Senegal - Terres Neuves Resettlement Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FILE COPY Report No. 2589 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT (Credit 254-SE) June 29, 1979 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 kilometer (km) - 0.62 mile I hectare (ha) - 2.47 acres 1 kilogram (kg) - 2.2 pounds 1 metric ton (ton) - 2,204 pounds 1,000 kg/ha - 892 lbs/acre ABBREVIATIONS CFDT - Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles (Cotton Development Agency) FAC - Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (French Aid Fund) ONCAD - Office National de Cooperation et d'Assistance pour le Developpement (Cooperative Development and Marketing Board) ORSTOM - Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre Mer (French Overseas Research Agency) SATEC - Societe d'Aide Technique et de Cooperation (French para-public consulting firm) SODEFITEX - Societe pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles (Senegalese Cotton Development Agency, successor to CFDT) STN - Societe des Terres Neuves (Resettlement Agency) WFP - World Food Program (Programme Alimentaire Mondial) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 254-SE) Table of Contents Page Preface i Basic Data Sheet ii Disbursement Table 11 Highlights iv PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. Summary I II. Main Issues 4 A. Reflections on the Pilot Nature of the Project 4 B. Settlement and Infrastructure Policy 6 C. Farm Models and Extension Services 8 D. Farmer Organizations 11 E. Role of Women in the Project 12 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Background 13 II. Preparation and Appraisal 14 III. Implementation 20 IV. Institutional Development 25 V. Agricultural Impact 27 VI. Financial and Economic Results 30 VII. Special Issues 35 VIII. Government and Bank Performance 40 Annex 1 - General Information 42 Annex 2 - Physical Progress and Cost 46 Annex 3 - Financial Results 52 Annex 4 - Economic Analysis 56 Map This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performa3nce of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 254-SE) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the Terres Neuves Resettlement Project in Senegal for which Credit 254-SE was approved in May 1971 in the sum of US$1.35 million. The final disbursement of this credit was made on February 27, 1978 and US$ 1,900 was cancelled on March 31, 1978. The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department and a Project Completion Report dated December 19, 1978. The PCR was prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office on the basis of a country visit in October 1977. The audit memorandum is based on a review of the Appraisal Report (No. PA-73a) dated April 8, 1971, the President's Report (P-923) of April 29, 1971, the Credit Agreement dated June 18, 1971 and the PCR; correspondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in relevant Bank files have also been consulted and Bank staff associated with the project have been interviewed. An OED mission visited Senegal in November 1978. The mission held discussions with officials of the Ministries of Rural Development, Plan and Cooperation as well as from the Terres Neuves Corporation. A field trip to visit participating farmers was undertaken. The informa- tion obtained during that mission was used to test the validity of the conclusions of the PCR and permitted discussion of farmer organization aspects and the role of women in the project. A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower on May 4, 1979. No comments have been received. Project management prepared a completion report which gives the project's history and an outlook of likely future developments. The Region however, considered the report was not sufficiently analytical and used its material in preparing the Bank PCR; there are no differences in view between the PPAR and the project management document. The audit finds the PCR comprehensive and accurate with respect to the project's principal achievements and shortcomings. The points discussed by the audit mission have been selected because of their importance to this as well as other rural development projects in West Africa. The valuable assistance provided by the Government of Senegal, project staff and the farmers visited during the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged.  PROJECT PERFOWMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 254-SE) REY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 1.55 1.72 Overrun (%) - . 11 Credit amount (US$ million) 1.35 LI 1.35 L Disbursed )- 1.35 Cancelled )12.31.1978 0.002 Repaid to ) Outstanding to ) * -- 1.26 /1 Date for Completion of Physical Components 1976 1976 Proportion Completed by Appraisal Target Date (Z) -- 100% Proportion of Time Overrun (%) -- -- Incremental Economic Rate. of Return 13% 592 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Current Estimate First Mention in Files or Timetable -- . - 01/03/69 Government's Application -- -- 01/03/69 Negotiations 03/04/71 03/10/71 Board Approval 04/20/71 05/11/71 Credit Agreement Date 06/18/71 06/18/71 Effectiveness Date 10/01/71 12/01/71 01/31/72 Closing Date 12/31/77 03/31/78 03/31/78'/ Borrower Republic of Senegal Executing Agency Societe des Terres Neuves Fiscal Year of Borrower July 1 - June 30 Follow-on Project Name Terres Neuves II Credit Number 578-S-7 Amount (US$ million) 2.0 Credit Agreement Date 08/06/7! MISSION DATA No. of No. of Date of Item Month,Year Weeks Persons Manweeks Report Preparation April 1969 2 2 4 04/30/69 Appraisal Feb. 1970 4 3 12 08/15/70 Appraisal II Sept. 1970 3 4 12 04/08/71 Total 28 Supervision I July*1971 1 1 1 08/25/71 Supervision II Jan. 1972 1 1 1 02/29/72 Supervision III May 1972 2 2 4 06/05/72 Supervision IV Sept 1972 2 2 4 11/07/72 Supervision V Jan. 1973 1 1 1 02/14/73 Supervision VI Sept 1973 1 3 3 11/26/73 Supervision VII April 1974 1 1 1 06/27/74 Supervision VIII Feb. 1975 2 3 6 04/07/75 Supervision IX Nov. 1975 4 1 4 03/05/76 Supervision X Sept 1976 2 1 2 10/29/76 Supervision XI April 1977 2 1 2 06/17/77 Sub-total 29 Completion Oct. 1977 2 2 4 COUNTRY EXCHLANCE RATES Name of currency (Abbreviation) Communaite Financiere Africaine Franc (CFAF) Year: Appraisal Year Average Exchange Rate: US$1 - CFAF 278 Intervening Years Average US$1 - CFAF 237 Completion Year Average US$1 = CFAF 245 1 US$100.000 financed by BROT FUR DIE WLT. /7Plus exchangu adjustrwnt of US$0.2 million, where applicable.  SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT (Credit 254-SE) Disbursement Table (US$ million, cumulative) Appraisal Actual Actual as % Period ending Estimate Disbursement of Estimated 06/30/1972 0.18 0.03 17 12/31/1972 0.30 0.11 37 06/30/1973 0.41 0.28 68 12/31/1973 0.63 0.43 69 06/30/1974 0.54 0.45 83 12/31/1974 0.72 0.72 100 06/30/1975 0.85 0.83 98 12/31/1975 0.92 1.03 112 06/30/1976 1.04 1.19 114 12/31/1976 1.13 1.20 106 06/30/1977 1.22 1.21 99 12/31/1977 1.35 1.35 100  - iv - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 254-SE) HIGHLIGHTS The Terres Neuves Resettlement Project provided funds for the resettlement of about 300 families from the Groundnut Basin to unexploited land in Eastern Senegal. Other objectives of the project were the provi- sion of basic facilities and services to 250 established farmers in the project area to improve production of groundnuts, cotton and sorghum. The project succeeded in reaching a much larger number of the rural population than anticipated at appraisal. Average yields and farmer incomes also exceeded appraisal projections. The follow-on proj- ect (Credit 578-SE) continues the settlement of farm families but no longer on large blocks of land and due to the popularity of the scheme, with reduced incentives to new settlers. The economic rate of return has been recalculated at 59% considerably above the appraisal estimate of 13%. Points of special interest are: - provision of basic infrastructure contributes to rendering resettlement more attractive to rural population (PPAM paras. 12 and 13); - extension efforts did not focus on some apparent production problems (PPAM paras. 23 to 26 and 33; PCR para. 2.11); - by shifting to different cropping patterns farmers show more flexibility in following market forces than anticipated (PPAM paras. 20, 24 and 26; PCR paras. 5.01, 5.03 and 6.02); - inadequate efforts to organize settlers for more self administration (PPAM paras. 27 to 29); and - Bank's insufficient socio-economic knowledge especially in regard to women's role in the project becomes apparent (PPAM paras. 12, 13 and 30 to 33).  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT.MEMORANDUM SENEGAL - TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 254-SE) SUMMARY -/ 1. The project was identified by Government in 1968, prepared by the consulting firm SATEC in 1969 and appraised twice, in February and September 1970. The Credit Agreement (Cr. 254-SE) was signed on June 18, 1971, and it became effective on January 31, 1972. The project fitted into Government's then evolving strategy, with which the Bank concurred, of diversifying agricultural investments out of the Ground- nut Basin and out of groundnuts. Its broad objective was to foster the settlement, over perhaps 15 years, of some 6,000 families from the Groundnut Basin in Eastern Senegal through the controlled develop- ment of unexploited land. Its main specific objective was the organized settlement, as a pilot operation, of 300 families; other objectives were the provision of facilities and services to 250 established farmers in the vicinity of the pilot settlements; and introduction of intensive farming techniques and diversified crop production. 2. The appraisal estimate of net-of-tax project cost was CFAF 430 million or US$1.55 million at the prevailing exchange rate; IDA was to finance US$1.35 million. Actual project costs were CFAF 407 million or 5% less than the appraisal estimate. In current US dollars, actual project costs amounted to US$1.72 million; IDA's contribution remained unchanged, its share of net-of-tax costs declined from 87% at appraisal to 77%, but Government readily made up the gap of about US$200,000. 3. The 300 families were settled as scheduled, by mid-1974. Construction of roads, wells and warehouses, and mechanical land clearing were completed on schedule. Although the drinking water supply was erratic until early 1975, the school did not become operational until 1976 and the dispensary was not built until 1977, only two settler families abandoned the project and returned to the departure zone. Settlers' net incomes including subsistence were estimated at appraisal to reach US$670/family at full development, in the eighth year after arrival. Actual incomes have fluctuated widely with variations in rainfall; following the good rains of 1975 actual incomes in 1970 constant prices were US$1,120/family in 1975/76, but fell to US$630 in 1976/77 after the poor rains of 1976. Nevertheless, average incomes by about the fifth year of the project were already much higher than appraisal estimates at full development, the main reason being that the cultivated area per adult family member grew rapidly; by 1974/75, it was 65% higher than envisaged at appraisal. Yields of the main crops, groundnuts and sorghum, were also slightly above appraisal estimates. 1/ Adapted from the PCR. -2- 4. Project activities for established farmers were estimated to, and did, account for only 10% of project costs. Throughout the project life, but particularly in the first three years, project management con- centrated its efforts on its main task -- settlement. Established farmers'l/ net incomes including subsistence were estimated at appraisal to increase from US$550/family to US$710 by the tenth year of the project. By 1974/75, the only year for which reliable data are available on estab- lished farmers, their actual incomes in 1970 constant prices were US$950/family. Since rainfall in 1974 was about normal, incremental income by the third year of the project was already much higher than the appraisal estimate for the tenth project year. This result cannot, however, be properly attributed to the project in view of the scant attention, at least through 1974, paid by project management to established farmers; rather, the result indicates the magnitude of incomes that can be obtained by farmers in this part of Eastern Senegal with very little Government assistance. 5. Project design was based on the suppositions that spontaneous settlement entailed soil deterioration and "over-concentration" on ground- nuts. It was argued that settlement should be controlled in order to introduce intensive farming techniques and more diversified crop production. These goals were to be met through an obligatory uniform farm plan as well as improved services, of input supply, credit, marketing and extension. Although those services were provided, farmers have systematically refused to adopt the uniform farm plan because of better returns on groundnuts than on cotton. In practice, settlers' cropping patterns are no more or less diversified than those of established farmers, some of whom are recent, spontaneous, unassisted migrants; settlers use of crop inputs and improved techniques is more intensive than that of established farmers but much less than envisaged at appraisal. The emphasis, in project design, put upon avoidance of soil deterioration is correct; and the apparent over-concen- tration on groundnuts was simply a response to price signals transmitted by Government's pricing policy. 6. Although its establishment was a condition of effectiveness, the settlement agency (Societe des Terres Neuves - STN) was to have no executive responsibility, since project management was to be contracted out. During the first two years of project execution, STN had no permanent staff and no facilities. The Board of Directors did, however, meet regularly and gave guidance and support to the project manager. Shortly after STN acquired a full-time Director General in early 1974, the management contract with CFDT 2/ was terminated and STN became directly responsible for project management. The change-over took place without 1/ Established farmers, i.e. farmers living in the project area as opposed to the settlers. 2/ Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles. - 3 - proper preparation, but the Bank considered that the development phase of the project had been completed with the installation of the third and last group of settlers by mid 1974 and that STN would be able to manage the project thereafter; despite some initial accounting and budgeting problems, this judgment has been borne out in practice. STN is now satisfactorily managing the follow-up project. 7. For the settlement program, which constituted over 90% of project costs net of studies, the estimated economic rate of return at appraisal, with all farm labor valued at zero, was 12.5% over 25 years. This rate would have fallen to 9.7% when the appraisal calculation is adjusted to provide for (a) a higher share of overheads allocated to the settlement program and (b) lagging benefits by one year, as would have been more appropriate. The comparable actual rate of return is now estimated at 33% at 1970 constant prices and 37% at 1977 prices; the former measures the physical performance of the project vis-a-vis the appraisal estimate. These high returns are an apparent economic confirmation of the impressive physical and financial results of the project. The valuation of all farm labor at zero is a critical assumption justified, at appraisal, on the ground that land vacated by settler families in the departure zone would, because of land pressure there, be taken over immediately and cultivated by other farmers; although this has probably happened, zero valuation of labor opportunity cost requires other conditions to be met, and it is not clear that they have been (see PCR para. 6.07). On balance, however, the likeli- hood is that the particular people who migrated under the project would not have done so in the absence of the project, and that other prospective spontaneous settlers would not have been dissuaded from migrating because of the project; but it is also likely, by contrast, that settlers would have migrated with fewer inducements. 8. Although the project was undertaken as a pilot operation which was to lead to large-scale settlement, the question of the merits of different methods of providing public assistance to prospective settlers was not clearly addressed during preparation and appraisal. In effect, the project tested only one, high-cost method of settlement; the st 0 ctly settlement costs per family were US$4,100 (US$5,600 at 1977 prices)- . Further, the method adopted required blocks of land of about 1,250 ha per settler village. The availability of such blocks of land has subsequently been found to be very limited and the method not replicable on a large scale. These conclusions were reached by the mission that appraised the follow-up project. The mission proposed, as an alternative to a further small project in organized settlement, an overall agricultural development project to cover the whole of one of the three administrative districts of Eastern Senegal Province. This proposal was rejected by Government who suggested that, in addition to further organized settlement in the few 1/ CPS refers to Table 2, Annex I of the Bank Issues Paper "Agricultural Land Settlement" (Jan. 1978) which shows a settlement cost of US$5,600 per family (1977 prices) at the lower end of the acceptable cost range. available blocks of land, the follow-up project should include prepara- tion of an integrated development project for Eastern Senegal Province. This was the essence of the project that became effective in 1975 and is currently over half completed. The follow-up project removed any preten- sion to further replication of organized settlement on large blocks of land, provided for pilot settlement in existing villages, and reduced some of the incentives to be offered to settlers. II. MAIN ISSUES A. Reflections on the Pilot Nature of the Project 9. The principal aim of the project was to experiment, on a small scale (300 families) with a land-settlement policy of broad scope that would help to reduce congestion in the Groundnut Basin and contribute to the development of Eastern Senegal. 10. The PCR takes a negative attitude regarding the achievement of this objective because it does not consider the project to have been genuinely experimentallyince it tested only one, high-cost method of settlement (Summary 8)- . In addition, it is uncertain whether settlement can be developed on a large scale in face of the limited availability of suitable land with the right kind of soils and free of onchocerciasis (river blindness). For its part the project management considers it unrealistic to attempt several settlement formulas in one and the same area, as farmers may request equal treatment which would not be assured if different approaches were to be tested. It is there- fore preferable to experiment with a single formula and to adapt it consistently in the light of the results obtained. 11. For the audit mission an important aspect of the project -- besides its success at the farmer level -- is that the project has provided a continuing mechanism for monitoring and follow-up, with main emphasis on agro-economic and sociological aspects. It is possible to consistently evaluate the project impact and the reac9ons of the farmers and to draw practical conclusions for future projects- . It is only the scientific analysis made by outside researchers that gave the project an experimental character. 1/ The Region thinks that (a) insufficient attention was given during pre- paration and appraisal to encouragment of spontaneous migration and (b) that incomes obtained by established farmers with little Government assistance were high. 2/ The Region argues that the "return" from the ME exercise was marginal in the light of the costs (US$110,000). - 5 - 12. In the audit mission's judgment, neither the PCR nor the project management show awareness of certain project consequences: without realizing it and without pointing to the implications for the follow-on project, a settlement formula has been tested that is probably one of the best adapted for its purpose and which might be called triggered settlement.l/ It has financed the installation of 300 primary families (on average 7 persons per family estimated at appraisal), although some of the follow-on studies which sometimes conflict with others show that this theoretical population group has very rapidly doubled through the arrival of more family dependents.2/ Population would have grown even more rapidly if more land had been set aside at the early stages of settlement. The heaviest pressure in the old villages is now for an increase in cultivable land areas per farm unit, so that the rest of the family can move in -- a demand difficult to satisfy at present. This additional inflow of population is being brought about without special incentives and without additional expenditures. If the level of investment at the beginning of the project appears substantial in terms of the number of families, 3/ it becomes quite acceptable in relation to the total number of people actually involved. Investments in this project have also acted as the start-up costs essential to trigger larger population movements. The relative cost is progressively reduced over time due to the spon- taneous migration of more people being served by project infrastructure and would have been even lower if the project had made provision for a higher rate of population inflow. Although only limited information is available on spontaneous migration, according to local staff its heaviest concentration is in the Mereto region, where a well was sunk. 13. Two lessons can be learned from this experience. Firstly, the Bank at least during the preparation/appraisal stage of this project as well as the follow-on project, appears to have been unaware of the 1/ The Region expresses doubts on the qualification of this statement and contends that pending more surveys it is premature to reach this conclusion. 2/ At DIAGLE SINE, a village established in 1972, population increased from 273 in 1973 to 455 by 1976, an increase of 67%. By then the average family consisted of 8-10 members. Source: ISRA (Institut Senegalais de Recherche Agricole). Rapport sur le suivi agro-socio-economique de la campagne 1976-1977. May 1978. 3/ Costs which would have been increased without the project and which would have been financed by the Senegalese Government (roads, schools, health posts) should be excluded. - 6 - composition, motivation and reaction to innovations of the West African extended family.l/ With the benefit of hindsight it can be stated that a much larger number of people - in the case of this project about 25% more - can and will benefit from general agricultural development projects in many West African countries. On the other hand, incomes calculated on a per capita basis will be consequently lower than assumed at appraisal. Secondly, although average investment costs for the smaller family unit as described in the appraisal appear to be high, the additional inflow of members of the "extended" family will bring costs to more attractive levels. Increases in migration are enhanced by simple, relatively cheap investments, such as a motorized water pump in Mereto, provided additional cultivable land is also available. B. Settlement and Infrastructure Policy 14. The PCR notes (paras. 3.04 and 3.11) the difficulties encountered in providing adequate water supply systems as well as in school and dispensary construction. It emphasises that, despite these difficulties, only two families have abandoned the project (PPAM para. 3). The audit mission found that even at the end of 1978, no final solution to the infrastructure problem had been reached. 15. Experimental manually-operated pumps installed in the first four settler villages proved inadequate and settlers had, for a time, to be supplied with water by tank trucks. In 1974, the last two settler villages as well as the four existing villages were provided with open wells from which water was to be raised by buckets. Now, the two villages that have only open wells with water lifted up to 70 m complain of the excessively hard work of pumping water -- especially in comparison with their region of origin, where the ground water level is between 5 and 10 m below the surface. The four other villages were equipped, against the Bank's advice, with motorized pumps in 1975; the villagers appreciate this innovation but complain of fairly frequent stoppages, principally due to intermittent supplies of fuel oil, run-down batteries and frequent more serious breakdowns. Responsibility for maintenance of the pumps rests with the Societe des Terres Neuves (STN) for which STN receives an annual fee, revised upward each year without providing the farmers with any detailed explanation. The village has, however, some measure of responsibility in the handling of water, since one individual in each village is in charge of operating the generator and pump and of regulating the time (two hours in the morning and two hours in the 1/ Similar observations were made by OED in the Senegal - Casamance Rice Project (Credit 252-SE), Report No. 2056, May 10, 1978 and Sierra Leone - Integrated Agricultural Development Project (Credit 323-SL), Report No. 2066, May 22, 1978 and Cameroon - Semry Rice Project (Credit 302-CM), Report No. 2054, May 12, 1978. -7- evening) during which they may be used. The water is pumped into basins in which it is contaminated by impurities and parasites, a fact to which medical teams have drawn attention. With little additional cost and effort, water of a very high degree of purity could be made available either by installing taps or by introducing portable hoses, but thus far this problem has not received adequate attention. 16. The audit concludes that (i) the project was successful in intro- ducing an assured water supply - by bucket and rope extraction - in each settler village; but (ii) the provision by project management of motorized pumps in-four villages provoked resentment within those villages equipped only with open wells 1/; and (iii) the project did not succeed in arranging for the effective operation and maintenance of motorized pumps.2/ 17. As far as health and education are concerned, the project pro- vided for the construction of a school and a dispensary but the facilities which were needed to service the influx of settlers into the project area, were provided later than required. Because neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Education were consulted at either the preparatory or negotiating stages of the project, the school and dispensary were built only in 1976 and 1977 (under the second project in the case of the dispensary). Settlers joined together to pay for a teacher while waiting for the school to be built by Government. The health service, with assistance from the Progres volunteers following pressure from the population, organized health education and village pharmacies. The delay in providing improved health facilities was regrettable in light of the 1/ It should be noted that the issue hand operated vs. motorized pumps is still under debate. 2/ Without entering the debate on the merits of various pumping systems, it should be noted that the Bank paid inadequate attention to allevi- ating constraints on effective operations of motorized pumps. The best solutions for improving efficiency of motorized pumps might be (i) to prepare rules of operations for the pumps; (ii) to submit the draft rules to farmers and discuss the plan with them; and (iii) to ask them collectively to assume responsibility for the operation of the pumps. In this case fees would no longer be charged on an arbi- trarily assessed basis but would correspond to actual expenditures. They would, however, also include the cost of regular maintenance by an STN mechanic. This approach would be all the more recommendable to the extent that the generator could also be used for different purposes, for instance to power a millet mill or a small welding shop or possibly for a few lights in a meeting room. In view of the farmers' prospects for continued economic success and their high level of motivation and organization, they should now be ready to assume respon- sibility for such an experiment in partial village electrification. - 8 - high infant mortality in the six project villages, mainly from malnutri- tion, diarrhea and intestinal problems and frequent complete lack of access to a doctor or even a health assistant.l/ 18. As far as other infrastructure requirements are concerned, the project provided access roads and storage facilities on time but it was late in taking an interest in organizing cooperatives (marketing, supply of inputs and agricultural credit). It failed to make use of STN's food storage facilities to develop consumer cooperatives or promote cooperative marketing. In particular, it failed to respond to the need of settler wives to obtain millet mills: the mills had in fact been pur- chased and could in theory have been used with power from the generating equipment operating the pumps, but nevertheless they remained in storage for two years at Mereto without being tried out and were finally returned to Dakar without explanation in December 1978. 19. Both the project and the Bank failed to realize the importance of a well-formulated infrastructure policy. The economic calculations (investment costs, operating costs, durability, etc.) required to effectively choose between various types of small scale, village type equipment were not made. There were never discussions with settlers based on actual cost estimates, priorities to be determined and the implications of eventual choices. Such a discussion would have been the initial step required to prepare farmers for the progressive assump- tion of management responsibilities with regard to the infrastructure provided and the eventual establishment of farmer organizations. C. Farm Models and Extension Services 20. The PCR (para. 2.11) correctly observes that the project had to be based from the outset on a rigid and uniform farm model that would provide for a balanced rotation of various crops with the primary objective of ensuring maintenance of soil fertility. The PCR notes, however, that this model was not followed, mainly because prevailing pricing structures provided farmers with better returns on groundnuts than on cotton or food crops. The PCR concludes that this deviation from recommended cropping pattern, is not particularly regrettable as the significance of soil deterioration "is not backed by any persuasive evidence" (paras. 2.06, 5.08 and 7.05). 21. The audit finds this view on soil deterioration surprising and notes that it is in conflict with those of Senegalese agronomists and with accepted conclusions of research.2/ More specifically it conflicts 1/ ORSTOM Report on 1974/75 activities. Vol. 2, p. 71, July 1975. 2/ The Region argues that there are not yet any generally accepted con- clusions on possibilities of soil deterioration. - 9 - with the actual experience of farmers of the Groundnut Basin, particu- larly with those of settlers coming from Sine Saloun. They have already had ample experience of soil degradation and falling yields in the region from which they originated and they have no wish to repeat this. No soil deterioration has, of course, been apparent in the early years of the project, but it nonetheless constitutes a basic problem in Sahelian agriculture that must be taken seriously from the beginning even if soil conditions are more favorable in the project area than in the groundnut basin. 22. As a whole, on the basis of the agronomical surveys,l/ farmers' technical know-how and yields after two or three years are very satis- factory, particularly in the case of groundnuts and food crops. They practice soil cultivation with draft animals, use selected seeds, and fertilizers, carry out regular weeding and observe some crop rotation. Average groundnut yields reached 1570 kg/ha in 1978. The Serer farmers, having a tradition of mixed farming are keeping their livestock under cover at night and are putting the collected manure on their fields. They rent plots from local inhabitants in order to avoid the undesirable consequences of growing groundnuts twice in the same fields. 23. This generally satisfactory performance, however, conceals numerous disparities. Yields on fields of individual family members vary at a ratio of 1:8 depending on their social status within the family. It is the family that determines the date of sowing; the quality of land preparation, which in turn depends on the tools and equipment used; and the amount of work, particularly weeding, to be performed for each member. In addition the audit mission found that at farm level the gross value of output per hectare could vary from CFAF 20,000 to CFAF 50,000. 24. Despite cultivation problems the influence of the extension services has continued to be marginal. When extension responsibilities were placed in the hands of CFDT, the extension agents (two per village) who had been trained almost exclusively on cotton tried to emphasize this crop. Unfortunately, this crop was new to farmers and compared with groundnuts much more demanding in terms of labor input and subject to parasite damage. Based on average yields, returns per day worked are CFAF 300 for groundnuts and CFAF 140 for cotton. The promotion of cotton has had little success and this crop accounts for only 3% of the culti- vated area (against 20% envisaged at appraisal). Extension services have also attempted to develop farm models, explaining the importance of crop rotation and fertilization on soil fertility but did not succeed in 1/ See ORSTOM and ISRA reports. - 10 - convincing farmers to adopt the recommendations.1/ Extension also attempted to introduce maize, but so far this has not been efficiently marketed by ONCAD.2/ Most of the other technological innovations the extension services have sought to promote had already been known to farmers for many years. 25. If the extension services have so far not played a major role, they could have been more effective had they adopted different methods. There was no need to promote basic technical recommendations through inexperienced agents; what was needed were management advisors, fewer in number but better qualified. Within the existing farming system they should have concentrated on the large disparity in yields, analyzing the reasons for it in collaboration with individual family members (see para. 23 above) in order to identify constraints and demonstrate measures leading to improvement. The objective of such a policy would be to gradually increase crop yields of all farmers to the levels presently obtained only by the most progressive farmers in the upper quintile. 26. In addition, it would be necessary to go further and discuss with farmers various crop/rotation systems which would safeguard long- term soil fertility.3/ Judging from the discussions the audit mission had in some villages, there are indications that farmers are interested in this subject. Based on prior experience of Serer farmers in mixed farming, i.e. combined crop and animal husbandry, as well as farmers' understanding of problems of soil deterioration, acceptance of new farming systems seems likely. The strongly voiced desire of some families to expand their holdings to more than 10 ha or to be able to establish their sons on new farms should be made conditional on reaching agreements with farmers that they would accept certain new technologies (soil fertiliza- tion, livestock feeding, maintenance of forest areas and windbreaks). Experiments with cattle sheds mainly for the purpose of manure production and with fodder crops could be implemented simultaneously. 1/ CPS points to the difficulties in designing a farming system which may have an impact on maintaining soil fertility but works against the farmer's economic interest. 2/ Office National de Cooperation et d'Assistance pour le Developpement. 3/ CPS states that this is a basic problem of peasant agriculture especially in overpopulated areas. Guarding against environmental degradation is difficult, requiring, among other things, appropriate pricing policies, use of animal manure or fertilizers, heavy invest- ments to achieve forest and grass cover for erosion prevention and, most of all, incentives to involve the local populace in appropriate measures and their maintenance. - 11 - D. Farmer Organizations 27. Despite certain misgivings voiced by farmers because of delays in obtaining basic infrastructure (water, schools and dispensaries), relations between the authorities and the farmers have been generally good, marked by an atmosphere of confidence and a wide measure of freedom of expression on the part of the farmers. The latter are represented by their village chiefs, with village delegates attending STN meetings and a super-delegate representing the settlers on the STN board. Cooperatives are being estab- lished following the organizational structure of the societies found throughout Senegal. The farmer/authority relationship, however, continues to be one-sided, rather paternalistic in nature, and characterized by the farmers' willingness to accept in part a framework of rules imposed by the authorities. Similarly, the cooperative model continues to be imposed ready-made and is not adapted or modified to their needs by the cooperative members themselves. 28. Farmers, for their part, emphasize that STN fails to live up to its obligations, particularly in respect of regular water supplies. Only reluctantly do the settlers agree to pay water charges -- particularly as rates have been progressively rising -- and they consider that in such a situation STN should act as their representative and should assume full and effective responsibilities. They also expect STN to respond to their needs, particularly those which have to be conveyed to non project agencies (ONCAD, Seed Services, Health Services). 29. While such a paternalistic system is justifiable at the early stages of project implementation, it will not be able to sustain the settle- ment scheme without the continued support of STN, at substantial cost. As there can be no guarantee of continuous STN support, it will be necessary in the future to increase farmers' responsibilities with regard to project implementation and administration. This could be done by promoting and assisting farmer organizations without trying to impose rigid models that do not meet local farmers' priorities and requirements. Both parties, the project agency as well as the farmers, have gained enough experience to start a dialogue. In the follow-on project, discussions could focus on how to make better use of the generators and how to establish millet mills. An overall policy could also be formulated for operating and maintaining the existing infrastructure, as well as for expanding required facilities. At the same time, the best organizational form, i.e. village committees, cooperatives, etc. could be discussed. An agreement between the administration and the village units could be drawn up to be reviewed annually in the light of the results achieved and diffi- culties encountered. The relationship between settlers and authorities could then evolve progressively towards a new type of association in which the role of the resettlement agency would be primarily that of advisor (on farming techniques, management, etc.), and supplier of services (for example for the maintenance or repair of motors) while farmers would be responsible for community administration and farm management. - 12 - E. Role of Women in the Project 30. The PCR practically does not mention the role of women in project implementation. They have played in the past, and continue to play, a very important part in farming operations, and had they taken a negative attitude vis-a-vis the project it could have spelled complete disaster. 31. The farm model of the appraisal report was designed along the lines of a European type farm,l/ a pattern that had little to do with local realities. In particular, the fact that heads of the extended family must distribute individual fields to their sourgas (family dependents) and to their wives had been overlooked. This arrangement, typical of Senegalese farming, and also the provision of reciprocal services by members of the family, should have been identified and considered in the preparation of farm plans. Whenever the women found that the male members of the family or the project authority had no plans for clearing their individual fields, they organized themselves and prepared for an exodus. Faced with such pressure, STN and heads of families had to concede and arrange for fields to be cleared for the women. 32. It should also be noted that women have the greatest interest in the smooth operation of the infrastructure (water, millet mills, health, training, etc.), and although it is due to their very hard work that the new settlement has been able to survive and expand, the project failed to give them adequate support. 33. Extension services spent little if any time in the fields assigned to women. Women were not invited to participate in the various discussions with the authorities. Infrastructure management (especially in the case of water pumps and millet mills) would, however, have had a much better chance of being put on a sound footing if it had been entrusted to committees of women since traditional division of labor would have made them more aware of needs for establishing fuel reserves, ordering other requirements in advance, etc. Similarly, they should be represented in the cooperatives, especially whenever these cooperatives are multi-pur- pose. In order to enlist women's support for various measures and also to discuss special problems of women (ranging from farming to health), STN should establish a special branch of female extension agents with a high level of responsibility that can review and help resolve problems that affect one half of the population in the project area. 1/ The farm is considered a homogenous unit while the West African farm consists of relatively independent sub-units, with different objec- tives and constraints and being attended by different members of the family. - 13 - SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT I. BACKGROUND 1.01 The Terres Neuves project, for which an IDA credit of US$1.35 million (Credit 254-SE) was approved on May 11, 1971, 1/ was the fourth Bank Group operation in Senegal's agricultural sector. Located in Eastern Senegal, it was approved at the same time as the Casamance Rice Project (Credit 252-SE). 2/ These two projects reflected a common strategy. In the late 1960's Senegal's agricultural production and groundnut export prices were falling and there was little public investment in agriculture in Casamance and Eastern Senegal. Yet both these regions were better watered and less densely populated than the Groundnut Basin and their soils and cli- mate were appropriate for crops other than groundnuts. The Bank Group con- curred with Government's evolving strategy which began to stress diversifi- cation of public investments out of the Groundnut Basin and out of groundnuts; the Terres Neuves and Casamance Rice projects fitted into this strategy. 1.02 The broad objective of the Terres Neuves project was to foster the settlement, over perhaps 15 years, of some 6,000 families from the Groundnut Basin in Eastern Senegal through the controlled development of unexploited land. The project was conceived as the first pilot phase of such a program; its main specific objective was the organized settlement of 300 families in six villages over six years, 1971-76. 3/ The two other objectives were: pro- vision of facilities and services to 250 established farmers in the vicinity of the pilot settlements, and introduction of intensive farming techniques and more diversified crop production both on new settlers' farms and on those of the established farmers. 1.03 External financing for the project was also provided by Brot fur die Welt (BFW), an agency of the Evangelical Church of Germany, which con- tributed US$100,000 under a participation agreement with IDA, and by the World Food Program (WFP), from whom a small part of the foodstuffs supplied under a nationwide project were used in the Terres Neuves project. The proj- ect was executed by a new statutory authority, the Societe de Terres Neuves (STN), established by Law 71-63 of November 11, 1971 and governed by Decree 72-044 of January 25, 1972. Through mid-1974, field operations were managed 1/ Basic project data are at Annex 1, Table 1. 2/ For which a Completion report was issued in June 1977. 3/ Objectives and means as specified in the appraisal report are shown in the Chart at Annex 1. - 14 - by the Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles (CFDT) under a management contract with STN; through end-1974, project monitoring was undertaken by the Office de Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre- Mer (ORSTOM). In mid-1974 IDA appraised a follow-up project, the Terres Neuves II Resettlement and Eastern Senegal Technical Assistance Project, which was approved on August 8, 1975. The closing date of the first proj- ect was initially set at December 31, 1977; at that time about US$24,000 remained undisbursed so the closing date was postponed to March 31, 1978. This report is based on the findings of a completion mission in October 1977. In preparation for the mission's visit, the project manager (and Director General of STN) had prepared his own completion report which provided a valuable basis for this report. Other basic documents consulted are listed at Annex 1, Table 2. 1.04 The Director General's completion report contains an accurate review of the physical progress of the project, the problems encountered during implementation and how they were resolved. It clearly identifies Government's total contribution to project cost and breaks down expenditures between settlement and other activities not directly attributable to settle- ment. It looks forward rather than back; instead of critically reviewing the origins of the project, it draws on experience gained under the project (and the follow-up project) to suggest ways in which future settlement in Eastern Senegal might be promoted. It concludes that the accent should be on a more modest level of public assistance to settlers but that, since settlement is a discrete, special exercise, a specialized Government agency is needed to channel that assistance. II. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL A. Chronology 2.01 As part of the preparation of the Third National Development Plan, Government prepared an identification re ort on the scope for settlement in the "Virgin Lands," an area of 22,000 km in the southeast of Sine Saloum Province and the northwest of Eastern Senegal Province. This report was pre- sented to the Bank in January 1969. It reviewed the two previous experiences of organized settlement in Senegal, 1/ the existing spontaneous migration 1/ The SEMA scheme at Boulel in southeast Sine Saloum Province was started in 1947 and 400 families had been settled by 1960. It was initially set up to provide an example to religious-inspired settlements; fully mech- anized, settlers were recruited through religious leaders. In 1955, both mechanization and participation of religious leaders in recruitment were abandoned. In 1969, the scheme was considered to be an example to be avoided. The second experience of organized settlement was in the delta of the Senegal River where, between 1964 and 1967, 1000 families had been settled as irrigation farmers. This scheme was considered, in 1969, to be irrelevant to settlement of the rainfed Virgin Islands. - 15 - into the Virgin Lands and available information on: (a) soils, for which the existing map at 1/250,000 based on a reconnaissance survey was considered inadequate, (b) agricultural possibilities, for which the results obtained at a research substation in eastern Sine Saloum were considered adequate and promising, and (c) sociological aspects of migration, for which the work of individual ORSTOM researchers was deemed a good basis, though lacking a synthesis. The report indicated two main objectives to be sought through organized settlement: prevention of soil deterioration, and promotion of crops other than groundnuts. As the channel for organization of settlement, the report proposed an "Office National de Terres Vierges" with, as its main function, the determination of areas to be settled; this was to be done with due attention paid to pastoralism. The Office was to provide water points and access tracks, to organize recruitment and settling-in, and to provide agri- cultural services during the first few years of settlement. A pilot project was proposed, aimed at settling 500 families at a cost of CFAF 700 million (US$2.5 million), with 50% to be financed by the Bank Group. 2.02 Welcoming the project idea, the Bank considered that the main out- standing questions pertained to soils, the financing and structure of the management agency, and refinement of cost estimates. In April 1969, a two- man mission put these points to Government, and indicated that a pilot proj- ect should be sited south of the railway which roughly coincided with the 1000 mm isohyet. During that mission, it was agreed that the Bank would par- ticipate in drafting terms of reference for a feasibility study of such a project. In early May, the French consulting firm SATEC took an initiative in proposing to Government terms of reference for a feasibility study which envisaged two projects, each for settlement of 500 families per year over five years, located at Koungheul in eastern Sine Saloum and Tambacounda in west-central Eastern Senegal. Some sections of these terms of reference imply that the form of settlement, or the nature and degree of its organiza- tion, was an open question to be examined in the study; other sections sug- gest that the authors had already made up their minds that there was to be formal settler recruitment and selection, explicit land allocation and assis- tance to settlers in addition to provision of infrastructure. In mid-May, the Bank proposed draft terms of reference for a feasibility study which envisaged a single project to settle 1,000 families over five years, in which a farm size of 25 ha was specified in anticipation of livestock activ- ities. On May 21, the Bank wrote to SATEC stating that there were no funda- mental differences between the two drafts of the terms of reference although, in a further letter on May 29, the Bank pointed out ambiguities between the drafts concerning project size, project location, farm size, and further studies required. The SATEC reply proposed to examine several farm sizes, including 25 ha, to limit the project size to settlement of 1,000 families, but to retain two possible project areas because Government had so indicated. 2.03 The feasibility study, financed by FAC, was undertaken by SATEC and completed by October'1969. Field work included soil tests at a rate of 1/100 ha on 150,000 ha. Two areas were identified in which there was a prevalence of good soils fairly well grouped: in the west of Eastern Senegal, an area of 50,000 ha in which 10 village sites, representing about 25,000 ha, - 16 - were identified; and in central Eastern Senegal, a second area of 60,000 ha, of which about 30,000 ha were suitable for a project. The feasibility study made few remarks on spontaneous settlement, noting that it was generally to be found in valleys where water was available at reasonable depth, and con- cluding that, because spontaneous settlement existed, the idea of emigration did not need to be promoted; rather, "all that was required was to guide it and accelerate it." The study recommended a project for settlement of 1,000 families, in 10 villages on 25,000 ha, with the main outputs to be rice, sorghum, cotton, maize and livestock, but no groundnuts. The main project components were to be some land clearing, tracks, wells, local building materials, warehouses, and initial subsistence for settlers. Three senior project staff were envisaged, including two expatriates. The study was re- viewed by Government on October 13, 1969, when it was agreed that land clear- ing by the project should be limited to 2.5 ha/family, and that housing con- struction materials should be loaned rather than given to settlers. There was no communication between Bank staff and SATEC, nor with Government, while the study was being undertaken nor during Government's review of the report. 2.04 A three-man appraisal mission visited Senegal in February 1970 and an outline appraisal report was subsequently prepared. Later in 1970, it was decided that a second appraisal mission was warranted, in order to ex- plore the availability of suitable settlers, and to examine further the organization of the project, provision of farm credit, subsidies and taxes, the basis for yield forecasts, land clearance costs and marketing organiza- tion. A four-man mission visited Senegal in September 1970 and recommended a project providing for settlement of 300 families, rather than 1,000, and for provision of facilities and services to the 250 established families in the project area, which was in the first of the two areas identified by SATEC. The reduction in project size, which was reluctantly accepted by Government, was argued on the grounds that the project was to be a pilot exercise and that managerial ability and experience in organized settlement were scarce. The broadening of the project to include established farmers was done in the light of observations made in ORSTOM's socio-economic studies on migration; the established farmers program was, however, modest, amounting to less than 10% of estimated total project cost. The appraisal mission also recommended further soil surveys prior to definitive selection of village sites, with which Government agreed, as well as the hiring of consultants to undertake the independent monitoring of project results, with which Government disagreed. Government considered that monitoring could be adequately handled by project management and that, instead, the project should finance research on confec- tionary groundnuts, forage crops, chemical weed control and rainfed rice. This dispute was resolved in favor of the mission's view. 2.05 In the Bank's internal review of the appraisal report, no new issues were raised until after Green Cover. At that late date an extra- departmental commentator observed that the project cost per settler family was such as to call into question the concept of a pilot project destined to be replicable. It was argued that, since voluntary migration existed, the project's design should envisage minimum assistance at low cost per beneficiary; as a further clue to the right approach, it was pointed out - 17 - that the economic rate of return to the modest expenditures on established farmers (15.9%) was higher than the return to the settlement program (12.5%). While the records do not contain any response to these comments, the Gray Cover appraisal report states (para. 8.05) that, since the fixed costs and overheads of the long-term 6,000 families settlement program would be propor- tionally less than for the first tranche of 300 families, the return to the overall program would be 18% in contrast to 13% for the pilot project. Other than this observation, the appraisal report did not directly address the question of appropriate project design. B. Project Design and Concepts of Settlement 2.06 The above chronology demonstrates that all participants in the prep- aration and appraisal process were aware of the long-standing spontaneous settlement in eastern Sine Saloum and Eastern Senegal. However, the prevail- ing attitudes of the participants were not based on solid evidence. From the outset, there was a widely-held belief that spontaneous settlement 1/ entailed soil deterioration, fragmented landlholdings with no tenure rights, and "over- concentration" 2/ on groundnut production. It was argued that spontaneous settlement should therefore be controlled, to contain if not eliminate its ostensible disadvantages. But in fact there was no evidence of irreversible soil deterioration; there was, plausibly, some deterioration in the sense that, as population increased, the length of fallow decreased and yields were fall- ing, but it did not follow that soil deterioration was a major problem to be tackled immediately. More plausibly, yields were indeed falling but had not yet fallen sufficiently to make use of fertilizer worthwhile; with land abundant, returns to the scarcest factor would have impelled farmers to intensify labor but 'extensify' land use. Declining yields were a symptom of this process but should not have given cause for concern without evidence of a genuine threat of irreversible soil deterioration. Some sensitivity to the long-term problems that might arise from undue bush clearing by spontaneous settlers, and which could be prevented by land-use planning and enforcement, was appropriate; but this should have led to reflection on when and how to impose limits on individual behavior instead of to the assumption that strict control was required immediately. The second ostensible disadvantage of spon- taneous settlement was fragmentation of landholdings; this was also the prevalent pattern in the Groundnut Basin but, rather than a problem, frag- mentation constituted a wise response to an environmen with very variable rainfall. Even within the project area of only 250 km , the difference between the highest and lowest annual rainfall at the seven recording stations was, for the five years for which data are available, about 20% in two years, 30% in one year and 40% in two years (Annex 1, Table 3). Nor was the absence of 1/ Often called "uncontrolled settlement" and used in a pejorative sense. 2/ Another term used in a pejorative sense although, like the "over- population" of the Groundnut Basin, its meaning is not at all clear. - 18 - formal tenure rights peculiar to spontaneous settlement; their usufruct rights were granted by heads of existing villages in which they settled, and were no more or less legitimate than the tenure rights of most small-scale farmers throughout the country. Finally, the ostensible over-concentration on ground- nut production was simply a response to price signals transmitted by Govern- ment's relative producer pricing policy; there was scope, however, for training on other crops which would have been attractive to farmers at the prices then prevailing. The ostensible disadvantages of spontaneous settlement did not, in fact, justify the contention that it be controlled, though they did suggest some scope for advice and guidance. 2.07 Paradoxically, the need for guidance rather than control had been recognized in SATEC's first draft of the terms of reference for the feasi- bility study (para 2.02). That distinction became blurred and ultimately disappeared as the debate on project design concentrated on issues of project size, project location, studies required, and the basis for the technical coefficients assumed for relatively intensive farming. The deci- sions finally made on these matters were sound and included the, at that time, innovative measure of providing for monitoring and evaluation of the results of the pilot project. But a "pilot" project suggests that it should be replicable and, in this case, replicability was a specific objective. This implies that one method of promoting settlement is to be selected for trial after review of alternatives or, even, that more than one method is to be tried. The Terres Neuves project was a pilot exercise in only one method of settlement but that method had not been selected by careful consideration of the different methods of providing public assistance to prospective settlers. The question had been raised by SATEC but it was not subsequently faced head on by Government, the Bank or SATEC. Further, one feature of the method adopted was settlement on blocks of land of about 1,250 ha per village, of which 750 ha were to be good soils and 500 ha to be used for grazing. Despite the soil surveys that were undertaken during preparation and the further surveys done to select village sites, however, the availability of such blocks of good soils has subsequently been found to be very limited. C. Institutional Arrangements 2.08 Government's initial project proposal envisaged the creation of a statutory body to be responsible for the organization of settlement. It was also to provide agricultural services during the first few years of settlement and then to hand over such activities to the regular extension and other agencies in the area concerned. These proposed arrangements were not directly challenged during the preparation and appraisal process through Green Cover. They were challenged, however, by the Bank's subsequent pro- posal, announced at negotiations, to confer responsibility for project man- agement on CFDT under a contract to be arranged with the statutory body. Government's response was to question the utility of a body with no short- term purpose other than to oversee execution of the management contract. Government nonetheless accepted the Bank's proposal. In effect, during the - 19 - first two years of project execution, the statutory body (STN) had no per- manent staff and no facilities. The Board of Directors of STN did, however, meet regularly and gave guidance and support to the project manager. 2.09 With the termination of the management contract in mid-1974, STN became directly responsible for project management. Its statutes and proce- dures had, however, been defined nearly three years before. Then, in late 1971, there was no broad-based extension service in the project area and few cooperative and marketing staff. By mid-1974, however, SODEFITEX had become the successor to CFDT and with responsibilities far broader than the promotion of cotton; an option existed as to which agency should provide agricultural services to settlers. In the ensuing debate on demarcation of responsibili- ties, one possibility was overlooked: STN could have become a planning agency with no executive duties, but with sufficient financial power to assure the coordinated provision of services by other established agencies. The Bank tried to open this question but was unable to make much headway amid the inter-agency rivalry. STN's statute did provide that it could sub-contract responsibilities and some tasks - extension and regional planning - were subsequently contracted out. D. Targets and Goals 2.10 The main links between objectives and means as specified in the appraisal report are shown in the chart at Annex 1. For recruitment and settlement it was considered that, despite existing spontaneous settlement, the obstacles to migration were severe and that some inducements were war- ranted. These were to include free transport of settler families and their personal effects, an allocation by grant of 2 ha/family of mechanically- cleared land, an initial subsistence allowance payable in kind by way of food and housing construction materials worth CFAF 40,000/family, free seeds for the first crop, a special one-year grace period for medium-term credit repayments, and provision of a central pool of equipment for hire to project farmers. All these inducements except the last were in fact provided, and the initial subsistence allowance was increased to CFAF 50,000 per family in 1973/74. 2.11 For the introduction of intensive farming techniques, farmers' decision-making was to be controlled by obligatory uniform practices. In each village's 750 ha of good soils, 250 ha were to be set aside for long- term expansion of the village. The 500 ha to be developed would be divided into four blocks, each family being allotted 2.5 ha/block. In each block, one or at most two crops were to be cultivated at any one time, following a four-year rotation system: cotton, cereals, groundnuts and fallow. For each crop, improved seeds were to be provided. For groundnuts and cotton, compound fertilizers specifically tailored to the needs of the project area were to be used; urea was also to be used on cotton and cereals. Oxen and equipment - a seeder unit for groundnut and sorghum planting and a tool bar equipped with hoe, plow, ridger and groundnut lifter attachments - were to be bought by STN for resale to farmers on medium-term credit. With - 20 - the exception of compound fertilizers specific to the project area, all these inputs were in fact provided and in about the same volumes as fore- seen at appraisal. One extension worker per village of 50 settler families was foreseen, and two were provided. Three extension workers for the 250 established farmers were foreseen and indeed provided but not before 1974. Senior staff were to include two agriculturalists and one credit specialist and these were also provided. 2.12 A settler's contract was to specify the rights and duties of both the settler and STN, especially the terms of the settler's occupancy of the land and measures to be taken in case of default, including grounds for dis- missal of unsatisfactory settlers. Settlers were to undertake to follow a cropping pattern and to use cultivation techniques as directed by STN staff. A form'of settler's contract was indeed devised but it was never signed. 2.13 In sum, the project's settlement objective was to be realized through the organization of recruitment, provision of wells, roads, warehouses and some cleared land, and provision of special inducements for settlers. Its intensive farming objective was to be realized through obligatory uniform farm plans, cropping patterns and cultivation techniques as well as assured supplies of good inputs, easy access to credit and marketing and intensive staff/farmer ratios. Yields were expected to increase by about 50% over pre-project levels by Year 8. The broader objective of long-term, large-scale settlement was to be approached through monitoring the results obtained on about 10% of all proj- ect farms and preparation of a second-phase project. III. IMPLEMENTATION A. Effectiveness and Start Up 3.01 The project was approved on May 11, 1971 but did not become effec- tive until January 31, 1972. Four conditions of effectiveness had been set. The condition stipulating that STN had been created required enactment of a law and issuance of a decree; these procedures were not completed until January 25, 1972. As soon as STN had been created, Government duly satis- fied the second condition by paying CFAF 15 million (US$60,000) as its first instalment to STN's share capital. Parallel to the legislative delays, there were also delays in initial appointments to the posts of Manager, Deputy Man- ager and Senior Agriculturalist. The third effectiveness condition required that these appointments, acceptable to the Bank, had been made. The manage- ment agency, CFDT, initially proposed as Project Manager a Senegalese agron- omist, whom the Bank found to be unacceptable; although experienced, his field work had been limited to sugar cane research and it was proposed that he be seconded to CFDT rather than taken on as a full CFDT staff member. Three months passed before CFDT was able to propose a new candidate from its own staff, a 25-year old expatriate agronomist, who was considered to be acceptable. The first, rejected candidate was subsequently appointed as Senior Agriculturalist and Deputy Manager and a second expatriate was - 21 - appointed as Administrative Officer. That an inexperienced expatriate was found to be acceptable but an older Senegalese agronomist was not, was a difficult decision. In this particular case, that decision was amply borne out by events; much of the project's success in terms of physical progress was due to the capability of the Project Manager, whereas the Senior Agri- culturalist was fired in April 1973. The fourth effectiveness condition pro- vided for Bank agreement to a form of settler's contract; the records contain no evidence of any delay in meeting this condition nor, curiously, any discus- sion of the contents of the contract. 3.02 The supervision report of February 29, 1972 reported that the rea- sons for the delays in effectiveness had dangerously compromised the 1972 work program but that Government and CFDT were conscious of the urgency of the situation and appeared to have accepted the challenge offered. The time available between effectiveness and sowing of the first crops was scarcely four months. In the event, project management realized almost all of the 1972 work program; in the adverse living and working conditions in the proj- ect area, this was a remarkable achievement. B. Physical Progress 3.03 Settlement works were to be undertaken in each of the three years 1972-74 and were to be completed by mid-1974. Actual and planned physical progress are compared at Annex 2, Table 6, where it is shown that the former matched or bettered the latter in all respects save two. The school and the dispensary were to be established by the respective Government departments; the school was not completed until 1976 and the dispensary not until 1977. In addition, 40 instead of 65 km of roads and tracks were constructed but, given the settler village sites finally selected, the original program was no longer justified. 3.04 Based on hydrogeological surveys, which showed that by drilling to 350 m artesian water could be brought to the surface, the appraisal report envisaged the drilling of an artesian well in each of the first two settler villages. Depending on the results and cost involved, other villages were to be equipped either with artesian or with open wells. Even before the proj- ect became effective, however, Government's Public Works Department proposed a third solution to village water supply, namely drilling to about 120 m and equipping the borehole with three hand pumps, with a newly-designed recipro- cating lever action. The Bank's January 1972 supervision mission observed that the pumps seemed well suited to local conditions but noted that they had yet to be put to the practical test of use by villagers; the Bank agreed that the first two settler villages should be equipped for such tests. Fol- lowing the September 1972 supervision mission, the Bank urged that a thorough comparison of alternative systems of village water supply be made before finalizing the 1973 well program. In the event, project management proposed and Bank accepted that, if the next two new villages were to be operational - 22 - by mid-1973, there was no alternative to a repetition of the 1972 well pro- gram. During 1973, however, the unreliability of the hand pumps became in- creasingly evident; all parties concerned agreed that the two villages to be established in 1974 should be provided with open wells from which water would be raised by buckets, and that the four existing villages should also be provided with open wells as a standby in the event of complete breakdown of the pumps. These decisions were duly implemented whereupon, by early 1975, all settler villages at last had an assured water supply, albeit from open wells instead of more hygienic tubewells. By the end of 1975, all four tubewells were equipped with mechanical pumps and the pilot hand pumps were totally abandoned. C. Procurement 3.05 The appraisal report provided that all goods and services required for the project would be procured following local bidding procedures. This was justified on the grounds that contract lots were expected to be too small to attract foreign bidders but that foreign suppliers were well represented in Senegal and competitive bids would therefore be obtained. All goods and ser- vices were so procured and no problems were encountered. Some works were interrupted in mid-1973 but for reasons of non-payment of contractors, due to the project's then financial difficulties and neglect of recourse to Pro- cedure III, rather than mismanagement or otherwise of procurement procedures or contracts. D. Costs and Disbursements 3.06 The appraisal report estimated net-of-tax costs at CFAF 430 mil- lion, equivalent to US$1.55 million at the prevailing rate of CFAF 278 per US dollar. The cost estimate included an across-the-board 10% for physical contingencies and nothing for price contingencies over the six-year project life. Project purchases were to be subject to duties and taxes amounting to CFAF 58 million (US$210,000), Government was to finance CFAF 55 million (US$200,000), or 13%, of the net-of-tax costs; IDA was to finance the remain- ing US$1.35 million, to which Brot fur die Weld, an agency of the Evangelical Church of Germany, contributed US$100,000 under a participation agreement with IDA. 3.07 By main project activity, actual costs compare to appraisal esti- mates as follows: - 23 - Appraisal Actual Actual as % Estimates Costs of Appraisal ----------- (CFAF million)------ Civil Works, Vehicles & Equipment 179 203 113 Recruitment of settlers 17 17 100 On-farm inputs 65 84 129 Management 178 132 74 Studies 49 26 53 Total including taxes 488 462 95 Less: taxes 58 55 95 Total net-of-taxes 430 407 95 Source: Annex 2, Tables 1 and 2; for appraisal estimates, contingencies and taxes allocated prorata to baseline costs. With minor modifications between project activities, actual costs were re- markably close to appraisal estimates, even though the latter had included no price contingencies. Over 70% of project costs had been incurred before end-1974, however, before the impact of world inflation was fully felt. 3.08 Despite the savings realized in CFAF terms, actual project costs in current US dollars increased from US$1.55 million at appraisal to US$1.72 million. Appraisal estimates had been based on an exchange rate of CFAF 278 per dollar whereas the weighted average exchange rate was CFAF 237 per dollar. IDA's share of net-of-tax costs, which was estimated at 87% at appraisal, declined to 77% over the project life. As shown in Annex 3, Table 3, Gov- ernment readily made up the gap of about US$200,000. 3.09 IDA disbursements over time started slowly relative to appraisal estimates. This was due mainly to the delay in effectiveness until January 1972, whereby about half the first dry (working) season was lost. Disburse- ments did not exceed 75% of appraisal estimates through end-FY74 but this did not properly reflect commitments since CFDT was not being paid punc- tually for its management services. Actual final disbursements by category were broadly in line with appraisal estimates (Annex 3, Table 3). 3.10 Costs per Settler Family. The appraisal estimate of net-of-tax cost per settler family was CFAF 1.17 million (US$4,200), including contin- gencies but excluding studies and that part (about 10%) of management costs attributed to the established farmers' program. The actual cost calculated - 24 - on a similar basis, but expressing the dollar at CFAF 237 instead of CFAF 278 as at appraisal, was CFAF 1.14 million (US$4,800). Both appraisal and actual costs exclude school and health facilities since, as the appraisal report argued, Government would have to finance such facilities in the departure zone at some stage. Excluding incremental farm inputs, which costs are attributable to agricultural development rather than settlement in a narrow sense, the actual cost per settler family was CFAF 0.98 million (US$4,100). 1/ For settlement on non-irrigated land, this cost is high relative to costs incurred by other Bank-supported settlement schemes in Africa in the early 1970s. 2/ Actual settlement cost per cultivated ha was CFAF 98,000 (US$410), or 40% less than the appraisal estimate, since the cultivated area per family increased far more rapidly than foreseen; cost per ha was, however, still high relative to other Bank-supported rainfed settlement schemes during the same period, although all the above unit costs disregard any spread effect through induced spontaneous settlement. E. Covenants 3.11 All but three covenants have been complied with but in three cases compliance was late. The school and dispensary were to be operational by end-1974 but the former was not completed until 1976 and the latter until 1977. Audit reports were to be furnished within four months of the end of each fiscal year but have been several months late; the audit of the FY76 accounts was only furnished in March 1978. Government's contribution to STN equity was to have been provided in three annual instalments. The first pay- ment was a condition of effectiveness and was duly made; the second payment was delayed pending setting up STN in a manner satisfactory to the Ministry of Finance's new agency in charge of controlling state corporations, the Centre des Etablissements Publics. This problem was eventually resolved but not before the Ministry of Finance had unilaterally blocked STN's bank account for two months in late 1972, with a consequent stoppage of work of building, road construction, well drilling and mechanical land clearing programs. 3.12 Of the three covenants that have not been complied with, the first provided that STN conclude with each farmer a contract setting out respective rights and obligations. No settlers have signed such contracts and it is unclear from the records whether farmers refused to do so or whether they were never asked. Given the early difficulties with village water supplies, project management would have been unable to honor one of its main obliga- tions vis-a-vis settlers and for this reason, conceivably, refrained from concluding contractual obligations with settlers. For their part, settlers 1/ US$5,600 in 1977 prices. 2/ The Settlement of Agricultural Lands: an Issues Paper, World Bank Report, No. 1670, July 1977. - 25 - would not have been eager to sign a contract providing for their compliance with a project farm plan in view of the inappropriateness of a uniform plan, and settlers' perception that project management's interest in promoting crop diversification and intensive farming methods was not necessarily in their private interest (para 7.05). Nor did Bank supervision missions or Govern- ment insist that STN conclude a contract with each farmer. There seems to have been a tacit understanding between all parties concerned that a con- tractual relationship between STN and settlers would have entailed more problems than advantages and would not, without unacceptably authoritarian enforcement, have had much effect on project results. On the contrary, there was a real risk that strongly enforced controls would lead to abandonment of the project by the settlers. While there was a long-established flow of migrants into Eastern Senegal, this did not amount to the massive demand for land that would have permitted Government to impose strong controls on land use. 3.13 The second covenant that was not complied with concerned the re- habilitation of a secondary road, from Koumpentoum to Maka. This road was completed to Mereto, where the central warehouse and other facilities were located but, given the particular locations of the six settler villages, the Mereto-Maka stretch was no longer justified and was not undertaken. The third covenant required that Government keep IDA informed of any pro- posed changes in producer prices of seed cotton and groundnuts; in prac- tice, Government has so informed IDA but only after decisions have been made and it was probably too much to expect that such a narrowly-based and small project as Terres Neuves would be able to exert any leverage on impor- tant sectoral issues like producer prices. IV. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT A. Project Management and STN 4.01 The establishment of STN was a condition of effectiveness but everyday project management was to be carried out by CFDT under a manage- ment contract. This arrangement worked well in the sense of getting the settlement job done promptly and in line with cost estimates. It was not at all clear, however, how STN was to acquire the capability for management of, as originally conceived, a far larger settlement program based on the experience of the initial, pilot project. A Director General of STN was appointed in early 1973 but he was, at the time, also head of the Agriculture Department of the Ministry of Rural Development. Despite the latter being a high-level, full-time position, this appointment was approved by the Bank. Preparation of a second-phase project was undertaken in late 1973 and early 1974 by ORSTOM in close association with the project manager. During that period, STN still had no full-time staff and Government, too, played little part in project preparation despite frequent urging from the Bank. Early in 1974, the Director General of STN took on the job on a full-time basis - 26 - and, in April, gave due notice of three months to CFDT that the management contract was to be terminated. The assumption by STN of the project manage- ment function in July 1974 came just after the third group of settlers had been installed and after all seasonal inputs had been acquired and distributed. The change-over entailed much confusion and a difficult first six months for STN since the transfer of executive responsibility took place without having been properly prepared, but the Bank considered that the development phase of the pilot project had been completed by July 1974 and that STN would be able to manage it thereafter. This judgment has been borne out in practice. B. Supporting Services 4.02 One of the reasons, at appraisal, for setting up STN was that the national organizations in charge of extension, credit and marketing were not well represented in Eastern Senegal and that some other means would be required to provide the coordinated services needed during the project period. Through 1974, project management provided each of these services directly, debiting individual farmer's credit accounts for inputs received and deducting the re- payments from the sales proceeds of settlers' crops. It was foreseen that direct management of input supply, credit and marketing would eventually be transferred to cooperatives serviced by national institutions; to this end, the project was to initiate development of farmers' cooperatives in keeping with clearly-established national procedures for their formation. In 1975, STN abandoned direct provision of inputs and credit and now provides such ser- vices on behalf of ONCAD, with the exception of draught animals for settlers. A staff member of the Department of Cooperatives has been seconded full-time to STN to help establish farmers cooperatives. For the time being, farmers' accounts are still kept on an individual basis but solid, if slow, progress is being made toward establishing cooperatives. Overall, credit repayment rates have been impressive, averaging 96% through 1975/76 (Annex 3, Table 4). On Bank insistence, responsibility for extension services was in 1975 dele- gated from STN to SODEFITEX since the latter, having been reorganized, was adequately represented in the project area. The project provided no services to established farmers before 1974. C. Accounting and Reporting 4.03 During CFDT management, project accounts were kept by the admin- istrative officer in line with established CFDT procedures. After mid-1974, STN set up its own accounting system, modelled on that of CFDT and, apart from the period of transition, no problems have been encountered except for allocation of some costs between settlers and established farmers. Indeed, the project did very little for established farmers prior to 1974 and the allocation problem is a function of the nature of work undertaken rather than the system of accounting. Audited accounts are available through FY76 and the audit reports were in all cases satisfactory. - 27 - 4.04 A novel feature of the reporting requirements envisaged at appraisal was the provision for independent project monitoring. A contract was passed with ORSTOM to undertake surveys of about 10% of settlers during four years. The contract was cancelled by STN after three agricultural seasons had been monitored, but the reasons for the cancellation are not evident from the records. Faced with a fait accompli, the Bank raised no objections. What- ever the reasons for the cancellation, review of the utility of monitoring at para 7.08 suggests that it was useful but costly; further expenditure on an elaborate monitoring system was not justified. V. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT A. Production 5.01 Volumes of production are discussed below; values are discussed in Chapter VI. Actual crop production by settlers compares very favorably to appraisal estimates, as indicated in the following table: Appraisal Actual ------- (Tons) ------- Settlers' Production in 1976/77 (PY5) 1/ Sorghum 472 535 Millet - 337 Maize 165 17 Groundnuts 945 2,456 Cotton 532 82 1/ Gross value in constant 1970 prices: at appraisal CFAF 40 million; actual CFAF 59 million, i.e. 148% of gross value at appraisal. Source: Annex 2, Table 4. Appraisal estimates were based on average yield data in which the effects of rainfall variability were captured implicitly. The crop season 1976/77 was one with very poor rainfall (Annex 1, Table 3) and the comparison of actual results to appraisal estimates is even more favorable to the former in the other four years for which data are available. Comparison of actual and appraisal data on the mix of crop outputs is, on the other hand, fairly uniform regardless of the nature of the crop season; in all five cases except PY1, groundnut production was far higher and cotton output far lower than foreseen; and millet production was far higher and maize output far lower than envisaged. - 28 - 5.02 Pre-project crop production by established farmers had not been estimated in the appraisal report. The report included estimates of pre- project yields and of with-project incremental production. The available information on established farmers' output does not permit estimation of actual incremental production. It is clear, however, that the mix of crops is similar to that observed among settlers: very little cotton and maize, and much groundnuts and millet and sorghum. 5.03 The comparison of actual results and appraisal estimates of yields on settlers' farms shows considerable variation between crops: Appraisal Actual -------(Tons) ------- Settlers' Yields in 1976/77 (PY5) Sorghum 1.3 1.4 Millet - 1.4 Maize 1.2 0.8 Groundnuts 1.2 1.6 Cotton 1.5 0.7 Source: Annex 2, Table 4. The two crops for which actual yields are lower than appraisal estimates are precisely those for which actual planted area is far lower than estimated. Given the differences between actual yields of different crops, it is sur- prising that any cotton or maize is grown at all; such production probably measures settlers' willingness to make some token gesture towards accepting extension advice as reflected in the uniform farm plan. B. Technological Change 5.04 More intensive farming was to be introduced through improved seed and increased fertilizer use, as well as application of phosphate rock after land clearing, the use of ox traction and better land preparation, particu- larly ploughing. Each of the settlers was provided with a pair of oxen, tool bar and equipment, and a seeder unit. Some settlers have acquired a second or more pairs of oxen and nearly all have purchased young stock as eventual replacements for the initial pair acquired on medium term credit. One of the main purposes of provision of oxen was to permit ploughing which, at appraisal, was considered a prerequisite of high returns to fertilizers. - 29 - In practice, settlers have spurned ploughing even on their mechanically- cleared fields in favor of traditional light land preparation. Rejection of ploughing has also been observed in the ongoing crop intensification proj- ect in Sine Saloum Province; indeed, the advisability of ploughing is now being questioned by agronomists in Senegal. Monitoring work in the Sine Saloum project will provide some guidance on whether it should not be aban- doned as a theme of extension work. 5.05 Phosphate rock was supplied free to settlers, as in the rest of the country, for application to newly-cleared land. The total quantity applied was 297 tons (Annex 2, Table 5), sufficient for 740 ha whereas 3,100 ha had been cleared by 1976. Project records indicate that extension staff had great difficulty in persuading settlers of the utility of applying phosphate rock and, even, that some which was received was simply discarded. Reluc- tance to apply phosphate rock has also been observed in other parts of the country; though supplied free of charge, its application is tedious and time- consuming, and the benefits are long-term: the recommended interval for re- application is 8 years. With no sanctions at their disposal, the extension staff at Terres Neuves were nonetheless able to get the message across to about 35% of the settlers. 5.06 Improved seeds were supplied on seasonal credit and in about the volumes foreseen at appraisal. Having cleared more land than they were en- titled to, however, settlers did not request inputs for all their land, or all the land that they intended to plant to a particular crop. Thus improved groundnut seed obtained on official credit was applied to only 80% of the area planted to groundnuts and only 30% of the area planted to millet and sorghum. It does not follow that the seed used on the remainder of the planted area was not improved; settlers may well have made arrangements with neighboring established farmers for them to acquire improved seed on their behalf. 5.07 Compound fertilizers specific to the project area were to be made available but, because the quantities were too small to warrant special orders, this proved impracticable. Standard compounds, 6-20-10 and later 8-18-27 for groundnuts, and 10-21-21 for cereals, were supplied but, in prin- ciple at least, at the same application rates as had been envisaged for the more concentrated project-specific compounds; this entailed a lower intensity of application of nutrients. In addition, and partly because of settlers' interest in concealing the extent of land cleared and cultivated (para 5.06), compound fertilizer supplied on official credit was applied to only 80% of the area planted to groundnuts and only 60% of the area planted to millet and sorghum. In practice as indicated by detailed observation in 1974, most of the land may have been fertilized but at a rate lower than the recommended 150 kg/ha. This was a second factor entailing lower intensity of application of nutrients. In sum, aggregate use of compound fertilizer was higher than foreseen at appraisal, but lower on a unit-area basis. Urea was envisaged for cereals at 100 kg/ha but, in practice, was applied to only 50% of the area planted to millet and sorghum. These rates of application of fertilizer were disappointing in relation to appraisal estimates but were nonetheless considerably higher than those generally practised by established farmers. 5.08 Intensified farming was to be a means by which soil deterioration was to be avoided. In practice, ploughing has not been accepted, phosphate rock has been applied to about a third of the newly-created land, and appli- cation of chemical nutrients is running at about 70% of that foreseen per unit area at appraisal. If soil deterioration were a genuine threat, the actual level of application of nutrients would probably be deemed satisfac- tory; the shortfall in comparison with appraisal estimates is certainly not such as to doubt that the incomes so far achieved are sustainable or that settlement might not be permanent. VI. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESULTS A. Farmers' Incomes 6.01 Settlers' actual incomes, even when valued in 1970 prices, have been substantially greater than appraisal estimates. The appraisal report presented farm budgets expressed per group of settlers and showed income per year from the date of arrival. Comparable figures cannot be derived from the aggregate actual data at Annex 3, Table 1, but are readily available from the monitoring sample results: 1/ 1/ Sample data provide overall income estimates about 10% lower than the straight aggregates but they are nonetheless substantially greater than appraisal estimates. Years from Initial Settlement Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 (CFAF '000, constant 1970 prices) Net Value of Output per Family 1/ Appraisal estimates 24 46 87 Actual: 1972 arrivals 38 93 220 1973 arrivals 72 133 1974 arrivals 109 Net Cash Income per Head 2/ Appraisal estimates 3(13) 3/ 6(26) 12 (48) Actual: 1972 arrivals 5(22) 14(56) 28(113) 1973 arrivals 9(37) 15(61) 1974 arrivals 14(58) 1/ Gross value of crop outputs less cash inputs and medium term credit repayments. 2/ Net value of output less subsistence. 3/ Dollar values in brackets at CFAF 245 = US$1.00. Source: Annex 3, Table 2; sample survey data available through 1974/75 only. The appraisal report estimated that the net value of output per family at full development, in the eighth year after arrival, would be CFAF 165,000 (US$670). 1/ From aggregate output data (Annex 3, Table 1), average net value of output was CFAF 690,000 (US$2,820) in 1975/76, when the 1974 arrivals were still in only their second year, and CFAF 390,000 (US$1,590) in 1976/77; in 1970 constant prices, these values were CFAF 275,000 (US$1,120) and CFAF 155,000 (US$630) respectively. Since 1975 was a very good rainfall year and 1976 a very poor one (Annex 1, Table 3), average incomes by about the fifth year of the project were already much higher than appraisal estimates at full development. 1/ All dollar values expressed at CFAF 245 = US$1.00. - 32 - 6.02 The higher-than-anticipated settler incomes are attributable to three factors. First, the cultivated area per family grew more rapidly than envisaged. Family size also grew more rapidly than anticipated, but less so than the cultivated area; by 1974/75, the cultivated area per adult family member was 65% higher than envisaged. Second, yields of groundnut and sorghum exceeded appraisal estimates. Yields of cotton and maize, by contrast, were much lower than appraisal estimates but the area planted to these crops was, accordingly, much smaller than foreseen. Third, whereas purchased crop inputs have in aggregate been higher than appraisal estimates, on a unit-area basis they have been lower; since yields were higher, net income per unit area has been higher than foreseen. As a determinant of income, this factor is unim- portant relative to cultivated area and yields. 6.03 Established farmers' cash incomes were estimated at appraisal to increase by about CFAF 40,000 (US$160) per year by the tenth year of the proj- ect, being an increase of about 30% over pre-project incomes of CFAF 135,000 (US$550). Actual data concerning established farmers are available only from the 1974/75 monitoring work, which surveyed a sample of 20 families drawn from the villages where project activities, however limited (para. 4.02), were concentrated. The net value of output was found (Annex 3, Table 2) to be CFAF 546,000/family (US$2,230) and the net cash income CFAF 449,000 (US$1,830); in constant 1970 prices, these values were CFAF 233,000 (US$950) and CFAF 179,000 (US$730) respectively. Since rainfall in 1974 was about normal, established farmers' incomes had apparently increased by the third year of the project by more than the appraisal estimate of the tenth year's incremental income. This result cannot, however, be directly attributed to the project nor to a demonstration effect of settlement; either it would have been obtained without the project or, more likely, the initial estimate of pre-project income was too low. While the established farmers did bene- fit from project-financed tracks and wells, whatever the explanation, the observed level of their incomes in 1974/75 indicates the magnitude of income that can be obtained by farmers in this part of Eastern Senegal with very little Government assistance. B. Government Revenues 6.04 The Government cash flow as estimated at appraisal was shown to be negative in all but one year over the 25-year project life. After Proj- ect Year 4, however, the net annual negative balance was small, generally 5% of the total annual application of funds. Continuing project administra- tion costs, at about CFAF 10 million (US$40,000) per year in 1970 prices, represented 30% of the total annual application of funds. The estimated Government cash flow envisaged no phase-out of STN supervision of the first settlements and no new works to which some overheads could be allocated; in effect, it was unduly cautious. For 1977-1980, continuing project adminis- tration costs are now estimated at about CFAF 12 million (US$50,000) per year, at 1977 prices (Annex 2, Table 2). - 33 - 6.05 The estimated Government cash flow did, however, provide for a gradual reduction in fertilizer subsidies. In practice, although the price payable by farmers has doubled since the project began, the rate of subsidy is still over 50%. If basic compound fertilizers were applied to the total area cultivated by settler farmers, the total subsidy cost at about CFAF 40/ kg for 150 kg/ha on 3,000 ha would be CFAF 18 million (US$75,000) per year at 1977 prices. Government revenues have, on the other hand, increased more than sufficient to cover the input subsidy as well as continuing proj- ect project administration costs. Although producer prices have increased as a percentage of economic farmgate prices during the life of the project, the absolute amount per unit accruing to Government through explicit taxes and surpluses on the stabilization funds has also increased. Moreover, pro- duction, and particularly of groundnuts, has also increased in comparison with the appraisal estimates on which the original cash flow was based. The economic farmgate price of groundnuts in 1977 was unusually high at over CFAF 70/kg (Annex 4, Table 2); at a price of CFAF 55/kg and given the producer price of CFAF 41.5/kg, the gross revenue to Government on output of about 3,000 tons would be about CFAF 40 million (US$160,000). This amount alone would suffice to cover all Government outflows, including debt service of the IDA credit. C. Economic Returns 6.06 For the settlement program, which constituted over 90% of project costs net of studies, costs were almost identical to appraisal estimates and output was much higher than foreseen. Moreover, economic farmgate prices were higher than appraisal estimates. Economic returns with, as at appraisal, all farm labor valued at zero were substantially greater than envisaged, both in 1977 and 1970 constant prices. Economic rates of return over 25 years are as follows: Settlement Program Only Appraisal Actual 1977 prices 1970 prices 1. Appraisal base case 12.5 -----not calculated------- 2. Increase in share of 11.9 59 47 overheads allocated to settlement program 1/ 3. Benefits lagged by one year 9.7 37 33 1/ To keep the allocation in line with appraisal financial tables. Source: Annex 4. - 34 - It is not possible to calculate an actual economic rate of return to the established farmers' program. 6.07 The valuation of all farm labor at zero was a critical assumption, justified on the ground that land vacated by settler families in the depar- ture zone would, because of the land pressure there, be taken over immediately and cultivated by other farmers; this has probably happened. But zero valua- tion of labor opportunity cost requires two further conditions to be met. First, it has to be shown that settlement undertaken by the project was indeed incremental or, more narrowly, that in the absence of the project the settlers would not have migrated spontaneously. If they would have done so, their out- put foregone as spontaneous settlers is an economic cost of the project. In this case, as shown at Annex 4, the output of spontaneous settlers would have to be assessed below 60% of the output of organized settlers before the rate of return would approach 10%. 1/ It can, on the other hand, be contended that the particular settlers who were recruited to the project would not have been disposed to migrate unless there had been a project. This position could be argued on the ground that the settlers were to be, and were in fact, recruited primarily from the Serer people, who were considered to be less mobile than other Senegalese, notably the Wolof. The Bank's migration report 2/ observes that the "main difference between (the two peoples) is the lack of support by a strong organization to help (the Serer) benefit fully ... from the opening of the east". The report concludes, however, that "the migration behavior of Serer is now .very much the same as the Wolof". This change was presumably facilitated by the project, but the project did involve only 300 settler families. That the project was small makes it hard to identify project settlers as incremental or otherwise; the larger the project, the greater the likelihood of non-incremental settlement. 6.08 Second, it has to be shown that, with the project, the net effect on other prospective spontaneous migrants was, at worst, neutral. Some will have delayed their migration in the expectation of receiving the same kinds of advantages as those received by settlers selected for the project; some, having waited in vain, may even have abandoned their intention to migrate. It can, on the other hand, be contended that successful organized settlement has induced further spontaneous settlement. In the six new villages estab- lished under the project, the total number of people officially recruited and transported was 1,505 but the number of people in those villages in June 1974 was 1,969; in June 1977, however, the population was about the same (Annex 1, Table 4). Since the number of households was in each case 300, these population data suggest that friends and relatives came by their own means to join settler families in the initial period of installation but there have been no new migrants into the villages since 1974. There is unfortunately no data on population trends in the vicinity of the settler villages. 1/ At 70%, the economic rate of return would be negative. 2/ Migration and Employment in Senegal, Report No. 1302-SE of September 24, 1976, paras 64-65. - 35 - 6.09 It would be very difficult to show conclusively whether the two conditions required to support zero valuation of labor opportunity cost had or had not been met. It would be necessary to specify what would have hap- pened without the project and, even in the with-project case, to explore motives for migrating or delaying or abandoning migration. The likelihood is, however, that the particular people who have migrated under the project would not have done so in the absence of the project, and that the net effect on other prospective spontaneous migrants was close to, if not better than, neutral. It is also likely, by contrast, that the particular people who migrated would have done so with fewer inducements. VII. SPECIAL ISSUES A. Permanent Settlement? 7.01 That settlement be permanent is not a necessary objective of a settlement project. Provided discounted benefits exceed costs, then settle- ment which may last for only 10 years will nonetheless have been worthwhile. The net present value of project costs and benefits, in 1977 constant prices and with settler labor valued at zero and benefits lagged by one year, is positive at a 15% discount rate and a project life of 10 years; indeed, the break-even or minimum worthwhile project life is only eight years and will have been reached at end-1978. While permanency of project settlement is not therefore at issue economically, it is an issue either if it is consid- ered to be end in itself or if it is invoked as an indicator of social har- mony. The following discussion addresses these aspects. 7.02 Settlers' incomes have far exceeded appraisal estimates (para 6.01) and probably their own expectations. Their incomes have also been less vul- nerable to drought than in the departure zone. In the poor rainfall years of 1972 and 1976 (Annex 1, Table 3), rainfall in the project area was about 40% less than the long-term average but it was still close to 600 mm and suffi- cient for a reasonable crop. In the departure zone, by contrast, rainfall was more than 50% below the long-term average and, with less than 400 mm, crop failures were common. The effects of this contrast were observed by the ORSTOM monitoring team both in the project area and in the departure zone. The settlers were proud of their higher and more stable incomes and, on visits to the departure zone during the dry season, were able to bring food and money to their relatives. The initial reluctance of families in the departure zone to authorize some of their members to migrate had been fully overcome as early as 1974. Settlers soon began to accumulate wives and smallstock and, by 1977, were investing in livestock for oxen replace- ment and, in a few cases, had accumulated small cattle herds. In a survey of the 300 settler families in 1974, ORSTOM found that 265 considered that they had found their definitive place of residence in the project villages and that only 23 families were considering returning to the departure zone once they had accumulated large savings. Probably because of the general - 36 - financial success, only two settler families abandoned the project during the difficult early years, though the drinking water supply was erratic until early 1975, the school did not become operational until 1976 and the dispensary, though built, is still not operational. While settlers did and continue to complain about these facilities, villages meantime hired their own teachers. In the four villages where mechanical well pumps were in- stalled in 1975, settlers accepted and continue to pay an annual fee of CFAF 6,000 (US$25) per family to cover pump operating costs. There is, now, no doubt that the overwhelming majority of settlers intend to stay at Terres Neuves. B. Relations between Settlers and Established Farmers 7.03 Each of the six new villages is located a few kilometers from an old-established village. The ORSTOM monitoring team found that this proximity had encouraged frequent and friendly c2ntact from the outset. The initial population density was less than 10/km and large areas had been left aside as uncleared land. It was not surprising, then, that the established farmers, some of whom were themselves recent migrants, expressed no hostility to the idea of settlement. On the contrary, established farmers found some employ- ment as building laborers, and the new roads served them too. The initial 1972 settlers benefitted from a favorable predisposition on the part of the established farmers, and the latter in many cases loaned cleared land to new settlers. During the three-year installation phase, and despite the advan- tages given to new settlers by the project, the monitoring team found no cases of serious conflicts. Recently, however, two problems have begun to emerge and they may become more serious in the future. First, the estab- lished population are both farmers and pastoralists and grazing land is becoming scarce as land clearance continues and more settlers are being re- cruited under the follow-up project. Second, settlers have cleared some land in areas where the established population considers that it has the usufruct right. Conflicts arising from these two problems have so far been settled by STN staff. C. Relations between Settlers and STN 7.04 Since the settler contract was never made effective, relations between settlers and STN are rather ambiguous. Even after providing the initial installation advantages to settlers, STN retains considerable finan- cial power through control of access to seasonal credit and of the physical availability of input supplies. Each settler village, on the other hand, has chosen a chief, one of whose functions is to protect his constituents' interests vis-a-vis STN; one chief was deposed in 1974 precisely because the villagers considered that he collaborated unduly with STN. In 1975, each village decided to choose two delegates, other than the chief, who were to represent the village in meetings with STN. An assembly of delegates - 37 - then chooses two among themselves, for two years, to attend meetings of STN's board of directors in Dakar. The delegates were initially passive inter- locutors of STN but soon became outspoken representatives of their villages. They and the village chiefs have worked out a division of labor whereby the delegates are the representatives vis-a-vis STN for strictly settlement matters whereas the chiefs are the representatives vis-a-vis the provincial authorities in legal and fiscal matters. The two extension workers assigned to each village live in the villages but their advice is scarcely well received - they are young, have little farming experience, and they also suffer from the ambiguous relationship between the settlers and STN. D. Effectiveness of a Uniform Farm Plan 7.05 A common theme throughout preparation and appraisal was that spon- taneous settlement should be controlled since it entailed soil deterioration and over-concentration on groundnut production (para 2.06). Organized settle- ment, it was argued, could prevent soil deterioration by intensifying farming techniques and diversifying the cropping pattern. In addition to the induce- ments and training offered to these ends, there was to be a contractual obli- gation on settlers to follow STN directives expressed as an obligatory uniform farm plan. By 1977, the cropping pattern was hardly diversified (para 5.01) and few intensive farming techniques had been accepted (para 5.08); farmers have not adopted the uniform farm plan as a substitute for their own decision- making. One obstacle is that the concept of a uniform farm plan is inappro- priate to the situation. A standard farm behavior pattern presupposes that settler families are fairly homogeneous and, in the extreme, family size varies from two to 16 members. It also presupposes that the settler family is a single decision-making unit; in fact, the head of the family, as was the case in the departure zone, has no authority over what is planted and how it is cultivated in his women's fields or in the fields of his young relatives. A second and more serious obstacle to the acceptance of a uniform farm plan, and even though it was modified from year to year, was that it was devised by project management to express the public interest, in this case in intensi- fication and diversification; yet such interests were not perceived by farmers to be in their private interest. Moreover, project management was caught in the trap set by Government's declared interest in promotion of crops other than groundnuts while the price signals transmitted to farmers by Government's output pricing policy were inconsistent with this goal; although the project area is well-suited to cotton, farmers have spurned it in favor of groundnuts at the prevailing official producer prices. Both project management and supervision missions were well aware of the trap but were unable to tackle the sectoral issue of relative prices from a vantage point as narrow as that of a project for the settlement of 300 families. In these circumstances, project management chose, rightly, not to take a tough line in imposing the cropping pattern part of its uniform farm plan. Beginning in 1975, the Bank meantime initiated regular discussions with Government on relative crop prices, using the experience acquired at Terres Neuves as one illustration of the inconsistency between Government's declared interest and its relative pricing policy. - 38 - E. Organized and Spontaneous Settlement 7.06 Given the inappropriate notion of a uniform farm plan and the con- straints imposed by sectoral pricing policy, farmers' decision-making has not been controlled nor much influenced. The result is that the ostensible advan- tages of organized settlement, as claimed at appraisal, have not been realized. Settlers' cropping patterns are no more or less diversified than those of established farmers, some of whom are recent, spontaneous, unassisted migrants. Settlers' use of crop inputs and improved techniques is more intensive than that of established farmers, primarily due to easier access to credit, but much less than envisaged at appraisal. On the other hand, this report has argued (para 2.06) that the emphasis put upon avoidance of soil deterioration during preparation and appraisal was not backed up by any persuasive evidence and was not therefore warranted. Paradoxically, then, it does not matter that the goals of diversification and intensification have not been realized; these failures do, however, undermine the appraisal report's justification of the need for tightly organized settlement. 7.07 A further question is whether spontaneous settlement - in the proj- ect area - would have taken place without the project. The appraisal report acknowledged (para 3.03) that the project area "would probably be settled eventually without Government assistance." But it is not evident that the particular area selected for the project would have been settled without Government assistance. The area has no surface water and groundwater is not to be found at less than 50m depth. Settlement in such circumstances would therefore require investment in, at least, a traditional open well at a cost of about CFAF 2 million (US$8,000) in 1977 prices. This would require a com- munal effort which could be organized only by the chief of a sizeable village of which many families decided to migrate together, or by a religious leader able to accumulate the capital and to organize some of his followers to migrate as a group. The limited knowledge of spontaneous migration generally suggests that only the latter approach has been followed. There are, on the other hand, older, deep open wells in the old-established villages in the project area which, so far as is known, were built neither by religious groups nor with any Government assistance. This suggests that the difficulties of well con- struction would not have prevented the project area being settled eventually without Government assistance. F. Utility of Monitoring 7.08 Though the project was to deal with only 300 settler families and 250 established farmers, it was considered that an independent monitoring unit was needed to ensure collection and analysis of the data required to assess whether the pilot operation warranted replication. It was not explicitly intended, and neither did it happen, that the annual monitoring reports had much influence on project implementation. While the reports certainly helped supervision missions be flexible in, for instance, supporting changes vis-a- - 39 - vis appraisal in the cropping pattern, there is no evidence in Bank files that any particular supervision decision was taken on the basis of the monitoring reports. The appraisal mission for the follow-up project did, however, find the monitoring reports helpful particularly in explaining set- tlers' behavior in the initial settling-in period. Now, at completion, there are two serious gaps in information which the monitoring work, had its task been better defined, should have been able to fill in part: while changing attitudes to migration in the departure zone are reported, nothing is known about spontaneous settlement induced by the project; and nothing is known about differences in output between project settlers and other settlers. The results of the monitoring work were put to little use other than to confirm the veracity of project management's own reports. This was not without significance, for supervision and follow-up appraisal missions had thereby an indisputably sound data base; but this was a small return on expenditure of CFAF 27 million (US$110,000) on the monitoring work. G. The Pilot Project and the Follow-up Project 7.09 The follow-up project was appraised in July 1974, at the beginning of the third agricultural season of the pilot project. A preparation report had been prepared by ORSTOM on the basis of the monitoring of the first two seasons' results and, because of uncertainties concerning the availability of blocks of good soils, the report only reluctantly endorsed Government's request that the follow-up project provide for settlement of 2,000 families. The appraisal mission considered that, whereas the pilot project had indeed showed that organized settlement could take place when supported by generous Government grants, a major shortcoming was that it tested only one, high- cost method of settlement. Reviewing the preparation report, the mission concluded that only 500 families could be settled on large blocks of good undeveloped land which was also free from riverblindness. Thus the pilot project was found to be non-replicable. 7.10 Rejecting the project proposed in the preparation report, the appraisal mission proposed 1/ to Government an overall agricultural develop- ment project for the Tambacounda District. This was to include improved support services to existing farmers, further small-scale settlement in the pilot project area using modified and less expensive settlement tech- niques, including the testing of the feasibility of introducing settlers to existing villages, that might be replicated in some other areas of Eastern Senegal. Government rejected this proposal since it considered that there were indeed sufficient blocks of good soils to settle 2,000 families, and that the proposed highlighted regional development through SODEFITEX rather than settlement through STN. It was then agreed that, in addition to comple- tion of settlement in the pilot project area, the follow-up project should 1/ As reported in the Issues Paper but not recalled by the appraisal mission leader nor by the Director General of STN. - 40 - include preparation of an integrated development project for Eastern Senegal, including prospection for soils and diseases to determine the scope for settlement. This was the essence of the project that became effective in 1975 and is currently over half completed. 7.11 The follow-up project incorporated two important lessons from the pilot project. First, while providing for the settlement of 450 families in nine villages in the pilot project area, it contained no attempt at further replication of organized settlement on large blocks of land. More important still, it provided for the settlement of 150 families in existing villages. Second, the inducements offered to settlers were reduced. Two hectares of mechanically-cleared land per family were to be provided but as a loan repayable over 15 years rather than as a grant; for those people to be settled in existing villages, instead of mechanical land clearing, there was to be payment of a bonus for the first 2 ha cleared by hand. Distribu- tion of free seeds was to be stopped. Independent project monitoring was not to be revived. On the other hand, the notion of obligatory uniform farm plans was not abandoned nor was the 10 ha standard farm size; much emphasis continued to be put, both by Government and Bank, on the need to avoid soil deterioration. Mechanical land clearing was not entirely abandoned because Government resisted Bank pressure to do so. In the event, people settled under the follow-up project who received mechanically cleared land as a loan complain that it is far too expensive. Nor was the initial subsistence allow- ance cancelled; instead it was increased by 50% to CFAF 60,000 (US$250) per family. VIII. GOVERNMENT AND BANK PERFORMANCE 8.01 Whereas Government had taken the first step in identifying the project, subsequent preparation and appraisal were undertaken with little Government participation. Confronted, at negotiations, with Bank's proposal to entrust project management to CFDT under a contract to be arranged with STN (para 2.08), Government queried the need for a new statutory body but nonethe- less accepted the proposed organizational arrangements. For more than two years of project implementation, STN was not operational except for periodic meetings of its Board of Directors. In retrospect, it seems that the Bank, having made up its mind that the project was worthwhile, took the lead in promoting it and in making arrangements with CFDT and ORSTOM to execute and monitor it; Government acquiesced. The lack of a clear Government commitment to the project did not hinder project execution except in respect of the timely provision of Government's financial contribution. Bank supervision missions were, however, unable to elicit much Government interest in the early stages of preparation of the follow-up project. The underlying problem came to a head and was aggravated by the personalities involved, as soon as STN became operational; it was revealed in the abrupt cancellation of the CFDT and ORSTOM contracts and in the acrimonious discussions during appraisal and nego- tiations of the follow-up project. Earlier Bank supervision missions could - 41 - probably not have prevented a conflict, for it had been built into the proj- ect's organizational arrangements. Once this bubble had burst, STN and Gov- ernment became fully and responsibly involved in management of this project and the follow-up project. 8.02 Supervision missions took place twice a year, as envisaged, but their efficiency was hampered by the lack of continuity in staff. Yet the missions addressed management problems in a productive manner; their main contributions were in making arrangements for the effective channeling of project funds, for a workable solution to the water supply problem, and for improving accounting and budgeting practices of STN.  - 42 - ANNEX 1 SENEGAL Table 1 TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT GENERAL INFORMATION Basic Documents 1. Projet "Terres Neuves": Dossier Pr61iminaire de Pr6sentation, Direction de l'Am6nage- ment duTerritoire,January 1969; (the initial project proposal submitted by Government to IDA; it was drawn up by Government as part of the preparation of the Third National Development Plan); 2. La Colonisation des Terres Neuves au S6n6gal, Direction de l'Am6nagement du Territoire/ SATEC, October 1969; (the feasibility study done on the basis of terms of reference initially proposed by SATEC 1/ and revised in the light of Bank comments; financed by FAC); 3. Terres Neuves Resettlement Project - Senegal, Bank Appraisal Report No. PA-73a, April 8, 1971; 4. Opgration Terres Neuves Projet Pilote Koumpentoum-Maka, Etude d'Accompagnement, Rapport de fin de campagne 1972/73 et 1973/74, ORSTOM, July 1974. (and) Rappbrt de fin de campagne 1974/75, ORSTOM 2/ July 1975; (monitoring reports on the first three seasons); 5. Appraisal of Terres Neuves II Resettlement and Eastern Senegal Technical Assistance Project - Senegal, Bank Appraisal Report No. 685a-SE, June 6, 1975; 6. Communication en Conseil interministgriel sur la Socigtd des Terres Neuves pr6- sentge par le Ministre du Diveloppement Rural et de 1'Hydraulique, undated; (this is, in effect, a project completion report drafted in early 1977 by the General Manager of STN); 7. The Settlement of Agricultural Lands: an Issues Paper, Bank Report No. 1670; 8. Etude analytique des diff6rentes structures de d6veloppement r6gional int6grd du Sgnggal Oriental: 6tude agricole, rapport de fin de premi&re phase, SONED/SODETEG, July 1977; (contains a review of migration and organized settlement into Eastern Senegal). 1/ Socift6 d'Aide Technique et de Coop6ration, Paris. 2/ Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-Mer, Paris and Dakar. 3/ Soci6td Nationale d'Etudes pour le Dgveloppement, Dakar. ANNEX 1 -43 - Table 2 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT GENERAL INFORMATION Rainfall 1. Annual Rainfall 30-year 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1/ average Project Area No. Recording Stations 6 9 7 7 11 - Range (mm/year) 603-708 725-1013 848-1088 512-632 441-608 - Average (mm/year) 582 659 837 979 563 512 2/ Elsewhere Tambacounda 3/ (mm/year) 592 675 931 n.a. n.a. n.a. 917 Fatick 4/ (mm/year) 294 393 412 n.a. n.a. 364 795 Bambey (mm/year) 393 319 518 n.a. n.a. n.a. 667 2. Distribution June July August September October Total Project Area (mm/month) (mm/year 1972 104 145 186 87 60 582 1973 73 163 245 152 26 659 1974 54 246 252 225 60 837 1975 57 279 53 536 54 979 Elsewhere ------------(mm/month, 30-year average)------ (mm/year Tambacounda 3/ 131 196 289 231 70 917 Fatick 4/ 47 162 303 220 63 795 1/ Through September 30, 1977. 2/ October rains: Long term average 70 mm; in 1976, 27 mm, with a range from 14 to 46 mm. 3/ The recording station closest (100 km) to the project area for which a 30-year average is available. 4/ Departure zone. ANNEX 1 - 44 - Table 3 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT GENERAL INFORMATION Population 1. At Initial Settlement 1972 Arrivals 1973 Arrivals 1974 Arrivals Total No. of families recruited 41 1/ 109 1/ 152 302 No. of people transported 175 445 885 1,505 No. of people present in June 2/ 175 579 3/ 954 1,708 2. Trend 1972 1973 1974 1977 First two villages 175 534 4/ 696 594 Second two villages - 268 627 5/ 728 Final two villages - - 646 637 Total population 175 807 1,969 1,959 Sources: For 1972-1974, ORSTOM monitoring reports; for 1977, STN monitoring unit. 1/ One family subsequently returned to the departure zone; there were no losses from those recruited in the third year. 2/ At the time of planting of the first crop. 3/ The increase over numbers transported corresponds to friends and relatives who made their own way to Terres Neuves to join settler families. Though no data are avail- able, many of these additional people returned to the departure zone for the dry season; in effect, they were seasonal laborers at Terres Neuves. 4/ Of whom 228 residing with 1972 arrivals (up from 175) and 311 were 1973 arrivals. 5/ of whom 319 were residing with 1973 arrivals (up from 268) and 308 were 1974 arrivals. GHIiEkA . I NFO0alATl '14 Obectivea and Heana hapr e hra iaprt Br-ad Jet- .Bettleent of 6,000 f fali from the ro.mdn.t BaSn i. Eat- Senegal through te coætolled developmet ouexplted land --P -A B.tlent f 300 f-ell.es In 6 eilaes ao pilot projecL Proiion of faecillitien , I.trodutla af iøtfenie famig t«ehniques ad 20 established laree" _er. diveriflq crop prodcti o new tt in the VIcInIty ét U. fae. =ad an th006 at the estabi.hed fa~mre pilot Oettlteat ... Projet munitoring Projet tude. Orgaitan a Sa na teat Provi.ia r I.rM~atI nitial 9e4t1nt Proi o Eateaian, Credit and Mat~Ing g~rvo" arel Synthe*ie election & renparot Velle de steehaous Naahenialp eatence Hoing Initial Fana linafo hroiu IPput. Priary Foration hoL.ogrphy o d achlnary fta i tem rdering collecti at n ngcie pln redit elf cooprties pertantng to 300 mettlir fa~li.. ---------- ertai to 250 etabliahd familaa - 46 - S3~aL ANNEM 2 Table - TEPltES NiEs P5T"'L2MET PnET - eCMPelon3 22203T - MfTiTCAL P9RESlm AND COSTM OrtaInal senadule0 of talnd,urae -aTeal Grand 97' 1972 197' 1977. 15 1776 Total 1947 297" 1e" 1980 1977- TtaC APT''AL ASSET" - -- *000) Sur~ 7 fl?o3ectAre 66 - - . . ,650 - - - R-ada 3,000 3,2c 2,000 - - - 10,000 - 1 2.11. .0,172 1,7 MC 1i,710 - - - ,10 - - - 2arehousea - 2,735 2,735 2.735 - - 2,355 - 39s tand Clerrin - 6,131 13.262 19.692 100 - 39.75 - --- Shaller. e,Sa.s Traning9 quipnt (3Sr oaned) - 205 230 124 150 121 1.1-1 150 295 130 150 105 1, 3o1121r.ga 14,317 6,0.1 1.692 - - - ,or---.. 2,62 sut.t.1 38,123 32.303 3t.93 23,663 9u0 305 131,871 870 365 870 720 3,325 135,196 L. 0<stablis t r.ean' ?rogrm Pja2s - 6,250 - - - - 6,2" - - ,2- roses - - 2,5 - .. - 2,73-5 - - 2,7'! selern etc. 'TN <ned3 .. 255 20 112 60 30 57 65 70 052 u- 1.239 - 13 - - 1,652 - - - - 2 2 -2 96 '2 -6 l u,:oa.l - ,776 2,205 557 40 62 11,260 117 70 102 70 39 "9 ,-9; 3ubtotal 9: Capital Ae 38.123 40,079 !9,290 24,220 060 407 1k3,111 967 935 972 790 3,68 11,59 . rysfi T, T~ANP.rATION AND1 r o SE=~-MERS 57 2,14 .,7 7,071 - - 11,313 - - - - - 1,313 ItCR~ETAI. IA E T 222TS 1. s.ttimet rra S.ed - ;Ok 531 1,06 765 366 ',212 - - - - - 1,212 IartIlizer- - 792 2,491 5,095 0,399 3,64b 17,016 3i1 - - - 110 17,10 P2t1cid.a - L- 116 8 9576 770 2,190 138 - - . 3@ 2,923 fltt Oen and Iemnt - 1r ,,Sk 3.09 AL'S 1,f"3 2h6 - - - - - Su6total - 2,671 7,352 11,589 12,771 6,593 u,176 552 - - - '52 b,72 2. EstablIsed N=men' Program Saeds - ' 1 137 14 gd L6 1,056 :1 - -i 1, Pettllser. - -29 245 628 399 0 3205 130 130 2. Pasttcides - 10 27 234 9 1, 394 Dr*ft -rand I,ple t - '1891 - - ,2- - '820 Oibtotal - 1,97 1,350 2,141 1,933 725 3,129 316 - - - 3:6 3,5 ne-aeanttlPa1cm Iaut co-ta - 6zé 16.70 10.726 7.315 5 053 - - - 6 5_" P0JECT! MAGD R AND CPEATMN 7JS01 1, 5*ttlement Prgna Mal.. , mon6..., l Kanagent Fa ,367 20,781 22.333 21.183 22,333 15,962 107.179 9,090 6,190 t,9 29 25,360 133,439 ~a.ntenane of buildings 1nd !quIp.-t 560 1,231 1,389 1,111 1,0r2 1,111 6,673 1,397 1,207 1.007 1,257 3,133 11,311 lahlela Majat.abane tot peratngt co. 070 1,7.0 ,7 150 1,w 1,20 C,330 1,.50 1,430 1,l50 1.530 5,300 1-10 frpna a a Orie- .00 40.0 00 00 '00 2,j00 250 230 230 250 1,200 3,000 M.aitnacet ofton Tratcks and Mant=~e* and Operating 20 699 2Ig i61 .%1 .115 1.0'5 i035 1 3.'1, C..a of m7 >-nd Equ~1lge2t01öt, 9 S.t~ 5,717 20,392 26,55 25,1! 27,265 20,5,7 129,997 1,585 10,172 1,72 1072 12,00i 171,99 2. Eltablbshed Pe-Vrs P-oga salar%a*, U ~*oaoe -M6!nd6 Ser eAl ta n - 1.336 1,330 1.611 1,640 1.600 7,600 ,650 1,650 1,650 ,6<0 9,600 -,200 galat~nnc of Dan~a - - 62 62 83 83 250 225 225 225 225 900 1,190 nd Eqament vhlea tateane. and 2 0 i8 Operting Cona - 20 20 20 20 20 koo 20 20 r m OMC00and 2ffl0 20 2, - 300 300 300 300 300 :.M0 200 20R0 0 .oe ,0 afte~nance of Catten ?ra c".144 ~inteance and Oparating :~1t «fST n .upe650 60 2 _Z_ -- 60 9 SubM.10 - 1,656 2,299 2,7-6 2,799 2,315 12.323 2,7S 2,713 2.-45 2,75 10,9^0 2. 303 subtotal D: .9oae -dt ^e,t a,ctA 57 24. 2n.30 nc ad12 TODI35 - 6,300 9,800 10,200 7,0 1,500 38,300 -8 50 Subtotal: A. 3, 2, and E 897 q,784 i1,625 30,03l 52,752 '2.27 21,8b6 1! 11.152 J- X'7 ~crz3ENCIEs L. ',¾3 9.61*2 ,aug <,075 2-< Q'21 .e3 L,5 ,419 1 iO ,M=m PmEC''' 2ST7 0 0 -AXES 12. 37,2 1- 0.291 1.029 4.8v Z60 1. 67 «,r 222±.. =STMATED TAxES 12.2 2,,78 10,045 0.212 ,246 L2,4 -8,41, 2<!0 7~0 2 341 2. 1 '7 2 ~LYm vi 2s-s I=e =1 Tks ý0 14 ý,c ,m v2 I. ee,0 t, 97 ~L~ : w f : 1EC a § 9 gu-- 2 4 * s,, ,fl,- j s s 71 1 . . . . n k, 9 Iå A. . r4*' JENEuAL IRY;R NEUVES RESETIEMI;NT PROJECT-COMIIlTION F1 ORT PHYSICAL mWtOGRESS A.HD XLTs Agricultural development (Cultivated area) 1272/73 1922/Z4 1274/7 2 1 92 /77 127L8 M98/d 19980 180/ 1981/8? Appraisal Estimates (ha) Cotton-settlers - 25 100 250 375 450 450 450 450 450 -established farmers 60 80 120 130 160 190 190 190 190 190 -total 60 105 220 380 535 640 640 640 640 640 Groundnute-settlerG 50 200 500 725 825 750 750 750 750 750 -established farmere 65 105 175 205 215 215 215 215 215 215 -total 115 305 675 930 1,040 965 965 965 965 965 Maize-settlers 25 75 150 150 150 150 150 150 156 150 -satablished farmers - 10 20 25 30 30 30 30 30 30 -total 25 85 170 175 180 180 180 180 180 180 Sorghum-settlers and total 25 100 250 375 450 450 450 45a 45o 450 Total Cultivated Settlers 100 400 1,000 1,500 1,8 0 1,800 i,8o 1,800 1,800 1,800 Total Cultivated Established Farmers 125 195 315 360 405 435 435 435 435 435 1 Grand Total Cultivated 2 25 1,315 1860 2 2,235 2j 3, 2J23 2,235 Actual and Revised Estimates (ha) 2/ Cotton-settlers 11 51 156 154 120 150 150 150 150 150 1 -established farmers - 91 199 18 143 150 150 150 150 150 -total 11 142 355 172 263 300 300 300 300 300 Groundnuts-settlers 62 423 1,392 2,152 1,534 1,925 1.925 1,925 1,925 1,925 -established farmers - 148 244 1.474 1,706 1,725 1,725 1.725 1,725 1,725 -total 62 571 1,636 3,626 3,240 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 Maize-settlers 5 11 25 19 22 25 25 25 25 25 -established farmers - 20 28 12 19 25 25 25 25 25 -total 5 31 53 31 41 50 50 50 50 50 'orghum-settlers 26 105 384. 367 382 400 400 400 400 400 -established farmers - W0 59 114 546 550 550 550 550 550 -total 26 145 443 481 928 950 950 950. 950 950 Millet Souna-eettlers 13 51 219 399 241 400 400 400 400 400 -established farmers - 42 63 162 556 550 550 550 550 550 - total 13 93 262 557 ?97 950 950 950 950 950 Millet Zanio-aettlers and total 5 38 81 - - 100 100 100 100 100 Total Cultivated Settlers 122 679 2,257 3,&87 2,299 3,Ono 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 Total Cultivated Established Farmers - 341 593 1,780 2.970 3,000 3,000 3,o 3,000 3,000 Grand Total Cultivated 1d2 1,020 2,850 4,86? 222 6.000 6," - 6o -o Actal production as presented by :sTN; ORSTOM data, based on sample analysi, deviate by less than 10N. .ENEIAI TlE:. NEINVEZ RESE]riLMNT11 lla i _l - 'i,. Il:';], -I 0. PIMY11CAL. PROG.REýý AND CO:STS Agrtcultural Development (ylelds and total productjon) Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 1972/7 197/?74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 Q76/?9 979/Pl 19&/81 NB8/52 y IDt/ha) Alpraisal Eatimate 6/ Cotton (seed cotton) -(1.2) 1.2(].2) 1.3(1.3) 1.5(].3) 1.5(1.3) 1.5(1.4) 1.7(.5) 1.8(1.5) 1.8(1.5) 1.(1.5) Groundnuts (unchelled) 1.0(0..0( 0.0(0.9) 1.1(0.9) 1.2(1.0) 1.2(1.0) 1.3(1.0) 1.4(1.]) 1.5(1.2) 1.5(1.2) 1.5(].2) KMajze (grain) 0.9(-) 1.0(1.0) 1.0(1.2) 1.2(..4) 1.2(1.6) 1.2(1.8) 1.40.6) 1.6(1.8) 1.60 .8) 1.6(1.8) iorghum (grain) 1.0(-) 1.; (-) 1.2(-) 1.3(-) 1.3 (-) 1.5(-) 1.6(-) 1.P,(-) 1.p(-) 1.8( -) Actuaol and Revi8ed Estimates Cotton 0.b(-) 0.6(-) 0.2(0.3) 0.6(1.3) 0.7(0.7) 0.7 0.8 . a.6 o.8 0.8 ( rouidnuts 0.8(.) 0.9(0.5) 1.5(3.7) 2.2(1.8) 1.6(1.6) 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 Maize - (-) 0.5(-) 0.9(0.8) 1.2(2.6) 0.8(0.8) 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.. "orghum 0.6(-) ,.8(-) 1.3(0.8) 1.2(1.0) 1.4(1.4) 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Millet-Soun - (-) 0.5(0.5) 0.9(0.6) 1.2(1.0) 1.4(1.2) 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 Milt.ai .6(-) - (-) 1.0(--) - (-) - - .. -- I I:JlICT]Io] ( t Ap-raial Er,timates Cotton-;ettlers - 30 125 332 532 675 690 7?8 788 810 -establiehed farmere 72 92 154 167 208 228 261 264 264 264 -total 72 122 279 499 740 903 954 992 1,052 1,074 Groundnuta-settlera 50 200 515 780 945 913 950 1,025 1,088 1,125 -e8tablisihed farmere 27 47 87 117 125 131 138 159 174 174 -total 77 247 602 897 1,070 1,044 1,088 1,184 1,262 1,299 Maize -settlere - 7Q 142 155 165 180 185 200 225 240 -eBtablishod farmers - 10 24 35 48 54 54 54 54 54 -total 22 80 166 190 213 234 239 254 279 294 Sorghum-settlera and total 25 110 255 398 472 576 608 712 765 810 Actu-il and Revised Estimates Cotton-aett lers 9 32 38 97 82 105 120 120 120 120 -eatablilhed farerb - 54 65 23 98 105 120 120 120 120 -tot,.] 9 86 103 120 180 210 240 240 240 240 Groundnut&-aettlera 50 539 2,139 4,822 2,456 3,080 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 -eatabliahed farmera - 81 913 2,593 2,729 2,760 2,932 2,932 2,932 2,932 -total 50 620 3,052 7,415 5.185 5,840 6,205 6,205 6,205 6,205 Maize-settler: - 5 22 23 17 25 30 30 30 30 -catablished farmera - 21 31 15 25 30 30 30 30 -total - 5 43 54 32 50 60 60 60 60 Sork;hum-settlera 15 81 514 440 535 560 600 600 600 600 -established farners - - 46 114 764 770 825 825 825 825 -total 15 81 560 554 1,299 1,33b 1,425 1,425 1,425 1,425 Millet Smuna-oettlera - 28 201 474 337 480 520 520 520 520 -66tablished farmers - 22 36 162 667 660 715 715 715 715 -total - 50 237 636 1,004 1,140 1,235 1,235 1,235 1,235 Niillet ;anio-aettlers ain total 8- 79 - - - - - - etween brackete: yield estimates for established farmere with ONCAD/CFIYr fertilizere. The appraieal k;ive a third att of yleld eatimsten with improved fertilizers tailorei to tlie requirementb of ti.e project area; auch fertilizers were never supplied. - 50 - SENEGAL ANNEX 2 TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT PHYSICAL PROGRESS AND COSTS Input Use by Settlers Unit 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1974/75 - 1976/77 Cotton Seed (tons) 0.5 1.9 4.5 8.0 4.8 17.3 Implied area 1/ (ha) 13 48 U4 200 120 434 Fertilizer (tons) 1.5 5.6 15.5 - 18.0 33.5 Implied area 2/ (ha) 7 28 77 - 90 167 Actual area 3/ (ha) 11 51 156 154 120 430 Groundnuts Seed (tons) 6.5 47.6 131.2 226.0 155.7 '512.9 Implied area 4/ (ha) 54 396 1,094 1,883 1,298 4,275 Fertilizer (tons) 5.5 35.8 137.6 323.4 203.8 664.8 Implied area 5/ (ha) 36 239 917 2,156 1,359 4,432 Actual Area 3/ (ha) 62 423 1,392 2,152 1,534 5,078 Cereals Millet/sorghum seed (tons) 0.6 1.0 2.6 4.8 5.1 12.5 Implied area 6/ (ha) 30 50 130 240 254 624 Maize seed (tons) 0.6 0.1 0.8 1.2 4.4 6.4 Implied area 7/ (ha) 9 3 13 20 74 107 Total implied area (ha) 39 53 143 260 328 731 Compound Fertilizer (tons) 6.3 23.6 57.1 106.8 48.7 212.6 Implied area 5/ (ha) 42 157 381 712 325 1,418 Urea (tons) 0.6 9.3 26.0 56.0 34.3 116.3 Implied area 8/ (ha) 6 93 260 560 343 1,163 Actual area 3/ (ha) 40 205 709 781 645 2,135 Phosphate Rock Quantity (tons) - 68.8 - 228.0 - 296.8 10/ Implied area 9/ (ha) - 172 - 570 - 742 TO/ 1/ 40 kg/ha. 2/ 200 kg/ha. 3/ Annex 2, Table 3. 4/ 120 kg/ha. 5/ 150 kg/ha. 6/ 20 kg/ha. 7/ 60 kg/ha. 8/ 100 kg/ha. 9/ 400 kg/ha. 10/ 1972/73-1976/77.  51 - ANNEX 2 Table 6 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT PHYSICAL PROGRESS AND COSTS Settlement Works 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Total New Villages: Planned 2 1/ 2 2 - - - 6 Actual - 2 2 2 - - 6 Families Settled Planned - 50 100 150 - - 300 Actual - 41 109 152 - - 300 2/ Roads and Tracks (km) Planned 12 1/ 37 3/ 16 - - - 65 Actual - 23 17 - - - 40 Wells Planned 2 1/ 2 2 - - - 6 Actual - 2 2 4 2 - 10 4/ Mechanical land clearing (ha) Planned - 100 200 300 - - 600 Actual - 100 250 250 - - 600 Manual land alearing (ha) Planned - - 100 300 600 500 1,500 Actual - 42 337 1,278 830 n.a 5/2,487 Warehouses (ha) Planned - 1 2 6/ 1 - - 4 Actual - (3) 7/ 7 8/ - - - 7 School Planned - - - 1 Actual - - 1 1 Dispensary Planned -1 - - Actual - - - 1/ Planned :o be -onstructed in the last quarter of the calendar year, .c. at the beginning of the dry season: actuallv constructed in the middle of the dry seao-, i.e. in the next calendar year. 2/ 302 families were transported to Terres Neuves; two subsequently returned to the departure zone (Annex 1, Table 4). 3/ Of which 25 km originally planned as part of the established farmers' program. 4/ Of which 4 tubewells, initially equipped with hand pumps that proved inoperative and subsequently re-equipped with diesel electric submersible pumps;and 6 open wells; four were built as standby for the tubewells. 5/ Not available; total cultivated area declined in 1976 but the area manually cleared probably increased. 6/ Of which one warehouse for the established farmers' program. 7/ Temporary warehouses of simple construction. 8/ One central warehouse at Mereto serves settlers and established farmers. - 52 - A::NEX 3 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT ?ROJECT - COMPLETION REPOPT FINANCIAL RESULTS Settlers' Incomes 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 AgriculturalInnuts ('000 CFAF) 10/ seeds 1/ 212 1,429 5,814 io,018 - 6,967 'ertilizer 2/ 147 824 3,766 9,758 6,251 pesticides 3/ - . . . . iraft oxen and implements 4/ - 503 2,428 5,806 6,989 Total Agricultural Inouts 352 2,756 12,008 25,582 20,207 .Xgricultral OutDuts ('000 CFAF) cotton 5/ 262 1,087 1,785 4,462 3,854 groundnuts 6/ 1,155 15,900 88,769 200,113 101,924 maize 7/ - 125 770 805 595 sorghum S/ 263 2,025 15,420 13,200 8,725 millet 8/ 140 700 8,400 14,220 11,795 Total Agricultural Outnuts 1,820 20,924 i1144 22,800 i36,893 Total Settlers Set Return 1,66 18i68 103,136 207,218 il6,686 Number of Settler Families 41 149 300 300 300 Average Net Return ner Settler Family in CFAF 35,634 21,933 343,87 690,727 3o,95 Alaisal Estimate: Net Return mer Family in CFAF (in 1970 constant prices) 20,881 43,1d3 77,921 9b091 94,691 Marketed ?roduction/('000 CFAF) 1.302 15,397 81,67 864 95,586 Total Settlers Net Cash income 9431261 69,669 158,982 75,379 Average Net Cash income ner Settler Family in CFAF 23,000 _84,89 232 230 529,9L0 251,263 1/ Groundnuts: CFAF 29.5/kg until 73/74 and CFAF 43.5/kg thereafter; others: output prices; cotton: farmers are paid a net of costs of inputs price. 2/ 1972:12 CFAF/kg; 1973: 12 CFAF/kg; 1974:16 CFAF/kg ( 25 for urea); 1975: 20 CFAF/kg ( 25 for ,rea); 1976: 20 CFAF/kg (25 for urea); no costs included for tricalcium phosphate. 3/ No data available, mostly used on cotton only for which farmers are paid a net of costs of inputs price. T/ Repayments of 5 year medium term loan with one year grace; financial costs included in unit costs. 5/ 1972: 29.15 CFAF/kg; 1973: 33.98 CFAF/kg; 1974:46.97 CFAF/kg; 1975:46 CFAF/kg; 1976: 47 CFAF/kg. / 1972: 23.1 CFAF/kg; 1973:29.5 CFAF/kg; 1974 and thereafter: 41.5 CFAF/kg. 7/ 1972: 17 CFAF/kg; 1973:25 CFAF/kg; 1974 and thereafter: 35 CFAF/kg. X/ 1972:17.5 CFAF/kg; 1973: 25 CFAF/kg; 1974 and 1975: 30 CFAF/kg; 1976: 35 CrAF/kg. 9/ Marketed through official channels, estimated at: 100% cotton, 90% groundauts and 0% cereals. 10/ Inputs delivered to established farmers could not be separated. SENPul. TERRfS NEIUVES HESE1-l~TN1I e;l'T_PrTTON REPuHT INANCIAL RESULTS Output and Incoce In the Initial Year of Settlem,nit Appralsal katimate. for Settler in 1,r/2 Settler. In 19'71 Settlers E,talished Families Settled In Year Y In 19714 Ffarner Tear 1 lear Y+1 Yer Y+2 1972/73 1973/7T 197~/75 1971/74 1974/75 1975 1974/75 Sample Si%e No. farm familien 41 11 12 26 1 1 11 20 % of group of beneficleries 100% 27% 24 % % .)% Average Family Size Men 1.3 2.0 3-3 1.8 2.5 1.94 4.0 Women 1.1 1.t 1.4 1.14 1.5 1.3 2.9 Total adult.a 2 3 4 2.4 3.4 4.7 3.2 4.0 3.2 6.9 Total fam1ly ele 4 5 6 4.3 5.3 7.0 5.6 6.8 5.8 11.6 oun u 1 2 3.3 1.5 5.2 12.1 .'.2 7.1 ..1. Cotton - 0.6 1.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 Cereal 1 1.8 2.4 0.5 1.4 3.3 1.0 3.0 0.9 3.0 Income per bamIly (CFAk 000) Groa Value of Output / 54.3 199.8 608.7 124.5 395.2 261.9 618.9 Caet ,nputa 2/ 3.6 35.2 75.5 4.7 61.5 7.3 67.5 iat Value. f Output 50.7 164.6 533.2 119.6 333.7 254.6 546.4 per a-Iult 21.1 48.4 113.4 37.4 83.4 79.6 79.2 per h 16.4 29.1 46.3 28.2 38.4 48.6 44.7 bub.el.tence y 26.5 37.1 58.8 39.2 57.1 48.4 97.4 Net C.6h Incoe 24.2 127.5 474.4 80.4 276.6 206.2 41,9.0 per hed 5.6 24.1 67.8 14.4 40-7 35.6 36.7 per hn in USS 2 23 99 277 59 167 146 158 Inme per Family 1i conatont 99/ prices (CFÅF 8000 Groa vaue of imtput m4 77.8 129.. 41.2 12.7 27o.8 76.7 177.2 116.0 272.1 Cah 1-,ate 2 8.8 31.9 4;.1 5.6 30.'. 51.1 4.7 44.o 7.3 8.9 Net VUe~ ofl 0tout 23.6 45.9 87.1 37.6 93.3 219.7 71.9 1 .2 108.7 2'.2 per n,1.lt 11.8 15.3 21.8 15.7 27.4 46.7 22.5 33.3 34.0 33.8 per ha 11.8 11.5 14.5 12.1 16.5 19.1 17.0 15.3 20.7 19.1 2ub.jitence 2/ 11.2 14.0 16.8 14.8 20.7 27.4 22.0 31.9 27.3 54.6 Net Ca Incone / 12.4 31.9 70.3 22.8 72.6 . 192.3 49.9 101.3 81.4 178.6 per head 3.1 6.4 11.7 5.3 13.7 27.5 8.9 14.9 14.0 15.4 per hend In UJo $/ 13 26 48 22 56 113 37 61 58 63 ource. TS'S moniLtoring reporta for phycical data. Iroducer prices (CYAF/kg) kn 1972173 for groundnute, cotton and cerals. 23.1, 26.8. 25; 1n 1973/74: 29.5, 33.9, 30; an 1974/75: 41.5, 4(..5. 2/ Groundnut eec, at 120 kg/ha, 150 kg reaoiraable, valued at CFAF 29.5Ck In 1973/74 an CAY 43.5/kg $n 1974/75; for each Croun or aettlerd, the l irat year'a mees- wert fro*. Cotton saed, fertilizer and pecticide was, an elsehere in the country, rocoverad by payment of n oed cotton price net of the inpit package coat. Fertilizer for groundnuta and cereala wae recorded for oach of the famlieb eurveyed. Nedin~ ten cr*dit, with a on* year grace peri,>., wa j.lo recur,e per family surveye,. . No at. ava.- lable; appra1al satimat. of 280kg/family ~eeber/year adoptod. CrA, :45 = UJ 11.00. / Exlu,ng equipment maintanance, hand toola and maåe ahlling fro~ appraisal öatimate. 6/ before Cntas and excludec incone from liveetock. - 54 - ANNEX 3 Table 3 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT-COMPLETION REPORT FINANCIAL RESULTS Project Financing and Disbursements 1. Pro1ect Financing At Appraisal Actual (CFAF million) (US$'000) (CFAF million) (US$'000) IDA 347 1,250 290 1,226 BFW 28 100 24 100 Subtotal 375 1,350 314 1/ 1,326 Government 55 2/ 198 93 3/ 393 -otal net of taxes 430 1,548 407 1,719 Taxes 58 210 55 3/ 232 Total including taxes 488 1,758 462 r/ 1,951 2. Disbursements over time At Appraisal Actual Actual as % BFW 5/ IDA Total BFW IDA Total of Appraisal ------------------(US$'000 ------------------- - () end FY72 36 179 205 9 32 41 20 end FY73 82 409 491 82 280 362 74 end FY74 100 638 738 100 450 550 75 end FY75 100 851 951 100 829 929 98 end FY76 100 1,041 1,141 100 1,192 1,292 113 end FY77 100 1,218 1,318 100 1,208 1,308 99 12/31/77 100 1,250 1,350 100 1,226 1,326 98 3. Disbursements by Category 6/ Actual as Appraisal Actual of ApDraisal ----(U$'000 )--------- % I. Civil Works 220 225 102 II. Vehicles, equipment and operating costs 120 203 169 III.Farm inputs 170 190 112 IV. Mechanical land clearing and roads 200 252 126 V. STN staff and surveys 530 456 86 VI. Unallocated 110 7/ 24 8/ Total 1,350 1,350 1/ Inferred from the weighted average CFAF:.US$ exchange rate obtained for withdrawals on categories I-IV through early 1977; CFAF 236.8=US$1.00. 2/ Of which CFAF 35 million was to be equity capital in STN. 3/ In sum CFAF 148 million; equity capital in ST": CFAF 35 million, and grants to STN: CFAF 126.1 million; i.e. CFAF 161.1 million; difference attributable mainly to STN non-project expenditures. Tax component of government contribution assumed to be equal to estimated taxes in proJect costs ( Annex 2, Table 2). 4/ Excludes food supplied by the World Food Program (WFP) as part of the initial subsistence allowance for settlers. The value of WFP- supplied food is not known but was less than CFAF 12 million ( 300 families at CFAF 40,000). / Brot fur die Welt, an agency of the Evangelical Church of Germany. / Including BFV which contributed US$100,000 to disbursements under categories I and IV under a participation agreement with IDA. 7/ 9% of the above. / Not yet allocated. - 55- ANNEX 3 Table 4 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT. Financial Results Credit 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 -- ---- ---- - ------ (CFA Francs) - - ----- ---- Medium Term Credit Settlers 1/ Repayments due on new loans - 399,253 1,756,285 3,576,477 703,490 Arrears carried forward - - 399,253 - 66,577 Cumulative repayments due - 399,253 2,495,104 2/ 6,071,581 6,841,648 Repayments made - - 2,495,104 6,005,004 % Repaid - 0% 100% 99% Established Farmers Repayments due on new loans 3/ - - 560,039 577,217 865,943 Arrears carried forward - - - 35,524 37,273 Cumulative repayments due - - 560,039 1,172,780 2,040,512 Repayments made - - 524,515 1,135,507 4/ 7 Repaid - - 94% 97% 5, Seasonal Credit Settlers Loans made 147,316 1,282,275 3,246,365 7,376,844 Arrears carried forward - - - - 567,394 Total repayments due 147,316 1,282,275 3,246,365 7,376,844 Repayments made 6/' 147,316 1,282,275 3,246,365 7/ 6,809,450 ! Repaid 100% 100% 100% 92% Established Farmers Loans made - 136,200 971,800 2,852,311 Arrears carried forward - - - - 496,724 Total repayments due - 136,200 971,800 2,852,311 Repayments made 6/ - 136,200 971,800 8/ 2,355,587 . Repaid - 100% 100% 83% 1/ One year grace period, five-year annuity. 2/ Exceeds the sum of the two preceeding entries in this column since STN, with the beneficiaries' agreement, included the annuities due on demonstration implements that had, under CFDT, been deemed grants rather than loans. 3' No grace period. 4/ All arrears from 1974/75 were recovered; the short fall in repayments constituted new arrears. 5/ Mainly for fertilizer, but also fongicides and replacement parts for implements; seed is reimbursable in kind. 6/ Records do not indicate actual repayments made in 1972/73 and 1973/74; for the two seasons taken togethe,, 100% repayments must have been made since there were no arrears to be brought forward to 1974/75. / Actual repayments in the audited accounts are shown as CFAF 3.6 million. The apparent over-repayment reflects reimbursement, other than in-kind, for seeds; the aggregate repayment for seeds was 99%. 8/ Actual repayments in the audited accounts are shown as CFAF 1.1 million. The apparent over-repayment reflects seed reimbursement for which the aggregate repayment was 96%. - 56 - ANNEX 4 Page 1 SENEGAL TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS Economic Rate of Return at Appraisal 1. At appraisal, the economic rate of return over 25 years was esti- mated at 13%, on the basis of financial costs net of taxes and gross of sub- sidies. A critical assumption was the valuation of all farm labor at zero. This was justified on the ground that land vacated by settler families in the departure zone would, because of the land pressure there, be taken over immediately and cultivated by other farmers; although no hard evidence is available, there is no reason to believe that this did not, in fact, happen. On other grounds, however, the zero valuation of farm labor may be questioned (see para 7). 2. Costs of studies pertaining to a follow-up project (9% of total project cost) were excluded from the economic cost stream. Costs of staff and management and STN operating costs, while fully included in the economic cost stream, were allocated between the settlement program and the established farmers' program in a manner different from that in the project financial cost tables. No justification is given in the report, and although the absolute amount reallocated from the settlement program to the established farmers' program was only about CFAF 2.5 million/year, the effect on rates of return to the two project components was significant; the return to the settlement program declined by 0.6% but the return to the established farmers' program increased by 8.3% (para. 4). 3. Costs were incurred mainly in the dry season, in the first quarter of the calendar year, but benefits did not arise until the beginning of the following dry season; farmers were actually paid in the first quarter of the next calendar year and revenues from exports of cotton and groundnut products were not received before the middle of the calendar year. There is a good case for lagging the benefit stream by a full year in order to capture the delay between costs and benefits. The Appraisal Report adopted the orthodox approach of netting out inputs and outputs arising in the same agricultural season; the effect of lagging the benefit stream is, however, significant. 4. The effect of these adjustments in the Appraisal rate of return, still valuing all farm labor at zero, would have been as follows: ANNEX 4 Page 2 Settlement Established Total Program Farmers' Project Program ---------%, 25 years)----------- 1. Appraisal 12.5 15.9 12.9 2. Reallocation of staff costs, etc. in line with financial tables 11.9 24.2 12.9 Benefits lagged by one year: 3. Appraisal cost and benefit streams 10.2 11.8 10.4 4. Reallocation of staff costs, etc. in line with financial tables 9.7 17.1 10.4 Economic Rate of Return at Completion 5. It was envisaged at appraisal that the established farmers' program would constitute only about 10% of project costs. In practice, this estimate has proven accurate (Annex 2, Table 2) although most of the actual costs in- curred for established farmers were for seasonal credits, not all of which were incremental. In effect, STN took over from ONCAD the input supply func- tion to the two old-established cooperatives in the project area and the proj- ect cost table includes STN-managed seasonal credits rather than the real increment; genuinely incremental costs of the established farmers' program were probably less than half those shown in project costs. Similarly, STN took over from ONCAD the primary marketing function and outputs at Annex 2, Table 4, are not incremental. Given the problems of distinguishing incre- mental costs and benefits of the established farmers' program, and that that program accounted for less than 10% of total project cost, no economic rate of return has been calculated for it. 6. For the settlement program, project costs were almost identical to appraisal estimates (CFAF 400 million including taxes) and benefits, with aggregate output taken as incremental, were substantially higher than fore- seen, as shown at Annex 2, Table 4. Economic farmgate prices were also far higher than foreseen at appraisal. To isolate the price effect, the economic rate of return has been calculated using 1977 constant prices and 1970 con- stant prices. In each case, staff and management and STN operating costs have been allocated almost exclusively (94%) to the settlement program. The results are as follows, over 25 years: - 58 - ANNEX 4 Page 3 Settlement Program Only 1977 constant prices 1970 constant prices Base streams 59% 47% Benefits lagged by one year 37% 33% These rates of return are directly comparable with the appraisal estimates modified for reallocation of staff and other costs (lines 2 and 4 at para. 4); but should all farm labor be valued at zero? Valuation of Farm Labor 7. The issue arises from the treatment of spontaneous migration. It can be argued that, if the project had not been undertaken, the settlers would have migrated anyway. On this assumption, economic project costs would include that output foregone, to be valued as high as project benefits unless a case could be made for (a) slower land clearance and cultivation, being a measure of more sparse infrastructure and more difficult settling in, and/or (b) lower yields, being a measure of more difficult access to credit and to extension help. So little is known about spontaneous migration, partly because it is unorganized, that it is not possible to estimate values for (a) and (b). The sensitivity of the rate of return to (a + b) can, however, be gauged by a simple approximation. Expressing the output of spontaneous settlement as a percentage of project benefits and counting that amount as the opportunity cost of organized settlement to be added to project costs, the rate of return in constant 1977 prices would change as follows: Output of spontaneous Economic Rate of Return settlers as % project benefits No lag Benefits lagged 1 year 80% <-20 <-20 70% - 8 - 9 60% 8 5 50% 17 12 40% 26 18 30% 35 23 The output of spontaneous settlers would have to be assessed below 60% of the output of organized settlers before the rate of return would begin to be acceptable. - 5- ANNEX 4 Page 4 8. It could also be argued, on the other hand, that the particular settlers who were recruited to the project would not have migrated unless they had received the inducements offered by the project. Prior to their departure the settlers had not, in general, been landless farm laborers, and one of the selection criteria was that they had had experience in work- ing with draught oxen. The settlers did not therefore come from among the poorest of the residents of the departure zone. One theory of settlement suggests that spontaneous migrants will be either poor, and have little to lose, or rich enough to be able to take the risk; the immobile majority would not be disposed to migrate unless they were offered an inducement sufficient to reverse their private assessment of the costs and benefits involved. It would follow from this theory that most of the Terres Neuves settlers would not have migrated if the project had not been undertaken and that valuation of their labor at zero is appropriate. 9. But it can also be argued that because the project was undertaken other prospective spontaneous settlers did not migrate, in the expectation of receiving the same kinds of advantages as those settlers selected for the project. Even if such prospective spontaneous settlers delayed rather than abandoned their migration, economic project costs would still have to be in- creased. This phenomenon is, however, even more difficult to quantify than the case examined at para. 7 and would, moreover, have to be weighed against spontaneous migration induced by the project - which is equally difficult to quantify. The only data available relate to population growth in the six settler villages (Annex 1, Table 4). Whereas the total number of people transported to the project area in STN provided buses was 1,505 but the num- ber of people in the six new villages in June 1974 was 1,969, the population of these villages in June 1977 was only 1,959. This suggests that friends and relatives came by their own means to join settler families in the ini- tial period of installation but that there have been no new migrants into the villages since 1974. There is no compa able information on population trends in the 16 old villages in the 250 km area where the pre-project popu- lation was estimated at 250 families. 10. There are, in sum, two good grounds for supposing that farm labor should not be valued at zero but in each case there are counter arguments: Grounds for non-zero valuation Counter argument - settlers would have migrated without - unlikely since the settlers the project were neither very rich nor very poor in the departure zone; - with the project, other prospective - on the contrary, successful spontaneous settlers have delayed or organized settlement will abandoned their migration induce further spontaneous settlement. - 60 - ANNEX 4 Page 5 With the existing gaps in information, these conflicts cannot be satisfac- torily resolved. The Appraisal Report implicitly assumed that (a) settlers would not migrate without the project, and (b) the project would have, at worst, a neutral effect on other prospective spontaneous settlers. On these assumptions, the actual rate of return is about 60%; dropping these assump- tions, the rate of return would fall abruptly and, for instance, would be negative unless the opportunity cost of spontaneous settlement (para. 7) were valued below 70% of the output of organized settlement. 11. - This discussion has ignored the argument that spontaneous settle- ment leads to soil depletion or erosion. The advocates of this point of view would nonetheless agree that it would be a slow process; its effects would not therefore show up in rate of return analysis. - 61 - SENEGAL ANNEX 4 Table 1 TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS Economic Farmgate Prices - Cereals 1. Breakdown Appraisal: Completion: 1970 1977 -----------(US$/ ton)-- Reference price FOB Gulf 51.8 86.0 Ocean Freight and Insurance 14.3 30.0 CIF Dakar 66.1 1/ 116.0 --(CFAF/ton)----- CIF Dakar 2/ 18,500 28,420 Part handling to Dakar warehouse 2,700 3/ 3,000 Less: Transport Koumpentoum - Dakar 3,400 5,550 4/ Primary collection 3,000 - Economic Farmgate Price 17,800 22.870 Z. Trend Appraisal Completion Farmgate Prices Farmgate Price Freight and Inflation Farmgate Price (1970 terms) FOB S/ Insurance 5/ CIF 5/ Index 6/ in 1977 terms 7/ (CFAF1kg) ------------(US$/ton)---------- (1977 - 100) (CFAF/kg) 1970 17.8 51.8 14.3 66.1 48.8 27.6 Maize o/ Sarghwio 1972 18.85 16.30 55.0 15.0 70.0 56.3 24.9 1973 19.05 16.41 93.0 20.0 113.0 66.8 35.9 1974 19.20 16.5n 121.0 25.0 146.0 81.8 38.2 1975 19.52 16.86 111.9 30.0 141.9 92.4 32.1 1976 19.83 17.22 105.2 30.0 135.2 92.8 30.1 1977 20.10 17.58 86.0 30.0 116.0 100.0 22.9 1978 20.38 17.94 97.2 30.0 127.2 100.0 25.6 1979 20.66 18.30 107.6 30.0 137.6 100.0 28.2 1980 + 20.66 18.30 112.7 30.0 14Z.7 100.0 29.4 1/ Appraisal Report cites CIF Dakar cost; breakdown between FOB and ocean freight and insurance is inferred from later data on the actual 1970 FOB price for sorghum. 2/ 1970: CFAF 278 . US$ 1.00; 1977: CFAF 245 - US$ 1.00. 3/ Included CFAF 900/ton taxes. 4/ 370 km, CFAF 15/ton-km. 5/ Actual prices through 1976; for 1977 and after: estimates in 1977 terms. 6/ Bank's index of international inflation dated October 1977. 7/ Obtained from (a) CFAF 245 a US$ 1.00 throughout, and (b) net deduction from CIF price of CFAF 5,550/ton in 1977 terms as above - Breakdown. 8o As shown in Appraisal, in which cereal production was foreseen as 25% maize and 75% sorghum. Since actual production of maize was negligible, completion farmgate prices are based on a sorghum reference price as a proxy for cereal production of 50% sorghum and 50% millet. - 62 - SENEGAL ANNEX 4 Table 2 TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS Economic Farmgate Prices - Unshelled Groundnuts 1. Breakdown Appraisal: Completion: 1970 1977 -- -- - -- - --(US$/ton)--- - - - - - - Reference price CIF Europe 217.1 555.0 Equivalent Unshelled Basis (70%) 152.0 388.5 Ocean Freight and Insurance 14.7 1/ 25.0 Return from Processing 7.5 FOB Dakar 144.8 363.5 - -- --- -- --(CFAF/ton)- - - - - FOB Dakar 2/ 40,210 89,060 Warehouse to Port 2,700 1/ 3,000 Transport Koumpentoum - Dakar 5,550 3/ Marketing Costs 3,855 5,000 ?rimary Collection 3,000 Eccnomic Farmgate Price 33,655 72,510 2. Trend Appraisal Completion Farmgate Prices Farmgate prices Freight and Inflation Farmgate Price (1970 terms) CIF 4/ Insurance 4/ FOB 4/ Index 5/ in 1977 terms 6/ (CFAF/kg) ---------(US$/ton) --------- (1977 = 100) (CFAF/kg) 1970 33.66 152.0 14.7 144.8 7/ 48.8 56.2 1972 30.59 182.9 15.0 167.9 56.3 56.5 1973 28.77 275.0 15.0 260.0 66.8 78.8 1974 26.84 424.9 20.0 404.9 81.8 104.7 1975 26.84 316.4 25.0 291.4 92.4 60.7 1976 26.84 296.8 25.0 271.8 92.8 55.2 1977 26.84 388.5 25.0 363.5 100.0 72.5 1978 26.84 317.5 25.0 292.5 100.0 55.1 1979 26.84 280.8 25.0 255.8 100.0 46.1 1980 + 26.84 264.9 25.0 239.9 100.0 42.2 1/ Apparently taken together in Appraisal Report as CFAF 6795/ton; see also Annex 4, Table 1, footnote 3. 2/ 1970: CFAF 278 - US$ 1.00; 1977: CFAF 245 = US$ 1.00. 3/ 370 km, CFAF 15/ton-km. 4/ Unshelled basis; actual prices through 1976; for 1977 and after: estimates in 1977 terms. 5/ Bank's index of international inflation dated October 1977. 6/ Obtained from (a) CFAF 245 = US$ 1.00 throughout, and (b) net deduction from FOB price of CFAF 16,550/ton in 1977 terms, as above - Breakdown. 7/ Includes return from processing, US$ 7.5/ton; ignored below. - 63 - SENEGAL ANNEX 4 TERRES NEUVES RESETTLEMENT PROJECT - COMPLETION REPORT Table 3 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS Economic Farmgate Prices - Seed Cotton 1. Breakdown Appraisal: Completion: 1970 1977 Lint Seed Lint Seed --- -------(US$/ton) - -- - Reference price CIF Eurooe 657 83,7 1/ 1,609.4 159.2 1/ Adjusted for quality discount 601 2/ 83.7 1,368.0 2/ 159.2 Ocean freight and insurance 3/ 39 24.6 89.3 57.2 4/ FOB Dakar 562 59.1 1,278.7 102.0 - -- --- --- ---(CFAF/ton)-- - - - FOB Dakar 5/ 156,000 16,410 313,280 25,000 Port handling and storage 3,887 (6,226 5,800 5,200 Transport, Ginnery to port 3,000 1 12,600 Ginning and packing 22,400 2,300 36,100 1,200 Economic into-ginnery price 126,713 7,884 258,780 18,600 Seed cotton Seed cotton Economic into-ginnery price 6/ 52,450 105,600 Primary collection 3,450 6,000 Economic Farmgate Price 49,000 7/ 99,600 2. Trend Apprais&l Completion Farmgate Prices Faragate Prices Freight and Inflation Farmgate Price (1970 terms) 8/ CIT 9/ Insurance FOB 10/ Index 11/ in 1977 terms 12/ -M7AF7Zg) ------------(USton)-------------- (1977 = 100) (CFAF/kg) 1970 39.00 601 39 562 48.8 86.3 1Q72 40.99 703 40 663 56.3 88.9 1973 39.51 1,165 50 1,115 66.8 138.2 1974 38.12 1,240 70 1,170 81.8 114.3 1975 37.95 1,047 89 958 92.4 74.8 1976 37.95 1,486 89 1,397 92.8 121.8 1977 37.95 1,368 89 1,279 100.0 99.6 1978 37.95 1,308 89 1,219 100.0 93.1 1979 37.95 1,288 89 1,199 100.0 91.1 1980 t 37.95 1,247 89 1,158 100.0 87.0 1/ CIF Osaka; 1977 inferred from known FOB price and estimated freight and insurance, see footnote 4. 2/ Estimated at about 7% in Appraisal Report; actual data suggest an average discount of 15% for variety BJA 592 compared to Mexican Strict Middling; the latter figure is adopted for 1977. 3/ Includes sales expenses for lint. / Assumed to have increased pro-rata with lint freight and insurance costs. 5/ 1970: CFAF 278 = US$ 1.00; 1977: CFAF 245 - US$ 1.00. 6/ 1970: 37.5% lint and 62.5% seed; 1977: 36.5% lint and 60% seed. 7/ Appraisal Report substracts costs of seeds, fertilizers and insecticides (CFAF 10/kg of seed cotton) since it does not include such items in project costs; this procedure is not followed here. 8/ Input costs deducted. 9/ Quality discount (15%) deducted; actual prices through 1976; for 1977 and after: estimates in 1977 terms. 10/ Lint only. 11' Bank's index of international inflation dated October 1977. 121/ Obtained from (a) CFAF 245 - USS 1.00, (b) deduction from lint FOB price of CFAF 54,500/tcon, (c) lint content 36.5%, (d) deduction of CFAF 6,000/ton of seed cotton for primary collection and (e) addition to the economic farmgate value of seed cotton determined from lint of 12%, being the additional value of cotton seed in 1977, as well as in 1971. F.I*,(ALq IER*.J; r1:VE.i I&LXIflMENT )'UJt:C - CMILiT0 1IPR liWNNOHIC ANALYSI:3 Economic Cots and Benefits 1971 1972 19'5 1974 197 1976 1977 1978 1979 190 1981 1982-1995 -----------------------------------------(CFAF *000)------------------------------------------------------------------------- Project Costa 1/ Settlement Progr:,m Infrastructure anid STN-owned equipment 21,(XX) 19,215 56,310 55,615 4'.,666 - - 1,,8 - ,308 - 2,154 Settler Recruitment, Transport etc. 2/ - 2,460 6,028 8.568 - - - - - - - utaff and Management 1ee / 638 16,927 26,1148 28,479 17,99? 5,00X) 5.9 5 5,385 5.325 5,385 5,385 5,385 JTN Operating and other Costs - 1,070 2,569 10,720 6,46/ 7,1() 4,200 6,893 6,893 4,2) 5,547 5.547 On-farm cosae 4/ - 617 9,177 24,079 59,858 40,088 43,175 44,694 47,440 47,716 43.175 45,240 Subtotal 2/ 21,638 40,359 10,532 127,461 108,183 52,188 52,760 61,280 59,718 61,609 54,107 58,326 Subtotal net of taxes 19,041 35,516 8,468 112,165 95,201 45.925 46,429 53,926 52.552 54,216 47,614 51,327 Established karmer6 'rogrom Infrastructure and SThS-owned equipment - - 5,334 1,902 - - - - - - - - Staff and Management Fee Y - - 1,500 2,500 3,500 1,000 1.077 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077 STN Operating and Other Coats - - - - - - I - - - - - - On-farm costs 4/ - - 1,516 13,984 19,856 26,493 28,533 28.533 31,617 28.533 29,416 29.326 Subtotal 2 - - 8,350 18,386 23,356 27,493 29,610 29,610 32,694 29,610 30,493 30.403 Subtotal net of taxes 6/ - - 7,348 16,180 20,553 24,194 26,057 26,057 28,771 26,057 26,834 26;755 Total Project Cost 21.638 40,359 10,882 145.847 131,519 79,681 82,370 90,890 92,412 91,219 84,600 88,729 Total Project Costs not of taxes / 19,041 35,516 95,816 128,345 115,754 70,119 72,486 79,983 81.325 80,273 74.448 78,082 I Inflation Index Z/ 51.1 5C.3 66.8 81.8 9':.4 92.8 100 a\ Project Costs net of taxes: 1977 terms Jettlement Program 36,759 63,083 332,437 137,121 103,031 49,488 46,429 53.926 52,552 54,216 47,614 51,327 Estabionhed koraers' Program - - 11,000 19,780 22,244 26,071 26,057 26,057 28,771 26,057 26,834 26,755 Total 36.759 63,083 143.437 156,901 125,275 75,559 72,486 79,983 81.323 80,273 74,448 78.98 Project Coats ,t of taxes: 1970 terms Settlement Program 17,940 30,787 64,635 66,921 50,284 24,152 22,659 26,318 25,648 26,460 23,238 25,050 Established larmern' Propram - - 5,68 9,653 10,856 12,724 12,717 12,717 14,041 12,717 13,096 13,058 Total 17,940 30,787 70i,003 76,574 61,140 35.251 35,376 39,035 39,689 39,177 36.334 38,107 Settlement rgram beneite in 1977 terse 9 - 4,198 50,988 259,467 350,029 172.318 258,237 220,954 194,247 182,371 182,571 182.371 At Appraisal Prices, 1970 terms - P,355 18,930 72,628 149,677 84,996 106,215 113,992 114,406 114,406 114,406 114,406 Original Appraisal Estimate Ll/ - 2,753 10,077 25,523 43,273 56,957 63,764 66,365 72,305 76.759 80,720 80,720 Net benefits: :ettlement Progrum In 1977 terms (36,759) (58,885) (81.449) 122.346 226,99b 122,830 211,808 167,028 141,695 128,155 134,757 13),Q44 At Appraisal Output prices, 1970 terms (17,940) (28,4,2) (45,705) 5,707 99?)93 60,844 83,556 87,674 88,758 87.946 91,168 89,56 Original Appraisal Estimate (47,822) (62,921) (70,509) (52,585) (6,973) 15,163 33,870 37,853 43.926 47,917 53,543 54,330 Actual prices through 1976, inflation factor for 1977 over 1976: 7.7%, constant 1977 prices thereafter. Recruitmaent, transport and initial subsistence (food anf! buildinF materials). Total cost in 1976; CFAF 24 million of which CFAV 6 million attributable to the first Terree eauves PojVect, of which CIA 5 millIon attributable to the settlement program; same allocation maintained after 1976. Fertilizer valued, as at Annex 2, Ts.e 2, grose of subsidy but no, adjustment made to include the negligible subsidy on animal-drawn implements. Unlike Annex 2, Table 2, tle line also includes seed an, insecticide for cotton. Provision is made for replacement of malmal-dra-n implements beyond 1977. Gross of subsidies, with the single exception noted at . STaxes eatio,ted at 12A of project couts. Banklu index of international inflation dated (ctober 1977. 1970 inflation index in 1977 terms: 48.8; 1977 prices in 1970 terms; 204.9. Quantitiea* from Annex 2, Table 4; prices from Annex 4, Tables 1,2 and 3. In 1970 terme; prices from Annex 4, TaUles 1, 2 and 3; sarghum price used for all cereuls since male prodectlon ea negligible; s**d motton price increased by input cost of CFAF 8/kg, which had been deducted from benefits and excluded from coast at Appraisal, *a Annex 4, Table 3, footnotea 7 and 8. LI/ Appraisal Ne,ort, Annex 9, Table 1; inclusion of the input coats of cotton wnuld have iiacreased estimated gross benefite by about 7%.  斗