Bolivia - Structural constraints and development prospects

Report No. 4194-80 Bolivia Structural Constraints and Development Prospects January 12, 1983 Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY U Document of the World Bank This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Bolivian Peso ($b) US$1.00 = $b 200.00 $b 1,000 = US$5.00 Exchange Rate Effective November 6, 1982  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOREWORD This report is based on the findings of an economic mission which visited Bolivia in July/August 1981, and those of a subsequent updating mission in March 1982. The first mission consisted of Mahmood A. Ayub (Chief of Mission), Sudhir Chitale (YP) and Consuelo Cruz (Research Assistant). Nicholas G. Carter (Senior Economist) participated in the mission. The report also draws on the work done, at about the same time, by Lucio Reca (Consultant) on agricultural pricing and marketing, and by Glen Jenkins and Micheline Mescher (Consultants) on mining taxation. The report was subsequently updated and expanded by Roberto Zagha (Economist) in March 1982, and was discussed with the Government in December 1982 by Mahmood A. Ayub. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AASANA - Administracion de Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares a la Navigacion Aerea (Airport Services Authority) BAB - Banco Agricola de Bolivia (Agricultural Bank of Bolivia) BAMIN - Banco Minero (Mining Bank) BISA - Banco Industrial Sociedad Anonima (Industrial Development Bank) CBF - Corporacion Boliviana de Fomento (Bolivian Development Corporation) COMIBOL - Corporacion Minera de Bolivia (Bolivian Mining Corporation) ENA - Empresa Nacional de Arroz (National Rice Corporation) ENAF - Empresa Nacional de Fundiciones (National Smelting Corporation) ENDE - Empresa Nacional de Electricidad (National Power Corporation) ENFE - Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles (National Railways Corporation.) ENTEL - Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones (National Telecommunications Corporation) LAB - Lloyd Aero Boliviano (Bolivian Airlines) SNC - Servicio Nacional de Caminos (National Road Service) YPFB - Yacimentos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (Bolivian Petroleum Corporation)   TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. COUNTRY DATA SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................................. i-v I. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSE'ECTS ............ . . 1 Background ........................ .................. 1 Recent Economic Developments ................. 7 Prospects ............................................... 12 II. PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND FINANCING PROGRAM ............. ... 17 The Selection of Public Investments .. . .................. 17 The 1982 Public Investment Program ............. ......... 19 Financing of the Public Investment Program .............. 20 The Public Investment Program and the Economic Restructuring ....... .................... 20 III. MAJOR SECTORAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS ........ ............... 23 Agriculture ............................................. 23 Mining and Metallurgy ............... .I.................... 26 Hydrocarbons .... 31 Manufacturing ............. 33 Power ............. 35 Transport ............. 36 Social Sectors ............. 38 ANNEX A: Bolivia - Pricing and Marketing Policies for Major Tradeable Agricultural Products .... 41 ANNEX B: Bolivia - Issues and Policies Related to Mining Taxation . ............. .............. . 50 ANNEX C: Bolivia - Public Sector Investment Projects ........ 54 STATISTICAL ANNEX ............................................ 65 MAP  TEXT TABLES Table 1: Real Growth Rates of GDP and Selected Sectors, 1970-81 2: Expenditures and Savings Ratios and Growth Rates, 1970-81 3: Summary of the Consolidated Public Sector Operations, 1974-81 4: Balance of Payments Summary, 1975-81 5: End-of-Year Real Exchange Rate Index, 1970-1982 6: Projected Resource Availability for Imports, 1982-87 7: Projected Resource Availability for Imports, 1982-87 (Assuming Renewal of Operations with Foreign Lenders) 8: Summary of the Public Investment Program, 1982-85 9: Employment in COMIBOL Mines, 1980  PFae I f 2 COUNTRY DATA - (BOLIVIA) AREA POPULATION DENSITY 1,098.6 km2 5.6 MillIton (mid-1980) 5.1 per km2 Rate of Growth: 2.7 (from 1970 to 1978) 18.4 per km2 of arable land POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (1976 to 1979) HEALTH (1976 to 1979) Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000) 43.2 Populationi per physician 1845 Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) 16.4 Population per hospital bed 456 Inifant Mortality (per 1,000 live births) 158.0 INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1970) DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP (1976 to 1979) X of national iacome, highest quintile 36.0 % owned by top 1O. of owners 4.4 lowest quintile 13.0 % okned by smallest 10% of om,ers ACCESS TO PIPED WATER (1976 to 1979) ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (1976 to 1979) % of population - urban 81.0 % of population - urban 33.0 - rural 6.0 - rural NUTRITION (1976 to 1979) EDUCATION (1976 to 1979) Calorie Lntake as % of requiremernts 83.0 Adult literacy rate % 63.0 Per capita protein intake 52.0 Primary school enrollment % 86.0 /1 GNP PER CAPITA IN 1981 : USS 601 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN 1981 ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (X, constant prices) US$ Kln. % 1970-75 1975-80 1980-81 GDP at Market Prices 4,120 100.0 5.7 3.7 -0.6 Gross Domestic Investmenit 447 .. 10.9 -9.5 -19.0 Gross Domestic Saving 456 .. 3.5 -7.0 -26.0 Current Account Balance -284 -6.8 Exports of Goods, NFS 786 19.1 4.7 0.9 3.4 Imports of Goods, NFS ui is.7 13.1 -2.4 0.6 OUTPJr, LABOR FORCE AND PRODUCTITIVITY IN 1979 /2 Value Added Labor Force V. A. Per Worker USs Mn. % Thousands % US$ % Agriculture 717 17.f 688 42 1,042 41.0 Mining and Metallurgy 311 7.4 79 5 3,937 140.0 Manufacturing 539 12.9 147 9 3,667 162.0 Others 2,608 62.5 715 44 3,648 Total/Average 4,175 100.0 1,629 100.0 2,563 100.0 GOVERNMENT FINANCE /3 Consolidated Public Sector Central Government $b bln.) of GDP ( $b bln.) % of GDP 1981 1981 19-8-0- C 1981 1981 1975-80 Current Receipts .. .. 30.0 21 12.0 11.0 Current Expeniditures .. .. 29.0 27 15.4 12.0 Current Surplus -12 -0.5 1.0 -6 -3.4 -1.0 Capital Expenditures 11 6.6 9.0 5 2.9 4.0 External Assistance (net) 80 7.0 5.0 6 3.4 3.0 1/ The Per Capita GNP is at 1981 prices. Per Capita GNP in 1978 is used as a base figure; in that fear $b figures are converted at the current exchange rate of $b20/US$. Subsequent years are calculated by taking per capita GNP growth in local currency, multiplied by the US GNP deflator growth rate to arrive at the 1981 per capita GNP at 1981 prices. 2/ Total labor force; unemployed are allocated to sector of their normal occupation. 3/ Includes Social security. inot available not applicable  Paze 2 of 2 COUNTRY DATA - (BOLIVIA) MONEY, CREDIT AND PRICES 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 (Million $b outstanding end period) Money anid Quasi Money 6,715 9,404 12,262 13,716 15,926 22,485 29,016 Banik Credit to Public Sector 1,328 2,147 2,171 4,325 8,394 14,033 18,929 Bank Credit to Private Sector 3,713 7,842 10,671 13,658 16,958 19,416 24,046 Money and Quasi Morey as % of GDP 14 17 19 18 17 17 17 General Price Index /1 (1970=100) 255 266 288 318 381 559 741 Annual percentage changes in: General Price Index 8 5 8 10 20 47 33 Bank Credit to Public Sector 186 62 1 99 94 67 35 Bank Credit to Private Sector 24 IlI 36 28 24 14 24 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (AVERAGE 1975-80 in 1970 prices) 1970 1975 1980 1981 US$ Mln. X (Nil Lions US$) Exports of Goods, NFS 206 505 1,045 1,014 Tin, concentrated 53.7 19.0 Imports of Goods, NSFS 180 641 958 1,049 Tin, retallic 45.8 16.0 Resource Gap (deficit = -) 26 -136 87 -35 Other Minerals 101.9 37.0 Hydrocarbons 28.2 10.0 Interest Payments (net) -7 -24 -157 -179 Agricultural products 43.9 16.0 Workers' Remittances All other commodities 5.2 2.0 Other Factor Payments (net) -18 -13 -104 -166 Total 278.7 o0-.o Net Transfers 2 3 8 13 Balance on Current Account 3 -170 -166 -367 EXTERNAL DEBT, DECEMBER 31, 1980 5S$ Min. Direct Foreign Investment -76 35 45 32 Net MLT Borrowing Public Debt, inl. guaranteed 2,422 Disbursemernts 129 161 439 337 Non-Guaranteed Private Debt Amortization 20 50 117 100 Total outstanding & Disbursed Subtotal 109 111 322 237 Capital Grants 2 8 48 23 DEBT SERVICE RATIO for 19812/ % Otther Capital (net) -38 -66 -283 -79 Increase in Reserves (e) - -50 -34 -154 Public Debt, incl. guaranteed 27 Non-Guaranteed Private Debt . Total Outstanding and Disbursed Fulel and Related Materials IBRD/IDA LENDING, (December 31, 1981; Million USS): Imports 1 7 8 .. IBRD IDA of which: Petroleum .. .. .. .. Outstanding & Disbursed 203 78 Exports 13 159 245 .4. Undisbursed 72 30 of which: Petroleum 13 111 23 .. Outstanding incl. Ulndisbursed 275 108 Natural Gas - 48 222 360 1/ Average for the year 2/ Ratio of Debt Service to Exports of Goods and non-factor Services, after a 1981 rescheduling. not available not applicable  BOLIVIA NATIONAL ACCOUNTS SUM1MARY (Millions of pesos at current prices) Preliminary Estimated 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 GDP 12,374 49,468 57,787 66,743 80,594 102,279 149,506 193,970 Resource Gap (M-X) -306 2,712 740 226 4,144 4,557 -2,140 -311 Imports 2,137 12,808 13,476 14,328 18,234 22,154 23,446 24,542 Exports 2,443 10,096 12,736 14,102 14,090 17,597 25,586 24,853 Total Dom. Expenditures 12,068 52,180 58,527 66,969 84,739 106,836 147,336 193,659 Consumption 9,957 40,379 44,755 51,378 66,767 86,553 127,602 168,518 General Government 1,324 5,679 6,567 9,019 10,921 12,191 15,392 19,234 Private 8,633 34,700 38,188 42,359 55,846 74,362 112,210 149,284 Investment 2,111 11,801 13,772 15,591 17,971 20,283 19,764 21,020 Fixed Investment 1,792 8,830 12,508 14,442 15,959 17,480 17,189 22,162 Changes in Stocks 319 2,971 1,264 1,149 2,012 2,803 2,575 -1,142 Domestic Savings 2,417 9,089 13,032 15,005 13,827 15,726 21,904 25,452 Net Factor Income -301 -738 -800 -1,504 -2,186 -3,394 -6,839 -8,246 Current Transfers 46 208 280 380 756 1,009 1,396 . National Savings 2,162 8,559 12,512 13,881 12,397 13,341 16,311 . Average Exchange Rates Pesos per US$ 11.8 20 20 20 20 20.4 24.5 24.3 Pesos per SDR (1) 11.8 23.4 23.2 24.3 26.1 32.3 31.2 28.5 (1) End of period.  BOLIVIA NATIONAL ACCOUNTS SUMMARY (Millions of US$ at Constant 1978 prices) 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Gross Domestic Product 2,678 3,538 3,777 3,908 4,030 4,111 4,144 4,120 Terms of Trade Effect -42 -44 -30 -41 -- 6 73 -4 Gross Domestic Income 2,636 3,494 3,747 3,867 4,030 4,117 4,303 4,116 Resource Gap -65 177 45 12 208 195 -67 -9 Imports (g+nfs) 451 834 811 744 912 946 737 743 Capacity to Import 516 657 766 732 912 751 804 752 Exports (g+nfs) 558 701 796 773 704 745 731 756 Total Expenditures 2,571 3,671 3,792 3,879 4,238 4,312 4,236 4,107 Consumption 2,028 2,761 2,825 2,888 3,338 3,521 3,683 3,660 General Government 290 474 495 524 546 568 573 562 Private 1,738 2,287 2,330 2,364 2,792 2,953 3,110 3,098 Investment 543 910 967 991 900 791 553 447 Fixed Investment 462 708 886 928 799 675 481 481 Changes in Stocks 81 202 81 63 101 116 72 -34 Domestic Savings 608 733 922 979 692 596 620 456 Net Factor Income -67 -48 -51 -89 -109 -145 -205 -202 Current Transfers 10 14 18 23 38 43 45 National Savings 551 699 889 913 621 494 460 Local Currency Deflators (1978=100) Gross Domestic Product 23.1 69.9 76.5 85.4 100 124.4 -180.4 235.4 Imports (g+nfs) 23.7 76.8 83.1 96.3 100 117.1 159.0 165.2 Exports (g+nfs) 21.9 72.0 80.0 91.2 100 118.1 174.9 164.3 Total Expenditures 23.4 71.1 77.2 86.3 100 123.8 173.9 235.8 Government Consumption 22.8 59.9 66.4 86.1 100 107.3 134.2 171.1 Private Consumption 24.9 74.8 80.3 88.0 100 126.9 189.9 254.7 Fixed Investment 19.4 62.4 70.6 77.8 100 129.5 178.8 230.3 Changes in Stocks 19.7 73.6 78.5 91.6 100 121.2 177.8 168.0 Exchange Rate Index 169.4 100 100 100 100 98.0 81.6 82.2 (US cents per peso)  BOLIVIA BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Millions of US$ at Currenit Prices) 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 EXPORTS (g+nfs) 206 505 637 705 704 862 1,045 1,014 Merchandise (fob) 191 444 568 634 627 761 942 909 Non-Factor Services 15 61 69 71 77 101 103 105 IMPORTS (g+nfs) 180 641 674 715 912 1,086 958 1,049 Merchandise (fob) 135 503 516 532 690 815 680 931(1) Non-Factor Services 45 138 158 183 222 271 278 118 RESOURCE BALANCE 26 -136 -37 -10 -208 -224 87 -35 Net Factor Income -25 -37 -40 -75 -109 -166 -261 -345 Factor Receipts 2 7 17 7 5 7 14 22 Factor Payments 27 44 57 82 114 173 275 367 (M&LT Interest Paid) (7) (24) (37) (57) (84) (117) (157) (179) Net Current Transfers 2 3 4 5 8 7 8 13 Transfer Receipts .. .. .. 15 Transfer Payments .. .. .. 2 CURRENT BALANCE 3 -170 -73 -80 -309 -383 -166 -367 CAPITAL ACCOUNT Direct Investment -76 35 20 22 19 28 45 32 Official Grant Aid 2 8 10 14 30 43 48 23 Net M&LT Loans (DRS) 109 111 222 341 249 179 322 237 Disbursements 129 161 288 436 516 322 439 337 Repayments 20 50 66 95 267 143 117 100 Other M&LT (net) - - - - 5 - -14 - Net Credit from IMF - - - - 19 - 94 6 Disbursements - - - - 19 - 94 6 Repayments - - - - - - - - Net Short-Term - -2 1 37 33 -35 53 - Capital Flows NEI and Errors and Omissions -38 -32 -118 -308 -120 12 -416 -85 (2) Change in Net Reserves - 50 -62 -26 74 156 34 154 (-indicates increase) (1) For 1981, imports include c.i.f., and NFS exclude c.i.f. (2) Includes Capital Flows, NEI and errors and omissions.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS (i) Bolivia is made up of three distinct geographical regions. First, the Altiplano, the 3-4000 meter plateau, with its poor soils and its mineral deposits exploited since the early 16th century, cn which over 50% of the population lives. Second, the Llanos, fertile lowlands isolated in the middle of the South American continent, which experienced an economic boom in the last decade through agricultural and gas exports. Sugar, coffee and timber are the main agricultural exported items. Natural gas, with a pipeline to Argentina, is responsible for some 302; of Bolivian exports. Third, the Yungas, fertile valleys with rich agricultural potential, where fragmentation, high transport costs, and limited income in Bolivia's urban areas have mitigated against rapid development. (ii) Until the middle of the 20th century thE Bolivian monetary economy was little more than mines whose benefits accrued largely outside the country. Only very small amounts of resources were spent on infrastructure and on education, and even these were directed largely to the benefit of the mines. The highly unequal income distribution that characterized this economy helps to explain the violence of the 1952 revolution and the direction of economic policy after that time. The priorities of the revolution were agricultural reform and mining nat:ionalization; both were carried out, but the lack of infrastructure in agriculture and the establishment of the miners as a relatively privileged class while mines began to be exhausted, mitigated the gains that might have been achieved through the 1952 economic reforms. While the last: three decades have seen impressive gains in human and physical infrastruct:ure, the economy is badly undercapitalized and has little in the way of resources with which to pay for needed investments. (iii) An oil, gas, and commodity boom in the early 1970's provided the country with the first significant infusion of resources since the revolution. However, in keeping with the national desire to control the economy, huge investments were made in mineral processing, many of dubious viability and excessive size, and most with inflated costs. Little, if any, coherent investment planning was done. The increased foreign exchange and fiscal revenues made Bolivia an attractive client for foreign commercial banks, especially in the 1975-78 period, and loans for poorly conceived projects, as well as for general balance of paymrents support were made, with interest rates and maturities which were increasingly incompatible with the earning potential of the projects or even the general ability of the country to service these loans. (iv) The relatively easy access to foreign exchange in the 1970's allowed the country to follow policies, macro-economic as well as sectoral, which were detrimental to exporting and efficient import substitution. The nominal exchange rate remained fixed from 1972 to 1979 while the real exchange rate declined by over one-third. Low domnestic producer prices for primary products, apart from restraining production and exports, have resulted in substantial illegal trade to the neighboring countries. In the mining sector, the system of mining taxes in Bolivia has been a serious disincentive: the tax burden is the heaviest among major tin-producing  - ii - countries, the system dampens incentives for both exploration and develop- ment, and it has made the processing of ore, most of which is low-grade, almost unprofitable. In the hydrocarbons sector, the heavily subsidized domestic prices of petroleum products have encouraged a rapid increase in domestic consumption and illegal exports to neighboring countries, where prices are typically several times higher, reducing foreign exchange avail- abilities to the Central Bank. In the case of non-traditional exports, the current cumbersome and time-consuming administrative procedures discourage firms from exporting. (v) Public enterprises, which play an important role in the provision of goods and services, have been beset by a series of problems. The oper- ations of the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL) have been severely affected by excessive centralization, excess workforce, inappropriate system of worker bonus, run-down equipment, deficient inventory control, negligible investment, lack of exploration and severe labor problems. The financial problems of the National Smelting Corporation (ENAF) are a reflection of technical factors (design of plant, shortage of ores and existence of complex alloys which involve relatively high smelting and refining costs), of the high debt service, and of its monopsonistic position which reduces pressures for cost reduction. The current crisis of the Agricultural Bank of Bolivia (BAB) can be traced to the application of non-economic criteria for lending and to overcentralization and overstaffing. In the case of the Bolivian Development Corporation (CBF), which controls about 20 enterprises in indus- try and agroindustry, marketing difficulties, fixed prices and improper planning and execution of projects (glass and edible oils industries) have been the main factors for the deteriorating financial performance. The increasing debt service burden, excessive wage increases, and inadequate tariff rate and pricing policies have compounded the problems of the enter- prises. (vi) The poor export performance in the 1970's was accompanied by a substantial increase in imports, which more than doubled in real terms. The factors responsible for this growth were the high level of investment, an overvalued exchange rate, the accelerated growth of GDP (5% per annum during 1970-78), and rapid increases in real wages until 1978. This latter factor brought about a rapid rise in consumer goods imports, which in recent years have been doubled by illegal imports financed in part by illegal trade. As a consequence of the deterioration in the trade balance and with the increase in borrowing, came a sharp increase in external debt, which rose from $360 million in 1970 to $2.4 billion by 1981 while service on this debt as a share of exports almost tripled. (vii) By 1979 it became evident that Bolivia's resources, particularly petroleum, were not as ample as had been expected in the boom of the mid- decade. Gas reserves, although ample, face a difficult market with Argentine demand unlikely to increase and the Brazilian market dependent on the con- struction of a pipeline to Sao Paulo, completion of which, under the best of scenarios, is still four years away. Thus foreign lenders began to reassess their exposure and by the end of the 1970's, had become increasingly reluc- tant to extend further loans.  - iii - (viii) Late in 1979, the Gueiler government launched an economic program designed to improve the external trade performance of Bolivia and to restore the confidence of foreign lenders. Prices of pub:Lic goods and services were raised to more realistic levels, agricultural producer prices were increased and mining taxes were reduced. The peso was deva:Lued for the first time since 1972 and negotiations were begun with foreign commercial banks to reschedule the debt; these negotiations culminated in an agreement in April 1981. The economic program was supported by an I1P stand-by and by a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan. (ix) The government of Ms. Gueiler was deposed led by General Garcia Meza in August 1980, shortly before a newly elected government was to take office. Garcia Meza's administration in turn, was succeeded by two other military governments. The economic recovery program launched under the Gueiler Government progressively lost impetus since neither of the successor governments had the will or the political support to take the follow-up measures. GDP growth was negligible in 1980, -1% in 1981, and estimated at -10% in 1982. Public investment fell in absolute terms, and public finances, as a result of unrealistic price policies, deteriorated sharply. The nega- tive international image of the government broughit official aid flows to a virtual halt. In this climate, foreign commercia:L lenders largely ceased to provide new loans to Bolivia. However, the support of Latin American Govern- ments and Latin American Central Banks' short-term credits enabled Bolivia to avoid a balance of payments crisis in the remainder of 1980 and 1981, despite economic policies which were inadequate to address the serious foreign exchange situation or the nation's internal economic problems. (x) In 1982, however, as these sources were nearly exhausted, arrears on foreign debt service started to build up. In spite of a drastic decline in imports (average monthly imports were US$50 million in 1982 compared to US$80 million in 1981), debt in arrears reached some US$500 million by the end of 1982 (US$400 million being short-term debt owed to Latin American Central Banks and US$100 million for interest and principal on medium and long term debt due to commercial banks). Unable to solve the external debt problem and facing an accelerating deterioration of the economy, lack of popular support and a rapid erosion of confidence, the Military Government handed the power over to Dr. Siles Suazo, the winner of the 1980 elections. (xi) When forming a new Government in October 1982, President Siles Suazo was confronted with extraordinary complex problems: (a) on the inter- nal side-industrial production was coming to a halt for lack of imported spare parts and supplies; private and public sector enterprises were in a critical financial situation because of the increase in financial charges following the drastic fall of the peso since the beginning of 1982 and the unrealistically low tariffs, respectively; a consolidated fiscal deficit estimated at close to 10% of GDP; an inflation rate running at 300% in 1982; shortages in food and medical supplies; and a serious decline in the real purchasing power of large parts of the population, causing growing discon- tent; and (b) on the external side-mineral production was on the decline exacerbating the fall in mineral prices; instability of the free exchange  - iv rate with swings from $bl70/US$ to $b280/US$ during October 1982; and finally mounting arrears on the foreign debt service. (xii) In November 1982, the Government adopted a first package of economic measures to be followed by a second policy package in February 1983. The November measures aimed at introducing stability to the foreign exchange market by fixing the nominal exchange rate, reducing the fiscal deficit (through tariff increases and notably a 200% increase in petroleum product prices) and providing incentives for foodstuffs production; at the same time, an effort was made to mitigate the burden of these measures on the lower income groups. While these measures were extremely necessary, much remains to be done. (xiii) To mitigate the stringent constraints the external sector imposes on Bolivia's economic development, the Government would need the financial support of foreign lenders through reaching an agreement with the IMF, rescheduling the remaining portion of the foreign debt not covered under the 1981 agreement with the commercial banks (although the commercial debt represents only 44% of the medium and long-term debt, its service represents some 70% of the medium and long-term debt service for the next three years), transforming a large portion of the public short-term debt of US$400 million owed to Latin American Governments (average maturity is less than six months) into medium and long-term loans and obtaining fresh financing from the commercial banks. The essential elements of a supporting macroeconomic program would have to include realistic interest rates, and sound demand- management policies. Increases in public tariffs and petroleum prices (which are still only at about half international levels) are required to bring the fiscal deficit to manageable proportions. A prudent budget and a solid prioritized public investment program for 1983 will have to be prepared. Finally, further adjustments in the nominal exchange rate may be necessary if the present rate (which, in real terms, increased by 120% since the beginning of the year) is to be maintained in real terms. To adopt such a program will not be easy; essentially, the Government is walking a tightrope, trying to strike a balance between (i) its objective to protect the population against a further erosion in their standard of living and thus maintain political support and stability; and (ii) the need to strengthen the balance of pay- ments and to shore up the country's public finances as essential pre- requisites for sustained growth in the medium and long term. (xiv) The Bolivian Government will have to demonstrate that it has the capability to restore economic stability and strengthen the country's produc- tive capacity to convince external creditors to provide additional financial assistance. Unless it succeeds, the gross inflow of capital would be reduced drastically and servicing of the existing external debt would become extremely difficult. As a consequence, taking into account presently depressed prices for the major export commodities, first, funds for a number of promising export oriented projects in the mining, hydrocarbon and agricul- tural sectors, which have already been identified and whose implementation  -v - would strengthen Bolivia's external position, wouLd probably not become available; second, investments in basic infrastructure, vital for Bolivia's longer term development, would have to be delayed; and third, the low levels of imports and spare parts, imposed by the foreign exchange constraint, would idle industrial capacity even further and jeopardize present levels of exports. (xv) However, if the Government makes convincing initial progress in stabilizing the economy, Bolivia is likely to obtain the financing necessary to tide the country over the difficult adjustment period. If capital inflows were to match repayments of principal of Bolivia's external debt (constant nominal debt), import levels could probably be sustained that would allow the country to carry out a large part of the investment projects required to develop its export potential. In this context, and assuming that prudent borrowing policies are followed, GDP might be able to grow at moderate rates until 1986. By that time, the country would have strengthened its export capacity and commodity prices should have recovered to allow for higher rates of economic growth. Bolivia's long-term economic potential greatly exceeds its past performance, particularly if the gas pipeline to Brazil were to materialize. Exports of gas to Sao Paulo could be expected to increase export earnings by some 40% to 50% (US$400 to US$500 million) per year. (xvi) In summary, while Bolivia has the poteni:ial to expand exports significantly, it heavily depends on external financing to develop it. The adoption of sound macroeconomic policies, as a demnonstration of the present Government's determination to create the conditions of stability that are a prerequisite for future growth, would go a long way in restoring confidence. This, in turn, would help to reestablish the traditional external financing sources the country depends on for the execution of identified promising export projects. Realization of these projects, combined with prudent macro- economic policies, should reestablish Bolivia's creditworthiness for conven- tional lending within a relatively short period.   CHAPTER I RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS Background 1. Bolivia is made up of three geographical regions: the Altiplano, the Llanos, and the Yungas, totalling 1.1 million km2. The 3,000 to 4,000 meter highlands of the Altiplano, west and southwest of the country, are the mineral producing zone. Silver was produced from the early years of the Spanish colonization, until the exhaustion of silver veins in the late 1800's. The early exploration of silver led to some of the first European urban settlements in South America: Sucre (1538), Potosi (1545), and La Paz (1548) were centers of Spanish administration in the Alto Peru. Since the late nineteenth century, the main minerals produced in the Altiplano have been tin, antimony, zinc and tungsten. These, and a few other minerals, still account for the bulk of Bolivian exports: 70% in the late 1970's. Mining provides employment to only about 80,000 people9 10% of the Bolivian labor force living on the Altiplano. Some 1.5 million, out of the 3.0 mil- lion Altiplano population, are engaged in subsistence ag-riculture on often exhausted soils facing harsh climatic conditions, the remainder living in La Paz and other urban centers. 2. The Llanos (lowlands), north and east cf the country, account for 64% of tne country's area and 20% of its 5.7 million population. This region is considered to have a rich agricultural potential. Commercial agriculture has been growing rapidly in the last decade: sugar, rice, cotton, corn, coffee and tropical fruits are produced both for the domestic market and for exports. Most of the increase in agricultural exports which occurred in the 1970's (from 4% of total exports in 1970 to 11% in 1980) is attributable to the production of this region. The center, Santa. Cruz, has been the fastest growing urban area of Bolivia, particularly sincE, the discovery of petroleum and more importantly gas deposits. Exports of gas commenced in 1972, after completion of a gas pipeline to Argentina. In 1980, gas sales to Argentina were 20% of total exports. Finally, in the YungaLs, the fertile valleys between the highlands and the lowlands, the main activities are agriculture anid livestock, providing food for the urban areas. Agricultural techniques are often more modern than in the Altiplano. However, because high transport costs prevent exports and because the urban markets are relatively small, the pace of modernization has been much slower than Tin the lowlands. 3. Between independence in 1825 and the Revolution in 1952, the Bolivian economic structure and the policy framevork was not conducive to economic and social development. The most profitable irvestments for allo- cating the economic rent generated in the mining sector were outside Bolivia, aimed at controlling mineral prices in the international market: in the early 1900's, the Bolivian tin entrepreneurs managed to control production in Malaysia and processing facilities in the U.S. and England. As political ruling groups represented mining interests, virtually no taxes were collected from the mining sector and whatever revenues existed were invested in the infrastructure required by the mining sector. As a result, in spite of the fact that the large indigenous population, which was linguistically, socially, and culturally integrated only very imiperfectly in the modern sector, required substantial investments in human capital, only quite  limited public funds were available for such investments. Similarly, infrastructure designed to diversify the economic activity was neglected. Finally, the lack of active markets for agricultural products discouraged investments in the agricultural sector in which the majority of the population was engaged. The internal market was depressed as the disguised unemployment in the agricultural sector maintained mining workers' wages at the subsistence level. The high transport costs necessary to reach the external markets ruled out unprocessed crop exports as an alternative source of growth while the lack of an agroindustrial base ruled out exports of processed agricultural products. 4. Before 1952, the distribution of income and wealth was probably one of the most unequal in any South American country. This factor may explain the frequent popular uprisings, a recurrent phenomenon in Bolivia history. One of the most violent, in 1952, resulted in a Government for which two main objectives were agrarian reform and the nationalization of the larger mines. The results have been mixed. Land redistribution has removed one of the sources of discontent in the rural area, a landless peasantry. However, land redistribution by itself has not reduced the uneven distribution of the population vis-a-vis available land, and investments to remove supply constraints have not been made. Moreover, until the 1970's, lack of invest- ment in agroindustry continued to act as a deterrent to exports of processed agricultural products. Finally, the nationalization of mines has not had the economic impact that might have been possible. One of the main reasons the mines were nationalized was to force them to pay taxes. But the economic function of the taxation of exhaustible resources has generally been mis- understood by governments in the past thirty years. Instead of allocating mining tax proceeds to investments designed to diversify the economic structure, too large a portion of the tax proceeds has been allocated to either building processing facilities in the mining sector itself or to provide better living conditions for the mining workers of the state mining enterprises (COMIBOL). Mining workers in COMIBOL (some 25,000 in the mid 1970's) thus became a privileged group within Bolivia. This strategy has been successful in providing employment for white-collar workers and thus brought an indirect advantage to the urban classes from where most of these workers originate. A direct incentive to urban classes have been food subsidies; in recent years they accounted for as much as 2% of GDP. These could be thought of as some of the incentives to the rapid urbanization that followed. The urban sector, 30% of the population in the 1950's, grew rapidly to 45% of the population by 1975. The bias of public expenditures in favor of the urban population notwithstanding, part of the tax proceeds have financed investments in transport and energy infrastructure as well as expen- ditures in education, which in per-capita terms, were three times their 1950 level by the end of the 1970's. 5. The agrarian reform and the nationalization of the mines implied a major redistribution of wealth and major economic and institutional changes which, during the 1950's, disorganized the economy. Inflation soared and GDP declined. The trend of declining GDP after 1952 was reversed only in 1958; thereafter, until the late 1970's, GDP grew at an average rate of 5%. Per capita GDP, however, did not recover to its 1952 level until 1970. 6. The increase in world energy and metal prices in the seventies, together with indications of sizeable petroleum and gas deposits in the country, had a two-fold effect. First, it increased the revenues of the public sector, which rose from 25% to 30% of GDP over the decade, and second,  - 3 - it made the country an attractive client for foreign commercial banks. The attractiveness of the country was further increased by an extended period of political stability under the Banzer Government 1:1971-1978). The apparently bright prospects of the country enabled the Government to borrow massively from commercial banks, particularly between 1975 and 1978. The share of debt contracted on concessional terms, 50% for total f-oreign debt in the first half of the decade, decreased to some 35% in 1980, while the grant element of new borrowing declined from 30% to 9%. However, many of the projects financed with external commercial borrowing were of questionable economic justification. Also, a large portion of the debt contracted after 1975 constituted all-purpose loans to finance a current account deficit that had grown from a negligible proportion of GDP before 1975, to 6% in 1975 and 8% in 1978. 7. The sources available in the 1970's from increased revenues and from foreign banks allowed the public sector to undertake a massive invest- ment program, which was accompanied by a strengthening of most public sector agencies and an increase in their efficiency. During 1972 to 1979, public sector investments were, on average, some 10% of the GDP (about 2/3 of total investment). But public investments included many expensive projects, in some cases overdesigned, in others using inadequate technology, which did not increase the country's capacity to service the debt they created. Bolivian petroleum refining capacity, for example, is 150% in excess of present crude output. The equipment utilized in the newest tin smelting plant (ENAF), is not suited to the metal content and composition of some of the tin ore produced in Bolivia, and thus a part of the Bolivian production has to be exported in the form of concentrates, while there is idle capacity (30%) in the smelting plant. A smelting plant for lead and silver (Karachipampa), to be opened in 1983, will have a capacity of two to three times the current production of lead and silver ore. While some of this excess capacity has resulted from lower than anticipated production of hydrocarbons and minerals, it is clear that domestic processing facilities are far larger than the country will require in the near future. 8. The relatively easy access to foreign exchange in the 1970's also allowed the Government to follow policies detrimental to traditional exports of minerals and hydrocarbons. From 1972 to late 1979 the exchange rate was fixed at 20$b/US$. The real exchange rate thus declined by 35%. While average tin prices for the three year period 1978/80 were 52% higher in constant dollars terms than the average for the period 1970/72, in constant peso terms, they declined by some 40%. As wages in the mining sector kept increasing (until 1978), mining profitability declined. In addition to that, the mining sector was overtaxed (see para. 59) and the state mining enter- prise, COMIBOL (which produces some 65% of Bolivian mineral production), continued to be mismanaged. The volume of tin exports in 1978/80 was thus 11% lower in real terms than in 1970/72, and tot:al mineral exports 8%, lower. Finally, subsidized fuel prices in the domestic market contributed to the elimination of exportable surpluses of petroleum. (Between 1974 and 1980, while domestic production declined by 18%, domestic consumption increased by 31%.) Petroleum exports, US$160 million in 1974, declined to some US$20 million in 1980, and are virtually nLI at present. Total exports in 1978/80 thus were only 8% higher in real terms than they were in 1970/72. Gas exports to Argentina provided US$340 million in 1981 and are expected to yield some US$390 million in 1982, AgriculturaL exports, US$10 million at the beginning of the decade, increased to US$110 million in 1980 (sugar,  - 4 - coffee and timber being the main exported products). The increase in nominal exports from US$200 million in 1970 to US$1,000 million in 1980, is thus based on the increase in gas and agricultural exports and on the increase in mineral prices, which are likely to remain depressed in the coming years. 9. The poor export performance during the decade has been accompanied by a substantial increase in imports which, in real terms, doubled between 1970/72 and 1978/80. Several demand induced factors contributed to this increase. First, the high levels of investment realized during the 1970's required capital goods imports, which averaged 40% of total merchandise imports. Second, the relatively high level of economic activity, 5% growth rate during 1970/78, caused a rapid rise in imported intermediate goods, amounting now to some 35% of total imports. Finally, the continued increase in wages until 1978, during a period in which the exchange rate was not keeping pace with internal inflation, stimulated consumer goods imports. For example, the average real wage per worker, in peso terms, doubled between 1972 and 1978 in YPFB, and increased by 40% in COMIBOL. In US dollars terms these increases amounted to 400% and 250%. Although the labor force in COMIBOL and YPFB is only 30,000 (less than 2% of the total labor force), it sets the tone for wage demands in the labor market. Consumer goods imports, thus followed the general pattern of import increases, and their share in total imports remained roughly constant at some 25%. This figure, however, is underestimated, since it does not include the undeclared consumer goods which enter the country illegally. 10. The poor trade performance of Bolivia since 1975 has resulted in a growing current account deficit that had to be financed by an increasing foreign debt. While in real terms, the foreign debt did not increase between 1970 and 1975, it increased by 65% between 1975 and 1978. (In nominal terms, from US$0.8 billion to US$1.7 billion.) Interest payments, less than 5% of exports before 1975, thus became 13% in 1979 and 15% in 1980. The increase is the result of the increase in the level of the foreign debt in real terms, of the increase in international interest rates, and of the increase in the share of commercial lending. 11. By 1978-79, it became evident that Bolivia's petroleum resources were not as ample as had been expected. A market for the considerable gas reserves has not yet been opened. Gas exports to Argentina were unlikely to increase in volume, and the Brazilian market could only be developed after the construction of a pipeline to Sao Paulo. As it stands, the gas pipeline to Sao Paulo cannot be completed before the second half of the decade. The foreign lenders thus began to reassess the country risk against the outlook for continued poor export performance and the renewal of political instabil- ity (in 1978/79 there were four governments in less than sixteen months). As a result, they became increasingly reluctant to increase their exposure in Bolivia. 12. In late 1979, the Gueiler Government launched an economic program designed to improve the external trade performance of Bolivia and restore the confidence of foreign lenders. Prices of publicly produced goods and services were increased with the objective of reducing aggregate demand and thus imports. To stimulate exports, mining taxation was reduced, agricul- tural prices were increased, and the peso was devalued for the first time since 1972 (from b$20/US$ to b$25/US$). At the same time, negotiations began  TABLE 1: REAL GROWTH RATES OF GDP AND SELECTED SECTORS, 1970-81 (Percentage Annual Changes in 1970 Prices) Average Annual Growth Rate Average 1970-76 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1977-81 GDP at Market Prices 5.9 3.4 3.1 2.0 0.8 -0.6 1.7 Agriculture 4.9 -3.4 2.7 2.0 1.7 2.1 1.0 Mining & Metallurgy 3.2 2.9 -4.0 -6.0 1.8 n.a. n.a. L (Mining) (2.5) (2.4) (-5.2) (-7.5) (2.0) 0.1 (-1.6) (Metallurgy) (75.8)1/ (13.6) (19.4) (11.3) (12.4) (n.a.) (n.a.) Hydrocarbons 17.7 -24.0 -6.7 -10.0 -6.5 -7.9 -11.0 Manufacturing 6.7 6.0 4.2 2.6 -2.4 -2.8 1.5 Other Sectors 6.2 5.7 4.1 3.2 1.2 n.a. n.a. 1/ In 1971 metallurgical production was close to zero, and grew after the first plants started to operate in 1972. SOURCE: Table 2.2 of the Statitistical Annex and IMF for 1981.  TABLE 2: EXPENDITURES AND SAVINGS RATIOS AND GROWTH RATES, 1970-81 (Million $b; 1970 Prices) 1970 1975 1980 1981 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 % of GDP Growth Rates (%) Consumption 80.5 79.9 89.7 89.3 2.8 5.2 10.8 7.9 0.4 -0.1 (Private) *(69.8) (66.7) (76.2) (76.1) (2.5) (5.0) (12.1) (8.7) (0.1) (-0.8) ' (Public) (10.7) (13.2) (13.5) (13.2) (4.3) (6.0) (4.3) (4.0) (2.0) (-1.9) Investment 17.1 21.7 15.6 14.9 6.0 2.5 -9.3 -12.0 -15.3 -5.0 (Private) (6.7) (7.8) (7.4) (6.6) (-2.5) (-20.1) (121.4) (-13.2) (10.4) (-11.4) (Public) (8.9) (10.7) (8.3) (9.2) (42.7) (14.2) (-17.3) (-10.9) (-21.9) (10.3) Exports of Goods & NFS 19.7 19.1 15.1 15.8 15.2 -8.2 -11.5 8.8 -13.7 3.9 Imports of Goods & NFS 17.3 20.6 20.4 20.0 -1.7 -3.0 6.9 20.4 -21.1 -2.4 GDP at Market Prices 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.8 3.4 3.1 2.0 0.8 -0.6 Gross Domestic Savings 19.5 20.1 10.3 10.7 22.7 -2.6 -24.4 -29.1 2.3 2.9 Gross National Savings 17.5 18.5 5.1 5.9 25.0 -9.4 -29.2 -52.1 -13.4 13.6 SOURCE: Table 2.7 of Statistical Annex and IMF for 1980 and 1981.  with the commercial banks to reschedule the commercial foreign debt. As a result, the trade performance did indeed improve. Imports, including non-factor services, were 22% lower in real terms, in 1980, than in 1979, reflecting notably a sharp reduction in public investment expenditure. The economic program was supported by an IMF stand-by negotiated in 1979 and approved in January 1980 and by a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan approved in June 1980. Recent Economic Developments 13. The Government of Ms. Gueiler was deposed by General Garcia Meza in August 1980, shortly before a newly elected government was to take office. Garcia Meza's administration, in turn, was succeecLed by two other military governments. The economic recovery program launched under the Gueiler Government progressively lost impetus since neither of the successor governments had the will or the political support to take the measures necessary to sustain the recovery. The last tranche of the 1980 IMF stand-by could not be drawn as Bolivia failed to meet the IMF quarterly targets and most of the economic measures which had been supported by the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan ceased to be effective by mid 1981. Discussions on a new stand-by were initiated with the IMF and in early 1981 a formal rescheduling agreement was reached with the commercial banks. 1/ However, this agreement has not yet been ratified, requiring prior agreement on a stand-by with the IMF which has not yet materialized. The improving trend in the trade balance was disrupted, the current accotnt deficit increased from US$170 million in 1980 to US$370 million in 1981. Furthermore, the flow of aid came to a virtual halt since the negative international image of the Garcia Meza regime led many countries to break diplomatic relations with Bolivia. In this climate, foreign commercial lenders and multinational agencies largely ceased to provide new loans to Bolivia. Bolivia was, however, able to meet its foreign exchange requirements in 1981. The Argentine Government lent US$250 million on a med:ium-term basis to support the Garcia Meza government. Also, Bolivia was ab:Le to borrow some US$240 million from Latin American Central Banks on a short-term basis. Short term foreign debt (excluding debt owed by private enterprises without the mediation of local banks) thus increased from US$300 million by the end of 1980 to over US$500 million by the end of 1981. 14. A new military regime, under General Torellio, replaced President Garcia Meza in September 1981. Output was declining (real GDP fell -1% in 1981) and gross investment had fallen to less than 15% of GDP compared to 22% in 1975. Per capita consumption had remained rougyhly constant, largely because of declining real prices for the goods and services produced by the public sector; this was at the expense of public sector savings, which had fallen from 4% of GDP in 1977 to about zero in 1981. Net international reserves were negative by some US$300 million and Bolivia's Central Bank had stopped selling foreign exchange in July 1981. At the same time, the Latin American Central Banks became increasingly reluctant to roll over the short term loans, and even less willing to negotiate new ones. About half of Bolivia's US$2,400 million foreign debt outstanding was up for repayment between 1982 and 1985 (8% in 1982, 13% in 1983, and 14% in 1984 and 1985). Large repayments coincided with low tin prices (drop of 25% in the first half 1/ Through this agreement payments of about US$460 million falling due in 1981-1983 were rescheduled for 1983-1988.  - 8 - of 1982), high interest rates (interest payments doubled between 1979 and 1981), and closure of Bolivia's traditional external financial sources. Finally, the authority of the Torrellio Government was constrained by its previous links with Garcia Meza (Torrellio had been commander-in-chief of the army under Garcia Meza). 15. In this situation, the Torrellio Government adopted a gradual approach. Diplomatic relations with the U.S. were reestablished in late 1981 in the hope of reestablishing the flow of U.S. aid. In February 1982 the peso was devalued from $b25/US$ to $b44/US$ as a first step in resumption of consultations with the IMF and with the intention of negotiating a stand-by. In March 1982, the Government undertook additional measures: (i) a dual foreign exchange market was established, 40% of all export proceeds were purchased by the Central Bank at the rate of $b44/US$ while the remaining 60% could be sold on the free market. 2/ The 40% purchased by the Central Bank was earmarked for external debt service of the Central Government and the Central Bank and for Central Government imports; (ii) the interest rate on time peso deposits was increased from 20% to 30% and a rate equal to LIBOR was set for dollar deposits. Lending rates, both for dollar and peso loans, were freed; (iii) subsidies on sugar, rice and milk (which cost some US$100 million in 1981) were eliminated, leaving only the subsidy on wheat at an approximate cost of US$50 million per year. 16. Following adoption of these measures, an IMF mission visited La Paz in May 1982 but did not reach an agreement with the government. The Fund team concluded that the only way to reduce the consolidated fiscal deficit to a level compatible with the objectives of redressing the balance of payments, reducing inflation and restoring foreign lenders' confidence was to raise prices of goods and services produced by the public sector. The Government, however, feared that actions in these areas would be dangerous and could lead to unforeseen political reactions, even though it was apparent that the longer these measures were delayed the more drastic would they eventually have to be. 17. The elimination of subsidies and the devaluation, with its attendant increase in the cost of imported items (the nominal exchange rate increased four-fold between January and June) had indeed caused a drastic reduction in the real income of the urban workers. Although comprehensive data are not available, a recent limited household survey conducted in La Paz indicates that income in real terms may have fallen by some 30% in the first quarter of 1982. Faced with a wave of strikes (school teachers, truck drivers, bank employees, civil servants and employees of public enterprises), the Torrellio Government was reluctant to increase further public utility tariffs, and petroleum product prices which, with monthly inflation rates of above 10%, were declining rapidly in real terms. Failing to obtain the political support it needed for a comprehensive stabilization program, the Torrellio Government resigned in July 1982. The successor government under General Vildoso was short-lived. Faced with an accelerating deterioration of the economy and a rapid erosion of confidence, General Vildoso handed the power over to Dr. Siles Suazo, the winner of the 1980 elections. 2/ This system was essentialy a float with an earmarked export tax. The formula for the tax rate is T(%) = 40(F-R)/F, where F is the free market and R is the official rate. The free rate was at $b88/$US in April of 1982 and had risen to $b230/$US by September.  ITABLE 3: SUK{ARY CF THE ODNSOLIDATED PUBLIC SEBTOR OPERATIONS, 1974-81 (Million $b) 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Current Account Surplus/Deficit (-) 3,385.5 1,776.7 1,984.6 2,621.0 1,356.0 1,410.5 -2,731.2 -916 Capital Revenue 36.6 41.9 57.8 162.2 320.7 177.5 307.7 787 Capital Expenditure 3,032.8 5,268.8 7,860.2 9,998.3 9,335.1 9,202.9 8,593.2 11,429 Net Lending 83.0 395.5 294.2 297.2 150.4 158.2 145.2 421 Overall Surplus/Deficit (-) 306.3 -3,845.7 -6,112.0 -7,512.3 -7,808.8 -7,773.1 -11,161.9 -11,979 Financing -306.3 3,845.7 6,112.0 7,512.3 7,808.8 7,773.1 11,161.9 11,979 External Financing (net) 1,095.0 2,078.9 4,306.0 6,648.0 4,376.0 3,110.0 6,040.3 7,574 Doxnestic Borrowing (net) -1,749.5 1,132.2 1,786.0 116.3 2,822.7 5,150.2 4,866.7 4,640 Short-term Foreign Loans 348.2 634.6 20.0 748.0 610.1 -487.1 254.9 235 As % of CDP Current Account Surplus/Deficit 7.7 3.6 3.4 3.9 1.7 1.4 -1.8 -0.5 Capital Expenditure 6.9 10.7 13.6 15.0 11.6 9.0 5.7 6.6 Overall Surplus/Deficit 0.7 -7.8 -10.6 -11.3 -9.8 -7.6 -7.5 -6.9 External Financing (net) 2.5 4.2 7.4 10.0 5.4 3.0 4.1 4.3 Dnmestic Borrowing (net) -4.0 2.3 3.1 0.2 3.5 5.0 3.3 2.7 Short-tenm Foreign Loans 0.8 1.3 0.1 1.1 0.7 -0.4 0.2 -0.1 SOURCE: Ministry of Finance; Central Bank of Bolivia and IMF for 1980 and 1981.  - 10 - TABLE 4: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Millions of US$ at Current Prices) 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 EXPORTS (g+nfs) 206 505 637 705 704 862 1,045 1,014 Merchandise (fob) 191 444 568 634 627 761 942 909 Non-Factor Services 15 61 69 71 77 101 103 105 IMPORTS (g+nfs) 180 641 674 715 912 1,086 958 1,049 Merchandise (fob) 135 503 516 532 690 815 680 9.31 1/ Non-Factor Services 45 138 158 183 222 271 278 118 RESOURCE BALANCE 26 -136 -37 -10 -208 -224 87 -35 Net Factor Income -25 -37 -40 -75 -109 -166 -261 -345 Factor Receipts 2 7 17 7 5 7 14 22 Factor Payments 27 44 57 82 114 173 275 367 (M&LT Interest Paid) (7) (24) (37) (57) (84) (117) (157) (179) Net Current Transfers 2 3 4 5 8 7 8 13 CURRENT BALANCE 3 -170 -73 -80 -309 -383 -166 -367 CAPITAL ACCOUNT Direct Investment -76 35 20 22 19 28 45 32 Official Grant Aid 2 8 10 14 30 43 48 23 Net M&LT Loans (DRS) 109 111 222 341 249 179 322 237 Disbursements 129 161 288 436 516 322 439 337 Repayments 20 50 66 95 267 143 117 100 Other M&LT (net) - - - - 5 - -14 - Net Credit from IMF - - - - 19 - 94 6 Disbursements - - - - 19 - 94 6 Repayments - - - - - - - - Net Short-Term - -2 1 37 33 -35 53 - Capital Flows NEI and Errors and Omissions -38 -32 -118 -308 -120 12 -416 -85 2/ Change in Net Reserves - 50 -62 -26 74 156 34 154 (-indicates increase) 1/ For 1981, imports include c.i.f., and NFS exclude c.i.f. 2/ Includes Capital Flows, NEI and errors and omissions. Sources: Table 3.1 of the Statistical Appendix and Central Bank.  - 11 - 18. When forming a new Government in October 1982, President Siles Suazo was confronted with extraordinary complex problems: (a) on the inter- nal side-industrial production was coming to a halt for lack of imported spare parts and supplies; private and public sector enterprises were in a critical financial situation because of the increase in financial charges following the drastic fall of the peso since the beginning of 1982 and the unrealistically low tariffs, respectively; a consolidated fiscal deficit estimated at close to 10% of GDP; an inflation rate estimated at about 300% for 1982; shortages in food and medical supplies; and a serious decline in the real purchasing power of large parts of the population, causing growing discontent; and (b) on the external side-mineral production was on the decline exacerbating the fall in mineral prices; instability of the free exchange rate with swings from $bl70/US$ to $b280/US$ during October 1982; a short term public foreign debt of some US$400 million (about half of which owed to Argentina), most of it already overdue in September 1982 and the remainder falling due by the end of 1982; and finally, arrears on the medium and long-term debt of some US$100 million. Actual total arrearage is lower by some US$200 million, if the overdue payments of Argentina for gas imports from Bolivia are taken into account. 19. In November 1982, the Government adopted a first package of economic measures to be followed by a second policy package in February 1983. The November measures aimed at introducing stability to the foreign exchange market, reducing the fiscal deficit and providing incentives for foodstuffs production; at the same time, an effort was made to mitigate the burden of these measures on the lower income groups. The measures included: (i) unification of the exchange rates at a level of $b200/US$ (implying a de facto removal of a 30% implicit tax on exports); (ii) increasing petroleum product prices by 200%, electricity tariffs by 150%, and railway tariffs by 130%; (iii) introducing a monthly minimum wage for enterprises with more than 10 workers, a 30% increase for workers earning less than $b15,000 per month and a flat monthly increase of $b4,650 for those earning more. In some cases (e.g. Comibol), additional bonuses and compensation for overtime work meant a de facto increase of about 100%. However, as inflation in 1982 has been some 300%, even these wage increases have been modest; (iv) increasing prices of foodstuffs in amounts ranging from 33% for beef to 150% for bread, reducing significantly Government subsidies; (v) increasing the peso savings interest rate to 35% (still implying negative real interest rates), eliminating dollar denominated deposits, and centralizing all letters of credit and import financing operations in the Central Bank; and finally, (vi) prohibiting commercial banks from operatations in the foreign exchange market. The elimination of dollar denominated deposits and the prohibition on operations in the foreign exchange markets are part of a deliberate policy of restoring domestic monetary autonomy. Their short term impact, however, was to weaken the domestic private banking system.  - 12 - Table 5 1/ END OF YEAR REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEX - 1971/82 (December 1970=100) End of Year End of Year End of Year Exchange Exchange End of Year International Internal Rate Rate Real Exchange Inflation Index Inflation Index ($b/lUS) Index Rate of Index (1) (2) (3) (4) Dec. 1971 107 103 12 100 104 1972 118 128 20 167 154 1973 134 172 20 167 130 1974 147 239 20 167 103 1975 166 253 20 167 110 1976 171 267 20 167 107 1977 185 295 20 167 105 1978 214 335 20 167 107 1979 235 488 25 208 100 1980 256 604 25 208 88 1981 256 756 25 208 70 June 1982 265 1,193 103 2/ 662 147 Oct. 1982 270 2,342 224 2/ 1,267 146 Dec. 1982 275 3,032 200 1,667 151 1/ Defined as pesos of 1970 that an exporter would earn by exporting US$1 of 1970. (4) = (1) x (3)/(2). 2/ Free exchange rate in June 1982. The index takes into account the implicit export tax. Prospects 20. Bolivia's economy emerged from the 1970s with: (a) a medium and long-term foreign debt equivalent to some two years of export earnings, half of which must be repaid before 1986; (b) an unbalanced capital stock with inadequate basic infrastructure and an excess of large, costly, and under- utilized "white elephants"; (c) a structure of relative prices which discrim- inates against agriculture, medium-scale import substitution and the export industry; and (d) a financially weak public sector. The consequences of these structural problems coupled with the slow-down in capital inflows in the late 1970s precipitated balance of payments difficulties; these were temporarily resolved in 1979 and the first half of 1980 through a stabiliza- tion program supported by a stand-by from the IMF, a Structural Adjustment Loan from the World Bank and a rescheduling agreement by the commercial banks. The support of Latin American Governments and Latin American Central Banks' short-term credits enabled Bolivia to avoid a balance of payments crisis in the remainder of 1980 and 1981, despite economic policies which were inadequate to address the serious foreign exchange situation or the nation's internal economic problems. In 1982, however, as these sources were nearly exhausted, arrears on foreign debt service started to build up. In  - 13 - spite of a drastic decline in imports (average monthly imports were US$50 million in 1982 compared to US$80 million in 1981), which contributed to the estimated 10% decline in GDP in 1982, Bolivia is facing an extremely diffi- cult external debt problem. Unless the Bolivian Government succeeds in rolling-over the short-term debt owed to Latin American Central Banks and Governments, debt in arrears will reach some US$500 million by the end of 1982, including some US$100 million for principal and interest due to commer- cial banks. Even if Bolivia were to roll over thE short-term debt (see Table 6), debt service is expected to absorb more than 60% of export earnings in the next three years. 21. To mitigate the stringent constraints the external sector imposes on Bolivia's economic development, the Government will need the financial support of foreign lenders through reaching an agreement with the IMF, rescheduling the remaining portion of the foreign debt not covered under the 1981 agreement with the commercial banks (although the commercial debt represents only 44% of the medium and long-term debt, its service represents some 70% of the medium and long-term debt service for the next three years), transforming a large portion of the public short-t:erm debt of US$400 million owed to Latin American Governments (average maturity is less than six months) into medium and long-term loans and obtaining fresh financing from the commercial banks. The essential elements of a supporting macroeconomic program will have to include realistic interest rates, and sound demand- management policies. Increases in public and petroleum prices (which are still only at about half international levels) are required to bring the fiscal deficit to manageable projections. A prudent budget and a solid prioritized public investment program for 1983 will have to be prepared. Finally, further. adjustments in the nominal exchange rate may be necessary. To adopt such a program will not be easy; essentially, the Government is walking a tightrope, trying to strike a balance between (i) its objective of protecting the population against a further erosion in their standard of living and thus maintain political support and stability; and (ii) the need to strengthen the balance of payments and to shore up the country's public finances as essential prerequisites for sustained growth in the medium and long term. 22. While much needs to be done, progress has been made in 1982 to put the Bolivian economy on the right course. Between the beginning of the year and November, the peso value of the US dollar increased by 120% in real terms. This devaluation changed the relative prices towards a structure more in line with Bolivia's resources of unskilled labor, minerals and land. With the new relative prices, profitability has increased, not only in the tradi- tional exporting sector (gas and minerals) but also in agriculture and in medium and small-scale industry (stagnant over the last decade), which typically are labor intensive with low capital oul:put ratios. The increase in the profitability of these sectors is likely to produce a growth pattern more in line with Bolivia's factor endowments than has been the case in the past, provided the real exchange rate is maintained at current levels. The speed at which Bolivia will be able to shift its productive structure, in response to the shift in relative prices, will largely depend on the amount of investment, both private and public, directed to sectors neglected in the past. The resources available for investment, in turn, will depend on how successfully the balance of payments problems can be dealt with.  - 14 - 23. The Bolivian Government will have to demonstrate that it has the capability to restore economic stability and strengthen the country's produc- tive capacity to convince external creditors to provide additional financial assistance. Unless it succeeds, the gross inflow of capital would be reduced drastically and servicing of the existing external debt would become extremely difficult. As a consequence, taking into account presently depressed prices for the major export commodities, first, funds for a number of promising export-oriented projects in the mining, hydrocarbon and agricul- tural sectors, which have already been identified and whose implementation would strengthen Bolivia's external position, would probably not become available; second, investments in basic infrastructure, vital for Bolivia's longer term development, would have to be delayed; and third, the low levels of imports and spare parts, imposed by the foreign exchange constraint, would idle industrial capacity even further and jeopardize present levels of exports. 24. However, if the Government makes convincing initial progress in stabilizing the economy, Bolivia is likely to obtain the financing necessary to tide the country over the difficult adjustment period. If capital inflows were to match repayments of principal of Bolivia's external debt (constant nominal debt), import levels could probably be sustained (see Table 7), that would allow the country to carry out a large part of the investment projects required to develop its export potential. In this context, and assuming that prudent borrowing policies are followed, GDP might be able to grow at moderate rates until 1986. By that time, the country would have strengthened its export capacity and commodity prices should have recovered to allow for higher rates of economic growth. Bolivia's long-term economic potential greatly exceeds its past performance, particularly if the gas pipeline to Brazil were to materialize (see para 39). Exports of gas to Sao Paulo could be expected to increase export earnings by some 40% to 50% (US$400 to US$500 million) per year. 25. In summary, while Bolivia has the potential to expand exports significantly, it heavily depends on external financing to develop it. The adoption of sound macroeconomic policies, as a demonstration of the present Government's determination to create the conditions of stability that are a prerequisite for future growth, would go a long way in restoring confidence. This, in turn, would help to reestablish the traditional external financing sources the country depends on for the execution of identified promising export projects. Realization of these projects, combined with prudent macro- economic policies, should reestablish Bolivia's creditworthiness for conven- tional lending within a relatively short period.  TABLE 6: PROJECTED RESOURCE AVAILABILITY FOR IMPORTS, 1982-1986 1/ (US$ Million) Estimated Projected 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Inflows 1,148 1,235 1,285 1,351 1,468 1,551 Exports 935 1,028 1,110 1,196 1,312 1,397 (Tin) 2/ (297) (353) (402) (442) (512) (548) (Silver) (34) (51) (64) (80) (96) (110) (Natural Gas) (389) (389) (389) (389) (389) (389) (Other Merchandise) (130) (145) (160) (180) (200) (225) (Non Factor Services) (85) (90) (95) (105) (115) (125) Current Transfers (net) 38 45 52 60 68 76 Capital Inflows 175 162 123 95 88 78 (Direct Foreign Investment) (30) (30) (35) (35) (40) (40) (Disbursements from Ongoing M&LT Loans) (145) (132) (88) (60) (48) (38) Outflows 1,148 1,235 1,285 1,351 1,468 1,551 Debt Service on M&LT Loans 549 538 478 314 226 207 (Interest) (199) (166) (129) (93) (75) (65) (Amortization) (350) (372) (349) (221) (151) (142) Interest on Short-Term Loans 3/ 110 110 110 110 110 110 Available for Imports 489 587 697 927 1,132 1,234 Memo Item Debt Service/Exports (%) 70 63 53 35 26 23 oNw: Public & Publicly Guaranteed (%) 59 52 43 26 17 15 1/ It should be noted that this table does not include: (i) disbursements from new project and non-project loans, and (ii) exports from, and imports for, the proposed natural gas pipeline to Brazil. 2/ Tin production is assumed to increase 2% per annum. The following price/lb of tin in US dollars is assumed for 1982 through 1987: 5.50, 6.45, 7.25, 7.85, 9.00, and 9.45. 3/ Including other outflows.  TABLE 7: PROJECTED RESOURCE AVAILABILITY FOR IMPORTS, 1982-1986 (Assuming Renewal of Operations with Foreign Lenders and Without Gas Pipeline) (US$ Million) Projected 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Inflows 1,475 1,618 1,593 1,664 1,757 Exports 1,028 1,182 1,277 1,405 1,499 (Tin) (353) (442) (486) (563) (603) (Silver) (51) (70) (88) (106) (121) (Natural Gas) (389) (389) (389) (389) (389) (Other Merchandise) (145) (176) (198) (220) (248) (Non Factor Services) (90) (105) (116) (127) (138) Current Transfers (net) 45 52 60 68 76 Capital Inflows 402 384 256 191 182 (Direct Foreign Investment) (30) (35) (35) (40) (40) f (Disbursements from Ongoing M&LT Loans) (372) (349) (221) (151) (142) Outflows 1,475 1,618 1,593 1,664 1,757 Debt Service on M&LT Loans 571 548 420 350 341 (Interest) (199) (199) (199) (199) (199) (Amortization) (372) (349) (221) (151) (142) Interest on Short-Term Loans 110 110 110 110 110 Available for Imports 794 960 -1,063 1,204 1,306 1/ It is assumed that an agreement with the IMF is reached and that, as a result, foreign lenders maintain their exposure in the aggregate. The consequence is that disbursements increase in relation to what was estimated in Table 6, as well as interet payments on long- and medium-term debt. The renewal of operations with foreign lenders is assumed to allow export-oriented projects to be carried out. Their overall impact is expected to increase minerals and agricultural exports by 10% starting in 1984.  -17 - CHAPTER II PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND FINANCING PROGRAM The Selection of Public Investments 26. The Bolivian Public Investment Program (PIP) consists of a list of projects prepared by the Planning Ministry. It does not, however, include all the projects planned or being carried out by the public sector agencies. The Program does not contain project di,bursement profiles, project financing plans, or foreign exchange requirements. No attempt is made to make the domestic and foreign financing needs compatible with macro- economic, monetary and fiscal policies, or with the management of the foreign debt. Often, projects are included in the PIP and started, with a small budget allocation for the first years, even though their inclusion implies domestic and external financing needs for the forthcoming years which are incompatible with the sources available and original implentation schedules. 1/ Finally, different public agencies have different views of the content of the PIP. For example, the YPFB investment plan included the initiation of a fertilizer plant in 1983. According to the Planning Ministry PIP, the plant is supposed to start in 1982. In another instance, at the request of the Central Bank, even though the Central Bank does not have final responsibility for the PIP, CBF scaled down its investment plan to what it considers to be the bare minimum. The Planning Ministry was, however, not informed of this exercise and its 1982 PIP maintains the initial CBF figures. In summary, no systematic process is followed to select public investment projects. The implicit rules of the process are all but clear, the explicit legal rules are not followed. This problem is particularly serious in a country such as Bolivia where historically, the public sector has been responsible for more than two-thirds of gross domestic investment. The resulting public capital accumulation process has not been conducive to an optimal use of resources. 27. The confusing state of affairs describedL above illustrates the weaknesses of the process through which the PIP is elaborated, as well as some of the weaknesses of the fiscal and budgetary systems. Legally, any project identified and/or appraised by a public agency, ought to go through the National Project System (SNP), before it can be included in the PIP. Any project should, legally, first be reviewed by the Planning Ministry and then sent to the National Committee of Projects (Comite Nacional de Proyectos) for 1/ For example, Misicuni and Icla multipurpose projects, including compo- nents in irrigation, power generation, rural settlements and feeder roads (see Table 7 in Annex C) are included in the PIP for 1982 with a small budget allocation. Their total cost, however, could reach some US$700 million. Their claims on external and internal resources would preclude the execution of other projects, such as Vuelta Grande and ENDE interconnection Central-Oriental, considered of high priority by the government.  - 18 - approval. The National Committee of Projects incltides representatives of the Planning Ministry, Central Bank and Ministry of Finance. The function of the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance is to provide a foreign and domestic financing program for the project, integrating it into their overall monetary and fiscal program. Once the National Committee of Projects approves the project and authorizes its financing scheme, the project is submitted to the Council of Ministers (CONEPLAN), which issues the decree giving the go-ahead for the project. 28. Actually, less than 15% of the projects now being carried out have gone through all the steps of the SNP. Most projects by-pass the system and are presented directly to the ultimate decision-making body, the Council of Minister. There are two main reasons for this. First, the slow pace at which the SNP processes projects creates an automatic incentive to by-pass it. Second, there are no real advantages in going through it. Indeed, in recent years, the overriding concern of the Bolivian Government has been with foreign financing considerations and not with economic profitability. There- fore, a project, irrespective of its economic profitability, is likely to get the go-ahead if it already has ensured foreign financing, and therefore does not need Central Bank intermediation. One consequence of this process has been that inferior and often large projects were approved, absorbing large portions of domestic savings and budgetary resources and crowding out projects with higher rates of return. 29. In most cases, the agency which presents a project plays a more important role in obtaining the final project approval than the features of the project itself. Even when willing to go through the steps of the SNP, financially strong agencies have an advantage. First, they generally deal with big projects, affecting a wide range of interests, and thus they tend to have strong lobbying power. In such cases, to go through the SNP is often a mere formality. Second, they can afford to pay better experts and hence to have superior formal project preparation and presentation. Third, civil servants in the Planning Ministry tend to reflect, within their Ministry, the external strength of the agencies they deal with. The Planning Ministry civil servants are often overly impressed by the magnitude of the project they are dealing with, and by their better paid counterparts in the finan- cially stronger agencies. They thus have a tendency to have a louder voice than their peers, and to internalize the agency's interests instead of taking an impartial view. 30. The Bolivian public sector is a complex being composed of some 520 agencies, (120 in the Central Government, 350 in regional and local govern- ment, and 50 public enterprises and financial institutions). The factors which determine their financial strength vary from agency to agency. For some, earmarked taxes provide sufficient revenues to enable them to by-pass the SNP. Typical is the case of the Development Corporation of Santa Cruz (CORDECRUZ), which receives 11% of the production value of hydrocarbons. In recent years, these revenues have been enough to launch an ambitious and often poorly designed investment program, oriented towards industry, agricul- ture and urban development. Other Development Corporations, with earmarked taxes from mining production, such as the Development Corporation of Potosi  - 19 - (CORDEPO) and the Development Corporation of La Paz 2/ (CORDEPAZ), have followed the same pattern. This has led, in recent years, to an uncoordin- ated proliferation of cement factories, sugar refineries, and industrial complexes, where optimal scales are not achieved and geographical locations are far from ideal. Another type of agency, financially independent through earmarked taxes, although at a much lower scale, is the National Committee of Sports (CND). The CND has a share of the tax levied on beer, which allows it to carry out, in a fairly independent way, overdesigned and expensive sport centers in the main urban areas. 31. Foreign lending institutions also play an important role in the determination of the financial strength of public. agencies and thus in the determination of which projects will go ahead ancl which will not. For example, the financial support of KfW and the size of the project it is executing has made Karachimpampa a politically powerful agency. Even under severe budget restrictions in 1982, counterpart local funds ha-ve been made available to finance Karachipampa's processing plant. The project, however, is clearly overdesigned. Similar considerations apply for the Viru-Viru Airport, which is receiving Japanese assistance. 32. Based on technical assistance financed by UNDP and the World Bank, the Bolivian Government is currently preparing comprehensive legislation to improve the process through which public investments are identified, prepared and selected. The Planning Ministry is being strengthened through an inter- nal reorganization and by creation of a computerized data bank on project costs and execution. Also, clear guidelines have been prepared for project preparation and appraisal, so as to have a uniform treatment of the projects prepared by the public agencies. An overriding concern of the Planning Ministry is to separate financial from economic considerations in the approval of the project and reverse he present tendency of approving projects with ensured external financing, irrespiective of their economic profitability. The 1982 Public Investment Program 33. The Public Investment Program for 1982-85 presented in tables 1 to 11 of Annex C and summarized in Table 8, reflects the current thinking of the Planning Ministry. As mentioned above, this is not necessarily compatible with the investment programs of the individual agencies. A global cost of US$983 million (some 17% of GDP) is out of line with the zero public sector savings expected for 1982. A foreign exchange requirement of about US$500 million is also not compatible with the current attitude of foreign lenders towards Bolivia. From 1983 onwards, the PIP shown in Tables I to 11 in Annex C, was estimated, taking into account the projects carried on and planned by the public sector agencies. Again, its total size for the period 1983/85 (10%-16% of GDP) is incompatible with the foreign and domestic savings that can be reasonably expected in the years to come. 34. The current financial constraints limit the choice of the Government on which of these projects actually will go ahead. Projects with already committed foreign financing are likely to move. Those include 3/ Each one of the nine departments into which Bolivia is divided has its own Development Corporation.  - 20 - on-going projects, such as Viru-Viru (Japanese Government), the construction of airports (Brazilian Government) and providing equipment for airports (IBRD), as well as new projects such as San Jacinto (San Jacinto is a multi- purpose irrigation, power, rural settlement project, financed by the Argentine Government). Often such projects are not of the highest priority and reflect specific regional and suppliers' interests more than Bolivian development needs. 35. The major projects presented in Tables 1 to 11 in Annex C were ranked by Planning Ministry officials. Projects ranked A are considered well studied, well planned, timely and adequately dimensioned. New projects ranked B are not justified and should be deleted from the program. For on-going projects a reappraisal taking into account sunk costs should be carried out. As can be seen, particularly in the power, transport and indus- trial sectors, a large portion of big projects are ranked B. In the mining sector, most of the projects ranked B are in fact projects which are not ready to be carried out, but which are thought to have high rates of economic return. Financing of the Public Investment Program 36. Two factors will limit, in the next few years, the financial resources available for the Public Investment Program. First, world mineral prices will remain depressed and, hence, so will export revenues of COMIBOL and ENAF, as well as the proceeds of the tax on mineral exports, which account for some 50% of total public sector revenues. Second, foreign lenders evaluation of the Bolivian country risk, which is currently considered to be high. Even if public sector tariffs were continuously adjusted and wages in the public sector were to continue to decline in real terms (as is currently contemplated), public sector savings are unlikely to exceed 2-3% of GDP. Since the country risk will remain high, even in the best of scenarios new net external financing is unlikely to exceed 2% of GDP. Finally, if domestic finance through the Central Bank is not to fuel inflation, it should not exceed 2-3% of GDP. Within these constraints, in no case will the PIP amount to more than 6-8% of GDP. 3/ This level of public investment is much lower than the one reached during 1975-77 (about 15% of GDP), and remains at about the same level as during 1979-81. Provided the funds are allocated to export-oriented and high rate of return projects, even this reduced level of public investment can play a fundamental role in fostering the structural change required if the Bolivian economy is to achieve higher growth rates in the future. The PIP and the Economic Restructuring 37. The design of public investment will have to be a major instrument in any meaningful restructuring process of the Bolivian economy. If the burden of the foreign debt is to be reduced and higher rates of growth are to be achieved, public investments need to be concentrated on (a) export oriented projects and (b) projects with low capital-output ratios and low import requirements. Inefficient import substitution industries, over- designed transport projects, and long maturity projects as some projects in social infrastructure, will have to be scaled down. 3/ Since the gas pipeline to Brazil is expected to be financed as an enclave project, these figures do not include it.  - 21 - 38. There are a number of projects, already identified, which could increase exports in the medium term. In the hydrocarbon sector, for example, implementation of Vuelta Grande would increase rapidly oil production. The project was planned to start in 1981 but lack of external financing forced YPFB to postpone it indefinitely. Vuelta Grande is expected to produce 7,000 barrels a day for 17 years, equivalent to US$90 million a year at current petroleum prices. 39. The proposed gas pipeline to Sao Paulo alone could increase export earnings, in the second half of the decade, by some 50%. As of July 1981, proven and probable reserves of gas are estimated at 7 TCF (5.3 proven and 1.7 probable), and are largely sufficient to cover export requirements and domestic consumption needs. A 20-year sales contract, under consideration by the Brazilian and Bolivian authorities, would require a total of 3 TCF (while domestic consumption for the next 20 years is estimated to require 1.4 TCF, and gas exports to Argentina 1 TCF). The basic engineering study for the gas pipeline has already been completed. The total zost is expected to be some US$1,700 million of which US$800 million would be borne by Bolivia. The detailed engineering study is expected to be initiated soon and should be completed in mid 1983. If the project proceeds Dn schedule, gas exports could start in 1986. 40. In the mining sector, preparatory work is under way for a compre- hensive rehabilitation program of COMIBOL. An eKtensive study of financial, administrative and technical aspects of COMIBOL's operations was completed in early 1982. A list of priority investment projects has been identified, and the program could be launched in 1983, provided foreign financing is found to meet the foreign exchange costs of the program. Although world tin consump- tion has been stagnant over the last 20 years, and is not expected to pick up, currently, Bolivia's share in the world market stands only at 10%; hence, an increase in Bolivia's tin export by 10% would imply increasing its market share only by 1%, which should not be difficult. Apart from tin, other projects have been identified to increase the production of lead, silver, zinc and tungsten. These projects could become even more profitable after 1985, when mineral prices are expected to recover. 41. In the agricultural sector, there are a variety of export-oriented projects, already identified, with low capital output ratios and low import requirements. For the main commodities exported (sugar, timber, coffee and cotton), Bolivia is a marginal world producer and could easily expand its production if the present exchange rate is maintained in real terms and satisfactory policies are followed regarding the agricultural sector. It is noteworthy that agricultural exports in real terms were increased by 400% over the last decade, in spite of an unfavorable exchange rate.  TABLE 8: PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM - SUMMARY 1/ (US$ Million) Sectors 1982 1983 1984 1985 Reference Table in Annex C Agriculture 93 58 74 83 1 Hydrocarbons 247 145 300 347 2 Mining 86 68 122 141 3 Industry 148 38 43 50 4 Transport 116 120 113 124 5 Telecommunications 11 8 8 8 6 Power 88 69 73 83 7 Education 40 29 29 30 8 Water Supply & Sewerage 24 26 28 30 9 Health & Social Welfare 14 17 18 20 10 Urban & Housing 61 31 31 32 11 Others 55 - - - TOTAL 983 609 839 948 % of GDP 2/ 17 11 15 16 Total Without the gas pipeline to Brazil 983 593 682 787 % of GDP 2/ 17 10 12 14 1/ For details in each sector, see Annex C. 2/ Assuming zero growth rate of GDP for the period 1982-85  - 23 - CHAPTER III MAJOR SECTORAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS AGRICULTURE Background 42. Agriculture accounts for about 16% of Bolivia's GDP, provides employment for over 45% of the country's labor force and contributes about 10% of exports. The sector's growth rate over the past twenty years has lagged that of overall economy, with the share of agriculture declining steadily from 29% of GDP in 1960 to its present level. During the past four years, the growth rate of agriculture has fallen below that of population. About half of agricultural production consists of traditional food staples (roots and tubers, legumes and cereals), about a sixth consists of nontradi- tional tropical cash crops (oilseeds, cotton, tobacco, sugarcane, coffee, tea and cacao), and the remainder includes traditiona:L livestock products (beef cattle, dairy products and others, including llama and alpaca wool). 43. Bolivia's agricultural sector consists of two distinct economic sub- systems: the small farmer subsistence economy of the altiplano and valleys and the commercial agricultural economy of the eastern lowlands. The first has changed very little over the past two centuries, except for the land tenure structure, which was altered by the land reform oE 1952. Production is based on traditional methods and inputs supplied by the family. This type of farm produces most of the foodstuffs consumed by the urban dweller. The second subsystem has developed in the eastern lowlands of Santa Cruz and Beni and consists of market oriented enterprises that specialize in the production of cash crops for export or import substitution purposes. (See Annex A for a discussion of the main products.) Shortage of manpower and access to markets are the main constraints here. Problems and Issues 44. Structural constraints have hampered the development of the sector. The principal structural problem affecting the sector is the imbalance between demographic and natural resource endowments. Over three-quarters of the rural population is concentrated in the cold and relatively infertile altiplano and in the Andean valleys, which together constitute 30% of the country's land area, whereas the Yungas (lower tropical valleys) and the eastern tropical lowlands, with 70% of the land account for only 21% of the population. The unevenness of the population distribution, long distances between agricultural producing areas and markets, and extremely rugged terrain result in comparatively high per capita costs in providing adequate transportation, communication and social services.  - 24 - 45. These problems have been compounded by inappropriate agricultural policies as well as by a lack of support services. In particular, unrealistic pricing policies for major tradeable agricultural products, lack of competi- tively priced inputs and cumbersome procedures for export shipments have been real constraints to increased production and exports. The agricultural credit system has been unable to provide in a timely and efficient fashion the financial resources needed by farmers for expanding production, and there are severe management and financial problems in public credit agencies, especially in Banco Agricola de Bolivia (BAB). A weak Ministry of Agriculture has failed to provide the necessary support services to both subsistence and commercial farmers. An examination of the organization structure of the Ministry shows a multiplicity of agencies with overlapping responsibilities and limited resources to carry out their tasks. 46. Low domestic prices at the producer and consumer levels have historically been a disincentive to production and a source of unjustifiable subsidies. Producer prices have been particularly low in relation to inter- national prices for items such as coffee, timber, beef, wheat and oilseeds (See Annex A). According to mission estimates, the income transfer from coffee producers to coffee exporters averaged about US$4 million annually during 1976-81. Considering that some 20,000 families grow coffee in Bolivia, this transfer represents an income loss in the order of US$ 200 per family per year, not a trivial amount, given the small size of coffee operations in the country. Similarly in the case of wheat, with substantial import substitution potential, the imported grain is sold to the local millers at a highly subsi- dized price which implied a subsidy of US$40 million during 1980 and 1981. Low domestic agricultural prices, apart from restraining production and causing a drain on public finances, also result in substantial illegal trade to the neighbouring countries, particularly of coffee and beef to Brazil and of wheat to Peru and Chile. 47. While appropriate pricing policies could substantially alleviate the problems of commercial agriculture in Bolivia, there exist crop-specific constraints which need to be relaxed for the achievement of higher growth rates in the sector. In the case of coffee, coffee rust has begun damaging Bolivian coffee plantations. Sanitary control is being exercised in a very limited way, given the organization of the industry (small producers scattered throughout the valleys). Coffee rust could impose a severe constraint to the growth of the industry. High transport cost is the main constraint to sugar exports: the average transport cost to the port of Santos in Brazil, for example, is US$ 75/metric ton (i.e. equivalent to US$0.035/pound), about 20% of the current world price of sugar (US$ 0.16/pound in mid-1981). Irrational use of the forest lands poses a serious problem for the production of timber. Currently about 40,000 hectares of land have been taken over by spontaneous settlers. While such settlements help alleviate the pressure on land in the altiplano and the valleys, it makes it difficult to develop and implement rational policies for the preservation of natural resources. Firms in the forest sector complain that squatters are seldom forced to leave the lands they occupy. Moreover timber concessionaires indulge in substantial "high- grading" of the forest, in an effort to recover their investments in the  - 25 - shortest possible time. Forest companies also complain that CDF (Centro de Desarrollo Forestal) is only concerned with collection of stumpage rights and does little to rationalize the use of the forest resources or to promote new plantations. In the case of cotton, the critical factor in the rapid increase of production in the early seventies (and its transformation from an import- substituting crop to an export one) was subsidized credit much of which was never repaid. When this subsidized credit came to an end after 1975, produc- tion of cotton declined steadily, to the point that Bolivia had to import cotton during the last two years to satisfy local demand. In the case of beef, an indication of the low productivity of the industry is the low rate of extraction (natural rate of growth) in the Bolivian herd of 11-12%. This ratio is in the order of 14% in other Latin American countries with broadly comparable natural resources (sub-tropical production). There are no technical reasons why livestock production in Bolivia should lag behind. 48. Another constraint to agricultural development is the unavail- ability of reasonably priced agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, tractors, pesticides and seeds. Fertilizer consumption in Bolivia is among the lowest in Latin America. An important factor in this low use of fertilizers is their price. For example, the price of ammonium diphosphate in Bolivia is about 75% higher than the price at the farm level in U.S.A., a large differential even allowing for transportation costs. The price differential is even wider in urea, with domestic prices in Bolivia more than double those in U.S.A. Tractor prices, on the other hand, are about 10% higher than U.S. prices. However, tractors assembled in Bolivia are of poor quality, and the heterogeneity of the stock (in terms of age and brands) results in high maintenance costs. In the case of seeds, yields are generally low. 49. An important constraint to the expansion of agricultural production has been lack of credit. The system is short of funds, interest rates for agricultural credit are currently around 40% at a time when consumer prices are increasing at over 200%, and there are major problems in public credit agencies, especially BAB. Sector Policies and Institutional Improvements 50. A number of actions have already been taken or are planned for the near future to increase the rate of growth of agricultural production. In particular, significant increases in domestic producer prices of items with export potential (such as beef, coffee, sugar, etc.) were made during the last two years. Prices are now at levels offering satisfactory incentives to efficient producers. However, in view of the continuing high rate of inflation, further increases may be necessary. An automatic system of price adjustments based on periodic reviews might avoid future erosion of incentives. 51. The Government has been examining a rehabilitation plan for BAB and is planning to convert a part of BAB's Central Bank debts to long-term bonds. This should temporarily relieve BAB's financial problems while policies are developed and implemented on an adequate debt-equity ratio, administrative cost reductions and higher on-lending interest rates.  - 26 - MINING AND METALLURGY Background 52. Mining accounts for about 7% of GDP, contributes approximately two- thirds of Bolivia's merchandise exports and provides roughly 15% of Central Government revenues. The sector employs 80,000 persons (about 3.5% of the total labor force). Only about half are employed by established mining companies; the balance are more or less casual labor engaged in individual mining enterprises and cooperatives. Tin accounts for over two-thirds of the value of mineral exports; other important minerals are wolfram, antimony, silver and zinc. 53. Since the nationalization of the large private companies in 1952, the mining industry in Bolivia has been classified into three sectors: fourteen large nationalized mines under the control of the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL), accounting for about 70% of production and about a third of the mining employment; about 25 medium-sized private mines which account for about 20% of production and 10% of employment; and about 2,000-3,000 small mines and cooperatives. A slightly higher productivity of COMIBOL mainly reflects availability of better mines relative to those of the medium miners. A large proportion of the small mines is frequently brought into or taken out of production depending on mineral prices. 54. Bolivia's mineralized area is essentially confined to rather inaccessible regions of the Andes. Mines are located at high altitudes--in some instances above 5,500 meters--and access at times poses formidable infrastructural and logistical problems. Mineral outcrops normally occur in narrow, deep-seated veins, embodied in hard rock, which precludes efficient exploitation, making mining in Bolivia a high cost operation. Furthermore, deposits normally are low grade and frequently consist of complex ores-- lead- antimony-tin, copper-bismuth--which are fairly difficult to treat and, therefore, involve relatively high smelting and refining costs. 55. Smelting and refining activities are almost entirely carried out by the state-owned National Smelting Corporation (ENAF) which has a monopoly of producing and exporting refined metals. Prior to the construction of ENAF's smelting plant at Vinto in 1970, most of Bolivian tin concentrates were smelted overseas, traditionally in Europe and the USA; now about 80% of total production is smelted locally. In arriving at the price to be paid to its suppliers (COMIBOL and private miners), ENAF does not pass on the transport cost saving resulting from exporting metals instead of concentrates and, occasionally, has added surcharges for pollution and increased petroleum world prices without having been subjected to such cost increases. Problems and Issues 56. While Bolivia's topography and geological characteristics pose considerable natural obstacles to mining, the decline in production in recent years has been the result of steadily deteriorating ore grades and a neglect of systematic exploration and mine development.  - 27 - 57. There has been no exploration on a significant scale for nearly half a century, and, as a result, only about a dozen mines have developed reserves for periods of more than four years. The most common way for medium mining firms to increase ore reserves has been buying up other mining properties, mainly those of small mines which sold out once heavier investment and more sophisticated mining methods became necessary to continue operations. Small mines have not carried out any organized exploration and mine development. 58. Political instability, episodes of hostility towards the private sector and occasional threats of nationalization have seriously affected exploration and development, which by its nature is high-risk, high-cost investment requir- ing a long gestation period. However, even during periods of more favorable and stable political environment, the incentive to invest has been adversely affected by an inappropriate system of mining taxation, fiscal reserves, lack of credit and the financial and managerial inefficiency of COMIBOL. (i) Mining Taxation 59. The system of mining taxes in effect in Bolivia until 1980 had a number of serious drawbacks. 1/ These included: (a) the combined effect of infrequent adjustment of presumed costs and the presence of the export tax made the level of mining taxes in Bolivia one of the highest among the major tin producing countries; (b) the tax regime served to dampen incentives for both exploration and development because it did not take into account inter- enterprise cost variance of any kind, including exploration costs. Under the system, the mine that spent large sums on exploration and development paid the same taxes as a mine that spent none; and (c) the tax system made the processing of low-grade ore unprofitable. (ii) Fiscal Reserves and the Mining Code 60. A substantial portion of the national territory has been declared fiscal reserve (including a five kilometer wide belt around COMIBOL concessions and border regions) where private exploration is not allowed, even though exploration carried out by COMIBOL in these areas has been limited. In areas outside the fiscal reserve, the present mining code allows individuals to tie up mining claims on land for a nominal sum of money; as a result, they do little or no exploration but simply hold the land for speculative purposes. Low land taxes and absence of a standarized legal framework for operating in the concessions (which would reduce the possibility of discretionary action by the authorities) have been the main reasons why, despite the seemingly generous provisions of the present mining code, only two regular concession agreements are currently in operation. 1/ For details on the Bolivian mining taxes and recent changes in them, see Annex B.  - 28 - (iii) Credit Availability 61. For the private sector, scarcity of both short-and long-term financ- ing has been a major deterrent to the expansion of the industry. Historically, the ore buyers would extend working capital to the mining companies of up to six-months production. These loans would then be paid back over a period of three years or renewed. However, under present requirements to sell only to ENAF, these lines of credit have disappeared. Moreover, the current ENAF arrangements require the mining companies, in effect, to extend credit to ENAF. In the small mining sector, the state Mining Bank (BAMIN) does provide some credit for investment purposes. However, for the medium mining companies the only sources of credit are the privately owned Industrial Development Bank (BISA) and foreign banks. In the case of BISA, loans are usually for project and not for working capital and these are usually restricted to less than US$1.5 million. This amount is generally too small for the medium companies which typically require credit between US$2.5 million and US$5 million. Local commercial banks demand large collateral, and foreign banks have been generally reluctant to lend in view of the political instability in the country. At present there are only three private mining companies in Bolivia that are able to borrow abroad and even then in amounts usually less than US$ 2.0 million. (iv) Management of COMIBOL 62. Since its inception in 1952, COMIBOL has been beset by serious problems. A large part of the problem emanates from the fact that, because of political and trade union pressures, COMIBOL's social objective of providing employment and services to its labor force has been historically paramount, and many financially unprofitable mines have been kept open (subsidized by the more profitable ones) for purely social reasons. The situation has been aggravated by COMIBOL's excessive centralization, excess workforce, inappro- priate system of worker bonus, subsidized articles in the company's stores, run-down equipment, deficient inventory control and negligible investment. (a) Over-centralization: COMIBOL is essentially a holding company for the 14 mining companies that comprise it. Under the present system, company managers have the responsibility for production, but the authority of controlling the vital factors affecting it (ordering supplies, ensuring good labor relations, operating incentive schemes, etc.) rests with headquarters staff. With the authority removed, so is the responsibility and much of the interest of the company manager. (b) Overstaffing: Some of COMIBOL's mines, especially Catavi, Unificada and Colquiri, have to support a considerably larger work force than they actually require. Staff has been increased even in years of falling production; at the same time, the share of the work force employed underground has fallen to about 40% (see Table 7), compared to about 60% in private mining companies. Labor relations tradi- tionally have been strained and discipline has been low; strikes and unannounced work stoppages have been frequent. Moreover COMIBOL has been running an expensive program of fringe benefits and social services, company stores and free housing which have imposed on it a substantial financial burden.  - 29 - (c) Inappropriate Bonus System: The present bonus system is based on a division of profits at the mining company level and COMIBOL level. The first bonus is paid monthly to company employees as a percentage of company profits and has no limit; the second bonus is paid annually to all COMIBOL employees from COMIBOL's annual profits and is limited to 100% of annual salary. This system is faulty because it may bear no relation to effort or procLuctivity but rather reflect price fluctuations. Moreover, payment of the bonus on monthly profits is irrational, since profits may be very high in a month prior to which and/or after which profits have been low or negative. (d) Run-down Equipment: Most production equipment and safety installa- tions are over-aged; technology applied is outdated and health and safety standards in the mines often are appallingly low. There is also a shortage of day to day mine stores and materials such as explosives, rails, pipes and of machine spare parts and repair facilities. (e) Lack of Exploration: Because of the pool' financial position of COMIBOL, the enterprise has undertaken very limited exploration programs. (v) Problems Arising from ENAF Operations 63. It has been one of the objectives of the Government to increase the value added in the sector by maximizing the export of tin and other minerals in the form of metal rather than concentrates. During the 1970s, therefore, substantial investment was undertaken in capital-intensive refining and smelting projects. The economic and financial just:ification for most of these projects has been dubious, most of them have encountered severe cost overruns (for example, the total cost for the recently comp].eted tin volatilization plant at La Palca was more than four times the original estimate of US$17 million), and once completed have suffered from excess capacity and high operational costs. 64. Moreover, under the present arrangements, ENAF is in a monopsonistic position, both COMIBOL and private mining companies being forced to satisfy the demand of ENAF and only then being allowed to export the rest. Thus COMIBOL presently sells 80% of its tin concentrates to ENAF. The deductions that ENAF makes for smelting and transportation are excessive and there are stiff penalties for impurities in concentrates. Moreover, the payment terms are very unfavorable: COMIBOL and private companies are paid 40% of the value of the concentrate 15 days after delivery and are charged interest on this amount until full payment, four months later. Sector Policies and Institutional Improvements 65. The objective of successive governments i.n Bolivia has been to increase mining production through a comprehensive program based on reform of mining taxation, provision of adequate credit to the private sector, the reorganization of COMIBOL and a review of the operating and pricing policies of ENAF.  - 30 - Table 9: EMPLOYMENT IN COMIBOL MINES, 1980 Education Underground & as of % Name Underground Concentrator Surface Health Total Total Catavi 1623 949 1604 822 4998 32.5 Quechisla 1950 697 1438 575 4660 41.8 Colquiri 988 381 756 337 2462 40.1 Huanuni/- 935 390 474 300 2099 44.5 Unificada 865 415 581 181 2042 42.4 San Jose 583 297 463 276 1619 36.0 Caracoles 565 92 329 132 1118 50.5 Santa Fe 379 260 209 117 965 39.3 Corocoro 513 75 298 103 980 52.3 Viloco 336 92 223 112 763 44.0 Bolivar 256 64 129 49 498 51.4 Colquechaca 154 57 98 26 335 46.0 Matilde 353 51 207 66 677 52.1 Colavi 147 - 59 17 223 65.9 TOTAL/- 9647 3820 6859 3113 23439 41.1 1/ Includes 102 employees from Machacamarca. 2/ Does not include about 3,000 employees working away from mines. Source: I. J. Salway & Associates  - 31 - 66. In 1980, the Government adopted a numbe: of significant changes which the mining sector and the Bank had long pressed for. These changes included: (a) the elimination of the export tax; K'b) the updating of the presumed costs to more realistic levels; (c) the acceptance of the concept of indexing presumed costs to reflect changes in costs of inputs through time, and, as a first step, their updating in line with the floor price of the International Tin Council; (d) the encouragement of new investment through a tax credit against the regalia on incremental production for up to 40% of the cost of new investment in mining se:tor; 1/ and (e) the reduc- tion of the level of taxation on production of low grade concentrates. The Government is contemplating further reform in this area. A study has been completed which provides the basis for adjusting presumed costs according to movements in the prices of key mining inputs, which is more rational than the use of changes in the floor price of the International Tin Council. 67. In the area of private sector financing, there is need for insti- tutional strengthening of BISA and BAMIN and for increasing their lending programs. Following the creation, with Bank assistance, of the National Mineral Exploration Fund (FNEM), miners now have access to risk capital for exploration of mineral resources. 68. Under a Bank/UNDP project for the rehabilitation of COMIBOL two consulting firms have prepared recommendations for improving the operations of COMIBOL through setting up of better accounting and management information systems, detailed investment planning, decentralization, better system of incentives for workers and a program of upgrading of machinery and equipment. Also feasibility studies are being prepared for a number of possible projects. These recommendations could form the basis for a phased program of rehabilita- tion of COMIBOL. HYDROCARBONS Background 69. The hydrocarbons sector contributes abcut 4% of the value added, 20% of the fiscal (central and local Governments) revenues and about 22% of merchandise exports. The sector developed rapidly in the 1960s, and, after a temporary slowdown in 1969-70 following the nationalization of Bolivian Gulf Oil's assets, oil output continued to rise tby about 6.5% annually until it peaked in 1973 at 47,000 barrels per day. Thereafter, output declined steadily to 24,100 barrels per day in 1980. Since local demand continued to increase at over 10% per annum, oil exports, which reached 32,500 barrels per day in 1973, were reduced to spot sales of naphta and gasoline in 1980. 1/ The regalia is a tax on presumed income," which is the difference between world mineral prices in a specified market and a presumed cost set by the Government (see Annex B).  - 32 - On the other hand, exports of natural gas to Argentina increased from 150 million cubic feet per day in 1972 to 220 million cubic feet per day at present. Roughly 85% of the output of both crude and natural gas is produced by the State Petroleum Company (YPFB) and the remainder by private foreign companies. Natural gas reserves are close to 4.0 trillion cubic feet, sufficient to sustain current output for almost 50 years. Proven reserves of liquid conden- sates (crude oil and condensates) amount to about 110 million barrels, equiva- lent to about 10 years of production. Problems and Issues 70. The decline in petroleum output has been the result of a rapid depletion of old wells with no major new discoveries. At the same time, the heavily subsidized prices of domestic petroleum products have encouraged a rapid increase in domestic consumption as well as illegal exports. As a result, energy conservation efforts were not stimulated and YPFB's financial position weakened. Substantial progress was made after the 136% increase (95% in US terms) of petroleum products in November 1979 and a further 64% increase in January 1981, which brought average domestic retail prices to US/80/gallon equivalent, or 83% of international ex-refinery prices during 1981. This was reduced by devaluation to about 75% of international prices in January 1982. Thereafter, it reduced substantially, reaching a low of US414/gallon by early November. The economic measures of November 1982, resulted in a major in- crease to about US147/gallon, but this is still half the international level. 71. Between 1975 and 1980, YPFB's investment of about US$700 million was mainly devoted to the construction of refineries, such expenditures accounting for no less than two-thirds of YPFB's investment. With the completion of the expansion in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, refining capacity now totals 74,000 barrels per day, about 200% in excess of crude output. Because of low capacity utilization spread over four relatively small-sized units, refining costs are high. 72. Finally, while YPFB has been generally well managed and operates quite efficiently, it has suffered from a high turnover of staff. Sector Policies and Institutional Improvements 73. To achieve the two main objectives of increasing domestic production of liquids in order to maintain petroleum self-sufficiency and increasing substantially the exports of natural gas, the following measures have been taken, or are under consideration: (i) Agreement in principle has been reached between the governments of Brazil and Bolivia for exports of about 400 million cubic feet of natural gas per day. With financial assistance from the Bank and IDB, exploration is being undertaken to discover sufficient reserves to make the project feasible. Prospects for finding sufficient reserves are bright. However, excessive delay in the start of construction of the project could prompt Brazil to look for other ways of meeting its domestic demand for energy.  - 33 - (ii) Priority will be given to the development of gas condensate and enhanced recovery of producing oil fields. The Bank's proposed Vuelta Grande Project is among the most important projects in this category. (iii) A program will be launched to substitute liquified petroleum gas (LPG) and natural gas for kerosene, diesel and fuel oil. MANUFACTURING Background 74. The manufacturing sector contributes some 14% to GDP and employs about 180,000 workers, or about 7.5% of the labor force. Three subsectors dominate the manufacturing sector: food processing, beverages and tobacco (37% of total value-added in the sector) textiles and clothing (27% of total) and chemicals and plastics (24% of total). The sector is largely composed of artisan shops and small firms with less than 10 employees and is characterized by low productivity. Especially the larger firms have high import dependence. A large portion of domestic demand is being met through contraband imports of consumer goods. 75. Stimulated by the liberal industrial ircentives law of 1971 and a favorable investment climate, industrial investment expanded rapidly during the 1970s, averaging about 5.5% per annum over the period 1970-79. Rela- tively large investments by the Government through the Bolivian Development Corporation (CBF) have gone into sugar refining, milk processing, bus-body construction, ceramics and cement plants. As a result, public share in sectoral investment increased from about 15% in 1.970 to 40% in 1979. 76. The main features of the 1971 industrial incentives law are: import duty exemptions for capital and intermediate goodes of approved industries, the magnitude of the exemption depending on priority 1/, duty drawback and deduction of indirect taxes of export manufacturing; and accelerated deprecia- tion of fixed assets and tax liberalization on new industrial buildings. As an incentives to regional development, investments in the less developed provinces of Pando, Chuquisaca, Beni and Tarija are exempt from income taxes for ten years. By far the most important incentive has been the exemption from import duties. 77. The Instituto Nacional de Inversiones (INI) was created to control the operations of the incentives law. Enterprises wishing to benefit from the law are required to prepare a detailed project feasibility study as a basis for INI's project evaluation and categorization according to priority. Subsequently INI supervises the execution of the projects and handles the administration of duty-free imports and tax incentives. 1/ The highest priority is given to "strategic" subsectors such as metal products, machinery and automotive industry; the second priority is given to those industries that produce intermedial:e inputs for "strategic" industries.  - 34 - 78. The major portion of public investment in the sector has been carried out by CBF. 1/ Over the past several years, investment by CBF has averaged about US$ 30 million. COFADENA, the armed forces agency has responsibility, among others, for the automobile assembly project which produces certain categories of vehicles, components and parts for the Andean Common Market. Problems and Issues 79. The present incentives law, while encouraging some industrialization, has led to the establishment of excessively capital-and import-intensive industries which typically suffer from excess capacity. Also the export laws do not fulfill their purpose since the current cumbersome and time consuming administrative procedures discourage firms from applying for the incentives. In a number of agro-industrial products, Bolivia could successfully compete in export markets provided the export incentives were strengthened and access to credit by the private sector was made better. Shortage of credit to the private sector has added to these problems. 80. The project selection criteria used by INI are basically inconsistent. Article 26 of the incentives law requires project selection on economic, tech- nical and financial grounds, while Article 27 emphasizes priorities on "stra- tegic" grounds. In practice, INI has employed the categorization of Article 27, which has made redundant the requirements to prepare detailed and costly feasibility studies for subsequent project appraisal. Since INI does not perform systematic appraisal and supervision of projects, its duties mainly consist of support to the custom office and the Ministry of Finance in process- ing applications for import duties and tax deductions under the incentives law. 81. In the public sector, the major issue has been the poor management and financial performance of CBF and its affiliated companies. Initially CBF concentrated on the development of infrastructure and on the provision of credit to private enterprises. Over time, it has expanded into new ventures and has taken over several manufacturing enterprises which faced problems of servicing their debts to CBF. Sector Policies and Institutional Improvements 82. The Government of Bolivia is well aware of the major drawbacks of the incentives laws but no substantial action has been taken so far. It has revised the investment law to make it more attractive to potential investors, but the revised law continues to encourage excessive capital intensity. The Government is also identifying ways to simplify the admin- istrative procedures of the export incentives. 1/ Industrial investments by ENAF and COMIBOL are included in the mining and metallurgical sector.  - 35 - POWER Background 83. Like most Andean countries, Bolivia has abundant hydroelectric poten- tial; the economically exploitable potential is estimated at 18,000 MW, enough to satisfy power requirements over the next 40 years. Per capita use of electricity is one of the lowest in South America,, 84. Access to supply is extremely uneven because the electric systems cover only a small portion of the country and are not yet completely inter- connected: the inter-connection of some of the majlor systems was completed only last year. 85. Power facilities are concentrated in four main systems covering the areas of La Paz (North), Cochabamba (Center) Sucre/Potosi (South) and Santa Cruz (East). About 57% of generation is hydroelectric, most of the remainder being thermal. Existing generation and transmiss:ion facilities are owned by various companies: ENDE is responsible for public electricity generation and transmission in Bolivia except for the La Paz and Oruro areas; the Bolivian Power Company (BPC), a foreign-owned company, has the concession for generation, transmission and distribution in the La Paz and Omuro areas. COMIBOL and other self-producers own several generation plants and transmission facilities which provide part of their electricity requirements. Self-producers account for about 22% of the installed capacity in Bolivia. Problems and Issues 86. One of the major long-term problems of the power sector in Bolivia has been the institutional and technical fragmentation of the electricity system. Existing generation and transmission facilities are owned by various companies and some of the major regional systems are not yet interconnected. As a consequence, there is lack of coordination in the services provided and the pricing policies pursued. 87. The resolution of this problem has been rendered difficult by the financial and managerial problems of the National Electric Company (ENDE). Although ENDE maintained a comfortable financial position until 1978, there was a marked deterioration in its finances during 1979-80; rates of return on revalued assets were only 7.2% and 6.8% during 1979 and 1980, respectively (lower than the average 9% of previous years provided by the Electricity Code) and a low self-financing ratio of 17% and 19% (compared to an average of 30% in previous years). The situation deteriorated further during 1981 and 1982. This deterioration partly reflected an erosion of tariffs in real terms by some 33% between 1977 and 1980 and partly the fact that ENDE has been made responsible for power investments in La Paz. ENDE's finances have also been affected by the exceptionally high level of overdue receivables, largely accounted for by COMIBOL, private mining companies and some large power distributing companies.  - 36 - 88. While ENDE is experiencing a shortage of experienced technical staff at all levels, it is one of the best run and managed companies in Bolivia and its investments have been well-selected (least cost) and timely. Sector Policies and Institutional Improvements 89. The technical and economic objectives in the sector are to supply electricity at least cost and to promote the efficient consumption of energy, to discourage waste and to develop the indigenous energy resources. The institutional and financial objectives include completing the unification of the electric power sector and improving the financial position of the companies, mainly through tariffs adjustments. 90. The Government's strategy is to develop hydroelectric resources, to integrate further the isolated systems with the main regional systems through a high-voltage national grid and to concentrate in one company (ENDE) operation and the construction of all generation and transmission facilities. The new Government has decided to nationalize BPC, and negotiations are going on with the management of the company on the nature and magnitude of the compensation package. 91. In January of 1981, February and November of 1982, power sector tariffs were increased by an average of 60%, 30% and 150%, respectively. Even with these increases, however, ENDE's tariff levels will be insufficient to reach a 9% rate of return. To generate sufficient funds to cover ENDE's investment requirements, tariff rates would need to be adjusted further periodically. 92. In December 1980, the Government enacted a Decree Law aimed at re- solving the issue of inter-enterprise payments through the setting up of a clearing house mechanism where all receivables from public transactions would be periodically settled against each other and remaining balances paid. TRANSPORT Background 93. The main factors behind the relatively high cost of transport services and infrastructure in Bolivia have been the difficult topography, long distances between scattered population centers and low traffic densities. Road transport is the dominant mode, accounting for about three-quarters of all internal ton-kilometers and about 95% of all passenger trips. On the other hand, rail is of paramount importance for Bolivia's foreign trade, accounting for about 70% of the country's foreign trade tonnages. The majority of international passengers are carried by air.  - 37 - 94. The dominance of road transport is partLy a reflection of the slow speed and general unreliability of rail transport,, even though only about 3% of the 39,000 kilometers of primary and secondary roads are paved, and average cost per kilometer is much lower by rail. Another factor for the smaller role of rail may be the lack of a rail or other adequate intermodal connection between the Andean and the Eastern rai:L systems. 95. The major public enterprises in the sector are the National Railways Company (ENFE), the National Road Service (SNC) which provides and maintains road infrastructure, the Airport Services Authoriity (AASANA) and Bolivian Airlines (LAB). These are generally well-managed companies although SNC's organization is over-centralized, both with regard to the relation between headquarters and district offices and with regard to the staff organization at headquarters. Problems and Issues 96. In addition to the problems arising from the lack of an adequate interconnection between the two railroads, there are a number of issues that need to be addressed to rationalize economic policies in this sector. These include: (a) Excessively high cost of road infrastructure: Rather than expanding the road network to economic regions that justify adequate low standard gravel and paved roads, the Government has opted, from time to time, for high standard paved roads which in mountainous areas may cost as much as five to ten times what an adequate but lower standard paved road would cost. The return on spreading an adequate network more rapidly would be much higher than the return on higher standard roads. (b) Ineffective axle load limit enforcement: One of the reasons for the rapid deterioration of roads and high maintenance costs is the prevalence of high axle loads, substantially higher than allowed by law and what the roads were designed for. (c) Inefficiency of the trucking industry: Road transport in Bolivia is provided by syndicated truckers. Irn order to belong to a syndicate an operator may own no more than two vehicles. The syndicates share the interurban transport services and negotiate the tariff with the Government. The negotiated tariff rules out any flexibility on the part of the individuLal users and operator to negotiate the tariff to make maximum use of available truck capacity. A system based on individual negotiations is more likely to ensure that movement of empty trucks is kept to a minimum. Under the present system for instance, a part: of the traffic is reserved for return trips, and it often occurs t:hat trucks drive empty to other departments to collect return trips, which is clearly ineffi- cient. On the other hand, international truckers, who are efficient, are prevented from competing in the domestic market, further contrib- uting to excess capacity.  - 38 - (d) Financial problems of AASANA: The financial situation of this company has deteriorated partly as a consequence of low tariff rates. Sector Policies and Institutional Improvements 97. The National Transport Survey, prepared under Bank/UNDP financing, can provide a useful framework for future transport sector policies. The report contains a detailed prioritization of projects in the sector and has recommendations on institutional changes needed to strengthen execution of policies and programs. 98. ENFE has already taken measures to improve its financial position. Between November 1979 and January 1981, the tariff rates were increased by about 70% (consumer prices increased by about 50% over the comparable period). Further increase of about 40% and 130% were made in February and November 1982. Also, it laid off about 300 workers in an effort to reduce the problem of over- staffing. The need for maintaining realistic tariff rates for ENFE, AASANA and LAB remains. 99. The new Government has also decided to eliminate the monopoly of truckers, and a commission is examining ways of regulating the sector on a more competitive basis. SOCIAL SECTORS Background 100. In spite of substantial economic and social progress during the last two decades, Bolivia remains one of the poorest countries in South America. The majority of its population lives in the inhospitable altiplano, where social services are highly deficient. Life expectancy at birth in Bolivia is 52 years, a full decade below South American standards. Infant mortality is 158 per thousand. On average, there is one physician for about 2,000 persons and the literacy rate is still low: 63%. 101. The share of social sectors in public investment has averaged between 10% and 15%, much of it financed through external assistance from the Bank, IDB, USAID, UNESCO and UNDP. Social sectors account for a higher share in current expenditures. Problems and Issues (a) Housing and Urban Development 102. Approximately 2 million persons (about 40% of Bolivia's population) live in urban areas where services and shelter are scarce: less than 57% have access to piped water supply and less than 23% to any type of sewerage facili- ties. The rapid growth of La Paz and Santa Cruz, the two major cities, has  - 39 - led to severe housing shortages. The total units built annually throughout Bolivia have varied between 1,500 and 2,300 units while annual demand is estimated at about 10,000 units. In 1975, the estimated cumulative shortfall of the housing stock in major urban areas was estimated at 157,000. The lowest cost units built by both private and public sectors are estimated to cost over US$7,000, clearly unaffordable to the vast majority of the urban population. 103. The urban sector also suffers from inadequate institutional capacity. 'Some housing is provided by cooperatives and various employee councils, but these efforts are limited and scattered. The national housing council (CONAVI), established in 1964, has been almost a complete failure; in 1981, for example, it built only about 600 houses, and at an average unit cost of nearly US$30,000. The savings-and-loan system is much more efficient, and has in recent years developed an exemplary program of housing credit for low-income families in semi-rural settlements. The national housing bank (BANVI), a mixed public- private corporation, was founded in 1974. Although small, BANVI is a promising institution. Its demonstrated competence as fiscal agent for the Bank-financed Urban Development Project points toward a possible future role as a financial intermediary for housing and basic residential services projects nationwide. The municipalities of Bolivia are financially constrained, tend to spend their resources on works with high political visability, and recover little of their investments. The municipalities of Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Oruro have expressed interest, however, in copying the La Paz Municipality's successful program of urban upgrading on a cost-recovery basis. (b) Education 104. Despite sizeable budgetary allocations to education, no significant improvements in access and quality have occurred. Some of the reasons for the low productivity of expenditures have been the following: (i) Until recently, two subsystems, one for -.ural, one for urban education, existed side by side--both wish heavily overcentralized, inefficient administrations in La Paz. (ii) Drop out and repeater rates are high because children are taught in Spanish and not their native language, bescause they are malnourished and often cannot walk the long distances to get to a school and because they are taught an irrelevant and overly academic curriculum which bears little relation to future employment. (iii) Most of the expenditures go to salaries of untrained teachers. Few funds are available for expansion of the system and quality improve- ments such as distribution of learning materials or teacher supervision. (c) Water Supply and Sewerage 105. Less than 40% of the population (85% in urban areas, 9% in rural) has access to piped water supply and less than 25% (48% in urban areas, 4% in rural) to any type of sewerage facilities. With few exceptions (Santa Cruz), thq quality  - 40 - of services provided by most water systems is poor, most of them providing water without prior disinfection. Provision of services is often discontinuous. Present institutional arrangements are inadequate, a large number of weak institutions coexisting. The most serious shortcomings are: insufficient cost recovery from consumers, inadequate planning and project preparation and poor operation and maintenance in most areas, especially in rural areas. (d) Health 106. Available medical resources are underutilized in large measure because of continuous exodus of trained medical personnel. Most of the medical services provided by the Government are curative and only a small portion goes towards preventive medicine. The medical service in Bolivia is costly with no well-developed system of paramedics and rural health workers to take care of patients before they are passed on to fully trained medical personnel. Sector Policies and Institutional Improvements 107. A number of actions have been taken by the Bolivian authorities, assisted by the Bank and other bilateral and multilateral agencies. Low cost housing construction has been initiated in La Paz. In education, effort has been made at bilingual education, teacher training and vocational education. Sector authorities are preparing a national plan for basic sanitation for 1981-90 (PLANASBA), with technical assistance from the Pan American Health Organization. The Bank is assisting Bolivia in improving water supply and sanitation services through the construction of about 70 water systems in rural communities, the extension and improvement of water supply services in Trinidad, Beni, and the extension and improvement of water supply and sewerage services in Santa Cruz.  - 41 - ANNEX A Page I of 9 BOLIVIA PRICING AND MARKETING POLICIES FOR MAJOR TRADEABLE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 1. The major agricultural exports of Bolivia are coffee, sugar, timber, cotton and beef, whereas the major commodities with potential for import substi- tution are oilseeds and wheat. In the following paragraphs, the pricing and marketing arrangements for these agricultural products are described. 2. Coffee - Coffee production in Bolivia is typically a small farmer operation, with average output in the order of 20 quintels (one quintal equals 100 pounds) of "cafe pergamino" (producer level) per family, which roughly corresponds to the production of one hectare of area planted to this crop. About two-thirds of the production is exported. 3. Between 1975 and 1980, domestic prices of coffee, at wholesale and retail levels, were controlled, and, as a consequence, real prices at the consumer level declined by approximately 35% over the period. The maximum price scheme was enforced in the following way: exporters (who bought virtually all production from farmers and middlemen) were required to sell a proportion of it to domestic processors at the maximum price of $b 500/cwt during 1975-80. 1/ Table 1 Coffee Prices, Wholesale and Retail a/ Wholesale Prices Retail Pricss Current Constant Current Constant $b/cwt 1975=100 1b/Kg. 1975=100 1975 500 500 18.2 18.2 1976 850 794 18.2 18.2 1977 1500 1282 18.9 16.7 1978 1545 1136 19.0 16.4 1979 2000 1190 19.4 13.0 1980 2100 837 26.6 12.0 1981 2000 570 40.0 12.9 a/ Wholesale prices correspond to La Paz quotations. Wholesale and retail prices have been deflated by the wholesale price index and the consumer price index (for La Paz), respectively. Source: COBOLCA; and INE 1/ The rule was to sell one pound of coffee in the domestic market for each kilogram of coffee exported.  - 42 - ANNEX A Page 2 of 9 4. The price ratio between "cafe pergamino" and "cafe oro" (export coffee) largely depends on the technical rate of transformation of the former into the latter. Assuming (a) a technical rate of transformation of 0.80 (similar to the rate indicated by the International Coffee Organization), and (b) that costs other than coffee amount to 20% of the total cost of producing "cafe oro", the price of "cafe pergamino" relative to "cafe oro" should be in the order of 0.64 In Bolivia this price ratio, during 1977-1980, has been, on the average, 0.38 (see Table 2). This large gap between coffee prices at the producer level and at the export level could be the result of low yield in the transformation process, market power of coffee traders, or both. The income transfer from coffee producers to coffee exporters averaged about US$4.0 million annually during 1976-81. Considering that some 20,000 families grow coffee in Bolivia, this transfer represents an income loss in the order of US$200 per family per year, a non-trivial amount, given the small size of coffee operations in the country. Table 2 Coffee Prices, Export and Producer Level (Pesos per Pound) \ Price Ratio of "Cafe Per- "Cafe Pergamino" "Cafe Oro" gamino" to Year (Producer Level) (Export Level) "Cafe Oro" 1975 5.00 10.20 0.50 1976 6.70 36.00 0.19 1977 18.00 51.60 0.35 1978 12.50 29.00 0.43 1979 11.00 28.70 0.38 1980 11.78 32.75 0.34 1981 (October) 11.50 28.75 0.40 Source: COBOLCA. 5. COBOLCA (Comite Boliviano del Cafe) is the official agency in charge of design and implementation of coffee policy. Created in 1972, it was trans- ferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry in 1975 as an autonomous agency. COBOLCA has the responsibility for promoting production, processing and marketing, both in the domestic and export markets, and is financed by a tax of $b 100/bag of 60 kilograms exported. 6. Exports of coffee are handled by thirteen private firms. Three of them account for over 50% of total exports. There are no export taxes on coffee.  - 43 - ANNEX A l'age 3 of 9 7. Bolivia is a member of the Internationa:L Coffee Organization, and contributes to it US$0.75/bag of 60 kilograms exported. Bolivian quota is 102,600 bags, but recently the Government has app:Lied for an increase of the quota to 142,000 bags. 1/ Since the country's coi-fee exports account for only 0.15% of the world market, Bolivia should not have difficulties in increasing its coffee exports even under unfavorable conditions in the world coffe economy. 8. Illegal trade in coffee is stimulated by large price differentials between Bolivian domestic prices for coffee and prices in the neighbouring countries. Unofficial reports indicate that there is illegal trade even with Brazil. Sugar 9. Sugar production on a commercial scale is a relatively new activity in Bolivia. The first sugar mill started operating in Santa Cruz in 1952. In 1971, the area planted to sugarcane was 30,000 hectares, with an average production of 35 metric tons of sugarcane per hectare, a low yiield by international standards. During the seventies, the area planted grew at a rate of over 9% per annum; yields also increased, reaching some 45 metric tolls per hectare by 1980. Regional yields show substantial differences: they range between 35 and 45 metric tons per hectare in Santa Cruz while in the Bermejo area, they are as high as 70 metric tons per hectare. However, the possibilities of further expansion in the area planted at Bermejo are limited because very little additional land is available. 10. Sugarcane cultivation in Bolivia is duaListic. Some two-thirds of total area planted to sugarcane is cultivated folLowing traditional methods, which do not permit a full utilization of land (trees are only partially removed, thus excluding about a third of the cultivable land), fertilizers are seldom used, little credit is available and farmers frequently abandon their plots in search of new land. The remaining one-third of the area in sugarcane is cultivated in larger plots. Machinery, fertilizers and herbicides are widely used and yields are 20%-25% higher than in the small plots. 11. There are six sugar mills currently in operation in Bolivia. Four of them are located in the Santa Cruz area and the riemaining two in Tarija. Total installed capacity is 22,000 metric tons of sugarcane/day. The average rate of capacity utilization is about 80% - close to 100% at Tarija and 70% at Santa Cruz. There are plans for a new sugar mill at San Buenaventura in the Department of La Paz at a planned cost of about US$45 million, with a capacity to process 2,500 metric tons of sugarcane/day. The area around San Buenaventura would be a new sugarcane growing area and large investments in infrastructure (land improvement and feeder roads) would be required. 1/ Bolivia's average exports of coffee during 1974-80 have been about 84,500 bags, and only in one of these years (1979) was the quota met.  - 44 - ANNEX A Page 4 of 9 12. Sugarcane growers sell to the mills under a highly structured system of quotas. A national quota is determined by the Government, based on domestic requirements plus exports allowed Bolivia under the International Sugar Agreement. The national quota is allocated to the mills, which, in turn, allot a quota of sugarcane to each producer-supplier. Under this system, there is no competitive marketing. 13. Government intervention in the sugar industry is strong and pervasive. Sugarcane prices and domestic prices of sugar at the wholesale and retail levels are regulated. The price of sugarcane is determined annually and is the result of lengthy negotiations between producers, the sugar mills and the Government. The official prices for sugarcane have varied much less than world prices for sugar: while the coefficient of variation for sugarcane prices in Bolivia has been 15% for the period 1971-81, world prices for sugar varied by 60% over the same period. Domestic prices for sugar remained fixed in nominal terms between 1975 and 1979, and this led to substantial illegal trade. Sugar prices were revised upwards in February 1980 (85%) and again in May 1981 (44%). In late 1981, domestic retail prices were equivalent to US$0.36/pound, almost twice the level of international prices. 14. CNECA (Comision Nacional de Estudio de la Cana de Azucar) was created in 1958 and advises the Government on all aspects relating to production and marketing. The fixing of sugarcane prices (jointly by Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Industry) and sugar prices (Ministry of Industry) is based on studies and consultations done by CNECA. 15. CIMCA (Centro de Investigaciones y Mejoramiento de la Cana de Azucar) was originally part of CNECA, but in 1972 became an independent agency under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture. The agency deals with technological aspects related to the improvement of sugarcane production (new varieties, irri- gation, cultural practices, sanitary control, etc.). Cotton 16. Up to 1968, cotton production in Bolivia was directed at import substitution and only a small group of producers - around 20 - planted all commercial cotton. Between 1969 and 1974, a great expansion in cotton produc- tion took place, the area planted increasing seven times in four years. Two factors - high world prices and generous financing (both from official sources and private banks) were instrumental in this unusual increase in production. The lower world prices in subsequent years and the disappearsnce of credit (to a large extent resulting from the problems of Banco Agricola) brought the speculative drive to an end. As a consequence, area planted and output declined from 1976 onwards, to the point of making import of cotton necessary to supply the local textile industry in Bolivia. It is expected that in 1981 about a third of local cotton needs are going to be supplied by imports.  - 45 - ANNEX A Page 5 of 9 17. There about 140 firms involved in the production of cotton. The vast majority of these are individual producers (about 85%), accounting for about 60% of total output. Corporations account for about 33% of output, the rest being supplied by cooperatives. The average area cultivated is about 17 hectares per producer. However, 44% of the output is generated by 12% of the producers, in cotton fields from 300 hectares to 1000 hectares each. These figures indicate the relatively low number of farmers involved in cotton production and the high concentration of output in relatively large units of production. 18. Current production costs, including depreciation and interest payments are in the order of US$1000 per hectare, while average yields are 1000 pounds/ hectare, implying average costs of US$1/lb. of fibre. Transportation costs Santa Cruz Liverpool are US$0.14/lb. Price quotati'ons on the New York Cotton Exchange in mid-1981 were around US$0.85/lb., clearly making exports of cotton uneconomical. Three items each absorb about 17% oi total costs: insect control, harvest and cotton-ginning, and transportation. Weed control is the next important item, accounting for another 8% of total cost. 19. There are 10 textile plants in Bolivia. The largest one, located in Santa Cruz and financed by CORDECRUZ, supplies 60% of total demand. The four largest plants (two located in Santa Cruz and two in La Paz) together satisfy 90% of total demand. 20. ADEPA (Asociaci6n de Productores de Algodon), a private, non-profit organization, was created in 1968. All cotton producers are required to join ADEPA. Up to 1975, it was essentially a producers association concerned with cotton policy, prices, credit, inputs, supply, etc., with marginal participation in the marketing process. In 1975, ADEPA became the only marketing agent for cotton in Bolivia, for both domestic and export markets. ADEPA is also a financial agent for cotton growers, deducting from their gross income their corresponding tax and credit payments. It is financed by the producers, their contributions amounting to $b 5.8 million in 1980, i.e. some US$9.40/hectare planted, to cotton. 21. There is no price support for cotton. Domestic prices are determined on the basis of Liverpool cotton quotations January-June period) and corrected by US$0.07/lb. to account for part of the transportation costs. On the other hand, there is a 30% import tax on cotton, plus 6% to cover other import costs, giving a 36% nominal protection on domestic cotton production. In 1980, the 30% tax was lifted on the basis of insufficient domestic supplLes. Timber 22. The volume of forest products marketed in the period 1970-80 more than tripled from 21.1 million square feet in 1970 to 67.7 million square feet in 1980. Over the same period, the share of exports in total production increased from 31% in 1970 to over 50% by 1980. Sawn wood represents about 80% by volume of wood product exports, the remaining being sliced veneer and other forms of semiprocessed products. "Mara" (mahogany) is the most important specie.  - 46 - ANNEX A Page 6 of 9 23. In terms of volume, the two major export markets for Bolivia's timber are Argentina (about 55%) and the U.S.A. (about 30%). Japan and Venezuela, the other two outlets, are important for forest products with higher value added, such as sliced veneer, plywood and parquets. 24. Fourteen firms exported more than 1000 cubic meters each in 1980, the value of their exports ranging between US$0.2 million and US$1.2 million. Eleven of these firms are located in Santa Cruz. Some 33 other firms account for the rest of the exports, most of the smaller ones being located in La Paz. 25. Export of forest products is subject to the following regulations: (a) export of logs is prohibited; (b) sawn-wood is not subject to export taxes, but there are no special tax benefits; and (c) plywood, sliced veneer and other forms of processed wood are entitled to a tax rebate equivalent to 25% of the FOB value of the merchandise exports. This tax incentive is made effective through "certificados de compensacion impositiva" and are used to pay taxes. 26. According to the national forest law, all forests are ths property of the nation and their utilization is subject to previous permission and control of the State. The agency responsible for this task is the CDF (Centro de Desarrollo Forestal) whose main functions are to formulate the national forest policy, the corresponding programs, and to authorize and control the extraction of timber. CDF also has authority over processing and is in charge of research on forest improvement. In practice, the functions of CDF are centered on the fiscal side, such as collecting stumpage rights, controlling rates of extraction, etc. Very little is done either on the promotion side (new plantations) or on ways to rationalize resource use. 27. Although difficult to quantify, illegal trade in forest products is believed to be at least as large as the legal trade. Most of this consists of the smuggling of "morado" and other fine hard woods to Brazil, aided by the price differential between Brazilian and Bolivian markets and high transportation costs within Bolivia. Beef 28. Domestic consumption of meat is heavily concentrated in the urban centers and in the mines (COMIBOL). Total meat production in 1979 was 76,600 metric tons, 25% of which was consumed in La Paz, 14% in Santa Cruz and 11% in the mines. The other cities absorbed 22% while the remaining 28% of production was consumed in the rural areas.  - 47 - ANNEX A Page 7 of 9 29. Meat produced in the Beni area - largesi: supplier in the country - is transported by air to La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, and the mining centers. Some thirty private companies participate in this trade, with average load per plane of five metric tons. At the end of 1980, transpo:rt costs by air represented about 15% of the wholesale price of meat at Trinided (transport cost of $b 5/kilogram, compared to wholesale price of $b :33.5/kilogram). There was a subsidy on the price of fuel equivalent to $b 2.70/kilogram of beef, implying a total subsidy of over US$3.0 million in 1980. 1/ 30. As can be expected, at least a third of the 220 "mataderos" (slaughter houses) are located in the Beni area. Another one-third are in La Paz and Santa Cruz, the remainder being scattered throughout Bolivia. Most of these plants do not fulfill sanitary regulations. 31. The institutional base in the livestock sector is adequate. Cattle producers are a members of powerful and well-organized associations (FEGASACRUZ and FEGASABENI) in the two areas where most of the national herd is raised. The Ministry of Agriculture has responsibility on the production side, while the Ministry of Industry and Commerce is responsible for pricing and marketing issues. 32. Beef prices are controlled both at the producer and consumer levels. In recent years, prices have been adjusted every four to six months (see Table 4). At mid-1981 retail prices, and taking the historical ratio between retail and producer prices (around 0.7) and a ratio of carcass weight to live weight of 0.5, the corresponding live weight price would be in order of US$120/Cwt. This price, adjusted for transportation and marketing costs gives the quotation of US$80/Cwt reported in Santa Cruz (May, 1981). A comparable price in the U.S.A. - the largest beef market in the world (Omaha, April, 1981) - was US$63/CWT. However, the exchange rate developments during 1982 have significantly improved Bolivia's competitiveness. Table 4 Producer and Retail Prices for Beef a/ ($b$ per Kilogram) Retail Level Producer Level Date Current Constant Current Constant December, 1977 23.00 6.10 15.00 4.00 April, 1979 25.00 5.75 17.50 4.00 December, 1979 41.00 6.60 28.40 4.60 January, 1980 45.00 7.10 28.40 4.50 July, 1980 48.00 6.70 33.50 4.60 January, 1981 55.00 6.40 N.A. N.A. March, 1981 57.00 6.30 N.A. N.A. a/ Constant 1966 prices. All prices deflated by the consumer price index. 1/ About 30,000 metric tons were transported by air from the Beni area in 1980.  - 48 - ANNEX A Page 8 of 9 Wheat 33. Wheat is almost exclusively grown in the valleys by small farmers, the total area planted being 80,000 hectares over the past two years. Yields are below one metric ton/hectare, indicative of very low technological levels. To satisfy domestic demand, Bolivia has been importing growing quantities of wheat (see Table 5). A variable fraction of wheat imports has been financed under concessional terms (between 8,000 and 15,000 metric tons/year). Table 5 lmports of Wheat Year Volume Value (000 metric/tons) (000 US$) 1975 65.4 8,253 1976 97.4 11,487 1977 160.0 17,059 1978 243.2 31,710 1979 204.2 36,680 1980 296.6 57,850 Source: Ministry of Industry. 34. All wheat imports are done by the Government. Until January 1981, the grain was sold to the local millers at the maximum price of flour of $b 300/Cwt. A metric ton of wheat yields 760 kilograms of flour (16.7 Cwt); the maximum price of flour, therefore, meant a corresponding price of wheat of US$200/metric ton. By comparison, costs were as follows: Price of wheat, FOB US$/MT 185 Freight, insurance, port expenses 48 Transport (Antofagasta-La Paz) 39 In-transit losses 9 Financial costs and custom expenses 9 Total cost of wheat, La Paz 290 Milling cost (net) 42 Total cost, wheat flour 332 This implied a subsidy in the order of US$132/MT. In 1980 imports were about 300,000 metric tons, which implid a total subsidy of US$40 million. In addition to this economic cost, the underpricing of wheat at the consumer level also led to illegal trade of flour to Chile and Peru.  - 49 - ANNEX A Page 9 of 9 Oilseeds 35. Bolivia is a net importer of edible oils. In 1980, total consumption of edible oils was 15,000 metric tons, while domestic production was some 10,000 metric tons (soybeans 80% and cottonseed 20%). Given this deficit and increasing per capita consumption, it is pertinent to look at the possibilities of import substitution for oilseeds. Among them, soybeans appear most promis- ing. Yields are close to 1.5 metric tons/hectare, an indication of a reason- ably good adoption of the crop to the ecological conditions of the area. There was sustained increase in the output and area planted of soybeans between 1971/72 and 1979/80. Area planted and production fell during 1980/81, probably as a consequence of low prices for the 1980 crop; in real terms, producer prices in 1980 were 30% below the average for 1975-1979. 1/ 36. ANAPO (Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Oleaginosas) is a producers' association dealing with promotional aspects of oilseed production, especially of soybeans. It has close links with CIAT(Centro de Investigsciones de Agricultura Tropical in Santa Cruz). So far, AYAPO is mainly concerned with technological aspects of soybean production (testing new varieties, insect and weed control, etc.) It is financed with 1% of gross income of producers from oil seeds. 1/ Soybean prices are determined through negotiations between the Government, producers, and, more recently, ANAPO.  - 50 - ANNEX B BOLIVIA Page 1 of 4 ISSUES AND POLICIES RELATED TO MINING TAXATION Background 1. There are no less than 20 major types of taxes, plus over 30 low-yield "earmarked" levies, affecting the mining sector. All the major taxes applicable to mining are, for all practical purposes, assessed on gross value of exports, and are considered by the enterprises as equivalent to output taxes. Until March 1980, the two major mineral taxes were the regalia and the export tax. 2. The regalia is a tax on "presumed income", which is the difference between world mineral prices in a specified market (e.g. the London Metal Exchange) and a presumed cost set by the government. The regalia is expressed in terms of taxes due per "commercial unit" of the mineral in question. For such minerals as tin, copper, lead and zinc, the commercial unit is the "fine pound" (libra fina). This is intended to represent the actual metallic content per unit of the concentrate of metal exported. For other metals, such as antimony and wolfram, the commercial unit is the "long unit" (unidad larga) or 22.4 pounds of metallic content. The levels of presumed costs have been changed very infrequently in the past. 3. The export tax was imposed in October 1972 as a temporary levy to capture some of the "windfall" gains (resulting from the devaluation in that year). Like other "emergency" fiscal measures elsewhere in the world, it remained an important fixture in the revenue structure until it was abolished in March 1980. Initially the tax was 20% of net export values, but in October 1973 it was converted (primarily for administrative reasons) to a levy on gross values, and the nominal general rate was reducet to 7.5% or less on most mineral exports. Drawbacks of the Present System 4. Overall, the level of mineral taxation in Bolivia has been one of the highest among the major tin-producing countries. The joint burden of the regalia and the export tax has been equivalent to that of a perfectly administered income tax levied at a rate of about 50%. In addition, the structure of mining taxation in Bolivia has suffered from a number of serious drawbacks. These have included: (a) the tax structure has had adverse effects on incentives for efficiency, exploitation and concentration since the system has made the processing of low-grade ore unprofitable. It has led to inefficient use of concentrators since the taxes are based on the concentrates actually produced, not on the ore taken from the mine; and (b) the tax regime has served to dampen incentives for both exploration and development because it does not take into account inter-enterprise cost variances of any kind, including exploration costs. Under the existing system, a mine that spends large sums on exploration and development pays the same taxes as mine that spends none.  - 51 - ANNEX B Page 2 of 4 The exploration incentive is further dampened by the low rates of land taxes (patentes) since it is profitable for individuals to hold large tracts of potentially rich land as unexploited reserves. These problems were analyzed in a study by the Institute of International Development of Harvard University, under the technical assistance program financed by the World Bank. 1/ 5. In March 1980, the Government adopted a number of changes in mining taxation. The main features of the reform were: (i) the elimination of the ad valorem export tax; (ii) the updating of the presumed costs; and (iii) the adoption of an adjustment mechanism which would allow for more realistic (and more frequently adjusted) deduction of presumed costs from taxable base. Under this system, the presumed costs would be updated in line with the floor price of the International Tin Council. 6. While the mining tax reform reduced the tax burden on the sector (the sector paid about US$40 million less in taxes than it would have paid without these measures) and while the principle of frequent adjustments of presumed costs was accepted, the major structural. defects of the system remain. Moreover, the use of changes in the floor price of the Tin Council is less than satisfactory because that index is heavily influenced by mining cost changes in Malaysia, an efficient producer, and, as such, it would only be a matter of time before movements of actual mining costs in Bolivia will diverge from the movements of the Tin Council floor price. Alternatives for Mineral Tax Reform 7. The present Bolivian mining tax system is in need of a reform to encourage more efficient and rational use of existing capacity and to create one of the necessary conditions for reversing stagnation of investment in the sector. However, three major constraints limit the range of feasible alternatives: (i) The administrative machinery in the Miaistry of Finance and the Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy is not adequate to implement immediately a highly ambitious once-and for-all reform of mining taxes. (ii) the management and accounting infrastructure in the mining sector itself is not at present adequate to allow full compliance with the provisions of sophisticated mining tax legislation; and (iii) related to the administrative-compliance constraints above, and arising from the heavy governmental dependence on mineral taxes as a source of revenue, is the fear of significant loss of revenues in switching to a proportional income tax. Furthermore, the magnitude of such a loss under a pure income tax is virtually impossible to predict with any degree of precision. 1/ See Malcolm Gillis, "Taxation and Mining: Non-fuel Minerals in Bolivia and other Countries". Ballinger Publishing Company, on which much of this Annex is based.  - 52 - ANNEX B Page 3 of 4 8. Given these constraints, there appear to be two basic alternatives for reform of mining taxation. The first is a true income or profits tax, which would clearly be superior in terms of improving efficiency and encourag- ing investment (domestic as well as foreign). The second alternative is an indexed presumed income tax under which changes in presumed costs would be made in line with actual changes in input costs. Such a tax would be superior on revenue grounds, at least in the short-to-medium term, and could be imple- mented within a short period of time. Enactment of the latter would also result in substantial progress toward removal or amelioration of many of the adverse effects of the present tax system on efficiency in use of existing capacity and would (although to a much lesser extent than a true income tax) facilitate expanded investment in the sector. 9. A true income tax in the mining sector, therefore, represents the ideal toward which mining taxation in Bolivia should evolve. However, successful implementation of income taxation would require a more advanced tax administration and compliance infrastructure than is now present in Bolivia. A premature and hurried effort to install a true income tax on the mining sector may be worse than none at all. The country has already had one brief and unsatisfactory experience (1952-57) with the consequence of haste in implementing net income taxes on mining. A carefully designed technical assistance program by the Bank and/or UNDF can succeed in creating, in rapid order, the kind of tax administration machinery that would be capable of meeting the heavy demands inherent in the operation of income taxation of mining activi- ties. But the caliber of the tax administration is only one side of the coin of effective taxation of mining profits. The compliance capacities of the principal mining enterprises must be considered as well. A comprehensive report on mining accounting was prepared last year by the Canadian firm Woods Gordon (for CIDA). It is generally agreed that about six private medium mining companies are in a position to implement the Woods Gordon system. 10. For these reasons, it would be more appropriate to consider the adoption of the indexation of presumed costs as of immediate importance, to be followed by a shift to income taxation once the administration and compliance infrastructure is in place. 11. The key features of the Mining Cost Indexation System are: (a) Base-period standard mining costs for each mineral are calculated for each type of mine: COMIBOL, medium mines, small mines and cooperatives. (b) The standard mining cost is adjusted every six months, January and July, by a Bolivian mining cost index. (c) One national index is applied to adjust all of the standard mining costs through time.  - 53 - ANNEX B Page 4 of 4 (d) The cost index is a simple calculation dependent upon the Bolivian mining cost structure for its weights and inflation rates of key cost elements in Bolivian raining. (e) The weights of the index are calculated every three years. (f) the tax is determined as a percentage of the difference between: (i) the official price minus the actual non-mining costs; and (ii) the adjusted standard mining costs. 13. The automatic indexation system represents an improvement over the present mining taxation policies in five major ways, First, the semi-annual revision of the standard mining cost, a Bolivian adjustment factor, is bound to keep the presumptive cost in line with real mining costs. Second, the system will be sensitive to inflation rates and price increases and, therefore, will automatically adjust the tax burden accordingly, reducing the burden of inflation on the mining sector. Third, it will reduce the disincentives on low grade ore production by eliminating the non-mining costs from the tax calculation. Fourth, it will create a stabler environment for the mining enterprises with less risk of paying taxes of more than 100% of income. And Fifth, immediately following a devaluation, while export taxes need to supple- ment the regalia under the present system, the proposed system will automa- tically increase the tax burden without need for an extra tax on "windfall" profits. 14. The indexation system still leaves much to be desired. It does little to differentiate between variations in mining cost across enterprises, as would a pure income tax. It gives little incentive to investment in maintenance and repair, capacity expansion, or exploration and development. It does not fully exploit rents during periods of high mineral prices as would a graduated progressive tax system. It still presents disincentives for the mining of certain minerals relative to others in that it does not change the arbitrariness of the tax rates on the different minerals. It should, therefore, be considered an interim measure.  TABLE 1: AGRICULTURE External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) Ongoing Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL Abapo Izazog TDB/CEE A 11 3 - - - 14 San Julian Chani - 1 3 - - - 4 Agricultural Extension IDB A 7 1 - - - 8 and Research (IBIA) Irrigation Works IDB A 4 6 6 7 - 23 Agricultural Construction Works - A 1 1 1 2 - 5 Control of Mouth Disease IDB A 3 - - - - 3 Rural Development-Ulla Ulla IBRD A 2 4 6 - - 12 Rural Development-lngavi IBRD A 2 3 1 - - 6 Rural Development-Omasuyos- IBRD A 1 1 - - - 2 Los Andes New Projects Sectoral Loans II Under USAID A 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9 consideration Production and distribution Under USAID A 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 consideration Agricultural Development Under IDB A 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 consideration Irrigation Sachopera A 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 Villamontes (Tarija) Fishing Farming Japanese A 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 Government Others (some 100 projects - 46 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 46 most of them below US$1 47 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 47 o million for 1982) - 0 TOTAL 93 58 74 83 - 308  TABLE 2: HYDROCARBONS External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) Ongoing Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL Field Exploration A 6 7 3 3 2 21 Quantification of Gas Reserves IDB/IBRD A 25 - - - - 25 Exploratory Drilling A 43 45 48 48 48 232 (trampas estructurales y estructuras de pozos avanzados) Development Drillingds IDB A - - 3 3 3 9 (Monteagudo and others) Development Drillingds IDB A 3 4 5 5 - 17 (Espino) Secondary Oil Recovery 10 2 - - - 12 (Monteagudo, Camiri and others) New Projects Development of Boomerang - A - 15 15 15 15 60 Hills gas fields Vuelta Grande, Gas Recycling Under IBRD A 63 7 - - - 70 Prolect consideration Drilling of Stratigraphic Traps Under IDB A - 1 5 8 8 24 consideration Gas Pipeline Sta. Cruz Probably A - 16 157 161 198 533 Sao Paulo IDB/IBRD Gas Plants and Gathering A - 2 18 79 - 99 (system for the S. Paulo gas pipeline) Gas Pipeline - Sta. Cruz IDB B 33 48 32 - - 113 to the Altiplano Gas Pipeline - Sta. Cruz A 21 1 - - - 22 to Sucre C 204 145 286 322 274 1,237 Others 43 - 14 25 15 91 247 145 3O00 3547 289 1,328  TABLE 3: MINING External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) Ongoing Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL La Palca 18 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Erts-Bolivia U.N. A 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Mining Exploration IBRD A 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. New Projects Gold-Ore Project- - B 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Kaka-Majiri (COFADENA) Exploration (COMIBOL) - B 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Exploration Los Lipez - B 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. (COMIBOL) Exploration Santa Fe - B 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. (COMIBOL) Exploration Relaves - B 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. (COMIBOL) Mine Central (COMIBOL) - B 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Bolivar (COMIBOL) - A 25 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. 80 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. X Others 6 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. o 86 T868 122 141 - n.a.  TABLE 4: INDUSTRY External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) Ongoing Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL Sugar Refinery Guabira B 1 - - - - 1 Several milk processing plants Danish Govt. A 6 - - - - 6 Sugar Refinery Bermejo B 6 - - - - 6 Industrial Explosives A 2 2 - - - 4 (COFADENA) Lead and silver smelting KFW B 36 20 5 - - 61 plant (Karachipampa) New Projects Automotive assembly plant (ENAUTO) - B 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Fertilizer plant (YPFB) - B 29 45 - - - 74 Textile plant (INFOL) - A 2 3 - - - 5 Zinc Processing Plant (Karachipampa) - A 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Cement Plant (Cadeor) - B 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Agroindustrial Complex (Cordepaz) - B 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Paper Plant (Codetar) - B 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. a M Cement Plant (Codetar) - B 11 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. 0 Slaughter House (Tarija) - B 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Other Project - 22 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. 148 38 42 50 - Y5  TABLE 5: TRANSPORT External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) Ongoing Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL International Airport A 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Tarija Tarija Airport IBRD A 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Trinidad Airport A 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Radio System IBRD A 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Telecommunication System IBRD A 8 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. VASIS IBRD A 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Viru-Viru Airport Govt. of B 28 25 5 - - 58 Japan La Paz-Cotopata Road IDB B 4 5 4 - - 13 Rio Yacumo-Puerto A 3 4 4 2 - 13 Salinas Road B. Vista-Quiquibay Road Govt. of B 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. c Japan San Ramon-Trinidad Road B 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Maintenance Plan IBRD A 5 6 2 - - 13 Bus Terminal (Cordecruz) B 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. New Projects Uncia-Sucre-Muyupampa Road B 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Feeder Roads Under USAID A 8 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. consideration Potosi-Taropoya Road (Cordepo) - B 6 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Yacuzes-Pto. Suarez Road (Cordecruz) - B 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - 2 Ln 95 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Other projects 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. TOTAL 116 120 113 124 - 473  TABLE 6: TELECOMMUNICATIONS External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) Ongoing Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL Dom. Satellite - B 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Land Aquisition and - B 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Building (ENTEL) Communication Center-La Paz - B 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Others - 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. TOTALT 11 8 8 8 - 27 X PC (D 0 o c.  TABLE 7: POWER External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) Ongoing Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL Corani A 16 14 2 - - 32 Gas Turbine-Potosi A 6 2 - - - 8 Feasibility Study-Palillada A 1 1 - - - 2 Energy Resources Inventory A 2 1 1 1 - 5 New Projects Sakhahuaya Under IDB B 23 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. consideration Interconnection Central- Under IBRD A 12 14 25 6 - 57 Oriental consideration Fifth Gas Turbine- A 7 2 - - - 9 Santa Cruz Fourth Gas Turbine A 1 2 - - - 3 Santa Isabel ICLA and Misicuni B I n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. San Jacinto Argentine B 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. - 9 Govt. 78 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. * Others 10 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. TOTAL 88 69 73 83 - 313  TABLE 8: EDUCATION External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) Ongoing Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL Rural Education I and II A 6 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. ON Altiplano Education IBRD A 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Vocational Education IDB A 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. School Construction and A 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Repairs Tnfrastrcletutre Expansion IBRD A 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. 37 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Others 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. _ n.a. TOTAL 40 29 29 30 - 128 m p> 00 0 I-t I-  TABLE 9: WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) Ongoing Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL Potable Water-La Paz 2nd phase IDB/German A 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Govt. New Projects Water Supply and Sewerage-Cochamba Under IDB A 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. consideration Potable Water-Potosi and Under IDB A 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Oruro consideration Potable Water-Tarija Under IDB (several water supply projects consideration A 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. in La Paz, Potosi, Ororu, Cocha- bamba, Beni and Tarija) 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. Others 24 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. e 0  TABLE 10: HEALTH AN4D SOCIAL WELFARE External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) New Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL Maternity Hospital (La Paz) Govt. of Japan A 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Hospital Construction and Equipment (Tarija) B 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Hospital Construction and Equipment oa (Cochabamba) B 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Hospital Construction and Equipment (Beni) B 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Hospital Construction and Equipment (Cobriga) Govt. of Japan A 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Others 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. TOTAL 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. olq 0  TABLE 11: URBAN AND HOUSING External Source Ranking of Disbursements (US$ Million) New Projects of Finance the Project 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL Several Sport Construction work in La Paz, Santa Cruz, Oruro, Sucre, and Cochabamba B 11 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Water Supply in La Paz - A 24 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Administrative Building (Cordecruz) - B 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Bus Terminal in Oruro - B 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Street Pavement in Tarija - A 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 42 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Others 19 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. TOTAL 61 31 31 32 n.a. n.a. 0q z r0  - 65 - STATISTICAL APPENDIX- 1/ The Statistical Appendix was prepared during the July/August 1981 Mission. Some of the figures in the main text, part-of which was written in 1982, are based on more recent estimates.  - 66 - STATISTICAL APPENDIX Table of Contents 1. Population 1.1. Total Population by Sex for 1950-80 1.2 Total Population and Percent Distribution for mid-year 1980 by Age and Sex 1.3 Labor Force and Employment by Economic Sector, 1971-79 2. National Accounts 2.1 Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin at Current Prices 1970-80 2.2 Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin at Constant Prices 1970-80 2.3 Implicit Deflators of GDP by Sector of Origin, 1970-80 2.4 Growth of GDP by Sector of Origin 1970-80 2.5 Composition of GDP by Sector of Origin, 1970-80 2.6 Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices, 1970-80 2.7 Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices, 1970-80 2.8 Capital Formation at Current Prices 1970-80 3. Balance of Payments 3.1 Balance of Payments, 1970-80 3.2 Merchandise Exports (CIF), 1970-80 3.3 Merchandise Exports (CIF at Constant Prices 1970-80 3.4 Merchandise Imports (CIF) 1970-80 3.5 Merchandise Imports (CIF) at Constant Prices and Price Indices 1970-80 3.6 Gross Value of Exports of Mining and Metallurgy According to Producers 1972-80 3.7 Merchandise Exports (CIF) Volume, Price and Value, 1970-80 3.8 Direction of Trade, 1970-80 3.9 Terms of Trade 1970-80 4. External Debt 4.1 External Public Debt Outstanding as of December 31, 1981, Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency and Goods. 4.2 Service Payments, Commitments, Disbursem*nts and Outstanding Amounts of External Public Debt Projections Based on Debt Outstanding Including Undisbursed as of December 31, 1981 (Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency)  - 67 - 5. Public Sector Finances 5.1 Analysis of Consolidated Public Sectcr Finances, 1970-81 5.2 Central Government Operations, 1970-81 5.3 Central Government Current Revenues, 1970-80 5.4 Treasury Cash Operations, 1970-81 5.5 Decentralized Agencies - Revenues and Expenditures, 1970-81 5.6 Local Governments, 1970-81 5.7 Export Enterprises' Revenues and Expenditures, 1970-81 5.8 Other Enterprises' Revenues and Expenditures, 1970-81 5.9 Municipalities' Revenues and Expendit:ures, 1970-81 6. Monetary Statistics 6.1 Summary Accounts of the Banking System, 1976-80 6.2 Changes in Credit by Origin, Destinal:ion, and Financing, 1976-80 6.3 Structures of Legal Reserve Requirements and Interest Rates (in percent) 7. Agricultural Statistics 7.1 Agricultural Production and Yield of Selected Crops, 1975-80 7.2 Prices of Selected Agricultural Commodities, Bolivia and World Markets, 1970-80 8. Other Sectors 8.1 Domestic Production of Petroleum, Hydrocarbon Derivatives and Natural Gas, 1970-80 8.2 Domestic Consumption of Hydrocarbon Derivatives by Major Products, 1970-80 8.3 Production of Minerals, 1973-80 8.4 Gross Production of Electric Energy, 1970-80 8.5 Production of Cement, 1970-80 8.6 Value Added of Manufacturing Industries, 1970-80 9. Prices and Wages 9.1 Consumer Price Index, 1970-80 9.2 Wholesale Price Index, 1975-80 9.3 Average Monthly Salaries by Sector, 1975-80  - 68 - 10. Housing, Education and Health 10.1 Percentage Distribution of Houses According to Size and Occupancy for La Paz and Santa Cruz, May-October 1980 10.2 Percentage Distribution of Population by Age and Level of Education for La Paz, May-October 1980 10.3 Percentage Distribution of Population According to Access to Medication and Assistance for La Paz and Santa Cruz, May-October 1980  - 69 - TABLE 1.1: BOLIVIA - TOTAL POPULATION F'OR 1950-1980 BY SEX YEAR TOTAL MALT: FEMALE 1950 2,702,866 1,325,993 1,376,873 1955 2,973,772 1,459,368 1,514,404 1960 3,225,363 1,632,350 1,693,013 1965 3,760,507 1,847,659 1,912,848 1970 4,281,711 2,106,113 2,175,598 1975 4,887,870 2,407,148 2,480,722 1980 1/ 5,599,592 2,762,321 2,837,271 NOTE: Both the 1975 population are adjusted to reflect the mid-year population of these years. They are der:ived from the census totals with adjustments also for underenumeration. The enumerated populations are 2,704,165 (September 5, 1950) and 4,647,816 (September 29, 1976). 1/ Estimated Source: Carmen Arret and Hernan Orellana, Bolivia - Proyeccion de la poblacion por sexo y Grupos de Edad 1950 - 2000. Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia, December 1977. National Statistical Institute.  - 70 - TABLE 1.2 BOLIVIA - TOTAL POPULATION AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION FOR MID-YEAR 1980 1/ BY AGE AND SEX Population Percent Distribution AGE GROUP TOTAL MALES FEMALES TOTAL MALES FEMALES Total 5,599,592 2,762,321 2,837,271 100.0 100.0 100.0 0-4 958,106 483,030 475,076 17.1 17.5 16.7 5-9 782,578 391,090 391,488 14.0 14.2 13.8 10-14 671,196 334,258 336,938 12.0 12.1 11.9 15-19 576,390 286,254 290,136 10.3 10.4 10.2 20-24 492,992 243,458 249,534 8.8 8.8 8.8 25-29 414,649 203,32 211,347 7.4 7.4 7.4 30-34 315,293 172,189 179,104 6.3 6.2 6.3 35-39 287,404 140,717 146,687 5.1 5.1 5.2 40-44 240,697 116,545 124,152 4.3 4.2 4.4 45-49 208,095 100,551 107,544 3.7 3.6 3.8 50-54 179,545 87,122 92,423 3.2 3.1 3.3 55-59 143,572 68,864 74,708 2.6 2.5 2.6 60-64 108,978 51,331 57,647 1.9 1.8 2.0 65-69 82,275 38,287 43,988 1.5 1.4 1.6 70-74 54,092 24,616 29,476 0.9 1.0 0.1 75-79 31,645 14,049 17,596 0.6 0.5 0.3 1/ Estimate Source: National Statistical Institute.  TABLE 1.3: BOLIVIA - LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR (In Thousands) Preliminary 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Labor Force 1,359 1,388 1,418 1,448 1,479 1,511 1,547 1,586 1,629 Employment 1,236 1,275 1,317 1,359 1,404 1,447 1,486 1,526 1,567 Agriculture 593 605 618 629 642 655 668 680 688 Mining 64 66 68 70 72 74 75 78 79 Hydrocarbons 7 7 7 11 11 9 8 8 7 Manufacturing 108 113 117 122 127 132 137 142 147 Construction 48 54 61 68 77 86 89 92 94 Utilities 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 8 Transport and CoMriUTLctdoLls 72 74 78 79 82 86 91 96 112 Commerce and Finance 95 98 102 106 110 114 118 124 127 Services 244 253 261 268 277 285 294 299 305 General Government (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (144) (153) (161) (165) (n.a.) (n.a.) Other Services (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (124) (124) (124) (129) (n.a.) (n.a.) Unemployment 123 113 101 89 75 64 61 60 62 Unemployment Rate (%) (9.1) (8.1) (7.1) (6.1) (5.1) (4.2) (4.0) (3.8) (3.8) Note: Data for years 1977-79 are presently under revision. Source: Ministry of Labor.  TABLE 2.1: BOLIVIA - GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN AT CURRENT PRICES 1970-80 (illions of Sb) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Gross Domestic Product at m.p. 12,374 13,534 17,218 26,150 43.829 49,468 57,787 66,743 80,594 102,279 149,506 Agriculture 2,240 2,510 3,099 4,738 8,265 9,022 10,052 11,278 13,456 17,562 26,540 Traditional (1,982) (2,221) (2,698 (3,819) (6,798) (7,390) (8,323) (9,379) (11,629) (15,467) (n.a.) Non-traditional (258) (289) (401) (919) (1,467) (1,632) (1,729) (1,899) (1,827) (2,095) (n.a.) Mining and Metallurgy 1,157 952 1,687 3,066 4,384 3,306 4,010 5,480 6,532 7,608 10,701 (Mining) (1,155) (910) (1,612) (2,939) (4,202) (3,186) (3,802) (5,134) (6,073) (7,038) (9,845) (Metallurgy) (2) (42) (75) (127) (182) (120) (208) (346) (459) (570) (856) Hydrocarbons 118 232 543 1,042 3,365 2,343 2,564 2,101 2,058 2,169 3,222 Manufacturing 1,788 1,925 2,328 3,498 5,579 6,483 7,614 8,720 10,096 13,202 20,218 Construction 511 566 661 1,113 1,673 2,154 2,694 3,447 4,198 5,378 7,783 Energy 167 181 220 306 372 469 579 696 829 994 1,373 Transport and communication 931 1,092 1,416 1,850 2,783 3,620 4,350 5,459 6,880 8,656 12,594 Commerce 2,182 2,413 2,803 4,072 7,169 9,520 11,080 12,070 15,681 20,991 30,666 Banking 183 212 305 506 842 1,125 1,689 2,272 2,675 3,513 5,066 General Government 986 1,167 1,426 1,982 3,253 4,246 5,051 5,991 7,132 7,960 10,641 Ownership of Dwellings 1,088 1,178 1,352 2,111 3,182 3,700 4,207 4,836 5,704 7,126 10,485 Other services 1/ 1,023 1,106 1,378 1,866 2,962 3,480 3,897 4,393 5,353 7,120 10,217 1/ Net of imputed banking charges. Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.  TABLE 2.2: BOLIVIA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN AT CONSTANT 1970 PRICES, 1970-80 (Millions of 1970 $b) Preliminary Estimate 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Gross Domestic Product at m.p. 12,374 12,985 13,732 14,668 15,563 16,353 17,469 18,064 18,628 19,007 19,161 Agriculture 2,240 2,373 2,512 2,628 2,725 2,907 2,991 2,890 2,968 3,027 3,078 Traditional (1,982) (2,089) (2,177) (2,180) (2,242) (2,431) (2,528) (2,370) (2,150) (2,521) (n.a.) Non-tradional (258) (284) (335) (448) (483) (476) (463) (520) (490) (505) (n.a.) Mining and Metallurgy 1,157 1,160 1,203 1,470 1,425 1,226 1,398 1,438 1,380 1,291 1,314 Mining (1,155) (1,118) (1,162) (1,413) (1,377) (1,191) (1,339) (1,371) (1,300) (1,202) (1,214) Metallurgy (2) (42) (41) (57) (48) (35) (59) (67) (80) (89) (100) Hydrocarbons 118 233 318 429 377 296 313 238 222 200 187 Manufacturing 1,788 1,822 1,963 2,047 2,294 2,450 2,633 2,790 2,906 2,981 2,939 Construction 511 526 535 546 595 672 725 782 804 824 783 Energy 167 179 190 211 232 237 253 268 281 297 304 Transport and Communication 931 1,001 1,072 1,141 1,311 1,491 1,668 1,880 2,030 2,094 2,136 Commerce 2,182 2,240 2,290 2,360 2,513 2,704 2,813 2,875 2,964 3,029 3,060 Banking 183 205 261 308 341 400 478 536 563 600 618 General Government 986 1,089 1,185 1,257 1,380 1,481 1,577 1,643 1,685 1,720 1,742 Ownership of Dwellings 1,088 1,116 1,149 1,193 1,237 1,287 1,345 1,400 1,442 1,494 1,516 Othpr HRrvines 1,023 1,051 1,054 1,078 1,133 1,202 1,275 1,324 1,383 1,450 1,484 Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.  TABLE 2.3: BOLIVIA -IMPLICIT DEFLATORS OF GDP BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN - 1970-80 (1970 = 100) Preliminary Estimate 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Gross Domestic Product at m.p. 100.0 104.2 125.4 178.3 281.6 302.5 330.8 369.5 432.6 538.1 780.3 Agriculture 100.0 105.8 123.4 180.3 303.3 310.4 336.1 390.2 453.4 580.2 862.2 Mining and Metallurgy 100.0 82.1 140.2 208.6 307.6 269.7 286.8 381.0 473.3 589.3 814.4 (Mining) (100.0) (81.4) (138.7) (208.0) (305.2) (267.5) (283.9) (374.5) (467.2) (585.5) (811.0) (Metallurgy) (100.0) (100.0) (182.9) (223.0) (379.2) (342.9) (352.5) (516.4) (573.7) (640.4) (856.0) Hydrocarbons 100.0 99.6 170.8 242.9 892.6 791.6 819.2 882.7 927.0 1.084.5 1.723.0 Manufacturing 100.0 106.2 118.6 170.9 243.2 264.6 289.2 312.5 347.4 442.8 687.9 Construction 100.0 107.6 123.6 203.8 281.2 320.5 371.6 440.8 522.1 652.3 994.0 Energy 100.0 101.1 115.8 145.0 160.3 197.9 228.9 259.7 295.0 334.7 451.6 f Transport and Communication 100.0 109.1 132.1 162.1 212.3 242.8 260.8 290.4 338.9 443.4 589.6 Commerce 100.0 107.7 122.4 172.5 285.3 352.1 393.9 419.8 529.0 693.0 1.002.2 Banking 100.0 103.4 116.9 163.6 246.9 281.3 353.3 423.9 475.1 585.5 819.7 General Government 100.0 107.2 120.3 157.7 235.7 286.7 320.3 364.6 423.3 462.8 610.8 Ownership of Dwellings 100.0 105.6 117.7 176.9 257.2 287.5 312.8 345.4 395.6 477.0 691.6 Other Services 100.0 105.2 130.7 173.1 261.4 289.5 305.6 331.8 387.1 491.0 688.5 Source: Tables 2.1 and 2.2.  TABLE 2.4: BOLIVIA - ANNUAL GROWTH OF GDP BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN 1971-1980 (Constant 1970 Prices) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 GDP at Market Prices 4.9 5.7 6.8 6.1 5.1 6.8 3.4 3.1 2.0 0.8 Agriculture 5.9 5.9 4.6 3.7 6.7 2.9 -3.4 2.7 2.0 1.7 Mining and Metallurgy 0.3 3.7 22.2 -3.1 -14.0 14.0 2.9 -4.0 -6.0 1.8 Mining (-3.2) (3.9) (21.6) (-2.5) (13.5) (12.4) (2.4) (-5.2) (-7.5) (1.0) Metallurgy (210.0) (-2.4) (39.0) (-16.0) (-27.1) (68.5) (13.6) (19.4) (11.3) (12.4) Hydrocarbons 97.5 36.5 34.9 -12.2 -21.5 5.7 -24.0 -6.7 -10.0 -6.5 Manufacturing 1.3 8.3 4.3 12.1 6.8 7.5 6.0 4.2 2.6 -1.4 Construction 2.9 1.7 2.1 9.0 12.9 7.9 7.9 2.8 2.5 -5.0 Energy 7.2 6.1 11.0 10.0 2.2 6.8 5.9 4.9 5.7 2.4 Transport and Communication 7.5 7.1 6.4 14.9 13.7 11.9 12.7 8.0 3.2 2.0 Commerce 2.7 2.2 3.0 6.5 7.6 4.0 2.2 3.1 2.2 1.0 Banking 12.0 27.3 18.0 10.7 17.3 19.5 12.1 5.0 6.6 1.0 General Government 10.4 8.8 6.1 9.8 7.3 6.5 4.2 2.5 2.1 1.3 ownership of Dwellings 2.6 3.0 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.5 4.1 1.0 3.6 1.5 Other Servires 2.7 0.3 2.3 5.1 6.1 6.1 3.8 4.5 4.8 2.3 Source: Table 2.2  TABLE 2.5: BOLIVIA - COMPOSITION OF GDP BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN 1970-80 (Constant 1970 Prices) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Cross Domestic Product at m.p. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Agriculture 18.1 18.3 18.3 17.9 17.5 17.8 17.1 16.0 15.9 15.9 16.1 Mining and Metallurgy 9.4 8.9 8.8 10.0 9.2 7.5 8.0 8.0 7.4 6.8 6.9 Mining (9.4) (8.6) (8.5) (9.6) (8.8) (7.3) (7.6) (7.6) (7.0) (6.3) (6.3) Metallurgy (-) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.6) Hydrocarbons 0.1 1.8 ?.3 2.9 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 Manufacturing 14.4 14.0 14.3 14.0 14.7 15.0 15.1 15.4 15.6 15.7 15.3 Construction 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.1 a Energy 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 Transport and Communication 7.5 7.7 7.8 7.8 8.4 9.1 9.5 10.4 10.9 11.0 11.1 Commerce 17.6 17.2 16.7 16.1 16.1 16.5 16.1 15.9 15.9 15.9 16.0 Banking 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 General Government 8.0 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.9 9.1 9.0 9.1 9.0 9.0 9.1 Ownership of Dwellings 8.8 8.6 8.4 8.1 7.9 7.9 7.7 7.8 7.7 7.9 7.9 Other Services 8.2 8.0 7.7 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.7 Source: Table 2.2.  TABLE 2.6: BOLIVIA - EXPKND[TUA( ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT CORRENT PRIZES, 1970-'1- (Millions of 5b) 1970 1971 1972 1973 197-4 1975 1976 1977 1975 1979 1980) Gross Domestic Product at m.p 12,374 13,534 17,218 26,150 43,829 49,4b8 57,787 66,743 80,594 t02,279 149,506 Net Factor Income -301 -204 -285 -458 -810 -738 -800 -1,51)4 -2, 186 -3, 394 -6, 389 Gross National Produict at 1.p 12,o73 13,33)' 16,933 5,692 43,019 48,731) 56,987 65,239 78,409 98,885 143 117 Exports of Goods and NFS 2,443 2,41 P 2,897 5,738 12,116 10,096 12,736 14,1l02 14,090 17,597 25,586 lomports of Goods and NFS 2,137 2,264 2,714 5,360 8,430 12,808 13,476 14,328 1R,234 22,154 23,446 Resource Gap -3016 -146 -183 -378 -3,686 2,712 740 226 4,144 4,557 -2,140 Available Resources 12,068 13,388 17,o35 25,/72 40,143 52,180 58,527 66,969 84,738 106,836 147,366 Consumption 9,957 11,086 13,671 20,461 33,117 40,379 44,755 51,378 66,767 86,553 127,602 (Private) (8,633) (9,566) (11,752) (17,656) (28,669) (34,70(0) (38,188) (42,359) (55,946) (74,362) (112,210) (Public) (1,324) (1,520) (1,919) (2,805) (4,448) (5,679) (6,567) (9,1)19) (10,921) (12,191) (15,392) Gross Domestic Investmsent 2,111 2,3o2 3,364 5,311 7,026 11,801 13,772 15,591 17,971 20,283 19,764 (Fixed Capital Formation) (1,792) (1,927) (2,567) (4,443) (6,468) (8,830) (12,5(18) (14,442) (15,959) (17,480) 17,189) (Changes in Stocks) (319) (375) (797) (878) (588) (2,971) (1,264) (1,149) (2,012) (2,803) (2,575) Gross Domestic Savings 2,417 2,448 3,364 5,689 10,712 9,089 13,1)32 15,1)05 13,827 15,726 21,904 Net Factor Income -3u1 -204 -285 -458 -810 -738 -800 -1 ,504 -2,186 -3,394 -6,389 Net Curreut Tranisfers 46 84 177 308 274 208 280 38( 7256 1,009 1,396 Grosq National Savines 2,162 2,328 3,256 5,539 10,17b 8,559 12,512 13,881 12,397 13,341 16,911 NOTE: Set factor incone, exports and imports of goods and NFS, and net current transfers are from the Balance of Payments. Source: Central Banik of Bolivia  TABIE 2.7: BDLIIVA - EXPFENDITURE ON GROSS D ME[IC PRODDuCT AT COfNSTANT PRICES, 1T70-0 (MilLio's of 1'370 SO) 1970 1971 1972 1973 19374 197'5 19376 1-77 1978 1979 1'39 ,,DP at M.P. 12,359 13,732 14,6'3 15,563 16,353 17,469 18,064 18,623 19,027 19,161 TOT Dffect - -498 -652 -719 457' 62 135 15 226 322 642 GDY 12,374 12,4b7 13,0G) 13,949 16,02D 16,415 17,604 18,079 18,854 19,329 19,803 Imports of Goods and NWS 2,137 2,2Z6 2,155 2,166 2,73D 3,957 3,848 3,531 4,327 4,489 3,499 axports of Goods and W3S 2,443 2,875 2,993 3,027 3,132 3,076 3,494 3,394 3,091 3,270 3,210 Exports 'MI adjuosted 2,443 2,377 2,341 2,303 3,589 3,133 3,629 3,409 3,317 3,592 3,852 Resours_e Gap -306 -171 -186 -142 -859 819 219 122 1,010 897 -353 Corisumnpt on 9,957 9,996 10,079 11,324 12,671 13,689 14,063 14,347 16,366 17,148 17,296 Private 8,633 8,554 8,480 9,540 10,72S 11,53D 11,811 11,961 13,878 14,560 14,682 Public 1,324 1,442 1,599 1,784 1,945 2,159 2,252 2,396 2,483 2,588 2,614 Gross Dcmsstic Investrnent 2,111 2,320 2,815 2,483 2,490 3,545 3,760 3,854 3,493 3,078 2,154 Fixed Capital Forimticn 1,792 1,949 2,150 2,093 2,312 2,751 3,443 3,607 3,102 2,623 1,869 .Thanges Ln Stocks 319 371 665 390 178 794 317 247 396 455 235 Gtruss DarmastLc Savings 2,417 2,491 3,001 2,625 3,349 2,726 3,541 3,732 2,488 2,181 2,507 Net Factor Inoce -301 -189 -237 -191 -271 -216 -230 -3'3 -491 -653 -919 Net C%rrent Transfers 46 78 1483 123 92 61 81 102 170 194 201 Gruss National Savings 2,162 2,3W) 2,912 2,562 3,170 2,571 3,392 3,436 2,167 1,722 1,739 Sourre: Centml Bank of BoLivia  TABLE 2.8: BOLIVIA - CAPITAL FORMATION 1970 - 77 (Millions of $b) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Machinery and Equipment Agricultural 42 39 62 61 129 231 158 142 Other 424 551 698 1,146 1,795 2,441 3,201 4,288 (Public) (252) (445) (512) (436) (463) (1,123) (2,600) (3,879) (Private) (172) (106) (186) (710) (1,332) (1,318) (601) (409) Transport Equipment 417 364 537 1,162 1,468 2,347 2,557 2,170 (Public) (228) (219) (273) (162) (173) (647) (742) (427) (Private) (189) (145) (264) (1,000) (1,295) (1,700) (1,815) (1,743) Sub Total 883 954 1,297 2,369 3,392 5,019 5,916 6,600 Other Fixed Assets 909 973 1,260 2,064 3,076 3,811 6,592 7,842 Fixed Capital Formation 1,792 1,960 2,305 2,709 4,942 7,980 13,064 14,673 (Public) (1,002) (1,170) (1,548) (1,690) (2,199) (3,711) (7,022 (9,250) (Private) (790) (790) (757) (1,019) (2,743) (4,269) (6,042) (5,423) Total Fixed Capital 1,792 1,927 2,567 4,433 6,468 8,830 12,508 14,442 Increase in Stocks 319 375 797 878 558 2,971 1,264 1,149 Gross Capital Formation 2,111 2,302 3,364 5,311 7,026 11,801 13,772 15,591 GDP at Market Prices 12,374 13,534 17,218 26,150 43,829 49,468 57,787 66,743 Fixed Capital Formation % of CDP 14.5 14.2 14.9 17.0 14.8 17.8 21.6 21.6 Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.  TABLE 3.1: BOLIVIA - BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1970-80 (Millions of US$) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 -Trade Balance 31.8 16.8 24.9 30.3 190.3 -130.6 -25-5 15.4 -180-5 -201.5 128.1 Exports (F.O.B.) (191.0) (186.4) (197-9) (260.5) (556-4) (444-0) (568.2) (634-3) (627-3) (761-3) (941-9) Imports (C.I.F.) (159.2) (169.6) (173-0) (230.2) (366.1) (574-6) (593-7) (618.9) (807.8) (962.8) (813.8) Balance of NFS -6.0 -4.5 -11.0 -11.4 -6.0 -5.0 -11.5 -26.7 -26.7 -22.2 -41.5 Receipts (14.6) (16.4) (21.6) (26.4) (49-4) (60.8) (68.6) (70.8) (77.2) (100.8) (102.5) Payments (20.6) (20.9) (32.6) (37.8) (55.4) (65.8) (80.1) (97.5) (103-9) (123.0) (144.0) of which: Freight and Insurance (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (0-7) (3.7) (5.0) Others (-6.0) (-4.5) (-11.0) (-11.4) (-6.0) (-5.0) (-11.5) (-26.7) (-27.4) (-25.9) (-46.5) -Balance of Goods and NFS 25.8 12.3 13.9 18.9 184.3 -135.6 -37.0 -11.3 -207.2 -223.5 86.6 -Factor Services (Net) -25.3 -17.2 -21.6 -22.9 -40.5 -36.9 -40.0 -75.2 -109.3 -166.4 -260.8 Receipts 2.1 4.2 0.2 6.8 3.9 6.7 16.8 7.0 5.0 7.0 14.2 l Interest (2.1) (4-2) (0.2) (6-8) (3-9) (6-7) (16.8) (7.0) (5-0) (7-0) (14-2) c Other(-(-(-() () () ()()() Payments: 27.4 21.4 21.8 29.7 44.4 43.6 56.8 82.2 114-3 173.4 275.0 Interest (8-3) (12.8) (15-4) (22.6) (28.1) (33.6) (45-9) (68-8) (94.4) (147-0) (245-3) Other (19.1) (8.6) (6.4) (7-1) (16.3) (10.0) (10.9) (13-4) (19-9) (26.4) (29.7) -Private Transfers (Net) 1.5 2.1 4.8 4.9 3.0 2.6 4.2 5.0 7.8 6.5 8.0 -Balance on Current Account 2.0 -2.8 -2.9 0.9 146.8 -169.9 -72.8 -81.5 -308.7 -383.4 -166.2 Official Transfers (Net) 2.4 5.0 8.6 10.5 10.7 7.8 9.8 14.0 30.0 43.0 48.0 Direct Foreign Investment -75.5 1.9 -10.6 4.6 25.8 35-2 19.5 22.0 19.0 28.0 44.5 Net Official M & LT 108.8 67.8 101.0 21.5 73.3 110.7 221.7 340.7 249-3 179-3 322.2 (Disbursements) (129.3) (95.6) (147-5) (57-3) (129-5) (160.9) (288.2) (236.3) (361.1) (321.8) (439.1) (Amortizations) (-20.5) (-27.8) (-46.5) (-35.8) (-56.2) (-50.2) (-66.5) (-95.6) (-111.8) (-142.5) (-116.9) Other Long-Term Capital (Net) (-) () (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 5.1 (-) -13.8 Short Term Capital (Net) -0.4 7.3 -0.4 -1.9 -2.8 -2.4 0.7 37.4 32.6 -34.6 52.7 Use of IMF Resources (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 19.2 (-) 87.7 Errors and Omissions -37.8 -94.2 -84.2 -50.5 -145.7 -32.1 -118.1 -308.0 -119.5 12.3 -410.1 Change in Reserves(- = increase) 0.5 15.0 -11.5 14.9 -108.1 50.7 -60.8 -24.6 73.0 155.4 35.0 -Memo Items Imports (F.O.B.) 135.2 144.2 142.8 194.0 304.2 502.7 515.5 532.1 689.8 815.4 680.4 Reserve Level (Gross) 60.4 61.7 76.5 88.6 208.9 175.5 211.3 287.4 229.8 259.7 204.2 Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.  TABLE 3.2: 801LIVIA - MERCHANDISE tXPORTS (CIF), 1970-80 (Hillions of US$) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Minerals: 204.9 173.3 174.1 225.9 387.3 314.2 393.5 491.4 515.0 591.7 641.2 Tin Concentrdted 102.0) 82.0 88.9 98.7 174.5 120.0 142.1 192.9 172.7 167.6 139.3 TIn Metadilic - 23.9 24.6 32.3 55.6 51.4 74.3 133.8 201.0 228.0 238.8 Copper 12.5 8,3 8.8 13.4 16.0 7.3 6.5 4.1 4.0 3.3 3.6 Lead 7.8 6.0 5.7 8.3 11.5 7.7 8.4 12.4 1(0.7 18.0 14.5 Zinc 14.3 15.3 15.4 26.0 37.7 40.3 39.1 44.7 31.3 42.7 36.7 Tungsten 17.6 13.6 10.3 tl.l 21.1 22.3 34.8 45.1 39.5 35.1 47.4 Silver 10.5 8.3 7.6 17.6 26.8 28.5 24.3 30.8 33.8 58.3 118.3 Atimony 30.9 9.0 9.1 17.4 29.1 17.1 31.4 18.1 16.6 29.6 26.4 Others 9.3 6.9 3.7 6.1 15.0 19.6 32.6 9.5 5.4 9.1 16.2 Hydrocarbons: 13.2 23.9 41.6 67.0 193.1 158.9 167.5 134.8 122.1 149.7 245.1 Petroleum 13.2 13.9 31.7 48.9 163.9 111.4 11?.6 67.4 42.3 44.0 22.6 Natural Gas - - 9.9 18.1 29.2 47.5 54.9 67.4 79.8 105.7 222.5 Ariulral Products: 10.2 18.1 24.7 45.4 70.1 59.5 85.8 84.9 74.9 94.0 110.] Sugar 1.0 1.0 0.4 12.4 21.9 17.4 42.8 22.9 14.2 30.4 51.2 CoStton .7 3.8 7.6 9.7 22.0 18.1 12.0 17.7 14.8 10.6 1.0 Coffee 3.5 3.5 4.8 5.9 4.3 7.0 13.? l4-7 16.7 19.7 20.8 Timber 1.9 2.8 3.8 7.7 12.9 11.1 10.0 L2.0 1.6 19.0 23.4 Meat dnd Cattle 0.5 2.0 I.S 3.1 0.2 0.8 2.1 3.0 2.6 3.0 1.3 Others 2.6 5.0 6.3 6.6 8.8 5.1 5.7 10.6 14.0 11.3 12.4 Other Products: 0.5 0.7 - - - 3.5 2.8 8.2 11.7 24.0 39.5 Total Merchandise Fxports (CIF) ?28.8 216.( 240.4 338.3 650.5 536.1 649.6 719.3 723.7 859.4 1.035.9 Balance of Payments Adjustents I/ 37.8 29.6 42.5 77.8 94.1 82.4 81.4 85.0 96.4 97.6 94.0 Total Merchandise (FOB) 191.0 186.4 197.9 260.5 556.4 444.0 453.7 634.3 627.3 761.8 941.9 Non-Factor Services 14.6 16.4 21.6 26.4 49.4 60.8 68.6 70.8 77.2 OO.8 102.5 Total Exports and NE-S ?05.6 202.8 219.5 296.9 605.8 504.8 514.5 705.1 704.5 862.6 1.044.4 1/ Includes contrabdnd adjustment Source: Centrdl Bank of Bolivia, unpublished worksheets.  TABLE 3.3: BOLIVIA - MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (CIF) 1970-80 (Millions of 1970 US$) Preliminary 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Minerals: 204.9 212.9 211.2 215.4 214.2 191.5 217.8 220.3 200.4 196.5 181.6 Tin Concentrated 102.0 86.0 87.2 79.0 80.3 63.8 68.6 67.3 50.6 41.4 30.4 Tin Metallic (-) 24.7 23.8 24.9 25.6 27.2 36.1 45.6 58.0 55.8 51.8 Copper 12.5 11.0 11.9 11.6 11.2 8.5 6.6 4.5 4.2 2.5 2.4 Lead 7.8 7.1 5.8 6.1 5.9 5.4 5.6 6.0 5.0 4.7 4.8 Zinc 14.3 14.0 12.2 15.3 15.1 15.2 15.2 18.9 15.9 16.6 14.1 Tungsten 17.6 19.2 20.0 20.2 19.2 18.6 23.9 20.4 20.7 19.4 25.2 Silver 10.5 9.8 8.1 9.3 10.1 11.6 10.0 11.8 11.1 10.2 10.0 Antimony 30.9 31.1 35.1 39.5 34.9 31.8 46.3 36.8 28.8 44.5 33.7 Others 9.3 10.0 7.1 9.5 11.9 10.2 5.5 9.0 6.9 1.4 9.2 Hydrocarboris: 13.2 23.9 40.5 48.5 45.3 38.3 37.8 28.3 23.1 20.3 21.3 Petroleum 13.2 23.9 31.0 33.5 30.5 23.4 22.8 12.7 8.1 3.9 1.9 Natuiral Gas (-) (-) 9.5 15.0 14.8 14.9 15.0 15.6 15.0 16.4 19.4 Agricultural Products: 10.2 14.4 17.8 27.2 29.5 37.8 43.3 39.9 39.5 49.5 53.1 Sugar 1.0 0.9 0.4 9.1 6.4 10.2 19.9 16.0 10.3 16.8 13.9 Cotton 0.7 2.0 3.5 5.2 7.4 7.4 3.1 3.2 4.9 3.1 4.5 Coffee 3.5 3.7 4.9 4.2 3.4 5.3 5.3 4.5 5.5 7.7 12.0 Timber 1.9 3.0 3.6 4.5 8.3 9.1 11.2 10.3 12.1 17.5 18.6 Meat and Cattle 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.9 - - 1.0 1.1 1.4 0.7 0.4 Others 2.6 4.0 4.6 3.3 4.0 3.0 2.8 4.8 5.3 3.7 3.7 Other Products 0.5 3.1 - _ - 2.0 1.4 3.7 4.5 7.9 11.7 Total Merchandise Exports (CIF)228.8 254.2 269.5 291.2 289.0 ?69.6 3(00.3 292.2 267.5 274.2 267.7 Balance of Payments Adjustmentl/37.8 27.4 35.7 54.8 53.5 40.8 39.7 38.5 36.5 32.3 27.9 Total Merchandise (FOB) 191.0 226.8 233.8 236.3 235.5 228.8 260.6 253.7 231.0 241.9 239.8 Non-Factor Services 14.6 15.2 18.2 18.6 28.1 30.1 33.5 32.0 29.2 33.4 30.4 Total Exports and NI S 205.6 242.0 252.0 254.8 263.6 258.9 294.1 285.7 260.2 275.3 270.2 1/ Includes contraband adjustment. Source: Central Bank of Bolivia  TABLE 3.4: BOLIVIA - MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (CIF), 1970-80 (Millions of US$) Estimated 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Consumer Goods 32.3 34.2 34.6 40.8 90.4 127.8 118.7 126.7 173.5 235.7 187.2 Durable (22.5) (24.7) (26.5) (31.0) (52.7) (60.3) (56.0) (61.8) (84.7) (110.6) (89.5) Non Durable (9.8) (9.5) (8.1) (9.8) (37.7) (67.5) (62.7) (64.9) (88.8) (125.1) (97.7) Raw Materials and Intermediate Goods 59.9 53.4 51.0 61.1 119.6 199.2 195.8 219.3 282.4 331.8 284.8 Fuel (1.1) (1.2) (1.7) (2.0) (4.0) (7.2) (6.1) (6.2) (8.1) (9.6) (8.1) For Agriculture (2.4) (2.0) (2.1) (2.4) (12.3) (21.2) (18.9) (21.6) (28.2) (31.7) (28.5) For Tndustry (56.4) (50.2) (47.2) (56.7) (103.3) (170.8) (170.8) (191.5) (246.1) (290.5) (248.2) Capital Goods 66.2 71.1 84.6 99.9 177.2 223.7 235.7 267.6 345.3 384.7 333.7 Construction (8.8) (15.4) (14.5) (16.9) (19.8) (24.6) (25.5) (29.1) (36.3) (43.3) (32.6) For Agriculture (3.2) (3.0) (4.1) (4.9) (6.0) (7.2) (8.3) (9.9) (12.9) (14.4) (16.3) For Industry (26.4) (31.3) (31.5) (36.9) (70.4) (92.6) (98.2) (111.2) (142.8) (168.3) (146.5) Transport and Equipment (27.8) (21.4) (34.5) (41.2) (81.0) (99.3) (103.7) (111.7) (153.3) (158.7) (138.3) Other Goods 1/ 0.8 10.9 2.8 28.4 2.8 23.9 43.5 5.3 6.6 10.6 8.1 Total Merchandise imports (CIF)159.2 169.6 173.0 230.2 390.0 574.6 593.7 618.9 807.8 962.8 813.8 Freight and Insurance 24.0 25.4 30.2 36.2 85.8 71.9 78.2 86.8 118.0 147.4 133.7 Total Merchandise Imports (FOB)135.2 144.2 142.8 194.0 304.2 502.7 515.5 532.1 689.8 815.4 680.1 Non-Factor Services 44.6 46.3 62.8 74.0 140.8 137.7 158.3 184.3 221.9 270.4 277.7 Total Imports and NFS 179.8 190.5 205.6 268.0 445.0 640.4 673.8 716.4 911.7 1.085.8 957.8 1/ Includes wheat and other government imports. Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.  TABLE 3.5: BOLIVIA - MERCHANDISE IMPORTS, 1970-80 (Millions of US$) Estimated 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1 T _8( im Import P'rice Indices (1970 = 100) Consumer Goods 100 95.5 101.8 149.5 215.7 178.7 203.9 259.6 234.1 267.5 303.9 (Durable) (100) (94.4) (100.0) (146.3) (202.0) (166.6) (187.0) (226.0) (213.(0) (250.0) (287.0) (Non-durable) (1(0) (97.8) (108.7) (160.8) (239.0) (191.3) (221.7) (302.0) (258.6) (284.7) (321.7) Raw Materials anid inter- mediate goods 100 97.1 107.8 159.9 220.2 187.0 216.6 270.7 252.1 289.9 320.7 (Fuel) (100) (136.0) (173.() (236.0) (900.0) (873.0) (936.0) (1027.0) (1036.0) (1490.0) (2315.0) (Other intermediate goods) (100) (96.0) (306.0) (158.0) (214.0) (182.0) (211.0) (265.0) (247.0) (274.0) (313.0) Capital Goods 1lB 108.4 199.9 142.0 176.0 202.0 205.() 221.0 264.0 301.8 337.2 O;ther Goods 100 108.4 119.9 142.0 176.0 202.0 205.0 221.0 264.0 301.8 337.2 Total Merchandise Imports (CIF) 100 101.9 112.2 147.6 196.5 191.2 208.5 244.4 252.9 285.5 323.2 o, Freight and Insurance 1()0 108.5 119.9 142.0 176.0 202.0 205.0 221.0 264.0 301.8 337.2 Total Merchandise Imports (FOB) 100 100.8 110.7 124.4 203.1 189.8 209.0 249.0 251.0 282.7 320.0 Non-factor Services 100 108.5 119.9 142.0 176.0 202.0 205.0 221.0 264.0 301.8 337.2 Total Imports and NFS 100 102.6 113.3 147.0J 193.6 192.2 208.0 241.0 250.3 287.3 325.2 Imports in Cornstant (1970) US$ Millions Consumer Goods 32.3 35.8 34.0 27.3 41.9 72.5 58.2 48.8 74.1 88.1 61.6 (Durable) (22.5) (26.1) (26.5) (21.2) (26.1) (36.2) (29.9) (27.3) (39.8) (44.2) (31.2) (Non-durable) (9.8) (9.7) (7.5) (6.1) (15.8) (35.3) (28.3) (21.5) (34.3) (43.9) (30.4) Raw Materials and Inter- mediate goods 59.9 55.0 47.3 38.2 54.3 106.5 90.4 81.0 112.0 118.1 88.8 (Fuel) (1.1) (0.9) (1.0) (0.8) (0.4) (0.8) (0.7) (0.6) (0.8) (0.6) (0.3) (Other intermediate goods) (58.8) (54.10 (46.3) (37.4) (53.9) (105.7) (89.7) (80.4) (111.2) (117.5) (88.5) Capital Goods 66.2 65.6 70.6 70.4 100.7 110.7 115.0 121.0 130.8 127.5 99.0 Other Goods (.8 10.0 2.3 20.0 1.6 11.8 21.2 2.4 2.5 3.5 2.4 Total Merchandise Imports (CIF) 159.2 166.4 154.2 155.9 198.5 300.5 284.8 253.2 319.4 337.2 251.8 Freight and Insurarnce 24.0 23.4 25.2 25.0 48.7 35.6 38.1 39.3 44.7 48.8 39.7 Total Merchandise Imports (FOB) 135.2 143.0 129.0 130.9 149.8 264.9 246.7 213.9 274.7 288.4 212.1 Non-factor Services 44.6 42.7 52.4 51.4 80.0 68.2 77.2 83.3 84.1 89.5 82.4 Total Imports anid NFS 179.8 185.7 181.4 182.3 229.8 333.1 323.9 297.2 364.2 377.9 294.5 Source: IBRI), Commodity Price Data  -8f -l TABLE 3.6: GROSS VALUE OF EXPORTS OF MINING AND METALLURGY ACCORDING TO PRODUCERS (Millions of US$) Year MEDIUM SMALL COMIBOL SCALE SCALE OTHER METALLURGIC MINING MINING EXPORTERS PRODUCERS TOTAL 1972 93.1 31.5 20.5 4.3 24.7 174.1 1973 114.8 44.9 18.6 11.4 36.2 225.9 1974 196.4 70.8 37.6 15.6 66.8 387.2 1975 171.8 55.5 17.5 10.6 58.8 314.2 1976 185.6 66.2 34.7 15.5 91.5 393.5 1977 217.9 68.5 43.1 17.6 145.8 492.9 1978 192.2 67.3 42.2 2.9 210.4 515.0 1979 196.6 81.2 61.8 8.1 243.9 591.6 1980 234.8 64.8 64.8 11.0 265.7 641.1 Source: Ministry of Mining  Page 1 of 2 TABLE 3.7: BOLIVIA - MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (CIF), 1970-80 (Millions of USS) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Minerals (Metric Tons) Tin (concentrated) Volume 27,836 23,463 23,780 21,544 21,905 17,418 18,740 18,377 13,818 11,304 8,313 Price 3,845 3,495 3,740 4,580 7,965 6,891 7,582 10,495 12,498 14,823 16,763 Value 107,032 82,004 88,927 98,667 174,470 120,019 142,078 192,867 172,702 167,563 139,349 Tin (metallic) Volume - 6,814 6,553 6,866 7,049 7,497 9,868 12,478 15,879 15,313 14,218 Price - 3,504 3,756 4,708 7,894 6,853 7,524 10,722 12,657 14,890 16,796 Value - 23,874 24,614 32,326 55,647 51,379 74,251 133,786 200,976 228,004 238,000 Copper Volume 8,823 7,809 8,430 8,230 7,923 5,991 4,680 3,174 2,990 1,740 1,676 Price 1,416 1,062 1,039 1,633 2,022 1,212 1,393 1,291 1,327 1,894 2,110 Value 12,498 8,297 8,770 13,440 16,018 7,263 6,519 4,099 3,968 3,296 3,536 Lead Volume 25,756 23,337 19,188 20,153 19,374 17,665 18,582 19,878 16,482 15,633 15,936 Price 303 255 301 414 593 436 454 624 648 1,151 907 Value 7,808 5,949 5,776 8,347 11,495 7,706 8,436 12,398 10,683 17,992 14,450 x Zinc Volume 46,547 45,412 39,702 49,568 49,015 49,544 49,206 61,356 51,621 53,923 46,236 Price 308 336 389 524 768 814 795 729 608 791 793 Value 14,319 15,270 15,438 25,963 37,656 40,332 39,139 44,745 31,362 42,678 36,679 Tungsten Volume 2,410 2,638 2,750 2,768 2,618 2,551 3,278 2,800 2,852 2,647 3,435 Price 7,290 5,159 3,740 4,020 8,058 8,741 10,630 16,118 13,840 13,278 13,790 Value 17,568 13,610 10,284 11,128 21,096 22,298 34,844 45,130 39,472 35,148 47,369 Silver Volume 186 172 143 165 179 204 177 209 198 181 176 price 56,495 48,500 53,077 76,127 149,911 139,912 137,418 147,407 170,525 321,917 672,318 Value 10,508 8,342 7,593 12,561 26,834 28,542 24,323 30,808 33,764 58,267 118,328 Antimony Volume 11,576 11,672 13,149 14,800 13,071 11,927 17,409 13,822 10,526 16,636 12,622 Price 2,676 778 691 1,173 2,227 1,439 1,803 1,306 1,579 1,778 2,094 Value 30,978 9,040 9,087 17,353 29,114 17,159 31,393 18,053 16,616 29,577 26,433  Page 2 of 2 TABLE 3.7: BOLIVIA - MEROiANDISE EXPORTS (CIF), 1970-80 (Millions of US$) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Hdrocarbons Petroleum Crude (000 Barrels) Volume 4,662 8,447 10,944 11,844 10,789 8,282 8,066 4,489 2,863 1,363 651 - Price 2.8 2.8 2.9 4.1 15.2 13.5 14.0 15.0 14.8 32.3 34.7 Value 13,209 23,892 31,712 48,860 163,928 111,428 112,571 67,442 42,331 44,016 22,574 Natural Gas (Million of Cubic Metters) Volume - - 1,005 1,571 1,546 1,556 1,571 1,639 1,581 1,726 2,039 Price - - 9.8 11.5 18.9 27.3 34.9 40.7 49.6 60.8 108 Value - - 9,864 18,101 29,188 42,453 54,896 66,802 78,506 104,982 220,869 Agriculture (Metric Tons) Sugar Volume 7,030 6,613 2,710 63,804 44,730 50,904 139,753 112,029 72,435 118,264 98,195 Price 142.3 151 147.6 194 489 340 300 200 196 257 522 Value 1,000 1,000 400 12,400 21,900 17,400 42,800 22,900 14,200 30,392 51,226 Cotton Volume 2,211 6,129 10,856 16,253 22,972 25,774 9,662 9,888 15,118 9,729 645 1 Price 320.7 618 696 596 956 700 1,240 1,790 979 1,087 1,440 X Value 700 3,800 7,600 9,700 22,000 18,100 12,000 17,700 14,800 10,579 929 Coffee Volume 3,669 3,576 4,732 4,130 3,288 5,120 5,098 4,465 5,387 7,565 5,479 Price 1,028 982 993 1,428 1,307 1,360 2,580 3,748 3,100 2,600 3,790 Value 3,500 3,500 4,800 5,900 4,300 7,000 13,200 18,700 16,700 19,691 20,974 Timber Volume 19,937 31,298 44,653 46,495 85,784 94,193 84,890 42,605 49,689 71,932 76,701 Price 96.5 88 85 165 150 118 118 282 253 260 300 Value 1,900 2,800 3,800 7,700 12,900 11,100 10,000 12,000 12,600 19,008 23,449 Meat and Cattle Volume n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,897 7,579 8,497 10,371 11,975 6,394 Price n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 421 276 353 251 250 200 Value 500 2,000 1,800 3,100 200 800 2,100 3,000 2,600 2,991 1,279 Source: Central Bank of Bolivia and INE.  - 88 - TABLE 3.8: BOLIVIA - DIRECTION OF TRADE (Percent) PRELIMINARY 1977 1978 1979 1980 Exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Latin America Free Trade Association 26.3 25.9 26.8 36.7 Argentina (19.4) (16.6) (15.0) (23.7) Brazil (3.0) (3.9) (5.1) (3.5) Andean Common Market (2.8) (3.7) (5.1) (7.6) o/w: Chile /1.4/ /2.6/ /3.7/ /4.5/ Peru /0.8/ /0.9/ /1.4/ /3.1/ Other (1.1) (1.7) (1.6) (1.9) European Common Market 1/ 11.3 11.8 13.4 17.6 Germany (F.D.R.) (3.6) (4.8) (4.7) (5.3) France (1.4) (1.3) (1.4) (4.3) Netherlands (4.9) (3.9) (5.0) (4.4) Other (1.4) (1.8) (2.3) (3.6) United Kingdom 11.5 11.8 8.9 6.9 U.S.A. 35.3 31.2 33.0 25.7 Japan 2.8 2.0 2.3 1.0 Other 12.8 17.3 15.6 12.1 Imports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Latin America Free Association 31.6 27.9 26.9 27.6 Argentina (12.7) (11.2) (10.9) (12.3) Brazil (10.9) (9.5) (9.0) (8.6) Andean Common Market (7.6) (5.9) (5.7) (5.5) o/w: Chile /3.6/ /3.2/ /3.1/ /2.5/ Peru /2.6/ /2.2/ /2.1/ /2.6/ Other (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.2) European Common Market 1/ 12.1 13.3 12.5 13.4 Germany (F.D.R.) (8.4) (9.4) (8.4) (9.5) France (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.1) Netherlands (1.0) (1.1) (1.3) (1.3) Other (1.7) (1.8) (1.8) (1.5) United Kingdom 3.3 2.9 3.0 3.1 U.S.A. 29.4 27.6 27.9 32.0 Japan 12.8 16.2 17.6 14.8 Other 11.1 12.1 12.1 9.1 1/ Exludes U.K., Denmark and Ireland Source: Central Bank of Bolivia; Mission Estimates.  TABLE 3.9: BOLIVLA - TERMS OF TRADE, 1970-80 (1970 = 100) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Exports Quantum Index 100 118.7 125.8 127.1 126.1 123.1 140.2 136.5 124.3 130.2 129.1 Price Index 100 82.2 84.6 110.2 236.3 194 218 250 271.6 329.8 392.3 Imports Quantum Index 100 105.7 95.4 36.8 110.7 195.9 182.4 158.2 203.2 213.3 156.9 Price Index 100 100.8 110.6 148.2 203.0 189.8 209.0 249.0 251.0 282.7 320.0 Terms of Trade 100 81.5 76.5 74.4 116.4 102.2 104.3 100.4 108.2 116.6 122.6  Table 4.1 - BOLIVIA FA-;F -1 EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) D E B T O U T S I A N D I N G : I N A R R E A R S TYPE OF CREDITOR ----------------------------------- -------- CREDITOR COUNTRY DISBURSED :UNDISHURSED: TOTAL PRINCIPAL INTEREST SUPPLIERS CREDITS BELGIUM 5,309 5,309 - SOUTH AFRICA 2,999 - 2999 - UNITED STATES 597 - 597 - MULTIPLE LENDERS 10,094 10,094 - TOTAL SUPPLIERS CREDITS 18.999 - 18,999 - FINANCIAL INSTITlJTIONS AUSTRIA 236 236 - BELGIUM 35.850 15,924 51,774 - BRAZIL 12.736 5,027 17.763 2.30'l CANADA 6.023 - 6.023 - FRANCE 8.392 5,184 13,576 - GERMANY, FED.REP. OF 7.789 - 7.789 - ITALY 353 - 353 - LUXEMBOURG 51,025 - 51.025 - PANAMA 8.652 - 8,652 - SWEDEN 497 9.074 9,571 - SWITZERLAND 21,965 - 21,965 - - UNITED KINGDOM 2 943 - 2,943 - UNITED STATES 318.437 - 318,437 - MULTIPLE LENDERS 205,287 - 205,287 - TOTAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 680, 185 35,209 715,394 2,304 BONDS UNITED KINGDOM 15.000 - 15.000 10.000 TOTAL BONDS 15.000 - 15.000 10.000 MULTILATERAL LOANS IBRO 202.690 72,288 274,978 - IDA 78.327 29,238 107,565 - IDB 216.428 205.097 421.525 - TOTAL MULTILATERAL LOANS 497,445 306.623 804,068 - BILATERAL LOANS ARGENTINA 96.078 - 96.078 - BRAZIL 34.005 34.005 - CZECHOSLOVAKIA 2,572 - 2,572 - GERMANY, FEU.RFP. OF 10433 10,433 - POLAND 3.687 - 3,687 UNITED STATES 23,024 - 23,024 - USSR 21.620 1,884 23,504 - VENEZUELA 26.469 26,697 53,156 - MULTIPLE LENDERS 98.385 54,317 152,702  Table 4.1 - BOLIVIA PAGE 2 EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUJDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) D E B T O U T S T A N D I N G : I N A R R E A R S TYPE OF CREDITOR -----------------------:----------------------- CREDITOR COUNTRY DISBURSED :UNDISBURSED: TOTAL : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL BILATERAL LOANS 316,273 82,898 399,171 - - TOTAL EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 1.527,902 424,730 1,952,632 12,304 - NOTES: (1) ONLY DEBTS WITH AN ORIGINAL OR EXTENDED MATURITY OF OVER ONE YEAR ARE INCLUDED IN THIS TABLE. (2) DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDES PRINCIPAL IN ARREARS BUT EXCLUDES INTEREST IN ARREARS. '.0  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS RASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FORFIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) lYPE or CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY ARGENTINA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGE-S : BERGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M F N T S CANCEL- ADJUSTT- ONLY UNDISFURSED MENTS MENTS :------------[-----------:----------- lATIONS MENT + PRINCIPAlt INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - 1,585 239 88 7 95 - - 1972 151 1.497 5.077 1,708 232 9 241 1973 1,627 6.342 5,923 476 873 87 960 5,000 1974 945 6,392 1,563 2,128 1,031 76 1.107 - - 1975 2.042 6,924 1,737 4,588 928 49 977 2 - 1976 5,702 7,731 330 2,358 1,672 548 2,220 1 - 1977 6,388 6,388 603 453 1,100 442 1,542 - - 1978 5,741 5,B91 403 403 1,330 829 2,159 - 1979 4,814 4,964 1,011 - 888 310 1,198 - - 1980 3,926 5,087 - 1,161 1,206 263 1,469 - - 1981 3,881 3,881 - - 1,064 271 1,335 - -136 1982 2,681 2,681 t * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * t * * t * 1982 2,681 2,681 - - 1.030 189 1,219 - 1 1983 1.652 1,652 - 1,020 107 1,127 - - 1984 632 632 - - 126 45 171 - - 1985 506 506 - - 126 36 162 - -1 1986 379 379 - - 126 26 152 - - 1987 253 253 - - 126 17 143 - -1 1988 126 126 - - 126 '7 133 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 2 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPIIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY AUSTRIA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R T 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENr t PRINCIPAL- INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 65 65 - - 39 3 42 1972 26 26 - - 26 2 28 1973 - - - _- - 1974 - - - _ _ 1975 - - - - _ 1976 - - - _ _ 1977 - - - - - _ 1978 - - - - - _ 1979 - - - - - 1980 - - - - - - 1981 - - - - - _ _ _ - 1982 - - t t + t THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED t t * t t * t THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 3 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY BELGIUM YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E P I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E P V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS :-----------:----------------------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) : (8) : () 1971 -- - - _ _ 1972 - - - - _ 1973 - - 5.767 - - - - - -347 1974 - 5,420 116 420 304 43 347 - 758 1975 116 5.990 - 4,042 349 4 353 - -484 1976 3.540 5.157 - 1.657 74 347 421 - 496 1977 5,579 5,579 - - 792 401 1.193 - 446 1978 5,233 5.233 - - 902 388 1,290 - 670 1979 5.001 5,001 - - 452 181 633 - 113 1980 4,662 4,662 6.500 6.500 2,382 742 3.124 - -419 1981 8.361 8.361 - - 825 701 1.526 - -504 1982 7.032 7,032 + ++ * * +THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * . 1982 7.032 7.032 - - 2,016 1.013 3,029 - _ 1983 5,016 5,016 - - 2.016 736 2,752 - - 1984 3,000 3.000 - - 1.672 459 2.131 - -1 1985 1,327 1.327 - - i.327 222 1,549 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE lN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 4 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS or EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF lJ.S. DOILARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY BRAZIL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGE.S : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:---------- LATIONS MENT I PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 27 27 - - 4 4 8 - - 1972 23 23 - - - - 1973 23 23 - - - - - - - 1974 23 23 4,718 - 23 4 27 - 1975 - 4,718 - 4,242 - 20 20 - - 1976 4.242 4,718 15,428 476 337 496 833 - - 1977 4,381 19,809 1,657 7,121 677 838 1,515 - - 1978 10,825 20,789 486 9,744 1,234 978 2.212 - - 1979 19,335 20.041 197 480 1,992 1,142 3.134 - - 1980 17,823 18,246 - 50 3,134 2,226 5.360 - - 1981 14,739 15,112 - 373 2,592 1,012 3,604 - -231 1982 12,289 12,289 t t * t * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * 4 * 4 * 1982 12,289 12,289 - - 2,508 847 3.355 - - 1983 9,781 9,781 - - 1,995 667 2,662 - 1 1984 7,787 7,787 - - 1,474 537 2,G1i - 1 1985 6,314 6,314 - - 1,474 430 1.904 - -1 1986 4.839 4,839 - - 1,319 326 1.645 - 1 1987 3,521 3,521 - - 1,319 230 1,549 - -1 1988 2,201 2.201 - - 1.319 134 1,453 - 1989 883 883 - - 589 51 640 - - 1990 294 294 - - 294 10 304 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNUISRURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRFNCY AND GOODS (IN TFIOUSANDS OF U.S. DOlLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY CANADA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S 0 U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUl;T- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENIS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - 1972 - - 1973 - - 3.695 3,695 - - - 17 1974 3,712 3,712 1,905 1,905 757 389 1.146 - -207 1975 4,653 4,653 - - 1,135 365 1,500 - -116 1976 3,402 3,402 - - 1,171 279 1,450 - 52 1977 2,283 2,283 - 1,086 163 1.249 - -146 197B 1,051 1,051 - - 1,011 66 1,077 - -40 1979 - - - - 1980 - - - - 1981 1982 - * * + * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * 4 * * * * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE .YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY *rO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 6 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUFSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN rHOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY CHILE YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS - ---- :-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 2.058 2,058 - - - - - - - 1972 2,058 2,058 - - - - - - 1973 2,058 2,058 - - - - - - - 1974 2,058 2,058 - - - - - - - 1975 2,058 2,058 - - - - _ 1976 2,058 2,058 - - - - 1977 2,058 2,058 - - - - 1978 2,058 2,058 - - - - _ 1979 2,058 2.058 - - - - - - - 1980 2,058 2,058 - - - - 1981 2,058 2,058 - - - - _ -2.058 1982 - - * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED t W * * * * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLtJDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND rRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 7 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DERT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY DENMARK YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY IJNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 494 1,805 - 1,328 - - - 82 1972 1,887 1,887 791 791 - - - - 43 1973 2,721 2,721 213 213 52 123 175 - 128 1974 3,010 3,010 155 155 122 24 146 - 177 1975 3,220 3,220 4,874 - 283 30 313 - -461 1976 2,788 7,350 44 44 181 24 205 - 609 1977 2,759 7,822 32 4,931 293 22 315 - 619 1978 7,896 8,180 115 - 408 - 408 298 1,123 1979 8,588 8,712 - 120 461 661 1,122 - 177 1980 8,428 8,428 - - 633 408 1,041 - -910 1981 6,885 6,885 - - 3,242 272 3.514 - -907 1982 2,736 2,736 + * * + THE FOILOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED D * * 1982 2,736 2,736 - - 1,832 60 1,892 - - 1983 904 904 - - 72 - 72 - - 1984 832 832 - - 72 - 72 - -1 1985 759 759 - - 72 - 72 - - 1986 687 687 - - 72 - 72 - - 1987 615 615 - - 72 - 72 - -1 1988 542 542 - - 72 - 72 - - 1989 470 470 - - 72 - 72 - - 1990 398 398 - - 72 - 72 - - 1991 326 326 - - 72 - 72 -1 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 8 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OlJTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY FINLAND YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT - PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - - 1972 - - - - - - 1973 - - - - - _ 1974 - - - - - - - 1975 - - - - - 1976 - - - - - - - 1977 - - 1,176 1,176 - - 1978 1,176 1,176 - - 118 141 259 1979 1,058 1,058 - - 235 80 315 1980 823 823 - - 117 33 150 1981 706 706 - - 235 42 277 - -118 1982 353 353 +-++ + * THE FOLLOWTNG FIGURFS ARE PROJECTED + * * * * * 1982 353 353 - - 235 24 259 1983 118 118 - - 118 5 123 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 9 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBlIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABlE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF UJ.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY FRANCE YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISELIRSED MENTS MENTS ---------- : -LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAl : : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 1971 385 1,514 - 1,134 - - - 96 1972 1,610 1,610 61 61 - - 31 1973 1,702 1,702 154 154 45 4 49 - 136 1974 1,947 1,947 1,721 1,721 490 88 578 3 107 1975 3,282 3,282 3,217 3,217 679 115 794 - -78 1976 5,742 5,742 72 72 1,126 299 1,425 - -290 1977 4,398 4.398 135 135 922 297 1,219 201 125 1978 3,535 3,535 1,330 552 781 173 954 - 376 1979 3.621 4,460 - 825 887 202 1,089 - 122 1980 3,695 3,695 - - 909 295 1,204 - -334 1981 2,452 2,452 - - 1,342 109 1,451 - -446 1982 664 664 * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * 1982 664 664 - - 238 50 288 - - 1983 426 426 - - 238 30 268 - 2 1984 190 190 - - 133 10 143 - 1985 57 57 - - 29 3 32 - 1 1986 29 29 - - 29 1 30 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 10 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PlJBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDTTOR COUNTRY GERMANY, FED.REP. OF YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PEPIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENt ; (2) : : ::PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) :(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) : () 1971 3,724 3,997 - - 1.021 131 1i152 372 1972 3,042 3,348 - - 224 208 432 313 64 1973 2,875 2,875 - - 1,177 173 1,350 - 548 1974 2,246 2,246 - - 1.174 108 1.282 - 188 1975 1,260 1,260 13.586 1.660 1,237 278 1,5t5 - -894 1976 1,554 12,715 2,923 2,421 1,882 - 1,882 - 1,337 1977 2,298 15,093 2,132 13,182 1,239 58 1,297 - 1,695 1978 15,605 17,681 2,101 3,911 1,840 435 2,275 - 2,390 1979 19.994 20,332 - - 16,283 1,538 17,821 - 77 1980 3,788 4,126 - 338 1,587 320 1,907 - -165 1981 2,374 2,374 - - 1,698 148 1,846 - -120 1982 556 556 + f * + f THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * + * Q 1982 556 556 - - 394 33 427 - - 1983 162 i62 - - 54 12 66 - - 1984 108 108 - - 54 8 , 62 - - 1985 54 54 - - 54 3 57 - - t THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE I SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF IJ.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY ISRAEL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIDNS MENI T PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) () 1971 - -- - - _ 1972 - - - - - _ _ 1973 - - - - - _ _ _ _ 1974 - - - - - 1975 - - 5,484 5.484 - - _ 1976 5,484 5,484 - - 1.645 475 2.120 - - 1977 3,839 3,839 - - 1,097 286 1,383 - - 1978 2.742 2,742 - - 1,097 198 1,295 - 1979 1.645 1.645 - - 548 66 614 - - 1980 1.097 1,097 - - 1,097 66 1,163 - - 1981 - - .- - 1982 - - C t * * . * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED 1 * * * * * N * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 12 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY ITALY YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------: LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) : () 1971 8,546 8,546 - - 1,194 103 1.297 - - 1972 7,352 7,352 26.647 370 2,250 252 2.502 - -1,851 1973 3,603 29,898 - 28 65 219 284 13,500 -535 1974 3,566 15,798 - - 239 173 412 - -780 1975 3.327 14,779 - 908 166 137 303 - -573 1976 4,027 14,040 - - 245 429 674 - -2,372 1977 3,600 11.423 - - 343 265 608 - 26 1978 3,256 11,106 - - 173 214 387 - 412 1979 3,098 11,345 - - 32 93 125 8,242 4 1980 3.075 3,075 - - 897 176 1,073 - -21 1981 2,157 2,157 - - 2,087 103 2,190 - -45 1 1982 25 25 C) F * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * 1 * * 1982 25 25 - - 25 1 26 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUJNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 13 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY JAPAN YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------: LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 12,409 12.409 2.080 2,080 1,525 671 2.196 - - 1972 12,964 12,964 6,432 6,432 1,863 429 2,292 - 128 1973 17,661 17.661 - -- 3,191 807 3,998 - 537 1974 15,007 15,007 - - 3,864 1,288 5,152 - -413 1975 10,730 10.730 10.780 - 2.528 822 3,350 - -47 1976 8.155 18.935 19,510 7,256 5,519 645 6,164 - 349 1977 10,053 33,275 7,681 11,821 3,209 411 3,620 - 4,039 1978 19,331 41,786 2.304 18,104 5,947 1,442 7,389 7,161 4,537 1979 33,202 35,519 19,034 2,304 6,462 1,930 8,392 - 5.051 1980 25,705 43,040 - 49 6,894 2,814 9,708 - 5,274 1981 21,006 41,420 - 3,727 7,377 1,721 9,098 - -2,551 1982 16,375 31,492 * t * * * + THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 16,375 31,492 - 4,913 6,497 1,461 7.958 - 1 1983 14,792 24,996 - 4,535 5.029 1,315 6,344 - 1 1984 14,299 19.968 - 3,590 3.947 1,225 5.172 - -2 1985 13,941 16,019 - 2,079 3.441 1,140 4,581 - 2 1986 12,580 12,580 - - 3,441 944 4.385 - -1 1987 9.138 9,138 - - 3,441 657 4.098 - - 1988 5.697 5,697 - - 2.715 370 3,085 - I 1989 2,983 2,983 - - 1,989 186 2,175 - - 1990 994 994 - - 995 37 1,032 - I * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 14 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY MEXICO YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 0 OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS- ---------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST T'OTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 1,332 1,332 - - - - - - - 1972 1,332 1,332 - - - - - - - 1973 1,332 1,332 - 1974 1,332 1,332 - - 50 - 50 35 - 1975 1,247 1,247 - - - -- - - 1976 1,247 1,247 - - - 81 81 - - 1977 1,247 1,247 - - 195 78 273 - - 1978 1,052 1,052 - - 208 65 273 - - 1979 844 844 - - 222 51 273 - - 1980 622 622 - - 237 36 273 - - 1981 385 385 - - 252 22 274 - - 1982 133 133 ++ * * * +THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED + * * * U 1982 133 133 - - 133 5 138 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBAIANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 15 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY NETHERLANDS YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T T 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS- -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT t PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTALI : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - - - - - - - 1972 -- - - - _ 1973 -- - - - _ 1974 - - - - - - _ _ 1975 - - - - _ _ _ 1976 - - - - - - - - - 1977 - - - - - _ _ 1978 - - - - - - _ _ _ 1979 - - 43,390 43,390 - 1,144 1,144 - 2,267 1980 45,657 45,657 - - - 4,382 4,382 - -4,802 1981 40,855 40,855 - - 2,627 2,627 - 5,611 1982 35,244 35,244 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * a 1982 35,244 35,244 - - - 2,643 2.643 - - 1983 35.244 35.244 - - 3.065 2.586 5,651 - - 1984 32,179 32,179 - - 3,065 2,356 5.421 - 1985 29,115 29.115 - - 3,065 2,126 5,191 - - 1986 26,050 26,050 - - 3.065 1,896 4,961 - - 1987 22,985 22.985 - - 3,065 1,666 4,731 - - 1988 19,920 19,920 - - 3,065 1,437 4,502 - - 1989 16,855 16,855 - - 3,065 1,207 4,272 - l 1990 13,791 13,791 - - 3,065 977 4,042 - - 1991 10,726 10,726 - - 3,065 747 3,812 - I * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 16 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSIANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY PERU YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 0 OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCIUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- : S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MFNTS MENTS ------------ -----------:----------- LATIONS MEN'I * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 909 909 - - - - - - 1972 909 909 - - - - 1973 909 909 - - - - 1974 909 909 - _ _ 1975 909 909 - - _ _ _ 1976 909 909 - - - - - 1977 909 909 - - - _ _ 1978 909 909 - 1979 909 909 - - 1980 909 909 - _ _ 1981 909 909 - - - - - -909 1982 - - * ' *t * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * THIS COLUMN SHOWS TFIE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOIHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 17 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DFC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY SOUTH AFRICA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS __ _A_ ----------- ----------- : IATIONS MENT * : : . PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - 4,060 - - - - - - -270 1972 - 3,790 - - - - - - -86 1973 - 3,704 - - - - - 617 1974 - 4,321 1,322 3,028 386 178 564 - -130 1975 2,603 5,127 - 838 238 280 518 - -1,023 1976 2,569 3,866 - 1,104 284 167 451 - - 1977 3,389 3,582 2,126 1,753 235 205 440 - - 1978 4,906 5,473 978 - 574 315 889 - - 1979 4,332 5,877 - 1,595 764 346 1,110 - 289 1980 5,402 5,402 - - 1,027 197 1,224 - 541 1981 4.916 4,916 - - 918 126 1,044 - -999 1 1982 2,999 2,999 * + * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * *X 1982 2,999 2,999 - - - - - - -2,999 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THIE AMOUJNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 18 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF ExrERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJIECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY SPAIN YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------------------:----------- LATIONS MENT * : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 2.989 5,327 - 2,286 - 170 170 52 - 1972 5,275 5.275 - - 856 209 1.065 - - 1973 4,419 4,419 - - 208 65 273 - - 1974 4,211 4.211 - - 280 99 379 - - 1975 3,931 3,931 - - 244 48 292 - - 1976 3,687 3,687 - - 244 36 280 - - 1977 3,443 3,443 52 40 756 424 1,180 1,290 1978 1,437 1,449 - - 398 43 441 12 - 1979 1,039 1,039 - - 42 2 44 - - 1980 997 997 - - 864 75 939 - - 1981 133 133 - - - - - - -133 1982 - _ C r * * * * t THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * w * * * ' * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 19 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY SWEDFN YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ----------- -----------:----------- LATIONS MENI ' : : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (c) 1971 162 162 282 - 20 5 25 - 1972 142 424 - 282 155 7 162 - 1973 269 269 - - 100 - 100 - 1974 169 169 - - 101 6 107 - 1975 68 68 - - 54 8 62 - 1976 14 14 625 - 14 6 20 - 1977 - 625 - 625 62 28 90 - - 1978 563 563 - - 126 42 168 - 1979 437 437 - - 125 32 157 _ 1980 312 312 - - 125 24 149 - 1981 187 187 - - 125 12 137 - 1982 62 62 tt * * sTHE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 0 1982 62 62 - - 62 2 64 - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 20 SFRVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUJPPIIERS CRFDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY SWITZERLAND YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D LU R I N G P F R I 0 D OTHFR CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * : : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - 1972 - - - - - - 1973 - - - - 1974 - - - - - - _ _ 1975 - - 72 72 - - - - -1 1976 71 71 - - 38 6 44 - 5 1977 38 38 - - 39 3 42 -1 1978 - - - - - 1979 - - - _ 1980 - - - 1981 - _ _ 1982 *+ * * * * ~THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * I-. * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOIHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 21 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUFLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING lUNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN IHOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY UNITED KINGDOM YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C I 1 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I O D : OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M F N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY LJNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ----------- ---------------- IATIONS MENT PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL.. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 1,285 1,285 - - 244 40 284 - - 1972 1,041 1,041 - - 296 46 342 - - 1973 745 745 - - 245 30 275 - - 1974 500 500 - - 195 19 214 - 1975 305 305 2,067 1,889 1,418 19 1,437 - -16 1976 776 938 265 409 99 51 150 - -25 1977 1.079 1,079 9 9 207 65 272 - 11 1978 892 892 38 38 241 46 287 - 9 1979 698 698 - - 266 33 299 - 11 1980 443 443 - 230 19 249 - 6 1981 219 219 - - 84 5 89 - -120 1982 15 15 -e * * 8 + *THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * 1982 15 15 - 15 1 i6 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 22 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PlJBLIC DEBT PROdECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDITOR COUNTRY UNITED STATES YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D : OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M F N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ....ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ------------ ---------:----------- LATIONS MEN1 F PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (q) 1971 12,393 12,594 - 201 393 42 435 - -11,735 1972 466 466 1,146 1,121 419 15 434 - - 1973 1,168 1,193 872 897 385 54 439 - - 1974 1,680 1,680 1.975 12 491 139 630 - - 1975 1,201 3,164 2,400 2.400 755 200 955 - - 1976 2,846 4,809 - - 779 177 956 - - 1977 2,067 4,030 1,941 1,227 645 152 797 - - 1978 2,649 5.326 557 245 654 184 838 - - 1979 2,240 5,229 168 3,157 1,843 767 2,610 - - 1980 3,554 3.554 -- - 1,352 239 1,591 - - 1981 2,202 2.202 - - 517 175 692 - 1982 1,686 1,686 * * *4 * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * 1982 1,686 1,686 - - 1,083 122 1.205 - 1983 604 604 - - 472 43 515 19R4 132 132 - 66 8 74 1985 66 66 - 66 4 70 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISRURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 23 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBIURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS CREDTTOR COUNTRY MULTIPLE lENDERS YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGE.S BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS :-----------:---------------------- LATIONS MENT * : : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : : () (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (B) (9) 1971 - - - - - 1972 - - - - --. . _ 1973 - - - - - _ _ _ 1974 - - - - 1975 -- - - 1976 - - - _ 1977 - - - 1978 - - - - - 1979 - - 6.200 - 1980 - 6,200 - 6,200 - 48 48 - - 1981 6.200 6,200 19,732 201 89 566 655 - -15,749 1982 10,094 10.094 k t* * THIE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * k 1982 10,094 10.094 - - 2,037 914 2.951 - - 1983 8,057 8,057 - - 2,037 581 2.618 - - 1984 6,020 6,020 - - 2.227 408 2,635 - - 1985 3,793 3,793 - - 379 296 675 - 1986 3,414 3,414 - - 379 266 645 - - 1987 3.035 3.035 - - 379 235 614 - -1 1988 2,655 2,655 - - 379 205 584 - - 1989 2.276 2,276 - - 379 174 553 - - 1990 1,897 1,897 - - 379 144 523 - -1 1991 1,517 1.517 - - 379 114 493 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISRURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOSF COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 24 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN TH1OUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS TOTAL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUSiT-- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS :------ .-----------:------------ LATIONS MENT * : : : :.: PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (B) (c) 1971 46,778 56,090 3.947 7,268 4,528 1,176 5,704 52 -11,455 1972 38,278 44,002 40.154 10.765 6,321 1,177 7,498 313 -1,671 1973 41,112 75,851 16,624 5,463 6,341 1,562 7,903 18,500 1,101 1974 41,315 68,735 13,475 9,369 9,507 2,634 12,141 38 -300 1975 40,952 72,365 44,217 29,340 10,014 2,375 12,389 2 -3,693 1976 58,813 102,873 39.197 15,797 15,310 4,066 19,376 i 161 1977 59,808 126,920 17,544 42,473 12,897 4,138 17,035 1,491 6,816 1978 90,857 136,892 8.312 32,997 17,042 5,559 22,601 7,471 9,477 1979 112,913 130,168 70,000 51,871 31,502 8,578 40,080 8,242 -1,991 1980 132,976 158,433 6,500 14,298 22,691 12,363 35,054 - -830 1981 120,625 141,412 19.732 4,301 22,447 7,912 30,359 - -30,636 1 1982 92,944 108,061 ++* t4 * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * 1982 92,944 108,061 - 4,913 18,105 7,365 25,470 - -2,996 1983 76h756 86.960 - 4,535 16,116 6,082 22,198 - 4 1984 65,179 70,848 - 3,590 12,836 5,056 17,892 - -2 1985 55,932 58,010 - 2,079 10,033 4.260 14,293 - 1 1986 47,978 47,978 - - 8,431 3,459 11,890 - - 1987 39,547 39,547 - - 8,402 2,805 11,207 - -4 1988 31,141 31,141 - - 7,676 2,153 9,829 - 2 1989 23,467 23,467 - - 6,094 1,618 7,712 - 1 1990 17,374 17,374 - - 4,805 1,168 5,973 - - 1991 12,569 12,569 - - 3,516 861 4,377 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UJNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY T0 ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 25 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNIS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN TliOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COLJNTRY ADELA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:----------------L ATIONS MEN' * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) : (6) (7) (8) (C) 1971 - - 1972 - - 10,000 10,000 - 140 140 - 1973 10,000 10,000 - - 1,019 1,019 - 1974 10.000 10.000 - - 1,250 819 2,069 1975 8,750 8,750 - - 2,500 1,597 4,097 - 1976 6,250 6,250 - - 2,500 535 3.035 - 1977 3,750 3,750 - - 3,750 259 4.009 - 1978 - - 1979 - 1980 - 1981 1982 - t * # + THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED " * 8 * * 0 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBAIANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBLJRSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 26 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY ARGFNTINA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS :-----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT t : : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 100 100 - - 30 4 34 1972 70 70 - - 17 3 20 1973 53 53 - - 53 1 54 - - 1974 - - 230 230 - - - - - 1975 230 230 - - - 7 7 - - 1976 230 230 - - - - - - - 1977 230 230 519 , 519 57 34 91 - - 1978 692 692 - - 233 55 288 - - 1979 459 459 - - 73 17 90 - - 1980 386 386 125,000 125,000 121 495 616 - - 1981 125,265 125.265 - - 158 21,112 21,270 - - 1982 125,107 125,107 t * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED O * * * * * 1982 125,107 125,107 - - 17,945 18,675 36,620 - - 1983 107,162 107,162 - - 35,733 14,669 50,402 - - 1984 7i,429 71,.42 - - 35,714 9 q34 45.048 - -1 1985 35,714 35,714 - - 35,714 4,000 39,714 - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 27 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUJBLIC DEBT PROdECTIONS BASED ON DEBF OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNrRY AUSTRIA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E P V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADOJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * : : : . PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) 12) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - 763 - - - - - - 1972 - 763 - 763 - - - 1973 763 763 - - 14 - 14 1974 749 749 - - 38 - 38 1975 711 711 - - 164 - 164 110 1976 437 437 - - 68 - 68 - 1977 369 369 - - - - - 1978 369 369 - - - - 1979 369 369 - - - 1980 369 369 - -123 - 123 1981 246 246 - - 10 13 23 - - 1982 236 236 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 236 236 - - 157 12 169 1983 79 79 - - 79 2 81 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO IHE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 28 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLlC DFBT PROPJFCTIONS BASED ON DEBI OUTrTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U-S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY BELGIUM YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUJDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -------------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - - - - 1972 - - - - - - - _ 1973 - - - - - - _ _ 1974 - - - - - - _ 1975 - - - _ _ - ,, 1976 - - _ _ _ _ 1977 - - 9,589 - - - - - 838 1978 - 10,427 47,705 3,694 - 127 127 - 5,877 1979 4,033 64,009 4,906 11,057 - 991 991 - 1,937 1980 15,693 70,852 - 29.953 - 2,116 2,116 - -7,811 1981 41,708 63.041 - 1.624 - - - - -11,267 1982 35,850 51,774 i* * * t # *THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * t * * t * 1982 35,850 51,774 - 5,213 5,999 2,985 8,984 - 1983 35,065 45,776 - 5,141 5,999 2,908 8,907 - - 1984 34,208 39,777 - 5,141 5,999 2.829 8,228 - 2 1985 33,351 33,780 - 428 5,999 2,565 8,564 - - 1986 27,781 27,781 - - 5,999 2,102 8,101 - I 1987 21,783 21,783 - - 5,999 1,622 7.621 - - 1988 15.784 15.784 - - 4,510 1173 5,683 - - 1989 11,274 11,274 - - 4,510 812 5,322 - 1 1990 6,765 6,765 - - 4,510 451 4,961 - - 1991 2,255 2,255 - - 2,255 90 2,345 - - * TFIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBAItANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE IABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 29 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANOING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAl PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCIUDING UNDIS8URSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. OOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY BRAZIL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S 0 U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS --------M--:-----------:------------ LATIONS MEN' * : : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - 6,000 2,500 - - - - - 1972 2.500 6,000 7.862 5,201 2,500 242 2,742 - - 1973 5,201 11,362 4,750 5,302 1.204 96 1,300 - - 1974 9,299 14,908 13,500 6,156 1,610 197 1,807 - - 1975 13,845 26,798 - 10.455 1,615 494 2,109 - - 1976 22,685 25,183 13,694 13,859 2,052 1,198 3,250 642 - 1977 33,850 36.183 19,463 1,445 5,960 1,883 7.843 600 - 1978 28.735 49.086 - 2,145 5,384 1,769 7,153 - - 1979 25,496 43.702 1,259 536 4,288 1.392 5,680 - - 1980 21,744 40,673 730 12,510 3,068 1,848 4,916 - - 1981 31,186 38,335 - 2,122 4,132 2,590 6,722 - -323 X 1982 28,853 33,880 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * O 1982 28,853 33,880 - 1.587 6,200 2,006 8,206 - -2,304 1983 21,936 25,376 - 1,588 6,014 1,627 7,641 - -1 1984 17,509 19,361 - 1,852 5,490 1,269 6,759 - -2 1985 13,869 13.869 - - 5,129 922 6.051 - -1 1986 8,739 8,739 - - 3,542 538 4,080 - -1 1987 5,196 5.196 - - 2,807 315 3,122 - - 1988 2,389 2,389 - - 1,703 120 1,823 - -i 1989 685 685 - - 685 36 721 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMRALANCES ARE CHANGES IN FXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 30 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PlJBLIC DFBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY CANADA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT Tr R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ----------- ----------- LATIONS MENT S : : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - 1972 - - - - - - 1973 - - - - - - _ 1974 - - - - - - 1975 - - - - - - 1976 - - 30.000 30.000 - 1,908 1.908 1977 30.000 30.000 - - - 2,388 2,388 1978 30,000 30,000 9,000 9,000 30,000 1,946 31,946 1979 9.000 9,000 - - 1,143 1,057 2,200 1980 7,857 7,857 - - 1,404 1,535 2,939 1981 6,453 6,453 - - 430 992 1,422 - - 1982 6,023 6,023 + * * + + THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED + * * * * * 1982 6,023 6,023 - - 6.023 497 6.520 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDJSBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMRALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE. I  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 31 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUlSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS DF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY FRANCE YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T P A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P F R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBORSE-: S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - - - - - - 1972 - - 1973 - - - - - 1974 - - 5,583 1,400 - 74 74 - 346 1975 1,400 5,929 - 4,115 - 391 391 - -40 1976 5,327 5,889 2,764 829 655 369 1,024 - -518 1977 5,114 7,480 2,862 5,255 1,569 691 2,260 - 4t8 1978 9,191 9,191 5,918 - 1,683 395 2,078 - 1,411 1979 8,460 14,837 12,082 5,174 2,644 590 3,234 - 1,144 1980 11,481 25,419 - 2,416 1,957 529 2,486 - -2,665 1981 10,647 20,797 - 2,969 1,423 339 1,762 - -4,601 1982 9,589 14,773 * *. * * *THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * 1982 9,589 14,773 - 1,698 2,989 723 3,712 - 1 1983 8,300 11,785 - 1,162 2,964 608 3,572 - 2 1984 6,499 8,823 - 1,073 2,377 486 2.863 - 1985 5,195 6,446 - 1,251 1,715 399 2,114 1 1986 4,732 4,732 - - 1,052 335 1,387 - 1987 3,680 3,680 - - 1.052 256 1.308 - 1 1988 2,629 2,629 - - 1,052 177 1,229 - 1989 1,577 1.577 - - 1,052 99 1,151 - 1 1990 526 526 - - 526 20 546 - * THIS COILUMN SHOWS THF AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDINCG UNDISBURSEO FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2- BOLIVIA PAGE 32 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMFNTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUJBLIC DEBT PROtJECTIONS RASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCL-UDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN IH1OUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY GERMANY, FED.REP. OF YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N 5 0 U R I N P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ------------------ - - LATIONS MENT PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) ~~(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971--- -- 1972 --- - - - -- 1973 -- 3.627 1.263 50 13 63 --66 1974 1.193 3,511 2,358 2,526 100 53 153 -403 1975 3,892 6,172 6.000 7,568 160 432 592 --302 1976 11.005 11.710 596 1.301 891 491 1.382 -360 1977 11,775 11.775 7.571 - 4,015 940 4.955 -1.113 1978 8,101 16,444 - 3,944 3.475 514 3,989 -1,615 1979 9.300 14,584 - 5,274 1,565 832 2.397 -596 1980 13,615 13,615 - - 1.312 706 2,018 --1,276 1981 11,027 11,027- - 719 154 873 - -1,245 1982 9,063 9.063 ** THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED **** 1982 9.063 9.063 - 1,553 675 2.228 1983 7.510 7.510 - -1.553 554 2,107 - 1984 b,b 5.958 i 513433 1,986 - 1985 4.405 4.405 - -1,553 313 1.866 - -l 1986 2,851 2,851 - 1,553 191 1,744 - 1987 1,298 1,298 - -1,298 75 i,373 - *THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHIMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMAOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES oF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 33 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSiANDrNG AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PRODECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GDODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY ITALY YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 U OTHER CHANGfS BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ----------- ----------- ----------- LATIONS MEN1 T PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) () 1971 - - - - - 1972 - - - - - 1973 - - - - -_ 1974 - - - - - - 1975 - - - - - - 1976 - - - 1977 - - - - -- - _ 1978 - - 1,183 1,183 203 41 244 1979 980 980 - - 392 61 453 1980 588 588 - 196 35 231 1981 392 392 39 14 53 - 1982 353 353 * * *w * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED + # * * * * 1982 353 353 -3-3 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMRALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHiER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 34 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBlIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY LUXEMBOURG YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MEN1' * PRINCIPAL. INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - _ _ _ _ 1972 - - 1973 - - - - - _ _ 1974 - - 24.000 12,000 - - - 1975 12.000 24,000 - 12,000 - 1,627 1.627 1976 24,000 24,000 - - - 2,479 2,479 1977 24,000 24,000 7,500 - 4.000 1,841 5.841 1978 20,000 27,500 37,000 44.500 4.000 4,353 8,353 1979 60,500 60,500 - - 4,000 6.322 10,322 1980 56,500 56,500 - - 4,000 7,934 11,934 1981 52,500 52,500 - - 1.475 8,699 10,174 - - 1982 51,025 51,025 * * 4. * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * L 1982 51,025 51,025 - - 23,300 7,349 30,649 1983 27,725 27,725 - - 15,700 3,919 19.619 1984 12,025 12.025 - - 12.025 1,482 13,507 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PAGE 35 PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY PANAMA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 0 OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY :UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:-----------: LATIONS MEN'l' PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) : (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) : () 1971 _ 1,330 - - - 1972 - 1,330 - 622 - 44 44 - 1973 622 1,330 - 543 - 97 97 1974 1,165 1,330 - 165 222 173 395 - 1975 1,108 1.108 - - 221 99 320 - 1976 887 887 7,607 - 222 36 258 - 1977 665 8,272 - 6,469 289 329 618 1,138 1978 6,845 6,845 6,784 4,823 1,644 582 2,226 - 1979 10,024 11,985 - 1,925 1,645 1,214 2,859 - 1980 10,304 10,340 - 1,422 1,757 3.179 36 1981 8,882 8,882 - - 230 1.493 1,723 - 1982 8,652 8,652 * * * * * * THIE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * t * * * * 0 1982 8,652 8,652 - - 3,398 1,254 4,652 - -162 1983 5,092 5,092 - - 1,542 768 2,310 - -2 1984 3,548 3,548 - - 1,542 516 2,058 - - 1985 2,006 2,006 - - 1,542 265 1,807 - -1 1986 463 463 - - 463 52 515 - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 36 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSFANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUJDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN rHOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY PERU YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 0 OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ----------- -----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - _ _ 1972 - - - - _ _ .. 1973 - - - _ _ _ 1974 - - - _ _ . 1975 - - - - _ 1976 - _ 1977 - - - - _ _ _ 1978 - - - _ _ _ _ 1979 - - 10,000 - - - - 1980 - 10,000 - 2,570 172 76 248 1981 2,398 9.828 - 4,187 1,512 308 1,820 - - 1982 5,073 8.316 * * * + + + THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 5,073 8,316 - 1,671 1,512 415 1,927 1983 5,232 6,804 - 1,179 1,,512 408 1;990 1984 4,899 5,292 - 393 1,512 354 1,866 1985 3.780 3.780 - - 1,512 255 1,767 1986 2,268 2,268 - - 1,512 142 1,654 1987 756 756 - - 756 28 784 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 37 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 OEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) IYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY SPAIN YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S 0 U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - 1.344 - 1,251 234 63 297 93 - 1972 1,017 1,017 - - 52 45 97 - - 1973 965 965 93 93 36 B 44 - - 1974 1,022 1,022 - - 68 166 234 - - 1975 954 954 - - 19 65 84 - - 1976 935 935 - - 105 25 130 - - 1977 830 830 - - 211 42 253 - - 1978 619 619 - - 210 29 239 - - 1979 409 409 - - 210 15 225 1980 199 199 - - 199 6 205 - - 1981 - - - - - - - - - 1982 - - s * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * t* 1* * *m * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 38 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY SWEDEN YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGE,S BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- : S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ------------- -----------:----------- L&TIONS MENT * : : : : . PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - - - - - - - 1972 - - - 1973 - - - - - - _ _ 1974 - - - - - _ _ - 1975 - - - - - _ _ 1976 - - - - _ _ _ _ 1977 - - - - _ _ _ _ 1978 - - - 1979 - - - - _ _ _ _ - 1980 - - 9,700 499 - _ _ _ _ 1981 499 9,700 - 127 129 184 313 - 1982 497 9,571 t . t t t t THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED i * * * t * 1982 497 9,571 - 5,054 1,472 179 1,651 - - '983 4,079 8,099 - 2,iO6 i,472 3 j3 1,78S - -1 1984 4,712 6,626 - 1,149 1,472 321 1,793 - - 1985 4,388 5,154 - 766 1,472 287 1,759 - -1 1986 3,681 3,681 - - 1,472 215 1,687 - 1987 2,209 2,209 - - 1,472 120 1,592 - -1 1988 736 736 - - 736 24 760 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  T*ble 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 39 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBIIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY SWITZERLAND YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS. -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - _ _ _ 1972 - - 2,400 2,400 - - - - 1973 2,400 2,400 303 - 812 221 1,033 - -18 1974 1,588 1.873 276 579 788 182 970 - 41 1975 1,402 1,402 19,327 3,178 800 51 851 - -754 1976 3,548 19,175 - 9,968 35 533 568 - 1,195 1977 14,160 20,335 5.017 7.073 74 1,045 1,119 - 1,463 1978 22,564 26,741 10,000 9,177 934 2,232 3,166 - 2,000 1979 32,807 37.807 - 5,000 3,881 2,899 6,780 - 720 1980 34,646 34,646 - - 6,327 3,523 9,850 - -1,355 1981 26,964 26.964 - - 1,780 3,780 5.560 - -1,201 1982 23,983 23,983 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * 1982 23,983 23,983 - - 14,845 3,231 18,076 -- 1983 9,138 9.138 - - 6,721 1,022 7,743 - -1 1984 2,416 2,416 - - 2,417 296 2,713 - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 40 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY UNITED KINGDOM YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENF * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 326 326 - - 326 - 326 - - 1972 - - - - - - - - - 1973 - - - - - - _ 1974 - - - - - _ 1975 - - - - - _ . _ _ 1976 - - 19,043 9.660 - 199 199 - -726 1977 9,449 18,317 32,799 8,827 80 1,100 1,180 - 2,261 1978 19,292 53,297 2.000 29,195 4,025 2,272 6,297 1,409 1979 45,584 52,681 1,000 6,658 3,268 2,469 5,737 - 1,999 1980 50,740 52,412 2,550 4,299 6,812 6,222 13,034 782 1,571 1981 48,939 48,939 - - 6,846 3,884 10,730 - -4.020 1982 38,073 38.073 * * t + * t THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * 1982 38.073 38,073 - - 7,611 3,011 10,622 - -1,156 1983 29q306 29,306 - - 7,318 2.308 9,626 - 3 1984 21,991 21,991 - - u,975 1.650 8.635 - - 1985 15,016 15,016 - - 6,646 i,051 7,697 - 2 1986 8,372 8,372 - - 3,975 553 4,528 - - 1987 4.397 4.397 - - 2,389 255 2,644 - - 1988 2,008 2.008 - - 804 136 940 - 1 1989 1,205 1.205 - - 804 75 879 - - 1990 401 401 - - 402 15 417 - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 41 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY UNITED STATES YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E P I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS L---------------------------------- lATIONS MENT PRINCIPAL INTEREST T01AL i:) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (3) 1971 15,079 15,079 10,000 8.781 3,080 1,093 4,173 - 1972 20,780 21,999 12,800 12.800 7,563 1,159 8,722 1,219 1973 26,017 26.017 1,500 1,500 1,859 2,056 3,915 - 1974 25.658 25,658 25,396 25,396 3,555 2,313 5,868 1975 47,499 47.499 74,197 44,197 3,218 5,507 8,725 - 1976 88,478 118.478 146,159 90,184 9,506 10,249 19.755 - 1977 169,156 255,131 149,656 204,999 20,637 20,718 41,355 1 1978 353.518 384,149 182,930 211,384 154.748 34,292 189,040 150 1 1979 410.005 412,182 16,962 3,310 39.070 50.133 89,203 579 1980 374,245 389,495 13,543 20.943 26,057 62.887 88.944 - 1981 369,131 376,981 - 4.910 11,447 59,912 71,359 - 4 1982 362,598 365.538 *** * *THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * q. 1982 362,598 365.538 - 1,660 126,051 52,295 178,346 - -5,294 1983 232.913 234,193 - 440 115,728 32,701 148,429 - 1 1984 117,626 118,466 - 560 87,388 15,006 102,394 - -1 1985 30,797 31,077 - 280 24,046 2,590 26,636 - 1 1986 7,032 7,032 - - 758 678 1,436 - 1987 6,274 6,274 - - 758 625 1,383 - - 1988 5,516 5,516 - - 758 572 1,330 - - 1989 4,758 4,758 - - 940 519 1,459 - - 1990 3,818 3,818 - - 364 447 811 - 1991 3,455 3,455 - - 364 403 767 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 42 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY VENEZUELA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENI' * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1,) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - ' - - - 1972 - - 1973 - - - - 1974 - - - 1975 - - - - 1976 - - - - 1977 - - 2,000 2,000 - 37 37 1978 2.000 2,000 - - - 153 153 1979 2.000 2,000 - - 500 351 851 1980 1.500 1,500 - - 500 104 604 1981 1,000 1,000 - - 500 70 570 - - 1982 500 500 *+ * * * * ~THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * i * * w 1982 500 500 - - 500 30 530 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 43 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUJBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOILARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY YUGOSLAVIA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS :-----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENI- * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) : () 1971 - - - - - - - 1972 - - 1973 - - - - - _- 1974 - - - - - - - 1975 - - - - - - - 1976 - - - - - - - 1977 - - - - - - 1978 - - - - - - - 1979 - - 20,000 - - - - 1980 - 20,000 - - - - - 1981 - 20,000 - 11,200 3,077 386 3,463 - 1982 8.123 16,923 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 8,123 16,923 - 4,600 3,077 772 3,849 - - 1983 9,646 13,846 - 2,400 3,077 806 3,883 - 1984 8,969 10,769 - 1,800 3,077 728 3.805 - 1985 7,692 7,692 - - 3,077 554 3,631 - 1986 4,615 4,615 - - 3,077 308 3,385 - 1987 1,538 1,538 - - 1,538 62 1,600 - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 44 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENIS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLlJDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CREDITOR COUNTRY MULTIPLE LENDERS YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R T 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ----------- -----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * : : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (i) 1971 - - - - - _ _ 1972 - - - - - - - _ 1973 - - - - _ - _ _ 1974 - - - - - _ _ 1975 - - - - - _ _ _ 1976 - - - - - - - _ 1977 - - - - - - _ _ 1978 - - 6,500 - - - - - - 1979 - 6,500 113,663 74,491 - 6,053 6,053 - 787 1980 74,963 120,950 - - - 12,190 12.190 20,512 -1,676 1981 73,957 98,762 80,471 14,612 2,425 13,516 15,941 - 64,899 1982 232,180 241,707 * - * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * t * U 1982 232,180 241,707 - 6,161 24.988 38.302 63.290 - 1 1983 213,354 216.720 - 2,646 69,355 33,165 102,520 - 2 1984 146.647 147t367 - 720 74,053 21,235 95,288 - I 1985 73,315 73.315 - - 23,737 11,355 35,092 - - 1986 49,578 49,578 - - 22,317 7,428 29.745 -1 1987 27,262 27,262 - - 19,138 3,831 22,969 - - 1988 8,124 8,124 - - 8,124 695 8.819 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 45 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEST OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TOTAL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I O N S D U R I N G P E R I O D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ----------------------------------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 15.505 17.612 17,330 12,532 3,670 1.160 4,830 93 - 1972 24,367 31.179 33.062 31.786 10.132 1.633 11.765 1,219 1973 46.021 52.890 10.273 8,701 4.028 3,511 7.539 - -84 1974 50,674 59.051 71,343 48.452 7,631 3.977 11,608 - 790 1975 91,791 123,553 99,524 81,513 8,697 10.270 18,967 110 -1.096 1976 163.782 213,174 219,863 155,801 16,034 18.022 34.056 642 311 1977 303.348 416.672 236,976 236.587 40,642 31,307 71.949 1,739 6,093 1978 501.926 617,360 309,020 319.045 206.539 48,760 255.299 150 12,313 1979 619.426 732,004 179.872 113.425 62,679 74,396 137.075 579 7,183 1980 674,830 855,801 151,523 198,190 53,670 101,963 155,633 21,330 -13,212 1981 811,194 919,112 80.471 41,751 36,332 117,446 153,778 - 42,246 1982 945.778 1,005,497 + * * + 4 THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * t w * l 1982 945.778 1.005.497 - 27.644 247,620 132.411 380,031 - -9.266 1983 716,537 748,611 - 16,662 274,767 95,778 370,545 - 4 1984 458,436 473.848 - 12,688 241,594 55.949 297,543 - - 1985 229,528 232,254 - 2.725 112,i42 24,556 136,698 - - 1986 120,112 120,112 - - 45.720 12.542 58,262 - 1 1987 74,393 74,393 - - 37,207 7.189 44.396 - - 1988 37,186 37,186 - - 17,687 2,897 20.584 - - 1989 19,499 19.499 - - 7.991 1,541 9,532 - 2 1990 11,510 11,510 - - 5,802 933 6,735 - 2 1991 5.710 5.710 - - 2.619 493 3,112 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 46 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR BONDS CREDITOR COUNTRY UNITED KINGDOM YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S 0 U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- AOdUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENI F PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - - - _ _ _ 1972 - - - - - _ _ _ 1973 - - - - - . _ 1974 - - - - - _ _ _ 1975 - - - - - _ _ 1976 - - - - - - _ _ 1977 - - 15,000 15,000 - 1.151 1,151 - 1978 15,000 15,000 - - 1.627 1,627 - 1979 15,000 15,000 - - - 1.544 1.544 - 1980 15,000 15,000 - - - 1,540 1.540 - 1981 i5,000 15.000 - - 1,281 1,281 - 1982 15,000 15,000 + * t * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 15,000 15,000 - - 5,000 256 5,256 - -10,000 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UJNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 47 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXFERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR BONDS CREDITOR COUNTRY UNITED STATES YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G . P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------------------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (') 1971 67,363 67,363 - - 582 1,843 2,425 - 309 1972 67,090 67,090 - - 583 1,857 2,440 - 3,200 1973 63,307 63,307 - - 582 1,857 2,439 - -726 1974 61,999 61,999 - - 892 1,858 2,750 - -871 1975 60,236 60,236 - - 1,084 1,547 2,631 - 1,119 1976 58.033 58,033 - - 1,133 1,590 2.723 - -1,010 1977 55,890 55,890 - - 1,179 1,550 2,729 -840 1978 53.871 53,871 - - 1,243 1,649 2,892 860 - 1979 51,768 51,768 - - 1,095 929 2,024 1,409 1980 49,264 49,264 - - 892 1,856 2,748 1,627 1981 46,745 46,745 - 1,250 1.306 2,556 - 1982 45,495 45,495 t * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 45,495 45,495 - - 1,269 1,276 2,545 - - I 1983 44,226 44,226 - - 1,289 1,246 2.535 - - 1984 42,937 42,937 - - 1.310 1,215 2,525 - - 1985 41,627 41,627 - - 1,330 1,184 2,514 - - 1986 40,297 40,297 - - 1,351 1,152 2,503 - -1 1987 38,945 38,945 - - 1,373 1.119 2,492 - - 1988 37,572 37,572 - - 1,395 1,086 2,481 - 1989 36,177 36,177 - - 1,417 1,052 2,469 - -1 1990 34,759 34,759 - - 1,440 1,017 2.457 - - 1991 33,319 33.319 _ - 1,191 982 2,173 - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING iNCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 48 SERVICF PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUT'STANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR BONDS TOTAL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ------------:----------- -----------: IATIONS MEN'I' PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 67,363 67,363 - - 582 1,843 2.425 - 309 1972 67,090 67,090 - - 583 1,857 2,440 - -3,200 1973 63,307 63.307 - - 582 1.857 2,439 - -726 1974 61,999 61,999 - - 892 1,858 2,750 - -871 1975 60,236 60,236 - - 1,084 1,547 2,631 - -1,119 1976 58,033 58,033 - - 1.133 1,590 2,723 - -1,010 1977 55,890 55,890 15,000 15,000 1,179 2.701 3.880 - -840 1978 68,871 68,871 - - 1,243 3,276 4,519 860 - 1979 66,768 66,768 - - 1,095 2,473 3,568 1,409 1980 64.264 64,264 - - 892 3,396 4,288 1,627 1981 61,745 61,745 - - 1,250 2,587 3,837 - - 1982 60,495 60,495 + F * + THE FOLIOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED + + * 1982 60,495 60,495 - - 6,269 1,532 7,801 - -10,(00 1983 44,226 44,226 - - 1,289 i.246 2,535 1984 42,937 42,937 - - 1,310 1.215 2,525 - - 1985 41,627 41,627 - - 1,330 1,184 2,514 - - 1986 40,297 40,297 - - 1,351 1,152 2,503 - -1 1987 38,945 38,945 - - 1,373 1,119 2,492 - - 1988 37,572 37.572 - - 1,395 1.086 2,481 - - 1989 36.177 36,177 - - 1,417 1,052 2,469 - -1 1990 34,759 34,759 - - 1,440 1,017 2,457 - - 1991 33,319 33,319 - - 1.191 982 2,173 - 1 + THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. TIIE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 49 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PIJBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR NATIONALIZATION CREDITOR COUNTRY UNITED STATES YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:------------ LATIONS MENT PRINCIPAL INTEREST IOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 78,622 78.622 - - 662 150 812 - '1,735 1972 89.695 89,695 - - 3,602 - 3.602 -- 1973 86.093 86,093 - - 9.255 1.040 10,295 - 736 1974 77.574 77,574 - - 16,007 65 16.072 -- 1975 61,567 61,567 - - 12.048 - 12,048 415 1976 49,104 49,104 - - 9.658 - 9,658 - - 1977 39,446 39,446 - - 16,777 - 16,777 - - 1978 22,669 22.669 - - 15.280 - 15.280 - - 1979 7,389 7.389 - - 7.389 - 7,389 - - 1980 - - - - - - 1981 - - _ _ _ 1982 - - t * * * * ~THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * w *. * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UJNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 50 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROOECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR NATIONALIZATION TOTAL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ----------------------:-----------: LATIONS MENr * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 78,622 78.622 - - 662 150 812 - 11,735 1972 89.695 89,695 - - 3,602 - 3,602 - - 1973 86,093 86,093 - - 9.255 1.040 10.295 - 736 1974 77.574 77,574 - - 16,007 65 16,072 - - 1975 61.567 61,567 - - 12,048 - 12.048 415 - 1976 49.104 49.104 - - 9,658 - 9,658 - 1977 39,446 39.446 - - 16,777 - 16,777 - 1978 22.669 22,669 - - 15,280 - 15.280 - - 1979 7,389 7,389 - - 7,389 - 7.389 - - 1980 - - - - - - 1981 1982 - * * * *, * +THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * + * * * * * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  _able 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 51 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBUPSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY 00000000000000000000 YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * : : : : . : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - - - - - 1972 - - - - - - - 1973 - - - - - _ 1974 - - - - _ _ 1975 - - - - _ _ _ 1976 - 1977 - - - - - _ _ 1978 - - - - - - _ 1979 - - 585 - - - - 1980 - 585 423 - 7 7 1981 - 1.008 - 81 45 6 51 - - 1982 36 963 *t * * * * *THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 36 963 - 434 125 15 140 - - 1983 343 838 - 262 161 25 186 1984 445 677 - 151 161 26 187 - 1985 436 517 - 81 161 23 184 - - 1986 356 356 - - 161 17 178 - 1987 196 196 - - 161 8 169 1988 35 35 - - 35 1 36 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANbING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOSr COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 52 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARfS) TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY BIA AHORROS Y PREST. YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------: ------:----------- LATIONS MENl * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - 1972 - - 1973 - - - - - - - _ 1974 - - - - - - - _ _ 1975 - - - - - 1976 - - - - - - - - - 1977 - - - - - - - _ _ 1978 - - - - - - _ _ 1979 - - 5,000 1,000 - - . _ 1980 1.000 5,000 - 4,000 666 471 1,137 - - 1981 4,334 4,334 - - 1,334 540 1,874 - - 1982 3,000 3,000 4 + * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * L O U 1982 3,000 3,000 - - - 351 351 - - 1983 3,000 3,000 - - 92 348 440 - - 1984 2.908 2,9O8 - - 92 33a 430 -1 1985 2,815 2,815 - - 92 327 419 - - 1986 2,723 2,723 - - 92 316 408 - - 1987 2.631 2,631 - - 92 305 397 - -t 1988 2,538 2,538 - - 92 294 386 - - 1989 2.446 2,446 - - 92 284 376 - - 1990 2,354 2,354 - - 92 273 365 - - 1991 2.262 2,262 - - 92 262 354 - -1 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 53 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDJSBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY CORP. ANDINA FOMENTO YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - 98 98 - - - - 1972 98 98 2.047 416 - - - 1973 514 2,145 1,183 1.172 37 59 96 - 1974 1,649 3.291 - 755 137 213 350 - 1975 2,267 3,154 26,109 1.299 317 95 412 9 1976 3,249 28.937 7,190 653 440 266 706 228 1977 3,462 35,459 1,075 3.958 523 391 914 21,906 1978 6.887 14,105 - 5,064 575 626 1,201 - 1979 11,376 13.530 302 1,539 398 644 1,042 - 1980 12.517 13,434 12,902 1,596 632 668 1,300 - -433 1981 13,481 25.271 - 975 865 705 1,570 - -1,409 1982 12,181 22.997 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 12,181 22,997 - 5,058 3,805 871 4,676 - 1983 13,435 19,192 - 3,055 2,899 1,101 4,000 -1 1984 13,591 16,294 - 1,763 2,657 1,159 3.816 - -1 1985 12,696 13,636 - 940 2,239 1,110 3.349 -1 1986 11.398 11,398 - - 1,496 1,013 2,509 -1 1987 9,903 9,903 - - 1,243 909 2,152 - 1988 8,660 8.660 - - 1,056 818 1,874 - 1989 7,604 7.604 - - 554 747 1.301 - 1990 7,050 7,050 - - 611 690 1.301 - 1991 6,439 6,439 - - 674 627 1,301 - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 54 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 FOOTNOTE: DEBTS EXCLUDED BECAUSE REPAYMENT TERMS UNKNOWN. TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY CORP. ANDINA FOMENTO YEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT * BEGINNING OF PERIOD : DISBURSED : INCLUDING : ONLY :UNDISBURSED 1981 1.410 1,410 I-. Ul * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 55 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DFBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY IBRD YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G. P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ---- :-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * : : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - 23,250 - 15,315 - - - - - 1972 15,315 23,250 - 7,694 - 1,144 1,144 - 1973 23,009 23,250 - 241 628 1,521 2,149 - - 1974 22,622 22,622 - - 1,884 1,525 3,409 - - 1975 20,738 20,738 32,000 826 628 954 1.582 - - 1976 20,936 52,110 68,000 12,255 1,884 1.942 3,826 3,300 - 1977 31,307 114,926 92,000 20,973 628 3,196 3,824 - - 1978 51,652 206,298 34,000 24,055 1,256 5.915 7,171 6,290 - 1979 74,450 232,752 - 32,100 1,256 8,497 9,753 - - 1980 105,293 231,496 50,000 72,617 2,604 10,342 12,946 - - 1981 175,307 278,892 - 31,297 3,914 14,579 18,493 - - 1982 202,690 274,978 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 202,690 274,978 - 24,837 8,743 17,661 26,404 - 2 1983 218,786 266,237 - 20,566 12,977 18,508 31,485 - 1984 226,376 253,261 - 12.978 13,242 18,681 31,923 - - 1985 226,112 240,019 - 6,287 13,537 18.299 31,836 - - 1986 218,862 226,482 - 3,301 17,180 17,478 34,658 - -1 1987 204,982 209,301 - 2,051 17,520 16,287 33,807 - - 1988 189,513 191,781 - 1.191 17,880 14,992 32,872 - 1 1989 172,825 173,902 - 624 18,270 13,616 31,886 - - 1990 155,179 155,632 - 303 17,699 12,175 29.874 - - 1991 137,783 137,933 - 126 16,801 10,755 27,556 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA - - ~~~~~~~~~PAGE 56 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBIIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDIS6URSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE or CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY IDA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- : ADJUST- : ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------: -----: LATIONS MENI * : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 17,814 25,800 6.800 3,787 - 144 144 - - 1972 21,601 32,600 8,000 2,076 - 216 216 8 1,920 1973 25,597 42,512 6G000 1,858 - 307 307 - 2,878 1974 30,333 51,390 6,200 10,641 90 257 347 - - 1975 40.884 57,500 7,500 8,791 181 327 508 - - 1976 49,494 64,819 - 4,105 182 407 589 - - 1977 53,417 64,637 - 3,872 195 378 573 - - 1978 57,094 64,442 9,000 2.185 205 433 638 - - 1979 59,074 73,237 19,500 3.511 247 426 673 - - 1980 62.340 92,490 16.000 1,776 306 477 783 - - 1981 63,81O 108,184 - 14,899 381 537 918 237 -1 1982 78,327 107,565 t * t t t' t THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * t t 1982 78,327 107.565 - 10,219 372 569 941 - - 1q93 88,174 107,193 - 8,831 482 643 1,125 - -1 1984 96,522 106,710 - 6,014 936 743 1,679 - 2 1985 101,602 105,776 - 2,963 973 771 1,744 - -t 1986 103.591 104,802 - 897 1,010 776 1,786 - -t 1987 103,477 103,791 - 237 1,058 774 1,832 - - 1988 102,656 102,733 - 63 1,283 767 2,050 - -t 1989 101,435 tO1,449 - 14 1,928 755 2,683 - -1 1990 99,520 99,520 - - 2,120 741 2,861 - - t991 97,400 97,400 - - 2,187 726 2,9t3 - -t THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 57 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY IDB YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDTSBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 5,402 5,402 19,879 13,049 2,023 217 2,240 - -2 1972 16,426 23,256 1,150 6,853 1.431 1,242 2.673 -- 1973 21,848 22,975 28 131 1.361 1,878 3,239 - 1.208 1974 21,826 22,850 35,019 40 651 2,023 2,674 1.003 1,144 1975 22,359 57,359 55,880 9,852 696 1,994 2,690 - -565 1976 30,950 111,978 60,200 15,023 1,443 3,465 4,908 - 1,009 1977 45,539 171,744 8,500 35,448 1.401 4,607 6.008 - -423 1978 80,644 178,420 102,800 34,926 1.461 6,160 7,621 - 6,134 1979 116,869 285,893 121,745 44,532 1.522 7,160 8.682 80 327 1980 160,472 406,363 22,600 28,486 2.099 8,872 10,971 47 -1,616 1981 185,224 425,201 - 34,937 3,745 9,905 13,650 - 69 1982 216,428 421,525 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * 0 * * 4 * 1982 216,428 421.525 - 37.830 3,702 6,655 10,357 - -15,000 1983 236,556 402,823 - 40,432 5.215 6,997 12,212 - - 1984 271,773 397,608 - 42,033 5,215 7,349 12,564 - -2 1985 308,589 392.391 - 33,994 6,238 8,016 14,254 - - 1986 336.345 386.153 - 22,649 7,057 8,384 15,441 - 1 1987 351,938 379,097 - 15,596 8,501 8.809 17.310 - -3 1988 359,030 370,593 - 9,245 8,770 8,718 17,488 - -3 1989 359.502 361,820 - 2,078 12,449 9,524 21,973 -- 1990 349,131 349,371 - 240 14,450 9,645 24,095 - -1 1991 334,920 234,920 - - 15,222 9,192 24,414 -1 + THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THF AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSEO FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 58 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBlJRSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXIERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 FOOTNOTE: DEBTS EXCLUDED BECAUSE REPAYMENT TERMS UNKNOWN. TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY IDB YEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT : BEGINNING OF PERIOD * DISBURSED : INCLUDING : ONLY :UNDISBURSED 1982 14,000 15,000 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE..  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 59 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY IMF TRUST FUND YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PFRIOD - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - --__ _ - - _-_ _-_-_-_-__ _-__.- DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS :-----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT ' PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - _ 1972 - - 1973 -- 1974 - 1975 - - 1976 - - 1977 - - - - - _ 1978 - - 19,207 19,207 - 40 40 - 773 1979 19.980 19,980 - - - 99 99 - 223 1980 20,203 20,203 26,921 26,921 90 90 -1,185 1981 45,939 45,939 - - - 230 230 -- 1982 45,939 45,939 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * *C 1982 45,939 45,939 - - - 230 230 - - I 1983 45,939 45,939 - - - 230 230 - - 1984 45,939 45,939 - - 3,912 225 4,137 - - 1985 42,027 42,027 - - 6,550 205 6,755 - - 1986 35,477 35,477 9,188 1C6 9,354 - - 1987 26,289 26,289 - - 9,188 120 9,308 - 1 1988 17,102 17,102 - - 9,188 74 9,262 1989 7,914 7.914 - - 5,276 33 5,309 1990 2,638 2,638 - - 2,638 7 2,645 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 60 SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY OPEC SPECIAL FUND YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PFRIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- : S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS ------.------ ____-- ----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) () 1971 - - - _ _ - _ .1972 - - - - .- _ _ 1973 - - - - - - _ 1974 - - - - _ _ _ _ 1975 - - - _ _ _ _ 1976 - - - - - - - - 1977 - - - - - - _ 1978 - - - - - _ _ 1979 - - 5.000 - - - _ _ 1980 - 5,000 - _ _ 1981 - 5.000 - 150 - - - - 1982 150 5.000 . . * * * * +THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 iso 5.000 700 - - - - 1983 850 5,000 - 900 156 - 156 - 1984 1,594 4.844 - 1.050 313 - 313 1985 2,331 4.531 - 800 313 - 313 - 1 1986 2.819 4.219 - 600 313 - 313 - 1987 3.106 3,906 - 450 313 - 313 - 1 1988 3,244 3:594 - 250 313 - 313 - 1989 3.181 3.281 - 100 313 - 313 - 1 1990 2,969 2,969 - - 313 - 313 - 1991 2,656 2.656 - - 313 - 313 - 1 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 61 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS TOTAL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGLS BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * : : : : PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (t) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 23,216 54,452 26,777 32.249 2,023 361 2,384 - -2 1972 53,440 79.204 11,197 17,039 1,431 2.602 4,033 8 1,920 1973 70,968 90.882 7,211 3,402 2,026 3,765 5,791 - 4.086 1974 76.430 100.153 41,219 11,436 2,762 4,018 6,780 1,003 1,144 1975 86,248 138.751 121,489 20,768 1,822 3.370 5.192 9 -565 1976 104,629 257,844 135,390 32,036 3,949 6,080 10.029 3,528 1,009 1977 133,725 386.766 101,575 64,251 2,747 8,572 11,319 21,906 -423 1978 196,277 463,265 165,007 85,437 3,497 13,174 16,671 6,290 6,907 1979 281,749 625.392 152,132 82,682 3,423 16.826 20,249 80 550 1980 361,825 774,571 128,846 135,396 6,307 20.927 27.234 47 -3,234 1981 488,095 893,829 - 82,339 10,284 26,502 36,786 237 -1,341 1982 558,751 881,967 *~ * *t * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1982 558,751 881,967 - 79,078 16,747 26,352 43,099 - -14,998 1983 607,083 850.222 - 74,046 21,982 27,852 49,834 - 1 1984 659,148 828,241 - 63,989 26,528 28,521 55,049 - -1 1985 696.608 801,712 - 45,065 30.103 28,751 58,854 - 1 1986 711,571 771,610 - 27,447 36,497 28.150 64,647 - 1 1987 702.522 735,114 - 18,334 38,076 27.212 65.288 - -2 1988 682,778 697,036 - 10,749 38,617 25,664 64.281 - -3 1989 654,907 658.416 - 2,816 38,882 24,959 63.841 - - 1990 618,841 619,534 - 543 37,923 23,531 61,454 - -1 1991 581,460 581.610 - 126 35,289 21,562 56.851 - -1 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 62 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1981 FOOTNOTE: DEBTS EXCLUDED BECAUSE REPAYMENT TERMS UNKNOWN. TYPE OF CREDITOR 'MULTILATERAL LOAN,S YEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT * BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED : INCLUDING : ONLY :UNDISBURSED 1981 1,410 1,410 1982 14,000 15,000 Ln * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 63 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASFD ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR BILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY ARGENTINA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MEN' * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 76,510 76,510 4,310 4,310 1,323 - 1,323 - 1972 79,497 79,497 4,235 4,235 1,797 - 1,797 - 1973 81,935 81.935 3,401 3.401 2.171 - 2.171 - 1974 83,165 83,165 2,868 2,868 5,733 - 5,733 - 1975 80,300 80,300 3.382 3,382 6,183 - 6,183 - 1976 77.v499 77,499 4,648 4,648 8,673 - 8,673 - 1977 73,474 73,474 55,009 5,009 5,533 - 5,533 - 4 1978 72,954 122,954 791 1,756 56 19 75 1,073 1979 73,581 122,616 7,957 15,346 7,773 695 8,468 7,423 1980 73.731 115,377 50,793 33,042 2,770 76 2,846 - - 1981 104,003 163,400 - 59,397 3,606 5,539 9,145 - -63,716 1 1982 96,078 96,078 t * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * + 1982 96,078 96,078 - - 18,262 10i937 29,199 - 1 1983 77,817 77,817 - - 18.262 8,604 26,866 - 1984 59,555 59,555 - - 18,262 6,270 24,532 - 2 1985 41,295 41,295 - - 18,262 3,938 22,200 - 1986 23,033 23,033 - - 6.581 1,604 8,185 - 1987 16,452 16,452 - - 6,581 1,111 7,692 - 1988 9,871 9,871 - - 6,581 617 7,198 - 1989 3,290 3,290 - - 3,290 123 3,413 - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THIE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 64 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 FOOTNOTE: DEBTS EXCLUDED BECAUSE REPAYMENT TERMS UNKNOWN. TYPE OF CREDITOR BILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNERY ARGENTINA YEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED : INCLUDING ONLY :UNDISBURSED 1981 63,716 63,716 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 65 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR BILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY AUSTRIA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATJONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - - - - - - 1972 - - - - - - - - 1973 - - - - - - - 1974 - - - - - - _ _ 1975 - - - - - - - _ 1976 - - - - - - - _ 1977 - - - - - - - _ 1978 - - - - - - - - 1979 - - 1,171 - - - - - 87 1980 - 1,258 - 940 - - - - -126 1981 879 1,132 - 163 33 10 43 - -165 1982 876 934 * + * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * a 1982 876 934 - 33 33 8 41 - 1983 876 901 - 16 33 5 38 - -1 1984 859 867 - 8 54 11 65 - 1985 813 813 - - 59 17 76 - 1986 755 755 - - 42 15 57 - -1 1987 712 712 - - 42 14 56 - 1988 671 671 - - 42 13 55 1989 629 629 - - 42 12 54 1990 587 587 - - 42 12 54 1991 545 545 - - 42 II 53 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCFS ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 66 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR BILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY BELGIUM YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) : (2) : (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 - - - - - _ _ 1972 - - - - - _ _ 1973 - - - - _ _ _ 1974 - - - _ _ _ _ 1975 - - - - _ _ - 1976 - - - - - - _ _ 1977 - - 1,396 1,396 - - - - 122 1978 1.518 1,518 2,385 2,385 - - - - 437 1979 4,340 4,340 2,559 2.559 - I 1 - 232 1980 7,131 7,131 - - - - - - -787 1981 6,344 6.344 - - - - - - -1,147 1982 5,197 5,197 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * O * * * * 1982 5.197 5.197 - - - - _ - _ 1983 5,197 5,197 - - - - _ _ _ 1984 5,197 5,197 - - - - - - 1985 5.197 5,197 - - - _ _ _ _ .98- 5, 97 a, i97 - - ----- 1987 5,197 5,197 - - - 1988 5,197 5,197 - - 32 - 32 - - 1989 5.165 5,165 - - 160 - 160 - - 1990 5,005 5,005 - - 208 - 208 - - 1991 4,797 4,797 - - 255 - 255 - -1 * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 67 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR BILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY BRAZIL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST- ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1971 11,803 11,803 6.000 - - - - 1972 11,803 17,803 1,812 6,740 916 1.074 1,990 - - 1973 17,627 18,699 - - - 350 350 1,072 1974 17,627 17,627 - - 280 393 673 - 1975 17,347 17,347 60,000 - 2,557 794 3,351 - _ 1976 14.790 74.790 - 31,225 2,277 1,568 3,845 - - 1977 43,738 72,513 682 18,750 1,290 2,199 3,489 - 1978 61,198 71,905 - - 306 3,098 3,404 - 1979 60,892 71,599 - - 4,418 2,697 7,115 - 1980 56.474 67,181 - 627 4.558 3,491 8,049 - - 1981 52,543 62,623 - 10,080 3,633 3,251 6,884 - -724 1 1982 58,266 58,266 * * * * t * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * *m 1982 58.266 58.266 - - 5,673 3,402 9,075 - -1 1983 52,592 52,592 - - 5,673 3,062 8,735 - 1 1984 46,920 46,920 - - 5,673 2,721 8,394 - -2 1985 41,245 41,245 - - 5.673 2,382 8,055 - I 1986 35,573 35,573 - - 5,537 2,043 7,580 - - 1987 30,036 30,036 - - 5,537 1,713 7,250 - 1 1988 24,500 24,500 - - 5,537 1,382 6,919 - - 1989 18,963 18,963 - - 5,537 1,053 6.590 - -1 1990 13,425 13,425 - - 5,537 723 6.260 - 2 1991 7,890 7.890 - - 5.137 393 5'530 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.  Table 4.2 - BOLIVIA PAGE 68 SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1981 DEBf REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS) TYPE OF CREDITOR BILATERAL LOANS CREDITOR COUNTRY CANADA YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES BEGINNING OF PERIOD