Nicaragua - Second Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE f NLY Report No. 4844 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT NICARAGUA LOAN 1244-NI SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT December 20, 1983 Education Projects Division Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office IThis document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT NICARAGUA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (loan 1244-NI) Table of Contents Page No. Pre:ace .. . ........... i Basic Data Sheet............................. . ....... u........ ii-v Highlights ..... * ................ .... vi-vii Project Comption Report I. Background and Conternt of the Project .1 Project Objectives ...................... . 1 Project Content/Rovisions . .1 Project Generation .. 2 IT. Project Irtplementation ..........3. TmIplemerntation Period. .. 3 Project Managemaent .. 4 School Construction . . 4 Community Assistance in School Construction. . 5 School Locations/Sizes . ........................,.. 6 Furniture and Equipment .......................... 7 Technical Assistance - Specialist Services a Fellowships ..................................... 9 Teacher Upgrading Programs . ................ 9 Project Cost and Financing ......................... 10 Disbursements ..12 III. Operational Outcomes.. 12 Overview ... .. 12 Organ_zational and Administrative Issues.12 Administrative Linkages..12 Efficiency and Quality Issues.13 Use of School Facilities .13 Efficiency of the System ......................... 14 Enrollments .......... 15 Teachers .......... 16 Curricula ...16 Teaching/Learning Materials . ..................... 16 Recurrent costs .................,.17 TV. Conclusions and Recommerndations . . 17 Conclusions ........... .17 Recommendations ..........1 .. .......19 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Table of Contents (Continued) ANNEX ES: Page No . Annex I Compliance with 'oan Covenants .. ............ 21 Annex 2 Project Implementation and Disbur3ement Schedule ., 22 Annex 3 Completion of Physical Facilities .... ............. 23 Annex 4 Summrvry of Total Pro,ject Costs .24 Annex 5 Plaria.d and Actual Structure of Primary/ Secondary Education .25 Anr'- 6 CIBA Enrollments 1982 by Grade and by Shift 26 Afnlt x 7 Progression Rates in Urban and Rural Priraary Schools (Cohort 1973-1978) .27 Annex 8 Promotion, Repetition and Drop-Out Rates (%) irn Primary Schools 1976, 1979 nd 1981 .. 28 Annex 9 Distrioution of Primary and Secondary Students in Projeat Schools by Grade (1982) . - .. .. ...... .. 29 Annex 10 Planned and Actual (1975 and 1982) Enrollments in Project Schools .30 Annex ll State Primary and Secondary School Teachers/Administrators by qualifications 1982 . 31 Annex 12 Nicaragua - Expenditures for Education .32 .,  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT NICARAGUA - Loan 1244-NI Second Education Project PREFACE This Project Completion Report (PCR) derives from: (a) a Bank Project Completion field mission of 4 staff/weeks; (b) a review of a Project Completion Report prepared by the Borrower; and (c) a review of material in Bank files, notably project related correspondence and mission reports, the Appraisal Report (No. lOO3a-NI of March 26, 1976); the President's Report (No. P-1808-NI, of March 31,1976), the Loatn Agreement (Loan 1244-NI of June 15, 1976) and the subsequent amendments thereto. This PCR draws substantialla, especially in regard to physical implementation aspects, on the PCR prepared by the Borrower with which there is general agreement. Where Bank perceptions are at variance with opinions and conclusions expressed in the Borrower's POR these are appropriately documented in the present report. The Bank completion mission visited five of the six project regions including a selected sample of nuclei, base and satellite schools and basic secondary institutions. It held discussions with officials of the Ministries of Education, Planning, Construction and Finance, with project implementation staff and in the field with chief administrative officers and staffs at regional (Delegado Regional), Zone (Delgado Zonal) and nucleo (Director ITER) levels, and with teachers, community leaders, and school principals. The report which follows highlights project implementation issues, project outcomes, conclusions and recommendations of the mission. The Operations Evaluation Department decided not to audit the project and sent the PCR to the Government in October 1983. No comments have been received from the Government.  -ii- BASIC DATA SHEET Nicaragua Second Educaticn Project (Loan 1244-NI) Key Project Data Item Appraisal H9stimate Actual Total Project Cost (US$million) 19.85 24.06 Overrun (%) 0% 21% Loan Amount (US$million) 11.00 11.00 Amount Disbursed 11.00 11.00 Cancelled _ _ Repaid (to March 31, 1983) - Outstanding (as of March 31, 1983) 11.00 Date Physical Components Completed 12/31/80 12/31/82 In Months Since Loan Signature 54 78 Proportion Completed by Original Completion late (%) 100% 30% Proportion of Time Overrun (%)- 44% Institutional Performance 1976-1979 poor 1980-1982 - very good Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$million) FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 (i) Estimated at Appraisal 0.15 5.50 8.19 10.40 11.00 - - (ii) Actual Disbursement 0.00 0.25 0.44 3.28 5.78 10.59 11.00 (iii) (ii) as % of (i) % 7% 5% 32% 53% 96% 100%  -iii- BASIC DATA SHEET NicaraEgua Second Education Project (Loan 1244-NI Other Project Data Item Original Plan Revisions Actual First Mention in Files - - 01/07/72 Government Application - - n7/75 Appraisal - - 08/04/75 Negotiations - 03/06/t 6 Board Approval Date - - 04/20/76 Loan Signature - - 06/15/76 Effective Date - - 08/17/76 Closing Date 6/30/81 12/31/81 05/16/83 Borrower: Government of Nicaragua Executing Agency: Ministry of Education Fiscal Year of Borrower: January 1 - December 31 Follow-on-Project Name: Third Education Project Negotiation Date: March 23-25, 1981 Loan Agreement Date: Withdrawn by Government from Board Presentation School Year: March - December Currency Exchange Rate Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Cordoba (C$) Exchange Rates: Appraisal Year (1975) US$1.o0=C$ 7.00 Intervening Years (1976-1978) US$1.00=C$ 7.00 Year Currency Devalued (1979) US$1.00=C$10.00 Completion Year (1982) US$1.00=C$10 00 Current (1983) US$1.00=C$10.00  ALLOCATION OF LOANi PROCEEDS (Aouors in u5 Dollars) ORIG01XL ALlUCATiONS REVISION I a? REVISION 2 FEOAL ALLOCATIOSS Category Allocation 2 of Eeponditures Finane.d Allocation X of Expenditures Financed Allocation % of txenditntres Financed Allocation o of Expenditures 04zanted (I) Civil Works 5,300,000 40% 5,300,000 t00o paatunts o massd,o,oo 7,282,141.10 372 7,175,001.60 3(t of total exVendituTes until Iorc, 31. 1980, and 48l thereafter al (Z e Professional SOOOO 1001 500,000 1002 685,200 1002 157,885.15 937 of to'tI expeEditures 4 services (3) Furniture and 2,950,000 100l of foreign oxpeedi- 2,950,000 100I of foreign expendi- 2,176,000 1002 of foreigs cepe4di- 2,346,641.98 89Z of total expenditures Eqioipn-t tures and 85% of expen- tures and 852 of expen- tures aod 85I of c.pen- diturea for loCally pro- ditures for locally pro- diouts for locs lly pro- cured goods cured good, Cd goods (4) Teoboioal A.tci- 715,000 lOOY 715,000 100% 545,Z00 100% 427,037.66 1001 cf total expesditures tance and Train- ind Abroad (5) Upgrading mnd 515.000 100% 515,000 100% 291.407 1002 273,373.06 1ooZ of rotal expenditures Teacher Training (5) Fqudpment asd 20,000 iO0 of foreign enpendi- 20,000 1001 of foreigo eopondi- 20,058.90 1O0Z of foreign napnodi- 20,058.90 917. of total roperidtures Funniturn for cures sod 852 of ecpes- ures esid 857 of expen- tures and 852 of xapes- ?to5ect hiuni- aitures for lolly pro- di-urcs fur lousily pro- ditures for locally pro- ni.rartion cured goods cured goods cured goods ( Va inallocated 1,000g,OO 1.000,000 0 0 AL 11 i.000,000 11,000,000 11,000,000 10,999,998.97 a in an a.endnert to Schedule I dated April 1. '9f1. rte p-r-ntare of nopoodi tures to be financed under ScheduLe L (Civil l.ovISi vajs rcdifItof to ecad: "looz af puy.c-r radn up tO u -ociou- of 12,000,00 until June 30, 190C, and L' therruft-r.  BASIC DATA SHEET Nicaragua - Second Education Project (Loan 1244-NI) Mission Data Sent ktonth/ Number of No. of Persons Staff Date of Type of Mission By: Year Weeks Composition Weeks ReDort RID UNESCO 2/72 n.a. n.a. n.a. 05/30o72 Reconnaissance IBRD/UNESCO 7/72 1.0 2 (Ed, En) 2.0 07/12/72 Reconnaissance IBRD 2/73 2.0 2 (Ed, Ar) 2.0 03/06/73 Planning/Review IBRD 5/74 2.0 2 (Ed, Ec) 1.2 06/14/74 Planning/Review IBRD 10/74 1.5 3 (Ed, Ee, Ar) 1.5 12/09/74 Planning/Review IBRD 4/75 0.5 1 (Ed.) 0.5 05/02/75 Reconnaissance IBRD 5-6/75 2.0 3 (Ec, 2 Ed) 6.0 07/03/75 Preparation IBRD/UNESCO 7/75 3.0 5 (3Ed, Ar, Ec) 15.0 08/06/75 Appraisal IBERD 8/75 3.5 4 (2Ed, Ar, Ec) 14.0 03/25/76 Total 14.0 b/ 41.7 b/ Supervision 1 IBRD 9/76 1.0 2 (Ed, Ar) 2.0 10/13/76 Supervision 2 IBRD 3/77 1.0 1 (Ar) 1.0 04/04/77 Supervision 3 IBRD 4/17 1.0 1 (Ed) 1.0 07/07/77 Supervision 4 1BRD 8/77 0.2 1 (Ed) 0.2 09/19/77 Supervision 5 IBRD 7/78 1.0 1 (Ar) 1.0 09/29/78 Supervision 6 IBRD 2/79 0.6 1 (Ar) 0.6 03/02/79 Supervision 7 IBRD 9/79 2.0 1 (Ed) 2.0 09/05/79 Supervision 8 IBRD 2/80 0.5 1 (Ar) 0.6 03/07/80 Supervision 9 IBRD 7/80 0.3 1 (Ar) 0.3 08/11/80 Supervision 10 IBRD 11/80 1.0 1 (Ar) 1.0 12/30/80 Supervision 11 IBRD 12/81 0.6 1 (Ed) 0.6 01/15/82 Supervision 12 IBRD 5/82 1.6 2 (Ed, Ar) 2.0 06/07/82 Supervision 13 IBRD 11/82 1.0 2 (Ed, Ar) 1.5 12/16/82 Total 11.8 13.8 Completion IBRO 2/83 2.0 2 (Ed, Ar) 4.0 06/20/83 a/ Ed - Educator; Ar - Architect; Ec - Economist bU/ Excluding RID mission.  - vi - HIGHLIGHTS Identified in 1972 (para 1.04), preparation of the Second Educationi Project was postponed until 1975 because of the country's need to concentrate its resources to reconstruction efforts following the December 1972 earthquake which destroyed Managua, the capital city. Loan 1.244-NI which was approved in April 1976, supported the Governyiient's rural education and training development strategy (para 1.01) by (i) improving and expanding rural basic education opportunities, and decentralizing education management, (ii) increasing agricultural training to meet the manpower needs of the v sector, and (iii) improving teacher qualifications. The agreed project (para 1.02) included provision of (i) a total of 204 primary schools organized into 18 rural primary education nuclei composed of "base", "sub-base" and "associated" schools; (ii) 18 lower secondary schools; (iii) 9 agricultural training centers; and (iv) 4 agricultural secondary schools. The project also included an upgrading program for 1,100 teachers and administrators, technical assistance and fellowships of 11 and 17 man-years respectively. Following the 1979 civil war, the project content was reduced, the entire agricultural training component was deleted, and the repair and refurnishing of 22 Diversified Secondary Schools damaged during the civil war was added to the project. In a subsequent loan amendment, three lower secondary schools were added, and two nuclei deleted. The project as revised, has been satifactorily completed and has rendered substantial benefits to the system as a whole (para 4.01). Cost effective, easy to construct and maintain schools (para 2.05 and 2.06) were designed, built and equipped under the project providing new places for 13,680 primary and 5,200 secondary school students, exceeding the targ,.ts by about 8'" A successful community-assisted school building program (para 2.07 and 2.08) was undertaken, providing invaluable experience in implementation mechanisms at grass roots level. The project had an effective institution building effect; the project unit has become an efficient and important project implementation arm of the Ministry of Education (para 2.04). With respect to educational aspects, the school nuclearization scheme (para 3.02) has been made operational and teachers trained (para 2.13, 216 and 3.11) and retrained in the areas of multigrade teaching and practical arts. In addition, the technical assistance (para 2,14) and fellowships (para 2.15) programs have provided guidance and training to a sufficient degree in the areas of education administration, nuclearization, and science and language teaching. The project, however, has been less successful in several aspects. Although nuclearization has been established, the new decentralized regional administrative structure is operating ineffectively and without precise definition of linkages and responsibilities of each management level (para 3.02), thereby militating against cost effective and sound educational practices. The envisioned network of regional secondary education system has not materialized. Although appraisal enrollment targets (para 3.09) have been achieved and show signs of increase, internal efficiency has not improved above the rates existing at the time of appraisal (para 3.04-3.07). The system of continuous evaluation (para 2.17) of education and training programs has not been established. In the areas of teacher training, mathematics teaching was not undertaken (para. 2.17), and technical  - vii - assistance in school nuclearization (para 2.14) was of insufficient depth. With hindsight, some of the problem could have been minimized at an early stage such as by conducting an in-depth review of sclhool mapping before reaumption of implementat:Lon (para 2.11) after the civil war when it became apparent; that population had shifted subs.oantially. This sttudy could have preenmpted the current confusion and diseconomy in the educational orginizational structure and over or under utilization of some facilities. The Government should give immediate attentioa to these organizational problems and the still low inLternal efficiency of the education system. Although the project 1had a time overrun of two years (para 2.02) and a total cost of 21% above appraisal estimates (paras 2.18 and 2.19) project implementation and disbursemnent performance (para 2.21) have been remarkable, especially during the last 2.5 years of implementation, considering the adverse effects of the 1972 earthquake from which the country had not fully recovered and the 1979 civil war which further aggravated economic difficulty. On the whole, both the Borrower's and the Bank's performance have been satisfactory. The Bank's flexibility in considering modifications to project content and facilitating disbursements througlh increased disbursement percentages (para 2.21) during a difficult economic period, and the new Government's ready allocation of scarce resources to this project considered of high priority, have made possible the generally successful conclusion of this project. Bank participation in this project has been a worthwhile investment. Further external assistance is, however, necessary to effect qualitative improvements in the system (para 4.02) by providing instructional materials and textbooks, teacher/administrator upgrading programs and assistance in curriculum development. The following points may be of particular interest to Bank Staff and the Borrower: (a) the successful community involvement in rural primary school construction under direct supervision by the project unit (para 2.07 and 2.08); (b) the effectiveness of the use of an increased disbursement rate at the initial siage of project implementation without necessarily increasing the Bank's overall participation in financing total project cost (para 2.21); (c) the stability of the project unit staff not withstanding a change in government (para 2.04); (d) the need to review school mapping and school locations when substantial delays in start of ixplementation have occurred and unexpected population shifts may have taken place (para 2.11); (e) distorcions in the educational organizational structure which could result from unplanned school growth/expansion (para 3.02); (f) too theoretical approaches in the work of expatriate consultants as a possible outcome of unfamiliarity with the couLntry (pare 2.14); and (g) the importance of educational software (such as textbooks, teacher tr;ainingt and curriculumn development) in improving educational rpi;d.ity and iriternal efficienicy (para 3.04, 3.11 and 3.12).  I. BACKGROUND AND CONTENT OP THE PROJECT Project ObJectives 1.01 The project was designed to support the government's rural education and training development strategy by: (a) improving and expanding rural primary education opportunities under an innovative nuclear school system; (b) increasing agricultural training opportunities by establishing non-formal training facilities in selected areas and supporting the manpower needs of the agricultural sector by establishing agricultural secondary schools; (c) expanding and improving rural secondarj educational opportunities through a restructured regional secondary education system; and (d) improving the quality of education through in-service teacher training and a cechnical assistanca program. Project Content/Revisions 1.02 During project implementation, the project content was modified twice (April 1, 1980 and October 9, 1981). Details of the original project content and the subsequent amendments are shown in Table 1.1. Changes were made for the following reasons: (a) First Revision: Following the 1979 civil strife, the Government was in a precarious economic situation and needed to concentrate its meager resources. The deletion of the entire agricultural training component was requested as this was considered to have a lower priority than the basic education component. l/ Many buildings were damaged during the civil war, among them, the Diversified Secondary Schools (IREMs) built uinder Loan 532-NI. Repairs of these schools and tha replacement of lost/damaged furniture and equipment were therefore added in the revision of the project. A revolving fund was established. (b) Second Revision: Two Rural School Nuclei (NERs) in Zelaya, comprising 18 primary schools were located in remote areas without access. The government undertook to build these schools with its own resources and requested deletion of these 18 schools from the project. Three additional Lower Secondary Schools (CIBAs) were added in areas where the Ministry of Education (MED) found the greatest need for these schools. Force account procedures ware included in the Loan Agreement. 1/ The importance, although of secondary priority, attached by the Government to the agricultural training component, is evidenced by its inclusion in tne aborted Third Education Project.  -. 2 - Table 1.1: Project Content and Faev~Lsions Original Revision 1 Rlevision 2 1?OjSCt Com onent/Aspect 06/15/76 04/01/80 10/09/81 Construxction, Furnis Eippin: Primary schoo1s 204 204 18& Fihral CormmUIity Centers 18S 18 16 Agricultural Training Centers (IA) 9 deleted Agricultural Secondary School(BAC) 4 deleted - lDowei Secondary Schools (CIBA) 18 18 21 In-Servica Training: No. of Teachers/Administrators 1,170 1,170 1,170 Technioal Assistance: Basic Education: Specialists 8 s/y 8 s/y 8 s/y FellowGhips 7 Sly 7 sly 7 s/y Agri.Education: Specialists 3 sIy deleted Fellowships 10 sly deleted - Bepair/ Refurnishing: Diversifed Secondary Schools: not included 22 22 No. of Student Places Provided: Primary Education 14,640 14,640 12,440 Lower Secondary Education 4,320 4,320 5,040 Agricultural Education 1,785 - - 1.03 The loan proceeds were reallocated accordingly, final allocations are shown in detail in the Basic Data Sheet. During implementation, the Bank agreed to other minor revisions involving the transfer of school locations either due to difficulties in obtaining school Sites or to population shifts. Project 'eneration 1.04 The project identification stage took twice as long (3 years) as the average education project (1.5 years) due to the divergent views of the UNESCO programming mission and 'che Borrower, and the adverse conditions brought about by the Managua earthquake in December, 1972. The first rmention in files of a possible Second Education Project occurs on January 7, 1972 when a tentative selection of personnel for a UNESCO KID mission was being considered. A report was subsequently received detailing the findings of the RID mission which identified as priority the development of general secondary, vocational training and agricultural schools. The Governmnent viewed these findings as inconaistent with its educational development plan and priority needs. A Bank reeonnaissance mission that was mounted in February 1973 to resolve the divergent views of UNESCO and the Borrower concerning project content, recommended that the second project be postponed to FY76 because of (a) delays in the implementation of the First Education Project (Lioan 532-NI); (b) the Government's constrained implementation capacity due to the reconstruction projects underway after the disastrous  -3- earthquake; (o) the need to reexamine the country's priority educational needs and in that contpxt, possible project content. 1.05 Preparation and appraisal missions left in July and August 1975 respectively and after that date, the project was processed efficiently. The Loan Agreement was signed on June 15, 1976 and became effective in August 17, 1976 when the appointment of project unit staff, a condition for loan effecti'veness, was approved by the Bank. II. Project Implementation 2.01 :n the context of the devastating earthquake of 1972, the unsettled conditions of the mid-1970s which culminated in the 1979 civil war and the economic constraints which have wracked Nicaragua ever since, physical implementation can be described as generally very satisfactory.The Government has complied with most of the covenants of the Loan Agreement (Annex 1). 2.02 Iuplementation Period. Project implementation took 6.5 years to complete (Annex 2) from the date of loan signature or 44% (2 years) beyond that estimated at appraisal. This is an average period for the education projects approved in the mid-1970s. A remarkable difference in the rate of project implementation before and atter the 1979 civil war is,however, noteworthy. For almost 4.5 years from August 1976 (effectiveness date) to December 1979, only about 5% of the project had been executed. Standard school building plans, bid documents and equipment lists had been completed, but little civil works had been iuitiated: two NERs and one EAC (Agricultural Secondary School which was subsequently deleted from the project ) were contracted and some technical assistance rendered. The first set of schools were tendered ili April 1978 - nine months later than scheduled at appraisal for the first phase. Delays at this stage were dua to site acquisition and relocation problems, the additional time needed for design modifications, and delays in the transmittal of correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower. By July 1978, the socio-political situation in Nicaragua had badly deteriorated and adversely affected implementation: (a) the expected 1978 and 1979 budget allocations were not received; (b) contractors were reluctant to participate in bids for fear that payments would not be forthcoming; and (c) building materials were difficult to obtain even at inflated prices. The outbreak of the civil war in mid-1979 paralyzed project implementation for the next six months. 2.03 Project implementation effectively commenced only around May 1980 under the new government after the first modification of project content (Para 1.02). During the 2.5 year period up to the closing date, virtually the entire project as modified was completed and the remaining loan funds (95%) disbursed. Although, completion of the preparation activities (i.e., school plans, bid documents, equipment lists) prior to the civil war greatly facilitated project implementation during the post-war period (it would have taken about 18 months longer to complete the project had these activities not been accomplished), credit for the remarkable implementation performance during this period should be shared both by the Bank and the Government. The Bank displayed comprehension of, and a flexible approach to the socio-economic problems of Nicaragua such as: (a) readily agreeing to the Borrower's proposal to concentrate its meager resources on basic education,  - 4 - and therefore to eliminate frnm the project the agricultural education and training component; l/and (b) agreeing to an accelerated disbursement rate (para 2.21), thus providing much needed funding at the time the Government faced difficulties in providing counterpart funds. To the credit of the present Government are: (a) its ready endorsement of a project formulated by a previous administration (politically unacceptable to the current one); and (b) the high priority it has accorded to the project, significantly reducing internal bureaucratic procedures. Unlike the 4 years preceeding the civil war, the new Government promptly provided human and financial resources on a generous scale not previously available to the PIU for efficient project implenentation. All major implementation activity had effectively been terminated as of December 31, 1982 with the exception of CIBA-18 (RAMA) which the Government has undertaken the responsibility to complete by July 1983. 2.04 Project management. The uncharacteristic stabilitv of the project unit contributed substantially to efficient project implementation. The DGIAF (Department of Investments and Financial Assistance), charged with responsibility for project execution, was reconstituted under the new government into DEPE (Directorate for the Execution of Education Projects) of MED. Notwithstanding the change in government, DEPE retained most key staff of DGIAF (project director, architect, accountant) and thus achieved consistency in decision making on implementation matters throughout the life of the project. Their expertise, dedication, and success in attracting active community participation in rural areas, have been a significant and positive factor in prcject implementation. DEPE continues to be the important ann of the Ministry of Education to implement locally and externally financed projects. 2.05 School Construction. Implementation of this component was the most successful in the project in spite of problems with school sites, contrnetors and cost overruns. By the closing date (December 1982), about 98% of the revised total schools to be built and/or provided with additional facilities had been satisfactorily completed. Table 2.1 compares the facilities which have actually been provided with both appraisal and revised targets (see Annex 3 for details). Table 2.1: Facilities Provided Appraisal Revision 2 % Actual Target Target Actual vs. Revised Primary Schools (NERs) No. of Nuclei 18 16 16 100 No. of Scnools: 222 204 184 90 - Constructed and Equipped 117 159 166 104 Equipped Only 45 45 18 40 No. of Student Places Provided 14,640 12,440 13,680 110 Secondary Schools (CIBAs) No. of Scnools 13 21 21 100 No. of Student Places Provided 4,320 5,040 5,200 103 Repair/Refurnishing of (IREMs) NIo. of Schools not incl. 22 19 1/ This mission estimates that it would have taken about 18 months longer to complete tne project if tnis component were retained.  - 5 - 2.06 In general, the schools provided are econoraical, simple and appropriate for the level of instruction involved. They are easy to build and maintain due to the adaptation of standardized NER and CIBA school designs which make maximum use of locally available materials. The modular designs developed by consultants hired under this project which were further simplified on recommendations of the Bank, require little specialized skills to construct or maintain, facilitate the expansion of school buildings and are easily adaptable to varying site conditions. The simple designs have made possible the successful involvement of the commurLity in school construction. 2.07 Community Assistance in School Construction. The niew governnent's active endorsement of developing participatory planning and implementation mechanisms at grass roots level has resulted in wide-spread voluntary community involvement in school construction and maintenance, and in local infrastructure development. Direct comm.unity involvement in school building was envisioned at appraisal, but the Loan Agreement did not provide procedures allowing its use. Because of civil works cost overruns (then estimated at about 45%) brought about by the unsettled political and economic situation (and scarce materials), the Government was prompted in late 1978 to request Bank approval for use of community assistance in building schools in order to reduce cost>; CARE would assist DGIAF. The Bank agreed to try out the system in Boaco on a pilot basis (with 6 schools), with a view to expanding the use of community assistance if found successful. The civil war suspended further use of assistance of this nature. Thus community involvement in school construction only came to be realized in 1981 when DEPE made concrete steps to organize the process after no consl 2ction tenders were received for rural schools in areas of difficult access. The Bank supported the process by amending the Loan agreement so as to enable DEPE to use a force account method or direct administration in civil works. NED, through DEPE, delivered building materials to rural communities and contributed technical expertise by assigning project staff and clerks of works full time on school sites to supervise the labor voluntarily contributed by the community. Where building materials CDuld not be delivered due to lack of access, the community undertook the hauling of materials from the last accessible delivery points to the school site and in some cases even built access roads to the proposed sites. Fifty out of the 184 primary schools were built by the communities, with schools ranging in size from one classroom schools to a central school complete with classrooms, workshops, laboratory and administrative areas. Schools built by the community show construction savings of as much as 60%; they are at Least equal in quality and better maintained than those built under contract with private firms. There are indications too that the involvement is benefitting student participation and retention rates due to the increased awareness of the rural community of the benefits of education, and parental interest in ensuring that their children enjoy the faoilities they have helped to build. 2.08 A number of factors contributing to the success of the community involvement in school construction under this project are normally not found in other projects: (a) just prior to the civil war, the country gained successful exper-ience in a CARE assisted rural school construction project wnaee about 300 classrooms were built with community assistance; procedures  - 6 - were therefore already established and tested; (b) the country had recently emerged from a civil war in which ordinary citizens easily identified themselves with the overthrow of an old system of government and the establishment of a socially-oriented government, and encouraged by the new government, readily translated community participation in school construction to lending a direct hand in nation building. The same identification motivates the "promotores" of MED who organize working groups in the community and selflessly supervise the work often under harsh living conditions; (c) nuclei directors, who were already in place where the process had been introduced, greatly assisted in motivating the community. The implications of such self-help practices for improved living standards and for cost-effective, quality education should not be lost upon the Bank and other Borrowers. 2.09 The use of force account and direct administration of civil works using community assistance has been successful under this project, and in hindsight, wider use of this procedure could have significantly lowered total project 0ost and reduced the problems and disputes with small c.ntractors. Following the civil war, many large contracting firms were disaolv.id as a result of unstable econoaic conditions in the country. The majority of school buildiag contracts were therefore won by small firms which w1b-e technically capable, could generally count on only limited financial resources. As the majority (about 65%) of the schools built weve snall and in widely dispersed, often isolated locations, difficulties ani delays in delivery of building materials, sometimes aggravated by adverse weather cordaitions, were often encountered by these small contractors. Misputes between contractors and DEPE were not infrequent. Although only about 3% of the contracts awarded to private contractors were eventually abandoned, DEPE nevertheless was left to complete the works under direct administration and had to cDntend with the delays incurred and the resultant increased costs. 2.10 School Locations/Sizes_ In general, most schools were properly located and accessible to the communities they intended to serve, although there are cases where mislocation became apparent at the later stage of project implementation. Vith respect to school sizes, the areas provided per student place are adequate and compare favorably with appraisal figures and Bank-wide statistics for education facilities of the same type (Table 2.2), with the exception of some schools where apparent mislocation (paras 2.11 and 3.03) h1a: resulted in overcrowding or oversizing. Efficient planning and reduction of circulation areas reduced unit areas under the project. Table 2.2 Unit Gross Areas Per Student Place (sq. m.) Appraisal Bank-wide Actual % Difference (a) (b) (c) (c)'.(a) (c):(b) Rural Primary Schools 3.3 3.6 3.2 -3% -11% Lower Secondary Schools 5.7 5.7 5.5 -3% - 3% Staff HDusing 72 100 75 +4% -25% 2.11 Tn hindsight, it is clear that the long interval between project definition and execution, and the trauma of the civil war in betwieen. produced significant population movements in the rural areas which resulted in apparent mislocation of schools with implications for the appropriateness  -7- of their size and capacity. In the rush to make up for lost implementation time, a review of school locations (which to its credit was started by DGIAF before the civil war) was done in so cursory a manner that some of the schools then being completed were either too small/big for the student population or improperly located. Although adjustments were Lndeed made in late 1981 to correct deficiencies, it was too late for some of the already built oversized schools. It would be appropriate to reappraise school locations and capacities, particularly where substantial time has elapsed between loan signature and start of project implementation. 2.12 Two other issues related to the location and size of construction emerged: the appropriateness of multi-purpose rooms and staff houses. (a) A covered multi-purpose area of 24 sq.m. (capacity not indicated at appraisal), was planned to be added to existing rural primary schools in the project area which had an adequate number of classrooms and required no remodeling or repair work. Early in project implementation (1979-1981) after some of these areas were constructed, it was found that either (i) the spaces were unusable because they were too small, or (ii) it was difficult to annex these areas usefully to existing buildings unless designs were altered in each case. Finally, the covered areas in some schools were increased to classroom size (accommodating 40 students) to be of practical use, and in others, no construction was done. Both solutions were satisfactory. (b) Staff houses (53 for NERs and 18 for CIBAs) were to be provided under the project for school directors (Annex 3). Although the designs are simple and adequate for their intended use, about half of the 59 staff houses actually provided are either unused or have been converted into other uses such as office space, student activity room, storage or classroom. Reasons for the disuse are either (i) school directors are residents of the commnunity or nearby and thus have no need for another house, (ii) the houses are either too small or too large for the size of the school staff's family, or (iii) the intended user prefers to stay in his own home and commute. The practicality of both the isolated multi-purpose covered areas, and staff housing, should be considered carefully before these ara included in future projects. 2.13 Furniture and E4uipment. Educational equipment and furniture acquired for the project are unsophisticated,suitable for the level of training involved, adequate in quantity, sturdy and of a satisfactory quality of workmanship. All equipment and learning materials were procured from abroad; about 90% of furniture was locally manufactured. Procurement which was in accordance with Bank guidelines was appropriately begun only when civil works had been initiated in order to time deliveries with completion of schools, and delivered in bulk to DEPE for subsequent distribution to the dispersed schools. However, unavailability of local transportation tD project schools, many of whiich (about 45%) were off regular transportation routes, delayed deliveries from MED to about half of the project schools until close to the closing date. DEPE had to count upon the limited transportation facilities of MED to deliver furniture and equipment, whenever these were available. The rural communities were instrumental in getting this equipment to the isolated satellite schools as delivery vehicles often could get no further than the NER central school. All furniture and equipment (except for CIBA-18 in Rama which is under construction) are now in place. Deliveries of a limited quantity of library books to CIBAs and NER central schools will be completed by the end of April 1983. In future projects, appraisal missions should investigate the transportation need for  - 8 - project implementation, and, where transport difficulties are foreseen, vehicles for delivery of equipment, furniture and construction materials should be provided to the extent possible to the project unit, as these vehicles would und&ubtedly be useful to the institutionL even after completion of the project. 2.14 Technical Assistance - Specialist Services. The services rendered by educational specialists to the project mere substantially in accordance with the appraisal targets, if the technical assistance related to agricultural education that was deleted through the Loan Agreenent amendment, is excluded (Table 2.3). However, the Government's current assessment of the technical assistance provided is that the services rendered in the field of nuclearization was of insufficient depth. The technical assistance program was rendered in two stages: 12 3/a out of the 100 s/m provided were completed before the 1979 civil war, and the remaining 88 s/m after the war. Effectiveness of the first services (12 s/m in curriculum development) rendered were effectively lost in the aftermath of the civil war. Contacts established between specialist and local counterparts were interrupted and substantial documentation was lost. Of the 88 s/m of services rendered after the civil war, 35 s/a were provided by five local consultants who generally performed satisfactor,.ly within the limits of the guidance provided by expatriate specialists which tended to be too theoretical, particularly in the area of nuclearization. The field application of these concepts, was therefore not as effective as expected. Additional assistance in this area, and particularly in atudent evaluation which was not included because it was at that time considered of lower priority, is required. Table 2.3 Specialist Services Appraisal Targets Actually Provided IqIo. of Duration No. of Duration (s/m) Area Experts (s/n) Area Experts otal Local Foreign Nuclearization 1 24 Nuclearization 2 22 10 12 Multigrade Teaching 1 24 Multigrade Teach. 3 5 0 5 Student Evaluation 24 Curriculum Dev. 1 32 0 32 Secondary School Education Administration and Administration 2 25 9 16 Teacher Training 1 24 Agri. Education 1 24 Science Teach. 2 7 9 8 Special Subjects a/ 12 Language 1 9 9 C Teackiig TOTAL 5 b/ 132 11 100 35 65 Total excluding Agricultural comp. 96 100 a! Number of special subjects experts (short-term consultants) not specified. b/ Excluding short-term consultants.  _ 9 _ 2.15 Fellovships. The fellowships program as irsplemented, was substantially reduced in scope and duration compared to that envisioned at appraisal, but was well executed and met the Government's priority needs for staff development. The project originally provided 17 staff-years of fellowships for local staff in (a) primary school adminislration and supervision, (b) aecondary school administration and teacher-training and (c) agricultural education. Because of the outbreak of the civil war in .1979 (a) the curriculum expert who was chief technical adviser of the TA program and re3ponsible for preparing the fellowships plan was unable to complete this plan; (b) the agricultural education component was deleted during the first loan amendeient (para 1.02). Problems in identifying suitable fellows and appropriate training institutions, and government reluctance to release key staff for long periods of training abroad prompted the administration to propose a more limited series of study tours in the same general areas, to which the Bank acquiesced. The study tours provided training for 19 staff as compared to the planned 10 but absorbed only abou-t 12 of the 84 s/m provided in the revised Loan Agreement; they were satisfactorily conducted and met the Borrower's priority needs for staff development in the field of nuclearization. Training was supplemented by the specialists contracted under the project. However, the Government feels a further need for training, specially in school administration and supervision. The mission concurs with the Government's view. 2.16 Teacher Upgrading Programs. With the consent of the Bank the teacher/administrator training prograxs were: (a) shortened takiTig cognizance of the facts that (i) no separate course for NER supervisors was required besides the course for the NER director since the latter is himself responsible for school supervision; (ii) the IREMs would not be able to supervise CIBAs; and (iii) the agricultural component of the project was deleted during the Loan amendment; and (b) modified to include additional teacher training programs in industrial arts and home economics. The changee, together with reduction in length of sDme training courses, rcsulted in only 913 of the planned 2,014 staff/months being used (Table 2.4). Table 2.4-: Teacher/Administrator Upgrading Program No. of Participants Duration-Staff/Months Area Appraisal Actual % Diff. Appraisal Actual D5. flf NER Supervision 40 40 0 60 13 -78% CIBA Supervision 40 20 -50% 40 7 -82% NER Multigrade Teaching 700 595 -15% 1400 298 b/ -79% IREM Supervision 114 20 a/ -78% 214 20 b/ -90% CI13A Science and Matb 100 124 +24% 200 95 b/ -52% NER Voc. Teaching Not Inc. 124 - - 251 - CIBA Voc. Teaching 50 80 +60% 100 229 +129% Agricult. Training 30 deleted - 60 - - LA/EAC SuperviSion 30 deleted - 50 - - Total 1104 1003 -9% 2124 915 -57% Total exal. IA/EAC 1044 1003 -4% 2014 913 -55% a/ IREM directors were expected to carry out echo seminars to area chiefs. b/ Duration o-f training courses was justifibly reduced to 1-4 weeks compared t.) th-e excessive 1-2 months duration provided at appraisal.  - 10 - 2.17 Despite the reduced length of training courses in multigrade teaching, the program was successful and the new techique is being satisfactorily applied in satellite schools. Training of mathematics teachers, however, (provided at appraisal) was not implemented and should be mounted to meet a real dearth of teachers in this discipline. Furthermore, upgrading courses Lor teachers/administrators should be updated and conducted regularly, and a continuous evaluation of the education and training programs should be carried out as provided under the project now that MED has defined its y>licies more concretely (para 3.04). 2.18 Project Cost and Financing. The project as modified incurred a total cost of about US$24-12 million or 21% (US$4.28 m) above appraisal estimates including contingencies. Details of project cost, analyzed in Annex 4 are summarized below: Table 2.5: Total Project Costs (US$m) Appraisal Actual % Difference Rural Education Nuclei 8.30 13.00 +57% Lower Secondary Schools 6,33 9.41 +49% Agricultural Schools/Centers 3.66 deleted - Repair of IREXs Not incl. 0.99 - Technical Assistance 0.73 0.43 -41% Teacher Training 0.57 0.27 -52% Project Administration 0.26 0.02 -92% Total: 19.85 24.12 +21% 2.19 Comparison between appraisal and actual cost of project components which were not subsequently modified indicates an increase of actual over appraisal costs by about 40%. By including the estimated cost of community labor inputs into school construction (about 30% of the paid up cost of these schools), the total increase would be about 43%. By early 1980 when about 95% of civil works still remained to be contracted, base costs are estimated to have already increased by 50% over appraisal base costs when the price escalation rates estimated at appraisal are applied. Data gathered from INEC (the Nicaraguan Bureau of Statistics) however reveal that general construction price indices for June 1980 were more than 100% above the 1976 levels. Therefore, the cost overrun is attributable mainly to actual price increases which were much higher than appraisal estimates. Comparison of capital costs per student place (Table 2.6) between actual, appraisal and Bank-wide averages for education projects implemented between FY78-FY80 reveals that: (a) for rural primary schools, actual total unit capital costs are 65% above appraisal costs and 29% above the Bank average (which could be explained by the difficult sites); and (b) in the case of the basic secondary schools, actual unit capital costs are 28% above appraisal estimates but 19% below the Bank average. Overall, the costs of the project are reasonable compared to Bank averages, and the minimal maintenance costs required for the facilities make them economic in the long run.  - ii1 - Tatle 2.6: Unit Caypital_Costs (Us$) Appraisal Bank Actual %Difference (a) (c-b) (c>ae ) NERs: Civil Works: contracted works 463 - 1030 -122% - community aesisted n/a - 337 -27% 1/ - average unit cost 463 586 836 +81% +43% Equipment: 35 47 -20% +34% Furniture: 85 42 21 -19% -50% Total Capital Cost/Student Place 548 700 2/ 904 +65% +29% CIBAs: Civil Works: 1135 1580 1513 +33% - 4% Equipment: 190 423 163 -14% -61% Furniture: 84 161 110 +31% -31% Total Capital Cost/Student Place 1410 2225 2/1809 +28% -19% 1/ T1% below appraisal unit cost for civil works. .