Senegal - Second Terres Neuves Resettlement and Eastern Senegal Technical Assistance Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 578-SE) October 27, 1981 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 Meter (m) = 1.1 Yards 1 Kilometer (km) 0.62 Miles 1 Hectare (ha) = 2.47 Acres ABBREVIATIONS BNDS National Development Bank of Senegal (Banque Nationale de Developpement du Sengal) CFDT Cotton Development Agency of France (Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles) ISRA Institut S6negalais de Recherche Agricole ONCAD The Office for Cooperatives and Development Assistance (Office Nationale de Cooperation et d-Assistance pour le Developpement). ORSTOM The Overseas Research Agency of France Office de la Recherche Scientifique des Territoires d-Outre Mer) PA Agricultural Credit and Extension Program (Programme Agricole) SATEC Socied6 d-Aide Technique et de Cooperation SODEFITEX Senegal Cotton Development Agency (SoC 'J pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles) SODEVA Agricultural Development Agency (Societ6 de Developpement et de Vulgarisation Agricole) SONED Socie"te Nationale d-Etudes pour le Developpement STN Resettlement Agency (Societe des Terres Neuves) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Project Performance Audit Report SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 578-SE) Table of Contents Preface Project Performance Audit Basic Data Sheet ii Highlights iv Annex 1 - Borrower's Comments vi ATTACHMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Summary and Conclusions ................................ i I. Background ........................................ 1 II. Formulation ..........................................2 III. Implementation .......................... ............ 4 IV. Agricultural Impact ........................... ....... 10 V. The Eastern Senegal Technical Assistance Component ... 12 VI. Financial and Economic Results ....................... 13 VII. Institutional Performance ................... ........ 15 VIII. Special Issues ...................... ................. 16 Annexes 1. Schedule of Disbursements and General Information 20 2. Settlement Works and Physical Progressive 23 3. Economic Analysis 26 4. Note on STN prepared by the Director General 34 Map This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Project Performance Audit Peport SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 578-SE) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the second Terres Neuves project for which Credit 578-SE in the amount of US$2.0 million was approved in August 1975. The last disbursement was made on October 2, 1980 leaving US$1,600 undisbursed. The credit is expected to be closed soon. The audit report consists of Highlights prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated May 5, 1981 prepared by the West Africa Regional Office. The audit is based on a review of the appraisal report (No. 685A-SE) of June 6, 1975, the President's report (No. P1627A-SE) of June 23, 1975, the Credit Agreement dated August 6, 1975, and the PCR. Correspondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on files have also been consulted. Bank staff assceiated with the project have been interviewed. A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower for comments on July 15, 1981. The suggested changes have been introduced or appropriately footnoted in the PCR and they are attached as Annex I. Under OED's abbreviated procedures, the audit finds the PCR comprehensive and has no reason to question its conclusions. 』園 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 578-SE) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 3.94 3.32 Underrun (%) - 16 Credit Amount (US$ million) 2.o 2.o Disbursed (US$ million) 2-o 2.o Date Physical Components Completed 12/79 9/80 Proportion Completed by above Date 100 90 Proportion of Time Overrun - 20 Economic Rate of Return 14 18 Financial Performance satisfactory Institutional Performance satisfactory DISBURSEMENT US$000 Appraisal Estimate 1976 1977 1 978 1979 1980 1981 Yearly 400 700 Sau 300 100 - Cummulative 400 1,100 1,600 1,900 2,000 - Actual Yearly - 658.3 348.2 835.0 81.2 75.7 Cummulative 658.3 1,006.5 1,841.5 1,922.7 1,998.4 Actual/Estimate 60 63 97 96 99.9 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Est. Actual First Mention in Files or Timetable June 1972 Government's Application - 6/13/73 Appraisal April 1974 - July 1974 Negotiations 5/19/75 5/27/75 5/27/75 Board Approval 6/24/75 - 7/8/75 Credit Agreement Date 8/6/75 8/6/75 Effectiveness Date 10/15/75 1/13/76 11/14/75 Closing Date 06/30/80 - 3/31/81 3orrower Government of Sene-al Executing Agency Societe des Terres Neuves Fiscal Year of Borrower July 1-June 30 Follow-on project name Eastern Senegal ASricultural. Development (being prepared) - iii - MISSION DATA Item Sent Month/ No. of No. of Date of by Year Weeks Persons Manweeks Report Identification PMWA 04/73 1 1 1 08/31/73 Preparation PMWA 10/73 1 1 1 11/05/73 PMWA 02/74 2 1 1 04/08/74 Appraisal HQ/PMWA 07/74 5 3 15 06/06/75 9 18 Supervision I HQ 11/75 2.0 1 2.0 03/05/76 Supervision II PMWA 04/76 0.2 1 0.2 05/12/76 Supervision III HQ 06/76 0.4 2 0.8 07/09/76 Supervision IV HQ 09/76 1.0 1 1.0 11/10/76 Supervision V HQ 04/77 1.0 1 1.0 06/17/77 Supervision VI HQ 10/77 1.5 2 3.0 11/23/77 Supervision VII HQ 05/78 1.0 1 1.0 07/18/78 Supervision VIII HQ 11/78 0.5 1 0.5 12/19/78 Supervision IX HQ 09/79 0.5 1 0.5 11/05/79 Completion HQ 11/80 1.0 1 1.0 9.1 11 COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Communaut& inanciire Africaine Francs (CFAF) Year Appraisal Year Average (1974) Exchange Rate: US$ 1 = CFAF 225 Intervening Years Average (1975-1979) US$ 1 = CFAF 232 Completion Year Average (1980) USq 1 = CFAF 206.31 - iv - Project Performance Audit Report SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 578-SE) HIGHLIGHTS The Second Terres Neuves Project (Credit 578-SE) was designed to continue assistance to the Government's program aimed at resettling farm families from the over-populated Groundnut Basin into the less populated and relatively well watered Eastern Region of Senegal. The first phase of this program consisted of a pilot project (Credit 254-SE) completed in 1977. A Project Performance Audit Report for this project was prepared in 1979 (OED Report No. 2589). The second phase project aimed at resettling 450 families in new villages and 150 families in existing villages, and providing physical and social infrastructure and services. The technological package introduced under the project was only partially adopted by farmers because Government price and marketing policies favored certain crops in the rotation relative to others, and because of the deterioration of the credit system which adversely affected input supplies and distribution. This factor, together with low and poorly distributed rainfall during the implementation period, caused farmers to concentrate on the production of groundnuts, sorghum and millet at the expense of maize and cotton. Despite these changes in emphasis during project implementation, project benefits have been better than anticipated at appraisal mainly because yields realized were higher than expected and costs incurred on-farm were lower than expected. The average family income has reached a level twice that forecast at appraisal. The economic rate of return for the project was re-estimated at 18.2% compared to 14% at appraisal. The major lessons from this experience for future projects are: (i) Government support for this type of program should be limited to infra- structure development and information dissemination; this would give farmers full responsibility for all agricultural operations, including land clearing and would reduce project cost to Government (PCR, paras. 8.04-8.06), and (ii) the acceptability of technical packages, including cropping patterns, depends not only on their technical soundness, but also on the market forces and the adequacy of the marketing infrastructure. Evidence from this project shows that deviatiors from appraisal cropping patterns were due to Government price and marketing policies which favored groundnuts, millet and sorghum at the expense of maize and cotton (PCR, paras. 4.01, 4.02, 8.01 and 8.02). The PPAR for Terres Neuves I (Cr. 254-SE) raised several issues of interest on which the Completion Report for Terres Neuves II (Cr. 578-SE) does not provide any follow-up. These include triggered settlement, the role of the extended family and the nature of extension advice and organization needed. These and other important issues will be dealt with in a forthcoming impact evaluation study of the Terres Neuves I project. -v - The following points may be of particular interest: - legal covenants involving agencies other than the project entity were difficult to comply with (PCR, paras. 3.16, 3.17 and 3.18); - breaking the link between output marketing and debt recovery destroyed the credit system and, subsequently, negatively affected the input delivery system (PCR, para. 4.07); - Government actively participated in the design of the project and made commitments at negotiation which served as a basis for the Bank accepting modifications in project design. Those commitments were not fully adhered to during implementation (PCR, para. 2.03 to 2.07 and 7.03, 7.04); - farm plans introduced by the project were not fully accepted by farmers because they did not reflect the relative prices which prevailed in the market (PCR, para. 8.01); and - project entity (STN) established at the insistence of the Bank outlived its utility and its role should be redefined if it is going to be allowed to continue in its present form (PCR, paras. 8.07 to 8.10). FORM NO. 788 (1-74) - vi - Annex 1 Page 1 BORROWER'S COMMENTS Ministry of Rural Development Soci6t& des Terres Neuves B.P. 440, Dakar No. 00668/STN/DOC Dakar, August 24, 1981 Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Director, Operations Evaluation Department IBRD, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Kapur: Evaluation Report on Terres Neuves II Resettlement and Eastern Senegal Technical Assistance Project (Credit 578-SE) Thank you for your letter of July 15, 1981 accompanying the above report, After reading the report I have the following comments: 1. The target of 12 classrooms was reduced to six to allow for construction of a dispensary in the second Project; this was done because the dispensary was omitted in the initial estimates. 2. The estimated yields and production figures are given in the quarterly reports for June to September, while the December-March reports show the actual results obtained as regards mainly groundnuts and cotton. The improvement in the preparation of the quarterly reports consists precisely in the fact that they provide a detailed statement of the different results according to the type of settlement: resettlement villages (Projects I and II), mixed villages (settlers and original inhabitants) and original villages. 3. The estimated production figuresin your report for the 1978/79 and 1979/80 cropyears differ appreciably from those presented in our quarterly report No. 12 and annual reports for those dates, which are as follows: - vii - Annex 1 Page 2 Ton ne s 1978/79 1979/80 Groundnuts 3,086.8 2,341 Millet 507.575 843 Sorghum 743.25 1,263 Maize 55.575 26 Cotton 76 30 4. The delay in disbursement was also caused by the fact that the first credit, 254-SE, had not been fully utilized by the time the second project (Terres Neuves II) was started, which meant that up till 1978 requests for reimbursement still related to Credit 254-SE. Furthermore, analysis of,the economic results of the second project shows that these have not been uniform throughout. STN's performance has been marked by certain weaknesses, primarily as regards the aims of crop intensifi- cation and diversification. Certain of the data cited in the report as evidence of these deficiencies dont appear conclusive to me. They are in fact more in the way of a criticism that by no means calls in question the settlement and development methodology adopted by this project or the advisability of main- taining the executing agency, viz. STN. The deterioration of agricultural credit in Senegal has had very little effect on the process of technological change. This deterioration occurred after each settler had been provided with the full set of agricultural equipment. It is, however, true that certain steps have been taken at the national level regarding the supply of seed and fertilizer in order to improve the loan repay- ment rate. Moreover, the statement that the yields obtained by the mechanized teams are no better than those achieved by those using manual means does not appear - viii - Annex 1 Page 3 warranted to me. At the level of STN, the different project follow-up studies made to date do not bear out this statement. I would appreciate learning the data on which it is based. While we all admit that the crop intensification and diversification achieved have not been commensurate with the resources put into the effort, the improvement in agricultural techniques in the project area as compared with elsewhere cannot be denied. The proper utilization and care of windbreaks and village woods, fertilizer use and soil preparation are becoming increasingly evident as project benefits. This is something that is closely bound up with the controlled nature of the operation, which I admit has been very costly. However, the spontaneous migration observed before the start of the project was of low intensity but a considerable threat to the ecology of the pioneer areas. The project has had the effect of precipitating the population movements summarized in Table 1, but has been of particular value in regulating the settlement of migrant families. The aim of the Directorate of Settlement Operations set up in STN as part of its reorganization in pursuance of the recommendations of the May 1980 Interministerial Meeting on STN is to devise a new settlement and development methodology for the Terres Neuves that will be both less costly and suitable for large-scale application. The study under way, which is governed by economic and social imperatives, envisages a mixed type of settlement: spontaneous to begin with, then controlled after arrival of the settlers through a predetermined development plan for the area. Once this study has been completed, a meeting with the Bank Experts would facilitate the search for financing for future STN projects. In the light of the results that are seen as satisfactory and the scale of the problems still obtaining in the Groundnut Basin, continuation of the - ix - Annex 1 Page 4 resettlement scheme is of pressing interest. This was reaffirmed by the Government at the Interministerial Meeting referred to. As to the advisability of retaining the executing agency, viz. STN, the decision is a matter for the Senegalese State. In any event, the integrated nature of the settlement operation (the first of its type, carried out well before the 1980 rural development reform and based on a new concept of integrated rural development projects for Senegal) on the one hand, and the satisfactory technical and financial results achieved by STN on the other, justify the role that must be reserved exclusively for this agency. To this must be added the fact that STN, as a development corporation, can perform all sorts of specific functions. It was moreover for these reasons that the authorities decided to entrust the vegetable sector to STN while waiting to obtain for it the financing needed for future settlement projects. Accordingly, one of the chief recommendations of the May 1980 Interministerial Meeting was to the effect that far from being abolished, STN should be restructured. These are the comments that I feel have to be made on your report. Generally speaking, it is faithful to the spirit in which the Terres Neuves II Project has been carried out. Moreover, the World Bank people contributed effectively to the imple- mentation of the project. The Bank's participation, both financial and technical through the many supervision missions, has been most appreciated. These factors prompt me to express once again my earnest desire to carry out further settle- ment projects in conjunction with the World Bank. Finally, the importance of settling Senegal's virgin lands is such as to warrant inclusion of our comments verbatim in the conclusions of your evaluation report. Annex 1 Page 5 Yours, etc. /s/ Minolphe Don Diallo stamp: Ministry of Rural Development General Manager Soci6te des Terres Neuves Table 1. Numbers of santhianes (miPrants) and date of settlement in Terres Neuves project area Nondetermined Arrived Arrived between Arrived between Villages surveyed 2 a : 2 x Total date a before 1972 2 1972 and 1975 1976 and 1960 p 2 2 2 2 3 a S,O a 5.0 + 5.0 : S.0 + Mdr4to 2 1 2 * 3 2 6 14 18 4 a 50 2 2 :Total- i )+(2)+ a aa a (3) 30 Ca116 (1) - 2 4 £ 12 9 : (25) 2 3 Diaod Sine (2) a .. 2 2 s 1 (3) Darou Fall (3) x - - 2 2 : (2) N diambour a 2 2 8 2 5 a 13 TOTAL a 1 2 2 3 2 a 20 14 38 13 93 3 a 5 27 55 100 There are migrants living in Diagl6 Sine and Darou Fall whose lanI is in Gall6: they have been included in the figure for Gall6, i.e. 30 families. + This column shows the migrants from eastern Senegal. a A7TACHMENT SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Cr. 578-SE) COMPLETION REPORT May 5, 1981  SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Summary and Conclusions i. The Second Terres Neuves project was to continue Government strategy of encouraging and organizing migration of farm families from the over popu- lated Groundnut Basin to the less populated and relatively well watered Eastern Region of Senegal, started through the first Terres Neuves Resettle- ment project. The main objectives of the second project were to (a) establish 9 new villages for 450 settler families and install another 150 families in existing villages; (b) construct settlement officer houses, stores, classrooms, village access tracks and roads, and wells in the new villages and rehabilitate wells in existing villages; (c) provide settlers with subsistence allowances, credit facilities for agricultural inputs, extension services, tools and grants for manual land clearing (in existing villages), and credit facilities for mechanical land clearing (in new villages); and (d) provide the staff and consultant services required to prepare a regional master plan and investment proposals for the development of the agricultural sector in Eastern Senegal. ii. The settlement component of the second project followed the pattern of the first project except that; (a) 25% of the families were to be resettled in existing villages to determine the feasibility of such a resettlement approach, and (b) ONCAD and STN were to work with settlers to create coopera- tives to take over STN-s credit and marketing operations. The other difference from the first project was the inclusion of the preparation of a master plan for agricultural development in Eastern Senegal in the second project. iii. The project became effective on November 14, 1975 one month after the original effectiveness date. Physical implementation of the well program was slow and this affected the progress of the settlement component. Settle- ment was finally completed in 1979/80, one year later than scheduled, but road construction and mechanical land clearing were completed ahead of schedule despite minor delays in starting the road program. iv. Total project cost, at appraisal, was estimated at CFAF 885.3 million (US$3.94 million). Actual costs have been estimated at CFAF 761.1 million (US$3.32 million), 16% less than the appraisal estimate. IDA financed about 60% of project costs compared to a provision of 51% at appraisal. The higher share of IDA financing was due to the lower costs of the components financed by Government. v. Settlement activities in existing villages proceeded at a faster pace than in new villages and revealed that it would be possible to encourage settlement in already settled areas. Inhabitants in the existing villages welcomed settlers and took advantage of the project to improve their agricul- tural practices. Cropping patterns for settlers did not strictly follow those recommended at appraisal and were closer to those of established farmers, as farmers reacted to Government price and marketing policies. Because of the - ii - general deterioration in the agricultural credit system from the third year of settlement farmers were not able to follow the recommended intensification themes extended by the executing agency, STN. Despite this lack of new inputs, production and yields of the main crops; groundnuts, millet and sorghum, were quite satisfactory especially during years of good rainfall or its distribution. vi. On Government insistence, the project financed mechanical land- clearing for settlers in new villages though the appraisal mission had argued against financing such an activity. It was agreed at negotiation that farmers would repay the funds used for the mechanical land-clearing but Government unilaterally cancelled these credits in 1979. The high cost per settler of the two Terres Neuves projects was due in part to the inclusion of mechanical land clearing in the projects. Since the average crop yields on mechanically cleared land were not significantly different from those on manually cleared land, it was an error on the part of the Bank to have agreed to include the mechanical land-clearing in the project at negotiation. vii. Though it is not possible to calculate actual settler incomes by year of arrival, an average income per family can be estimated for each year. This shows that by PY5 average family income was about US$82C in 1975 prices compared to a weighted average family income of US$430 projected at appraisal, the main reason being that areas cultivated per adult family member has grown more rapidly than anticipated and yields of the main crops have been above appraisal estimates during the good rainfall years. It is expected that average settler incomes would continue to be higher than forecast, especially with the recent producer price increases for the main crops, but will grow at a much slower rate than occurred in PY4 and PY5. The economic rate of return at appraisal was estimated at 14% for the settlement program. Using the same assumptions as at appraisal the ERR has been re-evaluated at 18%. viii. The technical assistance component of the project successfully compiled existing but dispersed information on the Eastern region and drew up a long term plan (schema directeur) as well as actions to be undertaken in the short and medium term. It was successful in identifying project ideas that can be implemented though experience with the preparation of the Eastern Senegal Agricultural Development project has shown that these same ideas could have been generated through normal identification and preparation processes questioning the usefulness of the preparation of the original master plan. ix. Project implementation was carried out by STN which generally provided good management. The end of the second project has zowever opened up debate on the future role, if any, of STN which was set up under Bank insistence to execute the first project. It can be argued that there is a justification for maintaining an official land-use and planning agency, but the form that this agency would take need not necessarily conform to the present structure of STN. Government appears committed to maintaining STN and has assigned it the responsibility for supervising fruit and vegetable production in the country. Government has however not been able to obtain the funds for financing new STN activities and it may be in the interest of the country to scale down STN-s activities to that of a land-use and planning agency. SENEGAL SECOND TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Cr. 578-SE) COMPLETION REPORT I. BACKGROUND 1.01 In the late 1960's the Senegal Government adopted a strategy of stressing diversification of public investment out of the Groundnut Basin that led it to consider resettlement of farm families from the overpopulated Basin to the relatively well-watered and less populated Eastern province of Senegal. In 1969, therefore, the Government asked IDA to help finance a resettlement project in these "virgin lands" of Eastern Senegal. IDA agreed to finance a pilot project providing for settlement of 300 families and provision of facilities and services for 250 established families in the project area as a prelude to possible resettlement of a larger number of families. The pilot project however represented a considerably scaled-down version of the initial Government request which proposed financing resettlement of about 1,000 families. This first project was carried out between 1971/72 and 1976/77 and during this project the feasibility of a larger resettlement program compris- ing the migration of about 6,000 families over fifteen years was to be studied. 1.02 The main specific objectives of the first project were: (i) the organized settlement of 300 families in six villages over six years; (ii) provision of basic facilities and services for 250 established families in the area; and (iii) the introduction of intensive farming techniques and more diver- sified crop production for farmers in the project area. 1.03 The first project was quite successful in terms of its economic impact and reaching a larger number of the population than anticipated at appraisal. Incomes for both settler and established families exceeded appraisal expectations though income increases for established families could not be fully attributable to the project since existing families were largely neglected by project staff who were preoccupied with the resettlement program. The provision of infrastructure and other services made resettlement more attractive to the rural people but failed to demonstrate whether the project could be replicated on a large scale especially where generous Govern- ment grants would not be available and when resettlement would of necessity have to take place under much harsher conditions. Thus a major shortcoming of the project was regarded as having tested only one high cost system of settle- ment. The pilot project was also criticised for failing to encourage self administration by settlers. A second phase project was prepared during this period and was supposed to correct some of these shortcomings. - 2 - II. FORMULATION A. Origin and Preparation 2.01 The second Terres Neuves project was to continue Government strategy of encouraging and organizing migration of farm families from the over populated Groundnut Basin to the less populated and relatively well watered Eastern Region of Senegal. Since the pilot project had shown the willingness of families to resettle and spot checks had also indicated some spontaneous settlement in the region even before the first project, Government had en- visaged the preparation of a Second project for resettling about 6,000 families over 6 years. Initial Bank identification missions however suggested that an intermediary project aiming at resettling about 1,000 families be prepared. Government accepted the idea of an intermediary phase of settlement but proposed that this project be prepared to resettle a minimum of 2,000 families over 4 to 5 years. Government's idea then was that during the 4 or 5 year period of the second project a large-scale project could be prepared to resettle the remaining part of the virgin lands in Eastern Senegal and Upper Casamance. 2.02 A consultant group which was involved in monitoring the socio- economic impact of the pilot project was put in charge of preparing the follow up project. During preparation, soil and health surveys indicated that the scope for resettlement in Eastern Senegal was less promising than originally anticipated and that resettlement of the 2,000 families envisaged would only be possible if the project area was extended considerably to the east, implying in some cases, declassification of forest reserves. Yet, the preparation report still proposed a project to resettle 2,000 families over 5 years. It however identified settlement sites for only 500 families in the pilot project area, and sites for a further 500 families some 100 miles away from the pilot project area, but was unable to find sites for the remaining 1,000 families near the project area and therefore proposed declassification of forest zones and prospection for sites further east. The report did not include any proposals for improving existing farms in areas adjacent to the settlement sites. B. Appraisal 2.03 A four-man appraisal mission visited Senegal in July 1974 and raised several issues as regards the proposed project. Aside from the general sector issues involving Government price policy, the mission found that; (i) the incidence of onchocerciasis (river blindness) was quite serious; (ii) enough suitable land was not available for a large settlement project, and (iii) institutional arrangements for project execution were poor. Owing to the reduced prospects for any large-scale settlement project therefore the mission proposed a new project that would comprise overall agricultural development in the Tambacounda Department that would have as a component completion of settlement in the pilot project area and also test the feasi- bility of introducing settlers to existing villages. - 3 - 2.04 Government rejected the proposal for an agricultural development project and suggested instead that the project be limited only to settlement in a smaller area around the pilot project and that it should rather have as a component preparation of an integrated development project for Eastern Senegal including detailed soil and health surveys that would determine prospects for further settlement in the region. 2.05 Though the project proposed by Government would have a reasonable rate of return, the appraisal mission considered that; (i) it would make a limited contribution to an appropriate development strategy for the region; (ii) it involved too high an investment cost per settled family, and (iii) the available land could be reserved to meet the needs of natural population increase, and hence it concluded that on balance the disadvantages of the project as proposed by Government were more than its advantages. 2.06 A decision meeting to consider the issues raised by the appraisal mission and the Government proposals however decided that the Bank Group could finance the revised project proposed by Government on condition that; (i) Government agrees to the institutional arrangements proposed by the appraisal mission, especially that all agricultural extension in the region be under one extension agency; (ii) that land clearing for settlers be done manually to reduce cost per settler family; and (iii) Government accepts a package approach for the studies and settlement program in order to develop a strategy for integrated regional development in Estern Senegal. 2.07 Government did not agree to the first two conditions but agreed to compromises during negotiations. These compromises have had the effect that (i) one covenant in the credit agreement to recover credit for mechanical land clearing was not adhered to (see para 3.18) and (ii) IDA through its implicit acceptance of recruitment and extension role for STN has unwittingly built it up into a regional development agency with no purpose or role once IDA financing has ceased (see para 8.07 and 8.08). C. Targets and Goals 2.08 The final project design approved in August 1975 consisted of a program to complete settlement in the pilot project area and a technical assistance component designed to prepare a master plan for agricultural development in Eastern Senegal. The master plan was to emphasize the con- siderable potential for increasing output from existing farms and livestock herds and the plan would contain investment proposals for the integrated agricultural development of the region. The settlement component was along the same lines as the pilot project and had the following objectives: (i) establishment of 9 new villages for 450 settler families and installation of 150 families in existing villages; (ii) construction of 8 settlement officer houses, 9 stores, 12 class- rooms, 76 km of village access roads and 25 km of secondary roads; (iii) construction of a well in each of the 9 new villages and rehabi- litation of a total of 15 wells in existing villages accepting settlers; and (iv) provision of settlers with tools and grants for manual land clearing, subsistence allowances, and credit facilities for agricultural inputs and mechanical land clearing, as well as extension services. 2.09 Settlement was to start in 1976 and would take three years. The settlement pattern would follow that of the first project except that: (i) 25% of the families were to be resettled in existing villages to determine the feasibility of such a resettlement approach, and (ii) ONCAD and STN would work with settlers to create cooperatives that would take over STN's credit and marketing operations. Facilities and services including wells, roads, and extension were to be provided for the new families to be resettled as well as existing villages accepting settlers. Agricultural practices would follow the intensification themes of the first project and settlers were to be bound by contract to follow farming practices recommended by STN or face expulsion from the scheme. 2.10 Following the procedure adopted in the pilot project, each resettled family would be allocated 10 ha of land of which 2 ha would be mechanically cleared for those resettling in new villages but farmers resettling in exist- ing villages would clear their lands manually. Crops to be grown would include groundnuts, cotton and cereals; and intensification themes--stump removal, plowing, comprehensive fertilization, and timely seeding and adequate weeding--were to be applied. Using these techniques farmers were expected to obtain yield increments ranging from 400 kg/ha for groundnuts to about 500-600 kg/ha for cereals by PY5. At full development in PY10, the total annual incremental production of the project was expected to be about 1,500 tons seed cotton, 2,800 tons of unshelled groundnuts, 1,650 tons of maize and 1,822 tons of millet and sorghum. 2.11 Gross farm production income/family of settlers in new villages was expected to rise from CFAF 93,000 in the first year of settlement to CFAF 286,000 within ten years. For settlers moving to existing villages their average income was expected to rise from CFAF 81,000 in the first year to CFAF 250,000 in ten years. These would imply about 60 percent increase in per capita income for each settler. III. IMPLEMENTATION A. Effectiveness and Start up 3.01 The credit was approved on July 8, 1975 and the project became effective on November 14, 1975 one month after the original effectiveness date. There were two conditions of effectiveness. The first was the signing of an agreement between STN and SODEFITEX for the latter to provide extension services to settlers and the second involved the official publication of a - 5 - decree setting up a revolving fund for STN. A delay in the creation of the fund led to a month's postponement of the effectiveness date. This condition was met in the first half of November and the project was declared effective on November 14, 1975. 3.02 Contracts for mechanical land clearing and roac construction (32 kilometers for the first year) were awarded and approved by IDA towards the end of 1975, and in order to have water available for the first settlers, contracts for construction of three wells were given out in mid 1975 and construction of four others by force account began in early 1976. On the whole, the project got off to a good start even though work on infrastructure development under the first project was still continuing. B. Revisions 3.03 There were no major changes made in design of the project during implementation. Two changes affecting the scope of the project were however made by project management. The first involved 25 km of secondary roads that were to be constructed. Project management decided in mid-1977 to cancel construction of the secondary roads, since they argued that the new villages could easily be reached by access tracks. The mileage of access tracks was consequently increased with IDA agreement. The other involved the classrooms to be constructed. The appraisal report had proposed construction of 12 classrooms. Project management requested reduction of this number to sixl/, but by credit closing only two classrooms had been constructed. 3.04 Other revisions involved the method of execution of subprojects; mechanical land clearing, road, and well construction. Roads were to be con- structed either by the Army Engineering Corps or the Ministry of Works; mecha- nical land clearing was to be done on force account using Government equip- ment; and wells were to be constructed by the Government well buildin6 brigades on force account. In all these cases it was not possible to get the relevant Government department to do the work and hence these were contracted out. The result was that the unit costs were higher than foreseen at appraisal for land clearing and roads, and wells were constructed by local well diggers who did not have the necessary equipment for well-digging in an area with such deep water table. Funds were reallocated twice during imple- mentation to take account of these changes. C. Physical Progress 3.05 The settlement program started in the 1976/77 season and proceeded at a faster pace than anticipated for settlement in existing villages. For the new villages however pace of settlement was slower than expected at appraisal. This was mainly due to the fact that progress on infrastructure development, especially well construction, was slow. In 1978/79 therefore recruitment of settlers was made for only the villages which had already been established. The last two villages were established and settled in 1979/80 one year later than scheduled. Annex 1, Table 1 compares actual and planned physical progress of settlement activities. 1/ STN explains that the number of classrooms was reduced to six to allow construction of a dispensary. - 6 - 3.06 Despite the rapid start-up of procedures for infrastructure develop- ment, the main problem remained the slow rate of well construction. The new villages had to be supplied water with tankers due to the delays in construc- tion. These delays arose from the poor equipment of local well diggers given contracts for well-digging. 3.07 For road construction, the Army Engineering Corps proved to be too expensive and the Public Works Department did not have, the necessary equipment to participate and hence the work was carried out by a local contractor who also did the mechanical land clearing. Minor delays were encountered in the road program due to the lengthy procurement procedures of Government. Once a contract was signed with the local contractor however, the program proceeded satisfactorily. 3.08 Progress on the school construction program was the slowest. The appraisal report proposed the construction of 12 classrooms in three locations to serve new and existing villages. This objective was reduced to six class- rooms since six had been built under the first project. Work on this reduced program did not start till the first half of 1980. Two classrooms had however been constructed in one of the villages of the first project starting in September 1978. In general then despite a few timing problems project exe- cution was reasonably satisfactory. The credit would be closed in May 1981. D. Reporting 3.09 Quarterly reports were generally submitted on schedule to IDA. The quality of these reports was however not uniform and generally leave gaps in information. For example, in most cases it is not clear what yield figures are estimates or actual and what are just projectionsl/; and for the earlier years data provided do not distinguish between new settlers, existing farmers, and settlers under the old project. The quality of reporting improved starting in 1978. The independent monitoring and evaluation studies done by ISRA in 1976/77 and SATEC in 1978/79, however, placed more emphasis on settlers under the first project and existing villages than on those resettled by the second project, making it difficult to draw definite conclusions about the differential impact of the second project. 3.10 The main shortcoming of the quarterly reports is that they do not help throw more light on an important innovative feature of the second project--that of resettling farmers in existing villages. From what data is available this feature seemed to have worked well, and possibly better than settlement in new villages, but the evidence is not sufficient to make definite conclusions about this. E. Procurement 3.11 Because of the small size of expenditures and their spread over time, the appraisal report did not provide for international competitive 1/ STN explains that the September report normally gave yield and production projections while the March report gave actual figures chough in most cases there was no difference between figures in these two reports. - 7 - bidding. Local bidding procedures were to be used for construction of three wells in 1975 and the purchase of vehicles and equipment. Construction and improvement of the other wells were to be done by the Government's well building brigades. Feeder roads and village access tracks were to be con- structed by the Ministry of works or the Army Engineering Corps, and junior staff housing and mechanical land clearing were to be done on force account. Not all these procurement procedures were followed since the relevant Admin- istrative Departments could not participate. Thus road and well construction plus mechanical land clearing were done through local bidding procedures approved by IDA. Also the contract for the preparation of the master plan was awarded to a Senegalese consultant group by private contract and approved by IDA. Despite the deviations from the procurement provisions of the appraisal report, the procurement process was satisfactory. Well construction however suffered in quality due to the poor equipment of local contractors. This was however unavoidable given that Government's well building brigade was contacted as foreseen but was unable to help in the construction. F. Projects Costs 3.12 Total project costs were estimated at CFAF 885.3 million (US$3.94 million) at appraisal including price contingencies of CFAF 158.6 million (US$0.70 million). Actual costs have been difficult to establish especially for incremental on-farm costs and salaries and operating costs. STN figures supplied the completion mission are inconsistent with actual IDA disburse- ments for some categories. Available cost figures indicate that cost for mechanical land clearing and vehicles and equipment were considerably higher than appraisal, but actual on-farm costs and STN operating costs have been estimated to be much lower than at appraisal. Acutal costs and appraisal estimates compare as follows: Estimated Appraisal Actual Actual as % of Estimates Costs Appraisal ------------- CFAF million--------------- Mechanical Land Clearing 45.0 193.6 431 Vehicles and Equipment 18.0 68.1 378 Salaries and Operating Expenses 148.1 134.7 91 Recruitment and Installation 79.9 28.6 36 Incremental on farm Costs 129.2 92.7 1/ 72 Regional Plan 82.8 88.5 106 Contingencies 229.7 - - 885.7 761.1 81 1/ This figure is an estimate based on scattered data on input supplies. - 8 - 3.13 The Appraisal report, aware of the possibility that mechanical land clearing might have to be done on contract rather than on force account had included a 100% physical contingency for this component. This was still insufficient to cover the cost of this activity which had to receive reallo- cations from other categories. G. Financing and Disbursement 3.14 IDA financed an estimated 60% of project costs compared to a pro- vision of 51% at appraisal. The higher share of IDA financing was due to the lower costs of the components to be financed by Government. The initial financing plan was adhered to with IDA providing 80% of financing for all expenditures other than vehicles and equipment, and foreign costs of con- sultants where the respective IDA shares were 60% and 100%. Financing by category is shown in the table below. Project Financing IDA Government BNDS/STN Total CFAF CFAF CFAF CFAF Million US$ -000 Million US$ -000 Million US$ -000 Million US$ -000 Civil Works 123.9 518.9 31.0 129.8 - - 154.9 648.7 Vehicles and Equipment 39.2 169.9 28.9 125.3 - - 68.1 295.2 Mechanical Land Clearing 154.8 678.2 38.8 178.9 - - 193.6 857.1 STN Operating Expenses 73.5 326.5 61.2 1/ 272.7 - - 134.7 599.2 Recruitment and Installation - - 28.6 127.1 - - 28.6 127.1 Consultant Services 68.7 304.9 19.8 87.9 - - 88.5 392.8 On Farm Costs - - 11.6 50.4 81.1 352.3 92.7 402.7 Subtotal 460.1 1,998.4 219.9 972.1 81.1 352.3 761.1 3,322.8 Undisbursed 1.6 1.6 Total 2,000 219.9 972.1 81.1 352.3 761.1 3,324.4 1/ May include expenses for activities other than the project. - 9 - 3.15 Credit disbursement started in July 1976, about eight months after the credit had become effective. The delay in the start of disbursement was due partly to the fact that STN had obtained a working capital of CFAF 100 million from Government as one of the conditions of credit effectiveness and hence was slow in submitting disbursement requests. It was also affected by the poor performance of STN-s accounting department in the initial stages of project execution. When disbursement started it remained sluggish up to the third quarter of 1978 when it increased rapidly. By the middle of FY 1980 when the credit was expected to be fully disbursed 93% of the funds had been paid out. The remaining 7% was disbursed within one year. H. Covenants 3.16 All but one of the covenants under the project were complied with in one form or another. In two cases the spirit of the covenant was complied with though not according to what was envisaged in the credit agreement, and in a few other cases compliance was late. 3.17 Covenants involving monitoring of the first resettlement project, appointment of a project manager in the field, accounting and auditing were complied with though with some delays. One covenant required the signing of a contract between STN and SODEFITEX for the provision of extension services. This was done during the first two project years but was discontinued without the prior agreement of IDA and STN has since provided the extension services itself. Other covenants partially complied with involved maintenance of roads and access tracks and maintenance and staffing of classrooms. The covenants required maintenance of access tracks by the Ministry of Public works and operating of classrooms by the Ministry of Education. The ministries have so far not been involved in maintaining roads or operating the classrooms and these have been done by STN. In all these cases of partial or late compliance, project execution was not seriously affected, however, with the completion of the project and subsequent rethinking of what role STN should play and also the drying up of its funds, it is necessary to have: (i) SODEFITEX provide extension; (ii) the Ministry of Education be responsible for staffing and operating the classrooms constructed so far; and (iii) the Public Works Depart- ment maintain the roads and wells constructed. Instructions have been given by the Prime Minister to this effect. 3.18 The credit agreement required that mechanical land clearing be provided on credit to settlers and the interest rate charged should be two percentage points above the discount rate of the Central Bank. STN had been reluctant from the beginning, to apply the interest rate for land mechanically cleared. After repeated requests from IDA to Government to implement this covenant, the Director of STN proposed that instead of the envisaged interest rate, a lump sum payment be made by farmers per hectare of land cleared. This proposal meant that farmers were to pay effective interest rates less than the Central Bank discount rate. Since none of the credit for land clearing had come due, no solution was immediately found, but in May 1979 a ministerial council decision declared that all credit repayments for mechanical land clearing would be cancelled and this would be considered as a subsidy by the state. A letter was sent to the Government seeking explanation for the cancellation of the credits contrary to the covenant in the credit agreement. No reply was however received. - 10 - IV. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT A. Production 4.01 Production has been affected by low rainfall and poor distribution of rains in three of the five years during implementation. For the most part however, appraisal production estimates were attained in average rainfall years, except for cotton and maize as shown in the table below: Crop Production by Settlers in 1978/79 (PY4) and 1979/80 (PY5) 1978/79 (PY4) 1979/80 (PY5) Estimated Estimated Appraisal Actual 1/ Appraisal Actual 1/ -----------tons ---------------------- Groundnuts 1,350 3,027 1,755 2,332 Millet 514 520 554 843 Sorghum 296 743 510 1,263 Maize 299 50 342 21 Cotton 60 76 194 30 4.02 Average yield estimates at appraisal included a provision for drought every fourth year equivalent to a 40% reduction in output and also did take account of part of farm production using traditional techniques and hence not attaining the yields obtained on intensified fields. On the whole, estimated average actual yields, provided through monitoring work of STN, were higher than appraisal estimates on improved fields except for: (i) 1977/78 and 1980/81 when the bad drought affected yields throughout the country, ana (ii) cotton and maize for almost all the years. The table below compares appraisal and estimated actual yields for 1978/79 and 1979/80. The former was a normal year while the latter had total rainfall below normal, but that was quite well distributed in time. Crop Yields for Settlers 1978/79 1979/80 Estimated Estimated Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Groundnuts 1.1 1.7 1.1 1.5 Millet 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 Sorghum 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 Maize 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.3 Cotton 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 1/ STN comments show slight differences between the actual production estimates and figures used here. These differences are however not significant (see Government comments). - 11 - 4.03 Production of groundnuts, millet and sorghum was higher than ex- pected with settlers devoting larger areas to these crops than forecast at appraisal. Government price and marketing policies perhaps explain to a large extent this deviation from appraisal cropping patterns. Farmers found that the returns for groundnuts and millet/sorghum were relatively higher than for cotton production. For maize, the absence of any official marketing mechanism also meant that farmers produced mainly for auto-consumption. Thus the pattern of farmer concentration on the easily marketed and relatively more profitable crops is expected to continue until policies change regarding prices and marketing opportunities for cotton and maize. B. Technological change 4.04 The main agricultural themes to be used by settlers involved intensification whereby they would; cultivate with draft oxen, plant with improved seeds, plough every three or four years, rotate crops, apply heavy doses of fertilizer, and hoe, weed and seed on time. 4.05 Settlers during the initial years were selected both from landless farmers (sourghas) already living in the project area and from farmers in the Groundnut Basin. These early settlers--especially those already in the area --were aware of their obligations in terms of agricultural practices and were generally susceptible to follow extension advice. 4.06 Project records indicate that during the first two settlement years a large quantity of inputs were supplied the farmers and most of them were able to follow a large part of the recommended cultural practices except for ploughing. This is not surprising since as indicated in the PCR of the first project, farmers in Senegal have in general spurned ploughing, and the advisability of ploughing is being questioned by agronomists in Senegal. 4.07 From the third year of settlement the agricultural credit system in Senegal began to deteriorate. This was aggravated by Government decision in 1978 to allow purchase of groundnuts before debts are repaid. This resulted in sharp increases in debt delinquencies that finally destroyed the system. Supplies of oxen, implements and fertilizer fell considerably and for the last two agricultural seasons there have been very limited input distribution for project participants. STN continued to distribute some pairs of oxen under a special credit, separate from the general credit system, and has managed to maintain distribution of an average of about 50 to 70 pairs per year since 1978/79. Compound fertilizer was used on at least 80% of all groundnut and millet/sorghum fields between 1976/77 and 1978/79 but project records indicate that only a small number of project participants received any compound ferti- lizer in 1979/80 and 1980/81 and for the last year most of them had to use only rock phosphate on about half their groundnut fields. They also have not been able to obtain any new implements since 1978/79. In addition, seed quality throughout the project period has not been uniform and in most cases has been bad. Thus, in general, aside from the first two settlement years it has not been possible for settlers to apply the recommended intensification themes. - 12 - 4.08 Despite these shortcomings in input supply, farmers managed to attain reasonably high yields especially during years of good rainfall or its distri- bution. Extension work has been fairly good and, to the credit of the project, more farmers in existing villages have benefitted from extension advice of STN. Most of these farmers had only been exposed to sporadic agricultural extension and hence have now taken the opportunity to improve their cultiva- tion methods. V. THE EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COMPONENT 5.01 The project financed a study of the development potential of Eastern Senegal over the long term. A master plan was to be prepared to determine: (i) the constraints on development in the region; (ii) the relative merits of different investments; for improving farming by established farmers, for livestock development, and for resettlement; (iii) the priorities for infra- structure improvements; and (iv) institutional responsibilities. 5.02 The study was undertaken in two four month phases by a Senegalese para-public agency with assistance from three expatriate consultant agencies. The first phase was completed in July 1977 and consisted of a compilation of existing though dispersed information on the region and a quantitative discussion of its alternative long term development strategies. After dis- cussion of the reports between IDA, Government and the consultants a second phase was undertaken and completed in April 1978. Four volumes of the second phase report dealt with a long term plan (Schema directeur) and the remaining three volumes with actions to be undertaken in the short and medium term i.e. through 1985. 5.03 The most immediate action proposed in the reports was an agricul- tural development project in parts of the region. A draft terms of reference was discussed towards the end of 1978 for preparation of a possible project to be financed by the Bank Group. Project identification and initial preparation work were carried out in 1979 by the agency which prepared the master plan, with assistance from the Bank-s Regional Mission in West Africa. Project proposals were reviewed during this period and terms of reference defined for a full feasibility study and preparation report. 5.04 Preparation was finally completed in July 1980 and a project, which would cover parts of Eastern Senegal and Upper Casamance with SODEFITEX as the executing agency, was proposed. The proposed project-s main objectives would include: (i) arresting the decline in cotton production and increasing production of traditional cereals; (ii) improving the efficiency of SODEFITEX; and (iii) promoting the development of essential rural infrastructure in health education, roads and village water supplies. Appraisal was to have taken place in October/November 1980 but had to be delayed to ascertain the competence of SODEFITEX new management. - 13 - 5.05 The technical assistance component was successful in identifying project ideas which can be implemented. However the experience of the Eastern Senegal master plan has shown that these same project ideas could have been generated through normal identification and preparation processes, thus questioning the usefulness of the preparation of the original master plan. The inherent appeal of the master plan route is that it would ensure coherence between the long and short term. However the danger is that such plans concentrate too much on the long term to the detriment of concrete short-term project and investment proposals. Thus aside from the cost aspect of such an elaborate exercise, a full preparation and identification process had to be undertaken for a possible project. Since in the long- term many things are possible the argument of coherence between the short and long term implied by a master plan loses its appeal and hence the direct identification and preparation approach, would in most cases, be more beneficial than the round about method of preparing master plans. VI. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESULTS A. Settler Incomes 6.01 Farm budgets presented in the appraisal report show that average settler incomes would rise from CFAF 93,000 to CFAF 286,000 in the tenth year of settlement for farmers settling in new villages and for those moving to existing villages, incomes were supposed to rise from CFAF 81,000 to CFAF 250,000. Actual aggregate output and input figures available do not permit the calculation of settler income by year of arrival but an average income per family can be calculated for all settlers. Comparable figures can also be derived from the appraisal report weighting yearly net income by number of settlers having reached that income per the appraisal report. These compare with actual average incomes as follows: Project Year 1/ PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 Net Value of Output per Family 2/ (CFAF-000 - appraisal prices) Appraisal Estimates (weighted Average) 90.9 80.6 74.6 94.1 Actual (All settlers - weighted average) 84.3 37.0 195.6 181.9 At Actual Prices Actual (All settlers-weighted average) 113.1 57.9 299.7 284.9 1/ Project Year 2 corresponds to Settlement Year 1. 2/ Gross value of crop production less inputs and credit repayments (short and medium term). Source: Annex 3, Table 1 and Appraisal Report. - 14 - 6.02 Actual average net family income (at appraisal prices) was lower than appraisal estimates in the first two settlement years, because during the first year the area cultivated was quite low owing to the late distribution of draft oxen and agricultural equipment. In the second year there was poor rainfall that reduced production considerably throughout the country. Since then average family incomes have been about twice as forecast at appraisal in "constant" prices. Average incomes in 1980/81 are expected to be considerably lower than appraisal estimates owing to a particularly poor rainfall. 6.03 Three main factors account for the higher than anticipated settler incomes in PY4 and PY5. First, purchases of inputs have been lower than foreseen owing to the breakdown in the agricultural credit system but the lack of new inputs did not lead to any large falls in production (para 4.07). 1/ Second, settlers in new villages have not had to repay credits for mechanical land clearing-repayments which would have been higher than appraisal forecast. Finally areas cultivated for the main crops and their yields in settlement years 3 and 4 were higher than anticipated (see Annex 2, Table 2). It is expected that average settler incomes would continue to be higher than fore- cast but will grow at a much slower rate than occurred in 1978/79 and 1979/80 as farmers purchase more inputs in the coming years. B. Economic Reevaluation Economic Returns 6.04 At appraisal, the project's economic rate of return over 20 years was estimated at 14 percent. Costs included all settlement related activi- ties and extension work plus a valuation of family labor at the value of production of a family engaged in subsistence agriculture. Benefits were calculated taking account of the probability of drought once every four years decreasing output by 40% and hence reducing benefits on average by 10% a year. The same cost categories have been included in the economic reevalua- tion. Costs during execution have been lower than estimated at appraisal but economic farmgate prices in real terms were also lower than foreseen at appraisal. In calculating benefits we have assumed the probability of drought once every three years from PY7 (1981/82) reducing yields by about 45% and hence decreasing annual benefits by 15% per year over the remaining useful life of the project. Family labor was valued at the average rural wage rate of CFAF 350 per man day. Comparison of the rates of return is given below: Appraisal Actual 1980 Prices 1974 Prices Economic Rate of Return 14 18.2 23.6 1/ It is not clear however whether settlers brought any equipment with them from their departure areas. This is quite likely and the effect of such equipment would offset the lack of new inputs in settled areas. - 15 - 6.05 The economic rate of return for the project has been estimated at 18.2 compared to 14% at appraisal. Using prices forecast at appraisal and actual costs in 1974 terms, the rate of return is 23.6%. The difference reflects the lower actual output prices than forecast at appraisal. Assump- tions underlying the calculation of the rate of return are in Annex 3. VII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE A. Executing Agency 7.01 Project implementation was carried out by STN, the agency set up for resettlement under the first project. General project management was good but frequent staff changes at the project level meant that there were problems with efficient planning. These showed up in delays in well develop- ment, arrangements for monitoring project results, and measures for making settlers more independent through development of cooperatives. SODEFITEX had assisted in extension work during the first two years through a contract signed with STN but this contract was cancelled unilaterally in 1978 by STN which began providing extension services by itself. Cancellation of the contract and assumption of extension duties by STN had one significant and important effect, it opened up debate on what future role if any, to assign to STN and what agency would be responsible for providing extension for farmers resettled under the two projects. This question has not yet received a satisfactory answer but the real issue discussed below in paras 8.09 and 8.10 is whether STN should have been set up at all and now that it does not have financing for any follow-up resettlement project what role, if any, it should play. 7.02 Support services to settlers was satisfactorily provided during the initial years by SODEFITEX which also played an active and constructive role in preparation of the proposed Eastern Senegal Agricultural Development Project. Other administrative departments expected to participate in the project - Hydraulics, Education, Public Works, and the Army were unable to do so and hence overt administrative support was lacking in project imple- mentation. The Ministry of Health, however, did a good work in organizing a health survey of the Region as part of the Eastern Senegal master plan studies. B. Government and Bank Performance 7.03 Government took an active part in the appraisal process and made some contributions to the final project design. Government however adopted a rigid approach to the design that ultimately increased the per unit cost of settlement. During implementation, Government commitment to the project came into question a few times when it delayed releasing counterpart funds. It also reneged on a commitment made at negotiation to ask settlers in new - 16 - villages to repay credits made for mechanical land clearing. The Ministries of Planning, Health and Rural Development all played an active role in the master plan component of the project and in the preparation of the proposed Eastern Senegal Agricultural Development Project. 7.04 Bank supervision missions took place about twice a year as envi- saged. The missions were able to address management problems in a productive manner. The missions were however not always successful in getting project management to implement some aspects of the project, despite continuous urging during the missions and through follow-up letters. Thus land clearing credit policy, for example, was never implemented and requests by the Bank for STN to renew extension contract with SODEFITEX was not done. Project monitoring and reporting of project results and activities also suffered from this inability to get STN to follow all the agreements reached at negotiation. In retrospect then, the Bank should not have accepted the modifications of project design at negotiation. VIII. SPECIAL ISSUES A. Agricultural Development 8.01 Like the pilot project, appraisal goals included introduction of intensive farming techniques and more diversified crop production. These goals were to be met through an obligatory farm plan similar to that of the pilot project. Such a plan required farmers to progressively destump their land, use recommended varieties, follow comprehensive fertilization programs, and follow sound crop rotations. Settlers were to sign contracts with STN undertaking to follow recommended farming practices or face expulsion by STN from the scheme. In practice and like the pilot project, farmers showed more flexibility in following market forces than anticipated. Thus cropping patterns calling for increases in maize and cotton areas were not followed and crops produced have been mainly groundnuts and millet/sorghum, in later years, as these latter two crops have become more and more lucrative. 8.02 Several factors have however accounted for the not too strict adherence to the farm plan. First, maize marketing for example has never been organized in the project area and most settler farmers are not even aware that there is a producer price for maize. Second, cotton production has suffered both because of the low relative price and the apparent lack of interest of SODEFITEX in providing extension services for cotton production in the project area. Third, the deterioration in the input supply and agri- cultural credit systems since 1977/78 have meant that farmers have not always received expressed input needs or recommended inputs. Despite the failure of crop intensification and diversification goals however project benefits have been better than anticipated both financially for the settlers and economically for the country thus reinforcing the conclusion of the PCR of the pilot project that these failures have in a sense undermined the justification of the project based on the need for highly organized and controlled settlement. - 17 - B. Spontaneous or Official Settlement 8.03 One of the major criticisms of the two projects has been that they have encouraged a high cost method of settlement. Critics argue that settlement would have taken place even without the project and that such project intervention raises expectations of potential settlers and postpones rather than helps spontaneous settlement as potential settlers wait for Government to pay for their cost of resettlement. 8.04 While there may be some merit in this type of argument, the evidence is so scant that one cannot be sure that settlement would have taken place in the project areas without the intervention of the project especially because there is no surface water and groundwater can only be obtained at depths of 50 m or more. The major advantage of sponsored settlement is that large numbers of families can be resettled within a short period of time and that it is organized enough to enable the provision of basic infrastructure at reasonable cost per settler. The high cost of the two Terres Neuves projects originates essentially in the inclusion of mechanical land clearing as one of the components of the projects at Government insistence during negotiation. Since the average crop yields on mechanically cleared land may not have been significantly different from those on manually cleared land 1/, it was an error on the part of the Bank to have conceded that point during negotiations. 8.05 There is some evidence that during the two projects, there was some spontaneous settlement especially in existing villages. For three of the largest villages preliminary STN studies show that about 90 families resettled on their own in these villages during the period of the two projects. This would imply that a larger number of families possibly close to 15-20% 2/ of those officially settled moved to settle in the project area on their own. One could reasonably argue therefore that this "uncontrolled" settlement did take place because of the project since (i) the project created a favorable climate for existing villages to accept new settlers, (ii) the provision of rural infrastructure made the transition a lot easier for potential settlers, and (iii) the installation of new families in a hitherto unsettled area meant that input credit, extension and marketing facilities would be available for both new and old residents. It could also be argued that, in the same vein, because of the project, further settlements would be encouraged in the project area as distant relatives move to join settled families. 8.06 A strong argument then could be made for continued official support for settlement provided that land is available and no endemic diseases exist in the area. The question then becomes what sort of official support should 1/ Government comments that this comparison is not fair since there is no data to permit such comparison. The original sentence has therefore been changed to reflect this uncertainty. 2/ The total number of families officially settled in the two projects was 900. - 18 - be given for settlement and whether settelement should be tightly controlled and organized. The evidence points to the conclusion that official support should perhaps be limited to infrastructure development and information dif- fusion and farmers allowed to decide on other matters. The exact type of possible official involvement is discussed below under the future role of STN. C. The "Societe des Terres Neuves" (STN) 8.07 STN was created by Government in November 1971, at the urging of the Bank to execute the pilot resettlement project financed by IDA. STN became fully operational about two years after the pilot project had begun and took responsibility for implementation from CFDT and ORSTOM who were responsible for the project at the time. The pilot project was generally regarded as successful and STN was charged with execution of the second project. In the two projects STN has overseen the resettlement of 900 families for whom it has provided extension 1/ and support services, in addition to services for another 600 families already living in the project area. It has also overseen the development of a considerable amount of rural infrastructure especially in roads and water supply (see attached map). After the cancellation of the STN contract with SODEFITEX in 1977 several discussions began in Senegal and also informally with the Bank on what future role STN should play. 8.08 An interministerial council meeting in May 1980 decided that exten- sion and support services for families resettled under the first project would be provided by SODEFITEX. No mention was made of those resettled under the second project and STN would presumably continue with its extension work for them. The meeting also decided that the infrastructure developed under the project be maintained by the Administrative Departments concerned and that the Ministry of Finance should seek, together with the Ministry of Plan and STN, the financial resources required for financing STN's activities. These activities, as defined at the time, included feasibility studies for resettlement projects in Eastern Senegal and Upper Casamance and attempts to remove the constraints posed by riverblindness to resettlement. In September 1980, Government, unable to find financing for any new settlement projects and unwilling to dissolve STN, decided to confide to STN extension work for fruits and vegetables in Thies, Louga and the Fleuve and designated it as the regional development agency for cap-vert in addition to its work as a resettlement agency. The main argument used to justify this was that STN has experience in integrated rural development and was qualified to supervise any form of rural development project. 8.09 The real issue here is whether STN should have been set up at all and once it has accomplished its primary mission whether there is a justifica- tion for its continued existence. The Bank insisted on setting up STN to give a limited financial autonomy to the project. This could perhaps have been 1/ On Bank insistence responsibility for extension services was delegated from STN to SODEFITEX in 1975 but STN cancelled its contract with SODEFITEX in 1977 and began reproviding extension itself. - 19 - done through covenants in the Credit Agreement asking for financial autonomy for an administrative department to execute the project. On hindsight there- fore, it appears to have been a mistake on the part of the Bank to have insisted on the establishment of STN at least in its present organizational form. One could argue that initially there was a justification for setting up STN but since that is no longer there it should be scrapped. This argument should however be looked at from the socio-political context of the country (and even the West African Region) where it is easy to create bureaucracies but difficult to get rid of them. We include at Annex 4 a note prepared by the Director General of STN on the new orientations of the agency. This note indicates the support in the country for the continued existence of STN, and the reluctance to reduce its role. Given the shortage of financial resources however the hopes of the agency may need to be modified. 8.10 As argued above (paras. 8.04-8.06) there is some justification for maintaining some official assistance to settlements at least in the form of land use planning for rural infrastructure development. Thus, so long as feasible settlement areas do exist it may be necessary to maintain some land-use agency responsible for infrastructure planning in light of soil and other criteria and to provide the initial assistance to settlers in the form of advice. The form which this agency would take need not conform to the present structure of STN. The agency could become a specialized Department of the Ministry of Rural Development and could maintain a staff for planning and information diffusion purposes. When a potential area is ready for settlement and enough families show an interest in moving to the area, the Department could arrange through contracts or temporary staff for the necessary studies and infrastructure development. For the potential settlement areas in Senegal the most important infrastructure requirement would be well construction and some roads. In most cases settlers would be willing to construct their own schools and even health posts with assistance from the relevant ministries. The resettlement agency would then be performing more of a planning function but with sufficient financial power during any project execution to be able to assure coordination and provision of the required services. This proposal was raised by the PCR of the first project (Para 2.09 of the PCR) and needs to be discussed again with Government. - 20 - ANNEX/ANNEXE 1 SENEGAL Table /Tableau 1 TERRES NEUVES II RESSETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT PROJET DE COLONISATION TERRES NEUVES II ET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LE SENEGAL ORIENTAL COMPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT Schedule of Disbursements/ Tableau des d6boursements Fiscal Appraisal Actual Total Actual as % Year/ Estimate/ Disbursements/ of Appraisal/ Ann6e Estimation Total actuel Actuel en tant budg6taire de des que pourcentage l'6valuation d6boursements de l'6valuation ---------------'000 US$ /Dollars EU------------ 1976 1976 December 31 100 - D&cembre 31 March 31 200 - Mars 31 June 30 400 - - Juin 30 1977 1977 September 30 600 298.8 50 Septembre 30 December 31 800 298.8 37 D6cembre 31 March 31 900 298.8 33 Mars 31 June 30 1,100 658.3 60 Juin 30 1978 1978 September 30 1,300 754.2 58 Septembre 30 December 31 1,400 874.0 62 D&cembre 31 March 31 1,500 924.3 62 Mars 31 June 30 1,600 1,006.5 63 Juin 30 1979 1979 September 30 1,700 1,667.0 98 Septembre 30 December 31 1,800 1,717.0 95 D6cembre 31 March 31 1,850 1,774.0 96 Mars 31 June 30 1,900 1,841.5 97 Juin 30 1980 1980 September 30 1,950 1,859.0 95 Septembre 30 December 31 2,000 1,862.1 93 D6cembre 31 March 31 1,922.7 96 Mars 31 June 30 Juin 30 1981 1981 September 1,959.0 Septembre December 1,998.4 Dcembre SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES Il RESETTLEMENT ANI) EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT/ PROJET DE COLONISATION TERRES NEUVES Il ET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIOUE POUR LE SENEGAL ORIENTAL CONPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT General Information/Information Générale Rainfall/Chute de pluie Annual Rainfall / 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1931/1960 Chute de pluie annuelle Average)/ (Moyenne) Project Area/Zone du projet Nombre de stations d'enregist 7 71 il il - Quantité (mm/an) 848-1088 512-632 420-643 763-1071 543-783 - Moyenne (mm/an) 979 563 538 912 667 - Groundnut Basin/Bassin arachidier Louga (mm/an) 1/ 317 274 167 308 n.a. 473 Fatick (mm/an) 2/ 650 656 370 490 n.a. 799 Diourbel (mm/an) 3/ 505 489 349 623 n.a. 700 Nioro du Rip (mm/~an) L 1020 713 519 683 n.a. 927 May/ June/ July/ August/ September/ October/ November/ December/ Mai Juin Juillet Aout Septembre Octobre Novembre Décembre Total ---------------------------------------un/Month/mois ---------------------------- mm/year/an Distribution /Distribution 1975 - 57 279 53 536 54 - 979 1976 - 71 175 111 178 27 - 563 1977 - 16 157 114 234 17 - - 538 1978 - 160 175 296 203 26 52 - 912 1979 12 96 241 149 81 84 - 4 667 1/ North Groundnut Basin. -/ Au Lord du Bassin arachidier 2/ Departure Zone - Central Groundnut Basin. 2/ Zone de départ - Centre du Bassin arachidier 3/ Central Groundnut Basin. 3/ Centre du Bassin arachidier 4/ South Croundnut Basin. 4/ Au sud du Bassin arachidier Source: STN Monitoring Reports. / Rapports d'enregistrement STN SENECAL TERRES NEUVES Il RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT PROJET DE COLONISATION TERRES NEUVES Il ET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LE SENEGAL ORIENTAL COMPLETIOD REPORT /RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT General Information/Information generale Population Structure of Settlers (June 1980)/Structure de la population des colons (juin 1980) 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55 + TOTAL YEARS Annees VILLAGES Village 7 66 26 12 39 31 29 19 il 15 8 2 4 262 Village 8 53 40 20 34 26 20 30 21 16 9 4 7 280 Village 9 69 30 14 33 20 35 15 12 9 4 5 6 252 Village 10 49 21 il 20 42 32 22 13 16 9 4 2 241 Village 1l 1/ - - - - - - - - - - - - 300 Village 12 58 33 13 23 22 20 14 12 6 6 6 1 214 Village 13 l/ - - - - - - - 256 Village 14 52 28 23 29 24 17 12 17 10 11 8 7 238 Village 15 49 16 22 31 32 40 7 10 9 8 1 7 232 Baki Telki 2/ 20 8 2 17 20 12 9 3 2 3 3 1 100 Fasse Ndiayene 2/ 25 15 9 15 15 12 9 7 6 2 3 2 120 Koukou 2/ 40 19 7 18 20 19 il 8 8 3 6 3 162 Sare Nfally 2/ 8 3 0 2 3 3 2 1 0 0 1 0 23 Darou Ndimbelane 2/ 18 8 4 14 5 12 1 5 1 1 0 3 72 Foula Kolong 2/ 54 24 5 23 14 14 11 15 5 1 1 3 170 TOTAL 3/ 561 271 142 298 274 265 162 135 103 65 44 46 2922 % of Total Population (approx.) 4/ 23.7 L1.5 6.0 12.6 11.6 11.2 6.8 5.7 4.4 2.7 1.9 1.9 100.0 P.urcenta7e de 1, population (approximativement) 1/ These villages were settled in Match 1979 and only the total population could be constituted by STN/ Ces villages ont éte colonises en mars 1979 et seulement la population totale a pu -tre tablie par la STN. 2/ These are exisLing villages receiving settlers: 24 families ai Baki Telki (Average of 4 persons/family); 25 families at Fasse Ndiayene (Average of 4.8 persons/family); 6 families at Sare Nfally (Average of 4 persons/family); and 36 familles at Foula Kolong (Average 4.7 persons/family)./ Les villages existants qui ont recu des colons: 24 familles a Bakit Telki (4 personnes en moyenne par famille); 25 familles à Fasse Ndiayene (4,8 personnes en moyenne par famille), 6 familles 2 Sare Nfally (4 personnes en moyenne par famille), et 36 familles a Foula Kolong (4.7 personnes en moyenne par famille). t 3/ Tho totals add up to 2,366 becanse the age structure of villages Il and 13 have not been established./ Le total s'Jlve a 2.366 parce que la structure de l'age des villages 11 et 13 n'avait pas 6té établie. 4/ On the assumption that villages 11 and 13 have an age structure corresponding te the average for bhe other villages./ En supposant que l'age structure des villages 1l et 13 corresponde S la moyenne des autres villages. - 23 - SENGAL ANNEX/ANNEXE 2 Table/Tableau 1 TERES NEUVES Il RESETTLEEIT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT PlaT M oeoIaTIDl m S imvS IC T D'ASSISTMACE TzENQU POUR Li SEMMaL ORIENTAL CRMPLETION REBORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVEHENT Settlement Works/ Travaux d'installation 1976/77 1977/78 -1978/79 1979/80 TOTAL A. NEW VILLAGES (No.) A. Nombre de nouveaux villages Plannéd 4 4 1 - 9 Projetes Actual 4 3 - 2 9 Existants B. FAMILIES SETTLED (No.) B. Nombre de familles installées 1. New Villages 1. Nouveaux villages Plannedii 200 200 50 - 450 Projetés Actual 100 183 67 100 450 Existants 1/ 2. Existing Villages 2. Villages existants Planned 50 50 50 - 150 Projetés Actual - 50 95 - 150 Existants 1/ C. ROADS AND TRACKS (ka.) C. Routes et Pistes (km) 1. Acces Trcks 1. Routes d'acces Planned 32 34 10 - 76 Projet's Actual 32 40 30 - 102 Existantes 2. Feeder Roads 2. Routes de déserte Planned - 25 - - 25 Projetées Actual -- - - - - Esistastes 2/ D. MECHANICAL LAND CLEARING (ha.) D. Défrichement automatique (ha) Planned 400 400 100 - 900 Projeté Actual 400 500 - - 900 Existant E. WELLS (No.) E. Puits 1. New Wells 1. Nouveaux puits Planned 6 3 - - 9 Projetés Actual 5 2 I I 9 Existants 2. Rehabilitated Wells 2. Rénovation de puits Planned 5 5 5 - 15 Projetée Actual - 2 2 4 - 13 Existante 3/ F. WAREHOUSES (No.) F. DépSts Planned2 4 4 - 9 Projetés Actual - - - - 2 2 Existants 2/ G. JUNIOR STAFF HOUSES G. Habitations pour Personnel Planned 3 4 1 - 8 Projetées Actual - - - - 4 9 Existantes 4/ H. CLASSROOMS (No.) H. Salles de classe Planned 3 6 3 - 12 Projetées Actual - - 2 2 Existantes L Initial STR reporte indiateéd that at leat e3 fmilies were esettled __/ Les rapporte initiaux de la STN indiquent qu'au moins 273 famille. in 1976/77 with 98 in existing villages and 175 in new villages. Latter avaient été installées en 1976/77 dont 98 dans les villages existants reports however showed only 100 in new villages and 50 in existing ones. et 175 dans les nouveaux villages. Cependant dans des rapports plus récents, on indiquait qu'il n'y en avait que 100 dans les nouveaux et 2/ Project management, in agreement with IDA, decided not to con.truot the 50 dans les villages existante. feeder road and also to reduce the numier of carehouses to two. 2/ La direction du projet en accod avec l'IDA a décidé de ne pas construire des routes de déserte et aussi de réduire le nombre de dépôts a 2. 6/ STN in general constructed new wells for existing villages instead of 3/ La STN en général construit de nouveaux puits potr les villages existants s rehabilitating old ones. The Quarterly reports tocards the end of the au lieu de rénover les anciens. Les rapports trimestriels de la fin du project show a cumulative total of 13 uells rehabilitated but evidence projet montrent que 13 puits au total ont été rénovés, mais d'autres could only be found for 8 in the earlier STN reports (see map). rapports moine récents rêvalent qu'il n'y en a eu seulement que 8. SReporting on Junior BSff housing sated only Rn 1978/79. The 3// Les rapports sur la logement du Personnel (jeune) n'ont débuté qu'en 4_ Rlptiv ount sSnin reports to,ards toe end of rte project is 9 1978/79. Le montant cmulatif paru dans In .rapports vers la fin du projet though evidence could only be found for 4. es 9, bien qu'en ne paisse trouves d'évidence que peur 4. SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES It RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT PROJET DE COLONISATION TERRES NEUVES II ET DASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LE SENEGAL ORIENTAL COMPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMNT Physical Progress/Prosrbs Physique Agricultural Development (Cultivated area)/Ddveloppeaent Aaricole (zone cultivde) PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 PY6 PY7 PY8 PY9 PYl0 PYl1 PY12 PY13 PY14 PY15 PY16 PY17-20 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 APPRAISAL E ESTIMATION (h) Groundnets Arachides Settler families (Existing Villages) 50 150 250 312.5 312.5 387.5 425 500 475 475 425 400 375 400 425 450 Famiies de colons (Villages exietants) Settler Families (New - Villages) 350 750 987.5 1200 L325 1550 1850 200 1925 1825 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 Patiles 4e ol... (Nou.. Village.) Total 400 900 1237.5 1512.5 1637.5 1937.5 2275 2500 2400 2300 2225 2200 2175 2200 2225 2250 Total Hililt Mii Settler Families (Existing Villages) 25 100 175 200 175 175 225 250 300 275 275 225 250 275 275 250 Piiles de colons (Villages existant.) Settler Families (New - Villages) 250 450 462.5 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 Famiies de colons (luvemmux villages) Total 275 550 637.5 650 625 621 675 700 750 25 725 675 700 725 725 700 Total Sorghum Sora Settler Families (Existing Villages) - - 25 62.5 112.5 137.5 125 125 100 100 100 125 150 150 150 150 Famillee de colon. (Villages existauts) r Settler Families (New -Villages) - 100 250 375 437,5 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 Faminle. de colons. (Nevvea villages) Total - 100 275 437.5 550 587.5 575 575 550 550 550 575 600 600 600 600 Total Maize Hae Settler Families (Existing Villages) - - 12.5 25 50 62.5 75 100 100 125 125 150 150 150 150 150 Famines de colons (Village. exstants) Settler families (New - Villages) - 100 200 225 225 225 275 425 587.5 662.5 675 675 675 675 675 675 Famie de colons (Neassees villaes) Total - 100 212.5 250 275 287.5 350 525 687.5 787.5 800 825 825 825 825 825 Total Cotton Ctos Settler Families (Existing Villages) - - 12.5 25 50 62,5 100 125 175 200 225 225 225 225 250 275 Familles de colons (Villages existants) Settler Families (New Villages) - - 50 150 212.5 225 275 425 587.5 662.5 675 675 671 675 675 675 Failles de colon. (Nouveaux villages) Total - - 62.5 175 262,5 287.5 375 550 762.5 862.5 900 900 900 900 920 920 Total Total Cultivated (Existing Villages) 75 250 475 625 700 825 950 1100 1150 1175 1150 1125 1150 1200 1250 1275 Total cultiv* (villages existant.) Total Cultivated (New Villages) 600 1400 1950 2400 2650 2900 3300 3750 4000 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 Total cultivi (nouveaux Villages) Grant Total Cultivated 671 1650 2425 3025 3350 3725 4250 4850 5510 5225 5200 5175 5200 5250 5300 5325 Grand total cultivA Actual and Revised Estimates 1/ Evaluation actualle corrisde Groundnuts (Total) 187.5 775.4 1825.7 1516 2351.0 2014.5 2360.3 2648.1 2716.8 2666.4 2574 2600 2625 2625 2625 2625 Arachidos (total) Millet 72.5 203.8 515.9 810 895 751.6 884 1008.8 1035.0 1035.0 936 960 960 960 960 960 Mil Sorghum 138.6 284.4 624.9 1090 817 991.7 994.5 1134.9 1164.4 1164.4 1040.0 1050 1065 1065 1065 1065 Sorgho Maie 16.3 12.7 44.5 21.0 28 58.1 70.7 100.9 103.5 129.4 260 265 270 270 270 270 Mai. Cotton - - 89.6 44.0 - 58.1 110.5 151.3 155.3 181.2 390 400 405 405 405 405 ctae. TOTAL 414.9 1276.3 3100.6 3481.0 4091,0 3874 4420 5044 5175 5177.5 5200 5275 5325 5325 5325 5325 TOTAL 1/ Actual area estimate. to 1980/81. Projections, a u ere ping pattern in the TN region thereafter. / Zone actualle 6valudjusqu'en 1980/81. Projections basdes sur mu dhle de culture m oyen .e dan. la r 1gion de ar es t Table/Tablau 3 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES Il RESETTLIMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT 7 PiOJET DE COLONISATION TERRES NEUVES II ET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE PCUR LE SENEGAL ORIENTAL COMPLETION REPORT / RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT Agrirultural Developmnt Yields and Total Production / Développement agricole rendement et production totale PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 PY6 Py7 PYs PY9 PYl0 PYIS PY12 PY13 PY14 PY15 PY16 PY17-20 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/93 Yield (Tone/ha) Rendement (tonnes/ha) Appraisal Estimates Evalustion Groundnut. 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 Arachides Millet 0.7 0.8 0.8 0,9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Mil Sorghum - 1,0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 Sorgho maize - 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.0 2,0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Mais Cotton - - 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Coton Actua and Estimation actuelle et revs S. Revised RstImaten Groundnuts 1.6 1.0 1.7 1.5 0.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 Arachides Millet 1.2 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 Mil Sorghum 1.4 0.7 1.2 1.2 0.4 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 Sorgho Maice 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 Mai Cotton - - 0.9 1.0 - 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 Coton Production (Tons) rmductie (tM&O Appraisal Estimates Evaluation Groundnuta 305 925 1,350 1,735 1,974 2,169 2,428 2,708 2,758 2,773 2,771 2,767 2,744 2,752 2,760 2,768 Arachides illet 195 447 514 554 558 580 640 671 711 698 704 689 719 749 742 742 Mil Sorghum - 100 296 510 691 814 860 975 970 985 990 1,035 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 Sorgho Maize - 120 299 342 409 463 615 1,038 1,425 1,600 1,600 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700 Mais Cotton - - 60 194 313 362 496 762 1,093 1,273 1,345 1,387 1,387 1,387 1,387 1,387 Coton Actul and Estimation actuelle et revisée Revised Estimates Groundnut 300 763 3.027 2,332 1,745 3,122 3,682 4,184 4,350 4,320 4,250 4,368 4,420 4,420 4,420 4,420 Arachide. Milet 87 140 520 843 895 750 900 1,050 1,100 1,115 1,053 1,104 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 Mil Sorghum 194 186 743 1,263 327 1,050 1,145 1,362 1,420 1,690 1,612 1,680 1,760 1,760 1,780 1.810 Sorgho Mai.e 13 8 50 21 31.0 54 72 121 145 207 468 477 486 486 486 486 Mais Cotton - - 76 30 - 57 126 170 184 234 517 540 563 565 565 565 Coton 1/ Actual yield estimates te 1980/81. Projections fter based on past yields Rend-ment actuel estima en 1980/81. Projection. basées d après rende%ant passés - 26 - ANNEX 3 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT COMPLETION REPCRT Economic Analysis Economic Rate of Return Appraisal At appraisal the economic rate of return over 20 years was estimated at 14%. Costs were based on incremental investment and management costs of STN and other Government departments during implementation as well as addi- tional management costs after credit closing. It also included all purchased inputs and family labor, the latter valued at the value of production of a family engaged in subsistence agriculture. Benefits were based on total production for settler farms and included a provision for drought every fourth year, leading to a loss of output of 40% and treated as 10% reduction in benefits each year. Completion Similar assumptions have been used to calculate the completion economic rate of return. Costs are based on actual investment, management and extension costs during the development period, converted to 1980 prices using the Bank's index of international inflation. Management and extension costs have been assumed to continue till the end of the project life. Since the project participants represent about 40% of the total number of farmers supervised by STN, 40% of the 1980 operating costs of STN has been imputed to the Project. Incremental farm production costs are based on: (i) the evaluation of all seed at the respective completion economic farmgate prices for the different crops; (ii) the valuation of fertilizer at its 1980 border prices - CFAF 49/kg for groundnut fertilizer, CFAF 50/kg for millet fertilizer and CFAF 66/kg for urea; (iii) costing of farm labor at CFAF 350/man-day repre- senting the average wage paid unskilled laborers; and (iv) implements valued at the total cost paid by the farmer plus the subsidy on each implement. Maintenance of equipment was assumed at 5% the year of purchase and 10% thereafter. For project benefits total incremental production was taken to be actual project production for the implementation period and forecast production for the remaining project life, the forecast production being based on actual yields during the project period. International prices at fob or cif levels including freight and insurance and marketing costs were used to arrive at the economic farmgate prices. Prices were then converted into 1980 - 27 - ANNEX 3 Page 2 terms using the Bank's index of international inflation (with 1980 = 100). Annual benefits were reduced by 15% per year over the remaining useful life of the project to take account of droughts. Details are in Tables 1-4. Rate of Return Under the above assumptions, the estimated rate of return of the project at completion is 18.2%. If however appraisal forecast prices are used to value project output and costs are converted to 1974 terms the estimated rate of return rises to 23.6 percent owing to the fact that appraisal forecast prices were more optimistic than actually did occur. These rates compare with the appraisal rate estimated at 14%. ANNEX/AiNNEXE 3 Table/Tableau 1 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES 11 RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT / PROJET DE COLONISATION TERRES NEUVES II ET DASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LE SENEGAL ORIENTAL COMPLETION REPORT / RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT Financial Results / Resultats financiers Settlers' Income / Revenu des Colons 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 Value bf Agricultural Inputs ('000 CFAF) Valeur des intrants agricoles (000 FCFA) Seeds 1/ 1,165 4,935 11,569 8,638 Semences 1/ Fertilizer 2/ 832 3,950 7,410 1,775 Engrais 27 Fungicides and Insecticides 3/ - 1,310 3,015 54 Fongicides et insecticides 3/ Draft Oxen Accessories 4/ 2,834 4,610 5,950 7,235 Accessaires de culture attelee 4/ Other Equipment 4/ 940 3,817 3,923 3,923 Autres equipements 4/ ,Total Agricultural Inputs 5,771 18,622 31,867 21,625 Total intrants agricoles Value of Agricultural Outputs ('000 CFAF) 5/ Groundnuts 12,450 31,665 125,620 106,106 Arachides Millet 3,045 4,900 20,800 33,720 Mil Sorghum 6,790 6,510 29,720 50,520 Sorgho Maize 455 320 1,850 777 Mais Cotton - - 3,724 1,470 Coton Value of Total Production 22,740 43,395 181,714 192,593 Valeur totale de la production Total Net Return (All Settlers) 16,969 24,773 149,847 170,968 Total net rentabilite (tous lea colons) Number of Settler Familiess 150 428 500 600 Nombre de familles de colons Net Return per Families (CFAF) Rentabilitg nette par famille (en FCFA) At Actual Output and Input Prices 113,127 57,881 299,694 284,947 Production agricole actuelle et prix des intrants At Appraisal Output and Input Prices 6/ 84,293 36,981 195,552 181,895 Evaluation de la production et prix des intrants 6/ Appraisal Estimate Eatimation de 1'evaluation Average Net Return per Settler Family 7/ 90,850 80,605 74,627 94,100 Rentabilite moyene par faille de colons 7/ 1/ Estimated from Area cultivated: Groundnuts - 100 kg/ha at producer price x 1.25, millet 4 kg/ha, sorghum - 7 kg/ha, maize 20 kg/ha all valued at producer price. Excludes seed cotton. / Estimation de Is zone cultiv&e: arachides - 100 kg/ha au prix de production x 1.25, mil 4 kg/ha, sorgho 7 kg/ha, male 20 kg/ha le tout dvalug au prix de production non compris lea semences de coton. 2/ Quantity supplied valued at CFAF 25/kg - excludes fertilizer for cotton. / La quantit4 fournie est dvaluele 2 25 FCFA/kg non compris l'engrais pour le coton. 3/ Based on quantities supplied settlers under the project. / Basts sur lea quantitds fournies aux colons en cours de projet. 4/ Mission estimates based on quantities distributed and repayments of 5 year medium term loan. Financial costs included in unit costs. / Les estimations de mission sont basdes sur lea quantitSs distribues et repay4es sur 5 ans par crddit h moyen terme. Les couts financiers sont inclus dans Les cocts unitaires. 5/ Valued at producer prices . / Evalue aux prix de production. 6/ Mission estimates - based on farm budgets; averaged to take account of year of settlement and forecast number of settlers. Net of debt service except for mechanical land clearing. / Estimations de mission basges sur lea budgets de ferme tiennent compte en movenne de 1'annde de la colonie et privoient le nombre de colons. Net de dettes de service excepte' pour le d1frichement Acanique. - 29 - ANNEX/ANNEXE 3 Table/Tableau 2 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES Il RESSETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT PROJET DE COLONISATION TERRES NEUVES Il ET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LE SEXEGAL ORIENTAL COMPLETION REPORT / PROJET D'ACHEVEMOENT Economic Analysis _ Analyse economique Economic Farmgate Price- Millet/Sorghum / Prix econosique au producteur - Mil/Sorgho 1. Breakdown / Ventilation Estimation Achevement Appraisal Completion 1975 1980 -----JS$/ton/Dollar EU/tonne---- Reference Price FOB Gulf Ports 106 122 Prix de reférence FOB Gulf Ports Ocean Freight/Insurance and Port charges 46.5 1/ 40.5 2/ Prêt maritime/assurance et frais de port CIF Dakar 152.5 162.5 CAF Dakar CFAF/ton --------- CIF Dakar 3/ 34,300 34,125 CAF Dakar 3/ Port Handling and Transport to Warehouse 4/ - 8,035 Manutention portuaire et transport au dépSt 4/ Wholesale Value Dakar 34,300 42,160 Prix en gros (Dakar) Less Distribution (Senegal) 2,400 6,300 5/ Moins distribution (Senegal) Economic Farmgate Value 31,900 35,860 Prix économique au producteur 2. Trend / Evolution Estiration Comletion armgate Price Economic farmgate (1974 Terms)/ Value (1980 Terms) Estimation du Freight and Inflation Achevement prix economique Insurance 7/ Index / pris econonique au producteur Frais et Taux au producteur (Termes 1974) FOB 6/ Assurance 7/ CAF d'inflation (Termes 1980) 1976/77 29.65 105 20.0 125.0 60.4 45.20 1977/78 28.97 88 20.0 108.0 65.6 36.31 1978/79 28.30 94 28.0 122.0 77.6 34.75 1979/80 27.40 108 38.0 146.0 88.9 36.22 1980/81 26.95 122 40.5 162.5 100.0 35.86 1981/82 26.95 132 44.6 176.6 109.0 35.76 1982 26.95 191 49.0 240.0 118.2 44.37 1983 26.95 211 53.9 264.9 127.7 45.30 1984 26.95 234 59.3 293.3 137.3 46.60 1985 + 26.95 260 65.0 325.0 146.9 48.20 l/ Appraisal Esti=ate includes port handling. / La manutention portuaire est compris dans l'estimation de l'évaluation. 2/ Estimate excludes port handling treated separately under footnote 4. / L'estimation ne comprend pas la'manutention portuaire qui est inscrite separement a la note 4. 3/ Appraisal exchange rate CFAF 225 = US$1; completion rate: CFAF 210 = US$1 / Le taux d'échange 'à l'ealuation est: FCFA 225 = dollars EU 1; le taux d'achèvement est de FCFA 210 - dollar EU 1. 4/ Actual rates for handling and bagging was CFAF 6,500 in 1979, 1980 rate increased by a factor of 1.15 plus CFAF 1,000/ton transport to warehouse./ Le taux de manutention et de mise en sac etait de FCFA 6,500 en 1979; en 1980 le taux a augmente d'un facteur de 1.15 + FCFA 1.000/tonne de transport au magasin. 5/ Assumed at 15% of wholesale value. / Suppose etre de 15% pour le prix en gros. 6/ Actual Prices trough 1979, estimates from 1980. / Prix actuel pendant 1979 estimation de 1980. 7/ Actual 1977 rate from US(Gulf) - Angola was US$20/ton, others derived using index of fre-ght rata for grains. After 1980 assumed ta increase at 10% p.a. / Le taux actuel 1977 des Etats-Unis (Gulf) à Angola était de 20 dollars/tonne; les autres d4rivés utilisent l'index du taux de fret pour les grains. AprAs 1980, il est supposé augmenter de 10% par an. - 30 - ANNEX/ANNEXE 3 SENEGAL Table/Tableau 3 TERRES NEUVES Il RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT PROJET DE COLONISATION TERRES NEUVES Il ET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LE SENEGAL ORIENTAL COMPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D«ACHEVEMENT Economic Analysis/Analyses Economiques Economic Farmgate Price - Mais/ Prix édonomique au Producteur - Mais l/ Breakdown /V en tilation __ _r u __ ___o_ _7_ __Ach evement_ Evaluation' Achevement/ Appraisal Completion 1975 1980 US$/ton/tonne Reference Price FOB Gulf forts 116 130 Prix de référence FOB Gulf Ports Freight/Insurance and Port charges 46.5 40.5 Fiet'Assurance et Fret Maritime -IF Dakar 162.5 170.5 CAF Dakar -- ----------------- CFAF/FCFA Dakar ------------ C2E Dakar 36,550 35,805 CAF Dakar "ort Handling and Transport to Warehouse - 8,035 Manipulation Portuaire et transport au magasin Wholesale Value 36,550 43,840 Prix en Gros Distribution within Senegal 2,400 6,300 Distribution a 1 intérieur du Senegal conomic Farmgate Value 50 37 540 Valeur économique au producteur 2. Trend 'Evolution Completion Farmgate Price/ Achevement prix écoenomiue au producteur Appraisal Economic Completion Farmgate Price/ Economic Farmgate (1974 Terms)/ FOB/ Freight and CIF/ Inflation Prices Estimation du Insurance/ Index/ (1980 Terms)/ du prix économique Achevement au producteur FOB Erais et CAF Taux prix économique (termes 1974) Assurance d'inflation au producteur (termes 1980) CFAF/kg ---------- US$/ton --------------- 1980 - 100 CFAF/kg -976 - 112 20.0 132.0 60.4 47.63 1977 30.55 95 20.0 115.0 65.6 38.55 !978 30.55 101 28.0 129.0 77.9 36.51 1979 29.87 116 38.0 154.0 88.9 38.11 -980 29.43 130 40.5 170.5 100.0 37.54 3981 29.43 163 44.6 207.6 109.0 41.73 982 29.43 219 49.0 268.0 118.2 49.35 1983 29.43 242 53.9 295.9 127.7 50.40 1984 29.43 267 59.3 326.3 137.3 51.64 1985 29.43 296 65.0 361.0 146.9 53.34 1/ Same footnotes as for Table 2 / les notes de renvoi sont les mêmes qu'au tableau 2 (Annexe 3) ANNEX 3 -31 - Table/Tableau 4 SEMEGAL TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTEM SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT/ PROJET DE COLONISATION TERRES NEUVES II ET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LE SENEGAL ORIENTAL CSPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVENT Economie Analysis/Analyse économique Economic Farmqate Price - Groundnuts/ Prix économique au producteur - Arachides 1. Breakdown /Ventilation Appraisal/ Completion/ Estimation Achèvement 1975 1980 ------------ US$/ton /EU dollar/tonne------ Reference Price - CIF European Ports/ Prix de référence - CAF des ports européens 410 480 Equivalent Unshelled Basis/Equivalent base des produits décortiqués 287 336 Ocean Freight/Insurance /Frêt maritime/assurance 38.5 45.5 Export Price FOB Dakar Unshelled/Prix d'exportation des 248.5 299.5 produits non décortiqués à Dakar (FOB) -------- CFAF/ton/FCFA/tonne---- FOB Dakar l/ 55,905 61,005 Port Handling 2//Manutention portuaire - 4,025 Marketing/Transportation 3//Transportation /distribution 4,300 12,200 Economic Farmgate Value /Evaluation du prix économique au producteur 51,605 44,780 2, Trend/Evolution Evaluation du prix économique Appxaisal Economi ConMletion Farmagate Value/ au prodst,,tr Farmgate Price Completion (1974 Terme)/ Economic Farmgate Evaluation du prix Freight and Inflation Value économique au CIF 5 Insurance 6/ FOB 7/ Index / (1980 Terme)/ producteur C / fFret et Taux Achavement (Termes 1974) ICAÈ- Assurance d'inflation Prix économique au producteur (Termes 1980) (CFAF/kg) 4/ -------US$/ton/dollar EU/tonne--- 1980 = 100 CFAF/kg FCFA/kg FCFA/kg 1975 51.6 316.4 32.3 284.1 59.4 84.21 1976 65.7 296.8 33.9 262.9 60.4 75.18 1977 59.2 385.7 36.2 349.5 65.6 96.66 1978 40.1 434.7 38.0 396.7 77.6 91.13 1979 36.2 395.9 40.5 355.4 88.9 67.73 1980 33.5 336.0 45.5 290.5 100.0 44.78 1981 35.7 420.0 68.5 371.5 109.0 55.35 1982 37.9 504.0 50.4 453.6 118.2 64.36 1983 40.1 548.4 54.8 493.6 127.7 64.95 1984 42.3 596.8 59.7 537.1 137.3 65.92 1985 44.5 650.3 65.0 585.3 146.9 67.45 1986 44.5 700.7 70.1 630.6 155.7 68.83 1987 44.5 755.0 76.6 679.5 165.1 70.20 1988 44.5 813.5 81.4 732.1 175.0 71.63 1989 44.5 876.5 87.6 788.9 185.5 73.08 1990 44.5 944.3 94.4 849.9 196.7 74.53 1/ Appraisal Exchange rate was US$ 1 = CFAF 220, completion rate was US$ 1 - CFA£ 210./ Le taux d'échange de à l'évaluation était de FCFA& 220 - 1 dollar EU, et le taux à l'achèvement était de FCFA 210 = 1 dollar EU, 2 Handling cost for grains in 1979 was CFAF 3,500/ton. Same rate is used and Increased by a factor of 1.15 for 1980./ Le coGt de manutention pour les grains en 1979 était de FCFA 3.500/tonne. Le même taux est utilisé et augmenté par un facteur de 1.15 pour 1980. 3/ Derived from the bareme paid ONCAD and oil mille for groundnut marketing. Provient du barême payé à l'ONCAD et moulin à huile pour la commercialisation de l'arachide. 4/ Obtained from appraisal report by dividing incremental benefits from groundnuts by incremental production./ Obtenu du rapport d'évaluation en divisant les accroissements de recettes provenant de l'arachide par l'accroissement de la production. 5/ CIF is on unshelled basis. Actual figures from 1975-1979, for 1980 and after projected. / CAF est sur une base d'arachide non décortiquée. Les figures actuelles de 1975-1979, pour 1980 et projetées après. 6/ Actual 1978 rate about US$38 from West Africa to Europe. Others derived using the Bank's Ocean Freight indices. From 1982 rates are assumed to be 10% of CIF.e Le taux actuel de 1978 est d'environ 38 dollars E.U de l'Afrique de l'Ouest à l'Europe. Les autres utilisent les taux de fret maritime de la Banque. Les taux de 1982 sont supposés être de 10% de FCFA. 7/ Taken from Economic Analysis and Projections Department of the Bank./ Pris du Département des Analyses économiques et de projections de la Banque Mondiale. - 32 ANNEX/ANNEXE 3 Table/Tableau 5 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT / PROJET DE COLONISATION TEREES NEUVES iI ET DASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE FOUR LE SENEGAL ORIENTAL Economic Analysis / Analyse Economique Economic Faragate Price - Cotton / Prix conomique au producteur - Coton 1. Breakdown / Ventilation Estimation Ach8vement Appraisal Completion 1975 1980 Fibre Semence Fibre Semence Lint Seed Lint Seed - - US$/Ton / Dollars E/tonne------- Reference Price CIF Europe 1,124 134 2,070 246 Prix de reference CAF Europe Adjusted for Quality Discount 1,124 134 1,759.5 1/ 246 Rabais de qualite ajustd Semence Coton Semence Coton / Seed Corto_t 2/ Seed Cotton 21 Per metric ton of Seed Cotton 494.0 798.6 Par tonne mitrique de coton en grain Freight/Insurance and Marketing 3/ 53.9 86.5 Prt/ussurance et distribution 3/ FO Dakar 440.1 712.1 FOB Dakar S--- CFAF/Ton / FCFA/Tone FOB Dakar A/ 99,039 149,544 FOB Dakar 4/ Port Handling, Storage, Transport 5/ - 13,000 Manutention portuaire, entrepit transport 5/ Ginning 6/ 38,601 19,424 Egronage 6/ Value of Seed Cotton(Ginnery) 60,438 117,120 Valeur do coton en grain (Usine d4grenge) Primary Collection and Transport 7/ - 9.150 Pr-micre collection at transport 7/ Economic Faragate Value 60,439 107970 Valcur economique au producteur 2. Trend / Evolution Completion Fa-gate Prices/ Achevement prix au producteur Appraisal Completion Economic Farmgate Prices Farzgate Price (1974 Terms) / (1980 Terms) Evaluation do Freight and Inflation Achevement prix prix conomiquo Insorance / Index / economique au au producteur Fret et Taco prodoctr (termes 1974) FOB Assurance CIF d'inflation (termes 1980) CFAF/kg /PCFA --US$/ton of seed Dollar Eu/tonne de semences-- CFAF/kg / FCFA 1976 - 652.4 60.7 591.7 60.4 164.15 1977 - 624.2 65.0 559.2 65.6 23F.44 1978 62.80 613.3 68.3 544.8 77.8 105.48 1979 62.93 669.8 75.7 594.1 88.9 98.76 1989 63.07 798.6 86.5 712.1 100.0 107.97 1981 63.07 868.8 94.2 774.6 109.0 107.66 1982 63.07 1,006.5 101.9 904.6 118.2 119.14 1983 63.07 1,124.9 111.?. 1,013.2 127.2 125.7 1984 63.07 1,259.0 122.4 1,136.6 137.3 132.27 1985 63.07 1,412.7 134.3 1,278.4 146.9 141.18 1/ Appraisal does not take account of quality; however actual data suggest an average discount of 15% for the RJA 592 variety compared to Mexican strict midding./ i'dvaluation ne tient pas compte de la qualitE; cependant les donnfes actuelles sugg9rent un rabais moyen de 15% pour Ca varidt4 BJA 592 comparee I celle strictement ordinaire du Mexique. 2/ Appraisal conversion'36.8% lint and 60% seed 1980 conversion at 37% lint and 60% seed. / Evaluation de la t-nsformation de 36.8% de fibre et de 60% de graine en 1980 137% de fibre et 60% de graine. 3/ Includes marketing expenses for lint: 1980, lint US$160/ton and seed at US$45.5/ton. Actual SODEFITEX expenses for 1979 for lint increased by 1.15 for 1980. / Y compris les d6penses commerciales pour le fibre; 1980 fibre 160 dollars EU/tonne 0t graine 45.5 dollars EU/tonno. Les dpenses actuelles de Is SODEFITEX pour 1979 pour le fibre a augmente de 1.15 en 1980. 4/ 1975: CFAF 225 - US1.0; 1980: CFAF 210 - US$1.0. / 1975: FCFA 225 - 1.0 dollar EU; 1980 FCFA: 210 - 1 dollar Eu. 5/ 105: fort landling and storage CFAF 8,050 lint transport from ginsery to port CFAF 13,300 lint, handling, storage and transport to port CPAF 8,500 for seed; actual SODEFITEX costs for 1979 adjusted upward by 1.15. Appraisal included In footnote_/ / 1980: manutention portuare at-entrepSt FcFA 8.050 transport d. fibre d lusine d'4grenage au port FCFA 13,300; nanutention, entrep6t et transport au port CPA 8.500; lea prix actuals de Ia SODEFIrE pour 1979 oont ajustds am- deasus de 1.15. L'eatmation eat comprise dans ls note 6. 6/ Appraisal ginning costs include transport, ginning and production costs; completion figure is for ginning and packaging - SODEFITEX costs for 1979 x 1.15 . / L'estimation du cout de 1'grenage comprend le transport, I'dgrenage et les co9ts de production. Le ohiffre d'achvoement est pour I'dgrenage et la mise en sa. Les couts de la SODEFITEX pour 1979 x 1.15. 7/ Appraxsal 1osts: included in footnote 6; 1980: SODEFITEX 1979 cost x 1.15. / Les cots d'estination ont fclo- dons In note 6; 1980 cots SODEFITEX 1979 x 1.15. 綢‘ 戶－ 〕〕〕〕〕〕〕〕〕〕〕！!‘〕〕、！!―〔／ 聞 方：!&！〔一：!/!&& 日疾吧日 O 9”了合lq？工J。兀qB由仲 仰靦而死面  - 34 - ANNEX 4 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES II RESETTLEMENT AND EASTERN SENEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Cr. 578-SE) COMPLETION REPORT A Note on STN prepared by the Director General 1/ A lot of things have been said and written about the "Virgin Lands" and it is not necessary to come back to them. There are grounds however to recall that the problem of settlement has been with Senegal since the colonial period. Indeed recently there has been, in the groundnut basin a disequilibrium in the man-land ratio tied to the existence in this zone of high population densities which has raised the intensity of farming. In 1969, a study by the Land Department revealed the existence of an excess of 200,000 able bodied persons in the groundnut basin that had to be transferred elsewhere. The Department then proposed a first resettle- ment project in Eastern Senegal. It is in this context that STN was created to be the supporting institution for this activity. STN which executed Terres Neuves I and II projects has gained an experience characterized by the successful transfer and settlement in Eastern Senegal of some 900 settler families and super- vision of 600 existing families making a total of 1,500 families grouped into 14 cooperatives and cultivating 10,000 ha. The concrete results obtained by STN led the Prime Minister, during an interministerial council meeting on the agency, to take the following decisions among others: (i) confirmation that STN is a national agency responsible for settlement; (ii) in collaboration with the Ministry of Plan, the necessary financial means must be sought to: - on the one hand, conduct feasibility studies on settlement projects proposed by STN in Eastern Senegal and Upper Casamance (in the latter case it is only a matter of completing a study already done: the Boncoto project for a total cost of 1,125 million CFAF); 2/ and 1/ Unofficial translation into English by the mission. 2/ i.e. about US$4.8 million. - 35 - ANNEX 4 Page 2 - On the other hand remove the constraints, such as river blindness in Eastern Senegal. (iii) in the search for financing it is essential that Government schedule settlement projects as a priority; and (iv) finally to play the actual role expected of it STN must not only have adequate financial means but must be better restructured in a way to save money. STN would then become a national agency charged with resettlement. It would have five central departments: - Department of Land Development and Equipment - Department of Production and Marketing - Department of Studies and Planning - Department of Administration and Finance - Office of the Special Accountant The concrete results obtained by STN in the execution of the Terres Neuves I and II projects led the Government to confide to STN from 29 Septem- ber 1980, the supervision of the vegetable and fruit sectors on a nationwide scale. STN will assume the role of a regional development agency for the region of Cap-Vert and an intervening agency in the other regions of Niayes, Thies, Louga and St. Louis. STN is going to establish in these regions, during 1981, the necessary structures for supervision and prepare a master plan for the development of vegetables and fruits. For resettlement, STN will be looking for financing for the Boncoto project (Casamance) and for studies on projects identified by SONED in Senegal. STN is going to prepare a master plan for resettlement in Senegal. STN is presently in the process of reorganizing itself to take on high level staff to be able to face up to its new activities and the new dimension that the Government has given it. 1 BRD 15644(PCR) 气一