process is much longer than what was envisaged at appraisal. especially in the case of the swamp rice program. It was observed that farmers who followed the swamp program and remained in it, realized much higher yields than their traditional and upland counterparts. 10.03 Although not envisaged at appraisal a well staffed and a logistically supported adaptive research unit is necessary to the success of the crop development program. It is important that the unit be closely associated with the farming pattern, only introducing changes where absolutely necessary. Much on-farm trials should be emphasized. 10.04 The training facilities at the project site have and continue to provide much needed services to both farmers and the public. Senior staff have visited other projects and agricultural institutions overseas. The need for more management and technical training still exists. 10.05 The feeder roads and wells programs enjoyed the most enthusiastical reception from the villagers. The roads were very instrumental in making many productive areas accessible and stimulated marketing activities. The program was key in the distribution of farm inputs and supplies. Community participation was very encouraging. 10.06 Although set as a condition for USAID's participation, importance of the M&E Unit in the project design was not appreciated until the later years of the project. The human tendency of resenting periodic check on one's activities has been the attitude of some project personnel when dealing with the unit. In spite of these problems, the unit continues to be the fulcrum for coordinating project activities. 10.07 With the strengthening of cooperatives and the possible handing over of inputs supply and credit functions to the cooperatives, the total project cost should be reduced substantially. The matter of strengthening MOA and related institutions should be considered when designing future agricultural development projects. Much local participation should be encouraged at appraisal so as to safeguide against repeating the errors of the past. 10.08 In summary, while inadequate knowledge at appraisal gave rise to much problems for implementation, and given the complexities of changing a large subsistence agriculture and the weakness of national institutions, the project, as a case study, for integrated agricultural development, was successful. The lessons learnt during the first phase implementation will certainly provide much guidance for future planners. With the improvement of encouraging the block farming system in tree - 37 - crops, much supervision cost can be saved and greater benefits accrue because of the inherent competition in the approach. KEY INDICATORS PRASE I and Interim Poriod PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 PY-4 PY-5 pv-e ITEM UNIT App- Rev Act App Rev Act App Rev Act App Rev Act App Rev Act .- $ Ac& Farmers Participation No. 500 500 340 1400 1400 1233 2300 2180 2316 2600 3200 2301 1000 800 1299 , Cropped Area Ha. 500 300 320 750 940 815 1000 1540 1620 1000 1400 1598 1000 1619 1253 . Upland Rice-SI/SE of - - Upland Rice- ITmproved " 100 50 40 200 250 45 300 260 20 400 219 J 500 Subtotal 600 350 360 950 1190 860 1300 1800 1640 1400 1619 1598 1500 1619 1253 756 706 809 Swamp - Advanced 100 50 - 100 too - 100 - - - - - - Swamp - Improved .6 250 250 10 500 100 82 500 364 144 500 142 93 23 100 Sub-total " 100 50 6 350 350 10 600 100 82 500 364 114 500 142 93 -2 *:ocoa (New) He - 20 30 300 300 181 700 1000 750 1000 1220 1074 1000 1215 978 300 370 Coffee (New) - 1 5 15 0 b4l 350 350 303 500 1 bw 546 "0 67MW "* 100u Subtotal - 40 35 450 300 245 1050 1350 1o$3 1500 1820 1620 1500 1822 1442 80050 370 . Cropr Total 700 440 401 1750 1920 1115 2950 3250 277S 3400 ,jiy 33&' 3500 358* 2788 61 Yli.ldb - Average MT/HA. a Upland Pice-SI/Z 1.3 - 1.02 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5 Upland RiceI.JP * 1.6 - 1,44 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.7 NA NA NA NA Swamp Rice ..ADV 1.6 - - - - Swamp/Rice -IMP * 1 7 rr-- -29 .. . 3.2 2.1 2.- . 72.- 3.9 (Semi-mlatoved done only for the first 2 years) without fertilizer. SE-started in PY-3 onward (W/O fert.) only seeds. 1/ As of PY-4 the timproves package upland discontinued. I - i/ Appraisal estimates. 3/ Revised estimates. KEY INDICATORS PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 PT-4 py. py.6 1IEM UNIT App.Y RevX1 Act App Rev Act App ROv Act App Rev ot App Rev Act App Rev Act Cocoa (New) KT/HA - i- - - - - m- Nag 054 0.2 0,175 N.A .35 * Coffee (New) 0 - - " *06 0.3 0.28 A 0.8 0.45., NA - Inputal HT__ ____ Fertilizers: Urea ' 74.1 15.0 5.0 222.4 112.0 14.2 30.0 236.0 42.0 100.0 271.0 8.8 50.0 92.5 29.4 T S P * 37.0 7.5 3.7 111.2 59.0 2.3 15.0 236.0 46.0 50.0 275.0 36.7 125.0 242.5 *5 ' 5o.a Compound - 4.0 - - 6.0 5.1 - 33.0 17.0 .7, - - -Ji.7 ' - 68.6 Rockphose U . - 3.6 - 145.0 1064 405.5 - - 579.0 - og* 67o.o. NPK * - - - - - - 299.0 - - 360.0 282.0 46.3 95.0 75.2 * All * . 26.5 2 333.6 322.0 127.6 749.5 505.: i..o 1069.1a2*o 1151.8 s 346.7 i12.8 1s0.0 Seudse IH-5/8-8/B0-90 K.T. 5.0 - 0.2 17.5 - 0.1 30.0 6.0 5.0 25.0 14.0 9.1 25.q 7.3 6.4 3.1 % LAC - 23 * 30.0 - 21.0 47.5 - 51.0 65.0 90. 92.0 70.0 91.0 120.0 is 83.6 14.5.47.1 Total 35.0 21.2 65.0 - 51.1 95.0 96. 97.0 95.0 1o5.0 129.1 00. 90.9 so00.9 50.2 Seedlings 1000 Cocoa * - 50.0 35.0 370.5 2360 86-5.0 1235. 1016 1235. 1312.5 1306.! 1320 1500.; 1248.4 437.1 cocee 5 6*O 160.6 100. 75 ." 42 432. 325 b1i 770 55. bbO 53.80* 2.7 TOTAL * - 1 _41. 1S50.5 410.6 310. 1 166 1341 1853 T049.3 , 7 190 2250 iG .5 439.8 * Survey going-on at present Appraisal estimates. Revised estimates. KEY INDICATORS PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 iFY-4 PY*5 py-6 ITEM UNIT Apal Rev! Act App Rev Act' App Rev Act App Rev Act App Rev Act Rqv Act SmAll/Implements Knife No - - 00- 2100 - 000 3o Cutlass 500 96 2650 814 5100 )271 o5500 78 $Soo i6a7 2053 Ax " 200 T1 700 562 1200 *2545 1000 1576 tooo -e- 527 Pirralin/Spide 9 00 900750 2100 2591 M000 PAP 3000 '- - bhovel 1000 26 3500 - 7 6000 151 SM00 107 2 -00 A - - Digger * 200 29 700 46 1200. - lo0 1117 1000 .0 1 - - Roe * 500 224 1750 jj 3000 - I10 . . . 2soo 2so( %n20 8 Sickle __- - - -- . 9. A. * . H. ---- Sprayera * 11 - 411 M - - 46 - 0 770 Bird Not " - - - - 158 140 . - 5- Rice Thresher - . - - - . - 2 - - - TOTAL 2400 547 11100 2705 20700 11030 21000 c 21000 * 7279 5565 1/ Appraisal estimates 2/ Revised estimates IEZY INDWATORS Py-i Py-2 PY-3 PY-4 PY-- I T E M UNIT APP1 ,AECT APP REV ACT A AE ACT APP RE A ACT APP af C 5. Credit $1000mme eema mm ----------------------------- ----------- ---------- ----------------- --------------- ---- Loun zo farmers ----------------------------------....----....--.------..--.. ..-.......-.- ... 3 Development 47.8 11.4 236.0 11.9 518.7 314.6 822.9 280. 7 6.9 486.5 288. Seasonal 2 6.5 11.2 69.5 24.8 81.5 44.9 61.3 50.2 34.0 46.9 22. Total * 74.3 22.6 305.5 136.6 600.2 359.5 884.2 327.4 10.9 533.4 311. Recoverya Development * - - - 6.7 N/A N/A Seasonal * 0.1 _LO 23 . 12.5 14.4 22.8 - 774 -4No Total 0.1 9.0 23.2 12.5 14.4 27J 22.8 77.4 40.75 N/A 1/ Appraisal estimates 2/ Revised estimates KEY INDICATORS PY -1TPY-2 : Pr-3 Pr-4 PY-5 PY-6 ITEM uNrT Ap Ap Rev- Act App- Rev Act A Rev Act Ap ,Rev ACt App Rev Act 6. Project StaffinR Administration * No 28 21 _12_ 48 33 21 .334 33 59 33 46 Pinance 13 6 16 11 18 15 is 17 18 116 8 16 Training 20 - 21 16 22 11 22 16 22 23 22 _ 16 Lrnd Planning 5__ 1 11 1 22 51 24 51 22 51 26 1' 26 Ag. Services 96 117 15 9 148 127 148 Roads & Workshop** * - - - - 49 - - 56 Commercial241 5 379 390 3 1 SSU 14 11 14 13 14 11 14 14 MEU -11 1 1 _ 14 TOTAL 255 30 2 221 331 ___ 3 - 332 - 332 '4f_ Trainin V - (a) Staff Pre-service No. 48 6 6 20 25 & In - Service -105 17 251 21 1 (b) Farmer. Residential . . 2 327 In --Field , I -1- 518 7 j2- 1 4 15. * Includes PNU Note: In PY-1 the field staff were trained in Lofa. ** Previsualy under Administration *a * 1/ Appraisal estimaies 2/ Revised estimates KWT INDICATORS PY-1 PY-2 PT-3 PY-4 P-6. 1 tem Unit APp Rev- Act App Rev Act App Rev Act A Rev Act ev Act Ap Rev ACt Infrastructure .-... ............ ..... . Suidin:---------- -------------------------------------------------- ------------------ ---------- ---------- ---- . Residential No 8 - 5 - - Storehcuse - 1 1 .-. Workshop_"11 trainin H 2 . - 2 Administralion - Sub Center 2 --2 - SSU Lab 1 Guest House 1 __ Shed 1 Palava Hut 1 - Toilet (Headqtr) H 2 Pump Attendance of Sub gas station Bath house 1/ Appraisal estimates. 2/ Revised estimates. 0'- KEY INDICATORS Py-1 19 PY-2 1979 PY- 31 PY19i 4 198 -5 1982 PY-6 191) 1 2 J WIT Ap Re Ac6 App Rev Act App Hev Act Rev Act App Rev Act Act W11s No - - - - - 5 30 20 - 40 16 15 55.0 18 Latrines -1 I0 6 - 40 9 75 11.0 Road KM - Access - - - 48 8 68.8 8 - 83.2 26 104 96.5 3e.4 Recond/Mant- - - 130 178 3.2 225 143.4 137 - 225.6 137.- That is the appraisal target for feconditioning. The rest of the appraisal targets in this row are exclusively for maintenance. Includes 44.8 km constructed by BCADP and 25.6 km constructed by MPW. 1/ Appraisal estimates. 2/ Revised estimates. *4 KEY INDICATORS PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 PY-4 PY-5 PY..6 EM UNIT ev. Act Ap Rev Act ARev l ID ev Act A Rev Act App Rev Act .Cooperat!--es* Gwn Membership No 520 1967 1999 2786 4426 4216 7169 6500 6190 9300 7409 7970i 10. SSU No SwAmp (new) 30 24 37 - 53 - - 60 98 Contact Sites - - - .60 14 - 16 - 12 - - 7 } (New) Parmers : -It--- S. Haemat6:hium No - - - - 935 - - 422 - - 270 - - 1069 794 S. Mansorz' - .4 -- -1 ~-a I 1/ Appraisal estimates. 2/ Revised estimates. BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PHASE I INCREMENTAL ECONOMIC COST AND BENEFITS A. Incremental Costs PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 PY-4 PY-5 PY-6 Py-7 PY-8 PY-9 PY-10 PY-ll PY-12-30 1977-78 78 -79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 Building 265.5 354.9 178.3 190.4 179.9 10.8 - - - - - - Vihicle 70.7 305.8 109.5 328.1 211.5 25.5 - 69.4 164.2 44.0 55.8 148.8 Furniture 6 Equipment 119.5 152.8 105.9 115.2 156.0 14.5 - 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 Salaries & Wages: PMU 99.3 465.3 842.1 1173.9 1513.6 1541.6 427 427.4 427.0 427.0 427.0 427.0 IDA 31.5 166.0 230.1 438.6 223.0 68.0 - - - - - - VOC 19.9 110.1 240.0 415.3 480.3 312.2 82 81.9 81.9 81.9 81.9 81.9 I. GSC 62.4 131.0 198.6 364.8 574.3 410.0 131 131.0 131.0 131 131 131 ** Farm Inputs 5.7 149.9 447.0 968.5 735.6 706.2 439.31 381.3 346.0 346.0 335.0 340.3 Hired Labor - 2.2 25.1 84.0 100.1 150 150.0 150 150.0 150 150.0 150.0 Road Wurks - 690.0 182.5 70.9 204.3 230.3 108.5 36.0 36 , 36.0 36.0 36.0 Family Labor @ $1.00/MD 73.9 191.6 435.5 519.0 465.4 314.8 333.31 333.4 333.4 333.4 333.4 333.4 Family Labor 8 $1.50/MD 110.7 287.3 778.5 697.8 416.4 491.0 .491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 691.0 !.ess: Investment on Training 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Present Ext. Services 42 46 51 56 61 68 74 82 90 99 108 120 Total (Undeflated) 506.4 2618.6 2843.6 4512.7 4683.0 3615.8 1497 1514.0 1610.8 1511.3 1511.3 143E Deflated Costs: at 1.n/MD 639.1 3046.4 2985.7 4352.3 4809.9 361U.8 1497 1514.0 1610.8 1511.3 1520.3 1436 at 1.50/MD 675.9 3142.1 3203.5 4611.8 5042.3 3717.4 1654.6 1654.6 1768.4 1668.9 1677.9 1593.6 (B) B. PHASE I BENEFITS: Rice (Padi) 21 42 301 528 356 297 462 499 552 580 b14 688 Cocoa - - - 9 66 225 502 860 1072 1091.0 983 Coffee - - - Neg. 8 46 217 503 856 1165.0 1165.0 1155 Total Benefit 21 42 301 528 373 409 904 1504 2268 2717 2870 2786 C. NET INCREMENT VALUE AT: S1.00/HD. (618) (3004) (2684) (3824) (4437) (3207) (593) (10) 657 1206 1350 1350 At $1.50/HD F. Lobor (655) (3100) (2903) (4084) 4669) 3308) (751) (168) 500 1048 1192 1192 1/ PY6 cost is 6% of building, 12% of vehicle; 91 of furniture & Equipment; 1022 of PHU SSW 30% of IDM 652 of VPC 712 of CSC, 963 farm inputs, 15% hired labor, 13% of, is considered. Farmers will be expected to purchase farm inputs three of the cropo on their own. So Ex-poste Project involvement was cut back. 2/ In PY-7, the second year after the end of Phase I, only about 1/3 of PMU will be around and hence only 252 of VOC and about 322 GSC. From PY-7 onward, the value of the family labor is the average of the previous six (6) years. (C) 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 939 986 1034 1081 1129 1176 1176 1176 1156 1201 1246 1291 1336 1383 1383 1386 2775 2867 2960 3052 3145 3239 3239 3239 1339 1431 1524 1616 1709 1803 1803 1803 1181 1273 1366 1458 1551 .645 )645 1645 (A) At $l.00/MD - Family Labor (B) At $1.50/MD - Family Labor BCR 4% = 64 - 1.02 BCR 4% 36442.88 - 0.95 Pwc 35,622.26 38,440.34 BCR 5% = 31,246.10 = 0.9§ BCR 5% 31,246.1 - 0.89 32,643.43 35,167.8 BCR 6% - 26,943.15 = 0.88 BCR 6% 26,943.15 - 0.83 30,699.94 32,376.78 BCR8% - 20,362.15 = 0.78 BCR 8% 20,362.15 = 0.73 26,015.91 27,903.33 (A) IRR at $1.00/MD = 4.34% (B) IRR at 1.50/MD 3.16% - 49 - APPENDIX I COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER INTBAFRAD WASHINGTON DC TELEX NO. 440098 PROJECT's COMMENTS ON THE PCR PARA 1.15 THE SECOND SENTENCE IN THIS SECTION SHOULD READ: ABOUT 170 SWAMPS AND 50 WATER CONTACT SITES WERE SURVEYED, 2,700 FARMERS TESTED FOR S. BAEMATOBRIUM AND S. MANSONI STOP COPIES OF TYPICAL FARM BUDGETS FOR COCOA, COFFEE AND SWAMP RICE ARE BEING MAILED TO YOU UNDER SEPARATE COVER STOP THEY WERE OMMITTED FROM THE ORIGINAL DRAFT SENT YOU STOP BESIDES THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, THE PROJECT IS SATISFIED WITH THE PCR STOP REGARDS DANIEL GOE