Peru - Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4877 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 949-PE) Decem r 30, 1983 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ACRONYMS CE3 - Centro de Educaci6n Ba'sica (Lower Secondary School) CECAPE - Centro de Capacitacion ProfesionaL Extreordinaria (Out-of-School Vocational Training Centers) CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency CRE - Comisi6n de la Reforma Educativa Profesional (Commission for the Reform of Professional Training) DHE - Direcci6n de Eduicaci6n Superior (Directorate of Higher Education, MOE) ESEP - Escuela Superior de Educaci6n Profesional (Upper Secondary School for Prof#-!ssional Training) GTZ - Agencia Alemana de Cooperacibon Tgenica (German Agency for Technical Cooperation) IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development INIDE - Instituto Nacional de investigaciSn y Desarrollo de Educaci6n (National Institute of Education, Research and Development) INIED - Instituto Nacional de Infraestructura Educativa (Rational Institute for School Construction) IPAE - Instituto Peruano de Administracron de Empresas (Peruvian Institute of Business Administrati!5n) ITS - Instituto Toeenico Superior (Higher Technical Institute) MOE - Ministry of Education H,VC - Ministerio de Vivienda y Construcci6n (Ministry of Housing and Construction) OSPE - Of icina Sectorial de Planeaci6n Educativa (Sectorial Education Planning Office, MOE) PIU - Project Implementation Unit PRONACAP - Programa Nacional de Capacitaci-n (National Training Program) PROYEZA - Proyecto Educativo para las Zonas Afectadas (Education Project for the Earthquake Zones) SENATI - Servicio Nacional de Adiestramiento en Traajo Industrial (National Industrial Training Service) UNDI? - United Nations Development Program UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 949-PE) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ............................................................ Basic Data Sheet ........................................... ..... . 1 Highlights ......................................................... v PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY ................... 1 II. PRINCIPAL ISSUES. ....... .................. 2 Project Generation ........................... 2 Project Management and Physical Implementation ...........2 Furniture and Equipment ................................. 3 Technical Assistance and Fellowships..................... 3 Costs and Disbursements.................................. 4 Covenants................................................. 4 Bank Performance ......................................... 4 III. EDUCATIONAL IMPACT ....................................... 5 Enrollment and Teachers 5.....................5 Use Factor of the Facilities 6..... 6 Curricula and Weekly Timetables .................... 6 IV. SUMMARY 7....................................... 7 Lessons Learned ........................ 7 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Introduction ............................................. 11 II. Project Background....................................... 11 III. Project Implementation .................................... 17 IV. Project Cost and Financing ........................... 32 V. Project Operating Outcomes .................................. 35 VI. Conclusions and Recommendations .......................... 40 TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) Page No. Annexes 1. Student Places Planned for, Student Places Actually Available, Location and Capacity ......... ............ 47 2. Originally Estimated and Actually Provided Construction Areas ... .................................. . . .. . 48 3. Technical Assistance Expert Services and Fellowships, Appraisal Estimates and Actual Figures ................. 49 4. Planned and Actual Implementation and Disbursements .......50 5. Schedule of Disbursements ................................ 51 6. Personnel with Administrt,tive, Coordination and Supervision Tasks in a Project CEB ..................... 52 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 949-P') PREFACE This is a performance audit report of the First Education Project in Peru, for which a loan in the amount of US$24.0 million was approved on . November 13, 1973. Final disbursement was made on November 14, 1983, after US$1,104,000 had been cancelled. The audit report consists of (a) a Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) for which a field visit was undertaken in February 1983, and (b) a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office and dated December 17, 1982 (revised March 24, 1983). The audit memorandum is based on a review of: (a) the Appraisal Report, No. 177a-PE of October 4, 1973; (b) the President's Report, No. P-1300a-PE of October 30, 1973; (c) the PCR; and (d) material in the Bank's files pertaining to this project. Discussions were also held with Bank staff currently and formerly associated with the project. On the basis of this review, the audit agrees with the PCR's overall findings and conclusions. However, the PPAM is more positive than the PCR on the use and role of the project institutions, in view of Sinformation obtained during the audit mission on the reorientation of the education and training syatem. As is customary in the preparation of audit reports, copies of the draft audit report--in a Spanish translation--were sent to the representa- tives of the Borrower for comment; this was done on September 14, 1983. No reply has been received from the Borrower. - 11 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BAS C DATA SHEET PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 949-PE) KEY PROJECT DATA Modified Appraisal Project Expectation Actual Total Project Cost (US$ million) 40 37.35 Overrun (%) -6.6 /a * Loan Amount (US$ million) 35.0 Disbursed 22.896 Cancelled 1.104 Repaid to 11/30/83 0 Outstanding as of) ' 22.896 Date Physical Components Completed 12/31/78 03/30/82 --in Months since Loan Signature 61 97 Proportion Completed by Initial Completion Date (%) 21 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 59 Institutional Performance Fair Cumulative Estimates and Actual Disbursements (US$ million) FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 (a) Appraisal Estimate 0.3 2.01 6.62 15.08 22.95 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 (b) Actual Disbursement 0 0 1.50 4.27 7.39 12.12 20.55 22.71 22.75 (c) (b) as % of (a) 0 0 23 28 32 51 86 95 95 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Plan Revisions Actual First Mention in Files 08/14/70 /b Government's Application 08/11/72 Negotiations 09/10/73 Board Approval 11/13/73 Credit Agreement Date 12/05/73 Effectiveness Date 03/05/74 Closing Date 06/20/79 12/30/80; 06/30/81; 06/30/82; 02/28/83 06/30/83 Borrower Republic of Peru Executing Agency Ministry of Education Follow-on Project Name Higher Agricultural Education Loan Number 2208-PE Amount (US$ million) 17.30 Loan Agreement De'.:e March 28, 1983 /a The cost of the modified project (13 project institutions were deleted) had been estimated to be US$32 million. Actually the overrun was thus 17%. 0b See para. 6 of PPA8/. - iii - MISSION DATA Month/ No. of No. of Staff- Report Mission Sent by Year Weeks Persons /a weeks /b Date Reconnaissance UNESCO 07/71 4.0 5 (BCDDE) 17.6 03/72 in Dept. (Sector Work) Reconnaissance Bank 05/72 1.0 2 (BE) 2.4 05/26/72 Preparation UNESCO 05/72 4.0 5 (ABCDE) 17.6 06/72 Appraisal Bank 09/72 4.0 5 (ABCDE) 17.6 10/03/73 Post Appraisal Bank 06/73 1.0 1 (B) 1.0 -- Total 56.2 Supervision 1 Bank 05/74 1.2 2 (AB) 2.8 06/26/74 Supervision 2 Bank 05/75 1.2 2 (A) 2.8 06/18/75 Supervision 3 Bank 02/76 1.2 2 (AF) 2.8 03/17/76 Supervision 4 Bank 02/77 1.2 2 (AB) 2.2 04/21/77 Supervision 5 Bank 10/77 1.2 2 (AE) 2.4 12/13/77 Supervision 6 Bank 05/78 1.2 2 (AB) 2.4 05/18/78 Supervision 7 Bank 06/78 1.2 2 (AB) 2.2 08/02/78 Supervision 8 Bank 10/78 2.4 2 (AB) 4.0 12/12/78 Supervision 9 Bank 12/79 0.6 1 (B) 0.8 01/12/79 Supervision 10 Bank 02/79 2.0 1 (A) 2.2 03/26/79 Supervision 11 Bank 06/79 1.0 1 (B) 1.2 07/24/79 Supervision 12 Bank 09/79 0.3 1 (B) 1.0 11/07/79 Supervision 13 Bank 10/79 1.4 1 (B) 1.6 11/14/79 Supervision 14 Bank 01/79 1.0 1 (B) 1.2 04/24/80 Supervision 15 Bank 09/80 1.0 1 (A) 1.2 10/30/80 Supervision 16/c Bank 04/81 0.8 1 (B) 1.0 05/07/81 Supervision 17 Bank 10/81 1.8 1 (A) 2.0 11/13/81 Total 33.8 Completion Bank/ 03/82 2 6.06 UNESCO CURRENCY EXCRANGE RATES Name of Currency: Sol Abbreviation: S/ Exchange Rates: Appraisal year US$1.00 - S/ 38.70 At time of completion mission US$1.00 = S/ 789.80 At time of audit mission US$1.00 = S/ 1,100 Average during implementation period US$1.00 = S/ 410.00 FISCAL YEAR O' BORROWER January 1 - December 31 /a A = Architect; B = General Educator; C = Technical Educator; D - Agricultural Educator; E - Economist; F = Education Planner. /b Estimated number of staff-weeks attributable to this project (including travel time). /c Combined with other duties. -iv - ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS (in US$ '000) Comparative Disbursements by Category Original Revised Actual Category Allocation Allocations Disbursement (06/79) (06/81) (12/83) I. Furniture 1,600 1,100 1,500 1,104 II. Equipment 7,000 6,000 8,085 7,783 III. Civil Works (including site development and architectural consul- tant's fees) 10,800 13,400 13,570 12,979 IV. Technical Assistance: Specialists' services and Fellowships 1,000 1,000 775 773 V. Unallocated 3,600 2,500 VI. Project Preparation 70 368 Amount Disbursed 22,896 .ancelled 1,104 Total 24,000 24,"D00 24,000 24,000 -v - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 949-PE) HIGHLIGHTS A loan of US$24.0 million to assist in financing Peru's first education project was approved in November and signed in December 1973. The project was estimated to be completed by December 1978 and to cost US$40.0 million (PCR, para. 2.19). The overall project objective was to support a major educational reform by providing: (a) funding for 49 institutions of which 33 were lower-secondary schools and 16 were upper-secondary schools; and (b) related technical assistance and fellowships for furthering the reform in critical areas, such as planning, curriculum design and teacher training. There were major changes in project content during implementation. Thirteen institutions (nine lower-secondary schools and four upper-secondary schools) were deleted from the project (PPAM, para. 4), partly because of the Government's waning commitment to the reform, and partly because of increas- ing financial constraints and shifts in Government priorities which decreased the availability of resources for investment in education. More recently, the lower and upper-secondary schools of the project are being changed into general secondary schools and higher technological institutes, respectively, to comply with substantial modifications of the Government's educational policy (PPAM, paras. 22 and 23; PCR, paras. 3.03-3.07). The total cost of the modified project which funded 26 schools was US$3'.4 million, or 17% more than the appraisal estimate for the 26 schools of US$32 million. Disbursements were completed in November 1983 except for US$1.1 million which was cancelled in December 1983. The project as amended was completed with a 59% time overrun. Management weaknesses, staff turnover, unfamiliarity with Bank procedures and cccasional shortage of local currency funds adversely affected project imple- mentation (PCR, paras. 3.08, 3.11, 3.13, and 3.15-3.17), as did insufficient field supervision by the Bank at the initial stages of implementation (PPAM, para. 16; PCR, para. 3.47). The project has provided adequate accommodations and appropriate equipment for the new institutions and through technical assistance has reinforced the curriculum development and the overall educational planning - vi - process. Furthermore, good use was made of the lower-secondary schools whose enrollments are presently approaching the appraisal target (PPAM, paras. 18 and 21; PCR, para. 5.05). The training of teachers and administrative per- sonnel, however, was less successful and the project had little impact on the Borrower's implementation capability. Furthermore, utilization of most of the upper-secondary schools was found to be below capacity at the time of the audit mission (PPAM, paras. 19 and 22; PCR, paras. 5.03 and 5.07). It is expected that enrollment will reach full capacity by 1988. Meanwhile, the Government has taken steps to determine more precisely the place of the two types of project schools within the recently revised education system. Bank support could be provided through the proposed third education project to facilitate the adaptation of project schools to the new study programs (PPAM, para. 24; PCR, paras. 6.06-6.07). The project experience brings out some important lessons (PPAM, para. 28) such as the desirability to limit the size and objectives of a first project in a given country and sector; the need to require convincing evidence before major project changes are agreed to by the Bank; the impor- tance of involving local communities in maintenance operations; and the need to ascertain before starting project execution that proper mechanisms exist to make adequate funds readily available. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 949-PE) 1. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY P 1. At the time of project identification in early 1972, the Peruvian Government had started a major overhaul of its educational system involving institutional changes and reforms in educational administration, curricula and teacher training. The 1971-75 Education Development Plan gave increased emphasis to the quality of instruction and internal efficiency, and aimed at making education more relevant to the country's manpower needs. 2. The project was designed to assist the Government in implementing its educational reform by: (a) financing a number of institutions (at the lower and upper-secondary level) that would be the forerunners of the new school system; (b) extending the geographical coverage of the reform to regions outside Lima; (c) introducing practical subjects and integrating them with existing academic courses in an upper-secondary school system; (d) upgrading teacher training facilities; and (e) improving education planning, research and curriculum design through technical assistance. 3. Specifically, the proposed project was to finance: (a) site development, construction, furniture and equipment for: - thirty-three new lower-secondary schools of which 10 were to have primary school facilities; - sixteen new upper-secondary schools for professional training (ESEPs); and (b) seventeen man-years of specialists' services and 80 man-years of fellowships related to the functioning of the project institutions and to assist in overall educational planning, curriculum develop- ment, teacher training, and project implementation. 4. During implementation, the project content was modified five times and extensively amended. These alterations included: (a) the change of location of five lower-secondary schools (CEBs) and one upper-secondary school (ESEP); (h) a 40% reduction in technical assistance; (c) an 80% reduc- tion in fellowships; (c) the deletion of nine CEBs and four ESEPs; (e) the establishment of a revolving fund to expedite construction contractors pay- ments; (f) the creation of an in-service teacher training program; and (g) the provision of funds to support preparatory work on a new primary education project. In addition, proceeds of the loan were reallocated to all categor- ies. The closing date was extended four times from June 1979 to June 1983. -2- 5. The project, as modified, has been physically implemented with a time overrun of 59% and a cost overrun of 17% if compared with the estimated cost of the modified project. The project has contributed positively to the educational development in Peru (PCR, para. 5.02) by providing physical facilities for new institutions, and by strengthening curriculum development and overall education planning through its technical assistance. However, this has not been achieved as smoothly and as fully as it could have been, due to difficulties encountered during implementation. These are described in the following section. II. PRINCIPAL ISSUES Project Generation 6. To support the 1971-75 education plan, the Peruvian Government requested a UNESCO mission in July 1971 to identify an education project.l/ This mission's report, which discussed broad educational strategies, was not finalized until March 1972. Similarly, an unusual period of 13 months elapsed between appraisal (September 1972) and negotiations (October 1973). These delays and the content of the correspondence and discussions between Peru and UNESCO, Peru and the Bank and the Bank and UNESCO, indicated that UNESCO and Bank staff hesitated to proceed with the proposed project which they considered to be overly ambitious. The Government, however, convinced the Bank that the project could be implemented and that it would give the project the necessary support. On November 13, 1973 the project was approved as appraised. Project Management and Physical Implementation 7. Under pressure from the Borrower, the Bank agreed to an optimistic implementation schedule and misjudged the Government's implementation capa- city. This situation was compounded by a weak Project Implementation Unit (PIU) which lacked a full-time educator,2/ and which suffered from discon- tinuity of senior staff. Thus, during the initial stages of project imple- mentation the PIU was less etficient than expected. Partly as a result of this the completion of the project was delayed by 36 months. Other reasons for the delay were: (a) difficulties in defining a curriculum for the ESEPS; (b) weak management of regional offices of the Minis'.ry of Housing and 1/ The Bank and the Government of Peru had been corresponding about a pos- sible education project as early as August 1963. This led to several missions including an appraisal mission. The 1967 appraisal report pro- posed a Bank Project for assisting technical education. This was followed by a several years' hiatus in relations between the Bank and the Borrower and by substantial changes in the education system, which made the 1967 appraisal findings obsolete. 2/ The position was not filled until 1975 when administrative rearrange- ments took place which affected the PIU staff. -3- Construction (MVC); and (c) interruptions in local currency funding (PCR, para. 3.08). 8. While the design of ESEPs was satisfactory, the CEBs could have been better designed if competent private arcaitectural firms had been used (PCR, para. 3.10). Supervision of construction was effective and the quality of the works was generally good. There were some serious problems of sites selection and of estimating costs for developing basic site infrastructure. These problems arose partly because at that time the Bank did not require adequate studies for school site selection before Board approval. Meanwhile, the policy has been changed and site selections have to be investigated thoroughly before a loan can become effective. Maintenance of buildings, furniture and equipment has been a problem until recently, and because of lack of sufficient budgetary provisions it was largely dependent on the efforts of individual school administrators. The Bank suggested the preparation of a maintenance handbook and the setting up of a routine maintenance program (including a maintenatome fund) for project institutions (PCR, para. 3.25); this has had positive results and progress has been noted on both issues. Furniture and Equipment 9. Except for the preparation of the equipment lists (which was done with the help of expatriates) and the award of equipment contracts for the first 14 CEBs, the procurement process for equipment and furniture has not been satisfactory (PCR, paras. 3.15, 3.16, 3.26 and 3.28). There were long delays (10% of the ESEPs' equipment had not been delivered at the time of the completion mission3/), equipment procurement was not coordinated with the construction program, and there were delivery and installation problems. Among the reasons for these shortcomings was a cumbersome process of taking decisions on bid evaluation and processing and, to some extent, insufficient control by the PIU over equipment installation and delivery. 10. The audiL agrees with the PCR view that it is advisable to have a full-time educator in the PIU to minimize difficulties with the equipment. It is believed that under the proposed third education project the important role of procurement coordinaf-ir will be entrusted to a suitable senior government official. Technical Assistance and Fellowships 11. Implementation of the project's software components has suffered from difficulties experienced by the PIU in coordinating the dispersed responsibilities of different agencies and offices involved. Furthermore, the technical assistance and fellowships were sharply reduced (PPAM, para. 4), while the contribution of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to the expert team was not fully implemented. An attempt to use proceeds of the loan for an in-service teacher and administrator training program did not materialize because of bureaucratic constraints (PCR, para. 3.34). 3/ The audit mission did not find evidence of much progress on this matter. -4- 12. As a result, the support provided by the project to the first phase of the Government's education program was weaker than expected and the strengthening of the PLU and project institutions (which were in need of administrators) was not fully achieved. In addition, there were shortcomings with the technical assistance, particularly in relation to teacher-training and to tracer studies for ESEP graduates. The main problems encountered were: (a) inappropriate timing; (b) difficulties in finding suitable counterparts; (c) foreign specialists sometimes having difficulties in adjustiag to local conditions; and (d) shortage of local currency funds. The fellowship program was considerably less efficient than anticipated as nearly half of the returned trainees were not used in positions re'ated to their training received abroad (PCR, paras. 3.33, 3.37 and 3.38). Costs and Disbursements 13. Total disbursements from the loan amounted to US$22.9 million; about US$1.1 million was cancelled. The final cost of the modified project was US$37.35 million compared to a cost estimate of US$32 million. The increase in project cost was caused by the implementation delays and a higher rate of inflation than had been assumed at appraisal. 14. Actual disbursements were slower than the optimistic appraisal forecast and reached only 51% of the appraisal target by the end of FY80. But since a revolving fund was established in October 1979 at the Bank's suggestion, disbursements have accelerated and proper accounting has been set up (PCR, para. 4.07). Unit costs per student place for both CEBs and ESEPs were kept within reasonable limits. Covenants 15. Some important covenants - e.g., those which required that qualified teachers and administrators be provided in project institutions or those related to maintenance - were only partly fulfilled. Furthermore, the Borrower's obligations for a periodic review of ESEP's related problems (such as the provision of qualified teachers and the estimate of the required number of graduates), for the implementation of technical assistance covenants, and the provision of funds for implementing the reform, were not fully met, largely because the Government started to abandon the education reform in mid-1980. Bank Performance 16. At the project generation stage, the Bank could have been more cau- tious in responding to Government pressure to support a large and ambitious project which had foreseeable difficulties in implementation. Conceptual problems, financial constraints, and construction capability were appraised in an over-optimistic way. This somewhat accommodating attitude prevailed during supervision when some important decisions modifying the agreement were not always fully discussed with the Borrower. 17. There were several shortcomings in the Bank's monitoring/assistance functions, such as: (a) absence of supervision mission members with exper- tise in agriculture and technical/vacational education; (b) inadequate super- vision at the early stages of project implementation; and (c) infrequent 5- visits to the project school sites (PCR, paras. 3.46 and 3.47). Furthermore, the Bank could have insisted more strongly on regular quarterly reports from the PIU. III. EDUCATIONAL IMPACT * 18. When assessing the educational outcomes of the project, one should bear in mind the changes in education policy which occurred in mid-1980 and the consequent modifications of the education structure. Enrollments and Teachers 19. Twenty-two out of 24 project CEBs started functioning between 1978 and 1981,4/ whereas 11 out of the 12 project ESEPs have been operating since 1980. For the CEBs the enrollment target of the modified project was 25,800. In 1981 there were nearly 25,000 students enrolled in two shifts as planned, but they were offered mainly "regular"5/ basic education programs. A third shift catered to 4,000 adults in nunformal programs organized at the community level. The role of these institutions had been more than that of pilot schools: during 1976-1981 the project provided 17% of all new places for basic education grades 1-6 and nearly one half of the new places for the third cycle of basic education (grades 7-9) (PCR, para. 5.06). 20. As for the ESEPs (grades 10-12), they enrolled only 4,800 students after two years of operation (1981 figure; PCR, para. 5.07) as against the 10,000 new student places they offered and the 30,000 students in the entire country's ESEPs. Enrollment is expected to increase and to reach full capa- city by 1988. Present underenrollment is a consequence o' the uncertainty about the future role and place of the ESEPs in the educa .ion system. The audit mission found that in 1982 the project ESEPs were filled to about 75% of their capacity, enrolling a total of nearly 7,500 students. However, in several ESEPs the majority of the students were adults, rather than the normal population of young students. 21. There are no data on the percentage of qualified teachers or on the teachers' qualifications in project schools compared with nonproject schools of the same levels both for CEBs and ESEPs. From audit visits to individual project institutions it appears that the proportion of qualified teachers in the CEBs is well above 70%, especially in nontechnical subjects. The corres- ponding figure given for the ESEPs is about 70%. In both cases, full time teachers are the great majority. However, the staffing pattern of the CEBs needs to be reviewed.. There appears to be an excess of administrators and many teachers are not carrying a full teaching load (PCR, paras. 5.08-5.09). 4/ One was completed in 1981 but is likely to become an ESEP; another started functioning in April 1982. 5/ At the time of project generation a "work oriented" basic education approach had been considered in addition to the "regular" basic educa- tion programs. -6- Use Factor of the Facilities 22. The use of the CEBs' facilities can be considered, on the whole, to be satisfactory. There are, however, several shortcomings such as lack of equipment or ill-functioning equipment, shortage of sgecialist teachers, and problems in applying the concept of student rotation_/ (on which the sche- dule of accommodation of such schools is based). In addition, underutiliza- tion occurs in libraries (because of lack of books not financed by the loan), art rooms (because of lack of teachers), and in some CEB's agricultural education facilities (because of lack of local demand for these programs). As for the latter shortcoming, Government remedial action is now under way following the recommendations of a curriculum expert financed from loan funds. 23. The Government decided that 11 of the 12 project ESEPs would become (after a transitional period to phase out the courses given in the present structure) Higher Technological Institutes (Institutos Tecnologicos Supe- riores - ITS) offering courses of 2-3 years duration7/ in the various practical specializations. This is expected to increase the use factor of the ESEPs (PPAM, para. 19). Curricula and Weekly Timetables 24. Since the education reform movement on which the project was based was halted in 1980, curricula and timetables in the CEBs and ESEPs will have to be modified. The CEBs will probably be converted into izomplete secondary schools8/ offering both the two-year lower cycle and the three- year upper secondary cycle with an increased percentage of practical sub- jects, in which case the graduates would be less favored than those of other secondary schools (which are more academically oriented) when they pursue higher education (PCR, para. 5.16). A ministerial resolution was taken on February 18, 1983, to expedite the implementation of the new Education Law. As a result of this Law, a series of guidelines were made available in April 1983 to adapt schools (including the CEBs) to the new education system. The Departmental Directorates of Education are responsible for the adaptation process. 25. Regarding the ESEPs, they will be converted to post-secondary tech- nical institutions (ITSs) starting with grade 12. Although the overall cur- riculum has been decided for 1983, and shows an increasing emphasis on the 6/ The concept refers to the practice of rotating the students from one classroom to another as opposed to the "homeroom" approach, in which the teachers change classrooms, not the students. 7/ The Government also decided that post-graduate studies would be offered in the ITS for a duration of one to two years, in order to allow pro- fessional specialization and, in particular, to train or retrain tech- nical subject teachers. 8/ Some schools will have attached primary levels. -7- professional training as compared to the general courses (80% of total weekly schedule as against 75% in the ESEPs of 1975), the detailed syllabi are still being written. However, these programs will be independent fron the univer- sity system and be designed for students not wishing to pursue university education. There is little doubt that with future changes in curriculum, timetable and length of studies, there will be need for some remodelling of the special facilities of the project ESEPs. The PCR recommends that appro- priate assistance for the conversion of project schools to the new study pro- grams be provided through the third project now under consideration (PCR, paras. 6.06 and 6.15). This proposal is strongly supported by the Borrower and would appear to be an effective use of Bank resources. IV. SUMARY 26. The diffi-4ulties encountered in generating and implementating the first education project have to be seen in the context of the country's changing policies concerning education and training. The project was designed to support an ambitious reform of the education and training system, and the Bank approved the project despite doubts about the Borrower's implementation capability (PPAM, paras. 1, 6 and 15). These circumstances explain most of the problems experienced during project implementation. Nearly two years before the project's original closing date (June 1979) the education reform was losing momentum and eventually v -s completely abandoned. This did not affect the project's progress but definitely affected the project's results. The latest Government decision to return to the pre-reform system implies the need to integrate the project institutions into the new education system by adapting their facilities and personnel resources. 27. However, notwithstanding the difficult circumstances described above, the project has had a reasonably successful outcome and its institu- tions have a fair potential to become outstanding schools in. the framework of the education system as envisioned by the present Government (PPAM, paras. 5, 19, 22-23; PCR, para. 6.04). Indeed, this Governnent has recently taken steps to determine more precisely the place of the two types of project schools within the future education system and to facilitate their adapta- tion to their new objectives. Lessons Learned 28. Some of the important lessons learned in this project are the following: - It is desirable for a first project in a given sector and country to be limited in size and objectives and to pay careful attention to the Borrower's implementation capacity (PCR, para. 2.19). - The Bank needs to be firm in the face of essentially unilateral project changes proposed by the Borrower, and would normally require strong evidence that such changes are indeed justified (PCR, para. 6.09). - Projects which are expected to be difficult to implement call for intensive supervision, especially during the start-up period (PPAM, para. 16), and for supervision by specialized staff (PCR, para. 6.11). - More attention needs to be paid to improve the design of projects if subsequent problems are to be avoided (PCR, para. 6.15). - It it; important to involve local communities in the maintenance of buildings, furniture and equipment (PCR, para. 6.15). - Before starting wi h the execution of a project there is need to ascertain that proper mechanisms exist to ensure that progress is not affected by the lack of readily available funds (PCR, para. 6.13). -9- PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 949-PE) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT December 17, 1982 (Revised March 24, 1983) Projects Department Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office ーバクー ノり万ノ4タpど秀ル才 I. INTRODUCTION Terms of Reference 1.01 Following terms of reference of March 1982, Messrs. R. Corradine, Facility Planner (IBRD), S. Syrimis, Technical Educator (UNESCO), and L. D. Insuasty, General Educator (UNESCO), visited Peru from March 23 to April 17, 1982, to carry out a completion review of the First Education Project, Loan 949-PE. They were expected to compare the results of the project with the targets set during appraisal and in the Loan Agreement, and to make a preliminary analysis of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of project institutions, drawing lessons to be learned. Methodology 1.02 The report attempts to examine how changes in the country's educa- tion policies which have taken place during the project implementation period have affected the execution of the project, and to wbat extent the outcome of this First Education Project may influence the content and proposed implemen- tation of future Bank-supported education investment in Peru. In order to do this, before its visit, the mission made a comprehensive study of project files available in the Bank. While in Peru, it visited 22 of the 36 project institutions, 1/ consulted relevant documents and held fruitful discussions with the autho7ities responsible. 11. PROJECT BACKGROUND Soclo-Economic Setting 2.01 Peru, with a total area of 1,280,000 Km2, is divided into three main geographical regions: Sierra, Costa and Selva. At the time of the project appraisal (1972), its population totalled some 14.1 million and was growing rapidly (3.1% per annum). About 50% of the population lived in rural areas; the metropolitan area of Lima-Callao accounted for some 30% of the total urban population. 2.02 The military government introduced a broad reform aimed at restoring economic growth and financial stability and at reducing poverty and social inequity. The agrarian reform launched in 1969 Introduced large structural changes and improved greatly the socio-economic conditions of a substantial segment of the rural population. Laws were passed to diversify and increase production In the industrial and mining sectors. In the education sector, a radical change was introduced to facilitate the socio-econonic reform and the training of manpower needed to sustain the expansion and diversification of the economy. 1/ Twelve of the remaining 14 schools were visited by Bank missions within two years before the completion mission. - 12 - 2.03 The economy grew 6.2% per annum during the 1969-72 period with the per-capita income reaching US$500 in 1972. Manufacturing was the leading sector contributing some 21% of the GDP aad absorbing 15% of the labor force, followed by agriculture with an 18% contribution to GDP and 44% of employment. Until 1971, a major characteristic of the Peruvian economy was its dependence on the public sector. Indeed, public investment, supported by increased consumption, played an important role in maintaining a satisfactory growth rate. However, since 1971, due to a decrease of capital formation and import capacity, public investment slowed down, and this became one of the factors that led to the economic crisis of 1975 and subsequent years. 2.04 In 1971 the economically active population was estimated at 4.4 million, of which some 2 million were considered either underemployed or unemployed. At that time, the economy was able to provide the equivalent of full employment for only about 60% of the labor force. The growth of the active population (about 20%) was slower than that of the total pop-ilation (around 32%) during the 1961-72 period, and the labor force participation rates dropped mainly because of increased and longer schooling and more retirements. 2.05 A major demographic characteristic of Peru is the massive migration of the Sierra rural population towards the cities in the Costa, where employment possibilities are higher and the educational and social services better developed. This movement which was the cause of the high growth rate of urban population (5.6% per annum during the 1961-72 period) had serious consequences for the government's budget because of a constant effort to provide housing and social services for the ever-increasing migrant population. Sector Setting 2.06 In 1972 the Peruvian education system was in a stage of transition as a result of a reform introduced in that year. The reform was designed to modernize and rationalize education and training, so as to ensure an efficient and productive system responsive to the socio-economic needs of the country. The specific objectives of the reform were to: (a) give more emphasis to non-formal education and training; (b) improve quality through teacher training and the provision of teaching/learning aids including educational television; (c) emphasize community participation and self-education; (d) decentralize educational administration and leadership through the establishment of nine educational regions, 33 school zones and about 950 school nuclei; (e) integrate practical and academic courses in the upper secondary school system; and (f) create the National Service Corps of Graduates by which graduating students at the upper secondary level would be required to work on civil works as a prerequisite for graduation. - 13 - 2.07 The reform restructured the education system to include: (a) pre-school education; (b) basic education (grades 1-9) comprising three cycles (grades 1-4, 5-6 and 7-9); and (c) a higher level, starting with a three-year practically-oriented cycle (grades 10-12) called Upper Secondary School for Professional Training (ESEP) followed by university education. 2.08 At the second level, an equivalent, more practically-oriented program (basic labor education) was introduted to cater mainly to out-of-school youths and adults. The vocational training system was reinforced with the establishment of the CECAPES (Out-of-School Vocational Training Centers), the reinforcement of SENATI (The National Industrial Training Service), and the creation of other specialized sectoral training agencies. 2.09 A major characteristic of the reform was its practically-oriented curricula, particularly at the lower secondary school (CEB) (grades 7-9) and upper secondary school (ESEP) levels with some 26% and 60%, respectively, of the instruction time devoted to practical subjects. Several options were foreseen at the ESEP level (industrial commercial, agricultural, teacher training, etc.) but there were no science or general education options. However, at appraisal time it was agreed with the government that university-ground students would attend a special program with an increased proportion of general education and science courses. Another characteristic was the decentralization of the administration of education through the establishment of nine educational regions, 33 school zones and about 950 school nuclei. 2.10 It was evident to the Bank 2/ from the beginning that it would be very difficult for the reform to be successfully implemented because of both unrealistic concepts and financial constraints. (These drawbacks were clearly confirmed in the UNESCO Sector Survey Report of July 1978.) 2.11 Conceptual issues involve: (a) early choice of a vocational career; (b) unjustified "vocationalization" of the whole pre-university education system; and (c) lack of articulation between ESEPs and universities. 2.12 As mentioned in paragraph 2.09, at the third basic cycle (grades 7-9), the reform curricula comprise 26% of vocational subjects. As a result children attending the CEBs are oriented towards a vocational career at the beginning of the 7th grade. This presents several drawbacks such as: 2/ See Staff Appraisal Report, Appendix 2, paragraph 11. - 14 - (a) strong vocational orientation at this stage is premature; (b) because of the relatively long program (3 years) and the built-in inflexibility of institutional programs, it is not possible to adjust the output of such programs to manpower demands which, as a rule, are unpredictable; (c) it would be very expensive to provide the facilities necessary to generalize praLcical instruction at this level; and (d) there is no need for all school graduates at this level to have a vocationally oriented education. 2.13 Similar remarks hold true for the ESEP level. The ESEP program has a strong vocational orientation with some 60% of the instruction devoted to practical subjects. Generalization of the ESEP education would mean that graduates 3/, of this level of education would be trained to take up a job at the skilled worker/lower technician level in the branches of the economy included in the ESEP curricula. The drawbacks from such generalization of the ESEP education are: (a) manpower requirements cannot be foreseen with precision so as to match supply and demand. In fact, during the limited time of functioning of the ESEPs, there were already surpluses in several branches (paramedical, dental) 4/; and (b) the vast majority of graduates continue their studies. As a consequence, the long and costly type of training during the ESEP attendance is, to a large extent, wasted. 2.14 Finally the weak articulation of the ESEP programs with the univer- sity programs was the main cause for the observed mistrust by parents and students of the ESEP as an institution. Although the ESEP curricula had a strong practical bias, the university programs remained mainly academic with their entrance examinations adjusted accordingly. Although it was stipulated in the reform that ESEP graduates should have access to universities (second higher education cycle) without entrance examinations, this was never accepted by the universities. As the entrance examinations were adjusted to the pre-reform upper secondary school curriculum, graduates of such schools had better chances to enter universities, despite their shortened pre- university schooling (11 years instead of 12). 2.15 Setting aside the conceptual issues outlined in the preceding paragraphs a simple calculation on the investment budget required to imple- ment the reform could show that it would be beyond the Government's financial capacity to provide practical facilities for the CEB and the ESEP levels to satisfy the requirements of the reform curricula. Neither was there a long- term plan elaborated by the Government as to how to proceed in this respect. A study by the Bank discussed with the Government (memorandum of March 28, 1973) pointed out the unrealistic targets of the reform. 3/ Except graduates from teacher training ESEPs. 4/ Not included in the project institutions. - 15 - 2.16 In retrospect, the reform appears to have been of an over-reaction to rectifying the deficiencies of an outdated academic system of education. Introduction of practical subjects at the lower secondary level (grades 7-9) is an educationally sound approach, but the aim of the program at this level should be a "practically oriented" education and not specialized training. Consequently, the proportion of practical subjects in the CEB curriculum should have been lower (e.g., 10% to 12%) and their nature different (prac- tical orientation but not vocational training). Specialized training at this level should be provided through out-of-school short intensive programs so as to respond swiftly and effectively to the short-term manpower requirements. In this way specialized training would be provided only to those who opt for it, reducing substantially the costs of education at this level. 2.17 Similarly, at the ESEP level, the curriculum should have been broader (e.g., to include less specialized subjects) to produce graduates with technical knowledge on a number of related areas while further special- ization could be accomplished on-the-job with the aid of specialized agencies or in post-secondary institutions. Also, science and mathematics, social studies and other academic subjects should have been included in the optional part of the ESEP curriculum. Project Generation and Overall Costs 2.18 Project formulation (identification to Board presentation) took 20 months, which is standard compared to the norm of about 18 to 24 months. The project was identified by UNESCO in March 1972, which reviewed with the Government its education development strategy and reported the results in the document titled "Peru Education Reform--Analysis and Projects" (UNESCO document EFM/44). In May 1972, a Bank reconnaissance mission visited the country and tentatively agreed with the scope and content of a project which would cost about US$30-35 million. 2roject preparation was done by the government with UNESCO assistance in June 1972. The project was appraised by a Bank mission in September/October 1972. 2.19 Thirteen months elapsed between appraisal and negotiations. It covered a period of Bank deliberation as to the most appropriate action to be taken and strategy to be applied. After appraisal, the size of the proposed project (US$36.3 million) was questioned by the Bank because there were uncertainties that existed with regard to the reform and its implications to the project (e.g., the reform's implementation schedule, financial and manpower requirements and unspecified admission procedures of ESEP graduates to universities). However, the Government provided assurances that these matters would be solved. Therefore, the project as proposed by the appraisal mission remained unchanged. It now appears that the Bank should have pursued, with great determination, its cautious attitude regarding project size and oppose a large one-shot project lending operation. Negotiations were completed by September 10, 1973; the Loan was approved by the Executive Directors on November 13, 1973; it was signed on December 5, 1973; and it became effective on March 5, 1974. - 16 - Project Objectives 2.20 As specified in the Appraisal Report (Report No. 177a-PE), the overall objective of the project was to assist the Government in achieving its educational reform by providing: (a) priority investments in a number of institutions that would become the forerunners of the reformed education system; and (b) technical assistance necessary for furthering the reform in critical areas such as planning, curriculum design and teacher training. 2.21 In addition to raising the quality of education by helping to improve curricula and modernizing educational facilities, the project was Jesigned to alleviate shortages of education facilities in provinces where there was a need. Also, although the project accounts only for a small proportion of facilities for the ongoing reform (e.g., only 7% of the total expected enrollment at the ESEP schools by 1980), its impact was expected to be important, as it constituted a pioneering effort in the implementation of the reform. The institutions financed were model institutions with complete facilities (buildings and equipment) for the implementation of new practical courses in the secondary curriculum. Project Components 2.22 The Government agreed during negotiations to include the following three major components in the project: 2.23 Component A: The CEBs. This component included construction, furniture and equipment for 33 CEBs located in medium-size cities. The project provided 23 of the centers qith facilities for only the lower-secondary grades (Cycle III of basic education, or grades 7-9); it provided the remaining 10 with facilities for primary grades (Cycles I and II of basic education, or grades 1-6). 2.24 The basic school facilities were intended to serve as models for the reform. In addition, they were intended to be used for student/teacher practice by the ESEP primary school teacher training program. All project CEBs were intended to be coeducational institutions, with a total capacity of 21,000 student places, which would provide: (a) regular basic education programs for some 21,000 students, with an annual output of 6,000; (b) basic labor education programs in a second sh:ft for some 11,000 students and an annual output of 3,000; and (c) non-formal, work-oriented programs for about 4,000 adults per annura. 2.25 Component B: The ESEPs. This component included construction, furniture and equipment for 16 ESEPs scattered throughout the country as shown in Annex 1. The schools' total capacity was originally planned at - 17 - 11,200. According to the appraisal, the annual output of the project ESEPs would be about 3,200 graduates, of which some 30% were expected to continue on to university studies. 2.26 Component C. Technical Assistance. As originally planned, technical assistance included 17 staff-years of specialist services in planning, curriculum development, teacher training, educational research and development, a tracer study of ESEP graduates and technical support to the project unit; and 80 staff-years of fellowships for graduate studies overseas to assist in the training of local counterparts and in the upgrading of educators and administrators needed for the project institutions. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Reorientation of the Educational Reform 3.01 At the time of appraisal, only the broad objectives of the very ambitious educational reform were outlined. Their translation into specific curricula, syllabi and teacher training programs exceeded the capacity of the Ministry of Education. Therefore, a sizeable component of technical assistance was included in the project, to be supplemented by additional assistance financed by CIDA outside the project. CIDA's first team of specialists was weak; it was recalled and replaced by a new team. 5/ The Bank-financed technical assistance, after delays in the negotiations between the Government and UNESCO, finally became operational in late 1976. 3.02 In mid-March 1976, a Bank sector mission reported that, although the reform still commanded the highest priority in the government's eyes and much had been achieved, its implementation needed to be rephased over a longer period of time. This opinion came in light of the complexity of the tasks at hand and the magnitude of the government's grossly underestimated financial and human resources required to address them, which was evident to the Bank during appraisal. 3.03 With the change of government in 1980, the implementation of the reform gradually came to a complete halt and new structures were again intro- duced through ministerial resolutions pending the final approval of a compre- hensive education law, which was issued on May 18, 1982. The new 5/ CIDA decided to concentrate on supporting the Agriculture ESEP in Tarapoto. - 18 - structure 6/ would abolish the concept of a nine-year basic education school followed by the ESEP and reinstate the six-year primary school followed by a five-year secondary school divided into a general two-year cycle and a diversifed three-year cycle. In turn, the ESEPs would become Higher Technical Institutes 'i.e., three to five year post-secondary technical institutions), and all teacher training, previously starting at the ESEP level, would become a four to five year post-secondary program in the reinstated teacher training colleges. 3.04 With regard to the administration, the decentralization effort would be further enhanced by the replacement of the nine Regional Offices by 25 Departmental Offices while Zonal Offices would remain subordinate administrative entities for larger geographical Departments (there were 20 Zonal Offices in the new structure). In addition, under the new system, municipalities have already been assigned an important role in school administration, supervision and community involvement, thus Vartly taking over the role of the school nuclei in this respect. Finally, the adminisrative structure of the Ministry of Education (MOE) has also been changed to include the general directorates shown in Table 1.1 below (together with the corresponding general directorates in the reform structure). 6/ For easy reference, the reform system (A) and the new system (B) are presented below: Primary Lower Second. Educ. Higher Education A Education CEB ESEP I Universities........ (Grades 1-6) (Grades 7-9) (Grades 10-12) (Gradep 13 and over) Primary Lower Sec. Upper See. Higher Technical B Education School School Institute ...... (Grades 1-6) (Grades 7-8) (Grades 9-11) (Grades 12-14/15) Universities ....... (Grades 12-16/18) Teacher Training (Normal Schools) (Grades 12-16) - 19 - Table 1.1: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION - GENERAL DIRECTORATES Reform Structure New Structure (i) Pre-School Education (1) Pre-School and Special Education (ii) Basic Education, Regular (ii) Primary and Secondary Education (iii) Basic Education, Labor, and Vocational Training (iii) Adult Education (iv) Higher Education (iv) Higher Education (v) Educational Extension (v) Educational Extension 3.05 The revised educational structure would of course require a reorientation of the curricula at all pre-university levels; indeed the Ministry's general directorates are actively engaged in this process and directives concerning timetables and program contents have been addressed to all educational institutions. 3.06 At the primary level (former Cycles I and II of basic education), there are no substantive changes in the curriculum. At the secondary level two types of curricula are proposed namely: Type "A" with three weekly periods of practical subjects for all five secondary grades; and Type "B" with three weekly periods of practical subjects in the lower secondary cycle an6 eight in the upper diversified cycle, the latter to be offered by well-equipped schools such as the project CEBs. At the post-secondary level the tendency is to adopt a four-year program for the Higher Technical Institutes. Changes in Project Composition 3.07 The project was modified during project implementation as follows: (a) On June 26, 1974, the locations of five CEBs and one ESEP (items A10, A12, A21, A23, A31 and B4) were changed. The changes, which were made because of the decision of the Ministry of Education's new administration, were formally incorporated in the Loan Amendment of June 29, 1979. They do not affect the basic project objectives; they do, however, reflect the urgency with which initial programs were put together ir. Peru at the time. There was little time for the Bank to examine fully the decision-making that went into changing locations and capacities of institutions against priority education and manpower demands in the whole country. (b) In July 1977 the Government requested a decrease in the staff-years of: - 20 - (i) education specialists from 17 to 10.3. UNDP supplied similar expert services such as the one included in the project to focus on a local teacher and school administration training program for the project institutions. In February 1978 this request was accepted by the Bank and incorporated in the Loan Amendment of June 29, 1979; and (ii) fellowships from 80 to 15.7. (c) On June 29, 1979, the Loan Agreement was amended to: (i) delete 12 of 49 project institutions (8 of the 33 CEEs and 4 of the 16 ESEPs-), which increased the percentage of Bank financing from 60% to 75% of total project cost; these changes were justified by the Bank in view of mounting costs compounded by a critical shortage of counterpart funds affecting the entire public sector, and stemming from the 1976-79 economic crisis in Peru; (ii) establish a revolving fund of US$1.0 million to expedite construction contractor payments, because the PIU had encountered serious delays and problems in processing payments with the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures within the Ministry of Education; and financial constraints; (iii) help finance an in-service teacher training program in lieu of some of the overseas fellowship programs (as explained in (b) above); (iv) reallocate proceeds of the loan to all categories; and (v) extend the Closing Date by two years to June 30, 1981. (d) On June 11, 1981, the Loan Agreement was again amended to: (i) delete the construction of one CEB (A24), which was to have been built by the Ministry of Education with its own funds because of the default of a contractor; (ii) create Category V for financing preparation work for a new primary education project to be submitted for Bank consideration; (iii) reallocate proceeds of the loan to all categories; and (iv) extend the Closing Date by one year to June 30, 1982. (e) On November 23, 1982, the Bank cancelled the indisbursed amount of the Loan other than the portion then allocated to Category V (Project Preparation, with US$300,000) in result rf which the Closing Date was extended until February 28, 1985. Disbursements concerning Category V would be honored until August 1983. - 21 - Project Management 3.08 The Loan became effective as scheduled on March 5, 1974, the original deadline for this purpose. The Closing Date originally set for June 1979 was postponed four tires to December 30, 1980, June 30, 1981, June 30, 1982 and february 28, 1983. The original implementation scheduLe was agreed to by the Bank as it reflected the Borrower's view of the urgent nature of the project. Because the Government's implementation capacity was weak, strengthening of project management was considered, by the Ban1k, of upnost importance for the success of project implementation. Rowever, because it was the Government's first experience with a Bank-financed education project, both the Bank and the Borrower misjudged the ability of the Borrower to set up the mechanism to implement a Bank-financed education project. Design by PIU's architects of the physical components started in May 1975, 9 months behind schedule and concluded by December 1978, 27 months behind schedule. Bidding started in March 1976 and lasted until February 1980, 30 nonths behind schedule. Construction comenced in June 1976 and all physical components with the exception of minor items of equipment were completed in March 1982, 51 mnths behind schedule. These delays can be broken down as follows: (a) about 8 months because of initial delay in making the Project Unit operational; (b) about 19 months because of difficulties in defining curricula for the ESEP conponent; (c) about 6 months delay in overall project inplementation and a 6 to 18 month delay in construction because the management of the Ministry of Housing and Construction (MVC) Regional Offices was weak; (e) about 3 to 6 months in each of the ten equipment bids because of complicated government procedures and poor management, as well as government restrictions on issuance of necessary import certification enforced at that time; (f) about 12 months because of uneven availability of counterpart funds; and (g) about 12 months because of ineffective project nanagement. 3.09 Project Implementation Unit. As stipulated in the Loan Agreement, a PTU was established in December 1973 within the M0E. The PIU vas required to have the full-time services of a project director, am architect, a procurement officer and an accountant. Placement and staffing in the MOE of the PIU with Ministry personnel were based on the proposition that the unit would be the most efficient -place to coordinate all project activities with the appropriate MOE departments, other interested agencies, and ninistries of the Borrower, and to provide liaison with the Bank. A full-time educator was not considered at first for the PIU because the Sectorial Education Planning Office (OSPE) was to coordinate all the implemeatation activities of the technical assistance and software aspects. - 22 - Managing Physical Implementation 3.10 By early 1974 the PIU was provided with permanent staff which included architects and support staff for the design of project schools. Instead of contracting private architectural firms, the PIU decided to employ technical staff for purposes of designing the CEbs. The PIU viewed this method of appointing professional staff as being more economical and providing for better integration of the educational and technical aspects of the project. Although with this method nobody clearly assumed liability for poor design, the approach was adopted as a reasonable one because: (a) the technical personnel appointed would strengthen the existing maintenance unit of the MOE; (b) at that time, there were no curricula on which to base an architectural brief; and (c) the Borrower, at the Bank's request, would create a technical committee within the PIU to control quality of designs. 3.11 Performance of the PIU during the first year of implementation did not reach the level of eff-3ciency expected by the Bank. This was largely due to: (a) the PIU's unfamiliarity with Bank procedures; (b) insufficient time devoted by the MOE education departments for careful preparation of the education programs which were basic for preparation of architectural briefs; (c) the lack of firm decision making, in such matters as site location. However, after the PIU was reorganized and transformed into a Directorate in the middle of 1975, accumulated experience strengthened its technical competence specifically in the planning and coordination of design work; and (d) Bank supervision was inadequate both in frequency and duration. 3.12 By July 1977 eight private architectural firms were appointed by the Government to design one ESEP each; the PIU's technical staff designed the remaining four ESEPs of the project (four ESEPs were deleted in the meantime). Virtually all of the design drawings were completed 1- fntober 1978. Those not completed were the boarding facilities in the agricultural ESEPs, because of the uncertainty of the Government dc Lnat time to include those facilities which were required in the appraisal. Designs for the boarding facilities were contracted with two architectural private firms by February 1980 and were completed by May 19P0. The performance of both architectural firms and the PIU staff was generally satisfactory. 3.13 In accordance with Peruvian laws, bidding and documentation connected with final payment for civil works were conducted under the responsibility of the only authorized agency--the Ministry of Housing and Construction (MVC). Unforeseen problems arose in those activities because: - 23 - (a) management of the MVC regional offices (except in Lima) was weak; and (b) procedures for gathering information on construction advancements and labor and material costs were cumbersome. 3.14 Supervision of construction, which was also under the responsibility of the MVC, was regular and effective. The MVC provided a resident in charge of supervision of each project institution. Also a PIU architect regularly visited the construction to monitor progress and follow up problems. 3.15 Procurement of furniture and equipment was organized and handled in accordance with Bank procedures. The preparation of the preliminary lists was started by the PIU as early as June 1975. However, the whole exercise of supplying equipment for office use, laboratories and workshops was so massive and complex that the PIU was not able to carry it out adequately because there were not enough exrerienced personnel. Unreasonable delays [para. 3.08 (d)] occurred at each step in the procurement process. For example, one package was bid four times (October 1977, May and December 1978, and February 1979). The bids were declared null and void beccuse there were fewer than three qualified bidders and the PIU was not allowed to negotiate with a limited number of suppliers; consequently, the equipment procurement process was not coordinated with the construction program. One bidder complained about awarding irregularities due to procedural ignorance and lack of clarity in the bidding terms which caused a delay of up to one year in the official awards. 3.16 It shculd be noted that the PLU staff had made some improvement in dealing with international competitive bidding (ICB) by 1979. However, the PIU's performance to improve procurement was restricted by the Vice Minister's sole authority in administrative matters related to project implementation particularly bidding. He, not the project director, was empowered to: (a) request clarification from bidders; (b) supervise bid evaluation; and (c) discuss and enter alone into agreement with the Bank missions about ways to improve and accelerate bidding procedures. Equipment procurement could have been greatly improved if the PIU had had clear administrative procedures and authority to minimize the risk of uncertainty of decisica making during the bid evaluation process. Managing Technical Assistance 3.17 The technical assistance component of the project (para. 2.26) was an integral and crucial part of the project. However, the PIU's coordination of the execution of the software aspects of the project (entrusted to the Planning Office of the MOE (OSPE), ME's Curriculum Department, the 'National Institute of Education, Research and Development (INIDE) and external agencies) proved to be a difficult and frustrating task for the PIU. This was caused mainly by: - 24 - (a) changes in the Ministry's top management and senior PIU staff during the life of the project (five Vice Ministers, three OSPE Directors, three Project Directors) which detracted from the continuity of implementation; (b) the lack of leadership of a project director and a project educator, which adversely affc.cted the quality of management; and (c) the poor coordination between all parties concerned. Civil Works Implementation Sites 3.18 At the start of project implementation, and contrary to the Loan Agreement, the Borrower decided to change several school sites (para 3.07). The changes were made without the necessary school location studies to justify them, and the Bank's reaction to them cannot be traced in the Bank files. Some selected sites do not meet the original selection criteria: The CEB A26 in Pucalpa and ESEPs B2 and B7 in Lima and San Agustin de Cayas are poorly located in regard to population centers. Regarding the ESEPs this was due mainly to the fact that industrial development did not take place as anticipated at the appraisal stage, thus causing a failure to reach the anticipated enrollments. 3.19 Inadequate consideration to the cost of developing basic site infrastructure (electrical, water and sever systems) caused difficulties in certain project items (A7, A9, A15, A24, A25, A27, A29, A30, B4, 38 and B13). As a result there were site development cost overnuns of 4-5%. 3.20 These problems could probably have been minimized, if not totally averted with: (a) adequate studies for school sites selection, as part of the project preparation phase; (b) proper supervision of the professional staff of the PIU by its management; and (c) more intensive and in depth supervision of the Bank at the initial stages of project implementation. Areas 3.21 The appraised and amended project with 25 CEBs and 12 ESEPs (instead of the originally 33 and 16, respectively), showed an overall area decrease of 4%. However, there were considerable variations in total areas per school (see Annex 2). In 28 institutions (19 CEBs and 9 ESEPs), there was an average area reduction of about 10%, based mainly on the post-appraisal study of the curriculum. In the remaining 9 institutions (6 CEBs and 3 ESEPs), the area increased an average of 22% due to the increase of the enrollment capacity of the ESEPs and different approaches to architectural designs of the CEBs. There were small variations in the ippraisal accommodation schedules of all the schools. - 25 - 3.22 Various items were added to the project after appraisal. The followii.g are the most important: (a) the building of a water reservoir for item A25 in Lamas; (b) the provision of water tanks and a water supply system for item B4 In Sullana; and (c) the provision of facilities and installation of independent diesel electric generators for 12 project institutions, which were located in cities where plans for strengthening the existing electric power systems were not carried out. Design 3.23 The same education specifications and architectural briefs were used for all project institutions. Architectural and corresponding engineering designs of project buildings, both those designed by PIU staff and those designed by consultants, were generally acceptable in functional terms. Any weakness in the designs tended to be more in detailing and finishing due to lack of experience in school design. However, the following main shortcomings in some of the schools were noted, for example: (a) prevailing climatic conditions were not sufficiently taken into account; there have been difficulties related to wind exposure (e.g., CEBs Al0, A13 and ESEP B13), lack of protection against rain, dust and sun (e.g., CEBs All, A26 and ESEPs B7, B12 and B14), and insufficient capacity of the sewage installation (e.g., CEB A26 and ESEP B12); (b) electrical designs, including the location of electrical outlets in some workshops, were defective (e.g , CEBs A12, A18, A25, and A26); (c) although the Project Brief and preliminary designs of each project institution received Bank approval in eight CEBs (A2, A3, All, A23, A27, A28, A29 and A31), multipurpose areas were not built, apparently due to the decision of the FIU architect during the development of working drawings; and (d) gas installation in the laboratories was not operating properly because they were not properly designed. All these problems were discussed with the Director of the National Institute School Construction (INIED), who was given a detailed list of measures (approved by the Minister) to rectify them prior to the physical completion date of the project (September 30, 1982). The Bank has learned that a program of action covering most of the listed measures was underway. In retrospect, it appears that most of the above-mentioned problems could have been minimized by a more conscious effort from the PIU's t!chnical staff. In some cases the PIU ignored the Bank's suggestions. In addition, the Bank failed to recognize some of these problems because they were hard to detect in the normal course of supervision. - 26 - Construction Quality 3.24 Since tendering for construction did not attract any interest from abroad, local competitive bidding procedures, which had been previously used with success by the MVC for all government construction works, were used. Forty-seven contracts were awarded to 33 construction firms. Delays due to three contractors defaulting made necessary the: (a) :etendering and subsequent direct administration by the PIU in CEBs A25 and A28; and (b) deletion from the project of CEB A24 which will be completed with government funds. However, the work produced by the contractors was of generally good quality. Maintenance 3.25 Maintenance is the responsibility of the Education Regional Zones with the assistance of the recently established INIED. However, the virtual lack of budget allocation hinders the maintenance service for buildings, equipment and furniture. This situation has been noted in CEB A10 where a full maintenance program is needed because of vandalism and CEB A18 where an earthquake affected the joints between the reinforced concrete beams and columns in the two workshop blocks. Since there is no maintenance budget, the directors of such schools are unable to carry out the necessary repairs. In addition, there are no guidelines for maintenance of project furniture and equipment. Maintenance of the school devolves directly from the principals and their staff. There is a close correlation between committed administrators and well-maintained schools. In general, there were many such administrators. As a result of the poor maintenance and repair of buildings and equipment, the PIU, at the Bank's suggestion, is: (a) preparing a maintenance handbook which should be distributed by January 1984; and (b) proposing a detailed routine aaintenance program, including a maintenance fund equivalent to 1% of the construction cost of the project (about S/260 million), for all project institutions to be considered by INIED. Establishment of this program should be considered as part of a future externally financed education project. Furniture and Equipment Implementation Procurement 3.26 Contracts for furniture were awarded from 1977 to October 1981. As brought out earlier, acceptable equipment lists were prepared with the help of the experts who developed the technical assistance program and the curriculum. Equipment contracts for the first 14 CEBs were awarded in timely fashion by August 1977. However, equipment procurement for the remaining schools did not proceed smoothly and came virtually to a standstill by November 1979. The major causes of this unsatisfactory situation were: - 27 - (a) disqualification of bidders for failure to fulfill requirements, which in review of the Bank were too numerous and too difficult to meet; (b) faulty (incomplete or unclear) specifications that discouraged suppliers from bidding; (c) lack of consensus between a technical evaluation team and the Procurement Commission at the Ministry of Education regarding bid evaluation; and (d) desire of high officers of the Ministry ox Education at that time, to adapt the international competitive bidding procedures for procurement under Bank loans to local regulations, these adaptations were not satisfactory to either the Bank or the Borrower. With intensive assistance from the Bank, corrective measures were taken by the Borrower and a new attempt for procurement was made in December 1979. This attempt was finally successful and contracts started to be awarded by February 1981. Quality 3.27 On the whole, the furniture is of average quality. However, the desks and tables are too fragile because the PIU is inexperienced in designing furniture. Most of it is made of metal tube covered with laminated wood and requires more than moderate maintenance and care. The equipment is appropriate for teaching/learning requirements in terms of quantity, standards and specifications. Fixed equipment is being correctly installed with few exceptions, and corrective actions are being taken in such instances. Delivery and Installation 3.28 All equipment has been received in the project institutions, except in the ESEPs, where 10% of the equipment for each ESEP is still undelivered and uninstalled. This delay was due to the Government's cumbersome custom procedures enforced at the time of delivery of the imported equipment. The delivery and installation of equipment was concluded in January 1983. The equipment supplier was clearly assigned responsibility for equipment installation, however, the PIU's deficient control resulted in slow installation and delays. For example, in CEB A15 and ESEP B14 packages of equipment had remained stored and unopened for more than one year. Moreover, because of the lack of PIU control, some electrical equipment delivered had the wrong voltage and cycle for Peru, needing the use of transformers and leading to inefficient use of equipment in some cases. These were solvable problems, and action was taken to remedy them after the completion mission return. 3.29 Clearly, the PIU did not give enough attention to the delivery and installation process, because there was insufficient PIU personnel to receive and check the equipment in each institution. In retrospect, the PIU should have more resources or the project schools should have appointed responsible - 28 - staff to carry out the exercise of checking equipment and its installation. These are specific areas in which a properly trained project educator could assist a procurement officer in forestalling such procurement delivery and installation problems. Technical Assistance Implementation General Background 3.30 A sizeable technical assistance component was included in the Loan Agreement comprising expert service (17 staff-years) and fellowships (80 staff-:ears at a total cost of US$1.1 million). The purpose of the component was to assist the project institutions in introducing the new program and the Ministry of Education in launching the first two phases of its education development strategy. In formulating this component, the Bank took into account that the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had negotiated with the Government to provide 8 staff-years of specialist services and 20 staff-years of fellowships necessary for the macro-planning of the reform. 3.31 During negotiations the Government provided assurances to the Bank that within six months of the signing of the Loan Agreement a detailed plan for the implementation of this part of the project would be drawn up and sent to the Bank for comments and that qualified local counterparts would be assigned to work with the technical assistance specialists. 3.32 Indeed, the Government submitted to the Bank a plan for technical assistance with some three months delay, but this plan provided for only 9.7 staff-years of expert services and 62.4 staff-years of fellowships. Lengthy discussions on this point and lack of local experience in handling technical assistance projects caused considerable delays in implementing this component. The Bank agreed to this proposal because: (a) the government was highly reluctant to use the total amount of funds available for technical assistance; and (b) UNDP, CIDA and the GTZ technical assistance from Germany were supposed to supply expert services as a substitute to that planned by the Bank. 3.33 In addition, because of mounting costs, technical assistance was substantially reduced (see Table 1.2), thus creating important gaps in the original plan (particularly regarding administrators for the PIU and the project institutions). This was further weakened by the fact that the C.TDA technical assistance mentioned in para. 3.30 above was not fully implemerted as the team of specialists who visited Peru in 1975 was recalled by CIDA because of differences between the team's chief and the Government. Besides, the Government never provided a full-time counterpart to coordinate technical assistance. Table 1.2 below sumarizes the technical assistance component as conceived at the appraisal stage and as provided by the project. Further details are given in Annex 3. - 29 - Table 1.2: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE No Appraisal Actu a No. of No. of as % of Persons Staff-Years Persons Staff-Years Original Specialist 10 17 10 10.25 60 Services Fellowships 60(52-68) 80 20 15.75 20 COST (US$ million) 1.1 0.610 3.34 To counterbalance the loss in fellowships, the Government requested in July 1977 that proceeds of the loan from the reduced technical assistance component be allocated for an in-service teacher and school administrator training program for the project institutions. The Bank, after submission by the Government of a detailed plan in February 1978, accepted this request. Although the concept of a training program appeared to be promising, insurmountable bureaucratic procedures to use the proceeds of the loan (the PIU Director was never authorized to pay a signed contract with INIDE; the Central Treasury did not make available counterpart funds for the training program which was budgeted for in advance) impaired its proper implementation (paras. 3.43-3.44). Specialist Services 3.35 Specialist services were contracted by UNESCO as executing agency. To this end, after an overall delay of more thr.- two years, because of lengthy bureaucratic procedures for agreements it. both the Government and UNESCO, seven specialists were recruited with conLracts expiring between November 1977 and January 1978. The specialist se-.'vices provided covered the areas of educational planning, ESEP curriculum development and follow-up of graduates, ESEP teacher training, and in-service training mainly for the CEBs. 3.36 It is difficult to assess the impact of this projact sub-component on the overall educational development process as all the experts, except some of the GTZ team (this German Agency provided 5 staff-years of technical assistance financed entirely by its own funds), had departed at the time of the mission and all the high-ranking Government employees directly or indirectly involved (e.g., Director of Planning, Higher Education, Basic education and INIDE) had changed. Furthermore, most of the reports prepared by the specialists were not available and the overall final report gave little concrete information on accomplishments. 3.37 In general, it appears that the overall result fell short of Bank and Government expectations for a number of reasons, including: The gaps created by the reduction of the program (paras. 3.33 and 3.34); inappropriate timing (e.g., the specialist on follow-up of ESEP graduates had to conduct his studies without graduates); difficulties in finding competent counterparts and delays in appointing them to work with the experts; and difficulty on the part of some of the specialists in adjusting to local work conditio,is. More specifically, the most serious weaknesses appear to be in the teacher training area and the follow-up studies for ESEP graduates. - 30 - Fellowshipq 3.38 As shown in Annex 3, the fellowship program covered all the areas foreseen at appraisal (planning, project unit, ESEPs, CEBs and teacher training), but on a severely reduced scale (66% reduction in the number of persons and 0% in the overall duration). This reduction, approved by the Bank was caused because of the Government's inability to select good and young candidates, e.g., some of the participants were too old at the time of their training through the fellowship program (some retired right after come-back). The effectiveness of the program was seriously handicapped by the above-mentioned reduction and by the fact that about 8 out of the 20 persons trained left the service or changed functions. It appears that the Planning Office and the CEBs (curricula) benefitted most from this project sub-component. The reduced fellowship program left gaps in administrative staff and specialist teachers in the project institutions, which the limited success of the training program (para. 3.34) failed to fill them. In-Service Training 3.39 As mentioned in para. 3.34, the Government requested that savings effected from the reduction of technical assistance be used for in-service training of teachers and school administrators for the project institutions. In February 1978, the Bank accepted this request and agreed to finance a training program for some 500 regional supervisors and specialist teachers for project CEBs and ESEPs, at a total estimated cost of US$364,500. At the same time the Loan Agreement was modified to allow for a 100% reimbursement of the training costs as against 65% for the fellowships (35% was considered as local cost). At the time of the amendment of the Agreement, the unexpended portion of Category IV (Technical Assistance) was, after the deduction of funds already committed, US$429,500. 3.40 The implementation of the program was delayed mainly because of lack of local funds to initiate the program. To accelerate action, the Government accepted a Bank proposal in May 1978 to appoint UNESCO as the implementing agency for this program. A coordinating body was appointed composed of a UNESCO expert provided under the technical assistance agreement, and two national experts. 3.41 However, with the new arrangement the local fund problem was not resolved and the program was finally transferred to INIDE as part of a comprehensive UNESCO/UNDP project initiated in October 1979 (PER/79/001/B/01/13) aiming at institutionalizing in-service training of practical teachers and school administrators. 3.42 This program included training for the Peru/BIRF project institu- tions. World Bank funds, as mentioned in para. 3.41, were never completely used; therefore, the contribution of this subprogram to the success of the project was minimal. In fact, in 1979/80 only 202 persons, mostly from project CEBs, were trained in 20-day courses; of a planned series of short courses (2 to 3 weaks each) only the first one was carried out. Therefore, these courses did not help the teachers face the multitude of technical and practical problems in the new institutions provided by the project. 31 - 3.43 The total amount spent on the courses was S/20.4 million (US$52,600 at the official UNDP rate) and it was allocated from the Ministry of Education's budget for this particular purpose. Although the Bank eventually reimbursed all of these funds, they were deposited in the Central Treasury and were never made available again for the continuation of the program by UNDP. 3.44 Information from INIDE indicates 5,400 participants in the whole of the program. However, this total includes the same persons several times according to the number of courses they have attended. The first part of the UNESCO/UNDP project ended in December 1981 with some 3,000 persons trained under several programs. A second part has now been agreed upon for a total of US$656,000. However, because of problems of communication between the Director of INIDE and the UNDP principal specialist, this part of the program was not implemented. Covenants 3.45 The Loan Agreement covenants that have been less than fully complied with are listed below: (a) Section 4.04 (Operate project institutions with qualified teachers and administrators). There is compliance with the proper operation of project institutions only where teachers/administrators were trained. (b) Section 4.04 (Maintain adequately building equipment and furniture of project schools). There is compliance with the maintenance covenant only to the extent that each individual institution is able to implement its own maintenance program, since funds for this purpose have not been allocated by the Government in violation of the provisions of this section. (c) Section 3.06 (b) (Adopt measures to ensure that university admission requirements and procedures will be the same for graduates of ESEPs and traditional secondary schools). There was university opposition to the enforcement of these measures (para 2.14). (d) Sections 5.01 (Review every two years: (i) the training of ESEP teachers; (ii) the demand of ESEP graduates; (iii) the implementation of technical assistance; and (iv) the availability of funds for the implmentation of the educational reform program). There is compliance with the monitoring of the implementation for the projected Educational Reform at large (there was a review in March 1976), the remaining clauses were not executed because of the Government's change in priorities in reference to reform implementation. Bank Peformance 3.46 Between 1974, when the project was started, and 1982, the Bank sent 17 supervision missions with a total of about 169 days, excluding the completion mission (see Basic Data)--an average of 20.6 days per year. - 32 - Supervision by two architects absorbed 52% of field work; the remaining 48% was provided by three general educators (40%), an education planner (4%), and an economist (4%). It should be noted, with regret, that no technical. or agricultural educators participated in supervision missions, nevertheless the project includes 8 industrial and 8 agricultural ESEPs. The frequency of the supervision missions ranged from about 10.7 months interval between missions during 1974/77 (project start-up) to about 4.3 months interval during 1977/81 when the project was actually implemented. 3.47 In retrospect, despite the relatively high supervision manpower coefficient, the frequency and duration of supervieion missions have not always been effective. It appears that particularly in the early critical stages of project execution, field supervision was insufficient and concentrated mainly on visits to Lima, with few visits to the project school sites to assess the true situation. This deficiency may have been due to the limited time available for missions to undertake travel (taking into account the sporadic internal flight schedules) and the necessity to keep supervision costs within the stringent budgetary limits. Furthermore, because of frequent changes and inexperience of the PIU staff and the Borrower's action under political and financial constraints and pressures, the supervision missions frequently found themselves dealing with emergency problems, which could not be easily resolved. Important decisions on PIU staffing were not discussed adequately but accepted as "faits accomplis." For example, the creation of an architectural design group within the PIU precluded the procuring of services of highly qualified Peruvian consultant firms, which could have exerted better control over architectural designs. 3.48 Even if the above factors had been avoided it is questionable whether the inputs from Bank supervision missions would have been the right answer to implementation problems. More advanced project preparation before Board presentation (e.g., early site selection, preparation of furniture and equipment lists based on a previously defined curricula, completion of designs and arrangements for technical assistance program), with adequate attention to the establishment of a stronger implementation unit would have improved project execution. The experiences gained in project implementation should help ensure that the Bank and the Peruvian authorities will search for better methods of implementation in proposed future projects. Implementation mechanisms will have to be realistically conceived, staffed, and functions and responsibilities clearly defined. Communication with the Bank 3.49 The Quarterly Progress Reports were not regularly sent by the PIU for about three years (1976-1978), despite efforts made by the Bank to receive them on a regular basis. IV. PROJECT COST AND FINANCING Capital Cost 4.01 The actual cost of the project was US$37.4 million against an appraisal estimate of US$40 million. These project costs are not strictly comparable because of major project modifications, including the deletion of - 33 - 13 project institutions. The Bank loan of US$24.0 million was not reduced at the time of project modification. However, only US$23.2 million had been disbursed by September 30, 1982, when the final payment was made. This total includes US$300,000 which have been allocated for the preparation of the primary education project. The undisbursed balance would be cancelled. 4.02 On the modified project the estimated cost was US$32.0 million, of which the Bank loan of US$24.0 million was to finance 75% of the total cost. The remaining US$8.0 million (25%) and any cost overruns were financed by the government. 4.03 Tha following table compares the appraisal project cost, excluding the institutions later deleted, with the modified project estimated cost and the actual project cost in the various expenditure categories. Table 4.1: APPRAISAL, REVISED AND ACTUAL COSTS Revised Original a/ Estimate b/ Category (Incl. Cont.) (Incl. Cont.) Final Cost Difference % (October 197 .December 1978) (February 1983) (1973/82)(1978/83) Furniture 1.31 1.59 + 4 +21 Equipment 6.52 6.64 8.58 +31 +29 !onstruction 21.56 23.05 26.07 +21 +13 fechnical Assistance 1.24 1.00 1.11 c/ -10 +11 TOTAL 30.79 32.00 37.35 +21 +17 a/ Excluding deleted items. b/ Cost of project after amendments. c/ Including in-service teacher training and project preparation for the Proposed Second Education Project. 4.04 Total cost overruns of US$5.35 million of the modified project, which stemmed from delays on the extended implementation period (1978/82) combined with extremely high inflation, are attributable to: (a) the increase in the construction cost of US$3.65 million or 68% of the total overrun (equivalent to 21% over the appraisal estimate) due to extension in construction periods ranging between 160% to 320%. Nevertheless, the reduced construction area (see Annex 2), which is 4% less than appraisal estimates, resulted in savings that offset some construction cost increases. Also, there were savings in professional services as most of the designs were undertaken by the PIU staff; and (b) the increase in equipment and furniture costs of US$2.22 or 41% of total overrun (or to 26% above the appraisal estimate). About 10% of the original ESEPs' equipment and furniture, including equipment for boarding facilities, was deleted. - 34 - 4.05 Cost of the technical assistance program was US$0.65 million (originally US$1.1 million) because the Borrower, with Bank approval, did not contract all the specialists and did not implement part of the fellowship program (paras. 3.33-3.39). Remaining funds, for those activities were diverted to the in-service teacher Lraining program (para. 3.40). At the end, the total disbursement from the proceeds of the loan to the in-service program was about US$53,000 because a problem of counterpart funds to implement the in-service program was never resolved (paras. 3.40-3.42). The remaining funds (about US$0.40 million) in the category of technical assistance were used to counterbalance mounting construction costs. Disbursements 4.06 Because of project delays, actual disbursements were below the planned estimates. Estimated and actual disbursements are shown in Annex 4 (by semester in Annex 5 and by category in Basic Data). Revolving Fund 4.07 In October 1979, at the Bank's suggestion, a revolving fund of US$1.0 million was established, mainly to: (a) alleviate the Government's acute shortage of counterpart funds, particularly for civil works; (b) expedite payment to construction contractors by paying them directly, so that the MOE's ponderous and long procedures were partially reduced; and (c) reduce elapsed time between the sending of withdrawal applications and disbursements (6-8 weeks). This fund was financed with a US$750,000 advance disbursement from the Bank and a Government contribution of US$250,000. 4.08 The effects of the revolving funds were remarkable: (a) the Government accelerated project implementation and replenished the fund on a regular basis (every 1-2 months); and (b) during the first year of fund operation (FY80) disbursements increased by 35% from US$2.5 million to US$3.5 million. From 1974 to 1979, project expenditures were aueited by the Ministry of Finance through the regular MOE procedures. Aftor the revolving fund was established, proper accounting was set up. In 1931, a formal audit of the project's complete financial records was carried oat by the National Controller Agency of the Ministry of Finance. Unit Costs and Space Allocation 4.09 The capital cost per student place for the average CEB project school as constructed is comparable with original appraisal estimates since the enrollment structure and the areas are virtually equal. The 12 - 35 - constructed ESEPs were appraised for a total capacity of 8,800 student-places, however, their actual capacity is 10,120 student-places (Annex 1). On this basis the average area per student place and the capital costs for civil works, furniture and equipment per student-place are shown in the following Table. Table 4.2: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PLANNED AND BUILT AREAS PER STUDENT AND OF COST PER STUDENT PLACE Type of Area per Student Cost per Student Place (US$) Insti- (m4) Civil Works Furniture Equipment Total tution App. Act. Diff.% App. Act. App. Act. App. Act. App. Act. Diff.% CEBs 6.0 5.6 - 7 855 724 59 44 175 138 1089 906 -17 ESEPs 7.1 5.5 -22 630 796 55 64 480 486 1165 1346 +16 4.10 Although the average area built per student in the ESEPs was decreased by 22%, based mainly in the post appraisal study of the curriculum, the total cost per student place resulted in an increase of 16%. This increase shows the effect of the high inflation during project implementation; however, compared with average unit costs of other Bank-financed projects, they are considered reasonable. V. PROJECT OPERATING OUTCONES Attainment of Educational Objectives 5.01 With the change in educational policy (paras. 3.01-3.06) and the consequent modifirations in the educational structure, it is difficult and practically irelevant to attempt to assess to what extent the project achiaved its prime objective, namely to contribute to the implementation of the education reform. 5.02 In general, the project has contributed substantially to the educational development in Peru, especially in the integration of practical subject teaching with academic subjects by providing adequate accommodation and appropriate equipment for new institutions and by reinforcing, through technical assistance, the curriculum development and the overall educational planning process. Several problems were encountered and shortcomings observed during the implementation of the project, most of which were reported by the supervision missions. In the following paragraphs of this Chapter such problems and shortcomings are briefly discussed and conclusions are drawn to be used as a guide. Enrollments and Teaching Staff 5.03 With the exception of A15 (Paucartambo), A25 (Lanas) and A28 (Azangaro), project CEBs started functioning between 1978 and 1981. Paucartambo was completed a year ago, but local political leaders are exerting pressure for its conversion into an ESEP. Lamas has just been - 36 - completed and started functioning in April 1982, and Azangaro is without a director or a deputy director because of a local political dispute. The Bank, in an aide-memoire left on April 7, 1982, with the Vice Minister of Education, urged the Government to take immediate action to rectify the above-mentioned problems. This situation was corrected after the return of the completion mission. 5.04 Actual enrollments and number of teachers in the functioning project CEBs Involved are shown in Table 5.1 below: Table 5.1: ENROLLMENTS AND NUMBER OF TEACHERS IN PROJECT CEBs (1978/1981) 1978 1979 1980 1981 Enrollments 9,779 15,503 22,689 24,577 Teachers 340 557 951 974 5.05 In the modified version of the project, the original enrollment target was 25,800 students, nearly--17,000 in a first "regular basic aducation" shift and 9,000 in a second "labor basic education" shift. Practically all project CEBs are functioning in two shifts but they offer mainly regular basic education programs in both shifts. It appears that the overall enrollment target for the two shifts will be easily reached when all project institutions are fully functioning. At appraisal a third evening shift for some 4,000 adults in a non-formal work-oriented program was also foreseen. This target was met to a large extent. So far such programs are community activities. Of the total enrollments some 20% are in primary classes which is in accordance with appraisal estimates. 5.06 The purpose of the project was to provide model institutions rather than to contribute to the expansion of basic education, but the project nevertheless provided some 17% of the average number of places provided annually for basic education during the project period (estimated at some 118,000 per annum during the 1974-81 period) or to some 46% of those provided for the third basic education cycle. In addition, about 30% of the places provided by the project have been used to replace existing places. 5.07 Of the twelve project ESEPs (grades 10-12), eleven have been functioning since 1980. The last one (B-4, Piura) will commence operations in February 1983 when the water supply system will be completed. The modified version of the project included about 10,000 new student places. In 1981, after two years of operation, there were 4,800 students enrolled in the project ESEPs, as against some 30,000 in all ESEPs and the number of teachers in the project ESEPs was 241. Enrollment is expected to increase at the rate of about 15% per year so that by 1988 the ESEP facilities will be utilized at full capacity for courses in the Politechnical Institutes. This shortcoming in enrollment occurred mainly because of uncertainty of the future of ESEP as an institution. The uncertainty concerning the new orientation of the ESEP and the announced changes of the ESEP decreased the enrollment of these institutes for the academic years 1980-1982 by at least 20% of the expected enrollment in those years. At this point in time, the above uncertainty prevails as details concerning the announced changes are not yet available. - 37 - Administration 5.08 The number of staff with administration, coordination and supervision tasks in the CEBs is regulated by the Ministerial Resolution No. 1380-78-ED of September 1978. The staffing, as proposed in the resolution 7/, is excessive (one administrator per 3 teachers as against a more conservative norm of 1:7), and in general it creates more problems than it solves, causing unnecessary spending. In addition, it appears that the project CBEB use an even more excessive structure with some 15 staff members having reduced teachi g load (see Annex 6). This excesoive administrative and supervision staff for the CEBs should be corrected. 5.09 It is not, of course, easy for this problem to be resolved as it involves vested interests and touches sensitive work regulations and acquired benefit issues. This subject was discussed with the Vice Minister of Education. The Bank suggested that the reorientation of the education system and the planned restructuring of many of the existing institutions (para. 3.03) would provide a favorable background for desired changes to be introduced concerning curriculun, reduction of school administrators and proposed reorientation of the secondary school program). Use of Facilities 5.10 Although the use of the facilities provided for the project CEBs can be considered generally satisfactory, there are certain weaknesses: non-functioning or no equipment, shortage of specialist teachers, and inexperience by principals in programming the classes. The apparent shortage of specialist teachers concerns the practical subjects and art teachers and is the result of the low performance of the project-sponsored teacher and school administrator training program (paras. 3.42-3.45). About 5% of the workshops are closed for lack of trained teachers. The use of facilities could be improved by having qualified staff, which would result from adequate implementation of the existing training program. 5.11 The most important factor, however, influencing the use factor of the teaching accomodation is the programming of the use of the facilities by several classes. In general, each class uses a specific classroom for all theoretical subjects, which results in empty classrooms when the students of that particular classroom are in the workshops or science laboratories. Adopting the special classroom system (e.g., for mathematics, social. sciences, languages, etc.) and rotating the students, as it was originally proposed at appraisal, apart from facilitating the use of teaching aids, can result in a better use of the facilities. School administrators, with whom this issue was discussed, proved willing to adopt the student rotation system * but they need training and guidance in this respect. 5.12 Of the special accommodation provided fcr the project CEBs, the following are not used or are underutilized: (a) all libraries for lack of books (although library facilities were constructed under the program, the project did not provide them); 7/ Eight staff members with reduced (or without) teaching loads. - 38 - (b) about 15% of art rooms for lack of art teachers (because of the shortcomings of the training program); and (c) three out of eleven agricultural education facilities because there is no local demand. 5.13 Remedies to the above weaknesses are urgently needed to contribute to even more use of the provided facilities. A specialist in basic education curriculum contracted with proceeds from the Loan, initiated a revision of the CEB curriculum from June to August 1982. His recommendations on this matter are being considered by the Government. It is expected, therefore, that better utilization of the provided facilities will result as a consequence of the Gvernment remedial actions. 5.14 With regard to the project ESEPs, it is not possible to assess the degree of use of their facilities. Most of them are half-empty because they only began functioning between 1980 and 1982. The following observations are indicative of the prevailing conditions: (a) about 5% of the workshops are not functioning because 10% of the equipment which is still in customs will be installed by December 1982. (b) there is an apparent shortage of specialist teachers and trained administrators for programming classes and extra-curricular activities; and (d) there is considerable drop-out after the first grade (up to 50% in certain ESEPs) mainly because students with complete secondary education 8/ succeed in the meantime to be accepted in the university. 5.15 1emedies to the above situation are urgently needed. Short-term specialists should further translate the curriculum requirements for the reorientation of the ESEPs into technical accommodations. The Government should consider how to insure the utilization of the provided facilities. Curriculum and Timetables 5.16 Curricula for both the CEBs and the ESEPs levels are in transitional stages because of the reorientation of the education system (paras. 3.05-3.06). The project CEBs started functioning partly with the reform curriculum and partly with a specially adapted program to bridge the transition from the old system to the reform system. However, all project ESEPs started their first and second grades with the reform curricula. With the reorientation of the education system, the project CEBs would most probably be converted into secondary schools offering certainly the lower two-year cycle and probably the B version with increased practical subjects of the upper-secondary cycle as well (paras. 3.05 and 3.06). This could be a 8/ Although a basic certificate (9th grade) is considered as an adequate qualification for entering ESEPs, many enter after completing secondary education if they do not succeed to enter university. - 39 - disadvantage to certain students because the dual program proposed at this level disfavors students following the practically-oriented Program B with regard to their pursuing higher studies. At present, the University entrance examinations are designed for academically-oriented candidates. 5.17 With regard to the CEB timetables, given that because of the double-shift system, there are only five hours per day available for each shift (7-12 and 1-6), the Bank suggests that: (a) the weekly timetable could be modified to include 30 periods per week of 50 minutes each, rather than 33 periods of 45 minutes each, as at present. In this way, in addition to the fact that up to a point, longer periods result in more effective teaching of practical and science subjects, there will be considerable savings because of the reduced number of teachers necessary to carry out the program with the modified timetable; (b) the weekly timetable could also be modified to include at least five evening periods after the regular working hours, particularly for the practial work necessary for the upper-cycle students; and (c) a new schedule of accommodations is needed to insure maximum utilization of the facilities available (para. 5.12). This is needed because of the reduction of practical work and the increase in academic activities. 5.18 The project ESEPs will probably all be converted to post-secondary technical institutions (para. 3.03). To this end and in accordance witb a relevant ministerial resolution, all functioning project ESEPs have introduced the post-secondary program (grades 12-14--at present called the Second ESEP Cycle) and suspended as of this school year, the intake to their regular (first) ESEP cycle (grades 10-12). Candidates who have completed secondary schools have to pass an entrance examination to enter the second ESEP cycle, while ESEP graduates have direct access. Neither the duration nor the precise content of the post-secondary program is fixed as yet. Although there is no particular study to show the demand, it is presumed demand is substantial because there are no institutions of this sort in the country. Although in the long run the post-secondary program would have similar objectives to the original reform, it is different in that: (a) the post-secondary program is independent from the university system; and (b) the post-secondary program would be designed for non-university-bound students. This would release the pressure on university education. 5.19 Further symptoms of the transition taking place in the ESEP curriculum are listed below: (a) the project ESEP in Callao, which replaced an existing specialized vocational training institution (polytechnic) was the first project ESEP to start functioning in 1980. This ESEP never fully adopted the ESEP curriculum but rather continued to function as a - 40 - polytechnic, which was consistent with the new orientation given to the ESEP program by the Government. This institution is probably the most popular of the project ESEPs; (b) certain ESEPs, in an attempt to increase their enrollments ;ntroduced, or plan to introduce, specializations (such as commercial courses) not foreseen in the original project proposal and for which they are not equipped; (c) according to the education law under consideration the teacher training specializations will be transferred from the ESEPs (there is one teacher training EFEP in the project) to the reinstated teacher training colleges (para. 3.03). Consequently, the program of the project teacher training ESEP should be modified accordingly or such ESEP could be used in conjunction with a teacher training college for the training of technical teachers. Recurrent Expenditure 5.20 Teacher salaries account for over 90% of the recurrent budget of the schools allocated by the MOE and little is spent on maintenance of buildings and equipment (less than 1%). For instance, the Ruancayo ESEP remuneration: S/122,400; materials: S/2,200; services S/0.900. The admission fees paid by the students (S/1,000 for the regular ESEP cycles and S/1,500 for the post-secondary cycle) are deposited into the Central Government Treasury (Banco de la Nacion). In practice, both CEBs and ESEPs charge more than the official rate (S/2,000-4,000) and keep the surplus as part of the parents' contribution to the school budget. Additional contributions are normally collected during the school year and are used for maintenance, repairs and the purchase of educational materials. In addition, practically all project schools organize production or service activities and use the income to cover vital recurrent expenditures. 5.21 The parents' active participation in the educational process is commendable. Measures should be taken to continue to safeguard that the school's basic requirements are adequatoly covered by the Central Government budgets without, at the same time, excessive financial burden on the community. The production activities, provided they are so arranged as to have an educational value rather than to impair the smooth functioning of the workshops, are also praiseworthy. VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6.01 This report set out to examine (a) how changes in the country's education policies which took place during project implementation affected project progress and results; and (b) to what extent lessons learned during implementation of this project could or should influence the content and implementation arrangements of future Bank-supported education projects in Peru (para. 1.02). - 41 - Effects of Changes in Education Policies 6.02 Regarding the first question, it appears that project progress (except probably in the technical assistance component at the later stages of execution) was not affected by changes in education policies. Delays and other problems are mostly due to other factors, analyzed below in the course of answering the second question. Indeed, the project advanced more rapidly since 1978, at a period when the 1972 reform was clearly losing momentum and several significant reversals in basic education policies took place. Project results, on the other hand, were definitely affected by policy changes. If it is accepted that the basic project objective was to assist the Government in achieving the 1972 reform (specifically, the strong orien- tation of secondary education curricula towards vocational training) by financing well equipped and effectively operating modern facilities, then the current Government's decision essentially to return to the pre-reforto system implies an unavoidable loss of at least some capital investment, and the need to devote additional resources in order to integrate project institutions within the new system. 6.03 As explained in paras. 2.10-2.19, the difficulties facing the 1972 reform were clearly seen by the Bank and pointed out to the Government. At the core of these difficulties were the following: - the premature and, in terms of eventual market demand, risky vocational orientation of students; - the proposal that ESEP graduates alone enter universities without admission tests despite being offered an inadequate number of general education courses (which led to the rejection of the whole ESEP concept by the universities); and - the financial constraints of the government which clearly precluded it from seeing the reform through. However, Government enthusiasm with the reform prevailed and the Bank went along reluctantly with a large project which, as far as support for the reform is concerned, should have been limited to a small number of experi- mental institutions. 6.04 This critical assessment of the background against which the project was approved and put into operation should not obscure, however, the actual and potential benefits derived from it. Project CEBs provided facil- ities for about 25,000 students, or 17% of additional students at the lower secondary level enrolled during project implementation. The learning environment in project schools, the quality of teachers, and curriculum content (with the exception of premature orientation towards vocational training) are generally well above the average observed in non-project schools. Project ESEPs, making up 46% -4 total project costs, on the other hand, have made a lesser contribution to improving the quality of and access to upper secondary education, both because they suffered from more serious conceptual problems and because they were completed mre recently. In 1982, after three years of operation of eleven ESEPs (out of twelve included in the project), only about 7,000 students, or 70% of the planned number were enrolled, and some equipment had not yet been installed. But it should be - 42 - emphasized that project ESEPs have the best chance to become pioneering institutions in the context of the new education system envisaged by the Government. Their being located in the majority of significant cities, and their sophisticated and modern equipment make them quite appropriate for conversion to post-secondary technical schools, whose graduates would fill an important gap in Peru's labor force. 6.05 The challenging task at present is to integrate project CEBs and ESEPs within the new system. Regarding the CEBs, it is important first of all for more officials to accept that the Ministry should not compete with or complement specialized vocational training agencies specifically created in Peru to train workers (SENATI, SENCICO, INIPA, etc.). Continuing and, if anything, increasing constraints upon MOE's budget and lack of basic adminis- trative and technical expertise in this area should be convincing arguments for the Ministry to limit itself to formal education, where acute problems of administration and financing are awaiting resolution. 6.06 Once this is accepted, CEBs should be seen as ordinary secondary schools (there is no reason why they should be limited to the lower cycle only), but leading the way towards a more practical mentality and orientation of the entire secondary system. To help in this effort, the Bank could include in a future education project funds for specialists' services (curri- culum reorientation, school administration) and training of school adminis- trators and specialized teachers. The Bank could also include funds for the purchase of supplementary furniture and equipment required for the conversion of project schools to the new study programs. 6.07 Similar help could be provided for converting the ESEPs to post- secondary technical institutions. Here, however, the task is more compli- cated because the Government has not yet decided on some important aspects of the operation of the new institutions, such as program duration. The Bank recommends that the Government opt for a more attractive program of about two years' duration, instead of the three to five years currently proposed by the MOE. The three to five-year program, if adopted, would in all probability (a) discourage students from seeking middle level careers, and (b) encourage more students to enroll in already crowed higher education courses. Implications for Future Projects 6.08 Regarding experiences with project execution and their implications for future Bank education projects in Peru, the following areas are of major significance: Bank reactions to proposed and also effected changes in project content and implementation arrangements; location and site selection; intensity and quality of supervision; delays in execution and resulting cost overruns; technical assistance; compliance with covenants; and operation of project schools. 6.09 Bank Reactions to Project Changes. The Bank accepted, apparently without serious discussion, changes in the initially agreed location of several CEBs and ESEPs; a large reduction in the technical assistance compo- nent (both specialists and fellowships); successive changes in the composi- tion and responsibilities of the PIU; and scaling down the size of the project. Although in retrospect some of these adjustments can be considered as beneficial, e.g., scaling down the size of the project, the overall - 43 - impression is one of insufficient firmness in the face of essentially unilateral decisions on the part of Peruvian officials which, at least in the case of changes in the PIU, clearly resulted in significant delays. Initial doubts regarding the rationale for the project probably account for part of this. But even recognizing this factor, the implication for future projects seems clear that the Bank should approve changes in project content and management only after good evidence has been provided that the proposed changes are justified, including reappraisal if the proposed changes are major. 6.10 Location and Site Selection. The proposed location of project schools proved to be in some cases ill-advised because the demand for graduates from programs offered by the schools did not exist and/or because the numbers in the corresponding age group of the surrounding population were inadequate also. Furthermore, the location of some schools was changed by the Government without due attention paid to agreed upon location criteria. Beyond the recommendation made in the previous paragraph on the need for firmness in the face of unilateral and unjustified changes, this situation further suggests that location of project institutions should be fixed on the basis of existing demand for skills and school-age population, rather than on planned industrialization or similar consideration. As for sites, they were inappropriate in several instances or lacked basic infrastructure (elec- trical, water and sewer systems). As a result, cost overruns in these cases reached 5-10%. These problems could have been minimized by making selection of at least part of school sites a precondition of loan negotiations (as is now current Bank practice), and by more systematic supervision on the past of the PIU and the Bank. 6.11 Supervision of the project was done at regular intervals, although it was usually limited to Lima and to consultations with the PIU, despite the fact that 29 of the 36 project institutions finally built were located in provincial towns and cities. A more serious deficiency was the complete absence from supervision missions of technical and vocational educators. Thus, an innovative project whose thrust was the change of educational content at the secoridary level towards more practical subjects was left to partial supervision by architects and general educators. In this respect, the project exemplifies the need to staff appropriately supervision missions, despite the difficulties arising from budgetary and staff scheduling constraints. 6.12 Delays in Execution. Delays totaling about 50 months occurred at various stages of project execution. The principal causes were: - initial unfamiliarity of Bank staff and national authorities with each other's operational procedures and modus operandi; - ineffective project management; - difficulties in defining curricula for the ESEPs; - complications arising from the involvement of the Ministry of Housing in school construction; - 44- - procurement problems; and - periodic lack of counterpart funds. Some of these causes were susceptible to corrective action and were in fact eventually corrected. For example, the Ministry of Housing agreed in 1981 to let to MOE the responsibility of civil works; and the establishment of a revolving fund helped overcome the difficulties created by lack of local funds. However, other sources of delay were unavoidable. The Bank needs to recognize this by accepting more realistic timetables, especially for first- time projects such As the one examined here. Cost overruns, for the part of the project finally executed, were reasonable (21% over initial estimates) despite the long delays, indicating realistic base cost estimates and contin- gency allowances. 6.13 Technical assistance in:luded in the project was greatly reduced during project execution (from 17 to 10 staff-years for specialist ervices and from 80 to 16 for fellowships). An attempt to substitute training of teachers in project institutions for initially planned fellowships also failed. Yet, given the innovative nature of the project and the limited supply of specialized administrators and teachers for project institutions, this was one of the most critical project components. This failure seems to reflect an initial reluctance on the part of the Peruvian authorities to include this component in the project, subsequent negative developments regarding implementation of the reform (which made implementation of this component appear less relevant), and lack of a mechanism that could bridge the time lag between dlatrseient and recovery of the expenditure from loan proceeds. The implications for future operations appear therefore to be twofold: The Bank should ensure full and unreserved support of project content on the part of Borrowers from the beginning. And mechanisms (e.g., working fund, revolving fund, tested telex procedures) should be sought and organized before project execution starts. This would ensure that progress is not paralyzed by the lack of readily available funds. 6.14 Compliance with Covenants. There has been only partial compliance with covenants referring to employment of qualified teachers and adminis- trators for project institutions; buildings and equipment maintenance; and review of operation of project institutions. To an important extent, this is due to the great reduction of the technical assistance and teaching training programs mentioned earlier. As for maintenance, systematic neglect of it is a standard feature of the Peruvian education system. To the question whether the Bank should have insisted, with the threat of loan supervision or cancellation, on full compliance with these covenants, the answer is probably negative. As mentioned warlier project CEBs and ESEPs are already providing better than average education and, with appropriate modifications, are expected to be important parts of the infrastructure envisaged within the new system. It is fortunate that those in charge of project supervision did not lose sight of this important expected outcome. Regarding maintenance, on the other hand, it appears that with continuing strong demands by teachers for salary increases the only feasible solution is to involve the local cummunity in efforts to prevent vandalism and to maintain and repair school facilities. - 45 - Peru is a country with a strong tradition of community participation. It should be possible, therefore, to find ways for involving local communities in future projects. 6.15 Operation of Project Schools. Problems are currently observed in the operation of project CEBs and ESEPs, some of them due to the gradual abandonment and eventual repeal of the reform, some to project design and/or execution, and some to characteristics of the Peruvian education system. In * the first category belong the current existence of parallel or transitional curricula (para 5.16), and the high dropout rate from ESEPs (para. 5.14). Project design or execution has resulted in some partially equipped schools (paras. 3.28, 5.10), shortage of trained specialist teachers (paras. 3.34, 3.43); lack of demand for agricultural programs kpara. 5.12); or lack of books in project-provided libraries (para. 5.12). The forces moving the education system itself, finally, have resulted in excessive numbers of administrative personnel and teachers with administrative duties who generate unnecessary costs and make school administration more difficult (paras. 5.08, 5.09). Regarding problems created from the repeal of the reform it has been recommended already that some resources should be put into a future project to help solve them and integrate project schools within the new system. Attempts to reduce the numbers of excessive administrative positions by making such reductions a precondition of future loans should be given much thought before being undertaken. The needs that future projects would address are urgent, and administrative practices are deeply entrenched. It is therefore probable that such attempts might result in serious damages without corresponding benefits. The Bank may have to settle for partial improvements resulting from, e.g., specialized training of selected adminis- trators, and let the effects of improving labor market conditions and/or of tight public budgets take care of excessive administrative positions in the longer run. Finally, more attention should be paid in the future to improve project design and supervision in order to avoid subsequent problems (e.g., include purchase of books in addition to providing libraries). From a more positive point of view, a correction of these problems could be attempted through including required resources in a future project. f 一終一 メばン／今介矛ガ熱ノ冷 . つ t 声 47 - ANNEX i PERU FiRSr EDUCATION PXWECT (Loa. ýý49 ýPE studu]IL Fiýues PI"!Ied for SL ca Actýllv Avallahle M.. of ?laýg No. of Plates T F.timatad, at Ac ually No. of pl..e. No. r Ple,ý, »e of inatituti- Appr81tal -AVatilable E-timat.d t Act.1131 Type of Inøtitition T t~ M=MY SCROOL UPPER SECONDARY ~ LS Å i TahuMtinguyo i!ýl 840 840 Å 2 clliqý ýt/ B ~ i Lla metýøplit"S 840 840 san J- de mi-flom. 1,080 1.080 A 3 Callac 84D 840 a Litma Metropolitan. - At. . M 1,nar) A 4 Nu.ý. R.P.ý-u 840 840 B - 3 Lilam møtropolftana, - Caliao 840 1,080 5 Perreiýafe 720 720 B - 4 pf.r. 160 C325) 480 6 s- P.dt. d. 1.. inc.. 600 600 13 - 5 ChL.layo 840 960 A 7 Ctacoa 840 840 B - 6 Lca 600 840 Å a san IsneciO 360 -- - 7 H~cayo 840 960 A 9 M.-hap.Y.- 480 480 - 8 Husnucc, 560 520 Å 10 Ilo (LOS Platilloe) 600 600 - 9 560 --- Å 11 le. 11 720 720 8 - 10 Arequipa 1.080 1,(180 A 12 Roqwgu4 720 720 B - 11 Cut. 880 --- A 13 B~my. sienye 720 720 B - IZ Pucallpa 440 (620) 480 Å 14 L,.t. Al 600 4- B - 13 "Jýrea 360 (310) 4W A.- 15 Paueartambo 360 360 2 - 14 Traj ill. 840 1,080 Å 16 A-rt. ýý/ 360 - 2 - 15 Trujillo 360 --- Å - 17 H-capi 360 B - 16 Ruare. 600 (325) le Socabaya (Rmter) 840 19 U. Grøa.d.. (Taý> 840 ffl MAL: An AppraiSed 11,200 Å - 20 Umbaaha jýl 720 -- Åa Anaendad B,ROO 10,120 A - U Iberia t/ 360 360 Å - 22 Talavera 480 - Å - 23 C.La (Amquipa) 360 860 Å - 24 Iquftos 720 Å - 2.5 L.. jýýl bil 720 720 Å - 26 480 480 Å - 27 Juli 720 720 Å - 28 A.&.&Sro 720 720 Å - 29 Julet. Y kl 840 840 A - 30 Smcý*go de Chuto 840 840 Å - 31 sente Kar£..' calleo 840 80 Å - 32 Chimbote 360 360 .k - 33 Pallasca 360 TorAls. A. Appraimd 21,000 - A» Amnd.d 17.040 18,000 al Primary school Facilities Progrememed. bf Ptimarj school fatilities Exteuted. Pleces for boarding which are mot ineluded ie th. total. -4- 48- PEBE FTRS PRNTrATION PWRMRn (1-nn QAQ -E) S Originally Estimated and Actually Provided Construct ati Type of Institutions Original Required Actually Provided Difference T5 ce LOWER SECONDARY SCHOOLS UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOLS B - 1 Lima Metropolitana - A - 1 Tahuantinsuyo 5,931 4.150 - 7 San Juan de Miraflor A - 2 Collique 4,545 4,063 - 11 B - 2 Lima Metropolitana - A - 3 Callao- 4,545 4.071 - 11 B - 3 Lima Hetropolitana - A - 4 Nueva Esperanza 5,931 4,691 - 13 B - 4 Piura A - 5 Ferrefiafe 3,905 3.853 - 1 B - 5 Ciclayo A - 6 San Pedro de los Tuces 3.675 3,171 - 14 B - 6 Ica A - 7 Catacaos 4,545 4,228 - 7 B - 7 Husacayo A - 8 San Ignacio 2,456 ---- - 8 Huinuco A - 9 Chachapoyas (Amazonaa) - 4.372 4,759 + 9 B - 9 Ruancavelica A - 10 Ilo (Los Platiios) 3,675 2,281 - 38 B- 10 Arequipa A - 11 Ica 3,905 3,802 -3 B -11 Cuzco A - 12 Moquegua - 4,814 4,697 - 2 B - 12 Pucallpa A - 13 Ruancayo - Sicaya 3,905 5,046 + 29 B - 13 Cajanarca A - 14 Llata - 4,137 --- - 14 Trujillo A - 15 Paucartambo 2,456 2,084 - 15 B - 15 Trujillo A - 16 Acoria A/ 3.380------B - 16 Huaraz A - 17 Huancapi 2,456 -----Sub-Total (2) A - 18 Socabaya (9unter) 4,545 4.380 - 3 A - 19 Los Cranados (Teena) 3,905 4,233 + 8 A - 20 Urubamba ! 5,931 --- A - 21 Iberia 2,456 2,481 + i TOTALS: As Apraised A - 22 Talavera 2,986 ---- As Amended A - 23 Caima (Arequipa) 2,456 3,744 + 52 A - 24 Iquitos 3,905 --- A - 25 Lamas A/ b/ 4,829 4,658 - 3 A - 26 Calleria 2,986 2,940 - 2 A - 27 Juli 3,905 3,227 - 17 A - 28 Azngaro 3,905 3,227 - 17 A - 29 Juliaca A/ k/ 5,328 3,514 - 33 A - 30 Santiago de Chuco 1 5,328 4,447 - 16 A - 31 Santa Marina, Callao 4,545 4,146 - 19 A - 32 Chimbote 2,456 3,946 + 60 A - 33 Pallasca 2,456 --- Sib-Total- (l*) As Appraised 126,009 As Amended 98,302 100,976 + 3 a/ Primary School Facilities Programmed h/ Primary School Facilities Executed Primary Scho' Facilitice area for boarding which is not included in total 22 rJEDUCATION RsEICLzT.an ojig-y) ad and Actually Provided Construction Areas (m ) Originally Actually ape ofinstitutions Required Provided Difference UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOLS B - I Lima Metropolitana - San Juan de Miraflores 5,952 4,468 - 25 B - 2 Lima Metropolitana - Ate 6,447 5,254 - 19 B - 3 Lima Metropolitana - Callao 5,493 5,326 - 3 B - 4 Piura 4,385 (1,787) 3,835 (2,076) - 13 B - 5 Chiclayo 4,658 4,857 + 6 B - 6 Ica 4,002 4,388 + 10 B - 7 Euancayo 5,397 4,775 + l B - 8 Rugnuco 3,25B 3,125 - 4 B 9 Huancavelica 3,026 -- B - 10 Arequipa 6,823 5,567 - 18 B -11 Cusco 4,710 B - 12 Pucallpa 6,286 (3,410) 3,186 (2,128) - 37 B - 13 Cajamarca 5,070 (1,815) 4,735 (2,070) - 7 B - 14 Trujillo 6,051 5,428 - 10 B - 15 Trujillo 4,370 (1,787) -- B - 16 Ruaraz 3,475 Sub-Total (2) As Appraised 79,403 (8,799) - As Amended 63,822 (7,012) 55,744 (6,274) - 13 (-11) TOTALS: As Apraised 205,412 (8,799) As Amended 162,124 (7,012) 155,744 (6,272) - 4 (-11) - 49 - ANNEX 3 PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 949-FE) Technical Assistance Specialist Services and Fellowships Appraisal Estimates and Actual Figures Appraisal Actual No. of Staff/ No. of Staff/ Specialists Months Specialists Months A. SPECIALIST SERVICES 1. Planning (Planner, 2 36 2 24 Economist) 2. Project Unit (Architect, 2 36 - - Equipment Specialist) 3. ESEP (Curriculum Develop- 4 96 3 48 ment, Graduates Follow-up) 4. Teacher Training (Practical 2 36 1 12 Science) 1/ 5. INIDE (Research and 2 48 4 39 In-service Teacher Training) Total 10 204 10 123 B. FELLOWSHIPS 1. Planning 9 156 8 83 2. Project Unit 3 84 1 6 3. ESEPs (Curriculum) 12(10-15) 180 1 9 4. CEBs 18(15-20) 300 7 60 5. Teacher Training 18(15-20) 240 3 33 (pre-service + in-service) Total 60 (52-68) 960 20 191 TOTAL COSTS US$ (nillion) 1.1 0.6 1/ of whom two local specialists and one foreign short-term (3 months) consultant. p E. R u FIRS? EDdeATION PROJECT (.OAN 949-pe) Planned and Actuat Imptementation:and Disbursements anLrrV086 (V4rCti 5, 19741 Original closing Datv3i une 30, 2979> JgguIomi߶ (aTUU -0. z2n - SWimm» IMøl 24 .. W~~l- 2 ~sæ æsomesT - - "ENTI A ODN=<2I~l .......•........ .......-........ - msa eamarn58 - TMARC BM ON-AC ................ ...........................~ - W a cm 011m 4uk~ -4 m5REc MD mIe8r m. ., . .\ . - A) .r- . . . . .r... . . . . . . . .r ...- r - a ----- ACTL 5. TEGMCAL W~ -FECILL0~ . ........... sø75~~~ 387 1O tOO 99 91 19 ---AGIL - 51 - ANNEX 5 PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 949-PE) Schedule of Disbursements (As of September 1982) Accumulated Disbursements Actual (US$ '000s equivalent) or latest estimated a Idisbursements as % of Fiscal Year and Appraisal Last Revised Esti- New appraisal estimates. Quarter Actual Estimate mate Estimate Actual Forecast 19 74 1st - (05/07/81) 02/28/83 2nd 200 3rd - 4th 200 19 75 Ist - 2nd 450 3rd - 4th 1,350 19 76 ist - 2nd 2,799 3rd 4th 4,989 19 77 1st - 2nd 587 8,340 3rd - - 4th 1,497 12,785 12 19 78 1st - - 2nd 2,723 17,245 16 3rd - 4th 4,267 21,460 20 -19 79 1st 4,920 23,740 21 2nd 5,749 24,000 24 3rd 6,480 29 4th 7,385 30 19 80 1st 8,795 .. 36 2nd 9,569 40 3rd 10,258 43 4th 12,124 50 19 81 1st 12,608 53 2nd 14,760 60 3rd 16,800 70 4th 20,551 86 19 82 Ist 21,320 89 2nd 94 3rd 22,500 98 4th 23,500 100 19 83 1st 22,707 24,000 2nd 23,007 - 52 - ANNEX 6 PERU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 949-PE) Personnel with Administrative, Coordination and Supervision Tasks in a Project CEB Teaching Load Personnel Number (period/weeks) Function a/ Managerial -Director 1 - overall responsibility -General Coordinator 1 - overall curriculum orien- tation, supervision. and implementation Technico-Pedagogical -Academic Coordinator 1 5 supervision and assessment of teaching of academic subjects -Workshop Coordinator 1 5 as above for workshop subjects -Administrative 1 5 office and other administrative Coordinator work -Student Coordinator 1 5 student services and guidance; home/school relationship -Primary Grades 1 - primary school curriculum Coordinator planning, assessment and implementation Hierarchical -Area Supervisors (asesores) 4 12 planning, organization, assessment and implementation of curriculum in a specific area (e.g., sciences, languages, etc.) -Permanent Teachers about (profesores estables) 4 12 assist the area supervisors Teaching Staff variable 24/30 a/ Managerial, technico-pedagogical and hierarchical staff should be present in the school for 40 hours/week. Source: Bank data