Liberia - Lofa County Agricultural Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4517 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 577-LER) May 27, 1983 Western Africa Projects Department Agriculture Division 4 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = United States Dollars Currency Exchange Rate = US$1.00 - Appraisal Year Average US$1.00 - Intervening Year Average = US$1.00 - Completion Year Average US$1.00 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES IMetric ton 0.98 long ton 1 long ton 2,240 lb = 1.016 metric ton 1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres 1 acre = 0.405 hectare 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile 1 mile - 1.609 kilometer ABBREVIATIONS ACDB Agricultural and Cooperative Develcpment Bank ADPs Agricultural Development Projects BCADP Bong County Agricultural Development Project CAO = County Agricultural Officer CARI = Central Agricultural Research Institute CDA = Cooperative Development Agency CMEU Central Monitoring and Evaluation Unit CS = Cooperative Society GCOL = Government of Liberia LBDI Liberian Bank for Development and Investment LCADP = Lofa County Agricultural IDevelopment Project LPMC = Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation M& = Monitoring and Evaluation MOA = Ministry of Agriculture MPW = Ministry of Public Works PMU = Project Management Unit PSC Project Steering Committee TCU = Town Cooperative Unit USAID = United States Agency for :International Development FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LIBERIA Lofa County Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 577-LBR) COMPLETION REPORT Table of Contents Page No. PREFA-CE - ........................................................i BASIC DATA SHEET ................,.......... ii F[IGHL OGHTS ........................................................ iii I. BACKGROUND. 1 IIe THE PROJECT. 3 IIT, IMPLEMENTATION. 5 IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS. 12 V. PROJECT IMPACT .14 VI. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION .18 VII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT .19 VIlI. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK .24 ,X. CONCLuSIO NS 25 TA,sLES IN TEXT Table 2.1 Anticipated Yields 3.11 Physical Achievements 3.2 Crop Development Program 3.3 Input Distribution 3.4 Loan Disbursements and Recovery 4.1 Project Costs 4.2 Project Financing 4,3 Disbursement (Cumulative) 5.e 1 Upland Rice Yields on Project and Non-Project Farms T.1his document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of heir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  LIST OF ANNEXES: Annex 1 Key Indicators Annex 2 Table 1 Project Costs Table 2 Project Costs by Departments Annex 3 Actual Prices Received by Farmers Annex 4 Table 1 Upland Rice - Farm Budget and Cash Flow Table 2 Swamp Rice - Farm Budget and Cash Flow Table 3 Coffee - Farm Budget and Cash Flow Table 4 Cocoa - Farm Budget and Cash Flow Annex 5 Calculation of Economic Prices Annex 6 Calculation of Economic Rate of Return Map: IBRD Map No. 11517R (PCR) Liberia Lofa County Agricultural Development Project  LIBERIA Lofa County Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 577-LBR) COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is a completion report on the Lofa County Agricultural Develop- ment Project (LCADP), for which Credit 577-LBR in the amount of US$17.0 million was approved on June 22, 1975. The Credit was closed in September 1982, nine months after the original closing date. A small balance of US$51 .995.68 still remains to be disbursed. The Project Completion Report (PCR) was prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office. It is based on several sources of information: pro- ject files, Staff Appraisal Report (No. 744a-LBR dated June 27, 1975), President's Report (No. P-1671-LBR dated July 9, 1975), Development Credit Agreement dated August 1, 1975, Supervision Mission Reports and a first draft of the PCR prepared by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the Project. The Project Performance Audit Report (OED Report No. 3008 dated June 3, 1980) on the preceding project - Liberia, Agricultural Development and Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 306-LBR) - was also consulted. A completion mission visited Liberia in April 1982. Discussions were held with Project Management, Government officials and with representatives of institutions participating in the project. Field visits were also undertaken and farmers interviewed. The information obtained and observations made during those missions are reflected in the PCR. The PCR was substantially completed and submitted to OED on October 28, 1982. The project was not selected for audit by OED and the PCR was sent to the Borrower on February 2, 1983 for comments by April 13, 1983. However, no comments were received from the Borrower by that date. The Western Africa Regional Office gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance provided by the Government and project staff, as well as the officials involved in the project. Their assistance greatly contributed to this report.   L IXI Lofa County Agricultural Developmt Project (Cr. 577-LBR) BASIC DATA Sim Actual as % of Appraisal Appraisal Key Project Data Estimate Actual Ehtimte Project Costs (t[licn) 17.0 15-59 92% Credit Amount (Mbailin) IDA 6.0 6.0 100 Cofincier (UAID) Lomn Asont 5.0 4.10 82 Date Bard Apprval 7/22/T5 Date S4Bng 8/1/75 Date Effectivernss 10/3D/75 5/26h6 Date PmicEl Cana p ts cpleted 12/31/81 - Proportimn tien cmpleted (%) 75% Closing Date 12/31/81 9//82 Eoomic Rate of Return() 25.9 12.5 48 Istituticnl Performance 10D.0 90.0 9Qs Agronc Performance 1C0.0 9D.0 9 Nhnber of Direct Penefticdsa 8,00).0 7,430.0 93% Olmlative Dsb3rasmt BY77 Ff18 FY79 FYO M FY81 F82 FY83 Appraisal btirmte (S$ nllinon) 1.30 2.80 4.0D 4.90 5.70 6.0 - Actual (LM million) 0.52 1.16 2.42 3.62 4.78 5.35 6.0 Actual as % of estimate 40.0 41.0 61.0 74.0 84.0 89.0 100.0 Date of final disbnusant A -11 belance of US51 ,995.68 remins to be disbursed. .9CZ DATA No. of Date of onth/ No. of eeks Special Performance Trend Problem sent IF Report Year Persoas in Field Report 1/ Rating 2/ 3/ 4/ Idenitif icatimn GOL/IDA 6/74 2 4 Prepration IDA 1/75 9 3 aperrvison i IDA 11/75 9/75 2 2 a,c 2 M &ipervision 2 @ 3/76 2/76 I 1 a 2 1 N &xperviasion 3 " 12/76 11/76 1 1 a 1 1 0 upervision 4 " 3/7 3/77 I 1 a 1 1 - Superviion 5 ' 7/77 6/77 1 1 a 1 1 - Supervision 6 " 4h/78 4/78 1 1 a 1 1 - aipervion 7 " 6/8 6/8 2 2 a,a 1 1 P Supervii 8 1 1/79 10/78 2 2 a,c 1 1 - Supe-n 9 8/79 5/79 2 2 a,c I 1 - ReSer1i0ciC " 1/90 12/79 2 3 c,a 1 2 T Supervsion 11 " 7/80 6/80 2 2 b,c 1 2 T Supervism 12 "12/80 12/9D 1 1 b 1 2 T Supervision 13 6/81 6/81 5 1 b,a,d,e,c 1 2 T Supervsin14 " 4/82 3/82 3 2 a,e,f 1 2 T Subtotal 78 OMl PROJEl DATA: Borrower Republic of Liberia Fx6cting Agency :Project Mangmnt U)nit Followson Project: Naxe : Seoond lofa County Agricultural Deve)opnt Project Loan/Credit NInber Cr. 1242-LHI Loan/Credit Amont US15.5 million Date Board Approval : 05/04/82 1/ a = agriculturist; b = agricultural ecrmist; c = Finanmal Analyst; d = operations asistant; e- eceist, f = credit specialist. 2/ 1 = problEm-fee or minor problenn; 2 = moderate problems. 3/ 1 improving; 2 = statioary. 4/ F = financal; M = managerial; T = tecimical; P = political, and 0 = other.   - iii - LIBERIA Lofa County Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 577-LBR) COMPLETION REPORT HIGHLIGHTS The Lofa County Agricultural Development Project was the first major integrated agricultural development project in Liberia. The project was identified by GOL/IDA and was prepared by consultants as part of the Liberian Agricultural Development and Technical Assistance Project (306-LBR) financed by IDA, USAID and the Government of Liberia. The primary objective of the project was to increase production of smallholder rice, cocoa, and coffee in two districts of Upper Lofa by means of an intensive extension system with supporting services such as credit, input supply and cooperative develop- ment.. In addition, the project included feeder road rehabilitation, well construction and the provision of some buildings. The agricultural targets attained by the project compared to those at appraisal were 98% for swamp rice, 93% for upland rice, and 51% and 78% for new -plantings of coffee and cocoa respectively in terms of hectarages de- veloped. The project area now has 49 tree crop nurseries. About 7,430 far- mers or 93% of the appraisal target of 8,000 farmers directly participated in the -project. The project established its own training facilities and adaptive research into farming systems. Through its unit designed to carry out small road maintenance and the construction of access tracks, the project completed a substantial program of construction and reconditioning of 557 km of feeder roads and tracks, 503 culverts, 370 stream crossings, 3 bridges, 195 wells and 78 latrines. Overall management of the Project was satisfactory with local staff taking over complete responsibility from expatriates by Year 3. Total costs up to the end of September 1981 were US$15.59m or 92% of appraisal estimates. Expenditures for IDA-funded components totalled US$6.3m, an overexpenditure of US$0.3m, which was met by the Government of Liberia (GOL). The actual costs exceeded appraisal estimates in building and con- struction materials, vehicles, vehicle operating expenses and development operational costs, but were less for equipment, consultants, Agricultural and Cooperative Development Bank (ACDB) and farm inputs. The economic rate of return is estimated at over 12%, lower than the appraisal figure of 25.9% due mainly to the late start of the tree crop pro- duction and lower than estimated yields of all crops, resulting in lower actual incremental production. In line with observed yield performance, future expected yields have also been adjusted downwards compared to appraisal yields.  - iv - As the first attempt at integrated agricultural development, the project has been reasonably successful in effecting improvements in the agriculture of Upper Lofa and in setting standards for Liberia even though problems were encountered in full farmer adoption of improved swamp rice techniques, rehabilitation of cocoa and coffee, achievement of acreage targets of cocoa and coffee and yield targets of all crops and development of cooperatives. The physical achievement, mobilization of farmers, institu- tional performance and development of a trained and motivated management and extension cadre have been satisfactory overall. The main lessons which emerge from the project's implementation experience include: (i) the complexities of changing traditional subsistence farmers into modern farmers, even in a highly receptive farming community, should not be underestimated (paras 8.02, 9.02 and 9.03); (ii) given the weak- ness of research institutions, recommended technological packages in projects should be kept under constant review (para 9.05); (iii) project M&E units can play a very effective part in introducing beneficial policy changes in project mid-stream (paras 3.18 and 9.08); (iv) optimum use of available resources should be made and duplication of functions avoided to improve cost-effective- ress of projects (para 9.10); and (v) the experience with cooperatives underscores the need for effective supervision of key project components (paras 8.02, 8.03 and 9.09). Other points of interest are: - complete and effective Liberianization of management had taken place by the end of the third year of the project (para 7.03); - the semi-autonomous status of the project combined with a good management team, which judiciously used this status, served to facilitate implementation (para 9.01); - the lack of integration of the project with the MOA which continued to carry its own agricultural staff located but not working in the project area was criticised (paras 7.02 and 9.10); - the project elicited considerable community self-help in the construction of physical infrastructure (para 9.07); and - the strategy of integrated agricultural development can satisfy both growth and equity objectives (para 9.11).,  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Liberia: Lofa County Agricultural Development Project (Credit 577-LBR) I. BACKGROUND Sector Background 1.01 Agriculture is the largest sector in the country contributing about 32% to GDP (14% from monetary and 18% from traditional sector). Three dis- tinct types of farming systems characterize the sector: (a) foreign-owned plantations of rubber and forestry concessions producing exclusively for ex- ports; (b) Liberian-owned commercial and state farms, engaged primarily in rubber production, but also in coffee, cocoa and oil palm, and gradually moving into other activities, such as poultry and pig production; and (c) tra- ditional farms consisting of smallholders (90% of all agricultural households) who produce mainly for home consumption with small surpluses sold for cash purposes. The principal cash crops are rubber, coffee and cocoa. Annual rub- ber production is currently about 82,000 tons, of which 70% is produced by six foreign concessions. Coffee and cocoa exports were about 10,000 tons and 3,400 tons respectively in 1980/81. Rice and cassava are the main crops of traditional smallholders, with annual production estimated at about 280,000 tons (paddy) and 155,000 tons, respectively. Crop yields on traditional farms are low. Except for those within the agricultural development projects (ADPs), farmers have little access to capital and agricultural inputs; agri- cultural technology is rudimentary and infrastructure is inadequate. Coffee and cocoa are the main cash crops for smallholders, who also sell kernels from the harvested fruit of wild oil palms. Sector Objectives and Strategy 1.02 During the project period, Government sector objectives were to sti- mulate increase in productivity, employment and income of Liberian farmers, particularly smallholders, and promote diversification of production in the sector. To achieve these objectives, the Government's strategy in agriculture has given priority to: (a) improving the institutional atructure to plan and carry out development programs more effectively; (b) improving price incen- tives for increased production by adopting an active price policy and improv- ing the marketing system and the infrastructure; and (c) provision of a pack- age of measures - extension, input supply, credit and marketing - to tradi- tional farmers in order to raise their level of production. In line with this strategy, the Government has pursued and is pursuing the decentralization of its agricultural services and improving the administration of agricultural programs and the development and improvement of agricultural research, exten- sion and training. The project under review was designed to meet Government objectives of stimulating increase in productivity, employment and income of smallholders.  - 2- Bank Group Involvement in the Sector 1.03 Bank Group lending in the sector supports Government's objectives of increasing smallholder productivity, diversification of production and strengthening of institutions. The Bank Group's involvement in the sector commenced in 1972 with the Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 306 - LBR for US$1.6 million). 1/ The objectives of this projec-t included the carrying out of a series of feasibility studies. Under that project, foreign consultants carried out the studies, the first of which resulted in the Lofa County Agri- cultural Development Project (Cr. 577-LBR for US$6.Om, 1976), subject of this report, followed by the Bong C.ounty Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 700- LBR for US$7m), and the Rubber Development -Project (Cr. 786-LBR/Ln. 1544-LBR for US$13m). A Forestry Development Project (Cr. 839-LBR for US$6 million) and an Oil Palm Project (Ln. 1765-LBR for US$12m) have since been added. A second phase of the Lofa County project (Cr. 1242-LBR for US$15.5 million) was approved by the Board on May 4, 1982. The performance of Lofa I (reviewed in this report) was overall satisfactory. The Bong Project, after a slow start (1978) and initial management problems, is also being implemented satisfac- torily. The Rubber Project which became effective October 1978 aims at strengthening Liberian-owned rubber production, but because of management problems, poor pricing, and a shortage of processing facilities, this project has been revised. The Forestry Project became effective in July 1978, and is designed to strengthen forestry institutions through training and technical assistance and to establish trial plantations. The performance of this project in general has been satisfactory. The Decoris Oil Palm project became effective in February 1981, and is designed to establish oil palm plantings on a nucleus estate, and associated smallholders plots. In spite of considerable delay in meeting conditions for effectiveness and financial constraints, project implementation is progressing reasonably well. Preparation and Appraisal of the Project 1.04 Preparation of the Lofa Project was completed in August, 1974. Appraisal took place in January 1975, with a mission of seven persons, includ- ing one from USAID. The USAID had decided to consider participation in the proposed project in view of a previous commitment to assist the Liberian Government in the area of rural development, for which some US$5 million had already been programmed. 1.05 Government asked the appraisal mission to consider: (i) Liberia's agricultural credit policies; (ii) strategies for development of nucleus estates with outgrower plantations for irrigated rice, oil palm, coffee and cocoa; (iii) the inadequacy of the extension service; and (iv) lack of exper- ienced Liberian managers capable of running an externally financed project. The appraisal mission proposed: (a) an integrated system of support services 1/ For further details see PPAR, Liberia - Agricultural Development and Technical Assistance Project (Credit 306-LBR), OED Report No. 3008 dated June 3, 1980.  - 3 - to aid approximately 8,000 farmers in the Upper Lofa area in growing swamp rice, upland rice, coffee and cocoa; (b) a project management unit; (c) a development authority in the project area responsible for agricultural ser- vices inicluding extension, credit and training; (d) assistance to help modern- ize and expand Liberia's agricultural extension services; and (e) setting up a schistosomiasis surveillance unit. 1.06 By April 1975, USAID confirmed that they would cofinance the project on a parallel basis. Negotiations took place June 3-6, 1975, and the project was approved by the Board on July 22, 1975. The credit agreement was signed August 1, 1975, and the USAID Loan Agreement was signed November 10, 1975. The project became effective May 26, 1976. 1.07 Total project costs were estimated at US$17.0 million, and the IDA approved credit for US$6.0 million and USAID financing of US$5.0 million were to fund 65% of the costs, while Government funding was estimated at US$6.0 million. II. THE PROJECT The Project 2.01 Project Area. The project area is centered on Voinjama in Lofa County in North West Liberia. It is bordered by Sierra Leone to the West and by Guinea to the North East. The project area covers some 3,300 km2 and containi nearly 14,000 farming families (90,000 people). The project area has ample rainfall of over 2,500 mm. It is drained by three major rivers and intersected by numerous streams. Swamps are formed from bottomland which is permanently or temporarily waterlogged. Swamp and bottomland rice is tradi- tionally cultivated. Women generally grow rice in these lowland areas on a semi-continuous basis, abandoning them only in years where the upland rice field is a considerable distance away. In some areas, improved swamp rice cultivation has been successfully introduced, replacing the traditional practice. 2.02 Shifting cultivation is the prevailing farming system in the project area. Fallow periods vary mainly as a consequence of population pressure, ranging from 5 to 12 years. Upland rice is the main crop and is generally sparsely inter-cropped with vegetables, cassava and pulses. Cocoa and coffee are grown as smallholder cash crops. The project introduced improved planting and cultivation methods for these crops. 2.03 The project comprised: the provision of development loans and seasonal credit to some 8,000 farmers to develop and improve a total of about 12,600 ha of swamp and upland rice, coffee and cocoa; the provision of tech- nical and administrative staff and support facilities for project implemen- tation; staff and farmer training centres and their operation; construction of village wells; setting up a schistosomiasis surveillance unit; assistance in establishing a branch of the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment  - 4 - (LBDI) in the Project area, and the provision of consultant services. In addition, Government was to have undertaken, independently, the construction of new and rehabilitation of existing feeder roads in support of the project. 2.04 Crop Development. The project was to provide credit for farm inputs, including hired labor for swamp development, tools and equipment, seeds, seed- lings, fertilizer and chemicals for: upland rice improvement (5,600 ha); the rehabilitation of some 500 ha of rainfed swamp rice; cultivation of 1,400 ha of new swamp of which some 400 was to be double cropped; the rehabilitation of 500 ha of existing coffee and new planting of 2,300 ha; rehabilitation of 800 ha of existing cocoa and the development of 1,500 ha of new cocoa. 2.05 Supply of Inputs. The project was to supp:Ly long-term loans to farmers for swamp rice, coffee and cocoa rehabilitation and new planting. These loans were to be in kind for tools and equipment, coffee and cocoa seed- lings, fertilizers and chemicals during the development period, and in cash for hired labor for swamp development. Short-term or seasonal loans were to be provided for upland and swamp rice to cover seed and fertilizer, chemicals and replacement sprayers. Delivery of these inputs was to be carried out through farmers' cooperatives. A revolving credit fund was to be established with and administered by the LBDI to finance inputs to farmers on a permanent basis. A branch of the LBDI was to be estabLished in the project area for this purpose. 2.06 Staffing. Some 276 administrative, technical and commercial staff were expected to implement the project, and it was anticipated that up to ten of these would be recruited internationally t,o fill positions for which suit- able Liberians would not be available. 2.07 Training. The project was to carry out staff training in basic man- agement, organizational and technical skills at a residential training center to be established under the project at Voinjama, supplemented by on-the-job training. Further staff training was to be obtained through the Agricultural Extension Training Center in the Monrovia area, for which the project was to have constructed a dormitory block. Four full-time cooperative officers were to provide internal training and support to cooperative staff under the direc- tion of a cooperative training officer. Farmers' training was to be conducted at Kolahun, where a resident training center was to be constructed under the project. Additionally, on-farm training through demonstrations was to be carried out. 2.08 Village Wells. The project was to assist villages in the construc- tion of 100 hand-dug wells on a self-help basis with the project providing ma- terials and technical advice. 2.09 Schistosomiasis Surveillance. A small laboratory and staff were to be provided to monitor swamp areas being developed for rice production under the project for schistosomiasis in support of existing health programs in the area.  2.10 Road Improver.ent. Some 100 km of new feeder roads in the project area were to be constructed and 500 km of existing upgraded and maintained by the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) in agreement with the project, specifically to facilitate project activities. Some US$1.5 million were to be provided under a Bank-financed highways project (Ln. 1156-LBR). A small road main- tenance program for minor feeder roads and tracks was to be undertaken by the project. 2.11 Project Benefits. The appraisal report anticipated the following agricultural yield increases: Table 2.1: ANTICIPATED YIELDS Crop Without Project With Project 1/ kg/ha kg/ha Upland Rice 1,000 1,700 Swamp Rice Rehabilitation 1,500 3,500 New - 3,500 Coffee Rehabilitation 280 700 Coffee New - 1,000 Cocoa Rehabilitation 280 600 Cocoa New - 850 1/ At Year 5. The project, through its support services including farm inputs, credit and marketing was to enable farmers to increase both areas under cultivation and crop yields. Secondary benefits were to be derived from the provision of improved roads, banking, education and health facilities, and the strength- ening of MOA's technical capabilities in agriculture and cooperatives. III. IMPLEMENTATION 3.01 Effectiveness. The credit was expected to be effective by November 3, 1975, but this had to be extended first to December 31, 1975, then to February 28, 1976, and finally to May 31, 1976 but the Credit was declared effective on May 26, 1976. The conditions of effectiveness were: the signing of the USAID Loan Agreement and effectiveness of this agreement, the appointment of a Project Manager, Agricultural Manager and Training Manager and the opening of a project bank account with an initial deposit of US$100,000. While the condition in relation to the USAID Loan was fulfilled in November 1975, and Government had opened the project bank account early in 1976, there were delays in finalizing the appointments of the three managers. At Government's request, the Bank assisted in recruiting international  - 6 - staff. Government did not always accept the first choice of candidates, and it was also obvious that the lack of facilities, such as adequate housing and schooling, made these positions less attractive to candidates. The Project Manager and Training Manager had been chosen by the end of 1975. However, the appointment of an Agricultural Manager was only finally settled in May 1976. It should be mentioned that by this time, an e-xpatriate Financial Controller had also been appointed, thus ensuring a relatively early establishment of project accounting systems. 3.02 Organization. A Projec: Steering Committee (PSC) was appointed by the Head of State comprising the .inisters of Agriculture (Chairman), Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs, Local Government, and Rural Development and Urban Reconstruction with the Project Manager Ras the Committee's secretary. Although on rare occasions the respective Minister attended meetings of this Committee, generally, Deputy or Assistant Ministers represented them, and this ensured a degree of continuity in the Committee's make-up. This Committee had overseeing responsibility for the project. A 'Project Advisory Committee was also established consisting of local officials such as the County Super- intendent and paramount chiefs for the purpose of getting local residents involved in the project taking into account local conditions, customs and attitudes. The Project Management Unit (PMU) was headed by the Project Manager responsible through the PSC to the Minister of Agriculture. Six Divisions were established, each headed by a manager: administration and personnel; finance; training; cooperatives and credit; land development; and agriculture. At year 4, a plant production and research division was created to produce coffee and cocoa seedlings, and carry out some adaptive research and demonstration. An evaluation and planning unit was set up to support the Project Manager through monitoring and evaluation activities. A schistosomi- asis surveillance unit was also established. 3.03 Staffing. Although the appraisal report adopted the principle of filling all positions with qualified Liberians, it recognized the existence of a shortage of suitably qualified experienced Liberians and identified ten key positions which were likely to require international recruitment. Nine ex- patriates were employed during the first three years of the project (2 funded under the USAID Loan Agreement for cooperatives and credit) eight of whom had local deputies. With the exception of the Evaluation and Planning Officer position which was created later, all key posts were filled by 1976. Project Management had full control over recruitment, and there was no shortage of personnel working in the project. The administrative and personnel matters were under the charge of a Liberian Manager, while a qualified supervisor headed the Schistosomiasis Unit for which a consultant was retained to plan and supervise programs. A good working relationship existed during the period cf expatriate management, and it was felt that after 3 years local deputies were capable of taking over the management of the project. All expatriates, including the Project Manager, satisfactorily completed their contracted 3 year assignment period with the project. Thereafter, the project continued to be satisfactorily run under local management. The organizational and staffing eLspects of the project were, therefore, successfully implemented. 3.04 Physical Implementation. Project achievements are shown below against appraisal estimates at Year 5. Details are at Annex 1.  Table 3.1: PHYSICAL ACHIEVEMENTS Component Appraisal Estimates Actual Crop Development 12,600 ha receiving inputs 9,472 ha Civil Works Vil:Lage Wells 100 195 Latrines Not provided for 78 Feeder Roads (MPW) 600 km (100 new, 500 upgraded) 280 km Feeder Roads & Tracks Not quantified 557 km (LCADP) Stream crossings Not provided for 370 Culverts Not quantified 503 Bridlges Not provided for 3 Training 3 training centers 2 Cooperatives & Credit Unspecified farmer 27 farm village stores centers Crop Development and Improvement 3.05 Overall, 75% of the planned hectarage benefitted under various crop development programs. Details at Annex 1 show that coffee and cocoa new plantings remained consistently behind appraisal targets every year. So was the case with upland rice except in 1980. Swamp rice acreage consistently exceeded the yearly appraisal targets for new swamp development except in 1981. The reasons for variable performance of these crops are discussed in the following paragraphs. Table 3.2: CROP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM Actual at SAR Project Program Estimate Completion % (at Year 5) (ha) (ha) Upland Rice 5,600 5,218 93 Swamp Rice 1,400 1,865 133 Swamp Rice (Rehabilitation) 500 Nil Nil Coffee (New Planting) 2,300 1,164 51 Coffee (Rehabilitation) 500 50 10 Cocoa (New Planting) 1,500 1,175 78 Cocoa (Rehabilitation) 800 Nil Nil Total 12,600 9,472 75  - 8 - 3.06 Upland Rice. The original upland rice package of improved seed and fertilizer evoked very little response and was de-emphasized in favor of the more popular package of improved seeds alone, which was generally provided through seed-exchange. However, the overall achievement under the upland rice program was nearly 93 percent of the target. Project's agricultural division reported a higher figure of 5,843 ha developed by them, based on the seeding rates initially assumed under the project. The evaluation surveys reported that the actual seeding rates were higher. The seeding rates were subsequent- ly revised from 40 kg/ha to 60 kg/ha. The figure of 5,218 represents the area based on the actual seeding rates adopted by the farmers. 3.07 Swamp Rice. Rehabilitation program for 500 ha of existing swamps was not taken up as it was found that the amount of work involved in rehabilitat- ing these swamps was so high that it did not constitute rehabilitation. Ef- forts were therefore concentrated on new swamp development. It was found practicable to encourage this development in areas where the population densi- ty exceeded 70 persons per square mile since, in low population density areas, labor shortage deterred swamp production. However, an important phenomenon was noticed that while new swamps were developed every year, farmers periodi- cally abandoned swamps developed in the early years, a situation exacerbated by the April 1980 disturbances, with the result that the area operated in 1981 was 1,273 ha or about 70 percent of the developed area (see paras 5.04-5.05 for an explanation of this phenomenon). Through increased project interven- tion and continuous contact of extension workers with the project farmers, the project estimates that this percentage would go up to 90 from 1982 onwards, that is, some 1,680 ha (of the total 1865 developed) would be under production each year. A second crop was taken on some of the swamps, the yield of the second crop being generally lower than the first crop. The area under the second crop of rice which was around 356 ha in 1980 went up further by 111 ha in 1981. 3.08 Coffee. The achievement of new planting was some 51% of the target, while a program of rehabilitation was dete!rmined by the Project in the initial years to be extremely difficult with the inexperienced staff of the project and the time needed to demonstrate the necessary techniques. Further, a sur- vey revealed that in most cases over 60% replacement of trees would be neces- sary and this level does not constitute rehabilitation. Moreover, farmers were not interested in cutting trees or losing even one years' production involved in pruning. A decision was taken that project staff would concen- trate initially on new planting. While farmer acceptance was no problem because of the attractive returns from coffee (para 5.10), the shortage of seedlings resulted in shortfall in acreage targets. LPMC 1/ supplied the project's seedling requirements from its nurseries in the area, but they en- countered difficulties in getting coffee seed on time and in adequate quanti- ties. In 1979 LPMC indicated that it could no longer supply seedlings and the project was forced to set up its own nurseries. Unseasonally cold nights affected seedling development in 1980. The problem of timely procurement of 1/ Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation.  - 9 - seed from the Ivory Coast also persisted. In Year 4, the project's agricul- turists carried out demonstrations of rehabilitation techniques on selected coffee farms. By Year 5, some 50 hectares had been accomplished, with addi- tional farms planned for future rehabilitation under Phase II. 3.09 Cocoa. Although it was initially felt that cocoa rehabilitation could be carried out on a limited basis, farmers were not enthusiastic about this activity because of reasons similar to those for coffee (para 3.08) and, as in the case of coffee, the project concentrated on new planting. At first, insufficient areas were found suitable for cocoa in the project area and hence project targets were not met. After further search, relatively large areas suitable for cocoa growing were located in excess of project demands, but as for coffee, availability of seedlings became the problem. Thus, despite farmer interest because of attractive returns from cocoa (para 5.10), only 78 percent of the acreage target was achieved during the project period, with the promise of further development under Phase II. 3.10 Input Distribution The quantities of inputs actually distributed to farmers over the project period are shown below: Table 3.3: INPUT DISTRIBUTION Input Appraisal Estimate Actual Rice Seed (tons) 394.3 377.0 Coffee Seedlings ('000') 3,974.0 1/ 1,366.2 Cocoa Seedlings ('000') 2,618.0 2/ 1,394.3 Fertilizer (tons) - 1,186.0 1/ Rehabilitation and new planting combined. 2/ For new plantings only. 3.11 Cooperatives and Credit. Before the initiation of the project there were four farmers' produce marketing cooperatives with some 3,700 members in the project area. The project attempted to build up a viable cooperative sys- tem to handle credit, input supply and marketing of output. However, these 4 cooperatives were located in the towns, and in order to facilitate farmer in- volvement, small village level units called town cooperative units (TCU) were set up to facilitate the processing of credit. The cooperative structure at the end of 1981 consists of 259 Town Cooperative Units with an average member- ship of 32 farmers per unit affiliated to five larger cooperative societies, the fifth one having been organized in 1979. The total number of cooperative members is 11,242 with a share capital of $56,200. 3.12 Due to organizational and management problems, the cooperatives have not been able to discharge their input supply and credit functions satisfac- torily. Credit recovery fell gradually over the project period as will be seen from the data given below:  - 10 - Table 3.4: LOAN DISBURSEMENTS AND RECOVERY Seasonal Loan Balance at the % Year Extended Amount Repaid End of the Year Recovery -_____------------ In US$ --------------------- 1977 9,570 9,570 - 100 1978 38,680 37,412 1,268 97 1979 53,179 48,784 4,395 95 1980 43,333 23,695 19,638 55 1981 31,726 3,273 a/ 28,453 a/ a/ Collection was in progress at the time of the PCR mission. The political upheaval in 1980 and the resulting uncertainties were the major factor which disrupted, among other project activities, the credit recovery process. Moreover, the flight of capital and the liquidity squeeze in the local Agricultural and Cooperative Development Bank (ACDB) branch after the political upheaval resulted in a shortage of cash for the cooperatives in the project area to pay farmers for their produce, with the result that many far- mers sold their produce to private traders and defaulted on loan repayment. The mismanagement and corruption of cooperatives was also a factor and the actual rate of credit recovery from farmers was not reflected in the payment made by cooperatives into the ACDB revolving fund. The project is trying to recover both 1980 and 1981 seasonal loans. 3.13 Civil Works. The funds for the rural feeder roads program were to have been provided by the GOL outside the project funds. However, due to shortage of operating funds and increase in costs, the Ministry of Public Works could only complete 280 km of new and rehabilitation of existing roads against the target of 600 km. On the other hand, the Project's own unit, ori- ginally designed to carry out small road maintenance and the construction of access tracks, completed a substantial program of construction and recondi- tioning of 557 kms of feeder roads and tracks, 50-3 culverts, 370 stream cross- ings and 3 bridges. The project also constructed 195 wells and 78 latrines. The other civil works undertaken by the project included a farmer training center, a staff training center, 27 farm service sub-centers, a workshop, storage sheds and other office buildings. This component of the project was very successfully implemented. 3.14 There was considerable community self-help assistance in the con- struction of roads, stream crossings, bridges, wells and latrines. Latrines were included in the project at the reques-t of the then Head of State during a visit to the project area. However, unlike the village wells program, where the utilization was satisfactory, the latrine program needed many adjustments in organizing and acceptance. Although a final design acceptable to most people has been adopted, they are still no-t fully utilized. No active health education program exists in the project area.  - 11 - 3.15 Disease Control. The Schistosomiasis Surveillance Unit was estab- lished to determine and monitor any presence or prevalence of schistosomiasis in swamps to be developed for rice production in the project area. Of the 841 swamps surveyed, 77 were found to be infected (9%). Around 18,560 stools were collected, of which about 80 were positive for schistosomiasis. The schisto- some organism most prevalent in the area was haematobium (out of 26,500 speci- mens collected during the five year period, 2,500 were positive for haemato- bium - that is, 9%). The mansoni schistosome was present in smaller quanti- ties. Farmers, school children and project extension staff who had contact with swamps were tested for this disease, and, with the help of local medical authorities, treatment was administered where necessary. The activities of this unit contributed greatly to the implementation of the swamp rice program of the project. 3.16 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). The Planning and Evaluation Unit (PEU) was set up in April 1978. The Unit carried out farm business surveys and crop cutting surveys on swamp rice and upland rice. The Unit also con- ducted traffic surveys with the part time help of students on summer vaca- tion. A Weekly Farm Record of selected farmers was also maintained and ad hoc special farm surveys were undertaken according to needs. 3.17 Considering that the M&E systems, especially with regard to develop- ment projects in developing countries, are still in the embryonic state, the M&E work that has been done in Lofa is quite impressive. An IDA supervision mission that looked into the M&E work in May-June 1981 found a few shortcom- ings in the design, analysis and interpretation of some of the evaluation studies, but concluded that these were attributable largely to staff and re- source constraints inherent in such small evaluation units. These deficien- cies are to be rectified in Lofa II. 3.18 A number of reports were brought out by the Unit. The subjects cov- ered included: crop yields, migration, labor, traffic loads and costs, gaso- line consumption, substitution of swamp rice for upland rice and special survey in Zorzor. The Unit also prepared a first draft of the PCR. In fact, the basic data used in this PCR have been collected by the Unit. By being closely associated with PMU, the PEU has also been able to influence many of the policy changes made in the project. Examples are changes in the seeding rate a,nd de-emphasising upland rice credit package. 3.19 Consultant Services. At appraisal 14 manmonths for periodic tech- nical advice to strengthen and oversee the cocoa and coffee development pro- gram eLnd 6 manimonths of periodic visits by a WHO specialist to advise on the schistosomiasis surveillance program were provided. During project implemen- tation, a consultant was employed to plan and supervise the schistosomiasis program. A financial consultant was also employed to integrate commercial services accounts with the general accounts of the project (para 7.10). The consultants' performance was satisfactory. In retrospect, it would have been beneficial to the project to utilize consultants for the tree crops develop- ment program considering the problems encountered in cocoa and coffee develop- ment (paras 3.08, 3.09 and 7.03).  - 12 - 3.20 Establishment of ACDB Branch Instead of LBDI branch provided for at appraisal, a branch of the Agricultural and Cooperative Development Bank (ACDB) was opened at Voinjama with project assistance. The branch provided normal banking services and administered the project's revolving credit fund satisfactorily. However, after the political upheaval in 1980, the branch experienced cash shortages which affected marketing and credit recovery by cooperatives in the project area (para 3.12). IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS Costs 4.01 The actual cost of the project up to the end of September 1981 was US$15.59 million as compared to US$17.0 million estimated at appraisal. As the physical and price contingencies are not separately indicated in the SAR for the individual categories of expenditure, overall contingencies are ap- plied to each category as follows: Table 4.1: PROJECT COSTS FUS$ '000) SAR Including SAR Physical & Price Actual/SAR Base Costs Contingencies Actual (%) Building & Construction Materials 435 616 953 155 Vehicles 613 869 1,566 180 Equipment 633 897 487 54 Salaries & Wages 4,669 6,616 6,438 97 Consultants 100 142 39 27 Vehicle Operating Expenses 902 1,278 2,280 178 Development Operational Costs 785 1,112 1,844 166 LBDI (ACDB) 150 213 99 44 Farm Inputs 3,289 4,661 1,186 25 Hired Labor 420 595 697 117 11,996 17,000 15,588 92 4.02 The actual costs exceeded the adjusted SAR estimates in building and construction materials, vehicles, vehicle operating expenses and development operational costs (general services costs), but were less for equipment, con- sultants, LBDI and farm inputs. The cost overrun in the building component was principally caused by increase in prices of construction materials much  - 13 - above appraisal expectations. Moreover, construction continued in the fifth year compared to appraisal estimate of construction completion by year 4. With regard to vehicles, appraisal overestimated the useful life, with some vehicles expected to be replaced in five and some in four years when in fact, due to the bad road condition, pickups and cars, in particular, had to be re- placed after two and a half years. Unit costs of some vehicles in later years of the project were also higher than anticipated at appraisal. The increase in vehicle operating costs was principally due to a three to fourfold increase in cost of spares and fuel not anticipated at appraisal. However, greater cost-consciousness by the project might have led to economy in this item. The development operational costs (general services costs) were also higher due to escalation in cost of office materials, stationery, etc. However, this cost item could also have been reduced with stricter cost control. As regards cost of consultants, a greater use could have been made of consultant services (para 3 19). The ACDB costs were lower then at appraisal since ACDB provided a much greater share of expenditure from its own resources than anticipated at appraisal. Farm inputs cost was only 25% of appraisal estimates since there was a substantial shortfall in acreage targets of cocoa and coffee (Tables 3.2 and 3.3), fertilizer was excluded from the upland rice package (para 5.03) and fertilizer application by farmers was lower than recommended doses for swamp rice as well as cocoa and coffee. Financing 4.03 USAID, as a cofinancier, financed the cost of the cooperative/credit divisioin, imported farm inputs and hired labor for swamp development, the schistosomiasis unit and the construction of a dormitory. At the originally agreed disbursement percentages, IDA funding would have totalled US$6.33 million. The difference of US$0.33 million with the Credit amount was met by the GOL. Financing of project costs was as follows (details are at Annex 2): Table 4.2: PROJECT FINANCING SAR ACTUAL % (UiS$ million) IDA 6.00 6.00 100.0 AID 5.00 4.10 82.0 GOL 6.00 5.49 91.5 17.00 15.59 91.7 Procurenient 4.04 No major procurement problems arose under the IDA Credit during pro- ject implementation. It was noticeable that there were very poor responses to ICB in Liberia in respect of this project (and the Bong Project Cr. 700 LBR). In those few cases where no response was received, the Project resorted to local purchasing in consultation with IDA.  - 14 - Disbursement 4.05 Disbursements took place slower than the appraisal estimates through- out the life of the project partly because expenditures were made at a slower rate and partly because disbursement applications were delayed. As of December 31, 1981 some US$5.35 million had been disbursed against the IDA Credit, with commitments in excess of US$6.0 million up to March 31, 1982. Below is a comparison of actual and appraisal disbursements: Table 4.3: DISBURSEMENTS (CUMULATIVE) (US$ million) Appraisal Actual 1/1 Actual as % Year Estimate Disbursements of Appraisal June '77 1.30 0.52 40 June '78 2.80 1.16 41 June '79 4.00 2.42 61 June '80 4.90 3.62 74 June '81 5.70 4.78 84 December '81 6.00 5.35 89 1/ Closing date extended to September 30, 1982. V. PROJECT IMPACT 5.01 The principal program of crop development in LCADP was to develop an area of 12,600 ha through improvement of upland rice cultivation, developing new swamps for rice cultivation and rehabilitating as we-Ll as bringing new areas under coffee and cocoa production. A more refined assessment of the impact of the project would have been possible, had there been time series data giving the area and production of crops in the Lofa County. Unfortunately, such time series are not available either at the county or at the national level since 1978. Crop Yields 5.02 A Liberian Agricultural Survey has been carried out annually by the Ministry of Agriculture up to 1978. For 1977 and 1978, the survey indicated a yield per ha for rice in Lofa County of 1266 kg and 1278 kg respectively. No further survey data are available. However, the project's Planning and Evaluation Unit (PEU) started collecting its own yield data in the second year of the project (1978 harvests). A 1981 supervision mission recognized that the statistical design and methods of analysis adopted for the surveys by this unit needed considerable improvement. In spi-te of these limitations, the data give a general indication of the trends and orders of magnitudes of the yield  - 15 - differences between the project and non-project farms over the years. The assessments which follow are based on the data collected by the PEU. 5.03 Upland Rice. The SAR estimated that the yields of upland rice farms would improve from 1,000 kg/ha without development to 1,700 kg/ha with development, with the adoption of a package comprising improved seed, fertilizers and associated agricultural practices. As mentioned earlier in para. 3.06 seed- exchange proved to be more popular than seed-fertilizer package and this was confirmed by the crop yield data. The project staff also concluded that in the shifting cultivation system of agriculture where planting takes place after a normal fallow period (10-15 years), there is little advantage gained in applying fertilizer. Further, although recognizing the value of improved seed, farmers were reluctant to take fertilizer on credit for their staple grown in the traditional way and to introduce other improvements in their cultivation methods, such as more timely planting, proper seed distribution and weeding. As a result, the yield difference between the traditional and project farms was of the order of only 230 kg/ha (Table 5.1) attributed mainly to seed quality as compared to 700 kg/ha anticipated in the SAR which was based on the assumption that farmers would adopt the complete package. Table 5.1: UPLAND RICE YIELDS ON PROJECT AND NON-PROJECT FARMS (kg/ha) Project Traditional Absolute Percentage Year Farmers Farmers Difference Increase 1978 1239 1017 222 22% 1979 1704 1471 233 16% 1980 1644 1408 236 17% 1981 1/ 1402 1235 167 14% 1/ Data for 1981 are provisional. 5.04 Swamp Rice. In the case of swamp rice, it was expected that single crop yields after full development would increase to 3,500 kg/ha starting with 1,800 kg/ha in the first year as farmers gradually improved their cultivation techniques in line with the recommended practices. In fact, this did not take place. The highest average yields were attained in the first year (3,192 kg/ha for 74 ha) but this was never sustained for a variety of reasons. Pro- ject farmers for the first time had been introduced to a technological package which involved some basic engineering (designing, laying out and constructing an irrigation system), followed by substantial clearing of trees and bush, nursery preparation, transplanting, water control, fertilizing, weeding and disease and insect control, if necessary. Extension staff in the flush of starting the project carefully supervised the activities in the first year but did not provide the same level of supervision to farmers in the succeeding years. It was also found that the more accessible swamps were developed first, with relatively easier supervision by project staff, but swamps with  - 16 - relatively more difficult access did not receive adequate supervision. As was found in an earlier Sierra Leone Eastern Area Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 568-SL/Ln. 1138-SL), follow-up supervision in the second year is neces- sary since, given the labor-intensiveness of the operation and a labor availa- bility constraint in the peak demand period, the farmer is inclined to cut corners and sacrifice standards. Experience also showed that complete clear- ing of the swamps took more than the first year, and renovation of the engi- neering was vital at the commencement of the second crop year. It is well known that the more frequently a swamp is cultivated, the easier working it becomes, since tree stumps are removed, there is less bush regrowth between crops, and with proper maintenance the engineering works become consolidated and settled. However, no provision existed in the project for further developmental loans to farmers, and it was left to farmers' own initiative to continue this development without much guidance from project staff. Farmers returning to the swamps in the second year were confronted with, in addition to tree stumps, substantial shrub regrowth and need for repair work on dykes, bunds and canals. With relative returns from rice not attractive enough for cash cropping of rice (para 5.10), many farmers compromised on technology and with a lower labor input settled into a form of cultivation which resulted in lower production. 5.05 Many farmers attended to the demands of swamp rice cultivation only after they had completed their traditional upland rice clearing, brushing and planting, thus making a late start in preparing swamps. This meant the farmer divided his efforts between the two crops, at the expense of swamp rice pro- ductivity. The PEU discovered that farmers reduced the quantities of ferti- lizer applied but that where farmers applied the recommended quantities, yields as high as above 4,000 kg/ha have been obtained. There were delays in procurement of fertilizers in 1979; they were not received until they could no longer be applied.. More extreme situations arose where farmers did not con- tinue swamp rice production, or reduced the acreage under cultivation. The PEU estimated that the actual area under production in PY5 would be some 18% less because of farmers dropping out of the swamp rice program. This repre- sents jailed farmers, disinterested farmers, and farm families where death or movement of the able-bodied or responsible family member has occurred and a very small number of dropouts due to faulty engineering and the presence of leeches in the swamp, for which no feasible solution has been found. The political upheaval in April 1980 also affected swamp rice development as well as other project activities. During 1980, the yield (1751 kg/ha) from swamps was the lowest during the project period. 5.06 The above trends in no way affected the popularity of this crop, and it is obvious that its appeal with farmers is largely due to the higher yields obtained. There are enough good swamp rice farms throughout the project area to prove this popularity. Some farmers, however, are unable to apply the discipline and technology needed for this crop. They may still continue to grow swamp rice at yield levels similar to upland rice (about 1000 kg/ha) thus depressing the project's yield averages or abandon their efforts (about 10% of the farmers estimated). On the other hand, the PEU reports that in the Foya District, nearly all of the cultivable swamps are now in production (because of a shortage of upland areas) and, where farmers are unable to cultivate  - 17 - swamps, others, who are able, take over. The yield assumptions in the appraisal report were too optimistic in view of the lack of experience with traditional upland farmers adapting to swamp rice cultivation. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that with the adoption of the full technological package, and good supervision beyond the first year, average single crop yields in excess of 3000 kg/ha can be obtained. 5.07 Coffee. It was estimated in the SAR that new plantations of coffee would start yielding benefits in the fourth year after planting with a yield of 300 kg/ha going upto 1000 kg/ha in the sixth year. The 105 ha of new cof- fee planted in 1977 were due to yield fruit in 1981. Some of the trees, how- ever, started bearing coffee in 1980, though as expected the yield harvested was low--116 kg/ha. Further, experiences in Sierra Leone and other West African countries indicate that under smallholder conditions a peak yield of 1000 kg/ha is too optimistic, and that 800 kg/ha would be more realistic with good management. Yields from rehabilitation in 1981 of some 50 ha of selected coffee would be assessed after two years, but indications are that favorable results could be expected. 5.08 Cocoa. As in the case of coffee, SAR estimated that new cocoa plan- tations would start bearing fruit in the fourth year after planting, yielding a harvest of 200 kg/ha--going up to 850 kg/ha in the seventh year. The 78 ha of cocoa planted in 1977 was due to yield cocoa in 1981. Some of the trees however started bearing fruit in 1980, though the yield was only 55 kg/ha. The results of 1981 harvest are not yet known. Future cocoa yields have been estimaLted, starting at 150 kg/ha and going up to 500 kg/ha. The experience of cocoa production using improved plant material under smallholder conditions in Liberia is limited and though estimates based on research findings elsewhere indicate that average yields of 850 kg/ha can be obtained under good manage- ment, based on the pattern of husbandry so far exhibited for cocoa in this project (which would be improved in future), it is more reasonable to assume an average yield of 500 kg/ha. Prices- 5.09 The SAR estimated the following farmgate prices in 1975 constant terms: US$ per ton 1980 1985 Economic Financial Economic Financial Rice in terms of paddy 233 214 233 214 Coffee Cherries 829 586 861 609 Cocoa Beans 982 692 999 706 5.10 The purchase price of paddy from the farmers was kept at 12 cents per lb ($264 per metric ton) by the LPMC throughout the project period. Details are at Annex 3. Using this financial farmgate price for rice, the revised  - 18 - crop budgets (Annex 4) show that both coffee and cocoa gave higher returns per manday at Year 5 than rice ($4.00 for cocoa, $4.50 for coffee and $1.08 for swamp rice). There was greater incentive to produce coffee and cocoa for cash purposes than rice. Thus while farmers continue to produce rice for subsis- tence, the adoption of improved swamp rice techniques for cash purposes has not been profitable enough compared to tree crops, partially explaining the slow adoption of improved swamp rice techniques. The purchase price of paddy was increased for 1982 crop season to 18 cents per lb ($396 per metric ton). Even the milled rice equivalent of this paddy price, without adding milling and handling costs, is about $600/m.t. which is substantially higher than the c.i.f. cost of imported rice of $435/m.t. The increased purchase price would significantly improve relative returns from rice thus providing incentives for faster adoption of improved techniques. 5.11 Though financial farmgate prices for cocoa and coffee were only about half of f.o.b. prices during most of the project period, they provided attractive returns relative to those for rice (para 5.10). LPMC marketing costs remained high. Moreover, part of the margin between f.o.b. and farmgate prices was deposited in an Agricultural Development Fund and a Price Stabili- zation Fund. With decline in world prices for cocoa and coffee, these Funds have become inoperative. However, LPMC costs continue to be high. With pro- jections of continuing real decline in world cocoa and coffee prices, improve- ments in LPMC efficiency to prevent substantial decline in producer prices are urgently needed. Measures to improve LPMC efficiency have been included under Lofa II. 5.12 In evaluating financial and economic benef:its, the following finan- cial and economic farmgate prices in 1981 constant terms were used. Details are at Annex 5. UJS$ per metric ton 1981 1985 1990 Economic Financial Economic Economic Rice in terms of paddy 319 264 345 357 Coffee Cherries 1,450 1,760 1,310 1,410 Cocoa Beans 1,410 1,452 1,180 1,280 VI. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION 6.01 The economic rate of return for the project has been computed based on the cost data obtained from the Project Management Unit and data on crop yields, areas, and costs of production from the PEU. The assumptions used in the economic analysis are: (a) Hired labor was valued at $2.00 per day and the cost of family labor at $1.00 per day in constant 1981 prices. The opportunity cost of family labor is estimated to be lower because the more mobile members  19 of the farm family would have joined the hired labor market, and the returns to family labor in their alternative uses range between $0.55 to $1.00 per man day. At appraisal, all family and hired labor was costed at 50% of the estimated wage rate ($1.00 per manday). (b) Actual project costs were included up to September 30, 1981, and these costs were converted into 1981 constant terms using rates of domestic inflation (based on Monrovia cost of living index) for the domestic component, and the inter ialional inflation rate for the foreign exchange component. Training costs, which were excluded at appraisal having been regarded as technical assistance for subsequent projects, have been included at completion. All road investment costs were included at appraisal. At completion, about one-third of these costs (equal to the share of MPW in total road construction and improvement) has been excluded on the assumption that general bene- fits to the farming community (not included in the benefits stream of the project) would offset these costs. The community self-help com- ponent of physical infrastructure costs has also been excluded on the same assumption. Apart from these, all costs have been included in full. (c) Economic farm-gate prices are based on actual international prices in 1981 constant terms and IBRD projections for 1985 in 1981 constant terms. (d) Although secondary benefits may be attributed to roads, wells, latrines and disease control, these have not been quantified and were not taken into account in calculating project benefits. These were not taken into account at appraisal either. 6.02 Based on these assumptions, the economic rate of return (ERR) is estimaated at a little over 12% (Annex 6) as compared to 25.9% at appraisal. The main reasons for the shortfall are that tree crop production started later than expected, and all crop yields were lower than anticipated, resulting in lower actual incre-ental production. In line with observed yield performance, future expected yields have also been adjusted downwards compared to appraisal yields. Sensitivity analysis shows that, compared to assumptions at comple- tion, if benefits are lower by 10%, the ERR will be about 11%; with 20% lower benefits, the ERR will be about 9%. It should be pointed out that the ERR would have been higher then estimated at completion if future acreage and pro- duction increases of coffee and cocoa made possible by the experience gained during the Project period (paras 3.08 and 3.09) were taken into account. VII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 7.01 Project Management/Staffing. The arrangement of having a Project Management Unit as a semi-autonomous body under the Ministry of Agriculture was seen at appraisal to be the best arrangement in view of the constraints of  - 20 - management capability and a poorly organized Ministry of Agriculture. The then Minister of Agriculture readily concurred with this proposal in the interest of effective project implementation. Similarly, the staffing of the unit through international recruitment was accepted by Government. The assem- bled management team consisted of British, Philipino, American, Sri Lankan, Indian and Liberian nationals. However, it was envisaged that this structure would exist only during the life of the Project, after which the project's extension staff, better equipped and more experienced, would revert to MOA or a special development authority which was proposed to be established as a supervisory body for successor and other projects. At the same time, consul- tants were expected to make proposals for the reorganization of the MOA. which they did in 1975. As it turned out, the Government rejected the consultants' report (see OED Report No 3008 - Liberia Technical Assistance Project Cr. 306- LBR), and no further studies were carried out. At this time the need for re- structuring MOA still exists. 7.02 Responsibility for project implementation, therefore, rested entirely on the PMU with little or no direct connection with any of the Government Ministries (except MPW in relation to the feeder roads construction). The Project Manager exercised full control over the project, reporting informally to the Minister of Agriculture and formally to an active Project Steering Committee whose actions supported this independent approach to project imple- mentation. This system worked well in the interest of project implementation, and permitted the expatriate managers to function with the least interference and red tape. However, some Government officials and local administrators viewed the project as one in which their Government had little or no influ- ence, and misunderstood the objectives of the project. Project Management corrected this through a public relations campaign of publicising project ac- tivities and inviting persons to visit the project area. However, from time to time the autonomous and independent form of management was criticized on the grounds that the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) was unable to influence its actions, and that this type of organization was counter productive to the development and improvement of the MOA, particularly since MOA continued to carry its own agricultural staff located but not working in the project area. The criticism became more pronounced because this management arrange- ment was used for other World Bank funded projects. The Government, the Bank and USAID have long recognized the increasing need to strengthen the Ministry of Agriculture, and a number of proposals f'or this exist, including consul- tants' studies under the IDA Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 306-LBR), incomplete proposals by a Rural Development Task Force which emphasized decen- tralization, the Ministry's own policy document which set out a new structure of the Ministry and a national extension project which was being prepared by USAID till recently. However, because of the political adjustments and the financial constraints since 1980, no comprehensive restructuring of the Ministry has as yet taken place, and, although new projects fall more directly under the administration of the Ministry, they cannot as yet be fully accom- modated within the existing structure of the Ministry. The criticisms of the Project Management Unit's approach for this project, while not unfounded, generally fell flat for want of a viable alternative. However, future pro- jects' design should keep this criticism in view (see para 9.10).  - 21 7.03 A remarkable institutional performance of the project was that, by the end of the third year of the project, complete Liberianization of manage- ment had taken place. However, a 1979 supervision mission identified that al- though the agricultural manager was competent to manage the extension program, neither he nor the other graduate agriculturists on his staff possessed the right background and experience in the technical aspects. The mission, therefore, recommended the recruitment of an expatriate agriculturist with strong tree crop experience to assist the project in this area. Government agreed to this recommendation, and requested the Bank to assist in recruit- ment. An Indian agriculturist with cocoa, coffee and rice experience in Malaysia was identified and approved by Government, but his recruitment was interrupted by the April 1980 change of Government, and subsequently the Bank was informed -that Government would no longer pursue this recruitment. The relevance of this occurence is that although project agriculturists have done reasonably well in attaining area targets for tree crops and rice (given the constraints beyond their control), crop husbandry standards were not high enough to bring about optimum yields. Some efforts were made late in the life of the project to improve the situation, and the Agricultural, Research and Project Managers paid visits to the Philippines, India, Brazil and Nigeria. Undoubtedly, these visits helped to improve the technical understanding of Proje!ct staff, and resulted in some recommendations for improving tree crop cultivation, and an enthusiastic introduction of an adapted version of the Training and Visit System. However, further exposure and training of technical staff is required in order to bring about higher levels of improvements than those attained under the project. 7.04 The number of Project staff as a whole increased above appraisal estimates. The largest increase occurred in the Administration and Finance Division which includes the Planning and Evaluation staff and Internal Audit, for which the SAR underestimated. Notwithstanding these, and other under- estimates in staff requirements, this division was considerably overstaffed which led to unnecessary ince~ase in project costs which could have been avoided through stricter control by Project Steering Committee. In contrast, the Agricultural Services Division carried a staff complement of 112 in PY4 versus 153 estimated in the SAR because the recruitment, training and equip- ping of agricultural staff accompanied by assessment at different stages was more difficult than the straight recruitment of administrative staff. The expanded roads, wells and latrine program also necessitated increased staff. The SAR envisaged that there would be a substantial reduction of staff by Year 5 in the Agricultural, Commercial and Land Planning Divisions. It was expec- ted that staff would be transferred out of the Project area to "other projects or development schemes". No such transfers took place in view of the fact that a second phase project is about to commence. Staff adjustments under the second phase would include reductions in some divisions and expansion in others and minimizing overstaffing, particularly in Administration and Finance Division. 7.05 Extension and Training. The Project recruited its own extension staff, and by offering better salaries and conditions than MOA, was able to exercise a high standard of selection. The Training Division carried out training of all staff, specifically in the crops to be grown, and in extension  - 22 - techniques. Prior to the Project, a core of extension agents of MOA was located in the area, but, poorly trained and ill-equipped, had no significant effect on the farming community. Also, Government and LPMC were involved in land clearing and tree crop planting in some districts, but both schemes en- countered difficulties and had to be abandoned. The Project, on the other hand, encountered a higher response from farmers to the technological and credit packages offered by the Project except for coffee and cocoa rehabili- tation. Extension staff with the cooperation of the local administration reached farmers fairly easily, and, although many of these were young and in- experienced, they were readily accepted by farmers. Short training sessions to introduce improved techniques were also conducted for farmers. Training was continuous for Project staff as short refresher courses were carried out from time to time. In 1980, the Project introduced a modified version of the Training and Visit system. So far, both project farmers and staff are enthu- siastic about it. 7.06 Cooperatives, Credit and Marketing. This component was funded by USAID. A Commercial Manager was recruited, who, under the Credit Agreement, was to have been appointed an Assistant Registrar of Cooperatives in order that he might carry out supervisory, auditing and other functions normally associated with this position. Government wras never able to fulfill this com- mitment, since the Cooperative Department of MOA was in a constant state of adjustment during most of the project period, and was generally ineffective with regard to the project. There were changes of Registrars, and finally, after Bank supervision missions' insistence, it was discovered that the appointment of Assistant Registrars and Registrars was the prerogative of the Head of State. Events such as the change of Government, and the creation of the Cooperative Development Authority followed soon after. By the time the subject could be raised again, the Project was almost at an end, and a compre- hensive review of Lofa cooperatives by consultants had been planned. 7.07 There were four existing cooperatives in the Project area at apprais- al, and it was intended that these societies would be used for (a) mobilizing the interest and participation of farmers and organizing them into small village groups or cooperatives, (b) organizing a system of delivery of inputs, credit distribution and recovery for participating farmers, and (c) providing assembly, storage, transportation, handling and other marketing functions. In order to accomplish these goals, the Project was to have trained coop/credit officers who would then train district cooperatives' management staff in the operational aspects. In effect, the need to get inputs to farmers in a timely and efficient manner became more dominant than the need to reorganize the co- operatives. The project had the procurement and distribution means, and, while organizing village level cooperatives (Town Cooperative Units - TCUs) to facilitate the processing of the in-kind credit, the Project proceeded to maintain the required records, etc. for these transactions, and helped to get the project implemented. At the start of the project, the district coopera- tives or main cooperatives were found to be chaotic, badly managed, and had not been properly audited, nor had recent elections been held. The project encountered obstacles in its efforts to improve these cooperatives, and even though the organization of the small units (TCUs) was successful, the project was unable to break the grip that local administrators and politicians had  23 - over the 4 cooperatives (one was chaired by a mayor, and two by Paramount Chiefs), whose interests and influence often ran counter to those of the project and the cooperatives. In Year 5, finally through the participation of TCUs in the elections of 3 of these cooperatives, members were able to elect a management slate of their choice. 7.08 In PY5, a team of cooperative consultants from India studied the functioning of cooperatives in the Project, and found that these cooperatives possessed chaotic accounts, were inadequately audited, were poorly managed by unqualified staff; elections were infrequently held, with management commit- tees serving beyond the period allowed in the by-laws; general meetings were not regularly held and the presentation of accounts and budgets to these meetings were often ignored. They also reported that the Chairmen and lIanagers of cooperatives often conducted transactions independent of each other, and that the Chairmen wielded their influence in an autocratic man- ner. Supervision by the Cooperative Department was weak and without impact, inferring that the Department had no influence over politically powerful Chairmen of societies. This was further compounded by the failure to appoint the Manager of the project's Commercial Services Division as an Assistant Registrar of Cooperatives in order that he would be able to exercise statutory power. In hindsight, since the Manager in the initial years was an expatri- ate, it is not certain that he would have been effective in what was clearly seen as a political situation. Through the local Deputy Project Manager (and later as Project Manager) the project was actively advocating the reform of the cooperative structure to permit greater involvement of the growing number of members entering these cooperatives through the Project. In the absence of a stronger Cooperative Department, these efforts were without success. The Project was unable to fulfill its commitment to train cooperative staff in farmer credit, input supply, marketing, management and organization, so that after the development period, full responsibility would be taken over by the cooperatives. 7.09 Notwithstanding the difficulties recounted above, the consultants were of the view that these cooperatives could be viable and efficient enter- prises, and made far reaching recommendations in this respect. Government accepted most of these recommendations in principle. In July 1981, a semi- autonomous Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) came into effect (based on the recommendation of USAID cooperative advisors), replacing the Cooperative Department of the Ministry of Agriculture. The CDA held the promise of reorganizing cooperatives to bring about the much needed improvements. How- ever, budgetary constraints may adversely affect its development. The propo- sals for cooperatives in the Lofa II Project address the major issues raised, and improvements (largely due to the changed political climate) have begun with elections of new executives. 7.10 Accounting and Reporting. In keeping with the requirements of the Credit Agreement, the Project's accounting section has performed creditably throughout the life of the Project. In the early years of the Project, ac- counting records of the Commercial Services Division which dealt with inputs and cooperatives were maintained in that Division. This occurred because the Division was principally funded by USAID. However at IDA's insistence and  - 24 - with Government's approval, these accounts were interfaced with those central to the Project. The expatriate Financial Controller handed over responsibili- ties to his Liberian deputy who continued to maintain the same standard of accounts. The audit requirement was fulfilled satisfactorily. Full and com- prehensive quarterly reports were prepared and circulated in a timely man- ner. Each report was a consolidation of reports from divisions, with the in- volvement of the Planning and Evaluation Unit. In addition, budgets and fi- nancial statements were prepared regularly. However, it is not certain whether good use was made of these reports by project management and Govern- ment officials. One criticism of the reporting procedure is the shortage of details of planning by each division which serve as the basis for budgeting. This aspect needs improvement. VIII. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK 8.01 Preparation and Appraisal. In view of the lack of prior experience and knowledge of the sector, Bank performance was reasonably satisfactory, particularly in designing a package which integrated schistosomiasis monitor- ing, feeder roads, inputs, extension and training. The use of a project man- agement unit made sense at that time and was in line with the wishes of the Liberian officials; so too was international recruitment of key staff in view of the shortage of experienced qualified Liberians. Adequate resources were provided to help the Project meet its objectives and targets, and a flexible approach to the project as it evolved was evident in the beneficial organiza- tional changes introduced (such as the establishment of a strong M&E Unit -- which was not clearly specified at appraisa,. -- a Plant Production Unit and an Internal Audit Unit), in the sensible adjustments of the crop development targets, and in the expanded program of feeder roads and other construction. 8.02 The major flaws in Project design were related to the lack of exper- ience with and understanding of Liberian conditions. Principally, the Project was least successful in the development of cooperatives. At appraisal, the assessment of the four existing cooperatives did not take enough account of the entrenched political forces who as executives ran the cooperatives with almost no accountability to their members, and the weakness of the Cooperative Department. This Department was unable to effectively supervise, audit, and generally enforce the laws governing cooperatives. The appraisal also signi- ficantly underestimated the complexities of changing traditional subsistence farmers into modern farmers, particularly with regard to adoption of improved swamp rice farming techniques for cash purposes. The projected adoption levels of the crop improvement packages by traditionally subsistence farmers were too optimistic, the fact that the estimated yieLds of rice, although attainable, were not sustainable without close supervision, was not taken into account and cocoa and coffee yield estimates were too high. Moreover, lack of enthusiasm of farmers to rehabilitation of cocoa and coffee was evidently not known at all at appraisal. 8.03 Supervision. Bank supervision was on the whole satisfactory. During start-up, the Bank effectively supported inexperienced Project staff in the  25 areas of procurement, project planning and recruitment of staff, helped establish good relations between Government and the expatriate staff, and in genereLl guided Government in its first large project in the sector. In the first years, there were joint supervisions with USAID. Later, with USAID personnel changes, supervision was done separately. Supervision missions freque!ntly briefed USAID officials on their assessment of the Project and generally cooperated with the cofinanciers. The Project utilized supervision missicins as an analytical mechanism, and often raised proposals for mission reaction. Supervision of the agricultural aspects of the Project was gener- ally satisfactory, but cooperatives should have been supervised midway through the project by a cooperative specialist. The inability of the cooperatives to take over the input supply and credit functions and the consequent performance of these functions by the Commerical Services Division of the project reduced the project's cost-effectiveness. This aspect should have been looked into seriously by Bank supervision missions. It is also questionable whether the project management and Bank supervision missions made full use of M&E data on swamp rice farming problems (paras 5.04-5.06) and introduce policy changes as they did for upland rice (para 3.18). One policy change, that is, continua- tion of development credit for the second year, has been introduced under Lofa Phase II. However, the need to introduce viable labor-saving techniques and penetration of social and cultural barriers to adopting rice farming for cash purposes (para 9.02) has not yet been effectively addressed. IX. CONCLUSIONS 9.01 The Lofa I Project has had a smooth organizational passage from con- ception to completion and a few factors are the obvious contributors to this process. The Government was eager to have an area based agricultural project, to demonstrate in a concrete way its interest in pursuing a policy of develop- ing smallholder agriculture. Lofa County residents were already well known for their industriousness and were actively interested in development pro- posals. They were far enough away from the influence of the city and were less sulspicious of Government than farmers in the areas with easy access to Monrovia. They were therefore receptive to extension advice, supervision and controL of the Project. The semi-autonomous status of the Project combined with a good management team, which judiciously used this status, served to facilitate implementation. 9.02 The difficulties of changing farmers from the traditional to the im- proved methods of cultivation were underestimated at appraisal, and notwith- standing the willingness of the Lofa farmer to improve his level of techno- logy, a better understanding of his needs, and how far he could be expected to go along with project recommendations, would have been beneficial to the Pro- ject. Traditionally, farmers produce rice for family consumption as a primary objective, and buying and selling rice has a social significance which bears little relationship to wealth enhancement. To sustain substantial surplus production as is expected under improved swamp rice production requires that the farmer accepts rice as a cash crop similar to coffee and cocoa. Pricing and marketing improvements would be obvious incentives to increase production  - 26 - under new swamp techniques. But, perhaps equally important, technical and extension services are necessary to penetrate the social barriers to produc- tion of rice as a cash crop. Moreover, introduction of available and viable labor-saving techniques for swamp development has to be seriously pursued by integrated agricultural development projects while a much greater research effort than evident so far in Liberia has to be directed to development of technically and economically efficient labor-saving techniques and adjustments in the cropping calendars to distribute labor requirements to the various crops more evenly over the year. 9.03 The time required to effect permanent changes in traditional agricul- ture, even in a highly receptive farming community, is much longer than the funding period of a project, and requires good introduction and follow-up ex- tension beyond the first year. Farmers who adopted the recommended packages and persisted in their use obtained yields far superior to the traditional system. 9.04 No provision had been made for adaptive research at appraisal, and the Project introduced some research into farming systems. There is need for continuing research specific to the Project area in order to refine and im- prove the technological packages which lack adequate testing. 9.05 The economics of rehabilitation and farmer acceptance of rehabili- tation packages for cocoa and coffee need to be examined seriously in ongoing and planned projects. The reluctance of farmers to use fertilizers for cocoa and coffee and the agronomic and financial justification of fertilizer use for these crops, also need to be examined. In general, technological packages for cocoa and coffee should be kept as simple an(d inexpensive as possible. 9.06 Project supervisory training needs were reasonably covered by its Training Division, and a good collection of training material has been de- signed specifically for the Project, but which could be used throughout Liberia. Senior staff have carried out visits to other projects and agricul- tural institutions overseas. However, there is need for more concentrated management and technical training to substantially increase their technical capabilities. 9.07 The feeder roads and wells programs have been enthusiastically re- ceived and elicited good community participation. The linkage of road con- struction with improved crop production has been successful, and helped to facilitate a general improvement in the movement of inputs and produce. The latrines construction program, added in project mid stream, required more preparation of the people in conjunction with Health and Education authori- ties. The community self-help in the construction of physical infrastructure is an important feature of the project. 9.08 The experience with M&E of the project showed that with good staff- ing, close supervision and management support, project M&E units can play a very effective part in introducing beneficial policy changes in project mid- stream (para 5.18).  27 - 9.09 The experience with cooperatives (paras 7.06-7.09 and 8.03) provides useful lessons for ongoing and planned projects in Liberia and underscores the need for serious efforts towards their development. 9.10 Two interrelated issues of integration with MOA and cost-effective- ness which have emerged from implementation of this and other agricultural projec-ts in Liberia deserve to be mentioned. With an autonomous management unit, the project hired its own staff at salary levels higher than those in MOA while MOA continued to carry its own agricultural staff located but not working in the project area. The project also provided its own training facilities and physical infrastructure which further added to costs. While this approach could be justified under the circumstances prevailing at project appraisal (para 7.02), it is clear that with this approach the MOA remained weak and outside the sphere of this major development effort, rendering later integration more difficult, while the duplication of functions increased costs rendering replication of this particular project approach on a national level unlikely considering the financial constraints of the Government. Under Lofa Phase II, integration with MOA has been initiated with the project covering entire Upper Lofa and the Project Manager taking over the MOA county office as County Agricultural Officer. With the strengthening of cooperatives, envis- aged under Lofa II, and a possible handing over of input supply and credit functions of the project to cooperatives at a later date, project costs should be reduced substantially. The issue of strengthening MOA and other national institutions, making optimum use of MOA's available resources and the re- sources of other institutions and Ministries involved in rural development, and thereby minimizing investment and recurrent costs, should be borne in mind while designing future agricultural development projects. 9.11 In summary, while problems were encountered due to inadequate know- ledge at appraisal, and the complexities of changing a largely subsistence agricu:Lture and weaknesses of national institutions, the project, as the first major effort at integrated agricultural development, was reasonably successful in effecting improvements in the agriculture of Upper Lofa and set many stan- dards for Liberia. It also demonstrated that in counties like Lofa, with relatively higher population density (Upper Lofa areas), with presence of thousands of smallholders cultivating multiple crops with significant potential for increasing productivity, and large pay-offs possible from construaction of physical and social infrastructure, the strategy of integrated agricu:Ltural development would satisfy both growth and equity objectives of the Government.  LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Key Indicators 1977 1978 1979 }980 1981 T 0 T A L SAR ACTUAL SAR ACTUAL SAR ACTUAL SAR ACTUAL SAR ACTUAL. _R ACTUAL PERCENT I Farmer Participation Total 200 345 930 1270 1710 1520 2300 2034 2860 2261 8000 -/ 7430 - 93 (i) Upland Rice (a) Seed Exchange - - 180 970 1501 1197 3848 (b) Credit 77 330 38 176 24 645 Sub-total 77 510 1008 1677 1221 4493 (ii) Swamp Ric e - 135 300 597 500 760 790 670 1185 721 2775 2883 104 (iii)Coffee a.(New planting) - 209 463 236 164 696 1768 b. Rehabilitated - - - - - 2 86 88 Sub-total 209 770 463 770 236 923 166 1077 782 3540 1856 52 (iv) Cocoa (New Plantings) - 93 461 288 461 179 615 374 769 791 2306 1725 75 Total 514 1858 2183 2887 3515 10957 3/ 11. Developed Area Under Crops (hectares) (i) Upland Rice 4/ 150 61 650 242 1200 1060 1600 1895 2000 1960 5600 5218 5/ 93 (ii) Swamp Rice (a) Newly Re- claimed 6/ - 74 150 370 250 524 400 402 600 495 1400 1865 (b) Rehabilitated 50 - 50 - 100 - 150 - 150 - 500 - Sub-total 50 74 200 370 350 524 550 402 750 495 1900 1865 98 (iii)Coffee (a) Newly Planted - 105 500 330 500 206 600 131 700 392 2300 1164 (b) Rehabilitated 50 - 80 - 100 - 120 - 150 50 500 50 Sub-total 50 105 580 330 600 206 720 131 850 442 2800 1214 43 (iv) Cocoa (a) Newly Planted - 30 300 240 300 190 400 247 500 468 1500 1175 (b) Rehabilitated 50 - 100 - 150 - 200 - 300 - 800 - Sob-total 50 30 400 240 450 190 600 247 800 468 2300 1175 51 III. Area Operated Under Swamp Rice 7/(hectares) (i) Area 74 441 906 935 1273 (ii) Double Cropped 15 68 146 356 467 Sub-total 89 509 1052 1291 1740 IV. Crop Yields (hectares) (i) Upland Rice (a) Traditional 1318 1074 1471 1408 1235 (b) Project 1529 8/ 1239 1704 1644 1402 9/ (ii) Swamp Rice (a) First Crop 3192 2804 2170 1767 1749 9/ (b) Double Crop 10/ 2554 2243 1736 1414 1399 (iii) Coffee 116 N.A (iv) Cocoa 55 N.A  V. Input Distribution (i) Rice Seed (tons) 11.0 6.2 46.7 30.0 85.8 82.7 118.7 131.3 145.0 126.8 407.2 377.0 93 (ii) Coffee Seedlings (000's) 8.4 123.5 867.0 385.0 870.0 282.2 1044.0 144.0 1185.0 431.2 3974.0 1366.2 34 (iii) Cocoa Seedlings (000 ') 10.5 35.2 610.0 281.6 620.0 246.5 827.0 271.3 550.0 514.3 2618.0 1349.3 52 (iv) Fertilizers (metric tons) 12-12-17-2 38.9 116.0 89.9 175.0 191.0 610.8 18-18-18-2 - 2.6 0.2 _ _ 2.8 Urea 12.4 17.6 61.0 64.6 46.3 201.9 TSP 11.8 63.7 42.4 43.0 24.5 185.4 Potash - 58.6 42.8 39.9 18.0 159.3 15-15-15 2.1 - - - - - 2.1 20-20-0 16.6 8.0 - 24.6 VI. Credit ($ '000) (i) Development Loan (a) Disbursed 21.00 55.90 471.00 294.00 615.30 394.30 868.40 292.30 1095.60 336.50 3071.30 1372.90 (b) Recovered - 1.34 - - _ _ 1.34 (ii) Seasonal Loan (a) Disbursed 12.80 9.20 61.10 38.70 109.60 53.20 153.40 43.33 30D.40 48.50 637.30 192.90 (b) Recovered 12.80 9.20 61.10 37.40 109.60 48.40 153.40 23.13 300.40 - 637.30 118.20 (iii) Total (a) Disbursed 33.80 65.10 532.10 332.70 724.90 447.50 1021.80 335.63 1396.00 - 3708.60 1565.80 (b) Recovered 10.54 37.40 48.40 23.13 119.54 VII. Civil Works (Infrastructure) (i) Wells Number 20 4 20 40 20 56 20 55 20 40 100 195 195 (ii) Latrines ' - - 20 8 20 22 35 14 34 25 109 73 67 (iii) LCADP Feeder Roads (miles) 32.5 72.8 44.1 107.6 85 104 342 329 (iv) Culverts 8 58 78 144 215 503 (v) Stream Crossing 16 47 82 158 67 370 (vi) Bridges - 2 - 1 - 3 (vii) Sub-centers 8 8 6 1 4 27 (viii) MPW Roads 75 15.0 75 46.4 75 27.5 75 70.0 75 16.0 375 174.9 47 VIII. Schistosomiasis (i) Swamps surveyed 13 39 235 271 373 841 (ii) Swamps infected 2 16 2 41 16 77 (iil) Stools collected 399 962 6916 9296 996 18559 (iv) Stools infected 1 5 22 30 22 80 (v) Urine Samples Cellected 329 916 8813 12779 3650 26487 (vi) Samples Infected 10 50 696 1237 529 2522 IX. Training (i) Farmers (a) Resident - 600 500 450 200 1750 (b) Workshop Parti- cipants 200 1648 854 462 2537 5701 Sub-total 200 200 930 2248 1710 1354 2300 912 2860 2737 8000 7451 93 (ii) Staff 83 152 108 90 48 481  X. Personnel II/ 109 158 164 308 219 341 276 416 164 421 164 421 (i) Administration & Finance 44 59 76 136 140 140 (ii) Training 10 15 24 25 23 23 (iii) Agr. Services 46 120 120 112 118 118 (iv) Land Planning 21 33 37 45 39 39 (v) Commercial 23 64 67 81 86 86 (vi) Disease Control 14 17 17 17 15 15 XI. Cooperatives (i) No. of Coop. at the end of year 4 4 5 5 5 5 (ii) No. of menbers at the end of year 4372 5534 7040 8501 11242 11242 (iii) Share Capital $ 218.60 276.70 352.00 430.05 562.15 562.15 (iv) Loans Issued 2022 2977 (v) No. of TCUs at the end of year 63 192 211 221 259 259 (vi) Membership of TCUs at the end of vear 905 3770 4439 6481 8273 8273 (vii) Seasonal Loan $ (a) Extended $ 95.70 386.80 531.79 433.32 317.26 (b) Repayment $ 95.70 374.12 487.84 236.95 32.73 (c) Balance due $ Nil 12.68 43.95 196.37 196.37 284.53 (d) Percent Recovery 100% 97% 95% 55% 55% 10% 1/ SAR indicated that the iotal nanber of project beneficiar,i- would be 8000 and showed thin phasing against upland rice 2/ Relates to all farmers receiving credit, input or extensive benefits from the project for any of the crops, each farmer being counted only once, if he receives benefit for more than one crop. 3/ Relates to all farmers receiving the project benefits, a farmer receiving benefits for two crops being counted twice. 4/ Includes both upland credit and seed exchalige programs. 5/ Based on the estimates arrived at by the Planning and Evaluation Unit. The estimate giveni by Agr. Division is 5,843 ho. 6/ Represents developed area. The area actually operated differs from year to year and is given in Section IV. ?/ The figures represent cumulative area operated in each year. 8/ Represents average of 1978-81 as no yield surveys were conducted on traditional farms. 9/ Provisional 10/ Estimated at 80% of yield of first crop 11/ Cumulative at the end of the year. N.A: Not Available  LIBERIA Upto Sept 30, 1981 LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Project Completion Report Project Costs ($'000) Staff Appraisal Report Actual IDA USAID GOL TOTAL IDA AID GOL TOTAL Building & Construction Materials 3.40 .95 - 435.0 7.10 1.64 .79 9.53 Vehicles 3.80 130.1 103,2 613.3 7,46 3.29 2.91 15.66 Equipment 4.56 55 121.8 632.8 2.56 1.39 91 4.86 Salaries & Wages 14.10 1135.6 2123.1 4668.7 7.77 17.47 39.14 64.38 Vehicle Operating 902.0 20.64 - 2,16 22.80 Expenses 9.02 - Development Operation Costs 7.43 42 - 785.0 14,65 1.95 1.84 18.44 Farm Inputs - 1631.8 3288.6 8.99 2.87 11.86 Hired Labor - 420 - 420.0 - 6.29 68 6.97 Consultants 60 40 - 100.0 35 - 4 39 LBDI 1.50 - - 150.0 79 - 20 99 TOTAL 44.41 3574.5 3979.9 11995.4 Physical Contingencies 2.19 176 200 595.0 Price Contingencies 13.40 1249.5 1820,1 4409.6 TOTAL 60.00 5000.0 6000.0 17000 63.32 41.02 51.54 155.88 X  LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Project Costs by Departments .($'000) PMU/ TRAINING AGRICUL- COMMER- LAND S.S.U P.P.U OTHERS TOTAL WRITTEN ADM TURE CIAL PLANNING OFF Buildings 191 230 34 112 372 14 - 953 Vehicles 239 89 519 177 509 33 56 1566 (-56) Equipment 260 68 41 45 50 27 - 486 (-5) Salaries & Wages 1921 475 1615 1130 656 247 389 6438 General Ser- vice Costs 1211 190 174 71 74 45 79 1844 Vehicle Operat- ing Costs 673 140 449 310 550 98 60 2280 Consultants 39 39 LBDr 99 99 Farm Inputs 1883 1883 15588 f TOTAL 4500 1192 2832 1845 2211 464 584 2021 15650 - 61 15589  LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Actual Prices Received by Farmers 3/ 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Rice in terms of paddy cents per lb. 12 12 12 12 12 18 2/ Coffee cents per lb. 80 80 65 1/ Cocoa cents per lb. 66 66 61 1/ 1 / Estimated Financial Farmgate Price Used in Lofa II 2 / The Financial Farmgate Price Used in Lofa II Works out to 15.5 Cents Per Kg. 3 / Used in Farm Budget and Cash Flow Analysis.  LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Upland Rice - Farm Dudgec ana Casn Flow (I hectare5 Traditional Seed Exchange Credit Package Yield 1 ha kg 1318.00 1599.00 1700.00 Farmgate Price c/kg 26.4 26.4 26.4 Value of Crop $ 347.95 422.14 448.80 Seasonal Cost Seeds $ 16.63 27.72 33.26 Fertilizer $ - - 25.45 Hired Labor2/$ 66.24 104.45 64.50 Sub Total $ 82.87 132.17 123.21 1 Interest on w Seasonal Loan 8.29 10.45 12.32 > Total $ 91.16 142.62 135.53 Inflow Value of Crop $ 347.95 422.14 448.80 Seasonal Loan $ 82.87 132.17 123.21 Sub Total $ 174.03 247.07 258.74 Net Income $ 256.79 307.24 313.27 Family Labor H X Mandays No. 243 196 183 m x Net Return per mandays $ 1.06 1.57 1.71 1/ Excludes cost of seed 2/ Hired labor valued at $2.0 a day 3/ Interest calculated at 10% for the duration of the loan.  LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Swamo Rice - Farm Bud2et and Cash 'low (l ha) lst Yr 2nd Yr 3rd Yr 4th Yr 5th Yr 8th Yr-/ On Full Development Yield per hectare kg 2246.00 2379.00 1924.00 1703.00 1844.00 3000.00 3250.00 Pricel/ cents per kg 26.4 26.4 26.4 26,4 26.4 39.6 39.6 Value of Crop $ 529.94 628.06 507,94 449.59 486.82 1188.0 1287.0 Development Cost Hired Labor $ 195.33 - - - - - - Tools $ 46.00 - - - - - - Sub Total $ 241.33 - - - - - - Seasonal Cost Hired Labor $ 102.67 167.70 167.70 167.70 167.70 167.70 167.70 Materials $ 61.50 55 54 48 55 77 85 Sub Total $ 164.17 222.70 221.70 215.70 222.70 244.70 252.70 Inflow Value of Crop $ 592.94 628.06 507.94 449.59 486.82 1188.0 1287.0 Dev. Loan $ 241.33 - - - - Seasonal Loan $ 164.17 222.70 221,70 215.70 222.70 244.70 252.70 Sub Total $ 998.44 850.76 729.64 665.29 709.52 1432.70 1539.70 1 Out Flow Development Cost $ 241.33 - - - - - - Seasonal Cost $ 164.17 222.70 221.70 215.70 222.70 244.70 252.70 Repayment of Dev. $ loan $ - - 53.54 53.54 53.54 53.54 - Repayment Interest on Dev. Loan 3/ $ - - 18.74 18.74 18.74 18.74 - Repayment of Seasonal Loan $ 164.17 222.70 221.70 215.70 222.70 244.70 252.70 Repayment of Interest on Sea- sonal Loan $ 16.42 22,27 22.17 21.57 22.27 36.71 37.91 Total OutFlow $ 586.09 467.67 537.85 525.25 539.95 598.39 543.31 Net Income $ 412.35 383.09 191.79 140.04 169.07 834.31 996.39 H S Family Labor Mandays No. 283 143 143 143 157 166 169 Net Return per Manday $ 1.44 2.68 1.34 0.98 1.08 5.03 5.90 1 / Prices in Years 1 to 5 are those actually received by the farmer; those in subsequent years are the actual 1982 prices received by the farmers. 2 / Year in which last instalment of development loan is repaid. 3 / Interest rate for development loan and seasonal loan for years 1 to 5 is 10 percent per annum and that for seasonal loan in subsequent years 15 percent per annum.  - 36 - LIBERIA TabLe 3 LOFA COONTY ACRICULTURAL DEVELOP15ENT PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Coffee - Fmot BEudget and Cash Flow (1 bectare) First Year Second Year Third Year Fourth Year Fifth Year Sixth Year Seventh Year T-elfth Year2/ 7hirteenh Year 31 Yield per hoctare kg - _ _ 116 200 450 800 800 650 PIrin Cents per 1/ kg - - - 176 176 143 143 143 143 Value of Crop $ - 204.16 352 643.50 1144 1144 929.50 Dene-lopent Coot Sired Labor S 34 11 11 11 - - - - S'edlings S 165 - - - - - - - -errilit-ts $ 59 44 22 22 T-1il S 24 - - sub-total $ 282 55 33 - - - - Soaseonel Cost Hired Labor $ 10 20 25 37 37 30 Fertilizers $ - 22 25 32 32 30 F-sti.idos S 10 10 ia 1O 10 10 Cthers S1 10 10 10 10 Seb-reral S 30 62 70 89 89 80 Inf l, Vaixe of Crep S - - - 204.16 352 643.6 1144 1144 929.50 Ce-elepoont Loan S 282 55 33 33- - - - Seasonal Lean $ - - - 30 62 70.0 89 89 80 Sob-total S 282 55 33 267.16 414 713.5 1233 1233 1009.50 Outflow DO-elop=ent Cost $ 282 55 33 33 - - - - Seasonal os-t $ - - - 30 62 70 89 89 80 Repeynent of Den, loan $ - - - - 70.30 70.30 70.30 70.30 - Interest on Den. Loan 3/1 - - - - 31.67 31.67 31.67 31.67 Repay-eot nf Seasonal Lean S - - - 30 62 70 89 89 63 Interest on Seasonal Laoa 4/ S - _ - 3 6.20 10.50 13.35 13.35 12.0 Sob-total S 282 55 33 96 232.17 252.47 293.32 293.32 172.0 Not Intone $ NIL NIL NIL 171.16 181.83 461.03 939.68 939.68 837.5 Farily Labor Dayn NO. 33 21 21 21 40 50 72 72 60 R-trrn per -nnday $ - - - 8.2 4.5 9.2 13.1 13.1 14.0 1/ Pri-es In years 4 and 5 are those anteally renei-ed by the famer from sioth year onwards they -p-ren. t finencial pricrs in 1982 real Ires. 2/ Year in chrb lane I inroalenene of denelop-ene loan i rep-aid. 3/ First year atler the fell repayment f d.e-oip-ent loan. 4/ Isterostrato for denolop-ent loae end seasonal loans for yearn 1 t- 5 is 10 pertent per ann-n med than fr seasnnal Ion from ninth year noeardn In 15 percent per an.no.  - 37 - Anco. 4 LIBERIA Table 4 LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DRVELOPlfDT PROJECT FROJUCI COJEpLFTUO' REPORT Cocoa - Farm Redact and C-h Fleov (1 hectar-) First Year Second Year Third Year Fourth Year Fifth Year Sith Year Sae--th Year Tvelith Tear Thirteenoh Year 1ild per hcetera kg - - - 55 150 300 500 540 50 Price 1/ cents p.kg - - 145.2 145.2 134.2 134.2 134.2 134.2 Valc of Crop S - - - 79.86 217.8 402.6 6710.00 671.00 671.00 Developneno Coot hired Labor $ 28.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 - - Seedlingn $ 165.0 - - - Fer-ilizers $ 51.7 42.5 37.8 37.8 Too1s $ 23.7 - - - Sub-Tote1 S 269.3 50.1 53.7 53.7 - - - Seasonal Cant Bired LabSr $ - _ - 1D 12 t5 10 10 18 Fertilizers S - - - 40 46 52 52 52 Peatioido $ - - - 10 10 10 10 10 10 Othern $ --1 0 10 10 10 -0 Sub-total - _ _ 30 72 8g 90 40 90 Val.. of Crop 0 - - 79.86 217.8 402.6 671 671 671 De-elop-ent Loan 8 269.3 58.4 53.7 53.70 - - - Seasoaal Loan 0 - - - 30.00 72.0 81 90 90 90 163.56 200.8 483.6 761 }61 761 Develep-aco Cont $ 269.3 58.4 53.7 53.7 - - - _ _ Sea.o.al Cent $ - - - 30.0 72.0 81 90 90 90 Fepaytent of De-. Loan 9 - - 93.67 93.62 93.67 - Interoest0 Bone. Loan.4/ $ - - _ - - 37.46 37.46 37.46 - Raepaytnco of era- sonsl Loan 0 - - - 30.0 72.0 Si 90 90 90 nterest on Sea- aonal Loan 4/ S 3.0 7.2 12.15 13.50 13.50 13.50 8ub-total $ 269.3 58.4 53.7 116.70 151.2 305.28 324.63 324.b3 193.50 Set Incone S NIL NIL NI. 46.86 138.6 178.32 436.37 436.37 567.50 FAMILY LABOR DAYS N.. 54 30 30 30 35 38 41 41 41 RET7RN PER MiNDAY 0 - - _ 1.6 4.0 4.7 10.6 13.6 13.8 1/ Frtio Sn rYear 4 and 5 are tho cacotual1y -eceived by the far=er; fUre sisth year on-ards they represent fi..naial pri.a iS 1982 rral terta. 2/ Year iA which lane inntalltyent of develepmnp t Loan is repaid. 3/ First year after the ftll r-pay-nt of de-elop-ent lean. 4/ Interest rare for dereLop-seot lean and nas-onal loans foe year I te 5 is 10 percent per an.en and thaot fo -o la Io ith ye owa is 15 per tper 0 .  LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Calculation of Economic Prices 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1990 Rice Commodity Price at 4/ Const. 1980 $ per m.t. 412 471 370 434 514 486 557 576 Const. 1981 $ per m.t.l/ 393 449 353 414 490 464 531 550 Economic Farmgate Paddy Price $ per m.t. 2/ 255 292 229 269 319 302 316 330 345 357 Coffee Commodity Price at Const. 1980