Guinea - Highway Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4358 GU INEA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT CREDIT 596 GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT March 1983 Western Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GUINEA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 596 GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page llo. Preface i Basic Data Sheet i HiPhli.htsi I. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1 II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL .......................... 1 A. Preparation ............................................ 1 B. Appraisal, Negotiations and Anticipated Cost ........... 2 C. Objectives ............................................. 3 D. Project Description .................................... 4 III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST ........................... 4 A. Effectiveness and Start-up ............................. 4 B. Procurement ............................................ 5 C. Rehabilitation and Maintenance of High Priority Roads .. 6 D. Training ............................................... 8 E. Implementation Schedule ................................ 8 F. Reporting .............................................. 8 G. Costs .................................................. 9 H. Disbursements .......................................... 9 I. Performance of Consultants and Suppliers ................ 9 IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT .... .............. 10 A. Management and Organizational Effectiveness ............ 10 B. Staff Recruitment, Training and Development ............ 10 C. Covenants .............................................. 11 V. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION ...... ................ ................ 12 VI. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................... 13 Project Objectives and Justification ....................... 13 Project Content, Implementation and Scheduling .............. 13 Covenants and Conditions ................................... 13 Bank Supervision and Working Relationship with Government .. 14 VII. CONCLUSIONS ................................................ 14 TABLES 1. Actual and Appraisal Estimate of Project Costs 2. Schedule of Estimated and Actual Disbursements 3. Scheduled and Actual Work Summary 4. Traffic and Works on Project Roads 5. Fuel Consumption, 1972-1979 6. Vehicle Registrations and Fleet Estimates, 1974-1979 7. Estimates of Vehicle Operating Costs, 1975 and 1978 MAP - 15531 (PCR) This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   (i) PREFACE This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) of the First Highway Project for which Credit 596-GUI was signed on December 23, 1975 in the sum of US$ 14.0 million. The Credit was fully disbursed and closed on June 30, 1980. The PCR was prepared by the West Africa region following a mission in April 1980 and incorporates comments received from Government officials on a first draft. The PCR was not audited by the Operations Evaluation Department in accordance with the revised procedures for project performance reporting approved by the Executive Directors. A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower on November 23, 1982. No comments had been received by February 7, 1983. The valuable assistance provided by the Government of Guinea and the project staff met during the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged.   - ii - Basic Data Sheet KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$million) 18.6 19.7 Underrun or Overrun (0) 7% - Credit Amount (US$million) 14.0 Disbursed 14.0 14.0 Date Physical Components Completed 12/78 02/80 2 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 100 70 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 45 Economic Rate of Return (X) over 100 over 100 1/ About US$1 million of the Second Highway Project was used to finance completion of the First Highway Project roads by June 1980. 2/ Scaled down project with funds within credit. OTiL., P;1JECT J.ITA Original Actual or Item Plan Est. Actual First Mention in Files or Timetable 01/19/72 Government's Application 07/31/74 Negotiations 11/17/75 11/17/75 Board Approval 12/23/75 12/23/75 Credit Agreement Date 12/24/75 12/24/75 Effectiveness Date 03/19/76 03/19/76 Closing Date 06/30/79 06/30/80 Borrower: Government of Republic of Guinea Executing Agency Directorate of Roads a .d Btidges Ministry of Public Works Fiscal Year of Borrower October 1 - September 30 Follow on Project Name Second Highway Project Credit Number 953 GUI; EEC 33-GUI Amount(U $million) 13.0; 4.0 Credit Agreement Date 08/28/79 Mission Data No. of No. of Item Staff Date Persons Man Days Report Date Identification. No formal mission sent. Preparation 09/16/74 2 22 11/21/74 05-06/75 3 45 12/05/75 677 Supervision I 05-06/76 2 6 06/08/76 II 10/76 1 8 11/10/76 III 02-03/77 2 20 04/26/77 IV 06/77 1 5 06/22/77 V 07/77 2 12 08/16/77 VI 11-12/77 2 16 01/05/78 VII 02-03/78 2 18 04/07/78 VIII 06/78 2 14 07/28/78 IX 03/79 1 6 04/09/79 X 09/79 1 10 11/28/79 XI 02/80 10 04/25/80 Completion 04/80 24 07/J1/80 149 Exchange Rates (Sylis per US Dollar) Appraisal: 20.5 Intervening years average: 20.1 Completion year average: 19.7 - 3/ January to March 1980 average.   (iii) Highlights i. The purpose of the project was to rehabilitate and ensure continued maintenance of Guinea's priority road network. The project provided for rehabilitation of existing equipment and workshops, the purchase of equip- ment, spare parts, supplies and materials needed for a road maintenance and rehabilitation program and for technical assistance for project implementa- tion, training, and preparation of a follow-up program. ii. The project was successful. About 86% of the 2491 km of project roads were maintained or rehabilitated, which is remarkable under a first highway project in a difficult environment where no road maintenance had taken place for a decade. However, the 900 km of paved roads were patched only instead of given full surface treatment. The gravel roads were re- habilitated (930 km, of which 744 km regravelled) or graded (300 km). The start of project implementation was delayed by about 20 months; after a difficult start-up period, the project crews had excellent outputs by West Africa standards and the Government performance was outstanding for 2 years; difficulties developed the third year with considerable diversion of equip- ment to non-project uses. The project achieved the estimated rate of return of over 100% and a benefit cost ratio of 4.6. iii. The following points may be of particular interest: (a) the 10% of spare parts foreseen underestimated needs; 27% were actually used (para 3.10) (b) the costly substitution of a patching unit for a re- sealing unit (para 3.12) (c) the staff commitment to the project, resulting in high brigades output (para 3.16) and equipment use ratios (para 3.17) (d) the wide variations in Government's performance (para 4.02) (e) the positive effect of the project on road users (para 5.05)   PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 Guinea's transport system comprises about 14,000 km of classified roads (of which about 1,100 km are paved), 1,100 km of railways, two deep water ports and ten airfields. Following the construction of the 600 km rail- way between Conakry, Mamou and Kankan 70 years ago, this has been the main transport artery of the country; the remaining three railway lines link the coast with mining developments. 1.02 The Government has, in the past, been particularly concerned with the mining sector and this has considerably influenced the transport policy, with efforts concentrated on developing rail and road links from the interior to the country's two principal ports. Attention was also given to upgrading key secondary roads feeding the Conakry-Mamou axis. In contrast, insufficient efforts were given to preservation of the remaining road network, which is vital to the exploitation of the country's rich agricultural potential. 1.03 Under the last Five Year Plan (FYs 1974-1978), the Government put greater emphasis on agricultural development, including rehabilitation and maintenance of roads serving agricultural areas. While practically no roads have been paved since 1975, the gravel road network has been upgraded, parti- cularly under the First Highway Project and the classified network increased by 700 km. 1.04 The Credit (No. 596-GUI) for US$14 million, signed on December 24, 1975, was the first Bank transport operation in Guinea since 1968 which was not related to mining. Earlier Bank projects in the transport sector made provision for extensive port and rail infrastructure needed for the Boke bauxite project in the northwest. The Second Highway Project (Credit 953-GUI), signed in 1979, continues rehabilitation work carried out under the First Project through pro- vision of further equipment, training and technical assistance to build up the maintenance capability which will be needed after its completion. 1.05 The main sources of information for the present report are documents produced by consultants who assisted in preparing and implementing the project and Bank supervision missions. II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL A. Preparation 2.01 In 1966, a firm of French consultants was commissioned by the Government to carry out studies of highway organization and the feasibility of constructing a road from Kissidougou and N'Zerekore to the Liberian border. The highway organi- zation study, financed by UNDP with the Bank acting as executing agency, explored in particular maintenance organization, labor, work methods and equipment and examined the need to rehabilitate the road network. The report was published in 1969 and in 1970 the Bank held discussions with the Government and indicated its  interest in financing a road maintenance project. At that time, the Government did not attach a high priority to road maintenance and so declined the proposal, preferring to construct the Kissidougou-N'Zerekore road, of which only the 85 km section from Kissidougou to Gueckedou was paved. 2.02 By 1974, the Government had decided to put more emphasis on agriculture and in view of the continuing and rapid deterioration of the road network, it began to reconsider its position. Meanwhile, a Bank Transport Sector Paper, pro- duced in July 1974 and based on the findings of an economic mission, concluded also that the principal problem in the highway sector was inadequate road mainte- nance. It recommended a pilot maintenance project in one region of the country and the provision of equipment and spare parts for maintenance of roads of highest priority. 2.03 A preparation mission visited Guinea in September 1974 and confirmed the findings of the consultant study that poor maintenance resulted from lack of equipment, spare parts, and repair workshops as well as from inefficient mainte- nance organization. The mission proposed a two-phase strategy: a first project which would provide financing for restoration and maintenance of priority roads and strengthening of the Government's maintenance capacity and subsequently a second project to extend these efforts to cover the entire road network. 2.04 The outline proposal submitted by the preparation mission was accepted by the Government which then formally requested Bank assistance in December 1974. In January 1975, two consultants, chosen and financed by the Bank and approved by the Government, each visited Guinea for two months. They produced detaiLed recommendations of organizational changes based on the 1969 highway organization study. They also defined the roads to be rehabilitated and maintained under the project, equipment and training requirements and means of improving maintenance operations. B. Appraisal, Negotiations and Anticipated Cost 2.05 A mission comprising two Bank employees and one consultant appraised the project in May/June 1975. Limited availability of IDA funds and the Govern- ment's reluctance to accept cofinancing meant that the scope of the project had to be reduced from that originally proposed. The total length of roads to be rehabilitated and maintained was reduced from 3,500 km to 2,500 km, decreasing the total cost from $22.6 million to $18.6 million, with a foreign exchange cost of US$14.0 million financed by IDA. The reduced project was considered t:o have the advantage of delaying the arrival of certain equipment before the maintenance organization was improved sufficiently. Somewhat reluctantly, the Government accepted this reduction and also agreed to finance all local costs. 2.06 A key issue focused on whether the political and administrativet climate in Guinea would permit successful implementation of the project. A particular risk was that the equipment would be used to upgrade rather than rehabilitate roads, or for other purposes. The risks were, however, considered justifiable in view of the country's economic difficulties at the time, of assurances made by the Government and its desire to have Bank assistance on a potentially worthwhile project of this kind.  - 3 - 2.07 After the return of the appraisal mission in June 1975, a new Minister of Public Works was appointed who requested changes in the list of roads to be covered by the project. Supplementary studies and discussions followed, although no slippage occurred in processing the project. Negotiations were held in Decenber 1975 and full agreement was reached without the need for special covenants or conditions of effectiveness. The Government assured the Bank that all equipment provided would be used solely for the Project until its completion, and thereafter for maintenance and rehabilitation and not for heavy earthworks (Section 3.03 of Credit Agreement). The Government also agreed to limit vehicle dimensions, weights and speeds (Section 4.03). 2.08 The Bank insisted on the appointment of consultants to advise and assist the Directorate of Roads and Bridges (DPC) in carrying out the project. The Government agreed, somewhat reluctantly because of its wariness about foreigners in its ministries, and selected consultants according to the Bank guidelines and on the basis of mutually agreed terms of reference. 2.09 In retrospect, one key to the success of the project was the work done at preparation and appraisal phases and its concentration on the right issues: smooth introduction of road maintenance which allowed the road users and the local authorities to witness its beneficial effects and to push for extension; monitoring of the use of equipment which ensured that project use was given priority over other uses and appointment of consultants whose help was fruitful and let the way to the continuance of foreign expertise which was and is still needed. It is doubtful, however, whether more frequent contacts with Government officials might have avoided some of the subsequent requests for changes during the start-up period, since these came from top-level Government. C. Objectives 2.10 The ultimate goal of the project was to permit and encourage the deve- lopment of the agricultural sector in Guinea, which was being impeded, inter alia, by deterioration of the road network. To achieve this end it was necessary to rehabilitate and ensure continued maintenance of the road network. This project represented the first phase of a long-range program and included provision for institution building as a preparation for the subsequent project and for eventual self-sufficiency in maintenance operations. The quantifiable objectives of the project were to rehabilitate as needed and begin maintenance of 2,491 km of roads and to train 90 mechanics and 45 equipment operators, who would afterwards work in the Ministry. 2.11 It is not known to what extent the ultimate Roal, to encourage Agricllitural development, was achieved. Overriding factors such as overall economic conditions and inadequate agricultural prices and marketing system prevented overall increased production. In 1980, however, traffic or. the improved gravel roads was about double the expected levels and the road users were beginning to benefit directly from reduced transport costs. All other objectives were achieved, albeit not 100% of the quantified ones; especially below target were the routine maintenance operations.  -4- D. Project Description 2.12 The project consisted of a three-year program for rehabilitat:ion and initiation of maintenance on 2,491 km of high priority roads and includesd the following componernts: (a) repair of existing equipment, plant and rehabilitation oE work- shops; (b) provision of (i) highway equipment and spare parts, (ii) workshop equipment and tools, (iii) equipment for engineering and labora- tory work and training material, (iv) radio equipment, and (v) other materials and supplies necessary for the project; and (c) 264 man-months technical assistance to the Directorate of Roads and Bridges (DPC) for (i) implementation of rehabilitation and maintenance program, (ii) training of mechanics and equipment operators, and (iii) preparation of a second phase program. ITI. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST A. Effectiveness and Start-up 3.01 The Credit Agreement was signed December 24, 1975 and was to be effec- tive by March 24, 1976; actual effectiveness took place March 19, 1976. No special condition of effectiveness was required. The provision of $150,000 for retroactive financing of technical assistance had not been used because of delays in project start-up. 3.02 Road maintenance and rehabilitation operations actually started in November 1977. During this unusually long start-up period (20 months), several special problems developed and were solved. They were due mainly to the fact that the project was one of the first World Bank Group projects to follow a 15-year absence of foreign assistance to the Guinean economy outside the mining sector. 3.03 The first special problem occurred in May 1976 when the Government sub- initted draft bidding documents for equipment procurement with major changes in the list of equipment to include heavy earthwork equipment. The Association sent a special mission at once to discuss the issue. On June 2, 1976, the Government and the Association agreed on a new list of equipment to be purchased, only 8% costlier than the appraisal list, and to increase the amount allocated for equip- ment under the Credit from US$5.1 million to US$5.5 million. No heavy earthwork equipment was included and changes were minor, except for the following: 5 vibratory compactors substituted for 10 pneumatic compactors; one asphalt distributor truck instead of two; four hydraulic excavators instead of one and an addition of five flat bed trucks. 3.04 On July 31, 1976 a special high-level mission delivered a letter, again requesting major changes in the project in order to procure more equipment, to include the whole network in the project, to remove the foreign technical assis- tance and to involve the Pouvoirs Revolutionnaires Locaux (PRL) in road maintenance.  -5- After the Association replied indicating it was prepared to agree to the revisions but that they would necessitate a reappraisal and cause some delay, the Government decided by letter of September 30, 1976, to continue with the project as negotiated with minor modifications to procure hand tools for the PRL to allow them to parti- cipate in road maintenance operations. 3.05 The second special problem arose from a decision at a political meeting on October 29, 1976, to trigger an emergency road rehabilitation operation. As the state of the road network had deteriorated significantly after the rainy season, it was decided to use all available means--Ministry of Public Works (MPW) staff including office clerks and PRL volunteers--to carry out emergency rehabilitation of about 2,200 km of roads. The works started at the end of November 1976 and ended in April 1977. They were carried out on an emergency basis and no record of expenses was kept. Road network improvement was spectacular during the dry season, but was washed out by the next rainy season as the materials used were not suitable and no drainage provisions had been made. The Association did not dis- burse for these works since the Government could not present any accounts or records. Inasmuch as a supervision mission had cautioned that the works as being carried out would not endure, the experience proved a good learning experience and encouraged better performance in the future. 3.06 The last problem was a substantial delay in workshop rehabilitation. Although the Government had agreed at negotiations to undertake immediately the necessary preparations for rehabilitating and equipping the main Conakry workshop, actual work did not start until June 1977. Work took one year to complete, thus delaying the rehabilitation of existing and the employment of new equipment until after September 1977 when a part of the workshop had been put in temporary working order. Contrary to what wasforeseen at the appraisal stage, it was decided, with Association approval, to set up a new central workshop in Conakry instead of reha- bilitating the old one. The Government, after having called for bids which were too expensive, decided to carry out the civil works on the four workshops under the project by force account. 3.07 The positive aspects of the project start-up period, such as the early mobilization of an effective Guinean team working closely with the Association staff, did little to mitigate these major problems which delayed the commencement of physical works. B. Procurement 3.08 Following the delays in reaching agreement on an equipment list, bids for equipment procurement were opened on November 4, 1976, about three months behind schedule. The bidders were asked to lengthen the bid validity period. Contracts were awarded in January 1977. Most of the equipment was delivered by July 1977 and had to be stored for a few weeks awaiting the setting up of minimal workshop facil- ities to maintain them. 3.09 The borrower had no difficulty following the Association's guidelines on procurement. Bidding documents were well prepared; the bids were evaluated and analyzed comprehensively by a 12-man tender board representing the Ministry of Public Works, various other Government agencies and the consultants. The lowest evaluated bids were accepted consistently. Only a few difficulties occurred.  One supplier requested a letter of credit before shipping the equipment which delayed delivery of patching equipment until February 1978. Spare parts delivery by one supplier was slow which delayed equipment repair and the probleim was aggra- vated by the low stock level of spare parts kept in the Conakry workshop. Twenty percent of the spare parts were procured locally and paid for in Sylis. 3.10 Under Category 1 of the Credit, $5,294,500 was spent for equipment pro- curement and $1,429,500 or 27% for tires, batteries and spare parts. This expenditure for spare parts is normal and the appraisal allowance of 10% under- estimated needs. 3.11 Procurement of radio equipment was first cancelled and then r:ransferred to the Second Highway Project, because Guinean regulations forbid its use in general, and because the MPW did not consider the matter to be of sufficient priority to warrant pursuit of a special permit at that time. C. Rehabilitation and Maintenance of High Priority Roads Paved Roads 3.12 Of the 1,046 km of paved roads included in the program, 405 km were to be rehabilitated by either an asphalt surface treatment or asphalt resurfacing. AAlthough the rehabilitation program was later reduced to 100 km of surface treatment, even this was not carried out and only about 200 km had drainage structure improved. The resealing unit that was to carry out surface treatment works was not constituted because the asphalt distributor ordered and delivered under the project was not equipped with a heater to use cut-back bitumen necessary for this type of work and had not been modified before project funds were exhausted. As a result the intended resealing unit was replaced by a patching unit which proved an insufficient and costly substitute for the resurfacing intended. The impact of the project on paved roads was less than expected. 3.13 Three to five brigades carried out patching works on about 800 km of rural roads and 100 km of streets. They patched at least twice urban roads in Conakry (although these were not included in the project), Faranah and the worst sections of Conakry-Kindia, Kindia-Mamou, Mamou-Labe and Mamou-Faranah; Faranah- Kissidougou and Coyah-Forecariah sections were patched once. The brigades used about 6,000 m3 of screened laterite aggregates and 800 tons of bitumen, and a con- crete mixer to prepare the cold mix. The output was good: 150,000 m2 were patched. In contrast, the patching was in general of inferior quality because of poor materials, the absence of compaction and the carrying out of the works under rain. On some sections, potholes reappeared on previously patched spots after the rainy season. It was also realized that 190 km of roads included in the progra; built more recently, did, in fact, need no work. 3.14 A chip screening and washing station for the production of materials for resealing and patching works was first installed at Kolente between Kindia and Mamou and thereafter moved to Faranah. It produced a total of about 13,000 m3 of materials, well under its nominal capability, because of operational difficulties, inexperienced staff, shortages in fuel supply and lack of working stock equipment.  -7- Gravel Roads 3.15 The project called for reshaping, regravelling and improvement of drainage on 1,445 km of roads, 270 km of which were also to be rehabilitated to the extent of some alignment and grade corrections but exclusive of heavy earth- works. Five regravelling units began the rehabilitation of the laterite roads in November 1977, one year later than scheduled. During the first season, execution of the work steadily improved. As of June 1978, about 390 km were completed by rehabilitation and 60 km started. In early 1979, with the Association agreeing "a posteriori", four of the five units were regrouped into two heavy brigades, which allowed more flexibility for the use of equipment and reduced the drop in output when one critical piece of equipment was out of order. Tn the second year of the project, 370 km were rehabilitated. As of February 1980, 170 additional kilometers were rehabilitated bringing the total to 930 km. Furthermore, a total of 300 km were graded. Brigades carried out the rehabilitation of the following project roads: Dubreka-Kolaboui, 188 km out of 213 km; Mamou-Dabola-Kankan, 256 km out of 410 km; Kankan-N'Zerekore, 384 km; and Gueckedou-Macenta-N'Zerekore, 100 km out of 243 km. The rehabilitation of the remaining sections of these roads and Macenta-Konsan Koro, 100 km and N'Zerekore-Liberian border, 95 km, were transferred to the Second Highway Project. Of the 930 km rehabilitated by reshaping the road to a 6-m width and grading, about 80% were regravelled by a 12 to 15 cm layer of laterite and less than 5% have undergone alignment and grade corrections. Thus in all, about 85% of the estimated work was achieved to acceptable standards, which is remarkable, given the fact that the brigades' outputs were overestimated at appraisal. 3.16 NPW staff carried out the works with enthusiasm, working overtime daily and seven days a week when the brigades were in working order, and producing an excellent daily output of 0.5 km or 500 m3. Unfortunately, brigade work was halted on numerous occasions for such causes as: transfers--in particular the trans- fer of one regravelling brigade from N'Zerekore to Macenta which took two months because of bridge out of service and could have been avoided; shortages of fuel; and towards the end of the project, equipment failure. The brigade chiefs placed more importance on kilometrage than quality, which was uneven: (i) drainage works were sometimes poor with shallow ditches and few turn-outs downhill; (ii) culverts were sometimes badly located and with shallow cover; and (iii) compaction did not keep pace with grading or was sometimes omitted entirely. More field supervision trips by the consultants might have improved the quality. Overall, in spite of shortcomings, the work on gravel roads was acceptable and, indeed, remarkable when viewed in the context of maintenance standards prevailing prior to project implementation. Further improvements are taking place under the Second Highway Project. 3.17 Equipment was used intensively the first two years, but less so later when some pieces began to need major repairs. The annual average outputs were: trucks 35,000 km; wheel-loaders 1,500 h; bulldozers 1,300 h; graders 1,200 h; vibratory rollers 700 h; and hydraulic excavators 400 h. Except for the hydraulic excavators and to a lesser extent the vibratory rollers, these outputs were excellent, well above the usual 700 h for West Africa. The agreed equipment changes were advantageous except for the one concerning the compactors. It was realized early during supervision that the project would have worked better with five additional compactors and all of the pneumatic type rather than vibratory, as the latter are fragile, need daily maintenance and do not suit force account uses in Africa.  -8- 3.18 A program of rehabilitation or reconstruction of bridges on the Mlamou- Kankan-N'Zerekore, Macenta Gueckedou and Macenta-Konsan Koro roads was prepared after stock taking of the needs and preliminary design of some typical bridges. Works were carried out on only four bridges. Under the Second Highway Project, the bulk of the works is to be carried out by seven brigades. 3.19 Routine maintenance for the project roads was to be carried out by subdivision forces. Twenty-one subdivisions and the PRL bordering the roads were provided with trucks and small hand tools for carrying out ditch clearing and vegetation cutting by labor-intensive methods (cantonnage). The results were deceiving: only a limited number of subdivisions such as Mamou carried out can- tonnage with civil servant laborers (cantonniers) regularly. The other subdivisions claimed they had a limited budget to pay temporary cantonniers and also that nobody was willing to work for the wage they were allowed to pay--GSy 1500 per month; as a result of the quasi-absence of routine maintenance, roads deteriorated rapidly during the rainy season. As maintenance is even more critical under the Second Highway Project, the Government is considering introducing a production--related salary system for cantonniers. D. Training 3.20 Under the project 90 mechanics and 45 equipment operators were expected to be trained for MPW. The training center in Conakry began training mechanics for the project in June 1977: 14 mechanics were trained the first year, 13 the second and 12 the third. These low annual outputs (representing only 25% of the appraisal estimate) were due to the extended duration of the training--much longer than fore- seen because of the trainees' low level of education. Based upon this experience MPW decided the third year to hire at the much higher level of education of "Brevet d'Enseignement Superieur", plus 3 years of practice. In order to focus training on the main center in Conakry, the training center in N'Zerekore was not opened. No formal training for equipment operators was implemented, but both MPW equipment operators and mechanics were carefully selected and received on-the-job training. More than 500 staff were employed under the project and on-the-job training proved effective. The brigades are now working well, completely manned by Guineans, E. Implementation Schedule 3.21 By December 1978, the original target completion date, only about 35% of the appraisal physical targets were completed. The delay was due mainly to slow start-up; one supplementary year should have been included for procurement and pre- paration of project implementation. By June 1980, 70% of the targets were completed and the credit fully disbursed. The appraisal team overestimated by about 30% the overall output of the brigades, despite the excellent production rate achieved by them. F. Reporting 3.22 The MPW reported very well from the beginning of the project to mid-1979. During this period, the inception report and the quarterly progress reports were received on time. They were comprehensive and whenever the need arose, were comple- mented or updated by letter or cables. Good reporting stopped mid-1979 with progress report No. 8 and no more were received. Also beginning around mid-1979, some changes to the project schedule were decided without informing the Association before- hand. Most of the changes produced problems  -9- which would have been minimized had the Association been informed in time. A completion report prepared by the consultants was submitted to a supervision mission in draft form only. G. Costs 3.23 The project cost was estimated at $18.7 million, however, about $22 million would have been needed to complete the execution, which is continuing under the Second Highway Project. Resulting from variations in unit prices and increases in the number of units procured, the cost of highway equipment was underestimated by about $1 million. Inasmuch as the 10% spare parts allocation for new equipment proved insufficient, 27% of the original equipment cost was used; this was, however, partly compensated by the deletion of parts for repair- ing existing equipment and lower expenses for shop equipment and miscellaneous tools. The net increase in equipment, parts and tools cost was about $400,000. In addition, the unit cost of technical assistance was underestimated by almost 50%, the actual cost amounting to about $11,160 per man-month, in line with rates under other similar projects. Although the project estimated 264 man-months at about $2 million, in effect, 224 man-months had been provided at a cost of $2.5 million by November 1979 when technical assistance financing was transferred to the Second Highway Project. Materials and supplies for the brigades were esti- mated at $5.4 million; but while the funds available enabled purchases totalling $6 million, an additional $1 million would have been required to complete the program. Thus there was an overrun on the order of 30%, partly due to procure- ment delays during an inflationary period. Skilled and unskilled labor was estimated at $3.7 million, whereas only $2.8 million was actually spent on wages resulting from the fact that routine maintenance was not carried out. The Government also spent the amount foreseen, which, as it contributed more towards materials and supplies, helped to offset the lower contribution to routine maintenance. Foreseen and actual costs for the reduced project are shown in Table 1. H. Disbursements 3.24 By July 1977, only 20% of the expected disbursements were made, reflect- ing the slow procurement process; however, there was a steady flow thereafter (Table 2). Final disbursement was made on July 2, 1980, one year later than the expected credit closing date of June 30, 1979. Disbursements from the Credit on each category are shown in Table 1. I. Performance of Consultants and Suppliers 3.25 The joint venture of consulting firms providing technical assistance performed well in an environment previously closed to foreign experts. After a difficult start and a change of mission chiefs, the team of consultants func- tioned satisfactorily and established good relationships with Guinean counterparts and officials. With the Government, it prepared the inception report which pro- vided a good basis for the project. From 1976 to early 1979, it recommended improvements in the project structure to assist the brigades in carrying out the works, advised Government officials adequately and prepared quarterly progress reports; those shortcomings experienced were related mostly to poor traffic counts and weak economic justifications. Around mid-1979, the consultants' work deteriorated: field supervision slackened, written reports and recommendations appeared to become scarce and the smooth relationship with the Government became less effective, with fewer of the consultants' recommendations implemented. Sub- sequently the consultants carried out a study which served as a basis for the  - 10 - Second Highway Project and were retained for its implementation. They are still the only expatriates in MPW. 3.26 Under the Project, 224 man-months were provided, less than the foreseen 264 despite a longer implementation period. This modification was due to a sharp reduction in the duration of the bridge engineer position (2 man-months in- stead of 30) and of equipment and shop specialist and mechanics positions (77 man- months instead of 96). 3.27 Suppliers' performance was, in general, good. IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFOR}ANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 4.01 Few institution-building issues were addressed, but priority was given to the build-up and execution of actual maintenance and rehabilitation work. The project was carried out through a Project Directorate which basically worked independently from the 31 subdivisions. The Project Directorate concept worked very effectively and is continuing under the Second Project, in the course of which the Directorate will gradually be integrated into the Ministry. A. Management and Organizational Effectiveness 4.02 After start-up problems were solved, MPW performance became outstanding for two years: the Minister, the project team and the consultants had established good mutual working relationships and managed to get the best out of the equipment and to dramatically improve the main gravel roads. Actions were planned and decisions made after careful study; priority was given to the most efficient pro- cedures. A constant dialogue between professionals at project management level, consultants and MPW officials was fruitful. Confidence was also built among suppliers, however, difficulties developed the third year (1979). Regrouping of regravelling units in heavy brigades, transference of brigades and rehabilitation of non-project roads did little to improve efficiency, output and quality of work, but rather had the effect of delaying project completion. Thereafter, under the Second Highway Project, MPW performance improved. 4.C)3 The leading weaknesses were possibly: (a) emphasis on quantity rather than quality; (b) delayed repair works, which reduced the effective fleet, and were directly related to the lack of a good stock-ordering system; and (c) admini- strative delays in purchasing fuels, materials, and spare parts (which sometimes halted works), in presenting disbursement requests to the Association and in pay- ing wages and bonuses. The weaknesses are being corrected under the Second Highway Project, and were in retrospect of limited significance when viewed in the context of project achievement. B. Staff Recruitment, Training and Development 4.04 From 1975 to 1979, the MPW staff increased from 2,000 to 3,000. Of these, 18% or 540 were occupied in carrying out the project. Equipment operators and mechanics were only partly trained at Conakry, but acquired good training and  - 11 - experience on-the-job and were integrated into effective brigades. Guinean brigade chiefs also acquired more experience and by the end of the project carried on successfully without expatriate counterparts. The turnover of MPW employees was low; the project manager and MPW professioals kept their posi- tions throughout the project period. 4.05 Project staff received a special bonus: they were fed at the site. This factor was probably more important than receiving wages on time and proved an effective incentive to overtime work, as well as ensuring a well-nourished staff. Sometimes, however, food supplies were scarce or late. One of the reasons why cantonnage failed was that such a bonus had not given to subdivision staff and few people were prepared to work for the regular daily wage. Under the Second Highway Project, routine maintenance is being carried out through the subdivisions with cantonniers paid by task at competitive wages and the reha- bilitation works continue through the Project Directorate. The FAO program provides food to the brigades, thus releasing the Government from this responsibility. C. Covenants 4.06 The Government complied with the axle-load regulation covenant and issued a decree in 1976 limiting the loads to 5 tons on unpaved roads during the rainy season and established rain-barriers. This law was not enforced, however. 4.07 The Government complied with the covenant limiting the scope and standards of road works, and for the most part limited improvement works to the agreed project roads (Table 3). One brigade did, however, improve in the last year some 30 km not included in the project, parallel to the railway and to a project road section from Dabola towards Kouroussa. The administration determined that the appraisal report map was wrong; the town of Bissikrima was shown on the south section, whereas the town should have been on the north section. Subsequently the Government opted to improve both alignments. In fact, it appears that two equally influential towns, one on each alignment, wanted the expected long distance traffic business the improved road would provide. The south section corresponded to the most justified alignment. 4.08 Despite the covenant that the use of equipment was to be limited to project works, it is apparent the trucks were also used for carrying agricultural produce after the brigade working day was over. While the brigade output was not directly affected by this diversion and there was no apparent misuse of fuel stocks, the practice did result in the deterioration of vehicles at a faster than expected rate. Trucks supplied for routine maintenance were additionally used for non-project transport needs. Given the scarcity of trucks at the time, it is difficult to say which use was the most economical in the country context rather than in the project-only con- text. In the long term, however, lack of routine maintenance is expensive. 4.09 Although systematic traffic counting was scheduled to begin no later than June 1977, only ad-hoc counts were carried out, mainly by the brigade personnel (Table 4). Fuel consumption data, which were not available at appraisal, are well- documented (Table 5) and new estimates of the vehicle fleet have also been made (Table 6).  - 12 - V. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION 5.01 In the appraisal report, the estimated rate of return for the project was over 100% and the benefit cost ratio was 4.6, at a 12% discount rate. This very high return was based on the expected extreme deterioration of the network if the project had not been implemented. The project was therefore expected to produce very high operating cost savings and to obviate the need for expensive reconstruction. 51.02 A number of the assumptions which formed the basis of the economic appraisal now need to be revised, in the light of recent actual information and the performance during implementation. One significant revision arises from the shortfall in meeting production targets: of the 1,046 km of paved roads to be improved in the original program, 190 km did in fact not need any works because they are of recent origin; 800 km were patched, one or two times, and the 400 km of resurfacing were not done; 100 km of city streets, not all origi- nally included, were also patched. Of the 1,445 km of gravel roads to be rehabilitated, 930 were rehabilitated although to lower standards than foreseen, and 300 were graded. The improvement costs per km averaged $11,000 for gravel roads and $3,000 for paved roads, including technical assistance costs. 5.03 Another revision concerns the traffic data. The 1975 volumes considered in the appraisal report were based on small samples and now appear to have been overestimated; conversely, the 3% p.a. growth seems underestimated. The vehicle fleet would have more than doubled from 1975 to 1979, that is, a 19% annual growth rate on average, and the fuel consumption statistics show an annual increase of 5% over the same period. Based on some traffic counts taken from 1977 to 1980, traffic expected on the paved roads appears to have been overestimated to varying degrees while traffic expected on the improved gravel roads seems underestimated by about half (Table 4). The veh-kms benefitting from improved paved roads would be as expected, however, around 508,000 per day in 1980, as the Conakry streets carry higher volumes than other paved roads not improved. Assuming an average of 60 vpd, veh-kms per day on improved gravel roads would number about 73,600 or about 30% more as compared to a projected 57,000 veh-km per day for 1980. 5.04 As a result, the vehicle operating savings need to be revised, too. Vehicle operating savings per km are somewhat less at 1975 prices given the lower quality of the improvement. At the same time, operating costs increased more than general inflation: about 50% for light vehicles and more than 100% for trucks, between 1975 and 1978. Thus, the expected unit savings at real 1978 values are at least as much as expected at appraisal (Table 7) and total vehicle operating savings are anticipated to be higher at least in the first years, tapering off as the quality of the improvements is lower and economic life shorter. On balance, and calculated in the same way, the project achieved the expected rates of return. This expectation is, however, contingent on appropriate road mainte- nance being carried out routinely. 5.05 In terms of effectiveness, gravel road rehabilitation has had the greatest impact; the Mamou-Daboula road can be considered as an example. Prior to the improvement the road was so degraded that maximum possible speed was about 20 kph, thus requiring a whole day for the 150 km trip; the fare per passenger was GSy 500. Immediately after the rehabilitation in 1979, the fare was reduced to GSy 200, but increased to GSy 300 in 1980 following fuel price increases; the trip requires less than 4 hours, allowing the passengers to attend to business  - 13 - and return the same day. Traffic has more than doubled--which can be accomplished with the same number of vehicles given the halving of the trip time. Reportedly, there is still a significant unmet demand because of the lack of vehicles; in Guinea, at present, there is still only one vehicle per about 270 persons. Thus, motor- cycle and bicycle traffic has also become increasingly important, even more so as the road passes a densely populated area with towns at an average distance of 3.6 km, and despite that a bicycle costs about GSy 10,000 (about 4 times the average farmer's monthly income) and is difficult to obtain. The railway, which parallels the road, is only used as a last alternative but is nevertheless congested. There is only one train per week, which takes 5-6 hours with no possibility of a return trip the same day; a one-way fare in 1980 cost GSy 94 in third class. 5.06 Passengers are also carried by private transporters who are also making a net profit. Furthermore, it could be said that the private carriers are com- petitive, pass on benefits to the direct users, and charge according to costs; on average in 1980, the fare was about GSy 1, 2 and 4.30 per passenger-km on paved, good gravel road and unimproved earth roads, respectively. This additional func- tion was not anticipated at appraisal, when it was envisaged that Government would be the main beneficiary. 5.07 Unaccompanied freight is, however carried mainly by Government truck. The Government apparently charges a flat GSy 2.5/ton-km, which has not changed for some time, but the official agricultural farm gate prices do not vary either by location or transport costs. Thus, to some extent, Government redistributes bene- fits from areas near Conakry or with low transport costs to other less favorable areas; specific road improvement can so delay overall price increases. Furthermore, gravel road improvements assisted those people dependent on agriculture for a live- lihood by lowering their cost of transport to local or regional markets, and although not intended, transport for produce was provided by the project trucks. It is not known to what extent these improvements may have influenced production. VI. BANK PERFORMANCE Project Objectives and Justification 6.01 The project objectives were the right ones to pursue; the most trafficked, main network has now been improved, and the Second Highway Project extends the effort to upgrading the remainder of the main network and to appropriate routine maintenance. On balance,the project was successful. The expected economic return will continue to be achieved provided that routine maintenance is carried out on the improved roads. Project Content, Implementation and Scheduling 6.02 The appraisal design was adequate in size and complexity, although the expected outputs were overestimated and operating costs underestimated. There were few noteworthy problems in implementation, and none intractable, although the schedule should have allowed more time for start-up period. The Borrower's implementation capacity was evaluated within an acceptable range. Covenants and Conditions 6.03 The Bank's pre-agreement requirements were reasonable, and the credit covenants were appropriate and in general, enforced. However, axle-load control on unpaved roads (Section 4.03) was not enforced, and some minor non-compliance could  - 14 - be observed on other covenants, e.g., the material was not used exclusively for project roads. These aspects are being monitored under the Second Highway Project. Bank Supervision and Working Relationship with Government 6.04 The Bank supervision was adequate, with a stable team that had a good working relationship with the MPW staff and consultants. In the final project year, however, changes in personnel resulted in relations which were less smooth. VII. CONCLUSIONS 7.01 The project was successful; 900 km of paved roads were patched and 1,230 km of gravel roads were improved. The length improved and the standards achieved, while somewhat less than foreseen, are nevertheless remarkable under a first highway project in a country where no road maintenance had taken place for over a decade. Overall, it would rather appear that appraisal expectations were optimistic. 7.02 Training, especially on-the-job, was very successful as the brigades now work without expatriates, achieving some of the best results in West Africa. The expected rate of return of 100% has so far been achieved; for it to continue adequate routine maintenance will have to be carried out. This aspect is being followed-up under the Second Highway Project.  GUINEA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 596 GUI PROJECT COMPLETICN REPOff Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs Cost Estimates including Contingencies (US$'000) I/ IDA Participation Actual Cost Comnpletion Date At Appraiea fAal l /________as____o appraosa Contract -~o Css Tot'al estimates Contracts Amount As of Mission as % of Costs Amount Project Item Executed by Signed ((S5'000) Contract Estimate Foreign Local Total Foreign Local Total Foreign ot-l (US$*0o) or Actual 1) Highway Equipment and Spare Parts Various Suppliers Yes 6,115 3/80 3/80 5,449 5,449 6,567 157 6,724 100 85 6,567 123 2) Shop Equipment and Miscellaneous Tools AFCO-Mali 5/25177 538 2/6/78 4/80 840 840 435 435 100 85 435 52 3) Parts for Existing Equipment Several Suppliers Yes 6/78 3/80 600 600 96 96 100 85 96 16 4) Engineering, Labora- tory Equipment and Training Materials Various Suppliers Yes 6/78 3/80 420 420 64 187 251 100 85 64 60 5) Radio Equipment 240 240 0 0 100 85 0 0 6) Materials and Supplies Various Suppliers Yes 1,298 7/79 3/80 4,590 848 5,438 4,427 1,556 5,983 100 85 4,427 110 7) Labor (Skilled and Unskilled) Government 3/80 0 3,671 3,671 0 2,753 2,753 0 0 0 75 8) Technical Assistance Berger-Tractionel 2/25/77 19 72 7/79 11/79 1,848 100 1,948 2,411 80 2,492 100 85 2,411 128 TOTAL COST 13,987 4,619 18,606 14,000 4,733 18,734 14,000 (Rounded) (14,000) (4,600) (18,600) ,14,000) (4730) (18,730) 1/ Excluding taxes. 2/ At exchange rate of US$1 - 20.46 Syli. 3/ At average actual exchange rate of US$J = 19.25 Syli.  - 16 - Table 2 GUINEA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 596 GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Schedule of Estimated and Actual Disbursements ACCUMULATED DISBURSEMENTS ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS IBRD (US$ millions equivalent) AS A PERCENTAGE OF FISCAL APPRAISAL ESTIMATES YEAR AND SEMESTER ACTUAL APPRAISAL ESTIMATE 1976 3rd 0 0.2 0 4th 0.2 0.9 23 1977 Ist 0.2 4.1 6 2nd 0.6 7.1 9 3rd 18 8.2 22 4th 2.4 11.9 20 1978 1st 4.0 12.7 31 2nd 5.4 12.9 42 3rd 8.3 13.6 61 4th 8.9 13.7 65 1979 1st 10.4 13.9 75 2nd 11.0 14.0 84 3rd 12.2 87 4th 12.7 91 1980 1st 13.3 91 2nd 13.5 96 3rd 13.8 99 4th 14.0 100 Closing Date 07-02-80 06-30-79  - 17 - Table 3 GUINEA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 596 GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Scheduled and Actual Work Summary TYPE OF ROAD WORK DESCRIPTION Total Km EXPECTED ACTUAL Asphalt Patching 1,046 900 (600 treated twice) Asphalt Surface Treatment 300 not done; degradation higher than expected. PAVED Asphalt Resurfacing (B.C.) with ADT < 500 60 0 with ADT > 500 45 Ditches and Shoulders 500 0 GRAVEL Heavy Rehabilitation 100 and and Minor Improvements 269 EARTH Rehabilitation (Works of lesser extent) 1,176 827 Grading only 0 300 SUBTOTAL 1,445 1,227 Source: Consultants' Report, adjusted by missions - 1975 and 1980.  GU INEA FIRST hIGhWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 596 GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Traffic and Works on Project Roads Number of Vehicles per Day Villages on 197511197711197&'- 1979- 1983/ Section (1980) 1975- 1977- 1978' 19751' 1 Improvements under Proect1980, car Average %h Nutos & Anticipatped oper. speed Distance I. Paved Roads km Trucks Bicycles 1980 at appr.- km Year Ty'pe Works km/hr No. km (cCyeyted) Conakry-Cuyah 2000 1425 2200 30 100 2300 50 43 6 5.0 -Kindia 266 1300 280 625 30 82 1495 85 1979 and 1980 patching (2 times) 70 20 4.5 -Mamou 750 260 220 342 34 62 862 131 58 29 4.6 Mamou-Dalaba 180 160 180 156 338 25 44 210 55 60 9 7.0 -Pita 245 180 160 192 25 84 210 52 1979 and 1980 patching (2 times) 62 3 26.0 -Labe 180 260 60 0 300 210 38 72 2 36.0 Mamu-Faranah 322 180 100 115 210 188 1979 and 1980 patching (2 times) -Kissidougou 180 86 165 37 50 210 134 1979 patching (I time) 82 27 5.0 -Gueckedou 90 180 112 155 21 88 210 - recently built no works needed 90 28 3.0 Kissidougou-K.nkan 50 90 105 - recently built no works needed Coyah-Forecariah 46 90 105 46 1978 some patching (1 time Coyah-(km 36)-Dubreka 18* 180 210 10 1978-1979 patching (2 times) Brke_Kamsar 52 90 105 - recently built Links in various zones 57 90 105 - Total Foreseen 1046 Added: Conakry streets 110 1978-1980 patching - 89. (192 km needed no work, as were recently built) II. Gravel & Earth Roads (total patching of 150,000 m2 carried out on about 1,500 km) Dubreka-Soubetide 47 50 220 58 47 1978 regravelled Soubetide-Boffa 40 50 64 58 40 1979 regravelled Boffa-km24 (Kolaboui) 126 50 69 58 101; 25 1979, 1980 regravelled; graded Mamou-Dabola*, 150 25 17 19 62 62 34 29 140; 10 1979, 1980 regrav-lled; graded 48 40 3.6 Dabola-Banco-Kouroussa 165 10-20 52 65 52 35 55 1979 regravelled 48 14 5.8 Kouroussa-Kankan 95 20 8 23 60 1979 regravelled Kankan-Kerouane 145 45 7 44 52 145 1978 regravelled Kerouana-Beyla 197 40 6 46 107 1979 regravelled Beyla-N'Zerekore 132 35 50 40 132 1978 regravelled N'Zerekore-Nacenta 143 30 11 35 40; 100 1978-1979 reh.bilitated; graded Macenta-Gueckedou 100 30 30 78 62 6 35 60; 40 1978 rehabilitated; graded 34 26 3.6 Macenta-Konsan Koro 100 25 29 - too degraded, needs complete rehabilitation N'Zerekore-Liberian border 95 25 29 95 7 graded, to be repeated Total Foreseen 1445 Added: Bissikrima Rowand Kouroussa 37 100 13 30 1979/1980 graded 40 7 1227 (857. of length expected, although at lower quality) (Regravelled 827 ki, graded 300 km, rehabilitated 100 km) 1/ As per appraisal report. 2/ DRB counts, average 3/ Based on l-day counts in May 1980, during supervision mission. 4/ At 37. growth p.a. * Error in appraisal; it is only 10 km. ** Error in appraisal; it said Bissikrima instead of Banko.  Table 5 GUINEA FIRST HIGIHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 596 GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Fuel Consumption, 1972-79 (million liters) 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Gasoline 69.5 76.8 80.3 69.4 67.6 70.4 75.8 83.5 Gas-oil 35.0 41.3 45.7 45.3 45.3 53.9 45.5 49.0 Diesel-oil 7.4 7.3 9.1 6.3 4.8 5.9 9.1 10.3 111.9 125.4 135.1 121.0 117.7 130.2 130.4 142.8 Lubricants 2.0 2.5 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.5 3.1 2.6 Note: No estimates available in appraisal report.  - 20 - Table 6 GUINEA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 596 GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Vehicle Registrations and Fleet Estimates, 1974-79 New Registrations venicle ric'ct 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Life Span Actual Estimated private public private public Years 1974 1979 Passenger cars 2,157 1,253 1,705 1,391 397 2,231 429 8 4,747 11,600 Vans 263 105 192 498 43 629 85 7 855 1,800 Trucks 856 359 702 160 110 282 678 6 2,310 4,400 Buses 58 57 25 14 18 128 58 8 1683 350 TOTAL 3,343 1,774 2,624 2,063 568 3,270 1,250 8,080 18,200 Increase over -47% +47% - 72% previous year  -21 - Table 7 GUINEA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 596 GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Estimates of Vehicle Operating Costs, 1975 and 1978 (GSy/km met of taxes) 19751/ Vehicle Paved Road Gravel Road Earth Type Good Fair Poor Good Fair Poor Road Light 2/ 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.7 4.0 Vehicles Heavy 3/ 3.9 4.4 4.9 4.9 6.3 7.7 11.1 Vehicles '197R Paved Road Laterite Road Good Fair Poor Good Fair Poor Very Poor Car 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.7 3.1 Van 2.7 3.1 3.6 3.5 4.3 5.0 6.0 l0t Truck 9.5 10.3 11.2 11.2 13.2 14.6 16.5 1/ In May 1975 prices, from First Highway Project Appraisal Report. 2/ Passenger cars, station wagons, and vans. 3/ Trucks (8-10 t). 4/ From Second Highway Project Staff Appraisal Report.  I  IBRD 15531 (PCR) .........CRA n- To oa Y JANUARY, 1981 L 5 E N E A L,, ! RREL 'I Yo.koun M A LI I - A / NIA wvers,rdXv X ?< _4l , / g a T1> B -r IMAI/NIGER I 's GLNERVA JT$AhT/ g'in _3ur-h J"'k' 'C Leek / :- 3 K <,f CJ CEA /V ~~~Ame -en du b0ie v 4 (+; 'T 7 \ X )* X( NIEI C O N CI )>t --\Nr 0 'lV2\''\' \<j '\' A$AROAD ARE, CNETWOKRAL:X$ L ig ;\t Q\: ; ;if 2\:;0 AlE"Cg+&eu . BET 5 Mali V~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ Y PavedT 'o'd .> \ Kre.investment x.jjG Ko A0A0 I [oC OCEAN M . j ,- / - A.~~~~~~N arye ~ tt