Philippines - Second Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4162 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPPINES SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 349-PH) November 1, 1982 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ACRONYMS BDS - Barrio Development Schools CCU - Curric:ulum Coordinating Unit CMU - Central Mindanao University EAHS - Experimental Agricultural High Schools EDC - Educac:ion Development Center EDPITAF - Educa:ion Development Projects Implementation Task Force OPS - Office of Planning Services RAC - Regional Agricultural College RMTC - Regional Manpower Training Center RS - (Agricultural) Radio Station RSTC - Regional Science Teaching Center SFP - Supervised Farming Program SL - Socia]! (Extension) Laboratory SSC - Social Studies Center TI - Technician Institute UPSEC - Science Education Center, University of the Philippines This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPPINES SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 349-PH) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface . ......................................................... i Basic Data Sheet ................................................. ii Highlights ............ ........................................... v Comments from the Borrower ....................................... vii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Summary and Conclusions ...... ................ . 3 Introduction ............................................... 9 Project Background ........ ................. 9 Project Implementation ...................................... 15 Project Cost and Financing ................ .. ................ 27 Project Operating Ouzcomes ................ .. ................ 29 Conclusions ................................................. 41 Annexes 1. Planned and Actual ]mplementation Schedule ....... .. ....... 43 2. Covenant Requirements ..................................... 44 3. Summary of Project Costs .................. .. ............... 47 4. Schedule of Disbursements .................................. 49 5. Comparative Analysis of Estimated and Actual Provided Gross Area ................. .. .................. 50 6. Comparative Analysis of Planned and Actual Areas and Cost per Place ........................ ............ 51 7. Enrollments, Drop-out Rates, and Graduates of Project Institutions ...... .............. ................. 52 8. Actual and Revised E,timates of Use of Technical Assistance and Fellowships ............... .. .............. 61 9. Employment by Sector ....... .............. .................. 66   - i - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPPINES SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 349-PH) PREFACE This is a performance audit report on the Second Education Project in the Philippines for which Credit 349-PH was approved in December 1972. The credit was fully disbursec! by and closed in August 1980. The audit repoiet consists of a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Bank Group's East Asia and Pacific Regional Office following a brief mission visit in February 1981, and a Highlights resume prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) which underlines some important elements of the project experience. As is customary in the preparation of audit reports, copies of the draft audit report were sent to the representatives of the Borrower; this was done on June 18, 1982. Borrower comments were received on August 6, 1982 and are reproduced on page vii. The PCR was itself based on a report prepared by the Borrower and a report prepared by UNESCO staff following a visit to the Philippines in April/May 1980; it contains much more material than the average Education PCR, and has required only minor revisions and additions following OED com- ment. The audit report is based on this PCR, first issued in August 1981 and revised in May 1982, the Appraisal Report PE-50A dated November 30, 1972, the President's Report P-1146 cf the same date, the Board discussion of this prior to its approval on December 12, 1972, and the Development Credit Agreement dated January 5, 1973. Certain documents in Bank Group files have also been consulted. On the basis of this limited review, OED finds no reason to question the analysis and conclusions of the PCR. While no mission was specifically undertaken by OED staff in connection with this audit, a two member OED mission visited the Philippines in February 1978 and held extensive discus- sions on this and other education projects in connection with a review of education projects in 17 countries.   PROJECT P'ERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET PHILI]'PINES SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 349-PH) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Estimate Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 17.7 21.4 Overrun (%) 21 (in dollars) 40 (in pesos) Credit Amount (US$ million) - 12.7 Disbursed - 12.7 Repaid ) Outstanding to Mrch 31, 1982- 12.7 Date Physical Components Completed 03/77 12/78 in Months Since Credit Signature 51 72 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 70 90 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) - 29 Institutional Performance Good Satisfactory OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Plan Revisions Estimated Actual First Mention in Files 02/04/69 Government's Application July 71 Negotiations 07/24-28/71 Board Approval 12/12/72 Date of Credit Agreement 01/05/73 Credit Effectiveness 04/10/73 04/11/73 Closing Date 12/31/78 -- 08/27/80 Borrower Republic of the Philippines Executing Agency Department of Education Fiscal Year of Borrower July 1 - June 30 Names of Follow-on Projects Education Projects III - VII Item Project III Project IV Project V Project VI Project VII Loan No. 1224T-PH 1374-PH S-8-PH 1786-PH 2030-PH Amount (US$ million) 25.0 25.0 2.0 38.0 100.0 Loan Agreement Dates 04/08/76 03/25/77 04/21/78 02/01/80 08/25/81   - iii - MISSION DATA Sent Month/ No. of No. of Staff- Date of Mission by Year Weeks* Persons Weeks* Report Identification UNESCO 01-02/71 3.5 4 14.0 03/10/71 Reconnaissance IDA 05/71 0.5 2 1.0 06/30/71 Preparation UNESCO 06-07/12 3.0 5 15.0 08/13/71 Appraisal IDA 11/71 3.5 5 17.5 11/30/72 Total 47.5 Supervision I IDA 08/73 1.0 1 1.0 08/30/73 Supervision II IDA 06/74 1.0 1 1.0 07/05/74 Supervision III IDA 11-12/74 0.7 2 1.5 01/14/75 Supervision IV IDA 06-07/75 1.0 2 2.0 08/12/75 Supervision V IDA 01-02/76 0.7 2 1.5 04/14/76 Supervision VI IDA 11/76 0.1 1 0.1 01/04/77 Supervision VII IDA 04/77 0.1 1 0.1 06/30/77 Supervision VIII IDA 09/77 0.5 1 0.5 10/17/77 Supervision IX IDA 12/77 1.0 1 1.0 01/31/78 Supervision X IDA 06/78 0.5 2 1.0 07/18/78 Supervision XI IDA 11/79 1.5 1 1.5 01/07/80 Completion UNESCO 04-05/80 2.0 2 4.0 Total 15.2 COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Philippine Peso (P) Exchange Rates: Appraisal Year Average US$1 = P 6.40 Intervening Years Average US$1 = P 7.31 Completion Year Average US$1 = p 7.38 * Estimated number of weeks and staff-weeks attributable to this project (including travel time).   - iv - ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS (US$) Original Revised Actual Category Allocation Allocation Disbursement (12/04/78) I. Equipment, Furniture -and Educational Materials $ 6,800,000 $ 7,700,000 $ 7,454,950.10 II. Civil Works and Professional Services therefor 1,870,000 3,300,000 3,798,783.22 III. Technical Assistance --International Travel, Remuneration and Allowances 2,100,000 1,700,000 1,446,266.68 IV. Unallocated 1,930,000 - $12,700,000 $12,700,000 $12,700,000.00   -v - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPP'INES SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 349-PH) HIGHLIGHTS The Second Education Proje'e.i: ii the Philippines was estimated to cost US$17.7 million equivalent. It was financed in pait by an IDA Credit of US$12.7 million, signed on January 5, 1973. The project aimed at helping to reform the education system and in meeting manpower needs for economic development. The project design was complex, including the creation or development of no less than forty-four project institutions of several dif- ferent types, spanning the fields of curriculum coordination and education development at the national level, science teaching at the regional level, plus a number of technical and agricultural education institutions. The PCR lists project components in para. 2.07. The original Closing Date of the project was December 31, 1978, and this was never officially changed. The Credit Account was closed on August 27, 1980 when the Credit funds had been completely disbursed. The final project cost was US$21.4 million, 21% over the appraisal estimate.l/ Civil works costs were substantially higher than estimated and economies were made in other categories, particularly the equipment and technical assistance categories, to cover them. Despite its complexity, which' the PCR rightly criticizes (paras. 5.01, 6.01 and 6.04), the project has been worthwhile, and was successfully implemented after some critical problems with approval of designs (PCR, para. 3.11). The main credit for this should go to the Government for its consistent support of the project both financially and otherwise, and in particular to EDPITAF, the project implementing agency which did a good job of coordinating institutional views with IDA comments. The PCR mentions (para. 5.01) the success of EDPITAF in managing succeeding Bank-assisted education projects and indeed the institutional-building elements of this project have been amongst its major benefits. Furniture and equipment lists were prepared by the institutions concerned--always a desirable procedure where possible--or by ad hoc committees in the case of new institutions (PCR, paras. 3.14 and 3.15). The transfer of funds for equipment to the civil works category to meet cost overruns is however adversely affecting the achievement of project objectives (PCR, para. 3.17). The audit has been informed that a proposed eighth education project will include funds to make up for these deficiencies. Considerable savings were effected in the Technical Assistance category (see Basic Data) which were made possible largely by using local instead of foreign experts (PCR, para. 3.20). A considerable increase in fellowship provision was also made possible (PCR, para. 3.21). 1/ The cost overrun in pesos amounted to 40%. See Key Project Data and the PCR, para. 12.  - vi - With such a diverse project, it is only to be expected that certain components, particularly those of a more experimental nature, were not entirely successful. These include the experimental agricultural schools, where the students were insufficiently mature for the practical programs offered, and the schools have reverted mainly to college preparation and have re-instituted degree programs (PCR, paras. 5.07-5.16). Similar problems were encountered with the Basic Development School programs; here the terminal vocational agricultural programs, which were not popular, have been converted to general secondary programs with an agricultural bias (PCR, paras. 5.17- 5.19). The attempt to establish practically-oriented Social (Extension) Laboratories has also not been completely successful (PCR, paras. 5.26-5.28). These developments illustrate once more the difficulties inherent in changing curricula, which have been noted often. It is of interest to note that this project was included in the OED Review of Bank Operations in the Education Sector. While the Review comments were generally favorable, it was noted that some cases of short-sighted planning for project universities had posed problems regarding their further expansion.2- The other project elements, though suffering from minor problems, are regarded as being successful overall; indeed even the less successful project elements might well be regarded as successful in other situations and in the context of less ambitious original aims. The PCR (Chapter 5) gives a good account of project achievements. Other points of special interest are: (a) the under-representation of industry on the Technician Education Board (PCR, para. 3.29); (b) the unrealism of IDA in the light of intense social demand and the general educational levels of the population to try to institute terminal secondary courses and to try to limit university enroll- ments, although both policies were justifiable on manpower grounds (PCR, para. 3.32). 1/ Report No. 2321 - Review of Bank Operations in the Education Sector, December 29, 1978. See paragraphs 4.17, 4.20, 5.24, 5.30, 5.40, 6.04, 6.06 and 6.10.  - vii - COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER WORLDBNK641 450 45446 EDPITAF PM 8/6/82 WORLD BANK r J INTBAFRAD FOR SHIV KAPUR. OPEI?ATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT. THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT WITH MANY THANKS YOUR LETTER WITH COPY OF WORLD BANK DRAFT ON THE PROJECT PERFOR:MANCE AUDIT REPORT OF CREDIT 349-PH. WE AFE INDEED PLEASED WITH IT AND FIND IT SATISFACTORY. WE HAVE NO COMMENTS TO MAKE. REGARDS. TENMATAY 45446 EDPITAF PMu WORLDBNK641450 45446 EDPITAF PM.....   PHILIPPINES SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT CREDIT 349-PU PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT August 20, 1981 (Revised May 19, 1982) Projects Department East Asia and Pacific Regional Office   - 3 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The Project and its Objectives 1. The general purpose of the project, as specified in the appraisal report, was to lay the framework leading to possible future educational reform and also to meet manpower needs in industry and agriculture. The project was designed to assist the Philippine Government in improving education planning, management and curriculum development; science teacher training; training of technicians for industry and agriculture; and training of skilled craftsmen aad farmers. 2. The Credit Agreement for the Second Education Project was signed between IDA and the Government on January 5, 1973. The Credit, which was for US$12.7 million out of a total project cost of US$17.7 million, became effective on April 11, 1973 and the target closing date was December 31, 1978. The institutions were handed over to the beneficiary Government agencies with a six-month delay. At that time, 90% of the project was implemented. 3. A special un:it, the Education Development Projects Implementation Task force (EDPITAF), was established to implement the project. While EDPITAF initially experienced some difficulties in managing the project, as it gained experience, it successfuly handled problems encountered during implementation and valuable lessons were learned which greatly facilitated the preparation and implementation of subsequent projects. During the course of project implementation, EDPITAF has developed into an expert agency charged with implementing all foreign assisted education projects and with carrying out educational research. 4. In general the educational objectives of the project have been met, although there have been deviations from the original targets. The Associa- tion's belief that manpower planning considerations should have the greatest weight in determining project outcomes led it to include several educational covenants among the standard set of Credit covenants. During project imple- mentation, it became clear that there were important social and political considerations which would not permit full realization of the goals set forth in these covenants. Changes in goals set forth in the Credit Agreement were noted for the following, components: (i) the Barrio Development Schools; (ii) the Experimental Agricultural High Schools; and (iii) the Regional Agricultural Colleges (paras. 5.18, 5.14 and 5.22). Overall, the project was moderately successful. 5. The strengthening of educational planning was achieved through the establishment of the Curriculum Coordination Unit and the Education Develop- ment Center. The component can be considered successful although, one aspect, the proposed integration of the Science Education Center and Social Studies Center, was not achieved in practice (paras. 5.03-5.04).  - 4 - 6. The expansion of training of science teachers was achieved through the establishment of Regional Science Teaching Centers and can be considered successful (para. 5.05). 7. The expansion of training of young farmers through the Experimental Agricultural High Schools (EAHS) and the Barrio Development Schools (BDS) has been modestly successful. Both institutions contribute substantially to the level of educational attainment of the rural population and to the equali- zation of educational opportunities, but less than anticipated to the practical training of young farmers (paras. 5.08-5.15 and 5.20). 8. The training of professional agricultural personnel and the improve- ment of the agricultural extension services were pursued through the rein- forcement of the agricultural colleges and the establishment of two Social Laboratories and two Agricultural Radio Stations. The Agricultural Colleges have been successful in expanding their agricultural courses, but the quality of the instruction appears to have suffered principally because of high student/teacher ratios (paras. 5.23-24). The Social Laboratories contribute to agricultural research and model farming, but do little in extension training which was the original purpose of the component (paras. 5.26-27). Finally, of the Radio Stations, one (at UP Los Banos) is working properly, while the other (at CMU) had serious difficulties and has just begun functioning (para. 5.29). 9. The training of industrial technicians through the Technician Institutes is difficult to assess as yet since there have been no graduates from one of the institutions and the other two have yet to reach full capacity output. It appears that a better understanding of the role of technicians is necessary and that measures should be taken to encourage more direct participation of industry in the training process. An attempt to establish a Board for Technician Training has so far failed (para. 5.35). 10. The expansion and improvement of the training of skilled craftsmen can be considered successful. All but one of the Regional Manpower Training Centers are functioning and their output is slightly more than that forecast at appraisal. Mechanisms to link output of the centers and manpower requirements have not yet been established, and there is a lack of coordin- ation of efforts between the several agencies dealing with craft training. In addition, there is insufficient involvement of industry in the training process. Measures should be taken to remedy these drawbacks (para. 5.39). 11. Along with the considerable success of some components, the project encountered problems in some domains and lessons have accordingly been drawn. Difficulties developed in the areas of:  - 5- (a) price escalation; (b) architectural designs; (c) procurement of furniture and equipment; and (d) technical assistance. (a) Price Escalation 12. There were many reasons for the 40% cost overrun which the project experienced. Implementation took place during the 1974 oil crisis which had a general inflationary impact in the Philippines, as elsewhere. Delays were experienced in the start of civil works and compounded the effects of high inflation rates. Increases in areas constructed and unnecessarily expensive designs for some institutions also contributed. Funds were transferred from the equipment component to meet the increased cost of civil works (paras. 3.07-3.09 and 3.17). (b) Architectural Designs 13. Architectural designs were the source of a series of misunder- standings between the Association and EDPITAF. Consultant architects were briefed by EDPITAF in a special seminar organized at the beginning of the project, but some did not follow the instructions and produced nonfunctional and unnecessarily expensive designs. Characteristic examples are the buildings of the Barrio Development schools attached to the CLSU, additional buildings at CLSU and the Technician Institute in Manila. The status and reputation of the consultant architects made it difficult for EDPITAF to influence them and obtain the necessary changes in the designs. Discussions on this matter between EDE'ITAF and the Association resulted in only marginal design changes (paras. 3.06, 3.07 and 3.11). 14. Some suggestions have been made as to how similar situations should be handled in the future. A simple first step would be to exclude from future projects architects who were not cooperative. EDPITAF has already taken this step. Other suggested measures include: (i) Briefing seminars, but with the participation of Bank representatives (architects and educators); (ii) More detailied architect's briefs (not limited to a set of working sheets) to give the generalist architect a better understanding of the importance of the functional aspect of a school design and of the need for economies in construction. The role of the Bank architects in supervision should also be clearly explained;  - 6- (iii) Continuity in supervision. The fact that several different Bank architects were sent for supervision during the Second Education Project seemed to have caused confusion; and (iv) Bank review focusing on sketch design during project preparation/appraisal (prior to the signature of the Credit/ Loan Agreement) (para. 3.10). (c) Procurement of Furniture and Equipment 15. Furniture produced was of uneven quality. For subsequent projects EDPITAF decided that manufacturers winning contracts should be asked to produce prototypes to serve as control samples for the remainder of production (para. 3.14). 16. With respect to equipment, EDPITAF initially experienced problems with procurement, including deliveries with missing components and/or without instruction manuals, long delays in delivery and failure to supply some equipment. In part, confusion was created because initial equipment lists were not adequately prepared and because some orders were placed by item and not by set or package. In part, EDPITAF's lack of familiarity with Bank procedures and ICB prevented it from using to full advantage the performance bond and retention money as leverage vis-a-vis suppliers to hold them to the terms of their contracts. EDPITAF has taken measures to remedy these problems, including instituting procurement procedures which include an effective system of checking and controlling delivery. (d) Technical Assistance 17. Difficulties in implementation of technical assistance were principally due to Government's desire to reduce the number of foreign specialists and increase the number of fellowships and its belief that fellowships were to be awarded by the project Closing Date, rather than completed by that date (paras 3.20-3.21). Several proposed foreign experts were successfully replaced by local experts. By project completion, 1,052 man/months of fellowships and 41.5 man/months of expert services were not used and were provided under the third loan (Loan 1224T-PH). In future projects the availability of local expertise should be carefully examined before including foreign expert services in a project. 18. Other problems encountered included smaller per student area norms than forecast at appraisal and overly optimistic projections of enrollment decreases for project institutions (paras. 5.12, 5.17, 5.22). Despite an increase in gross areas, the area per student place was considerably decreased due to higher than forecast enrollments. The Association's desire to bring output in the various subsectors into line with projections of market demand led it to give less weight to the social demand for education than was realistic.  19. As a result of experience gained in the implementation of this project, Bank staff have become more aware of the need to carefully assess political and social conditions prior to the formulation of covenants. Thus, educational outcomes may be based on more realistic expectations (paras. 5.15, 5.20).   - 9 - PHILIPPINES SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT: COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 This completion report is based upon draft completion reports prepared by the Borrower and by a Unesco mission. The Borrower's report was prepared by the Educational Development Projects Implementing Task Force (EDPITAF), the project implementation unit (PIU) for Credit 349-PH. The Unesco mission visited the country in April/May 1980. The two draft completion reports have been supplemented by interviews with project unit staff and documents contained in the project file. 1.02 In all instances, the project has been analyzed according to the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of education in project institu- tions, and compared, to the extent possible, with targets set in the Staff Appraisal Report. II. PROJECT BACKGROUND The Setting 2.01 The Philippines, with a total surface of 297,000 sq km consists of three island groups, Luzon in the north, Visayas in the middle and Mindanao in the south. Administratively it is divided into 13 regions. The population is estimated at approximately 49 million and has been growing at an annual rate of 2.8% per annum (3% in the 1960s). Over 80% of the popula- tion is concentrated in the two main islands of Luzon and Mindanao. There are eight dominant local languages in the Philippines spoken by 85% of the population. Pilipino, c,r Tagalog, has been made the national language by the Government and it is understood by over 60% of the people. The policy of the Government is to develop a bilingual nation able to communicate in both Pilipino and English. The Economy 2.02 GDP grew at an. average annual rate of 6.2% between 1970 and 1977, reaching P 78 billion (at 1972 prices) in 1977. The employment by sector and its percentage distribution for the years 1970, 1975 and 1977 are given in Annex 8. Unemployment is estimated to be around 15% of the labor force at present, while underemployment is of the same order of magnitude.  - 10 - Education System 2.03 The system of education comprises six years of elementary and four years of secondary schooling. At the postsecondary level there are two year diploma and three year degree level undergraduate courses. Postgraduate courses are available in certain subjects. A major characteristic of the formal education system is its high enrollment rate. In 1972, when this project was appraised, a gross participation rate of almost 100% was reported at the elementary level, 71% (now 55%) at secondary level and 25% (now 21%) at the postsec6ndary level. However, studies of the system revealed that its quality and the distribution of students among the various kinds of courses did not meet development requirements. 2.04 When project implementation began, the Philippine Government had just completed, with the assistance of the Ford Foundation, a massive review of the education sector. The report of the Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education, issued in 1970, identified several weaknesses of the sector. Foremost among those identified were: (a) low quality of instruction in the educational system at primary, secondary and tertiary levels; (b) weak planning and management capability; (c) outdated basic education curricula; (d) uncoordinated curriculum development; (e) inappropriate science and mathematics teaching methods; (f) an oversupply of business and liberal arts graduates combined with an acute shortage of qualified agricultural manpower; (g) shortages of vocational and technical manpower; (h) poorly equipped agricultural schools and colleges; and (i) poorly trained teaching staff. This report, detailing the above-mentioned sector weaknesses, among others, served as a partial basis for setting the priority areas needing assistance and, as a result, the composition of the second education project reflected the diversity of sector investment needs.  Project Generation 2.05 This project was the second to be financed in the education sector. The first project, Loan 393-PH had financed improvements to the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines at Los Banos. As that project neared completion, the Association began evaluating wider sector needs. Prior to loan signing, the following missions were involved in project generation: (a) Identification Mission (Unesco), January/February 1971. (b) Reconnaissance (Association), May 1971. (c) Preparation (Unesco), June/July 1971. (d) Appraisal (Association), November 1971. Project Objectives 2.06 As specified in the Appraisal Report, the purpose of the Second Education Project was to lay the framework leading to possible future educational reform and also to meet the manpower needs in industry and agriculture. The project was to: (a) provide the Department of Education and Culture, through the new Office of Planning Service and the Education Development Center, with the physical and human resources necessary to improve educational planning and management and to reform the education system; (b) expand the training of science teachers in accordance with national needs; (c) expand the training of young farmers in rural areas and help them to begin commercial farming enterprises; (d) improve and reorient the training of professional agricultural personnel at two colleges in accordance with urgent manpower needs, with particular emphasis on the improvement of the agricultural and extension services; (e) initiate the training of industrial technicians to fill the mid-level positions; and (f) expand and improve the training of skilled craftsmen in accordance with industrial manpower needs.  - 12 - Project Items 2.07 There were eleven components in the project as listed below: Table 1: PROJECT COMPONENTS AND COST Items Estimated cost (US$ million) Curriculum Coordinating Unit (CCU) Equipment, books and materials for a Curriculum 0.04 Coordinating Unit attached to the Office of Planning Service (OPS) of the Ministry of Education and technical assistance to supplement that being provided by UNDP. The proposed CCU was to coordinate curricular research being carried out by various agencies. Education Development Center (EDC) Construction, equipment and furniture for an Education 0.54 Development Center at the University of the Philippines (UP) integrating the Science Education Center of the University (UPSEC) and the Social Studies Education Center of the Department of Education (SSEC). Regional Science Teaching Centers (RSTCs) Construction, equipment and furniture for two new RSTCs 0.49 and equipment and furniture for two existing centers. The centers were to form an integral part of the State College in the region concerned and provide teacher training in science at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, as well as inservice training for science teachers during summer vacations. The centers were also to experiment with instructional materials developed by UPSEC and conduct research in the teaching of science in elementary and secondary schools. Experimental Agricultural High Schools (EAHSs) Laboratory and workshop equipment, construction 1.34 materials and initial supplies (fertilizers, seeds, insecticides) for 13 agricultural high schools for the introduction of a practically oriented curriculum in these schools.  - 13 - Items Estimated cost (US$ million) Regional Agricultural Colleges (RACs) Construction, equipment and furniture for additional 2.74 laboratories and workshops for two agricultural colleges attached, orte each, to the Central Luzon State University (CLSU) and the Central Mindanao University (CMU) with the purpose of developing these colleges into regionaLl centers for agricultural training and research. Technical assistance was also planned to support the universities staff development programs. Social (Extension) Laboratories (SLs) Construction, equipment and furniture for two Social 0.11 (Extension) Laboratories to be located "at the center of a group of adjacernt villages" close to the two universities (CLSU arLd CMU) to which they were attached. The universities were to provide services and staffing for the operation of these laboratories. Pilot Barrio (Village) Development Schools (BDSs) Construction, equipment and furniture for six BDSs, 0.34 three attached to the CLSU agricultural college, and three to the CMU agricultural college included in the project. The schools were to be located in nearby villages and were to have a terminal program with strong agricultural bias. Agricultural Radio Stations (RSs) Construction, equipment and furniture for a new agricul- 0.15 tural radio station at CMU, and equipment, studio facilities and mobile units for an existing radio station at the University of Los Banos (UPLB). The stations were to cooperate with the Government and private agencies in devising and operating their extension programs.  - 14 - Items Estimated cost (US$ million) Technician Institutes (TIs) Construction,.equipment and furniture for two Technician 2.60 Institutes located, one each, in Manila and Bacolod, and provision of additional equipment for the Iligan Institute of Technology. The institutes were to conduct a three-year course at the postsecondary level. Regional Manpower Training Centers (RMTCs) Construction, equipment and furniture for ten RMTCs. 3.68 The centers were to offer short, modular fulltime and evening courses ranging from introductory to advanced level for youths and adults, and in the process they were to meet industry's needs for skilled craftsmen. Technical Assistance A provision of 62 man-years of specialist services and 2.57 56 man-years of overseas fellowships was included in the project to assist the Project Unit in equipment procure- ment, increase the staff of the agricultural colleges and technical institutes, and strengthen the teams for the pre-investment studies on textbook production, educational planning and management, curriculum reform and other educational research activities. Total /a 14.60 /a Excluding contingencies which totalled US$3.08 million for a total project cost of US$17.68 million, of which US$12.7 million was financed by the Association.  - 15 - The Philippine Government expected to receive further technical assistance from UNDP. It was agreed at negotiations that if such assistance were forthcoming, the allocalion for technical assistance could be reduced accordingly and the funds transferred to other components (see para. 3.19). II::. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Overview 3.01 This project was very complex and provided the first wide-scale assistance to the education sector. Perhaps because of its complexity, a number of changes occurred during implementation. These changes and the reasons for them are discussed below. Chapter III examines general imple- mentation issues, Chapter IV analyzes total project costs, and Chapter V examines project operating outcomes. Overall the project had mixed success in meeting goals set forth at appraisal. As concerns educational outcomes, it had greater success in meeting shorter term quantitative goals than in meeting longer range institutional development goals. While considerable difficulty was experienced with respect to civil works and equipment procure- ment, resulting in a substantial cost overrun, the project set in motion a number of changes which have borne fruit in subsequent projects. Most notably, EDPITAF has become skilled at successful project implementation, for Bank-assisted projects, as well as those financed by other agencies. 3.02 At appraisal it was expected that physical implementation would be completed by December 31, 1976. Taking into account delays in physical implementation, guarantee periods and implementation of the technical assistance component, it was expected that project activities would be completed by September 1978. December 31, 1978 was established as the Closing Date. Due to considerable difficulties experienced at the outset in the appointment of consultant architects, the formulation of architect's briefs, the appointment of experts and changes in several sites, implemen- tation was delayed, and disbursements were not completed until August 1980. Despite these delays, the institutions assisted by the project were handed over to Government only six months behind schedule. When the transfer took place, 90% of project implementation had been completed (98% of civil works were completed, 80% of furniture and equipment contracted, while 86% of project funds were disbursed). Further delays were occasioned by late delivery of equipment an,l the delayed arrival of some technical assistance experts. Due to price e3calation during the implementation period and the expensive design of some buildings (areas were increased by an average of 30%), total project cost exceeded appraisal estimates by 21%. No components were deleted from the project, but the amount of equipment foreseen at appraisal was reduced to cover the increased cost of civil works.  - 16 - Credit Effectiveness 3.03 Two conditions were to be met by Government in order that the Credit be declared effective: (1) the establishment and operation of a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in the Department (now Ministry) of Education and (2) the establishment and maintenance of a special fund adequate to cover local implementation costs. Both conditions were fulfilled and the Credit was declared effective on schedule. Project Management 3.04 The PIU required by the Credit Agreement was called the Education Development Projects Implementation Task Force (EDPITAF). It was responsible to the Secretary (now Minister) of Education. During the course of project implementation it developed into a powerful unit in charge of carrying out project identification, preparation, implementation and educational research in specified areas. Within one year of its creation, it was operating with a staff of 100 persons. As might be expected, EDPITAF experienced some difficulties during the early stages of project implementation. The PIU was a newly established unit and had had no previous experience with IDA projects, nor with functioning as a coordinated planning and implementation unit. Initially EDPITAF found it difficult to obtain simple and functional designs from the consultant architects, program divisions lacked expertise in agricultural education and manpower planning required for the project, and there were some coordination problems between EDPITAF divisions early in the implementation period. After an initial "break-in" period, EDPITAF gradually developed into an efficient and well managed unit. Sites 3.05 When the Credit Agreement was signed, most of the sites had been selected but not all were evaluated. Of 26 sites for new institutions financed under the project, 21 were to be acquired. At the end of the acquisition process, the location of five project institutions had to be changed, as indicated in the table below:  - 17 - Table 2: CHANGES IN PROJECT SITES Moved Institution From To Reason RMTC Binan Batangas City Site unsuitable (flooding, inadequate area) RMTC Cagayan Iligan City Site unsuitable (no access road) RMTC Marikina Guiguinto Ownership problems RMTC Naga Npili Ownership problems Social Laboratory Moramang CMU campus For convenience in operation Lengthy legal procedures for the acquisition of the Marikina and Naga sites led to consiclerable delays. In addition, the decision to move the social laboratory site from Moramang to the CMU campus was made only in June 1975, that is, 26 months after the signing of the Credit Agreement. This experience suggests that, whenever feasible, sites should be fully eva- luated and acquired befoire the signing of the Credit Agreement. Professional Services 3.06 Twenty-five firms of consultant architects were invited for pre- qualification. Of these, 13 (all Filipino firms) responded and 12 were recommended by the qualifications committee established in the PIU Civil Works Division. Later the Association recommended that the number of firms be reduced to nine to avoid unnecessary design duplication and because the large number of consultant architects involved made it difficult for Project Architects to control their work. All consultant firms were briefed by EDPITAF during a two day seminar in 1973 and provided with an explanation of what the terms of the Credit Agreement implied concerning space standards, design and bidding procedures. They were also provided with an architect's brief prepared by the Civil Works Division. After project implementation, of the nine consultants, two were considered unacceptable by EDPITAF because of their unwillingness to adjust to the cost norms implied by IDA credit agreements. These architects were excluded from bidding on subsequent projects implemented by EDPITAF.  - 18 - Architectural Designs 3.07 Although the purpose of the briefing seminar mentioned above was to introduce the consultant architects to the broad parameters within which their work was to be done, and was, in principle, a sound straightforward means of accomplishing this end, the difficulties encountered during project implementation suggest that communication was not sufficiently clear. Most of the consultant architects did not follow the basic principles explained during the seminar and outlined in the architect's brief. Preliminary designs were submitted with areas unnecessarily increased above those presen- ted in the IDA worksheets and most were far more sophisticated and expensive, as well. 3.08 Most notable for increases in areas and concomitant increases in costs were: (i) the RMTCs in which gross areas for workshops were increased by 50%, with an attendant cost escalation of 269%; (ii) the Taguig and Visayas TIs where increased areas resulted in cost increases of 179% and 162%, respectively; and (iii) the CLSU construction which was increased by 31%, with a concomitant cost escalation of 123%. The Association strongly objected to preliminary designs of the BDSs at CLSU and declined to finance these schools finding their designs unsuited to their rural environment and excessively costly. 3.09 Almost all preliminary sketch designs sent to the Association were rejected. There followed a period of 18 months during which the Association reviewed sketches both at headquarters and during supervision missions. While the Civil Works Division of the PIU agreed that there were deviations from worksheet norms, particularly with respect to the schedule of accommoda- tions, areas and design sophistication, it did not concur with the Association architects' belief that: (a) areas should not deviate by more than 10% from the specifications set forth in the original worksheets; (b) while building designs should accommodate local conditions, internationally accepted norms should be adhered to whenever possible, especially with respect to cost norms; and (c) the Credit Agreement's implied cost norms should prevail even if Government is willing to absorb cost overruns above those provided for by project contingency funds. 3.10 The entire 18 month period was characterized by a lack of effective communication between IDA, EDPITAF, and the consultant architects. As a result there were long delays in preparing tender documents. Because of these delays, and a general inability of those involved to reach agreement, the Executive Director of EDPITAF intervened to request clarification of the role of IDA architectural supervision. His intervention eventually led to an exchange of letters in which he proposed that: (a) the role of IDA staff on supervision missions be clarified; (b) that Government's obligation to consult IDA on architectural matters be clarified; and (c) that one Association architect be designated to oversee the implementation of a particular project  - 19 - from start to finish. Thle Association responded by proposing that: (a) an agreement be reached on limits beyond which changes in worksheets could not be made without a clearly recorded, convincing justification; (b) IDA architects review and comment on draft architectural briefs and that this review take place by the time of negotiations; and (c) that EDPITAF submit drawings at an earlier stage in the desLgn cycle. Given the work program of the Division and its obligations toward all Borrowers it would not be feasible to assign one architect to follow a project throughout the implementation period. 3.11 The Association never formally approved the designs. In order to put an end to the communlcation difficulties and avoid further delays, IDA agreed that if the Ministry of Finance approved the designs after having been informed of IDA comments and the cost implications of the designs, then IDA would make no further comments. Bidding Procedures 3.12 International competitive bidding (ICB) was followed for civil works, furniture and equLpment components. All contracts for civil works and furniture were won by local firms. EDPITAF evaluated all bids, local and foreign, and submitted the list to the Association for approval. In the case of equipment, EDPITAF established a committee of three technical advisors, chosen by the Executive Director. When the bids had been evaluated by EDPITAF, they were sent with recommendations to the project institutions for comment, then to the Tecmnical Committee for final approval. Contracts were made between EDPITAF and the supplier. Terms of contracts and payments, approved by IDA, were based on advance payments equivalent to 90% of the foreign costs. During the early phase of the project, bids were organized item by item. Only a few items were packaged (electronic trainers, motors, audiovisual equipment, etc.). Later bids were prepared by package. The Bank also agreed to direct purchases by EDPITAF up to a maximum of US$50,000. When it became evident that the cost of civil works was considerably higher than appraisal estimates, it was mutually agreed to reduce the equipment purchase orders so that the savinlgs could cover part of the cost overrun on the civil works component. Construction 3.13 While the quality of construction was good and timing was satisfac- tory, the heavy workload of some contractors and their limited cash flow slowed down the building process. There was, however, no need for retender- ing. Due to an average delay of 8 months in the start of construction, at a time when the inflationary effects of the 1974 world oil crisis were particu- larly pronounced, construction costs greatly exceeded appraisal estimates. Although EDPITAF considered advanced procurement of building materials as a means of reducing costs, it finally abandoned this strategy because of the  - 20 - administrative and procedural difficulties involved. Final construction costs were 108% above appraisal estimates. All cost overruns were absorbed by Government. Furniture 3.14 During the early phase of the project, the Civil Works Division of EDPITAF was responsible for design and procurement of furniture. It provided designs for basic furniture for lecture rooms and general classrooms. Later the responsibility for procurement was transferred to the Procurement Division. Furniture lists were prepared by the institutions concerned and submitted to EDPITAF. At the Closing Date, all but 2% of the furniture had been delivered to project sites. However, in general, the quality of the furniture is uneven and of a low standard. Several constructive suggestions to improve the situation were made by EDPITAF, including: (a) a recommenda- tion that manufacturers winning contracts be asked to produce prototypes of furniture to serve as control samples for total production and (b) that initial furniture lists be prepared more carefully so that they need not be redone, resulting in delays and possible cost increases. Equipment 3.15 Equipment lists were prepared by the institutions concerned and supplemented by ad hoc committees including specialists from the Ministry of Education and consultants hired by EDPITAF./1 3.16 At the time of the original closing date (December 31, 1978), 80.4% of the allocation for equipment had been disbursed. The following are among the main reasons for delays in the purchasing of equipment: (a) shortage of counterpart funds required to meet cost overruns and local handl'ng charges, resulting in the delay of further bidding; (b) delays in the completion of buildings (particularly technical institutes and some RMTCs), which led to delays in procurement of equipment; and (c) reallocation of some equipment between project institutions. /1 In the case of new institutions, the ad hoc committees took over full responsibility.  - 21 - In addition, it was found that some agricultural equipment delivered to the project institutions was not suited to the type of soil or the type of crop. Finally, a number of components were delivered with missing accessories (which had been separately bid) or without an operational manual. 3.17 Due to delays and cost overruns in the civil works component, the appraisal allocation for equipment purchases had to be reduced. Overall, approximately 73% of the equipment was procured. Of the institutions assisted by the project, the CCU) received the smallest portion of its original alloca- tion. Only 33% of the equipment envisaged was purchased. The most severely affected of the technical project institutions were the RMTCS which received 60% of their equipment allocation, but which were often unable to supply the basic machinery received with the required accessories and parts. The Tech- nician Institutes and the Regional Agricultural Colleges received approxi- mately 80% of their original allocation. Despite reductions in equipment allocations, equipment costs for some institutions exceeded appraisal esti- mates. For the TIs, cost overruns were on the order of 117%. For the RACs, costs exceeded appraisal estimates by an average of 35%. With respect to the RMTCs, Government had to allocate +P 650,000 for the purchase of tools to supplement those provided by the project. The proposed eight education project (Vocational Training) includes equipment for the RMTCs to supplement that received under the second project. Technical Assistance 3.18 Appraisal estimates included provision for 62 man years of speciali- zed services and 56 man. years of fellowships for training abroad at a total cost of US$2 million. This assistance was provided in order to strengthen educational planning an!d management, curricula development and evaluation, reinforce the technical competence of staff in the agricultural colleges, the technician institutes and in EDPITAF. 3.19 In addition to the technical assistance included in the project, the Government expected UNDP to finance approximately 31 man-years of spe- cialist services and 6.25 man-years of fellowships. However, due to UNDP financial difficulties, this program did not materialize and the Government had to seek bilateral assistance; hence considerable delays were experienced in this respect. 3.20 In July 1975, EDPITAF proposed extensive changes in the technical assistance program, principally in order to reduce the number of foreign experts because they could be replaced by Filipinos, and increase the allocations to fellowships. The major reasons for their proposal were: (a) project institutions were reluctant to hire foreign experts where local staff was available; savings realized could be transferred to the fellowship program;  - 22 - (b) inflation had considerably increased the cost of expert services and fellowships; (c) savings could be used to cover the cost of overruns in civil works; and (d) changes in the enrollments at CMU and CLSU, requiring increased faculty with higher qualifications, and changes in the study program reduced the need for technical assistance. 3.21 Expert services were decreased from 744 to 576 man-months. All together, the specialists served for 582 man-months. The number of fellow- ships was similarly revised from 38 to 167 with a corresponding increase from 678 to 3,098 man-months. EDPITAF established a Technical Assistance Coordinating Committee to evaluate the credentials of the candidates, but scouting for and selecting experts was jointly carried out by the Project Unit and the institutions. The above mentioned revisions together with difficulties in the recruitment of experts and administrative red tape resulted in considerable delays. As a consequence of the delays 1,052 man-months of fellowships and 41.5 man-months of expert services were not used. Nevertheless, the cost of the fellowships surpassed the appraisal estimate by 26%. As funds originally intended for the technical assistance component were used for other project categories under Loan 1214-T-PH, financing was provided for the expert services which had been deleted. MAN-MONTHS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE /a Actual Appraisal Revised in 1974 Actual Appraisal % I. Specialists 744 576 582 78 II. Fellows 678 2,960 3,098 457 /a See Annex 7, Table 11 for details. Covenants 3.22 Most covenants related to civil works were fulfilled (Article III of the Credit Agreement). Covenants related to the attainment of the pro- ject's educational goals (Article IV) were substantially modified during project implementation. Most modifications were made due to overriding social or political considerations, which are discussed in detail below. The status of all covenants is given in Annex 2.  - 23 - (a) Training of Young Farmers (i) Experimental Agricultural High Schools 3.23 Section 4.04(b) of the Credit Agreement specifies that "within three years after the date of this Agreement, all the agricultural high schools included in the project cither than those at Munoz and Musuan should offer courses only at the secondary level (i.e., Grades 7-10) for the purpose of directing the efforts of such high schools to programs related to agricultural development." Degree programs were phased out by July 1972, but were reintroduced in 1975/76 for social and political reasons (para. 5.15). 3.24 Article 4.04(c) of the Credit Agreement stipulates that "the Borrower should formulate within one year after the date of this Agreement a detailed plan mutually acceptable to the Borrower and the Association, for supervised farming projects at each agricultural high school included in the project, and subsequently implement such plans." This covenant was fulfilled in principle when the Department of Education and Culture, through EDPITAF, deposited US$780,000 with the Central Bank to serve as initial "seed money." However, during its implementation, several "supervised" projects proved unprofitable and were abandoned to the great discouragement of the students (para. 5.08). (ii) Pilot Barrio Development Schools 3.25 Covenant 4.04(d) of the Credit Agreement states that the Borrower shall "formulate, within one year after the date of this Agreement, a detailed plan mutually satisfactory to the Borrower and the Association, for supervised farming projects at each pilot village (barrio) development school included in the Project, including the provision of credit facilities to pupils of said schools, and subsequently implement such plans. The covenant was fulfilled, but with limited success because of the change in the curriculum and the reasons given under the EAHSs (paras. 5.08-5.10). Within this framework, the Department of Education and Culture, through EDPITAF, deposited US$120,000 (through the Agricultural Loan Fund Scheme negotiated with the Central Bank) to serve as initial seed money for the farming projects in order to assist the pupils. Covenant 4.05(c) of the Credit Agreement provides that the "Borrower makes arrangements with the UP College of Agriculture in Los Banos -or the provision of technical assistance for the BDSs and ensure their impLementation." UP conducted a training program for project leaders and teachers covering all phases of BDS operations. The change of the curriculum :para. 5.14) lessened the impact of the trained agricultural staff in the schools' operation. (b) Training of Professional Agricultural Personnel and Improvement of the Agricultural Extension Services (i) Regional 4Aricultural Colleges 3.26 Two covenants in the Credit Agreement aim at relating agricultural education and training to manpower requirements in this area. To this end, the covenant in Section 4.04(a) provides that "within two years, the  - 24 - Borrower complete a study on national and regional manpower requirements in the agricultural sector, on the capacity of existing agricultural training institutions, including the appropriate location for a regional agricultural college for the Visayas, and on the most efficient means of meeting such man- power requirements." Furthermore, Section 4.05(a) of the Credit Agreement stipulates that "within three years the Borrower enter into agreements with Central Mindanao University for such University to: (i) adjust its student enrollment to correspond only to areas of study for which manpower needs exists; (ii) in the field of engineering offer only courses directly related to agricultural'development; (iii) integrate business management training with the operation of the commercial farms; and (iv) include in the agricul- tural degree programs one extra semester of practical work." 3.27 The above-mentioned study on agricultural manpower requirements was carried out by EDPITAF in 1975 and in 1976 it was complemented by more detailed studies which led to the Fourth World Bank Education Project./l Further, the results of the study were used as a basis for the introduction or readjustment of certain programs (e.g. agribusiness and veterinary science), but they were never used as a guide for adjusting the output of the colleges to manpower requirements. Enrollments were not controlled to match manpower requirements and the suggested deletion of the civil engineering course from the CMU curriculum did not take place. (ii) Social Extension Labs (SLs) 3.28 Covenant 4.08 of the Credit Agreement provides that "within one year the Borrower make agreements under which CMU, CLSU, the Agricultural Productivity Commission (APC) and other relevant agencies coordinate the provision of extension services in the areas to be served by the SLs included in the project." The effort the SLs made toward mobilizing resources in the barrios for maximum utilization had only modest success for several reasons, such as shortage of funds, the lack of interest of farmers, the uncoordinated efforts of the agencies involved and rivalries among local leaders. /1 Loan 1374-PH - Development of Visayas State College of Agriculture, strengthening of the University of the Philippines at Los Banos (UPLB), relocation of the College of Veterinary Medicine (from Diliman to Los Banos), and establishment of the Philippine Training Centers for Rural Development.  - 25 - (c) Training of Industrial Technicians and Skilled Craftsmen (1) Industr:ial Technician Training 3.29 Covenant 4.07 of the Credit Agreement states that "the Borrower should: (a) establish a technical education governing council with appro- priate representation of industry, to supervise the operation of the three TIs and ensure the application of uniform curricula and examination standards to all three; and (b) train or cause to be trained annually about 60 teachers for the TIs from 1973 through 1976." In compliance with part (a) of this covenant, an Interim Bc,ard on Technician Education was established in Decem- ber 1975, but it was later abolished and replaced by a Technical Panel for Technician Education within the framework of the Ministry of Education and Culture. However, this Panel does not function as foreseen. Competent authorities claim that the Board should be expanded to include more indus- trialists from the public and private sectors; at present there is an over- representation of educators. Fulfillment of part (b) of the covenant was pursued through the establishment of a Technician Teacher Training Program (TTTP) headed by the Don Bosco Technical Institute. The program, which includes three course cycles, started in November 1974 and is still in operation. At present 38 teachers have completed the first cycle, 48 the second and 22 the third. (ii) Skilled Craftsmen Training 3.30 Covenant 4.06 of the Credit Agreement stipulates that: "(a) upon completion, the RMTCs will be administered and operated by the NMYC and the Borrower shall ensure that until such completion, its Department of Education and the NMYC coordinate their activities with regard to the RMTCs; (b) the Borrower will train, within three years after the date of the Agreement, about 150 instructors and 10 supervisors in the National Manpower Skills Training Center in Taguig, Rizal to serve as instructors in RMTCs; and (c) not later than one year after the commencement of the operation of each RMTC, it will submit to the Association (IDA) an annual evaluation report on each of the centers." Parts (a) and (b) of this covenant were satisfactorily fulfilled; section (c) remains unfulfilled as no annual evaluation reports on each RMTC have yet been submitted.. IDA Performance 3.31 The Associaticon made 11 supervision visits to the Philippines during project implementation at an average interval of six months, but with a range of 3-18 months. In general, during the early stages of implementa- tion supervision focussed on physical and financial aspects of the project. Educational aspects, particularly technical assistance and enrollment ratios at project institutions began to receive more attention during the latter half of the project, particularly after 1976 when architectural matters were  - 26 - resolved. During the first two years of project implementation, design issues were the subject of prolonged EDPITAF/IDA correspondence and super- vision. However, the Association's suggestions had little impact on this aspect of implementation (para. 3.09), but design review procedures developed as a result of this project have benefitted subsequent projects. 3.32 During the second half of the project, the Association became con- cerned with the high enrollment figures and correspondingly high student/staff ratios at CMU and CLSU, the inclusion of post-secondary courses in the experi- mental agricultural high schools, and the slow recruitment of technical assistance. Although extensive discussions were held with the PIU personnel concerning the first two issues, by project completion student/staff ratios remained high and post-secondary courses had not been abolished. Given the intense social demand for education in the Philippines and the level of educational attainment of the general population, it was unrealistic of the Association to try to institute a terminal secondary degree and to try to limit university enrollments, although both were justified by analyses of the manpower pool. 3.33 The completion date for this project was never extended beyond the original date of December 31, 1978. The Association initially agreed to extend the disbursement period to June 30, 1979 when 96% of the credit proceeds were committed or disbursed. Subsequent to June 30, an informal agreement was reached between Programs, Projects, Legal and the Comptroller's Department to extend the disbursement period to March 25, 1980. At this date a final application for disbursement had been received. However, at that date there were also approximately 20 outstanding qualified agreements to reimburse. Before payment of the last application, the Comptroller's Department verified with the commercial banks holding the agreements whether they would be paid or not. The verification process required about five months so that the Credit was not fully disbursed, nor the account closed until final disbursement could be made on August 27, 1980. In this report, August 27, 1980 is assumed to be the Credit Closing Date and on that basis the time overrun was calculated.  - 27 - [V. PROJECT COST AND FINANCING 4.01 Total project cost was esti,mated by the Appraisal Mission at P 113.4 million or US$17.68 million. The total cost of the project including additional expenses was, at the time of the Completion Mission's visit, P 158.13 million or US$21.37 million, including depreciation of the peso in the course of the project implementation from 6.40 to 7.38 pesos to one US dollar. This represents a cost overrun of 40% and 21% on the basis of peso and US dollar prices, respectively. Estimated and actual costs are shown in Annex 3, Table 1; a summary is given in the following table. Table 3: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL PROJECT OJSTS (including contingencies in US$ million equivalent) A B C D E Appraisal Appraisal Actual Actual Difference Categories estimate estimate Costs costs % US$ (mil) P (mil) US$ (mil)/a P (mil) (D-rB) Civil works (construction and site development) 5.85 37.44 10.76 79.62 +112.0 Professional services 0.47 3.0 0.47 3.48 0 Equipment and furniture 8.20 52.48 8.33 61.64 +17.6 Technical assistance 3.16 20.22 1.81 13.39 -33.6 Total 17.68 113.14 21.37 158.13 +39.8 /a Actual project costs are calculated in 1980 US$ for which the exchange rate is US$1 = P 7.40.  - 28 - 4.02 This major overrun is the accumulated result of a number of inter- related factors, the most important being: (i) Delays in the start of project implementation due to administrative difficulties in selecting and contracting consultant architects, followed by an inability of some of them to adhere to Bank rules and worksheet specifications. This led to increases in areas, and expensive designs, and a long review process that delayed the project implementation by 22 months (discussed in Chapter III); and (ii) From the end of 1974 until project completion (December, 1978), the average cost escalation in the building industry was over 20% p.a., as compared to the 6% estimate of the Appraisal Report. Thus, at the completion date, the cost escalation for construction only (including contingencies) was about 2.1 times (133%) the appraisal estimate. 4.03 Mounting costs led the Project Unit to request the Bank's approval for a reallocation of Credit proceeds between the different categories of the Project. It was agreed that in order to cover the exceptionally high cost overrun for civil works, part of the disbursement originally allocated to furniture and equipment be transferred to civil works. This was detrimental to project objectives as the Government had to considerably reduce the planned program in this area. Disbursements 4.04 Annex 4 shows actual disbursements compared with appraisal estimates. The first application for withdrawal was sent 29 months after the effective date of the project and 18 months behind appraisal estimates. This was due, as explained above, to delays in the early phase of the project implementation. However, the amount of this first disbursement application (US$2.722 million) was already 120% above the appraisal estimate for the first two years of implementation and covered part of construction contracts and advance payment for equipment (at the rate of 90% of foreign cost). Recurrent Costs 4.05 This report does not include an estimate of recurrent costs for project institutions as the data received were inadequate to calculate these costs./l However, as enrollment rates for many of the institutions assisted under the project varied considerably from appraisal estimates, the recurrent cost figures are unlikely to provide much insight into the actual per student operating costs under optimal learning conditions. /1 A request has been made to Government to furnish further information.  - 29 - V. PROJECT OPERATING OUTCOMES Project Design 5.01 The Association appraised this project at a period when the educational system of the Philippines had recently undergone a major review and evaluation with the assistance of the Ford Foundation. The recommenda- tions of that report were far reaching and implied major changes in the structure and administration of the system. It was not possible at the time of appraisal to design a comprehensive project which would assist Government in revising the entire ;ystem. However, it was decided to support a number of high priority areas. While the variety and intensity of the needs of the educational system may have suggested wideranging assistance from the Asso- ciation, and the projecl: was designed to provide as broad a range of assist- ance as appeared feasible at the time, the very breadth of its coverage made implementation and supervision difficult. As designed, the project was an overambitious effort to meet as many of the country's needs as possible. The many components (11), designed to meet the needs of three different sub- sectors and to strengthen the overall planning capability of the educational system, made it a difficult task for the newly created PIU (EDPITAF), as well as for the Association to keep track of the development and status of project components. That the project should have in large measure succeeded is a testament to EDPITAF's ability to rapidly master Association requirements and procedures. The "fruit" of that capability has been demonstrated by the quality of its management of succeeding Bank-assisted projects. Attainment of Project Objectives 5.02 The project had six major objectives: (a) strengthening of educational planning and management; (b) expansion of the training of science teachers; (c) expansion of the training of young farmers; (d) improvement of the training of professional agricultural personnel and of agricultural extension services; (e) introduction of industrial technician training and of skilled craftsmen; and (f) provision of technical assistance to aid project implementation. In general, the educational aims of the project have been achieved, although in some cases there have been deviations from the original targets and objectives. A brief analysis of the performance of each component is given below, with the exception of the technical assistance component which was discussed above in Chapter III (paras. 3.18-3.21). Educational Planning, Management and Reform 5.03 The first objective, as stated in the Appraisal Report, was to "provide the Department of Education and Culture with the physical and human resources necessary to improve educational planning and management, and to reform the education system." This was pursued through equipping and rein- forcing by means of technical assistance, a Curriculum Coordinating Unit  - 30 - (CCU) attached to the Office of Planning Service (OPS) of the Department (now Ministry) of Education and by establishing an Education Development Center (EDC) attached to the University of the Philippines. The CCU was activated in February 1974 and is contributing to curriculum coordination activities through publishing and distributing curriculum research and through the production of materials development, coordinating/monitoring tools. It also holds consultations and conferences with individuals and groups involved in curriculum development at both national and regional levels. 5.04 The Education Development Centre (EDC) is functioning properly and contributes substantially to the educational development process through the preparation of manuscripts for textbooks, teaching guides and other instruc- tional materials for elementary and secondary schools and through educational research programs. The EDC premises house the Science Education Center of the University of the Philippines (UPSEC) and the Social Studies Center (SSC) under the Office of the Minister of Education and Culture (formerly under the Bureau of Public Schools). A major objective of the component was to promote coordination between the two centers and, as a first step, the University of the Philippines and the Department of Education and Culture signed, in 1972, a memorandum of agreement for the establishment of an Education Development Council. Due to large differences in the activities of each Center, the Council was never established and the coordination between the two centers remained only at the level of sharing of facilities. Training of Science Teachers 5.05 The objective of expanding the training of science teachers was pursued through establishing two new Regional Science Teaching Centres (RSTCs) and the equipping of two existing ones. As a result of this component, the number of RSTCs increased to nine. Together with five other newly estab- lished centers, dealing with areas other than science and mathematics (social studies, communications arts and practical arts), the nine form, within the framework of the textbook project (Loan 1224T-PH), a network of Regional Staff Development Centers providing training on the use of new textbooks for some 250,000 teachers. More specifically, the establishment of the five RSTCs contributed to extending the science and mathematics training programs to the primary level and to upgrading science and mathematics teachers (some 1,000 p.a.) through seminars and fellowship activities. Training of Young Farmers 5.06 This component provided equipment for 13 Experimental Agricultural High Schools and for the construction of 6 pilot Barrio (village) Development Schools.  - 31 - (a) Experimental Agricultural Schools (EAHSs) 5.07 The objective of this component was to expand and broaden the then "new" experimental high school project, based on the brief experience in two pilot schools, in support of the new practically oriented curriculum - Year 1 teaching the principles and practice of agriculture, and Years 2-4 having supervised farming projects in crop, or livestock production. The associated Supervised Farming Program (SFP) for pupils was an essential part of the pack- age, to encourage pupils to have practical farming responsibilities and exper- ience with banks and credit. 5.08 The Experimental Agricultural High Schools provide secondary and agricultural education in many deprived areas. Nevertheless, from the start, drawbacks in the concept quickly became evident, among which are: - the system's cost was high; - many pupils dropped out; - students were physically and emotionally too immature for farm work; - the skills taught were not sufficiently sophisticated for modern farming; - Over 80% of pupils proceeded to higher education, for which they were inadequately prepared; - pupils become discouraged from running unprofitable enterprises through the SF? and related bank loans; and - the school staEf did not support the entrepreneurial program. 5.09 At the time the project was appraised, a shift in curricular empha- sis in such schools away from college preparation towards vocational training was expected. By 1978, the emphasis was once more firmly on college prepara- tion, illustrated by the reduced practical work being undertaken. The EAHS always retained their secondary program, however, the time taken from it for practical work on SFPs dLsadvantages the majority of pupils taking the National College Entrancie Examination (NCEE), and in their subsequent studies (often in the degree prog,ram in the same institution - under the Bureau of Secondary Education - BSE). In addition, the poor record of rural banks and their farmer clients vis--a-vis the Philippine National Bank required them to curtail their activities in the EAHs. In many cases, they did not open a branch there as provided for. At CMU, projects were eventually funded directly through the President's Office. 5.10 In November 19;9, MEC/EDPITAF and the Central Bank reached a new agreement to establish a Loan Fund of P 3,155,808 to be deposited with qual- ified rural banks, to guarantee losses up to 85%. Loans have a 10% interest rate; 11 Ag. High Schools and 65 Agricultural training institutions benefitted besides other institutions. This program is financing a Supervised Experience Education Program (SEEP) to follow and enlarge on the SFP in Ag. High Schools, to be monitored by BSE.  - 32 - 5.11 The drawbacks cited above, and subsequent shifts in emphasis have resulted in EAHSs concentrating more on college preparation, and its required secondary curriculum. With SFP grafted on, pupils were occupied 45 hours per week, which - at their stage of physical development and in poor living condi- tions - could not but affect their success in general studies. 5.12 During the course of project implementation, there were substantial deviations from the original targets in the EAHs subcomponent, particularly with regard to programs and enrollments. Enrollments in the secondary courses of the EAHSs included in the project approached 10,000 in 1978/79 (project completion year) as against 5,500 foreseen in the Appraisal. In addition, there are some 4,000 students in postsecondary degree and nondegree (certificate) courses. The number of graduates of secondary courses reached some 1,300 in 1978/79. Annex 7, Table 1 gives enrollment and output of each school by level for the 1974/75-1977/78 period. The rapid increase in enrollments is certainly linked with the fact that postsecondary courses have been reintroduced. 5.13 As discussed above (para. 3.23), to enable project schools to con- centrate on secondary level programs, the Government agreed to phase out degree programs in all except the CLSU and CMU Agricultural High Schools. Indeed, by July 1972, all postsecondary programs at the eleven project schools were phased out. However, in 1975/76 degree programs were re-introduced into five schools and at present all project schools offer degree programs, in addition to the secondary programs, and ten of them also offer post-secondary nondegree programs. 5.14 This modification was due in part to changed political circumstan- ces in the country and, in part, to overambitious expectations at appraisal. In the long run no government would readily face the social implications of downgrading established and functioning institutions. Although the covenant dealing with this matter was justified on the grounds that the institutions had neither the teaching staff nor the equipment to conduct such courses, thereby increasing the possibility of lowering the quality of student output, it has proven unrealistic on sociopolitical grounds. 5.15 There are no detailed data available which document the route graduates of secondary courses follow, but it is estimated that some 20% continue to postsecondary programs. A survey conducted by the project imple- mentation officer (as part of his doctoral dissertation) on the occupational placement of 216 students who graduated from EAH schools during the 1976/77- 1977/78 period revealed that over half (63%) continued their schooling; 47% were studying full time in an agricultural institution and 16% were pursuing full time nonagricultural studies. Fourteen percent (14%) were working in agricultural professions and 7% were employed in nonagriculturally related jobs. Twelve percent (12%) of those queried were unemployed and 4% were engaged in a combination of the activities described above.  - 33 - 5.16 Despite the partial failure of this program, due mainly to inade- quately trained staff, insufficient supervision of students and increased cost of farming inputs, there was a positive outcome: the institutionaliza- tion of student credit for supervised farming projects. As in the case of the Barrio Development Schools, these EAHs experiences demonstrate the need for a more equitable comprehensive school system, including basic academic, as well as prevocational training for all - the latter to have a sectorial or regional orientation - which would embrace agricultural training in most regions of the country. (b) Pilot Barrio Development Schools (BDSs) 5.17 The Barrio Development Schools were designed as four year lower secondary schools (grades 7-10) with a terminal vocational agricultural program comprising 50% classroom instruction with strong agricultural bias and 50% practical work and supervised farming projects. Three BDSs were attached to CLSU and three to CMU. The BDSs began functioning in 1974/75 with an enrollment of 32 students per school per curriculum year which, by the end of the fourth year, dropped to an average of 11 students per school per curriculum year. The completion rates were 49% and 34% respectively for the CLSU and the CMU schools. The supervised farm projects followed the pattern outlined under EAHSs (para. 5.07). 5.18 Yielding to social pressure, first CLSU (1976) and later CMU (1978) replaced the BDS curriculum with the Revised Secondary Education Program, thus converting the terminal vocational agricultural schools into general secondary schools with agricultural bias. The supervised farm program became one among several electives and enrollment increased immediately. Annex 7, Table 3 gives enrollments and drop-outs rates by school for the 1974/75- 1978/79 period. The Philippines' experience with these pilot BDSs may be seen as a necessary stage in the evolution of a comprehensive junior secon- dary school system for all pupils. That the concept rapidly outgrew its social utility is beyond question, given the changing economic circumstances and pupils/parents' aspirations. In the BDS context, as in the Experimental Agricultural High Schools, the saddling of rural youth with quite heavy phys- ical work tasks and with banking responsibilities, appears to have been premature and contributed to that particular system's demise. Land, build- ings and equipment continue to serve the village communities, but in a way different from the project's objectives. 5.19 With their revised curriculum, the BDSs contribute to the equaliza- tion of opportunities for access to secondary education, but little to the training of young farmers which was the original purpose of the project. In the Philippines it appears that terminal secondary level programs are unlikely to succeed, unLess linked to avenues for further training.  - 34 - Training of Professional Agricultural Personnel and Improvement of the Agricultural Extension Services 5.20 These objectives were pursued through (a) expansion and reinforce- ment of the Regional Agricultural Colleges of CLSU and CMU; (b) the establish- ment of two social (extension) laboratories attached to the above-mentioned institutions; and (c) the establishment of a radio station at CMU and the strengthening of an existing one in Los Banos. (a) Regional Agricultural Colleges (RACs) 5.21 In view of the magnitude of the development program in the two RACs, local Project Implementation Units were organized to supervise their develop- ment and serve as liaison between the colleges and the EDPITAF. The two college presidents were designated as project implementation officers and headed the units. 5.22 Both colleges have responded to pressure from the local citizenry and regional secondary graduates and increased total enrollments. Enrollment at each institution was projected at 1,500 by 1978. This target was exceeded by 160% at CMU and by 290% at CLSU (Annex 7, Tables 4 and 5). The reasons given for this explosion in enrollments are the relatively low cost of educa- tion (to students) as compared to that in private colleges and universities, the good performance of the graduates, and the Government policy to democra- tize access in post-secondary education and, at the same time, to discourage enrollment in the areas of law, business and liberal arts. The increase in enrollments was not followed by a corresponding increase in staff, which caused the student/teacher ratio to increase from 15:1 envisaged in the Appraisal to 36:1 for CLSU and 21:1 for CMU, thereby endangering the quality of the instruction. 5.23 A second major objective of this component was to improve the qualifications of the teaching staff. While fellowships were provided for staff upgrading, the following table which gives the number of staff by qualifications in the two colleges for the years 1972/73 and 1978/79, shows that the proportion of staff with masters and doctoral degrees increased only slightly.  - 35 - TabLe 4: ACADEMIC STAFF IN CLSU AND CMU CLSU CMUJ Bachelor Mast:er Doctorate Bachelor Master Doctorate Year degree degree degree Total degree degree degree Total 1972/73 124 57 4 185 113 42 2 157 (67%) (31,%) (2%) (72%) (27%) (1%) 1978/79 196 81 18 295 193 79 12 284 (66%) (27;%) (6%) (68%) (28%) (4%) 5.24 The number oi graduates of the two colleges by level and speciali- zation is given in Annex 7, Tables 6 and 7. In 1978/79, there were 816 graduates as compared to 491 in 1972/73. The number of graduates in agricultural courses increased from 380 in 1972/73 to 789 in 1978/79, which represents 77.4% and 96.7% of the total number of graduates respectively. However, the ratio of agriculture graduates to enrollments remained practically stable (around 12%) as against 22% foreseen at appraisal. 5.25 The introduction of Agribusiness Management in both universities appears successful - st:udents benefit from a commercial approach, compared with the scientific discipline approach more commonly encountered elsewhere. Both colleges have veterinary faculties, with limited qualified staff. The case for expanded veterinary training in the Philippines is not proven, and there is a real danger of oversupply of underqualified veterinarians. Each of these regional universities is playing a significant role in its region's development, more particularly through their research, development and demon- stration programs. Were student numbers limited further and staff qualifica- tions further improved, the qualitative effect on their wide-ranging activi- ties would be considerable. (b) Social (Extension) Laboratories (SLs) 5.26 The major objective of the Social (extension) Laboratories was to give new emphasis to on-the-job training of extension workers and to associate them more closely with rural development. Two such laboratories were inclu- ded in the Droject, onE each, at CLSU and CLIJ. The concept originated at UPLB where the original SL (under the Department of Agricultural Education) was established in an adjacent group of villages to serve as a teaching lab in rural problem-solving for "extension major" students and their teachers and researchers. The laboratories were to provide in-service training for  .. 36 - Government and other agencies' extension personnel, and intensive and well- organized extension services to the villagers. Under university leadership, all agencies were to coordinate their extension services in these areas. The work program deviated considerably from the original concept. Both SLSs are used mainly for applied research and direct extension work rather than for training and coordination of extension activities as foreseen. 5.27 At present, the major contributions of the Social Laboratories lie in: (i) their-research projects for improved seeds and agricultural pro- cesses; (ii) small scale experimental farming, particularly in the CLSU Social Laboratory, which maintains a model mini-farm with diversified cultures; and (iii) technical and financial assistance to villagers for the creation of small agricultural or consumer product cooperatives. Although all the above-mentioned areas are very important to the development of the rural population, the impact of the SLs' work appears to be minimal, principally because of the small scale of the operation and the lack of a concrete action program which could, in the long run, have a multiplier effect. 5.28 The SLs started at CMU and CLSU in 1974/75 demonstrated early pro- mise and emphasized stimulating barrio residents into active participation in social and technical programs, including pre-consumers' cooperatives. This has been replaced by "transfer of technology" packages to raise the low in- comes of participants and observe the effects. Due to transport and rapid staff turnover problems, the target of 16 technicians in 16 barangays appears never to have been reached (lack of budget and other commitments), resulting in declining interest by Barrio residents. Efforts are now concentrated on some 6 and 3 barangays (8 and 3 technicians, respectively) the former at CMU in two pilot irrigation areas. Momentum in pressing the original objectives seems to have largely been lost: the technicians are increasingly SL- rather than Barrio-oriented and the physical facilities provided are more integrated with general university activities. University students still use the SL for field training. In CLSU, the SL building is now physically the Rural Development Studies Center (mainly social science) and part of one of five main divisions of the CLSU Research and Development Center; it is only partially utilized by the social lab and BDSs. The original concept of a field social teaching and research laboratory has given way to one of a University Extension Demonstration area, with more limited objectives and reduced enthusiasm, and providing an area for social science research. With greater interest (but less action) in organizing a more unified extension service, university involvement in that role appears to have waned. (c) The Agricultural Radio Stations (RSs) 5.29 This component was aimed at reinforcing the agricultural extension program. The strengthening of the radio station at UP, Los Banos, presented no particular difficulty as, since its inception in 1964, it has regularly transmitted programs which are predominantly educational (56%) and  - 37 - informative (25%), during its seven-hour daily air time. By contrast, a multitude of problems had to be faced in establishing the new RS at CMU. The transmitter room was too small; a nearby rice mill caused disturbing noise and produced dust damaging to the equipment; piecemeal delivery of equipment caused difficulties in assembling; and the transmitter developed malfunctions. The problems were finally rectified and the radio station started functioning properly in 1980. 5.30 The concept and utility of radio stations for agricultural/rural development is becoming established and accepted. Stronger technical and logistic support is required to reinforce and assist these extension programs on the air. This implies closer cooperation with the agents of equipment sup- pliers, adequate budgets,for spares and new equipment, and continuing strong links with agricultural development agencies, especially the Regional Bureaux of the Ministry of Agriculture. In many regions of the Philippines with transport problems and difficult access, e.g., mountain or island communities, such radio stations can play an important development role, with their con- tinuing education programs, support to different agencies' extension programs, and publicizing of well-tested research results, in addition to training University students. Training of Industrial Technicians 5.31 The objective of this component was to initiate the training of in- dustrial technicians to fill middle-level positions. It was pursued through: (a) the establishment cf two Technician Institutes (TIs) - the Manila TI in Taguig and the Visayas TI in Bacolod; and (b) the provision of equipment for the Iligan Institute of Technology (IT). 5.32 Actual enrollments in 1979/80 are shown below, together with those foreseen in the appraisal. Table 5: APPRAISAL ESTIMATES vs ACTUAL ENROLLMENTS FOR THE TECHNICIAN INSTITUTES Manila TI Bacalod TI Iligan IT Total App- App- App- App- rai rai- rai- rai- sal Actual sal Actual sal Actual sal Actual Capacity (day-shift enrollment) 600 467 400 435 400 } 1,400} } } Enrollment (two } 794 } 1,696 shifts) 1,2.00 - 800 - 800 } 2,800} Output -`60 266 240 240  - 38 - The Manila and Bacalod Tls have not yet started their second shift courses. Enrollments by year and specialization for the three institutes are given in Annex 7, Table 8. 5.33 Staff turnover has been a major problem for the TIs, due mainly to competition from industry. It appears that there is a predominance of teachers with a purely vocational background. In the Manila TI, for instance, 60% of the staff are vocational teachers without an engineering degree. This imparts a pronounced vocational character to the program which is more appropriate to-the training of skilled workers than technician training. 5.34 The three-year technician programs were initiated by the project. The curriculum which incorporates practical work in industry,/I was designed by a team of foreign and local experts. As a first attempt, the curriculum appears satisfactory. However, like any curriculum , there is room for improvement and readjustment. Industry's cooperation in the application of the industry-based part of the program is satisfactory so far. The question remains, will that be the case when all the three institutes are in full operation and the demand for training places grows larger? Perhaps more direct involvement of industry in the training process as a whole should be introduced in the near future, as is planned in the eighth education loan. 5.35 It is premature to assess the outputs of this project component as two of the TIs have not as yet produced graduates. It is true, however, that the role of the technician is not well established in the Philippines, his tasks being currently carried out by degree engineers or skilled workers promoted through the ranks. The ambiguous role of the technician makes students reluctant to enroll in the TIs and it is the principal cause of the relatively high drop-out rate observed so far (over 20% between the first and second years). The fact that the TIs form part of the National Polytechnic System with the vocationally-oriented Technical University of the Philippines (TUP) as the apex and the fact that the majority of the teachers have strong vocational backgrounds add further doubts as to the status of the technicians. Finally, the failure of the Board on Technician Education and the inaction of its successor, the Technical Panel for Technician Education, are not encouraging signs for the future development of technician education. It seems that a more direct involvement of industry in both curriculum development and program implementation is a prerequisite for a positive outcome. /1 Six-week industrial orientation after the first year, six weeks on-the job training after the second year and intensive on-the-job training during the last term of the third year.  - 39 - Training of Skilled Craftsmen 5.36 The expansion and improvement of the training of skilled craftsmen was pursued through the establishment of ten Regional Manpower Training Centers (RMTCs) under the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC). 5.37 The annual output of the RMTC courses in 1979 was 8,171/1 as against a total of 7,170 (2,390 from full-time courses and 4,780 from evening courses) envisaged in the appraisal. The distribution by course and center is given in Annex 7, Table 9. The drop out rate as a whole was around 8%. The 1977 output was 3,646 and that of 1978 4,850. As of 1979 the RMTCs form part of the National Polytechnic System. The programs offered are well-conceived and meet the basic needs of industry. 5.38 A tentative assessment of the results of this project component suggests that it has contributed positively to the improvement and expansion of the training of skilled craftsmen. Industrialists have expressed their satisfaction with the results and the rapid growth of enrollments indicates that the courses are poplalar. However, attention should be drawn to certain aspects which are important to a future expansion of the RMTC system, as outlined below. There has so far been no attempt to assess manpower require- ments at craftsmen level and to adjust training accordingly. Although this poses no particular prob'Lem at the basic skill level, as long as there is no proliferation of courses, it is of vital importance for more sophisticated levels of training which are likely to be introduced in the near future. In addition to the NMYC there are several other agencies dealing with vocational training, such as the Ministry of Education through its public and private vocational schools, the Ministry of Labor through its apprenticeship scheme, the Cottage Industries Development Council (CIDC) and the National Cottage Industries Development Auithority (NACIDA). Unless the role of each one of these agencies is well defined and their activities coordinated, there is likely to be duplication of effort and confusion leading to unnecessary spending and waste. In general, there is insufficient involvement of indus- try in the training process. As an example of increased industry involve- ment, some centers have agreed with private firms to utilize some of the center's facilities for ithe training of out-of-school youth and unemployed adults while producing their products. Although the principle is sound, attention should be drawn to the fact that this should not be done at the expense of the regular p:rogam and that the center's facilities should not simply used as productioni premises. For instance, in one of the centers visited, the automotive workshop was removed and garment making machinery of a nearby firm was instalLed in the area. Trainees are employees of the firm. /1 Excluding the RMTC, Mariveles which has not as yet started functioning.   - 41 - VI. CONCLUSIONS Procedural Issues Project Generation 6.01 For a project as complex and ambitious as this one, the upstream portion of the project :ycle was extremely short. A total of four missions, including the appraisal mission, was sent to the field, all within a one year period. This time frame seems all the more circumscribed given that the first Bank financed pro;ject was limited to one subsector and that the second project was appraised al: a time when the education sector was undergoing a thorough examination ancl extensive planning for revision was underway. A longer project generaticin period would have permitted more discussion of fundamental policy issues (and design alternatives) and such initial dialogue may have resulted in a simpler and better project design and more realistic project goals (paras. 5.12, 5.18 and 5.22). Project Implementation 6.02 The greatest logistical difficulties were encountered in the civil works and equipment components. As a result of project experience, discussion of design criteria and preparation of architects' briefs, preliminary draw- ings and cost estimates, working drawings, and tender documents have taken place much earlier in subsequent projects. As has been demonstrated in many Bank projects, advancing these activities in the preparation period permits issues between Government and the Bank to be resolved at an early stage and allows implementation of the physical aspects of the project to begin as soon as the loan/credit shall have become effective. Subsequent project experience has proven the merits of this approach. Policy Issues Project Outcomes 6.03 Despite the needs of the education sector, the coincidence of project appraisal with a thorough review of the education sector, and the desire of Government and the Association to meet as many sector needs as possible, this project was an over-ambitious effort to do an across the board putting of the "Sectoral House" in order. While recognizing that fundamental policy changes were required in order to meet sector weaknesses, the project design implied that a one-step intervention would be sufficient to effect the desired changes. Furthermore, the project was unrealistically optimistic about the time frame required to bring about change and the potential socio-political oppositiotn to the limiting of enrollments and the introduction of practical courses which were necessary to bring output into line with manpower needs and to make curricula more vocationally-oriented.  - 42 - 6.04 The "smorgasbord approach" taken in CR 349-PH was its greatest weakness. In later projects the Bank has given greater emphasis to (a) encouraging Government to examine and where feasible to adopt policy changes necessary to the successful implementation of projects; (b) encour- aging Government to set realistic timetables for realizing these changes; (c) phasing Bank projects to coincide with policy changes; and (d) limiting project components and goals to a realistic and manageable number.  PHILIPPINES SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 349-PH PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Planned amiu ctual Thmpiuit;ientaLgol Sohredulo planned 1973 ' 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 a Oi~ iA 2~I iii 12 ui6 4i i I 5I 61ii 21 72, 75 85 appoint.&contraots consult.arch , _ _ _ plamed dLsburselmt o select. & acquisition of sites - / desien phase(all proJect items) __ _ _._________I Construction phLsSO -- . actua- 4I^b"A-.t , ------ ----- ( -__ _ 0 prep:qucrlrient list & bid doc, - __ - - - - _ __/D prep.furmnSture list & bid doo. f _______ /*- 0 contract equipment procurement > __ = _ { deliveryf & instal. equtpmecnt