Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 3229 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (LOAN 1170-RO) December 29, 1980 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authortiation. Country Exchange Rates Name of Currency Lei Exchange Rate Appraisal Year Average (1975) US$1 = 20 Lei Intervening Years Average US$1 = 20 Lei Completion Year Average (1978) US$1 = 19 Lei FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (LOAN 1170-RO) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ...................**........................................... i Basic Data Sheet ...................................................... ii Highlights ............................................................ iii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM Initial Allocation of Loan Proceeds ...................... 2 Use of the Loan ...........................3............ 3 Procurement ............................................ 4 Project Costs .......................................... 6 Conclusions ............................................ 7 Annex I: Indirect Imports for Manufacturing of Roads and Railways Rehabilitation Equipment ...................... 8 ATTACHMENT 1: Comments Received From The Borrower ................. 9 ATTACHMENT 2: Project Completion Report ........................... 14 I. KEY PROJECT DATA ...................................... 14 II. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION ....................... 15 A. Introduction ........................................ 15 B. Project Background and Formulation .................. 15 C. Project Description .............................. 16 D. Implementation Arrangements ......................... 17 III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ................................... 18 A. Romanian Flood Recovery Program ..................... 18 B. Project Implementation ........................... 19 C. Project Cost ............................ ......... 20 D. Allocation of Loan Proceeds ......................... 23 E. Procurement .................................... .... 24 F. Disbursements ....................................... 26 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. -2- Table of Contents (Continued) Page No. IV. PERFORMANCE OF BORROWER AND BENEFICIARIES ................ 27 A. The Borrower: Investment Bank ...................... 27 B. The Beneficiaries .............................. .... 28 C. Compliance with Covenants ........................... 29 V. ECONOMIC BENEFITS ............................. ........ 30 VI. BANK ROLE AND PERFORMANCE ................................ 31 A. Project Objectives .................................. 31 B. Project Formulation and Processing .................. 31 C. Implementation and Supervision ................... 32 VII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED..................... 32 A. Overall Assessment ...................................... 32 B. Lessons To Be Learned .................................. 32 Annexes: I. Complete Progress Report .............................. 35 II. List of Equipment Procured for Industrial Rehabilitation .............................. ........ 46 Ill. Costs for Rehabilitation of National Roads and Rail Network ........................................... 48 IV. List of Equipment Procured for National Road and Railways Rehabilitation ................................ 51 V. Distribution of Equipment Procured by Transport Enterprises ............................................ 52 VI. Costs of Rehabilitation of Buildings and Infrastructure- Industry, Mining and Power Sectors .................. 53 VII. Procurement Summary ................................... 55 VIII. Production Plan for All Affected Enterprises ............. 56 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (LOAN 1170-RO) PREFACE This report presents a performance audit of the Romania Flood Recovery Project supported by Loan 1170-RO of 1975, for US$20 million. The loan was made to Banca de Investitii (BI), the Bank's official borrower in Romania for projects in the fields of industry, transport and power. Final beneficiaries were to be industrial enterprises which suffered damage as a result of the July 1975 floods, and the Ministry of Transport and Telecom- munications. A project completion report (PCR) covering experience under the project was prepared by the Bank-s Central Projects Staff. In November 1979, an early version of the report consisting of the PCR preceded by a short section of highlights prepared by OED was sent to the Government for its comments. Comments received from the borrower prompted a country visit by OED staff in May 1980. The present report consists of a memorandum prepared by OED followed by the borrower's comments (Attachment 1) and by the PCR (Attachment 2). The audit memorandum reflects OED's discussions with Bank staff and representatives of the Romanian Government. It is also based on a review of all relevant documents. The PCR provides a factual review of achievement under the project. The audit memorandum focuses on the two major issues raised between the Government and the Bank in relation to this project: namely, the allocation of loan proceeds and extent of local cost financing under the loan; and the difficulties which occurred between the Bank and the borrower concerning procurement-related matters. - 11 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (LOAN 1170-RO) BASIC DATA SHEET Amounts (in US$ M) As of 8/31/80 Original Disbursed Cancelled Repaid Outstanding Loan 1170-RO 20.00 20.00 -- 1.17 18.84 Cumulative Loan Disbursement 1976 1977 1978 (i) Planned 12.2 18.0 20.0 (ii) Actual 2.9 18.7 20.0 (iii) (ii) as % of (i) 23.8 103.9 100.0 PROJECT DATA Original Date Actual Board Approval -- 11/04/75 Loan Agreement -- 11/12/75 Effectiveness -- 12/02/75 Loan Closing 3/31/77 09/01/77 Total Project Cost (US$ M) 135.1 139.8 MISSION DATA No. of No. of Month, Year Weeks Persons Manweeks Date of Report Appraisal July 1975 3 5 15 October 1975 Supervision I December 1975 1 1 1 December 1975 Supervision II May 1976 1/2 1 1/2 May 1976 Supervision III November 1976 1 1 1 December 1976 Supervision IV November 1976 1/2 1 1/2 December 1976 Supervision V December 1977 1 1 1 April 1978 Completion August 1978 1 2 2 September 1978 - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (LOAN 1170-RO) HIGHLIGHTS Loan 1170-RO was one of two complementary loans approved by the Bank in November 1975 to Banca de Investitii (BI) of Romania. The loans were to assist in financing the Government's Flood Recovery Program following serious floods in early July 1975, which had caused extensive physical damage to the economy. Loan 1169-RO for US$40 million addressed the needs of the agricul- tural sector. The loan under review, in an amount of US$20 million, financed procurement for the industrial and transportation sectors. The loan was made to BI for on-lending to (i) a large number of industrial enterprises to replace equipment and spare parts damaged by the floods; and (ii) the con- struction trusts of the Ministry of Transport to finance earthmoving equipment to be used in a specific part of its road and railroad reconstruction effort. The Flood Recovery Program was implemented by the Government with great efficiency, and its major objectives were achieved. The Bank was not involved in its implementation. The principal purpose of the project was to assist Romania's flood recovery efforts by providing rapidly disbursing foreign exchange. However, because of the extensive and complex nature of the project, and the difficulties experienced by the Foreign Trade Enterprises responsible for procurement matters to adapt to the Bank procurement proce- dures, loan disbursement proceeded more slowly than anticipated. BI experi- enced increasing difficulties in identifying items eligible for Bank financing once contracts eligible for retroactive financing had been exhausted (para. 17 of the PPAM). While the project was expected to be completed by end-1976, the industrial component was actually completed in June 1977 and the transport component, in May 1978 (paras. 3.03 to 3.07 and 3.21 of the PCR). Other points of interest are: - the borrower-s difficulties with the Bank-s procurement re- quirements (paras. 13 to 17 of the PPAM and para. 3.18 of the PCR); - the development of comprehensive flood warning systems and flood prevention measures under the Flood Recovery Program (para. 5.03 of the PCR); the need for a proper organizational set-up when many different agencies are involved in processing disbursement requests and handling procurement issues (para. 7.05 of the PCR). PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (LOAN 1170-RO) 1. Loan 1170-RO was one of two complementary loans approved by the Bank in November 1975 to Banca de Investitii (BI) of Romania to assist in the financing of the Flood Recovery Program undertaken by the Government to deal with the extensive physical damage which severe flooding in July 1975 had caused in several parts of the country. While Loan 1169-RO for US$40 million addressed the needs of the agricultural sector, the loan under review, in an amount of US$20 million, dealt with the industrial and transportation sectors. 2. The project, which constituted a subset of the vast Flood Recovery Program undertaken by the country, comprised two components. A first compo- nent, the industry component, included all equipment and spare parts to be imported by industrial enterprises as a result of the floods. More precisely it was intended to address the needs of some 223 enterprises which had been identified in the course of appraisal as needing imported machinery of some kind to bring production back to pre-flood levels. The second component, the transportation component, consisted of a specific subset of the Government-s road and railway reconstruction program, the Bank intending to finance earth- moving equipment in an amount equivalent to the related depreciation of all construction equipment to be used in the particular reconstruction works identified under the project. 3. The Flood Recovery Program was implemented with great efficiency, the centralization of the economic management function permitting the Romanian Authorities to respond most effectively to the more pressing needs, and its major objectives were realized. The Bank was not involved in the implementa- tion of the program, but only in financing some of its components (para. 3.02 of the PCR). Given the emergency nature of the situation, strong emphasis was placed on rapid disbursement. However, loan disbursement proceeded at a pace slower than anticipated, largely owing to the extensive and complex nature of the project, and to difficulties experienced by the Foreign Trade Enterprises responsible for procurement matters to adapt to the Bank procurement require- ments (see paras. 13 to 17 below). While the project was expected to be completed by end-1976, the industrial component was actually completed in June 1977 and the transport component in May 1978 (paras. 3.03 to 3.07 and 3.21 of the PCR). 4. The full story of this project is set forth in the PCR attached. The paragraphs which follow elaborate on those issues which developed between the Government and the Bank during the negotiation and implementation of the project. - 2- Initial Allocation of Loan Proceeds 5. The allocation of the loan amount between the two components--as it was finalized in the loan agreement--was the result of prolonged negotia- tions between the Bank and the Romanian authorities: whereas the Bank in- tended to focus its lending on the country s additional import requirements resulting from the floods, the Romanian Government emphasized that it wished to minimize imports for replacement of flood-damaged machinery and spare parts as much as possible. In particular, the Government initially did not want the loan to be used for equipment imports and suggested that Bank funds be used for local cost financing, more specifically for the acquisition of equipment to be used in the transportation recovery program, for which substantial production capacity existed in the country--a request which the Bank was not in a position to accommodate. The allocation of the loan amount represented a compromise between the differing viewpoints of the Bank and the borrower. US$8 million and US$9 million were allocated respectively to the industry component and the transportation component of the project. The remaining US$3 million was left "unallocated," to be transferred to either one of the two categories in the course of project implementation (see para. 3.12 of the PCR). 6. In three respects at least, the loan under review was different from the earlier Bank operations in Romania: (i) the loan was an emergency operation and, therefore, expeditiousness, within the constraints of the country-s and the Bank's procedures and requirements, was an essential element of the loan operation; (ii) the loan was multi-sectoral in that it covered two sectors, elements being built in the loan arrangements to allow for flexibility in its use; (iii) finally, in its industrial component, the loan spanned a large number of enterprises for which servicing and procedural issues had to be taken into account. 7. Romania has a system under which all foreign trade arrangements are handled by "Foreign Trade Enterprises" (FTEs) which are solely responsible for import and export of goods, each FTE dealing with one particular sector of the economy (e.g., agriculture, construction industry, light industries, etc.). The Foreign Trade Bank is responsible for all payments related to and from foreign parties, while all shipping documents are prepared by the Shipping Enterprise. 8. The preparation and implementation of investment programs is monitored by specific authorities set up for the purpose, namely Banca de Investitii (BI) and the Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry (BAFI). BI is a specialized agency for investment in industry, transport, power and tourism, acting as fiscal agent for the Government in these particular sectors. Its field of responsibility covers project preparation and supervision, one of its functions being to ensure that the use of public funds earmarked for invest- ment remains in line with approved financial plans in the course of project implementation. BI is the Bank's official borrower for projects in its sectors of responsibility and, as such, has acted as a channel between the Bank and the actual users of Bank funds, be they industrial enterprises or construction trust companies. - 3 - 9. The Flood Recovery Project was the Bank-s sixth operation in Romania and the fourth financed through Banca de Investitii, the earliest loans to BI being for the industry and power sectors. Under these operations, the Bank had worked out operational arrangements within the Romanian administrative system. These provided for the beneficiary enterprises to use the appropriate FTE to arrange for the procurement of imported commodities, with BI having supervisory responsibilities and keeping direct contact with the Bank on operational matters. 10. In the case of the Flood Recovery Project, the same arrangement was maintained, BI having overall responsibility for ensuring that goods to be financed out of the proceeds of the loan be procured in accordance with Bank guidelines (Section 3.01 of the Loan Agreement). However, because of the large number of enterprises involved under the industry component of the project (over 200) and the unfamiliarity of most FTEs with the Bank's dis- bursement procedures, BI's function was, for this particular component, some- what wider and encompassed the actual preparation of disbursement requests, FTEs remaining responsible for handling bid tender and evaluation in consulta- tion with the beneficiary enterprises. Use of the Loan 11. The utilization of the loan proceeds differed from the sectoral allocation expected at the time of appraisal. Following a number of nego- tiated reallocations, the industry component eventually received US$7.6 million, compared to an initial allocation of US$8 million and estimated foreign exchange requirements of US$12.6 million, the difference having been covered from other sources (para. 3.13 of the PCR). In commenting on the report, the borrower indicated that special efforts to intensify domestic production of spare parts and to recover as much as possible of damaged equipment had resulted in a substantial reduction of foreign exchange require- ments (Attachment 1, para. 4). The remaining US$12.4 million of the loan went to earth-moving equipment which was procured in conjunction with similar equipment needed for a Bank-financed irrigation project (Giurgu-Razmiresti Irrigation Project). Ninety-four percent of this amount went to local sup- pliers (selected on the basis of ICB), as shown in the following table: Allocation of Loan Proceeds (US$ million) Loan Agreement Actual 1. Imported Equipment for Industry 8.0 7.6 Contracts over $100,000 2.3 (of which retroactive financing) (1.9) (contracts reviewed by the Bank) (0.4) Contracts under $100,000 5.4 2. Equipment for Road and Railway 9.0 12.4 (of which procured locally) (11.6) 3. Unallocated 3.0 - Total 20.0 20.0 12. In all, 58% of the loan amount was disbursed against local procure- merit; the amount of direct foreign exchange financing turned out to be, at US$8.4 million, substantially less than the US$11.6 millionl/ direct cost in foreign exchange which had been estimated at appraisal for the two industrial and transport rehabilitation components of the project. However, disburse- ments against the cost of locally-manufactured earth-moving equipment (e.g., road graders and rollers, excavators, bulldozers and dump-trucks) covered substantial indirect costs in foreign exchange. These amounted on average to 37% of the total value of contracts signed (Annex 1 to this memorandum)2/. Moreover, the Bank-financed "project"--which involved the rehabilitation of some 120 km of roads and 270 km of railways--represented, in terms of cost, little less than 30% of the overall transport rehabilitation program under- taken by the Government as part of its flood recovery program. The amount of local financing involved under the loan thus did not exceed the indirect foreign exchange costs incurred under the Government-s overall effort at rehabilitating the country's transport infrastructure. Procurement 13. During project preparation, the Romanian Government did not favor the use of international competitive bidding (ICB) for procurement under the loan, but later agreed to it in respect of transport equipment. The loan documents incorporated agreement to international shopping for industrial imports (Category 1 for US$8 million)--i.e., procurement was to be done in accordance with the Bank guidelines but without being subject to the Bank's usual ICB requirement. The loan agreement also provided for the retroactive financing of expenses incurred on account of industrial imports contracted for between the floods (July 1975) and the date of loan agreement (November 1975); there was no ceiling imposed as part of this arrangement. Contracts for earth-moving equipment (Category 2 for US$9 million), however, were to be awarded following Bank guidelines on the basis of international competitive bidding. Romanian suppliers were to have access to the bidding and to benefit from a preference margin of 15% (or the prevailing duty rate, whichever was lower). Finally, in the case of all contracts estimated to cost the equiva- lent of US$100,000 or more, the borrower was to submit invitations to bid, bidding documents, proposed awards and final contracts to the Bank-s review and to obtain its concurrence. 1/ Excluding US$4.6 million of physical and price contingencies. 2/ Among other pieces of equipment, 170 16-ton dump-trucks were procured under the loan for a total amount of US$4.4 million. These were manufac- tured in Romania on the basis of imported parts, the cost of which amounted to US$1.6 million. Total indirect foreign exchange costs were US$2.3 million, i.e., 54% of the contract value. - 5 - 14. Notwithstanding these arrangements, there were a number of pro- curement-related misunderstandings between the Bank and the borrower in connection with the acquisition of imported industrial equipment and spares. In all, there were over 200 contracts covering procurement under the loan, 14 of which, totalling US$14.3 million, were subject to the Bank-s review process under the procurement guidelines..! Of these 14 contracts, nine for an amount of US$12.8 million were approved by the Bank (including the five for earth-moving equipment). Disagreement on procurement matters led the Bank to refuse to finance the five other contracts (for industrial imports), totalling US$1.5 million, on grounds of lack of compliance with its procurement guide- lines. 15. In some cases, it appears that the borrower was clearly at breach with agreed procedures, in that either it had not proceeded to short-list suppliers on technical grounds prior to opening bids received, or that it had engaged in negotiations with suppliers after the bid opening. Decisions on other cases, however, were more a matter of judgment, as when spare parts for pumps were contracted from the original equipment supplier whereas the Bank argued that competitive bidding should have been organized, or when a con- tract was signed for knitting needles which were estimated to cost less than US$100,000 but ended up amounting to US$175,000. In general, the Bank expressed dissatisfaction with the advertising which Romanians gave to compet- itive bidding auctions and with the fact that its concurrence was often not requested at each stage of the procurement process (i.e., bidding documents, list of suppliers contacted, bid evaluation) as was required under the loan agreement. 16. A factor contributing to procurement difficulties under the loan was the obvious lack of familiarity on the part of most FTEs with the Bank-s procurement guidelines (see also paras. 5 and 8 above). Indeed, most FTEs involved under the loan had no previous experience with the Bank and had therefore no exposure to its particular procurement requirements. In this 1/ These included all of the five contracts for earth-moving equipment, totalling US$12.4 million and nine contracts for industrial imports, totalling US$1.9 million. The five contracts for earth-moving equipment were concluded on the basis of ICB. All of them were won by Romanian suppliers, although on the decision of the Romanian Authorities subsequently one of these contracts for for US$0.8 million was allocated to the second (foreign) bidder. The bidding process was organized by the Foreign Trade Enter- prise, Romagrimex, with the assistance of a foreign consulting firm appointed for this purpose. All other contracts for industrial imports were either covered by the retroactive financing covenant of the loan or were for amounts under US$100,000 and only required presentation of the proper purchase docu- mentation for disbursement. - 6 - regard, it is interesting to note that, with one exceptionY, disbursement requests which the Bank found itself obliged to reject had originated from FTEs without earlier experience with the Bank. Moreover, BI had to devote considerable manpower to the preparation of disbursement requests under the industry component of the loan --a task which involved a cumbersome process of collecting documents from numerous agencies, including more than a dozen FTEs. This limited the time that its staff was able to allocate to supervising the procurement procedures followed by the FTEs engaged under the project. The Bank has since come to realize that it should increasingly focus its attention on those agencies actually responsible for project implementation, even though BI remains the Bank's borrower and the official signatory to the loan agree- ment. The Bank also organized recently a seminar on procurement procedures to which were convened all FTEs with which it usually deals. 17. However, aside from the issues of BI's manpower availability and some FTEs- unfamiliarity with Bank requirements, BI appears not to have been always in a position "to cause the goods and services to be financed out of the proceeds of the loan to be procured in accordance with [Bank guidelines]" as it was required to do under the loan agreement--an undertaking which it had, in theory, the legal and administrative authority to comply with. Reflecting its policy to minimize the impact of damage caused by the floods on the country-s foreign exchange resources, the Government insisted that repairs to industrial enterprises be completed within the previously approved foreign exchange allocations to the industrial sector (i.e., approved before the floods); in other words, the Bank loan did not increase the budgeted foreign exchange allocation of those enterprises to which its proceeds were channelled. Beneficiary enterprises and FTEs had therefore little incentive to bend their usual procurement procedures in order to accommodate the Bank's particular requirements. This eventually led to substantial delays in the disbursement of the loan, as BI experienced increasing difficulties in identifying items eligible for Bank financing, once contracts eligible under the retroactive financing agreement had been exhausted. Project Costs 18. Because Romania-s economic setting differs so notably from that of most countries with which the Bank usually deals, some adjustments in the Bank's normal framework of analysis of completed projects are necessary to ensure that related Bank-country discussions focus on meaningful issues. A case in point is that of the notion of project cost, which has, in Romania, a legal significance that it usually does not have in other economies. It refers there, for each investment project, to a budgetary allocation approved by the country's highest authorities, which, under normal circumstances, is not meant to be exceeded. Project cost thus relates to an expense ceiling, which allows for some contingencies, rather than to an anticipated cost as 1/ The spare part case referred to earlier (para. 15). - 7 - such. Cost monitoring is facilitated by the fact that inflation is practi- cally absent from the Romanian economy. Moreover, a special account is set up by the Government to compensate for overruns in the cost of imported goods. In the project under review, repairs to industrial enterprises were completed within the previously approved foreign exchange budget. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that actual project costs turned out to be almost identi- cal to estimated figures, even though more work might have been executed under the project than originally anticipated (PCR, para. 3.11). Because Romania's price system is not an indicator of relative scarcities, time overrun is the only indicator, limited though it may be, of shortfalls in domestic resources for investment.!I Conclusions 19. The objectives of the Flood Recovery Program were achieved. How- ever, the Bank and the Romanian Government experienced substantial difficul- ties in defining a commonly agreeable framework for the use of Bank funds as a source for financing the program, and later on, in implementing the agreed project. These difficulties, which did not affect the implementation of the overall program undertaken by the country, reflected the Bank's and the coun- try's lack of familiarity with each other's institutional prerequisites and the unusually complicated arrangements for the project. 20. The Bank was concerned about the understaffing of the Banca de Investitii, the agency designated by the Romanian Government to be the bor- rower on this project and also on all other industrial projects, because such understaffing was seen to jeopardize the timely implementation of the project. This audit cannot pronounce on the adequacy of BI staff in relation to normal Bank projects for which BI assumed responsibility and which OED has not had occasion so far to review. In the case of the Flood Recovery Project, there is ample indication that insufficient manpower within Banca de Investitii-- though it may have hindered Bank operations at times--was only one of several factors which led to the difficulties encountered. 21. As mentioned earlier, the project under review had characteristics different from these which had earlier been financed by the Bank in Romania. The difficulties that were encountered arose out of differences between procedures and requirements as prevailing in the country and as specified by the Bank. In the light of experience with this project, the PCR expresses dissatisfaction with the adequacy of BI staff. However, since the Bank had dealt with BI under earlier loans, its agreement to the arrangements under the loan under review appears to indicate that it had underestimated the scope of work involved under the project and the pressures that would be generated for BI staff. The difficulties were sui generis, arising out of an operation which in important respects was not in the same genre as normal Bank opera- tions in the country. 1/ This will need to be reviewed in the light of the new system of real economic costs being introduced by the Government from January 1, 1981. -8- ANNEX 1 INDIRECT IMPORTS FOR MANUFACTURING OF ROADS AND RAILWAYS REHABILITATION EQUIPMENT ('000 Lei) No. of Value Indirect Imports Equipment pcs. Per pc. Total (A) Per pc. Total (B) B/A (%) Motorgraders, 180 HP 20 806.0 15,958.8 190.9 3,818.0 23.9 Road Rollers, 12 t. 70 218.4 15,135.1 3.0 210.0 1.4 Road Rollers, 14 t. 60 228.6 13,578.8 3.0 180.0 1.3 Excavators, 0.5 cm 20 503.0 9,959.4 198.2 3,964.0 39.8 Excavators, 1.2 cm 15 924.0 13,721.4 364.0 5,460.0 39.8 Concrete Mixers, 0.5 cm 31 48.1 1,475.6 8.6 266.0 18.0 Tower Cranes, 110 tf. 8 1,467.4 11,621.8 386.8 3,094.4 26.6 Truck-type Bulldozers, 180 HP 30 1,016.9 30,507.0 355.9 10,677.0 35.0 Truck-type Bulldozers, 150 1P 40 754.8 30,190.4 264.2 10,568.0 35.0 Agriculture-type Tractors, 65 HP 20 133.7 2,674.8 45.5 910.0 34.0 Dump-Trucks, 16 tons 170 515.0 87,550.0 276.0 46,920.0 53.6 TOTAL 232,373.2 86,067.4 37.0 - 9 - ATTACHMENT 1 COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM THF BORROWER A BANCA DE INVESTIT11 C,\BINF L. PRESLDIN FEL I Buchareet,September 19,198o Mr. Shiv S.Kapur Director Operations Evaluation Department WORLD BANK Re: ROMANIA - Flood Recovery Project Performance Audit Report As regards the draft of the project performance audit report on Flood Recovery Project drawn up by Operations Evalua- tion Department, which was sent to us with your cover letter dated July 23,198o, we would like to underline that this report generally succeds to show more objective and realistic the way in which Flood Recovery Project was implemented and Bank's loan granted for this Project was disbursed. We are pleased to find out that although Mr. Pinard of your Department had relatively short time at his disposal on his visit in our country, he succeded to enlighten himself and to clarify by project performance audit report a number of assertions and generalizations included in the report drawn up by Industrial Projects Department within the Bank. However, we would wish to call your attention on some our considerations referring to some aspects included in the draft of the project performance audit report with intention to make it to reflect as faithful as possible the reality. 1. We propose to you the affirmation made in the report (first line in paragraph 9) that "the procurement-related difficulties have marred the relationships between the Bank and its borrower" to be taken out, and the word "difficulties" to be replaced with "misunderstandings". It is true there were a number of misunderstandings and delays in procurement, due to the Project's nature and 0 / - 10 - and size, the large number of enterprises (27o) to be recovered after the floods, the modifications of the priorities for recover- ing, and if we are referring to the relationships between the Bank and its borrower related to procurement, we agree that there were a number of misunderstandings or disagreements,but we appreciate and suggest you that these have not marred our relation- ships with the Bank neither in the case of Flood Recovery Project nor for subsequent projects. On the contrary, we firmly belief that between ms and the Bank there was a fruitful cooperation from the very beginning, 2, As regards the last line in paragraph 3, we wish to underline that the Romanian Government never objected to use ICB for procurements within Bank's loans. Moreover, the Government asked us and immediately after our country became a member of the Bank,ICB were settled by a Decree - Decree no.152/1974 - and we appreciate that this Decree observes Bank's procurement quide- liness. 3. In paragraph 6, we propose to you to analyse the possibility of reformulating the first phrase in line 1, thust "The utilization of some loan proceeds differed from the initial allocation", having in view that the differences comparing with the initial allocation in the Loan Agreement were minimum and in the same time, these were agreed with the Bank as it is otherwise resulting in the second line. 4. Referring to the statement in paragraph 6 showing that the difference between the actual foreign exchange expenditu- res amounting US$ 7.6 million and estimated foreign exchange re- quirements of US$ 12.6 million was covered by barter deals and supplierstcredits, we wish to underline that following the measures taken by the Romanian Government to eliminate the flood damages, especially by its own efforts based on equipment and spare parts produced in the country and to recover by special efforts under- taken by workers of an important part of spare parts and subanasem- bles damaged by floods, as well as the support granted by various foreign companies, which initially supplied the affected equipment, by delivering on free base the spare parts and subanesembles required for repairs, we had succeded to substantially reduce the actual foreign exchange effort required for recovering the damaged enterprises confronted by that estimated on project appraisal. - 11 - 5. As regards the procurement matters shown in paragraph 11, we consider that the general conclusion of Bank's report should be that the Borrower comply with the agreed procedures. In sustaing this conclusion, we like to underline thatt a) The geods procurred under the Plood Recovery Loan were procurred in accordance with the agreed procedures,without any disagreements between the Bank and the Borrower. b) In two oases, the Bank rejected the financing of the goods amounting US$ 288 thousand, although, on our opinion, these were in accordance with the Loan Agreement's provisions, but they were differently interpreted by the Bank. We exemplify the contract concluded for knitting needles to which you refer too in your report, with which the Bank was not satisfied because were estimated to cost less than US$ loo,ooo and ended up amounting more than US$ loo,ooo and consequently should be organized ICB, In connection with this decision of the Bank, we indicate that other items within the same project ( four weaving mills required for Sighigoara Wool Weaving Enter- prise) for which the coat was estimated to more than US$ loo,ooo had been procurred based on ICB, although, the effective cost was under US$ loo.ooo. c) We consider that only 3 cases for items amounting US$ 1.2 million, might not comply with the provisions of the Loan Agreement. But we consider that these 3 cases may not be a base to give a conclusion of the report regarding the project's completion, having in view that for this loan there were more than 2oo orders and contracts submitted and accepted by the Bank, These are exceptions and to the extent you consider they should be specified in the Audit Report, we appreciate too that they should be presented accordingly, without changing the general conclusion shown by us above.in paragraph 1 hereto. Apart from those presented above, we suggest you to eliminate from the text of paragraph 11 the wording "as is customarily done under Romanian procurement procedures" since as it was mentioned before, after we joint the Bank we regulate the ICB by law which is an obligation for all foreign trade enterprises. We also consider not justified the statement within the same paragraph, according to which "the Bank was not satisfied - 12 - with the advertising which Romanians gave to competitive bidding auctions ",since the advertising system was established and jointly agreed with the Bank. 6. In the annex to our March,198ogletter including suggestions and proposals to the draft of the Completion Report for the Flood Recovery Loan,we have stated the responsabilities, as for as the Project is concerned ( paragraphs 4.ol and 4,o2 in the respective Annex)and would like them to be accordingly reflected in paragraphs 12 and 13 in the Performance Audit Report, Moreover,we would like to point out that preparation of the withdrawal applications by the Investment Bank,asstated in paragraph 13,is valid only for the Flood Recovery Project, due to the involvement of many foreign trade enterprises not able that time to undertake this responsability. For all other Projects,the responsability of prepairing the withdrawal appli- cations stays with the foreign trade enterprises involved and accordingly with a view to avoiding confusions,rewording of paragraph 13 is required. We do also consider appropiate that mentions have been made,showing that the Investment Bank is permanently cooperating with the Ministry for Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation and the foreign trade enterprises involved for observance of the procurement procedures and with the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade for supervising the observance of the disbursements procedures. 7. We insist and would kindly ask you again to agree that references,to the staff of the Investment Bank,are taken out from the Report,this aspect and others relating to the organization,responsabilities and role of the Investment Bank in relations with other agencies and enterprises in the country being within the competence of our internal bodies. Other difficulties in Project implementation or disagreements with the Bank in procurement issues,were not due to the understaffing of the Investment Bank but,as we have already pointed out and this should not be avoided to be also pointed out in the Report,to the large scale and complexity of - 13 - the Project and also to this Project being among the first Bank financed Projects in Romania, Also in relation to the statement in paragraph 1 that the Investment Bank was not always in a position to determine the goods and services to be financed out of the proceeds of the Loan and to be procured according to the Bankta Guidelines , we have to underline that due to the Project's complexity and theperiod of time elapsed until negotiation of the Loan with the Bank,several modifications occured in the list of goods to be financed out of the Loan. At the same time,we would appreciate your considering rewording of the part in paragraph 15 concerning the foreign exohan ge allocations for flood damaged enterprisea,taking into account that the Government insisted that recovery of the industrial enter- prises is performed within the total volume of foreign exchange approved for the whole economy by allocating foreign exchange for damaged enterprises depending on the requirements. 8. With reference to some considerations and recommen- dations reflected in relation to the system of prices in Romania (last phrase in paragraph 16 ) we would kindly ask you that refe- rences are made stating that currently,further to the new economic reforms approved by the Government,there are measures under way of being adopted in the system of prices with a view to reflect the real costs in the economy,as well as the adoption in foreign trade relations of an unique commercial rate of exchange to reflect realistically the foreign costs. With all our thanks for your particular cooperation, we would highly appreciate your taking into account our comments in prepairing the final form of the Performance Audit Report to be distributed to the Executive Directors. Yours very sincerely, Gheorghe Popescu President - 14 - ATTACHMENT 2 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT LOAN NO. RO-1170 I. KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Estimate Actual Overrun TOTAL PROJECT COST (US$ Million) 135.11 139.84 4% of which: Industry Component 81.94 86.32 5% Transport Component 53.17 53.52 1% FINANCING (US$ Million) 135.11 139.84 of which: Romania's Investment Bank 115.11 119.84 IBRD 20.00 20.00 LOAN AMOUNT: US$20 Million of which: Industry Component 12.00 7.60 Transport Component 8.00 12.40 Disbursed 20.00 20.00 Cancelled 0 0 Repaid to IBRD 0.28 0.28 Outstanding to IBRD 19.72 19.72 COMPLETION DATE Industry Component Dec. 31, 1976 June 31, 1977 6 mos. delay Transport Component Dec. 31, 1976 May 31, 1978 17 mos. delay OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower: Investment Bank Guarantor: Socialist Republic of Romania Beneficiaries: 223 Industrial Enterprises and Transport Construction Trusts which were affected by the flood Amount: US$20 Million Terms: Interest at 8 1/2 per cent per annum; amortization in 20 years including 3-year grace period Board Approval: November 4, 1975 Loan Agreement Date: November 12, 1975 Date of Effectiveness: December 2, 1975 Closing Date: March 31, 1977, postponed to September 1, 1977 Appraisal Report: No. 876a-RO, dated October 21, 1975 - 15 - II. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION A. Introduction 2.01 During the first 10 days of July 1975, serious floods caused exten- sive physical damage in Romania. Immediately after the floods, the Romanian Government began an urgent and comprehensive flood recovery program, and requested the Bank's assistance in its financing. A mission visited Romania in the last part of July 1975 and reviewed with the Government its measures for flood recovery. The project was then formulated on the basis of the mission's findings, and on November 4, 1975, less than four months after the floods, the Board of Directors approved two complementary loans for this Flood Recovery Project (Report No. P-1699-RO dated October 22, 1975): a US$40 million loan to the Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry (BAFI) for the agricultural component and a US$20 million loan to the Investment Bank (IB) for the industrial and transportation components of this project. The agri- cultural component is still under implementation, while the industrial and transportation components have been completed. This report concerns the US$20 million loan to the Investment Bank for the implementation of the industry and transportation components. B. Project Background and Formulation 2.02 While Romania has experienced a series of relatively local floods in the recent past, the 1975 floods were more widespread and caused more serious economic damage than any earlier floods. The floods dealt a serious blow to the Romanian economy. About 250 local industrial enterprises were damaged in addition to housing and community facilities in 1,300 villages and 65 towns. About 1.1 million hectares of agricultural land (10% of total cultivated area) were flooded. Some 2,600 km of rail network (24% of Romania's network) and about 3,400 km of national roads (25% of Romania's network) were affected. The total losses excluding extensive damage to housing and social facilities were quantified by the appraisal mission at about US$793 million, and were split about evenly between production (including crops) and asset losses. The production loss represented 2.4 percent of 1974 national income and the asset loss 6.2 percent of 1974 gross domestic investment. 2.03 The Romanian Government was prompt to respond and took immediate measures to correct the numerous problems caused by the flood. While support- ing and guiding the efforts of the population to protect and save life and property, it also issued appeals to potential international and bilateral sources for assistance to supplement local efforts. The Bank was one of the first foreign agencies to materially respond to the Romanian appeal. Upon its arrival in Romania on July 21, some 10 days after the Government request for Bank assistance, the six man interdisciplinary Bank Mission began its work by surveying the extent of flood damages. It then concentrated on evaluating the needs of key sectors of the economy and defining a potential Bank project to support the Government Flood Recovery Program. Two Romanian agencies the Investment Bank and the Bank for Agricultural and Food Industry, both already - 16 - familiar with the Bank assisted in the Bank mission's work. The Investment Bank had been the borrower for three previous loans - Loan 1020-RO Fertilizer Project (1974), Loan 1027-RO Special Steel Project (1975), and Loan 1028-RO Thermal Power Project (1975) - and the mission already knew its technical and managerial capabilities. Similarly, the Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry had received two Bank loans - Loan 1082-RO Irrigation Project (1975) and Loan 1083-RO Agriculture and Credit Project (1975). This prior familiarization and the high priority granted by the Romanian leadership to the Bank assistance mission facilitated the Bank work and the identification of potential problems. After the mission's return to Washington, the proposed loan was quickly processed in order to maximize the Bank's effectiveness in assisting Romania's flood recovery efforts. Negotiations were initiated with the Romanian authorities on September 16, 1975, within six weeks of the mission's return to headquarters. 2.04 Two special considerations due to specific concerns expressed by the Government arose during the formulation of the project. First, in order to minimize the adverse impact of the flood on Romania's trade balance, the Romanian authorities did not want the project to primarily finance imports of industrial equipment even though such financing came closest to normal Bank operations; presumably the authorities planned to minimize additional indus- trial imports and also preferred to finance them mainly either from other bilateral sources or through barter deals with equipment suppliers. In any case, the Government wanted the loan proceeds to be distributed against local expenditures and consequently use the loan mainly for agriculture and trans- portation rehabilitation equipment. Second, the Romanian authorities initially did not want the Bank-financed equipment to be procured under international competitive bidding but only under Romanian procedures, reportedly to minimize procurement delays. During project formulation and subsequent lengthy nego- tiations, these Romanian preferences were substantially accommodated within Bank's established procedures. First, the allocation of the loan to Romania's different economic sectors was agreed (see para 3.12), while allowing a degree of flexibility under which the Romanian authorities would purchase equipment according to their own priorities within procedures that would satisfy Bank's desire to have adequate control over the use of its funds. Second, the principles under which international competitive bidding could be used for a substantial amount of procurement under the Project without delaying imple- mentation were agreed upon (by combining a major portion of procurement under this project with that of an earlier agriculture loan). In addition, the modalities for procurement of Bank-financed equipment under international shopping were agreed. C. Project Description 2.05 The US$20 million loan to the Investment Bank was to finance the industrial and transportation components of the project. The industry component covered all elements of the Government's flood rehabilitation program in the sector to be executed in the short term. Some 223 industrial enterprises were selected by agreement between the Bank and the Government to be eligible under the Bank loan. For this component, the loan was to finance - 17 - acquisition and installation of machinery and spare parts, repairs to the buildings and the infrastructure damaged, and replenishment of inventories. The transportation component consisted of the reconstruction of 120 km of national roads, including 18 bridges, and 270 km of railroads, including 20 bridges. For this component the Bank agreed to finance earthmoving equipment used in the reconstruction effort by the various construction trusts of the Ministry of Transport. The amount of equipment to be financed by the Bank was calculated by estimating the related depreciation of all construction equipment to be used for reconstruction. D. Implementation Arrangements 2.06 The Investment Bank had the overall responsiblity for coordinating with the Bank the implementation of the project's industry and transportation elements. Industrial enterprises were responsible for the rehabilitation of their respective plants, the suppliers helping with the installation of spe- cialized equipment. Along with specialized workers and raw materials, the affected enterprises were, to the extent possible, to borrow equipment from unaffected enterprises and return it when they obtained their own replacement equipment, be it financed under the Bank loan or not. Transportation rehab- ilitation was carried out by the specialized construction trusts of the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications. The two project components were expected to be completed by December 1976. Following Romanian practices previously accepted in Bank operations in Romania, the Investment Bank and the beneficiaries were not required to enter into formal arrangements for onlending of the Bank loan proceeds. 2.07 Due to the nature of the project and the large number of enter- prises that were to implement it, it was not possible to perform detailed financial and economical analyses in appraising the project. For the same reason, the project formulation did not provide for specific economic and financial yardsticks to measure the performance of the Investment Bank and the different enterprises as they implemented the project. 2.08 It is important to note that the Bank project was designed as the Bank support and financing of specific parts of the Romanian Flood Recovery Program. The implementation of the overall Program by the ministries and enterprises was to be parallel but somewhat different in its procurement aspects from the Bank project coordinated by the Investment Bank, which followed procurement procedures agreed upon during negotiations. As discussed later, the difference in procurement procedures between the Bank financed and non-Bank financed items led to misunderstandings and difficulties during project implementation. 2.09 The Flood Rehabilitation Program was of such a peculiar nature and had so many different implementing agencies that the Bank could not directly super- vise its execution as in normal Bank projects. The Bank had therefore to structure procurement arrangements and legal agreements so that, while the Romanian authorities had the necessary flexibilility to implement their - 18 - program, the project objectives would be achieved also in accordance with Bank policies and procedures. As a result, in addition to the Loan Agreement the loan documents included five supplemental letters which described in detail the project and the modalities of its implementation. These letters specified (i) the list of industrial enterprises that could benefit from the Bank loan, (ii) the specific transportation works that were to be carried out under the project, (iii) the list of goods to be financed from the loan proceeds and the criteria for their selection, (iv) the disbursement certificates indicating that the equipment was to be procured and used for flood recovery purposes, and (v) the periodic reports through which the Investment Bank was to keep the Bank currently informed on the project implementation. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 3.01 This Chapter briefly discusses the execution of the Flood Recovery Program by the Romanian authorities, and then the implementation of the Bank project which financed parts of the Romanian Program. Both due to the nature of the project and the lack of adequate reporting by the Borrower during project implementation (para 4.09), the discussion in this Chapter is of general nature and is based primarily on limited information provided by the Investment Bank and on the impressions formed by two completion missions during field visits in 1978 to a limited number of selected beneficiaries. A. Romanian Flood Recovery Program 3.02 The Romanian authorities managed the national Flood Recovery Program diligently and efficiently. Since the Romanian economy is centralized, well defined channels of communications already linked the individual enter- prises to the centrals and the Ministries. This greatly facilitated the quick and orderly set up of the recovery efforts. Immediately after the first signs of floods, the regional authorities organized local relief efforts and the authorities in Bucharest required the enterprises to report daily to the centrals and the ministries on the evolution of the floods, the extent of the damages and the most urgent needs in manpower and equipment. For each affected enterprise, the corresponding ministry dispatched a coordinator who had full decision making power and was in charge of communications with the local (judet) civic authorities and with the central and ministries. In the most seriously affected enterprises, these coordinators stayed for up to 3 months. The problems not needing action from the central authorities were presented to the judet authorities and solved locally. Such centralization of information and coordination of efforts at the judet and ministry level allowed the authorities to respond effectively to crucial needs by quickly allocating specialists and equipment from unaffected areas and enterprises. Specialized maintenance personnel, trucks, electrical equipment and raw materials, among other resources, were identified and allocated promptly to fill the most urgent needs and to enable the affected enterprises to reach their target production levels at the earliest possible time. The Bank could not and was not involved in implementation of this Program, except for finan- cing some of its components. - 19 - B. Project Implementation 3.03 The industry and transport components of the Bank financed project were expected to be completed by end-December 1976. The industrial component was actually completed in June 1977, six months behind schedule, and the transport component in May 1978, seventeen months behind schedule. 3.04 Physical implementation of the industry component was slower than expected, as were the Bank loan disbursements. Although delays in physical implementation were substantial in some cases, we do not believe that they indicate any mismanagement of the recovery efforts, but rather that Romanian authorities (i) initially underestimated the extent of the rehabilitation works and (ii) subsequently adjusted investment priorities to reflect their overall development strategy (para 3.05). As Annex I shows, these delays varied considerably between the different ministries. In the Ministry of Machine Building Industry and the Ministry of Mining, Petroleum and Geology, all the affected enterprises had reached their pre-flood production levels by the end of December 1975. In the Ministry of Light Industry about 70% of the affected enterprises were rehabilitated by December 1975, 90% by August 1976, the remaining 10% being rehabilitated by late 1976 or early 1977. In the Ministry of Forest Industry and Building Materials, only 35% of the affected enterprises had reached pre-flood production levels by December 1975, 90% by December 1976, the remaining 10% being rehabilitated only by the first quarter of 1977. Finally, in the Ministry of Chemical Industry, only 16% of the affected enterprises were rehabilitated by the end of 1975, 85% by the end of 1976, the remaining 15% being rehabilitated by the first quarter of 1977. We believe these variations between ministries stem from: (a) the enterprises' geographical distribution among River Basins which were affected differently; (b) the different types and extent of rehabilitation works that had to be carried out; and (c) the varying priorities assigned by the Romanian authori- ties to the rehabilitation of the different industrial subsectors. This last point is further discussed below. 3.05 Delays in procurement and disbursements (paras. 3.16-3.21) were mainly due to the Investment Bank's inability to identify items suitable for procurement, even under the simplified international shopping permited under the Loan Agreement. The Investment Bank obviously had difficulties to coordinate with the ministries in identifying specific items eligible under the Bank project definition and procurement procedures. Also, some ministries and foreign trade enterprises, who normally obtain their import requirements by using procedures quite different than specified on the Bank loan (para. 3.19), preferred to finance their industrial equipment import needs through other channels when possible. In addition, since under the Government Flood Recovery Program they borrowed equipment from the unaffected enterprises, the damaged enterprises could postpone the procurement of Bank financed equipment without jeopardizing their quick and effective rehabilita- tion. So, even after the loan allocation Lor this industrial component had been considerably reduced, (para. 3.12) the Investment Bank had difficulties to identify items suitable for Bank procurement, and was only able to submit the last disbursement application by September 1977, some nine months after - 20 - the original closing date. While a delay of this magnitude is not unusual in normal Bank projects involving implementation over 3-6 years, it is serious in this case considering that the Project was processed within the Bank as an 'emergency' loan. Annex II lists the industrial equipment procured through Bank financing. 3.06 Transportation Component: The surrogate for direct participation in the costs of civil works, the Bank's usual means of financing transport projects, was to lend for the purchase of construction equipment to replace that depreciated in the reconstruction after the flood. Identification of, and agreement on the types of equipment needed was not a problem but procure- ment was protracted (para. 3.16). The physical works of repair and rehabil- itation, as defined in the Project Loan Agreement, were not completed until May 1978, seventeen months behind schedule. Annex III details the completion dates for the works in each River Basin, for the national road network and for the rail network. As in the case of the industrial component the rehabil- itation works proceeded differently according to the location and the type of works. In the Ialomita Basin 80% of the damaged national roads were rehabil- itated by December 1976, the remaining being rehabilitated by December 1977, and the rail network was rehabilitated by September 1977. In the Mures Basin 29% of the damaged national roads were rehabilitated by December 1975, 79% by December 1976, the remaining being rehabilitated by March 1977, while the rail network was rehabilitated by June 1977. In the 0lt Basin, only 48% of the damaged national roads were rehabilitated by December 1976, 86% by December 1977 the remainder being rehabilitated by March 1978, the rail network being fully rehabilitated by September 1976. Details of the equipment procured for this transportation component and its ultimate disposition are shown in Annexes IV and V. 3.07 The actual works considerably exceeded the restoration of infra- structure on which the Bank's appraisal (and the Loan) was based, and included protection works designed to minimize the effects of future floods. In some instances major road and rail realignments were carried out to avoid areas susceptible to flooding, and in others major river diversion works were built. Thus, the division in time between restoration of the status quo and comple- tion of each sub-project, including flood protection, is difficult to deter- mine. Field visits to some of the rehabilitated works confirmed that the work was designed and carried out appropriately, and that the new sections are of high quality overall. C. Project Costs 3.08 According to the information provided by the Investment Bank, the actual costs of flood repairs have been close to the appraisal estimates, not only in aggregate terms but also when broken down sector by sector: the total actual costs of flood repairs are 4% higher than the estimate, 5% higher for industrial rehabilitation and 1% higher for transport network rehabilitation, as detailed in Annexes I, II and VI. 3.09 For the Industry Component, the aggregate actual rehabilitation cost is reported at US$86.3 million, compared to appraisal estimate of US$81.9 million. The table below details for each Ministry the actual and estimated costs as well as the variations. - 21 - Industrial Rehabilitation Costs and Bank Loan Allocation--By Ministries (in US$ million) Costs of Industrial Rehabilitation Loan Allocation Estimated Actual Variations Actual (%) Estimated Ministry of Machine Building Industry 1.91 1.75 -9% .92 (12%) Ministry of Chemical Industry 18.09 19.56 +8% 1.83 (24%) Ministry of Electrical Energy 13.51 11.03 -18% .83 (11%) Ministry of Industrial Construction 2.52 2.53 - .04 (1%) Ministry of Mining Petroleum & Geology 13.10 6.76 -48% - (-) Ministry of Light Industry 9.90 10.44 +5% 2.09 (27%) Ministry of Forest Industry & Building Material 22.91 34.25 +49% 1.53 (20%) Common Items for all Affected Enterprises 0.23 - - .36 (5%) 82.16 86.32 5% 7.60 (100%) 12.00 Source: Investment Bank. The data supplied by the Investment Bank shows that although the total indus- trial rehabilitation costs were close to appraisal estimates on an aggregate basis, the actual rehabilitation costs experienced by each industrial Ministry differ widely from the appraisal estimates. We believe that these variations may be explained by two factors. First, considering the time pressure under which the original data was compiled by the Romanian authorities and the appraisal carried out by the Bank, the appraisal estimates were necessarily rough. Actually it is somewhat surprising that the final aggregate costs are so close to the original estimate. Second, the final costs most likely reflect the desire of the Romanian Authorities to allocate their rehabilitation resources according to their overall industrial development strategy and not only according to flood damage considerations. To that extent, and since in any case the majority of the affected enterprises reportedly achieved their 1975 production targets (Annex I), we consider that these variations in rehabilitation costs reflect, a priori, appropriate policy decisions. - 22 - 3.10 Some variations between the appraisal estimate and actual costs can also be observed when the costs are broken down between machinery, equipment, infrastructure and buildings: Cost of Industrial Rehabilitation - By Cost Categories (US$ million) Appraisal Estimate Actual Variations Buildings 12.20 10.52 -14% Infrastructure 6.61 8.29 +20% Machinery 48.73 52.80 +8% Equipment 14.62 14.71 +1% Total 82.16 86.32 5% Source: Investment Bank. The reductions in the cost of rehabilitation of buildings is in line with overall Romanian efforts during recent years to reduce costs of civil works by eliminating overdesign. The higher infrastructure costs are most likely due to the higher than originally anticipated damage and the relatively low original estimate in absolute terms. The variations in the other two items are marginal, particularly considering the nature of the project. 3.11 For the Transport Component, the aggregate actual rehabilitation cost is reported at US$53.5 million, compared to the appraisal estimate of US$53.2 million. As the table below shows, the final cost of rehabil- itating the national road network is estimated by the Investment Bank at Lei 429,385,000 (US$21.47 million) almost identical with the cost of Lei 429,335,000 (also US$21.47 million) estimated in July, 1975 - a remarkable achievement particularly in view of the fact that much more work for future flood protection was accomplished than originally foreseen. Similarly, the rail network is estimated to have a final cost (Annex III) of US$32.05 million, close to the July '75 estimate of US$31.70 million. In the absence of cost break-downs for the individual rehabilitation works it is not possible to comment on details of the final costs reported. Transport Network Rehabilitation Costs and Bank Loan Allocation (US$ million) Cost of Repairs Loan Allocation Estimated Actual Variations Estimated Actual % of Total National Road Network 21.47 21.47 - 9.0 (73%) Rail Network 31.70 32.05 +1% 3.4 (27%) Total 53.17 53.52 +1% 8.0 12.4 (100%) - 23 - D. Allocation of Loan Proceeds 3.12 During implementation, the allocation of the loan proceeds between different project components was substantially changed from that originally planned as shown below: Reallocation of Bank Loan Proceeds (US$ million) -----Bank Loan Allocation ---- Project Foreign Exchange Loan Final Component Cost Estimates a/ Agreement Allocation Industrial ] 8 7.6 12.6 Mining ]9 Transportation 3.3 ] 12.4 Unallocated - 3 - Total: 15.9 20 20 a/ Including contingencies (President's Report). The Bank loan was expected to finance three categories of goods: (i) imported equipment and spare parts for industrial rehabilition; (ii) imported and domestic earthmoving equipment for mining enterprises; and (iii) imported and domestic earth-moving equipment for transportation enterprises. Such an allocation was agreed to represent a balanced Bank response to the needs of the different sectors. After prolonged discussions during negotiations, it was agreed that no distinction would be made between the mining and trans- portation components because the equipment to be financed was similiar. At that time, the Bank also indicated to the Romanian delegation that it assigned low priority to the allocation of Bank loan proceeds to the transportation component which had small foreign exchange needs, and high priority to the industry component both because it was considered to be economically the most attractive component and because it was aimed at financing urgent direct import needs. 3.13 In October 1976, one year after negotiations and 3 months before the project completico date, the Investment Bank requested the first major reallocation of the loan proceeds. It advised the Bank that the Government now estimated the industrial rehabilitation direct import needs to be only US$7.7 million, compared to US$12.6 million estimated at appraisal time. It appeared that the Romanians had been able to attract foreign bilateral finan- cing through barter deals and that some other industrial equipment had been - 24 - imported from Western Europe under suppliers credits. Although during nego- tiations the import financing needs of the industrial enterprises had been a major issue, the Bank had not been made aware that such operations were underway to reduce the foreign exchange gap that the Bank loan was supposed to fill. Since according to the information furnished by the Romanians, all mining enterprises and virtually all industrial enterprises had nearly been rehabilitated by then and that no other import needs remained unmet, the Bank agreed on February 25, 1977, to reallocate to the transportation component the US$3 million which appeared as "unallocated" in the Loan Agreement--even though during negotiations the Bank had clearly expressed its reluctance to allocate any significant portion of its loan to the local currency needs of the transport component. A month after this major reallocation, the Bank was asked to and agreed to further reallocate US$0.4 million from the industrial component to the transportation component, leaving the final allocation as follows: US$7.6 million for the industial component of the project, (at appraisal time its foreign exchange cost had been estimated at US$12.6 million) and USS12.4 million for the transportation component (its foreign exchange cost had been estimated at US$3.3 million). 3.14 As a result of these changes more local costs have been effectively financed under the loan than was originally anticipated and the foreign ex- change currency disbursements were only US$8.2 million vs. the US$12 million anticipated at appraisal time. On the other hand, a higher proportion of the total loan amount has been disbursed against items procured under full ICB, because all earthmoving machinery was internationally bid (and won by Romanian firms with one exception) while almost all imported equipment was procured through international shopping as anticipated during appraisal. 3.15 Due to the large number of enterprises benefiting from the loan, the Bank could not closely supervise the project implementation and was not in position to object to the Romanian assertions that all but very few industrial enterprises had already been rehabilitated when the two requests for reallocation were made. And since the unallocated category was available for reallocation to either of the other categories, the Bank reluctantly agreed to the Romanian request. In retrospect, it might have been appropriate not to establish an unallocated category, but to allocate completely the loan proceeds to the different project components, particularly considering that (a) Bank financing of various project components and of local currency finan- cing was a major issue during negotiations, and (b) the Loan was expected to disburse over a short period and therefore the need for an unallocated cate- gory was not as critical as in case of normal Bank projects with long imple- mentation period. In addition, the Bank would increase its control over project implementation by financing only specific, predetermined types of equipment, instead of leaving part of the equipment to be financed open for changes. Finally, for the Bank to agree to amend the Legal documents, the Romanian authorities would have had to present more of a strong and documented case for reallocation than has been the case. E. Procurement 3.16 As described below, for a number of reasons, the major problems experienced during project implementation concerned procurement related matters. - 25 - 3.17 Organizational Set Up. Because their internal procedures were not adapted to even the simplified procurement arrangements agreed under the Loan Agreement, the Romanians had major difficulties in expediting procurement steps and disbursements against the Bank loan. While the Investment Bank was responsible for preparing the disbursement requests, a number of other Romanian agencies did all other procurement related work: the concerned Foreign Trade Enterprise, in consultation with the beneficiary Enterprise and Design Institute, initiated and evaluated the bids and placed the orders, for items required for flood rehabilitation along with regular orders from other enterprises; the Foreign Trade Bank was responsible for all payments; and the Shipping Enterprises handled the bill of landing and other shipping documents. The Investment Bank had to take the main burden for identifying items eligible for Bank financing and to collect documents from all these different agencies, which was not only time consuming but also cumbersome. The situation was worsened by the fact that procurement was handled by over a dozen Foreign Trade Enterprises who apparently placed low priority on meeting Bank pro- curement requirements. In addition, the Investment Bank staff responsible for coordinating Romanian procurement efforts and preparing disburement requests, had little prior experience with Bank's procurement requirements or of import procedures, and was also assigned other heavy responsibilities. This lack of adequate staff within Investment Bank and organizational arran- gements are also considered an important reason for inadequate reporting under the project (para 4.04). 3.18 Procedures for Bidding and Contract Awards. During project imple- mentation, the Bank had a number of substantial disagreements with the Invest- ment Bank on bid evaluations and awards. At first, despite repeated and clear discussions and written communications, the Romanian authorities did not follow the procurement procedures agreed upon in the Loan Agreement, leaving the Bank with no alternative but to reject a few disbursement requests. Even towards the project completion date, the Investment Bank had difficulties in persuading the Foreign Trade Enterprises to conform to agreed procurement procedures. Difficulties were encountered generally on three points: (i) Romanians did not invite an adequate number of qualified manufacturers to bid; (ii) some- times they would disqualify on technical grounds bids that had previously been found (technically) acceptable; and (iii) often they would finalize contracts without seeking Bank's prior approval of the bid evaluations, as required under the Loan Agreement. The Bank staff spent much time and effort explain- ing that it was serious about upholding the provisions of the Loan Agreeement, and in reviewing Romanian recommendations on procurement matters. 3.19 However, these difficulties cannot be attributable solely to the Investment Bank (para 4.05). The institutions responsible for inviting and evaluating bids for Bank financed equipment were Foreign Trade Enterprises. Most of them were either unaware of the Bank procedures or did not see the merits of using Bank procedures particularly considering that additional administrative efforts were required to use two different sets of procurement procedures and that Bank financed equipment represented only a small percentage - 26 - of their total purchases. Consequently, the Investment Bank found it diffi- cult to persuade the Foreign Trade Enterprises to identify items eligible for financing under the Bank loan and to strictly follow for them Bank Procurement guidelines (para. 4.05). In addition, there may have been too many Foreign Trade Enterprises involved for the Investment Bank with its very limited staff resources to effectively control and orient the Foreign Trade Enterprises procurement procedures. 3.20 We believe that the procurement difficulties the Bank experienced for this project were only partly due to the nature of the project and its design. Actually, most of the basic problems can perhaps be traced to two fundamental factors. The first concerns the conflict between the govern- ment's and Bank's preferences on how the Loan proceeds should be used. While the Romanian authorities wanted to minimize allocation of any additional foreign exchange resources to the enterprises for their flood rehabilitation efforts, the Bank felt that the Loan was meant primarily to finance such additional support requirements (para. 2.04). The second factor concerns the difference in the Romanian and Bank procurement procedures. While in their normal procurement of imported items Romanian authorities resort to lengthy technical and commercial negotiations simultaneously with a number of selected suppliers, the Bank procedures call for open international competitive bidding and prohibit commercial negotiations until after the selection of the lowest bidder. F. Disbursements 3.21 Loan disbursements proceeded at a slower pace than anticipated, largely because the Investment Bank and Foreign Trade Enterprises had diffi- culties to adapt to Bank procurement procedures. A comparison of the actual experience with the appraisal estimate is shown below: Cumulative Disbursement Schedule Estimates Estimates --Category I--- Adjusted -Category II-- Adjusted Actual Estim. for Actual Estim. for Reallocation Reallocation Dec. 31-1975 0.3 0.3 1.5 - 1.0 2.5 March 31-1976 2.9 7.5 3.8 - 2.0 5.0 June 30-1976 2.9 11.5 5.8 - 3.5 8.7 Sept. 30-1976 3.1 13.5 6.8 - 5.0 12.4 Dec. 31-1976 4.1 15.0 7.6 7.9 - - March 31-1977 5.7 - - 12.0 - - June 30-1977 6.5 - - 12.1 - - Sept. 30-1977 7.6 - - 12.4 - - - 27 - Romanian suppliers were awarded 59% of the contracts (by value) while the Germans suppliers were awarded 17% of total contracts and Austrian suppliers another 8% as shown in Annex VII. Actually, except for a few cases prac- tically all imported items were supplied from Western Europe. This breakdown of imports which is consistent with Romania's overall trading pattern, is also the result of two factors especially relevant to this project. First, prac- tically all of the items financed under the Bank Loan were replacements of goods earlier imported by the enterprises from Western Europe. Second, the European suppliers were more famliar with Romanian buyers and were more responsive to Romanian bid requests on an urgent basis under the international shopping procedures agreed with the Bank. IV. PERFORMANCE OF BORROWER AND BENEFICIARIES A. The Borrower: Investment Bank 4.01 For this project, as for all non-agricultural projects in Romania, the Investment Bank was the official bank contact and the borrower of the Bank loan. It passed on the loan proceeds to the enterprises, but was not respon- sible for the implementation and supervision of the Rehabilitation Program. It was, however, specifically in charge of (i) coordinating the Bank related project activities with the ministries and enterprises, (ii) collecting information and reporting it so the Bank could monitor the project implemen- tation, and (iii) ensuring adherence by other agencies to Bank procurement procedures and centralizing disbursement requests. In all three areas, the Investment Bank could perhaps have better fulfilled its responsibilities. 4.02 The Investment Bank appears to have performed only a limited role in the design and implementation of the National Flood Recovery Program, since within the Romanian system the responsibility for this was assigned to the ministries and judet authorities. This possibly explains the difficulties the Investment Bank had in expediting identification and procurement of items financed under the Bank Loan, and in keeping the Bank advised of the progress of the works agreed under the project. The Investment Bank itself did not have information on the implementation of the Rehabilitation Program and had to request it from the ministries. Despite repeated written or oral requests, the Investment Bank also failed to adequately report on the physical imple- mentation of the project (para 4.09). Finally, even if procurement difficul- ties were partly due to the nature of the project, its design and the number of Foreign Trade Enterprises that were involved, the Investment Bank due to its past familiarity with Bank procedures should have anticipated potential problems and sought solutions acceptable to all concerned. 4.03 We believe that two factors account for the above-mentioned problems, which are also encountered by the Bank in some of its other operations with the Investment Bank: (i) the Investment Bank is inadequately staffed to be an effective counterpart to the Bank; and (ii) lacks administrative responsi- bility over other government agencies in charge of actual project design, procurement and implementation. - 28 - 4.04 The Investment Bank staffing could be strengthened both in its experience and numbers. Most Bank counterparts (project officers) in the Investment Bank's foreign relation department are young economists with limited prior operational experience. This makes it difficult for them to fully understand the Bank's needs and concerns, and to deal effectively with senior officials in ministries and enterprises. As a result, their role is now merely to collect, screen and translate the information from different ministries, instead of acting as full fledged counterparts to Bank staff. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there are only a handful of these project officers dealing with Bank projects. With the increasing number of Bank operations within the Investment Bank, these few project officers are not able to keep up with increasing workload and have to re- strict their activities to the collection of data, processing of disbursement requests and procurement related matters instead of discussing and resolving substantive issues. 4.05 As mentioned in para 2.06, the proceeds of Bank loans are not addi- tional contributions by the Investment Bank to the beneficiaries, but merely pooled with other budgetary resources. Consequently the enterprises, design institutes, ministries and Foreign Trade Enterprises do not perceive to materially benefit from a Bank loan. They are therefore not keen about Bank financing, specially since such financing obliges them to devote more efforts to particular aspects of the projects than they would normally do (para. 3.19). Since in addition it has only limited control over investment selection and project supervision, the Investment Bank most likely finds it difficult to motivate the different institutions to release the information we need to monitor project implementation. B. The Beneficiaries Industry 4.06 As they implemented the Flood Rehabilitation Program, the affected enterprises and more generally, the Romanian people, displayed courage, ingeniousness and endurance. In most of the enterprises people worked day and night in 8 to 12 hours shifts, seven days a week and this for up to five months after the floods. In some cases, for example, in an Alba lulia factory, they repaired small electrical equipment part-by-part, instead of waiting for new, complete replacement pieces. At the same time, the people were also involved in the rehabilitation of their homes and cities. These efforts enabled a large majority of the affected enterprises to achieve, as directed by the national government, their production targets for 1975 (Annex VIII) even though most inventories were not replenished nor spare parts received until mid-1976. However, in most cases the 1975 quality and efficiency targets were not reached and profits accrued to the enterprises were below target. Consequently, not only no bonuses were distributed to the employees at the end of the year, but some enterprises also had to draw on special funds to pay their employees normal wages. In addition, the funds available for the enterprises' 1976 investments were lower than had been planned before the flood and it appears that at least in a few cases their 1976 investment - 29 - targets-had to be adjusted downward. As already mentioned, despite the supreme efforts made by the workers and enterprise managers, all the enter- prises could not be rehabilitated by end 1975 as the Romanian government had desired and planned. Transportation 4.07 As soon as the floods had subsided, all authorities concerned with transportation and communication mounted efforts to restoring the damaged links, initially on a temporary basis if permanent repairs were not then feasible. Indeed, at the time of the appraisal mission's visit, only a couple of weeks after the main flood peaks had passed, traffic was flowing, albeit slowly, over many of the damaged road and rail sections, evidence of the unremitting round-the-clock efforts of the repair teams. Concurrently with these works the construction enterprises of the Ministry of Transport took stock of the damage incurred, and initiated immediate planning for the permanent repairs and rehabilitation. As plans for each sub-project were completed, resources were allocated (diverted from the normal development program) and work started. However, as stated earlier (para. 3.07) the works ultimately built exceeded those envisaged at the time of project appraisal as flood protection works were also incorporated to minimize risk of damage from future floods. 4.08 Damage to the principal networks was widely dispersed; 120 km of national roads (including 18 bridges) which were destroyed were in over 730 locations in twelve river basins, and the 270 km of railroads (including 20 bridges) were destroyed in nearly 390 locations in seven river basins. Detailed supervison of all these sub-projects by Bank staff was therefore impracticable. However, the areas of greatest damage were visited by the completion mission and the works completed were confirmed to be of satis- factory quality. C. Compliance with Covenants 4.09 Except for difficulties with reporting and procurement, all the covenants agreed in the loan documents were complied with. In addition to the Loan Agreement which specified reporting requirements concerning the Invest- ment Bank itself, a supplemental letter detailed the reporting requirements concerning the project implementation (para 2.09). Quarterly reports were to be furnished to keep the Bank informed on the status of the project and on the results obtained from its execution. The reports were to cover two specific aspects: (a) procurement status and (b) project physical implementation (status of repair works and equipment commissioning). Only the first aspect was adequately reported and, despite repeated written requests, the Investment Bank failed to give the Bank information on physical progress of the rehabil- itation works and on project costs. For procurement related matters, while reporting on procurement status was adequate, the procedures followed did not comply with those agreed in the loan documents (para. 3.18). - 30 - V. ECONOMIC BENEFITS 5.01 Although due to the unique nature of the project no economic rate of return has been calculated, it is clear that the overall successful implemen- tation of the Flood Recovery Program and of this project as its integral part, did have a major positive impact on the Romanian economy. If calculated the economic return for the industrial and transportation components of the Recovery Program would be extremely high, because of the large sunk costs of facilities which could not be fully utilized and the high incremental benefits of putting them back into use. The impact of the recovery efforts can be appreciated by the fact that, in spite of direct losses which for production alone amounted to about 2.4% of the national income and for fixed assets totalled about 6.2% of gross domestic investment, Romania did achieve a 9.8% overall economic growth in 1975. In addition, the industial production, which was officially planned to grow - on a gross basis - between 11.1% and 12.8%, grew at 12% 1/ in spite of the flood. Admittedly, since the Romanian produc- tion indexes at the time were calculated on a gross and not a net basis, these figures do not exactly reflect the full economic impact of the flood recovery efforts. Discussions with individual enterprises indicated that while most of them met their gross production targets for 1975, most of them failed to meet their efficiency and profit targets for the year (para. 4.06). This in turn adversely affected the funds available from internal resources for investments during the following year, slowing somewhat the growth of the industrial sector in Romania. In addition, in 1976, some resources were devoted to resources expended in 1975 to meet that year's production targets. The same phenomenon most likely also happened at the level of the National Economy: The 1976 industrial output grew at only 11.4% (0.6% less than in 1975) when no calamity struck the economy. 5.02 As in the case of the industry component, it is not practical to quantify in economic terms the benefits of the transportation element of the project. Freight and traffic flows on the principal elements of the road and rail networks prior to the flood indicate that their disruption was a major setback to the economy and that maximum efforts devoted to their speedy reinstatement were necessary and fully justified. 5.03 Another long term benefit of the Flood Recovery Program is that the Romanian authorities have now developed impressive flood warning systems and flood prevention measures which should reduce the loss to the economy of any possible similar calamity in the future. For the flood warning system, Romania has organized information channels through which different warning posts upstream on the rivers regularly report water levels to factories and cities downstream. The authorities have also set up organizational arrange- ments to deal with future emergency situations. For flood prevention measures, the authorities apparently took advantage of the lessons learned from the 1975 flood and have by now completed water protection works: dikes, reservoirs, modified river courses and water intakes around factories. These works should help minimize the economic disruption Romania could experience in the event of another flood. 1/ 14.4% for heavy industry and 6.3% for consumer products. - 31 - 5.04 In summary, although they are difficult to assess quantitatively the economic impacts of the Flood Recovery Program were positive since (a) Romania's economic growth kept its sustained pace in 1975 in spite of the dramatic damages of the flood, and (b) the country is now equipped with elaborate and effective flood warning and flood prevention systems. VI. BANK ROLE AND PERFORMANCE A. Project Objectives 6.01 The Bank has traditionally assisted the economic development of its member countries by financing "classical" investment projects. It has not financed many disaster relief projects. Accordingly, its organizational and operational set ups were not designed for emergency operations and do not easily permit handling of disaster relief projects. This perhaps accounts for some of the problems the Bank faced with this particular project, specially those concerning procurement matters. Indeed, one might ask whether the Bank should lend for disaster recovery projects or whether it should restrict its operations to projects it can thoroughly appraise and closely supervise, assisting member countries struck by natural disasters by adequately adjusting its regular lending program. The experience on this project shows that direct loans for disaster relief should continue to remain the exception. However, in special circumstances they may be desirable as a necessary symbol of Bank interest in the well being of its member countries. 6.02 The major purpose of the Bank intervention in this project was to assist the Romanian Flood Recovery efforts by providing foreign exchange. This was achieved by the project, although the disbursements went much slower than anticipated. As expected, the Bank had no institution-building impact since the Flood Recovery Program implementation was managed and supervised by the Romanian ministries and enterprises while the Bank mainly dealt with the Investment Bank's Foreign Relations Department. B. Project Formulation and Processing 6.03 The Bank had very limited impact on the design and implementation of the overall Romanian Flood Recovery Program. However, the Bank structured its own project so that it would finance replacement equipment to be procured by the affected enterprises up to one year and a half after the flood, enabling them to borrow such replacement equipment from unaffected enterprises and restore production at the earliest. This approach was appropriate, as it gave the Romanian authorities adequate flexibility to allocate their resources to match their most urgent needs and at the same time permitted them to procure items financed by the Bank under its guidelines. The Bank was also effective in quickly processing this loan, as called for by the emergency nature of the project. The Loan was approved by the Board of Directors on November 4, 1975, only 3-1/2 months after appraisal, and this despite long and difficult negotia- tions. In retrospect, it appears that the project gained only marginally from - 32 - this fast processing. While the loan became effective on December 2, 1975, the disbursements went slowly thereafter (paras. 3.05 and 3.17) and such fast processing was achieved only through the special efforts of Bank staff who had to interrupt and delay work on other projects. C. Implementation and Supervision 6.04 The Bank showed necessary flexibility during project implementation. For example, it agreed to the Romanian authorities request to substantially change the loan allocation among the different project components (para. 3.12) in response to the government's judgment that the needs of various project components had changed since negotiations. This reallocation, however, also indicates that the Bank had limited knowledge of or influence on Romania's policy decisions that affected project implementation. This was largely due to the nature of the project. 6.05 The normal frequency of supervision missions, every 6 months, was appropriate for the project. More supervision would not have added signifi- cantly to the project implementation while consuming more Bank staff time. VII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED A. Overall Assessment 7.01 We believe the Romanian authorities managed the National Flood Recovery Program diligently and efficiently (para 3.02). This program had major positive impacts on Romania's economic performance in 1975 and after (para 5.04). The Bank project, which was designed to support and finance specific parts of this Flood Recovery Program, faced mainly procurement related difficulties. These were only partially due to the nature of,the project and its design (para 3.17-3.19), and can perhaps be traced to the role of the Investment Bank and its performance (para 4.01-4.05). B. Lessons to be Learned 7.02 The experience of this Flood Recovery project suggests a number of lessons of interest to the Bank and the Romanian Authorities for future similar operations. (i) Project Design and Monitoring 7.03 In view of the emergency character of this project and of the diversity of works to be performed under the Romanian Flood Recovery Program, the solution the Bank adopted in designing this project appears to have been successful: the Bank relied to a large extent on the ministries concerned, through the Investment Bank, to design the Program and monitor its completion. This approach should be retained for similar projects elsewhere provided the - 33 - implementing agencies are as competent as the Romanians. However, the project would have benefited if monitoring mechanisms or performance indicators had been established directly between the Bank and the ministries, so that the Bank could have appreciated directly the project implementation, instead of obtaining,,vith difficulty, limited documentary information indirectly through the Investment Bank (para. 4.09). (ii) Bank Flexibility 7.04 The project was designed so that the government would have some flexibility to allocate the B3nk loan according to its own priorities. When following Romanian requests the loan allocation was changed, the amount of local financing increased dramatically (para. 3.14). In future projects of this type, where the Bank has little control on project implementation, perhaps no unallocated category should be included in the Loan Agreement so that the Bank could retain better control on the amount of local cost finan- cing and to better ensure that the Bank funds would indeed be used in accor- dance with understandings reached during negotiations (para 3.12-3.15). When feasible, the Bank should also try to concentrate its support towards a relatively few number of selected enterprises with high rehabilitation costs. This would facilitate Bank supervision of project implementation. Such an approach was indeed used for the subsequent Romania Post Earthquake Construction Assistance Project (Loan 1581-RO, dated June 12, 1978). (iii) Procurement and Organizational Arrangements 7.05 The majority of problems this project faced have been procurement related problems (paras. 3.17-3.18). The experience with this project indicates that when many different agencies are involved in procurement and disbursement matters, careful attention should be given at appraisal time to define an adequate organizational set up for processing disbursement requests and handling procurement issues. It appears therefore that for disaster assistance loans a satisfactory organizational set up on the side of the loan beneficiary should be presented to the Bank before loan effectiveness. Along with detailed description of their functions and responsibilities, this proposal should examine what incentives the different institutions will have to procure equipment under the Bank loan and to follow Bank guidelines. In this particular project for instance, procurement of Bank financed equipment represented in value a small part of the total procurement activities of the Foreign Trade Enterprises, but necessitated disproportionately large organiza- tional efforts. Finally, this project experience shows that considerable attention and time has to be allocated for procurement related issues when an intermediary like the Investment Bank, and not the agency actually responsible for project implementation, is the Borrower of Bank loans to Romania. (iv) Future Operations with the Investment Bank 7.06 The experience of this Flood Recovery project suggests, that two complementary solutions could be considered to mitigate problems in future - 34 - Bank operations in Romania: (a) more direct Bank contacts, irrespective of who the actual Borrower is, with the Romanian agencies responsible for the design, procurement and implementation of projects (para. 4.05), and (b) a substantial increase in the number of experienced staff assigned within the Investment Bank to Bank activities (para. 4.04). Industrial Projects Department April 20, 1979 ROMANIA FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT COMPLETE PROGRESS REPORT COST OF FLOOD REPAIR WORLD BANK LOAN DATE OF REACHINC ( '000 Lei ) ALLOCATION PRE-FLOOD PRO- MINISTRY/ENTERPRISES _( $ ) DUCTION LEVELS Actual Estimated Actual 0 1 2 3 4 I. Ministry of Machinery Building Industry 1. Mediag "Automecanica" Enterprise 2,7oo 3,5oo December 1975 2. Mediap Screws Enterprise 2,300 2,ooo December 1975 3. Sinaia Fine Mechanics Enterprise 85o 1,5oo - November 1975. 4. Ploieqti Chemical Equipment Enterprise 1,92o 2,4oo 4,865.o9 December 1975 5. Tirgovigte Oil Equipment Enterprise 14o 6oo - July 1975 6. Moroni "Automecanica" Enterprise 25o 6oo 3,954.83 December 1975 7. Rimnicu Vilces Chemical Equipment and Forge 2,42o 3,ooo - December 1975 8. Sibiu "Independenta" Enterprise 3,14o 3,ooo 143,837.62 August 1975 9. Reqita Machinery Building Enterprise loo 6oo 19,9o2.51 October 1975 lo. Bucure§ti "Timpuri Noi" Enterprise 2,4oo 2,5oo lo9,797.o7 August 1975 11. Bucurcti Agricultural Machines Enterprise "Seminltoarea" 8o 5oo July 1975 12. Reghin Metallurgical Enterprise 24o 1,3oo July 1975 13. Cluj "Tehnofrig" Enterprise So 3oo July 1975 14. Bucure§ti Special,Industrial Con- struction and Erection Enterprise 1,o2o 2,ooo October 1975 0 1 2 3 4 15. Turda "Electroceramica" Enterprise 5,900 1,ooo 269,175.o7 December 1975 16. Tirgu Mureq "Electromuret" Enterprise 21o 5oo - July 1975 17. Refrigerators Enterprise - Glegti 2oo 3oo 7,730.51 September 1975 18. Titu Installation Electrical Apparatus Enterprise 95o 1,3oo - July 1975 19. Curtea de Argeg Passive Electronic Components Enterprise 190 2oo - July 1975 2o. Curtea de Argeq "Electroargeo" Enterprise 43o 5oo 16,267.62 August 1975 21. Urziceni Ferrites Enterprise 24o Soo - August 1975 22. Blaj Accessories for Machine Tools Enterprise 6o 2oo - July 1975 23. Plopeni Mechanics Enterprise 54o 1,ooo 11,655.46 September 1975 24. Cugir Mechanics Enterprise 2,75o 3,ooo lo2,176.31 September 1975 25. Tirgovigte "Romlux" Enterprise 80 4oo August 1975 26. Bucure§ti Electrioal Machines Enterprise 5,3oo 4,6oo 21o,844.2o August 1975 27. Buziu Technological Equipment Enterprise 9o 4oo 1,469.43 August 1975 28. Ploie9ti "1 Mai" Enterprise 45o 4oo 14,o88.62 October 1975 Sub-total I 35,ooo 38,loo 915,764.34 - .M F.)14 o 1 2 3 4 II. Ministry of Metallurgical Industry - 4.50o July 1975 III. Ministry of Chemical Industry 1. Rimnicu Vilcea Chemical Plant 16,7oo 13,8oo 264,644.61 February 1977 2. Govora Soda Products Plant 29,ooo 3o,ooo - August 1976 3. FAggraq Chemical Plant 2,ooo 8,5oo - May 1976 4. Pitegti Petrochemical Plant 1o8,1oo 104,2oo 261,211.26 February 1977 5. Valea CKlugareascg Fertilizer Plant 13,8oo 27,ooo 125,559.31 December 1976 6. G!egti Chemical Equipment Enterprise 11,ooo 7,ooo 2,766.41 May 1976 7. Copga Mic! "Carbosin" Enterprise 36,2oo 29,5oo 131,913.ol December 1976 8. Brazi Petrochemical Plant 6,8oo 6,2oo 269,507.80 March 1977 9. Victoria Chemical Plant loo 1,5oo - October 1975 lo. Timi§oara "Solventul" Enterprise 4oo - 19,958.72 October 1975 11. Bucuregti "Danubiana" Tyre Enterprise 5,000 - 173,524.62 December 1976 12. Floregti "Victoria" Tyre Enterprise 1,300 - 49,625.o4 December 1976 13. Pitegti Rubber Techiical Goods 32o - lo,741.29 October 1975 14. Bucureqti Plastics Processing Enterprise 2,550 - 92,164.65 September 1976 15. Buziu Plastics Processing Enterprise 3,45o - 72,815.52 May 1976 16. Ia§i Plastics Processing Enterprise 3,3oo - 11o,111.51 November 1976 17. TirnLveni Chemical Plant lo9,33o 12o,ooo - December 1976 18. Turda Chemical Enterprise 36,4oo lo,ooo - December 1976 19. Flglra§ Chemical Equipment Enterprise 5,5oo 4,ooo 14,5oo.78 August 1976 Common items 235,637.35 Sub-total II 391,25o 361,7oo 1,834,681.88 lut' q0 0 1 2 3 4 IV. Ministry of Electrical Energy All Affected Power Lines Enterprises 220,500 27o,2o3 829,042.17 July - December 1971 V. Ministry of Industrial Construction All Affected Construction Trust 50,5oo 5o,495 45,423.77 September 1975 - March 1976 VI. Ministry of Mining, Petroleum and Geology 1.Ctipeni Mining Enterprise 9,2oo - December 1975 2. Motru Mining Enterprise 14,2oo - December 1975 3.P1oiegti Coal Combine 2,ooo - December 1975 4.Cimpulung Muscel Mining Enterprise 3,3oo - September 1975 5.Petro§ani Mining Exploitation 8oo - August 1975 6.Voivozi Mining Enterprise 3,000 - September 1975 7.Bsia de Ariew Mining Enterprise 4,6oo - September 1975 00 8.Moldova Noul Mining Enterprise 5,300 - December 1975 9.Teliuc Mining Enterprise 1,50o - August 1975 lo.Bocga Mining Enterprise 1,2oo - August 1975 ll.Criscior Mining Enterprise 1,2oo - August 1975 12.Deva Mining Exploitation 5oo - August 1975 13.Copea Micl Non-ferrous Metal Metallurgical Enterprise 2,4oo - December 1975 14.Zlatna Non-ferrous Metal Metallurgical Enterprise 2,3oo - December 1975 M 0 1 2 3 4 15. Gura Humorului Mining Combine 7oo August 1975 16. Baia Mare Non-ferrous Metal Metallurgical Enterprise 17,ooo - December 1975 17. Cluj Mining Combine 2,ooo - Septemberl975 18. Constanta Mining Enterprise 1,ooo - August 1975 19. Miercurea Ciuc Mining Enterprise 1,500 - August 1975 2o. Rimnicu Vilcea Mining Enterprise 6,5oo - September 1975 21. Ocna Mureq Salt Mine 2oo - August 1975 22. Praid Salt Mine 1,400 - August 1975 23. Sl6nic Salt Mine 2oo - August 1975 24. Dej Salt Mine 1,ooo - August 1975 25. Orgova Mining Enterprise 1,2oo - August 1975 26. Alba.Iulia Mining Equipment and Repairs Plant 5,ooo - December 1975 27. Media§ Natural Gas Central 6,5oo - December 1975 28. Pitepti Oil Trust 6,loo - December 1975 29. Ploie9ti Oil Trust 1,ooo - August..: 1975 3o. Bucure9ti Geologycal and Geophysical Prospection Enterprise for Hydrocarbon 500 - August 1975 31. Bolintin Vale Oil Trust 15,900 - December 1975 32. Cimpina Electrical Equipment Repairs Enterprise 4,ooo - September 1975 33. Deva Geologycal Prospection and Exploration Enterprise 2,ooo - October 1975 34. Baia Mare Geologycal Prospection and Exploration Enterprise 1,000 - August 1975 35. Cimpulu Moldovenese Prospection and Exp oratIon Enterprise 1,500 - Deptember 1975 Ln 0 1 2 3 4 36. Cluj Geologycal Prospection and Exploration Enterprise 500 - August 1975 37. Bucharest Drilling and Special Geologycal Works Enterprise 4,5oo - December 1975 38. Bucharest Geologycal Prospection Enterprise for Solid Minerals 5oo - August 1975 39. Bucharest Construction-Erection Trust 2,ooo - October 1975 Sub-total VI 135,2oo 261,926 - VII. Ministry of Light Industry 1. Bucharest "Cotton Industry" Enterprise 63o 29,31o.78 December 1975 2. Bucharest "Jute Industry" Enterprise - August 1975 3. Bucharest "Borangicul" Silk Weaving Mill 97o 49,332.2o January 1976 4. Buftea Wadding Enterprise - August 1975 5. Balotegti "Textila" Enterprise - August 1975 6. Alba lulia Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise 22o 2,356.93 December 1975 7. Alba lulia "Ardeleana" Footwear Enterprise 180 l,o3o.8o December 1975 8. Alba lulia China Enterprise 1,2oo 25,25o.73 March 1976 9. Arad "Tricoul Rogu" Knitwear Enterprise 2o,25o lo5,4o9.71 January 1976 lo. Arad "Libertatea" Footwear Enterprise 15,2oo 23o,614.71 December 1976 11. Pitegti "Textila" Enterprise 93o 47,755.56 December 1975 12. CetAteni "Musceleanca" Weaving Mill - August 1975 13. Curte de Argeo Ready-made Clothes - August 1975 Enterprise Ile' +4 0 1 2 3 4 14. Curtea de Argeg China Enterprise 57o 25,250.73 November 1975 15. Pitegti Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - August 1975 16. Bistrita "Netex" Enterprise 12o - August 1975 17. Bistrita Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise 5o - August 1975 18. Bragov Preindustrialisation and Acquisition Enterprise - - August 1975 19. Buz6u Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise 2,1oo 65,699.56 January 1976 2o. Caransebeg Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - August 1975 21. Cluj Preindustrialization and Aqquisition Enterprise - - August 1975 22, Turda Glass Enterprise 4.500 95,478.oo December 1976 23. Bucegi-Puciossa "Textila" Enterprise 4,2oo 225,859.15 August 1976 24. Odorhei Thread Enterprise - August 1975 25. Gheorghieni Flax Spinning Mill 42o 3,367.26 September 1975 26. Odorbeiul Secuiese Ready-made Clothes Enterprise - August 1975 27. Miercurea Ciuc Ready-made Clothes Enterprise 780 38,253.13 August 1975 28. Hunedoara Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - August 1975 29. Sighigoara Cotton Weaving Mill 29,47o November 1976 3o. Sighigoara Silk Weaving Mill 18,ooo June 1976 31. Sighigoara Wool Weaving Mill 2o,ooo 575,o72.83 March 1977 32. Sighigoara "Tirnava" Ready-made Clothes Enterprise 2,loo March 1976 o 1 2 3 4 33. Sighigoara China Enterprise 1,2oo 41,227.39 September 1975 34. Tirgu Mureg Fur Enterprise - August 1975 35. Tirn6veni Window Glass Enterprise .2oo - August 1975 36. Tirgu Mi,reg "Imatex" Enterprise 1,5oo 62,397.37 December 1975 37. Cimpina Stockings Enterprise 4,ooo 22,433.50 December 1975 38. Vileni Silk Weaving Mill 5oo September 1975 39. VAleni Sand Quarry 4,000 - December 1975 4o. Mediag "Textila Tirnava" Enterprise 39,loo lo,436.58 January 1976 41. Cisnidie "Textila" Enterprise 1,2oo 73,572.45 January 1976 42. Mediag "8 Mai" Skin and Pootwear 6,2oo - August 1975 43. Agnita Skin and Footwear Enterprise - August 1975 44. Mediag "Vitrometan" Glass Enterprise 2,8oo - Janury 1976 45. Mediag "Emailul Rogu" Enterprise 26,ooo 143,135.79 September 1975 46. Sibiu Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise 250 5,9oo.92 August 1975 Common items ,2o8,547.27 Sub-total VII 208,840 198,o89 2,o87,693.35 VIII. Ministry of Forest Industry and Building Materials 1. Sebeg Wood Processing Combine 3o,loo - April 1977 2, Sebeq Exploitation and Transport Forestry Entreprise 28,ooo November 1976 00 0 1 2 3 4 3, Cimpeni Wood Processing Enterprise 2oo September 1975 4. Arad Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 3,5oo November 1976 5. Cimpulung Muscel Binders Combine 1,000 2o,o26.49 June 1976 6. Piteqti Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 41,500 December 1976 7. Bac6u Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 25,000 September 1976 8. Oradea Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 3,000 December 1975 9. Bistrita Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 5,ooo 42,73o.92 December 1975 lo. Bragov Wood Processing Combine 5oo - September 1975 11. Bragov Binders Enterprise l00 - September 1975 12. Bragov Building Matreials Enterprise 3oo - September 1975 13. Bragov Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 16,ooo - November 1976 14. BuzAu Building Materials Enterprise lo,ooo 44,28o.54 November 1976 15. Nehoiu Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 107,000 December 1976 16. Caransebeq Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 22,5oo - December 1976 17# Gherla Wood Processing Combine --5oo 7,731.45 December 1975 18. Turda Binders and Refractory Materials Combine 19,5oo 27,658.95 November 1976 19. Turda Building Matrials Enterprise 5,3oo 1,o99.43 November 1976 20. Cluj Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 32,5oo - November 1976 '0 0 1 2 3 4 21. Constanta Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 1,ooo December 1975 22. Tirgu Secuiesc Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 30,800 - December 1976 23. Fieni Binders and Asbocement Combine 13,3oo 95,385.55 December 1976 24. Craiova'Concrete Prefebricates Enterprise 8oo 9,o2o.88 August 1976 25. Tirgu Jiu Binders and Asbocement CombinaN 14,ooo 67,617.84 December 1976 26. Tirgu Jiu Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise lo,ooo - November 1976 27. Miercurea Ciuc Wood Processing Combine loo 55,682.43 August 1976 28. Miercurea Ciuc Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 15,ooo - May 1976 29. Toplita Wood Processing Combine 3,ooo - November 1975 3o. Deve Building Materials Enterprise 7oo - September 1975 31. Deve Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 15,ooo - June 1976 32. Iagi Exploitation and Transpost Forestry Enterprise 3,ooo - December 1975 33. Iapi Wood Processing Combine - - August 1975 34. Bucuregti Wood Exploitation Central 1,700 85,o57.72 September 1975 35. Baia Mare Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 2,ooo December 1975 36. Turnu Severin Wood Processing Combine 1,ooo December 1975 37. Orgova Exploitation and Transport Forastry Enterprise 6,ooo - March 1976 38. Reghin Wood Processing Enterprise 1,95o 93,725.26 November 1976 39. Tirgu Mureq Wood Processing Enterprise 13,8oo - March 1977 C1. 0 1 2 3 4 40. Sighigoare Ceramics Products Enterprise 2,loo May 1976 41. Reghin Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 26,loo 1,924.17 December 1976 42. Pietra Neamt Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 17,ooo - September 1976 43. Mizil Tapestry Materials Enterprise - August 1975 44. Bucov "iMai" Building Materials Enterprise August 1975 45. Ploiegti Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 20,ooo September 1976 46. Satu Mare Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 1,ooo September 1975 47. Sibiu Wood Processing Enterprise 2,5oo 29,1o4.9o September 1975 48. Sibiu Ceramics Products Enterprise 55o May 1976 49. Sibiu Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise lo,ooo May 1976 50. Suceava Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise lo,ooo 42,73o.93 May 1976 51. Timigoara Wood Processing Enterprise 1,16o - November 1976 52. Timigoare Exploitation and Transport Un Forestry Enterprise 5,ooo - January 1976 53. Rimnicu Vilces Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 75,ooo - September 1976 54. Foegani Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 25,ooo - March 1977 55. Bucure*ti Wood Processing Combine 5,ooo 162,468.41 December 1975 Common items (spare parts) 741,408.42 Sub-total VIII. 684,96o 458,130 1,527,654.29 -' General Total 1,726,25o 1,643,143 + 359,74o.2o/,c?Qmon items for all General To ala ficted enterprise) 7,6oo,ooo Source: Investment Bank Industrial Projects bepartment January 19, 1979 - 46 - ANNEX II Page 1 ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT List of Eouipment for Industrial Rehabilitation - US dollar equivalent - Value Item Estimated Actual A. Ministry of Chemical Industry 1. Cracking Towers (Reactors,Boilers) - 2. Pressure Regulators (Separators, Absorption Towers) 3. Other Chemical Equipment for Caustic Soda,Chlorine,Hydrogen Plants,Methyl Polymethacrylate 459,873.62 Processing Plants,Grinding Plants and Phosphrytes;Flow D9ying Equipment;Rubber Packing;Pumps; Compressors 4. Measuring Instruments,Controls, Laboratory Equipment Upto US$ 1 milua 329,156.27 5. Spare Parts Upin US$ 1 illiam l,o45,651.99 Sub-total A 1,834,681.88 B. Ministry of Light Industry 1. Control Panels,Electrical Equipment,and Instrumentation 184,632.93 2. Textile and Silk Weaving Machinery, such as Weaving Machines,Vaporizers, Dryers,Combing iachines,Glueing 1,292,226.57 Machines,Autocloves,Wool Washing Sets,Furnaces and Rollers 3. Spare Parts Upto US$l million 61o,833.85 Sub-total B 2,o87,693.35 - 47 - ANNEX 11 Page 2 Estimated Actual C, Ministry of Forestry and Building Materials 1. Wood Preparation,Processing and Finishing Equipment;Furniture lo7,933.74 Manufacturing Equipment 2. Pumps,Compressors,Mabrial Handling Equipment,Cement Plant 23o,69o.99 Equipment 3. Electrical Equipment,Controls and Instrumentation 288,olo.36 4. Spare Parts Upto US$ lmlion 9ol,ol9.2o Sub-total C 1,527,654.29 D. Ministries of Energy,Metallurgy and Industrial Construction 1. Electrical Equipment,Controls and Instrumentation 829,o42.17 2. Pumps,Compressore,Mixers and Other Construction Machinery - 3. Spare Parts Upto US$ 2million 45,423.77 Sub-total D 874,465.94 E. Ministry of Machinery Building Industry Up to US$ 1 million 1. Electrical Equipment,Controls and Instrumentation 497,236.o2 2. Other Equipment for Machine Building,provided that such equip- 3ol,ooo.74 ment meets the criteria specified in the letter attached hereto 3, Spare Parts for Equipment Referred to in E.2. 117,527.58 Sub-total E 915,764.34 F. Common items for all affected enterprises (ball bearing and 359,740.20 electric motors) Source: Investment Bank IndusLrial Projects Department Total 7,6oo,ooo.oo January 19, 1979 Notet For Ministry of Metallurgical Industry there were not used any amount from the loan. ANNEX III Page 1 ROMANIA FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT Costs for Rehabilitation of National Roads River Basin Road No. Number of Costs for repairs Date of Damaged Lei x 1,ooo comletion Locations Actual Estimated Actual Estimated Ialomiva 1 14 12,550 12,7oo Nov.1976 1975 1B 1 11o 125 May 1976 1975 1D 1 675 64o May 1976 1975 1A 52 22,350 22,26o Nov.1976 1976 2A 17 2,37o 2,490 Oct.1977 1975 20 1 315 29o Dec.1977 1975 21 1 890 92o Dec.1975 1976 71 1 2,710 2,78o Dec.1976 1975 72 1 190 2oo Dec.1975 1975 89 42,160 42,0o5 Mureq 1 34 3,815 3,79o Dec.1976 1975 6 1 185 19o Dec.1975 1975 7 7 4,575 4,55o Nov.1976 1975 13 33 8,69o 8,71o Dec.1976 1976 13A 6 995 1,olo Dec.1977 1975 14 32 15,115 15,13o March 1977 1976 14A 2o 8,245 8,25o Feb.1977 1976 14B 6 1,155 1,15o Ian.1976 1976 15 9 2,435 2,43o Nov.1976 1975 15A 1 65 7o Dec.1975 1975 16 3 2,115 2,12o Nov.1976 1975 66 3 1,72o 1,72o Dec.1976 1975 67C 26 5,385 5,390 Dec.1975 1975 74 38 3,595 3,58o Dec.1975 1975 74A 7 1,575 1,58o Ian.1976 1975 75 45 10,590 10,53o Feb.1976 1976 76 2.4o5. 241o Ian.1976 1975 2t'(2,b5o 72,61o Argeq 1A 3 34o 34o Nov.1976 1975 4 2 5o 4o Dec.1975 1975 5 1 16o 16o Nov.1976 1976 6 3 2.77o 2,76o May 1976 1976 7 26 1,410 1,42o Feb.1977 1975 70 22 15,o6o 15,o4o March 1977 1976 72 2 61o 590 Ian.1976 1976 72A 27 49o 27 47o March 1977 1976 Olt 1 19 21,225 21,22o Sept.1976 1976 lA lo lo,92o lo,93o March 1977 1976 7 11 8,815 8,81o Dec.1976 1976 7A 14 2o,56o 2o,54o March 1978 1976 lo 2 715 72o Dec.1975 1975 12 8 2,345 2,340 March 1977 1975 120 5 1,625 1,62o Ian.1976 1975 - 49 - ANNEX III Page 2 13 9 7710 77oo March 1977 1976 13A 2 93o 93o Dec.1975 1975 67B 5 8,230 8,23o March 1977 1976 73 3 1,145 1,150 Dec.1976 1975 73A lo 19,98o 19,970 March 1977 1976 73C il 16,735 16,7 Oct.1976 1976 r 20,935 12o,89o Buzåu lo 45 73,26o 73,24o May 1978 1976 11 6 4,205 4,21o Dec.1976 1975 12A 3 1,115 1,olo Dec.1976 1975 12B 12 2,415 2,42o Dec.1976 1975 15 1 36o 360 Dec.1975 1975 22 1 2,21o 2,2oo Jan.1977 1976 24 1 2,53o 52o Marchl1977 1975 ~9- 66,095 Ö5,960 Danube 50 3 565 56o Nov.1976 1975 54 4 46o 46o Dec.1975 1975 56A i 28o 28o Nov.1976 1975 57 3 1,625 1,630 Nov.1976 1975 57A 1 4o5 390 Dec.1975 1975 12 3,33 5 3,32o Other Basins Prut 24 1 1,325 1,36o Dec.1975 1975 240 3 205 190 Dec.1975 1975 28 1 16o 16o Dec.1975 1975 5 ~ 69 1,71- Cr-, 1 31 4,285 4,28o Dec.1976 1975 74 3 ,755 -3,75o- March 1977 1975 548,o4o ,o3o Nera 57B 3 1,605 1,61o Jan.1977 1975 Some§ 10 2 1,220 1,22o Jan,1977 1975 Timi§ 58 1 69o 69o Nov.1976 1975 58A 1 975 97o Dec.1976 1975 59 39385 9238o Dec.1976 1976 5= o,50 11,o40 Jln 7A 7 5,48o 5,48o March 1977 1975 67C 8 11,625 11,630 March 1977 1976 67D 6 15,6oo 15,61o March 1977 1976 =2 32,705 3 2,72o Total 7 3 1 429,385 429,335 ROMANIA FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT Costs for Rehabilitation of Rail Network River Number of Lenght Costs of Actual data Basin Route Damaged Damaged Temp.Repairs Final Repaire for Locations kActual Estimated Actual Estimated Final Repaire -million Lei - - million Lei - Argeg Bucharest lo 1.5 Craiova 1 8 Total 41 7.3 9 9 47 47 Jum 1977 Ialomita Bucharest 26 22,0 7 7 26 26 September 1977 BuZIu Galati 32 3o.o 35 33 135 132 June 1977 01t Craiova 11 5.o June 1976 Timigoara 3 o.5 April 1976 Braeov 8 45.5 September 1976 51.o 6 6 17 17 Mureg BraVoy 52 15.1 March 1977 Cluj 72 97.3 June 1977 Timi§oara 52 51 247 246 June 1977 . Jiu Craiova 4 1.0 2 2 3 3 February 1977 Dahube Bucharest 2 - _., 52 52 December 1976 Total 382 274.3 114 111 527 523 Source: Investment Bank Industrial Projects Department January 19, 1979 - - 51 - ANNEX IV ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT LIST OF EQUIPI.MT PRCCURED FOR NATIONiL ROADS fiND RAILWAYS REHABILITATION Roads Rsylv.ay3 Total Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value.: Equipment (no.of (thous.$) (no.of (thous. (no.of (thous. pieces) pieces) S) pieces) $) Dump-trucks,16 t. 131 3,373.25 39 1,oo4.25 17o 4,377.5o Track-type buldozers, lo 5I8.45 20 , 1,ol6.9o 30 1,525.35 18o, h.p. Motorgraders,18o h.p. 2o 797.94 - - 2o 797.94 Vxcavators, o.5 c.M. lo 248.98 lo 248.98 2o 497.96f Excavators, 1.2 c.m. 5 228.69 lo 457.38 15 686.o7i Front and wheel loaders, 826.oo - - 15 826.oc 2.3 c.m. Track-type buldozers, 4o 1,509.52 - - 40 1,5o9.52 15o h.p.4o 1595 4o 159.2 Concrete mixers,o.5 c.m. 31 73.78 - - 31 73.78 Road rollers, lo-12 t 7o 756.75 - - 7o 756.75 -oad rollers, 8-14 t 6o 678.94 -. - 6o 678.94 Tower cranes,llo t - - 8 581.09 8 581.o9 Agricultural type - - 2o 133.70 20 133.7c tractors,65 h.p. Total - 9,oo2.3o - 3,442.3o - 12,444.6c Source: Investment Bank Industrial Projects Department January 19, 1979 ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT DISTRiBUTION DY 5CZ DISE3 OF THE LQUIp..ENTS pRcCUpED OUT Or TRE PLOOD RSCOVERI LOAN FOR NATIONAL ROADS AND RAILWAYS REHABILITATION - no of pieces - Dump- Tr-nk- Motnr- Eèyéva- Eeoava- Traek- Conce,te Posd Road Tower Agriuiltu- Front a*d Enterprime truekn type graders tort to-- type ixera rollero rollers erna** ral t;,pe wh..1 16 to. hull-16- ie hp a.5 esa4 1.2 e,m. bull- o.5 a.m. 10-12 to 8-14 to 11. to tractvre le rer .er. dezera 65 h.p. 22 e.l. 1 h.p. 150 h.p. ROADS REIABILITATION 1. Buchareit-Otopeni Roasa mnd Bridge 2. Cucearest R14ad. and Bridgem Departmemt 32 5 6 23 6 5 . Fitenti Side Worke Company 36 3 2 8 4. Cluj Side Werka C92pony 18 2 2 2 2 2 !. Tieizooro Side Worka Company 6 3 3 3 5 6. Timi-eara Rande and Bridg* Regiemal Lrepartment ie 7. llrazov Side *orka Company 27 1 2 2 2 5 z. Zrieva Side Works Corpany 8 3 3 3 6 5. Is i Side Work& Cørpnwy 4 2 2 4 5 la. Girgiu Zo*crett Bridgen Eter,riaa 11. 3uleri 316 :rs Company 2 4 1.. C-natsate Side 'Aårka Compamy 2 14 o. iini ada and !ridgea Euterpriøe 2 ]!. r - So.dz -id Dr:dges Enterprire 6 U :'. :1.j ,iaaa #ad Bridien Saterprise 4 2 V.elii Ro.,ds and Bril:,en £nterrri*e 2 3'B-TOTAL FJR l<OAik 131 1. 2. lo 5 40 31 7. 6. - - 15 I,IL.AY REUHABILITATIPN 1. Duchoret Railways fonstrution Central 11 5 2 1 2 5 _.G1911 liydrotechnicN Gide ]Krk Ceapany 2 3 3 4 3. lå-i Railways Cnstruetion Entorprioe 2 1 4. C-neva Railwaya ZoaatructiOn Enterprise 4 1 1 1 '.)nøtenn; ydoecnia Conetruction E.e errrise 12 2 4 2 7 6. Pit.-ti 1,ailways Cenøtructi*n Regiemal C o.i a 14 7. Cluj Railwaya Costructiom Regi3a91 CD3ntky 10 :1. Timi;otra Railwaya.Canstruition Eterpri8e 2 SUB-2ZTAL F'R RAIL.AYS 39 2e - lo lo - - - - 8 2e - T 0 T A L 17.' 3.ø 2o 29 15 40 31 79 60 8 2e 15 Source: Investment Bank 1'1 Industrial Projects Departent January 19, 1979 ROMANIA FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT COSTS OF REHABILITATION OF BUILDINGS AND INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRY, MINING AND POWER SECTORS ( '000 Lei ) Ministry Total Buildingel) Infrastructure Actual Estimated Actual Estimated Actual Estimated TOTAL INDUSTRY, MINING & POWER SECTORS 376,o8o 376,285 210,350 243,976 165,730 132,309 A. INDUSTRY 248,38o 214,316 173,9oo 159,157 74,38o 55,159 1. Forest Industry & 2) Building Materials 190,24o 143,4oo 121,loo 98,7oo 69,14o 44,7oo 2. Light Industry 9,140 13,o89 7,loo 7,63o 2,040 5,459 3. Chemicals 18,ooo 22,ooo 14,8oo 17,ooo 3,200 5,ooo u 4. Heavy Machinery ) 5. Machine Tools & Electrotechnics ( 8,ooo lo,ooo 8,ooo lo,ooo - - 6. Industrial Constrution 23,000 25,827 23,ooo 25,827 - - 7. Metallurgy - - - - B. 8. Minig, Petroleum & Geology 12,500 6o,136 9,650 56,136 2,850 4,ooo C. C9. Electrical Energy 115,2oo lol,833 26,7oo 28,683 88,500 73,15o 1) Including power lines and Industrial Construction sites. 2) Except Central for Forest Exploitation. ROMAN IA FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT COSTS OF REHABILITATION OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMIENT INDUSTRY, MINING AND POWER SECTORS ('000 Lei ) Ministry Total Machinery Equipment Actual Estimated Actual Estimated Actual stimate TOTAL INDUSTRY, MINING & POWER 1,350,170 1,266,858 1,055,970 974,53o 294,2oo 292,328 SECTORS A. INDUSTRY 1,122,170 896,698 938,270 775,22o 183,9oo 121,478 1. Forest Industry & Building Materials 1) 494,72o 314,73o 316,32o 199,73o 178,4oo 115,ooo 2. Light Industry 199,7oo 185,ooo 199,7oo 185,ooo - - 3. Chemicals 373,250 339,7oo 373,25o 339,7oo - - 4. Heavy Machinery ) 27,ooo 28,loo 27,ooo * 28,loo - - 5. Machine Tools & Electrotechnics ) 6. Industrial Construction 27,5oo 24,668 22,ooo 18,19o 5,50o 6,478 7. Metallurgy 4,500 - 4,500 - - B. 8. Mining, Petroleum & Geology 122.7oo 2o1,79o 47,5oo 95.94o 75,2oo 105,85o 3. 9. Power 1o5,3oo 168,l7o 7,20 l,o 35,loo 65,ooo 1) Excluding Central for Forest Exploitation. Source: Investment Bank Industrial Projects Department January 19, 1979 - 55 - ANNEX VTI ROMANIA FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT PROCUREENT SUMMARY Value (US$ million) % Romania 11.70 58.5 Germany 3.30 16.5 Austria 1.50 7.5 Italy 0.70 3.5 Switzerland 0.50 2.5 France 0.50 2.5 Japan 0.50 2.5 Yugoslavia 0.40 2.0 United States 0.30 1.5 Belgium 0.20 1.0 Netherlands 0.10 0.5 Sweden 0.10 0.5 UK 0.09 0.5 Spain 0.04 0.2 Denmark 0.04 0.2 Guatemala 0.03 0.1 20.00 100.0 Source: IBRD Industrial Projects Department April 10, 1979 ROMANIA - FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT PRODUCTION PLAN FOR ALL AFFECTED ENTERPRISES - Lei million - 1975 1977 Planned Achieved Planned Achieved Production Production Production Production I.Ministry of Machinery Building Industry 1. Mediag "Automecanica" Enterprise 1,715.o 1,758.8 3,o78.5 3,168.8 2. Mediag Screws Enterprise 131.o 135.6 205.0 213.9 3. Sinaia Fine Mechanics Enterprise 707.7 723.6 764.o 841.7 4. Ploie§ti Chemical Equipment Enterprise 1,544.o 1,561.8 1,742.3 1,768.8 5. Tirgovipte Oil Equipment Enterprise 1,283.o 1,288.o 1,8o4.o 1,843.5 6. Moreni "Automecanica" Enterprise 825.o 834.o N.A. N.A. 7. Rimnicu Vilcea Chemical Equipment and Forge 227.o 23o.3 516.o 532.4 8. Sibiu "Independenta" Enterprise 1,276.o 1,190.8 1,31o.o 1,336.6 9. ReVita Machinery Building Enterprise 2,55o.5 2,551.5 2,94o.o 3,o43.9 lo. Bucuresti "Timpuri Noi" Enterprise 479.5 48o.o 634.o 64o.7 11. Bucuxreti Agricultural Machines Enterprise "Semln,toarea" 1,844.o 1,848.7 1,952.o 2,ol8.1 12. Reghin Metallurgical Enterprise 186.o 212.4 4o5.o 422.0 13. CluJ "Tehnofrig" Enterprise 501.5 5o3.1 555.o 578.o 14. Bucuregti Special,Industrial Construction and Erection Enterprise 84.5 116.9 1o9.5 141.9 15. Turda "Electroceramica" Enterprise 24o.o 253.7 263.o 263.1 16. Tirgu Mureq "Electromureo" Enterprise 1,297.6 1,3o2.9 1,827.o 1,877.4 17. Gle§ti Refrigerators Enterprise 697.o 713.2 643.o 664.9 0 1 2 3 4 18. Titu Installation Electrical Apparatus Enterprise 502.5 474.4 57o.o 603.3 19. Curtea de Argeo Passive Electronic ) Components Enterprise ( 2o. Curtea de Argeg "Electroargeo" Enterprise 6o7.o 614.7 47o.4 536.6 21. Urziceni Ferrites Enterprise 114.o 117.7 94.o 96.4 22. Blaj Accessories for Machine Tools 68.o 71.5 122.o 124.9 Enterprise 23. Plopeni Mechanics Enterprise N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 24. Cugir Mechanics Enterprise N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 25. Tirgoviite "Romlux" Enterprise 315,3 227.2 489,o 491.2 26. Bucuregti Electrical Machines Enterprise 1,430.4 1,409.2 1,641.o 1,689.o 27. Buzlu Technological Equipment Enterprise 737.o 741.4 l,o24.o 1,057.4 28. Ploiegti "l Mai" Enterprise 1,621.o 1,642.o 2,131.0 2,177.0 II. Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 1. Aiud Metallurgical Enterprise 63o.o 644.o 1,ooo.o 1,o25.6 2. Bragov "RAslritul" Enterprise 152.o 162.1 166.8 182.1 3. Turda "9 Mail" Enterprise 54.7 56.3 75.8 92.6 0 1 2 3 4 III. Ministry of Chemical Industry 1. Rimnicu Vilces Chemical Plant 2,854.4 1,387.3 2,571.5 2,582.5 2. Govora Soda Products Plant 92o.o 796.5 1,074.9 1,133.o 3. Flgirag Chemical Plant 1,265.o 1,308.5 1,484.o 1,604.6 4. Pite9ti Petrochemical Plant 8,607.7 4,93o.o 9,222.6 9,237.4 5. Vales Cg1uglreassc Fertilizer Plant 1,o61.1 917.1 1,11o.o 1,112.6 6. Gkegti Chemical Equipment Enterprise 272.7 2o2.2 292.o 387.5 7. Copga Mick "Carbosin" Enterprise 3o2.o 191.7 3o2.o 3ol.3 8. Brazi Petrochemical Plant 7,249.9 7,7o5.9 6,431.5 6,594.8 9. Victoria Chemical Plant l,oo6.o 844.o 1,373.1 1,384.3 lo. Timigoara "Solventul" Enterprise 1,014.3 751.2 934.o 969.3 11. Bucuregti "Danubiana" Tyre Enterprise 2,254.o 2,o63.3 2,o66.1 2,o76.8 12. Flore§ti "Victoria" Tyre Enterprise 1,488.8 1,239.8 1,931.o 1,948.3 13. PiteDti Rubber Technical Goods 944.2 967.o 1.126.5 1.171.3 14. Bucure§ti Plastics Processing Enterprise 713.7 597.3 786.o 8o3.o 15. BuzXu Plastics Processing Enterprise l,o43.8 895.7 1,2oo.1 1,271.1 16. Iagi Plastics Processing Enterprise 1,125.7 921.1 1,155.9 1,170.7 17. Tirnlveni Chemical Plant 1,566.1 1,566.8 1,455.8 1,472.7 18. Turda Chemical Enterprise 216.o 226.8 345.7 384.2 19. PAgArao Chemical Equipment Enterprise 823.o 821.6 963,o 1,o45.5 M F4 0 1 2 3 4 IV. Ministry of Electrical Energy 1. Bucureoti Electrical Energy Distribution Enterprise 1,164.6 1,167.4 963,o 967.7 2. Bucureqti Power Lines Enterprise 883.5 893,6 845.6 848.9 3. Bra§ov Power Lines Enterprise 611.4 613.1 508.1 527.7 4. Cluj Power Lines Enterprise 736.3 737.5 645.3 647.7 5. Craiova Power Lines Enterprise 956.7 950.9 743.o 749.4 6. Pite9ti Power Lines Enterprise 1,986.4 1,8o4.8 1,677.o 1,678.1 7. Ploieqti Power Lines Enterprise 1,o99.4 1,103.4 1,361.8 1,362.3 8. Sibiu Power Lines Enterprise 380.3 385.1 400.2 4oo.4 9. Timigoara Power Lines Enterprise 7o1.6 702.7 73o.6 732.9 lo. Deva Electro-stations Enterprise 1,897.4 1,966.o 1,551.6 1,612.2 11. Murey Electro-stations Enterprise 1,692.1 1,825.3 1,371.1 1,476.7 12. Bucuregti Hydroenergetic Buildings Trust 2,178.4 2,143.1 2,469.6 2,477.o 13. Bucuregti "Electromontaj" Trust 1,842.4 1,846.o 1,82o.8 1,824.2 V. Ministry of Industrial Construction 1. Constanta Industrial Construction Trust 786.5 786.7 968.4 973.6 2. Bucureqti Induttrial Construction Trust 916.5 917.o 1,119.4 1,121.3 3. Bragov Industrial Construction Trust 565.7 542.7 739.5 743.8 4. Iagi Industrial Construction Trust 496.7 494.8 992.6 998.8 5. Cluj Industrial Construction Trust 575.1 594.7 1,ol2.7 1,o38.5 6. Timigoara Industrial Construction Trust 427.7 356.1 465.1 466.7 7. Craiova Industrial Construction Trust 549.6 550.3 880.8 885.o 8. Bucureqti Agrozootechnic Construction Trust 9o3.7 935.1 953.4 954.5 lbt 1-4 F-4 0 1 2 3 4 9. Bucuregti Industrial Works Isolation Trust 549.3 549.4 815.1 826.9 lo. Bucuregti Installation-Erection Trust 662.4 665.1 61o.4 613.7 11. Bra§ov Installation-Erection Trust 386.9 384.2 465.9 469.6 12. Iagi Installation-Erection Trust 329.2 331.3 484.5 485.1 13. Pitei'ti Industrial Construction Trust 572.9 484.3 515.1 516.8 14. Gh.Gheorghiu Dej Industrial Construction Trust 581.6 582.4 87o.9 874.o 15. Cluj Chemical Construction Trust 295.5 289.5 514.4 516.9 16. Ploie§ti Industrial Construction Trust 452.8 455.o 486.9 489.o 17. Bucure§ti Special Works Trust 497.9 469.7 473.3 475.3 18. Bucureqti Chemical Equipment Erection Trust 1,529.o 1,509.9 1,569.3 1,575.7 19. Bucureqti Metallic Construction (prefabri- cated) Enterprise 739.3 783.8 484.4 53o.5 2o. Bucuregti Industrial Construction Mechanization Central 1,375.6 1,447.2 1,532.0 1,693.7 VI. Ministry of Mining,Petroleum and Geology a 0 1. Cgpeni Mining Enterprise 156.o 173.9 187.o 218.5 2. Motru Mining Enterprise 681.6 732.o 8o3.4 8o8.2 3. Ploie5ti Coal Combine 335.9 349.2 4o7.3 478.o 4. Cimpulung Muscel Mining Enterprise 22o.6 221.1 245.o 253.3 5. Petrogani Mining Exploitation direct subordonated to Central 2,523.9 2,58o.5 2,679.o 2,689.4 6. Voivozi Mining Enterprise 271.5 289.8 3ol.2 316.4 7. Baia de Arieg Mining Enterprise 265.7 33o.5 29o.5 34.2 8. Moldova Noul Mining Enterprise 352.6 365.3 403.2 427.8 0 1 2 3 4 9. Teliuc inferior Kining Enterprise 441.8 484.1 433.6 513.2 lo. Bocga Mining Enterprise 1o9.o 125.4 12o.1 126.4 11. Crtacior Mining Enterprise 156.o 168.o 2o4.o 223.3 12. Deva Mining Exploitation direct subordonated to Central 289.4 332.7 229.0 344.6 13. Coppa Mick Non-ferrous Metal Metallurgical Enterprise 2,497.8 2,243.5 2,483.4 2,487.9 14. Zlatna Non-ferrous Metal Metallurgical Enterprise 967.9 989.3 1,o33.6 1,o78.9 15. Gura Humorului Mining Combine 552.9 535.2 574.7 593.2 16. Baia Mare Non-ferrous Metal Metallurgical Enterprise 5,118.4 5,155.4 5,178.1 5,259.0 17. Cluj Mining Combine 5o4.5 553.4 526.7 547.8 18. Constanta Mining Enterprise 262.2 276.1 291.5 33o.6 19. Miercurea Ciuc Mining Enterprise 85.9 88.1 111.o 118.o 2o. Rimnicu Vilcea Mining Enterprise 124.4 124.9 141.8 155.9 21. Ocna Mureq Salt-mine 53.8 57.2 69.5 74.8 22. Praid Salt-mine 17.o 18.7 2o.5 22.7 I- 23. Slnic Salt-mine 47.2 50.1 52.o 57.8 24. Dej Salt-mine 26.4 28.7 26.5 28.9 25. Orgova Mining Enterprise 64.9 70.6 71.4 76.3 26. Alba lulia Mining Equipment and Repairs Plant 101.6 lo3.2 116.o 127.o 27. Mediag Natural Gas Central 5,352.3 5,394.3 5,586.4 5,793.o 28. Pite§ti Oil Trust 722.1 734.6 752.6 771.7 29. PloieUti Oil Trust 751.1 776.o 795.o 838.8' 30. Bolintin Vale Oil Trust 1,255.4 1,272.9 1,2o8.1 1,2o9.3 00D t~ 0 1 2 3 4 31. Cimpina Electrical Equipment Repairs Enterprise 214.2 22o.7 254.2 263.2 32. Bucure;,ti Drilling and Special Geologycal Works Enterprise 74.3 88.5 98.5 107.9 33. Bucureti Construction-Erection Trust 58.9 63.3 1o8.o 129.9 ( see foot-note ) VII. Ministry of Light Industry 1. Bucurerti "Cotton Industry" Enterprise 174.1 175.9 342.2 348.9 2. Bucure§ti "Jute Industry" Enterprise 355.2 362.2 656.o 674.3 3. Bucure'ti "Borangicul" 8ilk Weaving Mill 92.9 9o.6 152.2 155.7 4. Buftea Wadding Enterprise 16o.2 16o.2 308.5 308.6 5. Baloteeti "Textila" Enterprise 246.o 219.2 373.9 388.6 6. Alba lulia Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - - lo.o lo.6 7. Alba Iulia "Ardeleana" Footwear Enterprise lo.5 105.1 158.o 169.5 8. Alba lulia China Enterprise 86.2 92.2 154.o 167.6 9. Arad "Tricoul Ro§u" Knitwear Enterprise 365.7 320.7 5o7.1 535.6 lo. Arad "Libertatea" Footwear Enterprise 169.5 171.2 249.9 271.6 11. Pitegti ".extila" Enterprise 661.o 662.5 1,179.5 1,2o6.o 12. Cet4teni "Musceleanca" Weaving Mill 99.2 99.8 156.5 163.9 13. Curtea de ArgeQ Ready-made Clothes Enterprise 77o.o 783.6 558.7 578.7 14. Curtea de Argeg China Enterprise 5o.5 57.4 134.9 146.7 15. Pite9ti Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - Note: Geologycal Prospection and Exploration Enterprises within Ministry of Mining, Petroleum and Geology have not production plan. 0 1 2 3 4 16. Bistrita "Netex" Enterprise 161.o 165.1 197.9 2o2.o 17. Bistrita Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - - - 18. Brao:ov Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - - - 19. Buzgu Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - - - 2o. Caransebeg Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - - - 21. Cluj Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - - 2,3oo.o 2,533.o 22. Turda Glass Enterprise ?39.7 258.1 317.o 339.7 23. Pucioasa "Textila BUcegi" Enterprise 432.o 397.6 786.o 809.4 24. Odorhei Thread Enterprise 317.o 32o.8 584.0 6o7.1 25. Gheorghieni Flax Spinning Mill 2o6.o 198.2 291.o 296.3 26. Odorheiul Secuiesc Ready made Clothes Enterprise 5o4.o 5o7.8 4oo.5 404.7 ON 27. Miercurea Ciuc Ready-made Clothes Enterprise 47o.o 472.6 3o9.9 311.1 28. Hunedoara Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise o.6 o.6 - - 29. Sighi§oara Cotton Weaving Mill 96.2 83.1 128.5 132.1 3o. Sighi*oara Silk Weaving Mill 117.4 loo.5 12o.o 125.6 31. Sighigoara LWool Weaving Mill 131.o 113.9 1,593.o 1,594.6 Mill 00 <i 0 1 2 3 4 32. Sighitioara "Tirnava" Ready-made Clothes Enterprise 614.o 614.6 501.8 522.9 33. Sighi§oara China Enterprise 237.7 241.7 285.7 294.3 34. Tirgu Mureo Fur Enterprise 3o4.o 311.5 501.5 515.2 35. Tirniveni WindowmGlass Enterprise 176.o 177.7 2o6.8 215.o 36. Tirgu Mure§ "Imatex" Enterprise 337.0 306.9 355.0 374.6 37. Cimpine Stockings Enterrpise 112.4 lo3.1 114.1 114.1 38. Vileni Silk Weaving Mill 6.3 6.5 114.o 119.9 39. VIleni Sand Quarry 44.9 45.2 69.9 71.1 4o. MediaQ "Textila Tirnava" Enterprise 198.8 162.2 351.5 366.o 41. Cienrdie "Textila" Enterprise 831.o 84o.9 1,927.3 1,949.o 42. Mediag "8 Mai" Skin and Footwear Enterprise 338.o 34o.5 48o.o 487.4 43. Agnita Skin and Footwear Enterprise 21o.1 228.6 266.o 269.6 44. Mediag "Vitrometan" Glass Enterprise 211.4 222.1 258.o 283.9 45. Mediag "Emailul Rogu" Enterprise 434.o 392.o 655.o 665.6 46. Sibiu Preindustrialization and Acquisition Enterprise - VIII.Ministry of Forest Industry and Building Materials 1. Sebeg Wood Processing Combine 153.5 149.2 -,156.9 16o.o 2. Sebeg Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 155.5 158.3 216.o 218.3 3. Cimpeni Wood Processing Enterprise 61.5 65.3 135.4 14o.8 4. Arad Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 2o5.o 211.3 3o9.8 322.7 5. Cimpulung Muscel Binders Combine 378.5 365.1 452.9 46o.7 0 1 2 3 4 6. Pitegti Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterrpise 645.5 661.7 922.4 948.o 7. Bac4u Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 4o8.o 411.4 542.2 571.8 8. Oradea Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterrpise 161.o 163.6 258.4 275.6 9. BistriVa Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 241.o 245.1 396.4 43o.8 lo. Bra§ov Wood Processing Combine 373.3 373.3 396.2 402.2 11. Braqov Binders Enterprise 126.o 129.3 147.9 157.3 12. Bragov Building Materials Enterprise 173.5 177.7 233.o 235.5 13. Brapov Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterrpise 211.5 214.3 317.o 328.9 14. Buzgu Building Materials Enterrpise 149.6 157.9 2ol.8 205.5 15. Nehoiu Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 213.o 214.o 352.0 372.3 16. Caransebeg Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterrpise 366.8 37o.o 53o.8 556.o 17. Gherla Wood Processing Combine 196.6 197.1 246.4 254.9 18. Turda Binders and Refractory Materials Combine 667.9 694.5 667.6 712.3 19. Turda Building Materials Enterprise 554.5 557.2 654.6 693.3 2o. Cluj Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 169.o 172.5 222.o 231.6 21. Constants Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 118.1 12o.4 275.2 279.8 22. Tirgu Secuiesc Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 274.7 276.8 384.o 39o.6 0 1 2 3 4 23. Fieni Binders and Asbocement Combine 494.o 488.o 62o.o 647.1 24. Craiova Concrete Prefabricates Enterprise 191.5 191.6 212.5 216.6 25. TIrgu Jiu Binders and Asbocement Combine 86o.o 876.5 891.0 899..7 26, Tirgu Jiu Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 266.3 27o.3 4o3.1 411.4 27. Miercurea Ciuc Wood Processing Combine 22o.9 218.6 352.3 357.6 28. Miercurea Ciuc Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 374.5 386.6 644.o 68o.4 29. Toplita Wood Processing Combine 385.o 394.o 462.o 480.3 30. Deva Building Materiali Enterprise 236.5 241.6 379.o 4o8.o 31. Deva Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 218.2 223.1 3o5.o 314.6 32. Iai Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 128.5 129.1 150.1 155.7 33. Iagi Wood Processing Combine 268.5 269.1 297.8 3o5.3 34. Bucureqti Wood Exploitation Central 8,632.o 8,86o.7 12,718.2 13,324.3 35. Baia Mare Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 477.5 496.8 626.5 662.7 36. Turnu Severin Wood Processing Combine 3o4.3 31o.4 380.5 387.3 37. Or§ova Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 96.o 96.7 131.o 133.8 38. Reghin Wood Processing Enterrpise 321.o 324.4 359.1 366.3 39. Tirgu MureQ Wood Processing Enterp:ise 439.4 444.8 319.o 332.9 4o. Sighigoara Ceramics Products Enterprise lo2.3 lo6.2 189.1 2o9.7 41. Reghin Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 258.6 268.2 425.o 453.2 09t~ 0 1 2 3 4 42. Piatra Neamt Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 923.1 954.5 1,285.7 1,375.9 43. Mizil Tapestry Materials Enterprise 297.o 3ol.6 329.8 33o.8 44. Bucov "1 Mai" Building Materials Enterprise 95.4 loo.6 139.7 152.8 45. PloieQti.Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 245.5 249.9 355.o 361.7 46. Satu Mare Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 193.5 2oo.3 242.5 248.3 47. Sibiu Wood Processing Enterprise 159.9 161.8 228.8 236.o 48. Ceramics Products Enterprise - Sibiu 38.2 43.4 87.7 9o.5 49. Sibiu Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 175.5 178.9 24o.6 242.1 So. Suceava Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 1,152.5 1,214.3 1,795.5 1,917.1 51. Timi;oara Wood Processing Enterprise 241.3 241.4 339.9 34o.6 52. Timi.oara Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 93.o 95.8 158.o 165.7 53. Rimnicu Viloea Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 247.5 249.2 316.o 337.2 54. Foceani Exploitation and Transport Forestry Enterprise 134.o 137.9 2o9.o 215.2 55. Bucureoti Wood Processing Combine 62o.6 62o.8 679.8 682.o Note: The production data for 1975 are in 1963's comparable prices, and for 1977 are in 1977's current prices. Source: Investment Bank Industrial Projects Department January 19, 1979 H
Groupe de la Banque mondiale · Project Performance Assessment Report
Romania - Flood Recovery Project
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Project Performance Assessment Report
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