Upper Volta - Rural Development Fund Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FILE COPY Report No.2651 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UPPER VOLTA RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Credit 317-UV) September 4, 1979 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their offlcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Project Performance Audit Report UPPER VOLTA RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Credit 317-UV) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface i Basic Data Sheet ii Disbursement Table iii Highlights iv PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. Summary 1 II. Main Issues 4 A. Project Design and Objectives 4 B. Participation of the Rural Population 7 C. Prefinancing 9 D. Institutional Aspects 9 Annex 1 13 Annex 2 16 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Background 17 II. Identification, Preparation and Appraisal 17 III. Appraisal Estimates 21 IV. Actual Project Performance 25 V. Implementation Problems 29 VI. Changes in the Second RDF Project 35 VII. Economic Evaluation 37 VIII. IDA, Co-lender, RDF and Government Performance 40 Annex 1 - Description of the Project 43 Annex 2 - Appraisal Cost Estimates 44 Annex 3 - Physical Implementation of Subprojects 46 Annex 4 - Total Actual Project Cost and Financing 49 Annex 5 - Allocation of the Proceeds of the Credit 56 Annex 6 - Bottomland Rice Cultivation 59 Annex 7 - Weighted Average Rate of Return 61 Annex 8 - IDA Supervision Missions 76 Annex 9 - Basic Documents 77 Map This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Project Performance Audit Report UPPER VOLTA RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Credit 317-UV) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the Rural Development Fund Project in Upper Volta for which Credit 317-UV was approved in June 1972 in the sum of US$2.2 million. The final disbursement in respect of this credit was made on June 23, 1977. The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department and a Project Completion Report dated August 5, 1978. The PCR was prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office on the basis of a country visit in February/March 1978. The audit memorandum is based on a review of the Appraisal Report (No. PA-127a) dated May 16, 1972; the President's Report (P-1075) of May 23, 1972, the Credit Agreement dated June 26, 1972 and the PCR; correspondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in relevant Bank files have also been consulted and Bank staff associated with the project have been interviewed. An OED mission visited Upper Volta in December 1978. The mission held discussions with officials of the ministries and organiza- tions concerned with the project as well as with project management. Field trips to project sites were made and participating farmers were interviewe,-. The information obtained during that mission was used to test the validity of the conclusions of the PCR and permitted disccussion of participation of the rural population in development work, an issue not broadly covered by the PCR. A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower on May 17, 1979. Comments received from the Rural Development Fund's project manager and the Acting Minister of Rural Development are in Annexes 1 and 2 of the PPAM. Suggested changes have been introduced or different views footnoted. The audit finds the PCR comprehensive and accurate with respect to the project's principal achievements and shortcomings. The points dis- cussed by the audit mission have been selected because of their importance to this as well as other integrated rural development projects. The valuable assistance provided by the Government of Upper Volta, the Banque Nationale de Developpement, project staff and the farmers visited during the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT BASIC DATA SHEET UPPER VOLTA - RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (CREDIT 317-UV) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 3.0 3.37 Overrun () - 2 /1 Credit Amount (US$ million) 2.2 2.2 Disbursed )- 2.2 Cancelled - Repaid to ) March 31, 1979 - Outstanding to ) - 2.2 Date Physical Components Completed 12/31/75 12/31/76 /1 Proportion Completed by Appraisal Target Date (%) - 75 7T Proportion of Time Overrun (M) 33 Incremental Economic Rate of Return (%) 16.0 22 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Current Estimate First Mention in Files or Timetable 12/15/69 Government's Application 1971 Negotiations 04/10/72 - 04/08/72 Board Approval 05/30/72 06/13/72 06/08/72 Credit Agreement Date 06/26/72 - 06/26/72 Effectiveness Date 09/29/72 10/16/72 Closing Date 09/30/76 06/23/77 Borrower Republic of Upper Volta Executing Agency Banque Nationate de Developpement Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 Follow-on Project Name Second Rural Development Fund Project Credit Number 640-uv Amount (US$ million) us$9.4 Credit Agreement Date 06/21/76 MISSION DATA Month, No. of No. of Date of Mission /1 Year Weeks Persons Manweeks Report Appraisal 08/71 05/16/72 Supervision 1 08/72 3 1 /2 3.35 10/25/72 Supervision 10 04/73 2 1 2 05/08/73 Supervision 11I 11/73 1 1 1 01/15/74 Supervision IV 05/74 3 /3 1 3 08/18/74 Supervision V 10/74 3 7-3 2 6 12/10/74 Supervision VI 04/75 2 7 2 1 2 05/22/75 Supervision VII 09-10/75 2 7-3 1 /4 3 11/12/75 Supervision VIII 02/76 3 7 1 3 03/19/76 Supervision IX 04/77 3 6 2 6 06/01/77 Supervision X 02-03/78 3 7 1 3 08/05/78 Tots11 32.35 COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Communaute Financiere Africaine Franc (CFAF) Year: Appraisal Year Average Exchange Rate: US$1 = CFAF 256 Intervening Years Average US$1 = CFAF 237 Completion Year Average US$1 = CFAF 245 /1 Project was scaled down. 7-2 Two staff only part time. Time spent also on other projects (mission IX dealt with 4 other projects, missions V to VIII dealt with 3 other projects and missions IV and X with 2 other projects). Su One consultant part time.  - iii - Project Performance Audit Report UPPER VOLTA - RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Credit 317-UV) DISBURSEMENT TABLE (US$ million, cumulative) Actual Actual as % Period ending Appraisal Estimate Disbursements of Estimated 06/30/73 0.3 - 0 12/31/73 0.7 0.1 14 06/30/74 0.9 0.4 44 12/31/74 1.3 0.9 69 06/30/75 1.6 1.4 88 12/31/75 2.1 1.7 81 06/30/76 2.2 1.9 86 12/31/76 - 2.1 - 06/30/77 2.2  - iv - Project Performance Audit Report UPPER VOLTA RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Credit 317-UV) HIGHLIGHTS The credit was made to support small subprojects which because of their size were not individually suitable for Bank Group lending. These subprojects included irrigation and water development, construction of storehouses, upgrading of feeder roads, erosion control, some unidentified sub-components and studies. An important criterion in subproject selection was the required demonstration of the rural population's interest in the undertakings through providing free labor for project works. This highly innovative project was successful in implementing diversified and scattered subprojects. Appraisal estimates of bottom land development and erosion control were exceeded while the other subprojects with the exception of the irrigation and wells subprojects came close to targets. The project succeeded in reaching about 230,000 people in one of the most disadvantaged regions of Africa. The problems of supporting the organizations responsible for project administration and maintenance of investments, once external assistance is withdrawn, remain unresolved. Higher producer prices than anticipated at appraisal resulted in an economic rate of return of 22% which is above the 16% estimated at appraisal (excluding the feeder road component). Points of special interest are: - problem of recurrent cost financing remains unresolved (PPAN paras. 18 to 20, 23, 26, 27; PCR paras. 2.5, 3.2 and 5.14); - farmers' interest in providing free labor depends on benefits which are obvious and materialize quickly (PPAM paras. 29 to 35; PCR paras. 2.2 and 5.12); - delays in project start-up due to difficulties in allocating counterpart funds (PPAM paras. 36 and 37; PCR para. 5.3); - although adopting a labor intensive approach to road construction RDF was found less successful in this under- taking than the Service d'Entretien des Routes (SERS) (PPAM paras. 6, 43 to 47; PCR paras. 4.2, 5.13, 6.3 and 8.6).  Project Performance Audit Memorandum UPPER VOLTA RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Credit 317-UV) I. SUMMARY 1/ Identification, Preparation and Appraisal 1. The Rural Development Fund Project (RDF) was identified by a Bank mission in late 1969, prepared by IDA in collaboration with the co- lenders and government, and appraised in August 1971. Credit 317-UV was signed in June 1972 and became effective in October 1972. 2. The objective of RDF was to finance a variety of small sub- projects designed to raise agricultural production which, because of their size and scattered location, were not suitable for conventional Bank Group lending. The project, which was conceived as the first, experimental phase of a larger program, was to comprise: (1) 500 wells to improve village water supply; (2) 700 small village storehouses for farm inputs; (3) the development of 1,500 ha of bottomlands for .rice cultivation; (4) erosion control works on 1,000 ha to improve crop yields (sorghum, cotton, ground- nuts); (5) 200 ha of small irrigation schemes below existing dams, to produce rice; (6) the-upgrading of 270 km of feeder roads; and (7) studies and a number of unidentified subprojects. An essential point in subproject selection 'was the interest of the people concerned, expressed through their willingness to provide free labor for subproject implementation. 3. The main institutions involved were the RDF division established in the Banque Nationale de Developpement (BND) to manage the credit funds; the Direction de l'Hydraulique et de l'Equipement Rural (HER), responsible for the design and construction of wells and land and water development schemes; the Public Works Department (PWD), responsible for feeder road improvement; and the Organismes Regionaux de Developpement (ORD), respon- sible for subproject identification and preparation, and provision of support services to farmers. An Interdepartmental Technical Committee was formed to supervise RDF and approve its programs. 4. Project cost was estimated at CFAF 778 million (US$3.0 million), to be financed by the IDA credit of US$2.2 million (72%), French aid covering the cost of expatriate technical assistance (13%), and a govern- ment contribution (15%). The government agreed to prefinance project expenditures through quarterly advances to RDF. The project was to be implemented in three years. It was expected to benefit between 300,000 and 450,000 people and its economic rate of return was estimated to be 15.6%. 1/ Adapted from the PCR. -2- Implementation 5. Instead of three years, actual project implementation took over four years -- Cr. 317-UV was fully disbursed in June 1977. Progress was slow through 1973 due to avoidable delays in the recruitment of staff, the arrangement of prefinancing, the adoption of a model contract for participants in land and water development schemes, and slow procure- ment of equipment. The implementation rate picked up substantially thereafter. In order to avoid a gap between the first and the second RDF, which was appraised'in October 1975, project management had to reduce activities in 1975/76. 1/ 6. The overall implementation rate differed greatly between sub- projects, ranging from 17% of appraisal estimates for small irrigation schemes below existing dams to 115% for bottomland development and 140% for erosion control. The feeder road component was combined with that of Cr. 442-UV (Drought Relief Fund), which was also managed by RDF. The combined target could not be achieved, largely because of the requirement to transfer all road equipment to the Service d'Entretien des Routes Secondaires (SERS), an agency financed under Cr. 579-UV (Rural Roads), by June 1976. 7. After some initial hesitation, farmers strongly supported well construction, bottomland development, erosion control as well as feeder roads, and free labor was provided as foreseen. In the case of village storehouses', farmers' interest and willingness to supply free labor had evidently been overestimated. To save the program, it was agreed to pay them a small fee for their help, although this meant a departure from the project concept. 8. At CFAF 837 million, the actual cost of the reduced project that could be completed with the available financing is 7.5% higher than the appraisal estimate for the full project. International infla- tion and the dollar devaluation are the main reasons for this result. Inflation totalled 90% during 1973-1977, and unit costs of storehouses, feeder roads, small irrigation schemes and wells exceeded appraisal estimates by 50-80%. At actual unit costs, the execution of the original program 2/ would have-required 43% more funds than estimated at appraisal. On the other hand, the dollar devaluation reduced the CFAF equivalent of Cr. 317-UV, and indirectly also the government's contribution which was calculated as a percentage of expenditures covered by the credit. Cr. 317-UV yielded only'CFAF 495 million, or 12% less than expected. With CFAF 151 million drawn from Cr. 442-UV, IDA more than compensated 1/ Project year, July 1 to June 30. 2/ Excluding overheads and the allocation for unidentified items. -3- the shortfall, and its share in project financing increased to 77%. French aid (CFAF 96 million, 12%) amounted to slightly less than estimated at appraisal, mainly because of long periods when planned staff positions were vacant. The government contributed CFAF 95 million (11%), against CFAF 118 million foreseen at appraisal. 9. The project is now estimated to benefit about 230,000 people. Since actual data on economic costs and benefits are incomplete or missing, the recalculation of its rate of return is based largely on estimates, which closely follow the approach of the appraisal report. On this basis, the weighted average rate of return of all subprojects is 19.1%, and 22.2% excluding the feeder roads component. With benefits reduced by 10%, the latter rate would still be 18.5%, and it would take a reduction in benefits of over 30% to reduce it below 10%. Implementation Problems 10. Staffing was the main problem during project implementation. Vacant staff positions were responsible for RDF's failure to monitor and evaluate the subprojects it financed as foreseen at appraisal. Lack of staff in HER was the reason for the poor design and subsequent fail- ure of the small program of irrigation below existing dams. Shortage of extension staff, due to the government's failure to provide the required financing as ,agreed, was the reason for the insufficient support the ORD provided to farmers. Other problems occurred (accounts, audit) but had no major impact on project implementation. 11. Besides providing free labor, farmers were expected to pay an annual charge to cover the direct costs incurred by the ORD for the main- tenance of bottomlands and small irrigation schemes. The charge was not levied, as the government felt that it could not demand payment from RDF farmers while none was required under other similar projects. IDA tacitly accepted this position. The quality of maintenance done so far was not always satisfactory, but project management expects it to improve. The question of how maintenance costs will be met was left open. 12. Implementing the feeder roads program with existing Public Works or rented equipment as foreseen at appraisal proved to be uneco- nomical, as PWD was not always able to provide the equipment and rental from local contractors was too expensive. Since the road program under Cr. 442-UV also had to be reformulated,, project management and PWD pro- posed, and IDA agreed, to combine the two road components and buy the required equipment with credit funds. Changes in RDF II 13. Concentrating on the Mossi plateau, RDF II (Cr. 640-UV) finances the same types of subprojects as did RDF I, with the exception of feeder roads; in addition, it finances tubewells, village centers and medium- term credit for agricultural equipment. 14. Since most problems under RDF I resulted from lack of staff, RDF II provides funds to build up RDF's evaluation capacity and to hire expatriate and Voltaic staff for HER and the ORD. Technical assistance is complemented by a training program for nationals including scholar- ships, short rural development courses, and consultants' services for an extension training study. II. MAIN ISSUES A. Project Design and Objectives 15. The Completion Report emphasizes the innovational and experi- mental character of this project which was one of the first rural developments to be financed by the Bank. The establishment of a Rural Development Fund (RDF) within the Banque National de Developpement (BND) was justified in the President's Report on the following grounds: "The most critical constraints on rural development in Upper Volta, as analyzed above, can only be dealt with through a multiplicity-of small projects which do not lend themselves to direct Bank group financing. Hence the proposal to create a Rural Development Fund to channel external funds to local communities." 16. The subprojects to be financed by the RDF were expected to meet the following criteria: (i) a large segment of the rural population should be reached; (ii) produce quick results in regard to meeting the most urgent needs of the population; (iii) involve few organizational problems; and (iv) rely to a large extent on significant inputs of family labor. 17. The report of the economic mission that identified the project in 1969 states that projects "...should not give rise to need for significant recurring expenditures that could not be supported locally." A solution to the problem was thought to be possible through "...local entities would be willing to provide free labor to carry out the project." The report - 5 - concluded that "...prevailing poverty cannot for a long time be expected to contribute significantly to the increase in recurrent expenditures that are necessary to rural development. It would be unwise to emphasize pure investment outlays at the expense of recurrent expenditures." 18. The Bank's preoccupation with finding a solution on how to finance recurrent costs is evident in the Credit Agreement which stipu- lates contracts between the farmers and the ORD. The Credit also provided for a study to review: (i) the project's impact on the national budget; (ii) the beneficiaries' intentions to share project costs and (iii) ways and means to collect revenues. 19. The envisaged decentralization of recurrent cost financing is thus linked 'to a decentralization of planning activities. The siting and scope of subprojects is left to the ORD in charge of identifying the needs and the interests of the population. The availability of a line of credit for unspecified projects should encourage the ORDs to identify new types of projects. As conceived the project had by implication two complementary final objectives: (i) establish a decentralized planning system at ORD level, thus permitting the local population to participate in the planning exercise; and (ii) establish a decentralized system of project financing aimed at reducing capital investment costs and involving the beneficiaries to a higher degree in recurrent cost financing. 20. The project was partially successful in meeting the above objectives. ORDs play a part in planning and in conveying the needs of the local people in identifying and siting new projects. While formal farmer committees were not established to assist the ORDs, the latter were thus in touch with the farmers and could reflect their preferences in project planning. 21. The decentralized planning function of the ORDs, however, played a limited role in identifying new projects. The actual use of credit funds meant for financing "unidentified" ORD schemes serves as an indicator of the limited ORD success in developing their own projects (PCR para. 4.4). Reallocated funds have been used for financing ORD infra- structure and an engineering study. The study on the project's impact on the Government budget, on beneficiaries' willingness and capabilities to share costs, and on possibilities to collect taxes was not undertaken although, in the opinion of the audit, the study would have been an important project component. -6- 22. The typical contract at ORD level, which stipulated the rights and obligations of beneficiaries of land improvement schemes, was not enforced. The PCR (para. 5.14) only states that "the question of how maintenance costs will be met was left open." A more careful analysis of what Bank reports term "the most critical constraints on rural development in Upper Volta" would have revealed that other rural development projects in the country did not provide for beneficiaries sharing costs and that it would be unrealistic to introduce this in a single project. 23. The project thus failed in reaching one of its main objectives, i.e. to introduce a system under which project beneficiaries would finance recurrent costs of small projects. This failure is in striking contrast to the success the RDF had in financing small investments. The RDF per- formed satisfactorily as banker for the ORDs which found that after other aid programs had come to an end, they had now an efficient financier safeguarding the continuity of their operations. 24. In this context it is interesting to examine the alternative financing possibilities of projects assisted by the RDF. By their nature and size these projects are usually financed through the national invest- ment budget or through the rural communities' budget which also takes care of their recurrent costs. The project impact on these institutions was not analyzed by the PCR and the audit mission had insufficient time to study this aspect in depth. It would have been interesting to learn if external financing contributed to increasing revenues of self-financing entities or, as the audit mission fears, has led to RDF substituting funds for recurrent cost financing of failing local institutions.l/ The need for a second Bank Group financed project to assure survival of the RDF highlights the problem.l/ 25. The problem of providing adequate funds for financing recurrent costs of project-created infrastructure in rural development projects will require more study. In cases where incremental agricultural produc- tion is to improve the farmers' own nutritional intake, and/or where his produce is to enter local markets, without being handled by marketing organizations, it will be difficult to collect charges from participating farmers. Even with crops destined for exports recovery of developmental/ maintenance costs that would be charged only to farmers benefitting from specific development schemes, would be difficult if not impossible. 26. The difficulty of recovering maintenance costs from farmers whose cash incomes remain at such low levels that individual taxation would be uneconomic leads to the question whether adequate consideration 1/ The West Africa Regional Office does not agree with these conclusions. - 7 - has been given to this problem. This problem is not particularly restricted to, but is rather acute in the Sahelian countries where taxation of a few export crops constitutes an important part of Government revenue collection. The study for analyzing the impact of project implementation on the public budget (Part D,-Credit Agreement) was not undertaken due to reallocation of funds for other project activities (PCR para. 4.4). Nor was the study revived in the follow-on project and answers to the above problems are still not forthcoming. 27. The FDR II remains a financial outlet channeling external funds to the country's poorest regions. This is not a bad accomplishment, but one can question the long-term effectiveness of an undertaking that does not anticipate the promotion of saving efforts and the eventual substitu- tion of external finance through local funds. B. Participation of the Rural Population 28. One essential criterion for the selection of subprojects was the interest demonstrated by the local population and their willingness to contribute unpaid labor for the construction of project infrastructure (other than feeder roads). Labor input received different treatments in the economic analysis. While labor input for construction was taken as a cost, farmers' maintenance work was considered to be at no cost. The appraisal report states "that farmers would treat such maintenance work as part of their normal farming operations." 29. The PCR (para. 5.12) mentions that the farmers' interest and willingness to work without pay for the construction of village store- houses was overestimated at appraisal. It also states that overall "after some initial hesitation..., free labor was provided as foreseen." The audit confirms this judgement but points to the fact that organized food distribution (through the World Food Program) for the voluntary workers constituted an important motivation and most important, that the population's interest in providing free labor is strongly linked to the kind of project to be undertaken. 30. From the farmers' point of view the subprojects fall in three categories: (i) subprojects which benefit immediately the farmers who provided free labor (bottomland improvements, cattle sheds for manure production); (ii) subprojects where benefits are more diffused and serving farmers collectively (village storehouses, feeder roads, wells); and - 8 - (iii) subprojects under which only a minority of the participating farmers will benefit initially (soil conservation schemes). 31. It is not surprising to find that the willingness tc provide free labor is highest when it comes to work falling into the first cate- gory. In such cases when the project caters to priority needs of the population the added incentive in the form of free food is not required. This is especially the case in the bottomland improvements where the parcels reclaimed are immediately redistributed among participating workers. 32. For the two other categories free labor is likely to be made available on the basis of how urgent farmers consider the undertaking to be and how long the work is likely to take. It is understandable that improved water supplies provide a stronger motivation to contribute free labor than village stores or feeder roads. 33. The appraisal had not recognized the need for incentives to safeguard timely and successful implementation of project works. Food from the Food for the World Program provided the required incentives although not anticipated and/or planned at appraisal. Due to the absence of coordination between the Program and the Bank, however, different priorities were allocated. Lessons learned from this experience would call for closer cooperation between the Bank and agencies providing food for otherwise unpaid rural workers. Getting farmers to participate in the construction/establishment of infrastructure/soil conservation works is a sound principal but it should be recognized that farmers may have different priorities, especially when confronted with a venture with which they had no previous experience. Incentives like free food may decide the success or failure of a proposed investment. 34. A different problem concerns the soil conservation subproject. In this case, incentives in the form of free food proved insufficient. Farmers were reluctant to provide free labor which benefitted a few families at an early stage while it would take a number of years until the last family would obtain land protected against erosion.l/ With the benefit of hindsight it may be stated that assuming large scale voluntary, unpaid labor input for project undertakings with extended construction periods under prevailing conditions in Upper Volta was unrealistic. Financial arrangements for adequate compensation of workers would have been required. 1/ Project management states that this sub-component enjoys the greatest success among the people and they have never demanded any remuneration in cash (see Annex 1). -9- C. Prefinancing 35. The project encountered difficulties in obtaining timely Govern- ment counterpart funds and this contributed to a delay in project start-up. Other reasons for project start-up delays are discussed in the PCR paras. 5.2, 5.4 and 5.5. Due to the country's overall budgetary constraints, budget funds could not be reallocated within the financial year already underway when the project started. In this respect it appears that the Bank's approach to secure start-up funds differs from that of Fonds Europeen de Developpement (FED) procedures which allow for adequate donor financing of initial expenditures if a scheme is to be started during and not at the beginning of a financial year. 36. There was a lack of coordination on the Bank's side at the time of appraisal to ascertain the availability of Government counterpart funds during an ongoing budget year. While Upper Volta's fiscal year extends from January 1 to December 31, the credit was negotiated in April and was signed in June. The difficulties in providing counterpart funds and the consequent delay caused not only deferred benefits but also forced the Government to take recourse to costly short-term borrowing from local banking institutions. D. Institutional Aspects 37. The PCR (paras. 4.3 and 4.4) refers briefly to the organization proposed at appraisal. It does not examine the process of sharing respon- sibilities in project execution which was a special feature of this operation. 38. Project implementation called for cooperation of four institu- tions.: - the ORD, to be responsible for identification, preparation and implementation of projects (with the exception of feeder roads); - HER and the Public Works technical services, whose role would be to assist the ORD in technical aspects and preparation of subprojects; - RDF, established within the Banque Nationale de Developpe- ment (BND), to be responsible for appraisal and monitoring of projects and evaluation of their socio-economic impact; - local villagers, expected to take part in the works, who would be organized in groups under contracts with the - 10 - 39. As in the case of the cotton project 1/, financial assistance by the Bank led to the creation of a new organization (RDF) whose position vis-a-vis existing institutions had to be defined and which required additional human and financial resources. In general it can be stated that establishment of new institutions, in addition to the inevitable problems of coordination as well as conflicting areas of responsibility, often serves to accentuate the tendency of governments to employ higher level technical staff on duties of administrative nature, thus making recourse to costly technical assistance unavoidable.2/ 40. The adopted institutional arrangements have led to a weakening in determining priorities and especially of grass roots planning. For example, planning of erosion control subprojects is now governed solely by the availability of funds to be allocated by the RDF to the ORD. The siting and the scope of the projects, however, is dependent on the dyna- mism of local staff and money put at their disposal and may not always be in line with farmers' priorities. The design of subprojects is not based on an analysis of actual constraints prevailing in individual zones, but is more concerned with an equitable distribution of external funds among the various ORDs. 41. The RDF thus functioned only as a financial channel, in the originally anticipated role. The planning/programming function was taken on by the agencies mentioned above. The absence of farmer organizations did not permit RDF actions to have the necessary coherence at the base.3/ 42. Responsibility for technical studies which, as the PCR shows, was a bottleneck (para. 4.4), was dispersed among two institutions: the ORD and the technical services. Allocation of responsibilities for the studies tended to be determined by availability of qualified staff in the various institutions rather than by any clearly-defined policy. A good example of this lack of coherent organization is the RDF feeder road unit. 43. Although it was originally foreseen that design and construc- tion of feeder roads would be handled by the Public Works Department, responsibility was in fact given to the RDF and subsequently transferred 1/ Credit 225-UV audit report under preparation. 2/ However, it should be noted that in the case of this project, the training of local management and staff was highly successful. 3/ The Region thinks that the criticism of the lack of farmer organiza- tions is overemphasized and that the ORDs could gauge the needs of the farmers especially* in a case where farmers helped implement the project. Furthermore RDF II provides certain investments like grain banks, mills, etc. which require a group approach. - 11 - to the newly-established SERS under the Ministry of Public Works. The PCR (para. 8.6) comments on the manner of the Bank's intervention in this matter and notes the poor technical performance of the new unit. However, questions of procedure should not be allowed to obscure the basic problems. The accomplishments of the two institutions in the light of prevailing conditions within the country can be measured against two criteria: (i) their capacity to carry out the road works at minimum cost and using labor-intensive methods; (ii) their capacity to ensure continued and effective maintenance of the roads also after external assistance ceases. 44. With regard to the first point the RDF achieved satisfactory results (336 km built as against 270 km foreseen) and has not had any difficulty in recruiting the necessary labor, which was probably attracted during the Sahelian drought period by receiving half the legal minimum wage rate and the WFP food allocation. On the other hand, the audit mission noticed the extreme deterioration of the roads built by RDF in the Kaya region, but was unable to determine whether the deterioration is due, as RDF claims, to lack of maintenance, or, to faulty construction. Thus RDF's meeting the second criterion is in doubt. The relative finan- cial autonomy of RDF has allowed it to practice wage and work organization policies close to those of the private sector (e.g. payment of overtime), but only because of external financing. 45. SERS may not be in a position to attract large numbers of local labor but would be in a better position to guarantee proper maintenance. Although SERS had been paralyzed by administrative constraints, which are not different in essence from those of the ORDs, these are now gradually alleviated (e.g. special status of personnel, autonomous budget, etc.) and will permit SERS to put its operations on a more permanent basis. 46. In the case of SERS, although there were delays in finalizing the undertaking, it is worth noting that the Bank assisted in reorganizing a technical service which had the advantage of being well integrated into the national financing system. An organization was thus supported by the Bank that, judging from its performance, is likely to survive also after external aid ceases.l/ 1/ Considering the Government's actual financial situation and prospects for improvement, the Region feels this assessment to be optimistic. The Region also states that the RDF approach directly created income for the rural population while the SERS approach does not. - 12 - 47. The establishment of a Rural Development Fund served as a temporary measure to overcome the weakness of existing technical and financial institutions. After the withdrawal of external financing and in the absence of local community revenues, the RDF became the main source of financing for the ORD, which otherwise would have been unable to operate. The RDF showed a tendency to act as technical adviser, thus compensating for the inadequacies of the Technical Committee and the technical services. The project did not provide any answers or easy solutions to the problems: (i) should the organizational structure of the Rural Develop- ment Fund be strengthened and should it be given autonomy vis-a-vis BND; (ii) or should the functions temporarily assumed by RDF be transferred to already existing institutions which would then be reorganized and reinforced. - 13 - ANNEX 1 (Translated into English) Rural Development Fund Ougadougou, Upper Volta June 28, 1979 Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Director Operations Evaluation Department DJT/IF IBED Washington, D.C. Dear Sir: I thank you for your letter of May 16, 1979, transmitting the evaluation reports on RDF I and the Upper Volta Drought Relief Fund Project. We have read the reports with great interest. With a view to better harmonizing our viewpoints, and in a spirit of constructive cooperation, we wish to make one or two obser- vations, as follows: RDF I Paragraph 1 Maintenance of the schemes The problem of maintenance of, in particular, the agricultural irrigation schemes (bottomlands) has been a constant concern of the Upper Volta authorities responsible for their implementation. The solutions at present contemplated, while they do not totally meet the requirements, nevertheless merit attention since it is necessary to identify the nature of the problem clearly. RDF has opted for a Q_em-m j development system aimed at progressively obtaining total control of the water. Hence the transition from traditional to improved bottomlands. This considerably less expensive approach makes it possible to involve the beneficiaries closely and to measure their interest, throughout the process of implementation of the system. In our view the problem is to install an adequately effective staff that is capable of sensitizing and motivating the beneficiaries of the schemes, for in the long run they will have to undertake - 14 - maintenance of the operations, as they do in the case of the traditional fields. For that reason we have undertaken a crash program of recruit- ment and training of staff and a program of training of small-farmer beneficiaries. All of these operations began in October 1977 for staff and in October 1978 for farmers. Paragraph 16 We are astonished at the view expressed in this paragraph, particularly the idea that the operations financed by the RDF are not innovative; as we see it, innovation lies not only in the nature of the operations but also in the methodology and technology applied in executing them. In this connection we would have wished the report to be more explicit, since it is clear that the RDF has installed other systems of implementation of certain projects. Paragraph 25 Study of the impact of the RDF on institutions The report states that the mission did not have sufficient time to do work which in our view was its primary task. It limits itself to assumptions, after having said in paragraph 21 that the actual project results and the direction of the project appear to show that the initial objectives of the project have been lost sight of during implementation, whereas our entire policy hinges on the guidelines stated in paragraph 20. We feel that we did not succeed 100 percent but at no time has this policy been lost sight of, either by the Project Management or by the Government. Paragraph 34 We cannot possibly agree with the report concerning the manner in which the erosion protection program has been received by the local people. Quite to the contrary, this is the segment of the project that gained and continues to enjoy the greatest success among the people, and they have never demanded any remuneration in cash. All we did -- in view of the food shortage -- was to distribute PAM food in certain cases. Paragraphs 35 and 36 Some difficulties certainly arose in mobilizing Upper Volta governmental advances and counterpart funds but that does not mean that the Ministry of Finance was only marginally involved in the project negotiations. - 15 - The Ministry of Finance has always been involved in the installation of the project and at a given moment has even become its mainspring. Paragraph 39 This entire paragraph is without foundation: - It seems clear to us that the drafters of the report have not studied the RDF's planning system at all. - The manure shelters program has never been suspended; it has even been extended to other ORDs. Page 17 Drought relief project We have no basic comments. In general, we should like to take this opportunity to tell you that while we are receptive to constructive, objective and soundly- based criticism, the present report, though revealing in some places familiarity with the course of RDF I, seems to us to be neither very realistic nor objective. The report seems to have been prepared on the basis of elements that have nothing to do with RDF I. We cannot, therefore, endorse this evaluation report on RDF I. Please accept the expression of mW distinguished consideration. Copies - Mr. Peberdy, Chief, Division IV, Agricultural Projects, Western Africa - Mr. Florent Agueh, Resident Representative, World Bank, Ougadougou (Stamp) D. J. TRAORE Director Rural Development Fund  - 16- ANNEX 2 Ministry of Rural Development Republic of Upper Volta Ouagadougou, July 16, 1979 No. 0776 DR/FRD (Tanslated into English) Re: First Rural Development Fund Project Your letter of May 17, 1979 The Minister of Rural Development To I. B. R. D. Washington Attention: Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Director Operations Evaluation Department Dear Sir: It is with great interest that I have read the Project Performance Audit reports on the First Rural Development Fund Project (Credit 317-UV) and the Drought Relief Fund Project (Credit 442-UV) in Upper Volta. With a view to harmonizing our viewpoints, I wish to bring to your attention the following observations: The F.D.R. (Rural Development Fund), in this phase of ekperimentation, made a particular effort in setting up an efficient operational, financial and control network for the projects. Although the performance is still not completely satisfactory, the Technical Comnittee'of this Department, of which I am the.head, and which is responsible for the supervision of projects, has always very closely followed the projects implemented by the Fund in order to ensure a better adaptation to the objectives defined by the Government, in constant consultation with the staff of the World Bank. As an experimental project, I consider that the achievements,as far as the following issues are concerned, are rather encouraging: 1) figures relevant to the physical implementation, 2) their impact on rural development. Trusting that the above comments will have your best attention, I remain, Yours sincerely, (stamp) signed by Amadou G. Tamboura Minister of Tourism and Environment acting for the Minister of Rural Development cc: The Resident ReprE-cntative World Bank Ouiagi-dou.-u  - 17 - UPPER VOLTA RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Credit 317-UV) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. BACKGROUND 1.1 The Rural Development Fund project, for which an IDA credit of US$2.2 million (Cr. 317-UV) was approved on June 8, 1972, was the second Bank Group operation in Upper Volta's agricultural sector, following a cotton project started in 1971. Its objective was to finance, through a local intermediary, a variety of small subprojects in which the population concerned was genuinely interested but which because of their small size and scattered location had been neglected by donors despite their potential contribution to rural develop- ment. The three-year project was conceived as the first, experimental phase of a larger program to improve the standard of living in rural areas, especial- ly those with little scope for developing cash crops. It was expected to benefit between 300,000 and 450,000 people. 1.2 The French Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC) and Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE) provided technical assistance for the pro- ject which was carried out under the responsibility of the Rural Development Fund (RDF), a division of the Banque Nationale de Developpement (BND) created for this purpose. The credit agreement between the Republic of Upper Volta and IDA was signed on'June 26, 1972, and became. effective on October 16, 1972. The credit was fully disbursed on June 23, 1977, nine months after the original closing date and five months after the effectiveness date of the follow-up project (Second Rural Development Fund, Cr. 640-UV). 1.3 This report is based on a review of IDA records and the findings of a completion mission which visited Upper Volta in February/March 1978 -- covering Cr. 317-UV (RDF), 442-UV (Drought Relief), and 225-UV (Cotton). RDF manage- ment had intended to prepare a project completion report, but staff constraints prevented it from doing so; it gave full support to the completion mission, however. II. IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 2.1 The proposal to establish "a small fund for the financing of small local development projects within the framework of existing ORD's" 1/ 2/ came from the Bank's 1969 economic mission to Upper Volta. The mission had ex- amined "the extent to which agricultural development requires the financing of projects which cannot be direcly undertaken by the Bank Group but which might best be financed through a local intermediary institution" 2/ and had found consensus that there was a real need in this respect which was not being met. It informally discussed the possibility of extending an IDA credit for this purpose, to be managed by BND as an autonomous fund, and CCCE indicated its readiness to reinforce BND staff. 1/ Organismes regionaux de developpement; decentralized government agencies responsible for the formulation and implementation of development projects in their regions. 2/ Memorandum to files, December 15, 1969, Findings of Economic and Rural Development Mission to Upper Volta, para. 16. - 18 - 2.2 To qualify for financing under such a credit, the mission wrote, pro- jects had to be economically productive and reflect "the felt needs of local people" 1/ who had to be "willing to provide free labor to carry out the pro- jects, a financial contribution to the cost of the projects and/or partial reimbursement of the money made available from the BND fund." 1/ The projects should also not require "significant recurring expenditures that could not be supported locally." 1/ Five types of projects meeting these criteria were listed: (1) development of "bas-fonds" for rice cultivation; (2) development of small irrigation projects downstream from existing dams for the cultivation of..rice and garden produce; (3) construction and improvement of feeder roads, including bridges, which would facilitate and increase the marketing of pro- ducts; (4) village wells to supply livestock and the village population, par- ticularly where the supply of clean water would eradicate diseases adversely affecting agricultural productivity; and (5) small preinvestment studies to prepare local development projects. Since it was likely that project pro- posals from the ORD would in many cases require further elaboration before investment decisions could be taken, the mission stressed the need for various government services -- Direction des Travaux Publics (PWD), Direction de 1'Hydraulique et de l'Equipement Rural (HER), Direction du Developpement Rural (DDR) -- to assist BND in its work. 2.3 Because of the experimental nature of the proposed project the mission felt that it would need close supervision, preferably by RMWA staff, and that in the initial stage the Bank Group might wish to reserve the right to veto any subproject, and even to stop disbursements if the project was poorly implemented. 2.4 The.idea to finance a rural development fund was favorably received by IDA management. A first meeting to work out a specific proposal took place in January 1970 with participants from the Projects, DFC, Legal and Western Africa Departments. BND established a preliminary list of ORD pro- posals for types of projects that might be financed by the fund, which arrived in Washington in April 1970. By September 1970 the Western Africa Department had prepared a more detailed version of the original mission proposal which was intended to serve as a working brief for a project preparation mission scheduled to go to Upper Volta in November 1970. 2/ 2.5 Based on the ORD proposals submitted by BND, the working brief ex- panded the list of eligible subprojects given in para. 3.2 to include: (1) storage facilities; (2) training centers for animal traction; (3) work- shops for the training of rural artisans; (4) livestock vacccination centers; and (5) certain pilot schemes. At the same time, it said that any such list- ing should be regarded only as illustrative and that an eventual credit 1/ Ibid., para. 17. 2/ Pilot Project for Rural Development in Upper Volta - Proposal for Establish- ment of a Fund to Finance Small Projects, September 3, 1970, para. 31. -19 - agreement should leave room for other projects that were in line with its broad objectives. In view of the experimental and novel nature of the project, the brief again stressed the need for close supervision (by RMWA) and also the need for flexibility in determining: (1) financing limits for subprojects; (2) financial contributions by beneficiaries besides the required labor inputs; and (3) terms of financing for different subprojects. While the government was judged unable to finance the aggregate cost of the small schemes from its limited resources, it was expected to serve the IDA credit, since the project "should have a favorable impact on production and, consequently, on the revenue potential" 1/ of the budget. 2.6 The project preparation mission, composed of HQ and RMWA staff, arrived in Upper Volta in early November 1970. The planned participation of a FAC agronomist could not be arranged. The working brief was discussed with CCCE in Paris. The preparation report established by RMWA was sent to Washington in April 1971. No copy of this report (dated April 6, 1971) could be located by'the author, but later documents show that it: (1) estimated the IDA credit at about US$1.7 million (CFA 460 million); (2) assumed no cash contribution from the government; (3) did not quantify project benefits; (4) took a pessimistic view regarding the chances of cost recovery from benefici- aries; and thus (5) proposed that most subprojects be grant financed. 2/ Because of the innovational character of the project and the many issues involved, IDA management requested that these issues be brought to the atten- tion of the Loan Committee before the project was appraised. 3/ During fur- ther project processing, the possibility of including an education component was explored. A reconnaissance mission identified a suitable component, 4/ but the idea was finally dropped because it was thought preferable to handle rural education as part of a forthcoming education project. 5/ 2.7 The appraisal mission 6/, composed of HQ and RMWA staff, visited Upper Volta in August 1971. From the list of proposed subprojects the mission "selected those which: (i) had a high component of voluntary family labor, (ii) involved the minimum of organizational problems, (iii) promised to give quick and urgently needed improvements in the rural and general economic 1/ Ibid., paras. 22, 28. 2/ Office Memoranda, June 16 and 29, 1971. 3/ Office Memorandum, April 20, 1971, para. 2. 4/ Back-to-office Report, July 6, 1971, paras. 4.1, 4.2. 5/ Office Memorandum, September 27, 1971, para. 1. 6/ Originally, the mission was to undertake a preappraisal only, but suf- ficient information was available to permit a full appraisal. -20 - development of the country, and (iv) benefited a large number of farmers." 1/ Under these conditions, four types of subprojects qualified for financing: (1) wells; (2) village storehouses; (3) land and water development schemes; and (4) feeder roads. A small provision was made for other subprojects. Major changes from the proposals of the preparation report were increases of funds for the well-digging and land and water development programs which the mission expected to have the greatest impact on the rural sector. Higher management costs were due to the inclusion of additional expatriate special- ists to be responsible mainly for the land and water development schemes. 2/ 2.8 In contacts with Bank staff in December 1971 and January 1972, FAC and CCCE repeated their agreement to finance the project manager (CCCE) and expatriate technical staff (FAC). The IDA credit was negotiated in April 1972 and its amount fixed at US$2.2 million, roughly equivalent to total esti- mated project costs net of taxes less the French contribution, which was re- duced by about US$35,000 to about US$380,000 as the Voltaic delegation wanted the post of project manager to be taken over by a national in PY3. FAC and CCCE were informed of the outcome of the negotiations in early May 1972. The appraisal report (No. PA-127a) was ready on May 16, 1972, and the project was presented to the Board of Directors on June 8, 1972. 1/ Appraisal mission, back-to-office report, September 2, 1971, para. 3. 2/ Ibid., para. 4. -21 - III. APPRAISAL ESTIMATES 1. Physical Targets 3.1 Under the project, which was to extend to all parts of the country where the government -- through the ORD -- was in a position to provide support services when needed, RDF was to finance, over the three years 1972/73 to 1974/75: (a) About 500 village wells (average depth 20 m) with concrete lining and a concrete surround, to be constructed by unskilled volunteer labor (250,000 man-days) assisted by three well digging teams equipped with compressors, jackhammers and pumps. 1/ Benefits were expected to be improved protection against waterborne diseases, savings of time and energy previously spent on fetching water, and a possible increase in livestock. Some 20 tubewells (10 cm diameter) were to be equipped with different types of pumps to test the feas- ibility of replacing open wells by tubewells. 2/ (b) About 700 small village storehouses (3 x 4 x 2.6 m) for farm inputs, 3/ to be built mostly in cotton growing areas by unskilled volunteer labor (14,000 man-days) assisted by paid masons and car- penters. Expected benefits were the reduced wastage and ready availability of fertilizer and insecticides, leading to increased crop yields. (c) Three types of land and water development schemes for the cultiva- tion of rice and upland crops (cotton, groundnuts, cowpeas, sorghum and millet), with benefits being the expected increases in yields: (i) Development of about 1,500 ha of bottomlands (bas-fonds) -- plots of about 10 ha each at 150 sites -- through the construction of simple drainage and water control works. Volunteer village labor required was estimated at 600,000 man-days. (ii) Erosion control works on about 1,000 ha of uplands surrounding the bas-fonds (20 sites of about 50 ha each). Contour terraces and bunds were to be constructed by tractor teams assisted by volunteer village labor (200,000 man-days). 1/ Pumps were rarely used in well construction at the time. Thus, work could only start after the dry season was well advanced and the ground- water level had fallen, reducing the construction period. 2/ Tubewells produce less water than open wells and require regular main- tenance, but are far less susceptible to pollution. 3/ As USAID, CIDA and FAC were financing grain storage construction, there was no need for Bank Group involvement at the time. - 22 - (iii) Small gravity irrigation schemes (10 x 20 ha) below existing dams which had not been carried out for lack of funds. Volunteer labor requirements were estimated at 120,000 man-days. (d) The improvement of about 270 km of feeder roads in five ORD which could be shown to have an economic rate of return of at least 10% due to road user savings or increased agricultural production in- duced by better communications with extension services or markets. No unpaid volunteer labor inputs were expected for this subproject; the work was to be done on force account by PWD or by contractors. 3.2 Management and technical assistance were also to be financed under the project, and a provision was made for studies and unidentified subprojects. It was thought that the training of blacksmiths and other rural artisans and the supply of veterinary equipment might be financed under this category. Another possibility was the financing of preventive or remedial measures, if the IDA study undertaken in connection with the project showed that it had a detrimental effect on health. While investment costs were not to be re- covered from beneficiaries under the project, it was felt that this approach might strain government finances if RDF activities expanded as a result of a successful first phase. Therefore, studies on the impact of project implementation on the budget, the ability and willingness of beneficiaries to meet all or part of project costs, and ways to collect dues were to be financed under the above category. The project description from the credit agreement (Schedule 2) is in Annex 1. 2. Organization 3.3 BND was to manage the project through its RDF division. Senior RDF staff to be employed were a project manager (expatriate), a deputy manager (Voltaic) and an evaluation officer (expatriate). The deputy manager was expected to become manager in PY3. RDF was-to appraise subproject proposals and incorporate them into annual programs to be approved by an Interdepart- mental Technical Committee -- the establishment of which was the only condi- tion of credit effectiveness -- and thereafter by IDA. RDF was also to evaluate the physical progress, costs and economic impact of subprojects and prepare annual reports on these matters. 3.4 The ORD were to be responsible for preparing and implementing sub- projects. Whenever necessary, they were to be assisted by other government agencies. Thus, feeder road design and construction were to be done by PWD, for which purpose one additional engineer was to be employed. 1/ Well con- struction was to be carried out by existing HER staff. New HER staff, including three expatriates, was to be hired to take charge of the land and water development schemes. Once a subproject was completed, responsibility for proper operation and maintenance was to rest with the ORD for storehouses and land and water development schemes, HER for wells, and PWD for feeder roads. 1/ PWD was judged to have adequate field staff for the proposed program that was underemployed due to a shortage of finance (A.R., para. 5.06). - 23 - 3. Cost and Financing 3.5 Project costs, including contingencies, were estimated at CFA 778.4 million, equivalent to US$3.0 million at the prevailing exchange rate of CFA 256 per US$1. Contingencies of less than 8% of base costs were applied. Project management and technical services accounted for 28% of total costs, and subprojects and studies for 72%. 1/ The cost estimates excluded the value of unskilled volunteer labor that beneficiaries were expected to provide free for all subprojects except feeder roads (about CFA 95 million or US$370,000), and the services of existing government staff who were to be engaged part-time in RDF activities at no additional cost to the government (about CFA 22 million or US$86,000). 2/ 3.6 The project was to be financed by the IDA credit of US$2.2 million (CFA 562.7 milion; 72%) and contributions from the government (CFA 118.2 million or US$0.46 million; 15%) and FAC/CCCE (CFA 97.5 million or US$0.38 million; 13%), the latter covering the cost of technical assistance. A sum- mary table on cost and financing is given below; details are in Annex 2. 3.7 The government was to make the proceeds of the IDA credit and its own contribution available to RDF. Assurances were obtained during negotia- tions that it would credit to RDF quarterly in advance the amounts estimated by the project manager to be needed for project execution in the following quarter on the basis of the annual programs agreed with IDA. 3/ 1/ 19% and 81% respectively, with the cost of technical supervision, design and engineering allocated to the subprojects concerned. 2/ A.R., para. 4.02, and Office Memorandum, April 19, 1972, para, 2B. 3/ A.R., para. 4.05, and C.A., Sec. 3.03. - 24 - Table 1 RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Original Cost and Financing (CFA Mln.) Total Financing Cost IDA FAC/CCCE Government Project management and technical services /1 217.8 104.1 97.5 16.2 Imported equipment 12.4 7.4 - 5.0 Personnel 146.2 48.7 97.5 - Operating costs /1 52.4 41.2 - 11.2 Contingencies 6.8 6.8 - - Subprojects 560.6 458.6 - 102.0 Imported equipment 48.0 28.8 - 19.2 Labor 96.1 96.1 - - Locally bought equipment, materials and supplies 306.9 230.2 - 76.7 Studies and unidentified subprojects 61.0 54.9 - 6.1 Contingencies 48.6 48.6 - - Total cost and financing 778.4 562.7 97.5 118.2 Base cost (723.1) (507.4) (97.5) (118.2) Contingencies ( 55.3) ( 55.3) ( - ) ( - ) /1 Including BND remuneration. Source: Report No. PA-127a, May 16, 1972, para. 4.03 and Annex 9. -25 - IV. ACTUAL PROJECT PERFORMANCE 1. Physical Implementation 4.1 Project implementation was forecast to take three years; in fact, it took over four years, and not all targets were achieved. After a poor first year, in which only a few wells and less than one-third of the projected bottomland development were finished, the implementation rate accelerated in 1973/74 and 1974/75, so that the preparation mission for the second RDF project estimated that new financing of at least four times the amount of the first credit would be needed to keep up the pace in the coming years. 1/ In order to avoid a gap between the first and second RDF due to a lack of funds, project management agreed to a reduced program for 1975/76, which included also the deepening of about 100 previously dug wells that were not working satis- factorily. 2/ As some funds remained at the end of the year, a small program could be executed in 1976/77. 4.2 The overall implementation rate differed greatly between subprojects, ranging from 17% of appraisal estimates for small irrigation schemes below existing dams -- 38% including vegetable gardening financed under "unidentified subprojects" -- to 115% for bottomland development and 140% for erosion control. The feeder road component was combined with that of Cr. 442-UV (Drought Relief) in 1974. The combined target could not be achieved, largely because of the premature departure of the FAC financed road engineer and the requirement to transfer all road equipment to the Service d'Entretien des Routes Secondaires (SERS), an agency financed under Cr. 579-UV (Rural Roads), by the end of June 1976. 3/ Details on project execution by ORD and type of subproject are in Annex 3. 4.3 The few irrigation schemes below existing dams that were completed showed shortcomings in design and low quality of construction. The 29 ha constructed in 1973/74 were inundated and the works destroyed during the 1975 rainy season; the project completion mission could not find out whether they have been rebuilt. One reason for the shortfall in the well construction program was the lower than expected operating efficiency of the -- originally three, later four -- well "brigades". For bottomland development, improvements of the simple contour dike system were originally foreseen, including small weirs with lateral irrigation ditches and drains, to increase water control. These structures were not built because the necessary hydrological data were lacking. Implementation problems are discussed in Chapter VI. 1/ IBRD, Mission Regionale en'Afrique de l'Ouest - Republique de Haute-Volta, Deuxieme Projet de Fonds de Developpement Rural, 25 juin 1975, para. 1.09. 2/. Out of 214 completed in the two ORD concerned (Fada N'Gourma and Koupela). 3/ The government had to sign a sideletter to this effect (Report No. 1068b-UV, May 24, 1976, para. 10.03). - 26 - 4.4 Contrary to appraisal estimates, the following main items were fi- nanced under "Studies and unidentified subprojects": (1) a study of the irrigation potential of the Kamadena plain, located in the ORD Dedougou; 1/ (2) the construction of eight large ORD storage buildings; and (3) a number of vegetable gardening schemes using pump irrigation. Details are in Annex 4, Table 3. None of the studies mentioned in para. 4.2 were done, and the appraisal team of the second RDF did "not specifically" propose to carry out such studies under that project, as "continuous evaluation of RDF II" would "also cover (its) economic and financial impact." 2/ 2. Project Cost and Financing 4.5 At CFA 837 million, the actual cost of the reduced project that was completed is 7.5% higher than the estimated cost of the full project. World- wide inflation and the dollar devaluation are the main reasons for this result. Quite likely, without these factors a better implementation rate would have been achieved in spite of the problems described in Chapter VI. 4.6 Inflation totalled 90% during 1973/1977, 3/ and unit costs of store- houses, feeder roads, small irrigation schemes and wells 4/ exceeded appraisal estimates by 50-80%. Because of the simpler design actually used, bottomland development and erosion control.were considerably less costly than estimated at appraisal. Nevertheless, the execution of the original program -- exclud- ing overheads and the allocation for unidentified items -- would have required CFA 800 million at actual unit costs, against CFA 558 million estimated at appraisal: an increase of 43%. The cost overrun in project management and technical services was very modest in comparison. 4.7 On the other hand, the dollar devaluation reduced the CFA equivalent of Cr. 317-UV, and indirectly also the government contribution calculated as a percentage of expenditures covered by the credit. Instead of CFA 563 mil- lion expected at appraisal (exchange rate: CFA 256/US$1), Cr. 317-UV yielded only CFA 495 million, or 12% less (average exchange rate: CFA 225/US$1). With the CFA 151 million drawn from Cr. 442-UV, IDA more than compensated the shortfall and its share in project financing increased to 77%. The government could have decided to provide the CFA 118 million foreseen at appraisal, but limited its contribution to roughly the 17% of expenditures under category II not covered by Cr. 317-UV, 5/ or CFA 95 million (11%). With CFA 96 million 1/ CCCE agreed in principle to finance the project that might result. 2/ Report No. 1068b-UV, May 24, 1976, Annex 2, para. 44. 3/ IBRD, index of international inflation, Report No. 814/78, p. 44. 4/ In January 1973, project management alerted IDA to the fact that the well construction program had been substantially underestimated at appraisal. 5/ See Annex 5, Table 1. - 27 - (12%), French aid amounted to slightly less than estimated at appraisal, mainly because of the long periods when planned staff positions were vacant. Table 2 compares original and actual costs and financing; details on actual data are in Annex 4. 4.8 Annex 5 gives details on Cr. 317-UV. Actual disbursements lagged considerably behind appraisal estimates; 1/ in the later stages of the project the gap narrowed to about 15%. The revised estimates by supervision missions came somewhat closer to the actual figures. Despite IDA's regular reminders, service payments on the credit were frequently late, as in the case of other IDA credits to Upper Volta. 1/ For disbursement purposes the start of the project was defined as the date of the decree appointing the project manager and his deputy. As an exception, the cost of the project manager was to be reimbursed from the day he took up his duties. See FS 1, October 25, 1972, para. 3.01, and letter to Minister Yameogo of November 7, 1972. The project manager was appointed by decree dated March 6, 1973, and the deputy manager by decree dated July 5, 1973. - 28 - Table 2 RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Original and Actual Cost and Financing /1 (CFA M1n.) Total Cost /2 Unit Cost /3 Original Actual Original Actual Project management /4 79.1 96.8 Technical services 68.1 61.6 Subprojects 631.2 678.3 Wells 222.8 206.9 445,000 790,000 Village storehouses 41.7 57.1 60,000 89,000 Bottomland development 113.0 82.2 75,000 48,000 Erosion control 14.6 10.6 15,000 8,000 Small irrigation schemes 51.6 31.9 /5 258,000 420,000 Feeder roads 114.5 242.3 424,000 662,000 Studies and unidentified subprojects 73.0 47.3 Total cost and financing 778.4 836.7 IDA financing 562.7 645.8 French financing 97.5 96.4 Government financing 118.2 94.5 /1 With combined Cr. 317/442-UV feeder roads component. /2 Total 2 from Annex 2, Table 1, and Annex 4, Table 1. /3 CFA. /4 Including BND remuneration. /5 Including vegetable gardening schemes financed under "unidentified subprojects" (CFA 17.4 million). Source: Annex 2 and 4. - 29 - V. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 1. Start-up Problems 5.1 Although the project became operational in October 1C72, progress was slow through 1973 due to avoidable delays in the recruitment of staff, the arrangement of project prefinancing, and the adoption of a model contract for participants in land and water development schemes, and slow procurement of materials and equipment. I/ 5.2 Credit Effe ctiveness. To ensure adequate coordination of all aspects of the project, the government was to promptly establish an Inter- departmental Technical Committee, and this was made a condition of credit effectiveness. 2/ The decree establishing the Committee was signed on July 18, 1972, 3/ but since it did not specify the person representing the Prime Minister in the Committee, IDA had to postpone the effectiveness date from September 29 4/ to October 16, 1972. The missing detail was cabled to IDA on October 3, 1972. 5.3 Prefinancing. As mentioned in para. 4.7, the government agreed to prefinance project expenditures through quarterly advances. 5/ No appropriate arrangements were made in time, however, and RDF could only start operations because of financial assistance from BND. 6/ At the end of March 1973, BND informed IDA (and RDF management informed HER) that operations would have to be suspended by mid-April if no funds were provided by the government. After strongly worded letters of the Ministry of Plan and IDA 7/ to the Ministry of Finance, the government decided on April 11, 1973, to open a special RDF Treasury account, No further problems were encountered. 1/ FS 2, May 8, 1973, para. 2.2; A.R. 640-UV, Annex 2, para 4. This slow- ness affected in particular the well construction program. Some delays in procurement were caused by the use of procedures which did not con- form with IDA guidelines, making retendering necessary: IDA letter and telex of July 26, 1973, and telex of July 30, 1973; BND telex of August 2, 1973. 2/ C.A., Sec. 3.06 and 8.01. 3/ Decret 72-142 PM. AGRI. EL. 4/ C.A., Sec. 8.02. 5/ C.A., Sec. 3.03 and A.R., para. 4.05. 6/ About CFA 45 million through March 1973. 7/ Letters dated April 2 and March 30, 1973, respectively. - 30 - 5.4 Staffing. Although the credit documents were not as specific as in the case of the Interdepartmental Technical Committee, it was expected that all senior staff for RDF, HER and PWD would be recruited quickly. 1/ By the end of 1972, however, only the project manager, provided by CCCE, and one of the five 2/ technicians provided by FAC -- the rural engineer who was to co- ordinate RDF activities within HER -- had taken up their duties. Another two -- the heads of two HER bottomland development units -- started work in February 1973. The deputy project manager (Voltaic) and the evaluation officer were approved by IDA in February and March 1973, but took up their positions only in July and August 1973. Finally, the engineer to be responsi- ble for RDF roads within PWD was approved by IDA in January 1973, but arrived on the job only in November 1973. Finding suitable Voltaic rural engineers for HER also proved to be considerably more difficult than estimated at appraisal. 5.5 Model Contract. Under Sec. 3.08 of the credit agreement, the Ministry in charge of Agriculture was to define in a model contract the rights and obligations of the ORD and farmers participating in land and water development schemes. No subproject of this type was to start before IDA had approved the model contract. 3/ IDA reminded the government of its obligation before the credit b6came effective. Project management prepared draft con- tracts 4/ and submitted them to the Ministry for approval. By March 1973, no decision had been taken and IDA had to approve the first RDF program and budget (first semester 1973) excluding the planned bottomland development. 5/ In May 1973, project management sent copies of the draft contracts to IDA for comments. IDA had no objections, but repeated that the go-ahead for the bottomland development program depended on government acceptance of the contracts. 6/ In September 1973, the official version was sent to Washington and IDA could give its final approval. 7/ 1/ The first supervision mission (August 1973), in which a representative of FAC and the designated project manager participated, hoped that all would be appointed before the end of January 1973. 2/ During negotiations it was agreed that PWD would appoint a Voltaic road technician to be responsible for the feeder road program. The first supervision mission was informed, however, that none was available with the required qualifications and that the government had asked FAC to provide such a technician. FAC agreed to this request and IDA in turn agreed to finance the cost of housing the FAC experts which had been omitted from the appraisal estimates because FAC experts were normally housed free of charge by the government. 3/ A.R., para. 5.12. 4/ One for bottomlands and one for small irrigation schemes. 5/ Telex of March 8, 1973, to BND. 6/ Letter of May 16, 1973, to RDF manager. 7/ Telex of September 26, 1973, to BND. - 31 - 5.6 In view of these delays, the second supervision mission (April 1973) estimated that unless implementation could be speeded up the project period would have to be extended by one year. In a letter to the Minister of Plan, IDA expressed its disappointment and hope for more satisfactory progress in the future. 1/ When the second RDF program (July 1973 to June 1974) again was modest, apparently making no serious effort to catch up with the appraisal estimates, angry letters from IDA resulted. 2/ But project management insisted that the proposed program was realistic. 3/ IDA was reminded of the experi- mental character of the project 3/ and finally accepted that it was unlikely that activities could be "accelerated sufficiently to compensate for the initial delay." 4/ 2. Later Problems and Changes a. Staffing 5.7 Staffing was a problem throughout the project implementation period. In RDF, the position of deputy manager remained vacant after the expatriate project manager left in mid-1974 and his deputy became manager. It may have been true at the time that there was "no immediate need to fill" 5/ it, but certainly a qualified deputy manager was needed in the later stages of the project. The evaluation officer provided by FAC left in April 1975 and was not replaced, and the two Voltaic technicians to be "trained to replace foreign technical assistance personnel" 6/ apparently were never hired. Thus, it is not surprising that RDF management failed to monitor and evaluate the sub- projects it financed as foreseen at appraisal. 7/ 5.8 HER suffered from high personnel turnover and was, consequently, understaffed much of the time. This was the main reason for the failure of the small program of irrigation below existing dams. The situation of the staff financed under the project illustrates the difficulties encountered. The senior rural engineer who acted as coordinator of RDF activities left in July 1974 and was not replaced. The two heads of bottomland development units were on the job until early 1975; 8/ successors arrived in January and 1/ May 29, 1973. 2/ Especially of July 31, 1973, and November 17, 1973. 3/ Letter of October 25, 1973. 4/ FS 3, January 15, 1974, para. 2.05. 5/ FS 4, August 19, 1974, para. 11. 6/ A.R., para. 5.01. 7/ A.R., para. 5.03. 8/ One left in March 1975, one died in Upper Volta. - 32 - July 1976 only. The employment of Voltaic engineers presented comparable difficulties. In addition, the assignment of RDF-financed staff to non-RDF work sometimes posed minor problems, especially after the RDF coordinator had left. 5.9 Under Sec. 3.08 (a) of the credit agreement, the government was to provide, through the ORD, extension and credit services to farmers participat- ing in land and water development subprojects. Since these were services which the ORD already provided to farmers and the scope of the envisaged subprojects was small, the appraisal team thought that the existing ORD staff could handle the additional tasks. 1/ It soon became clear, however, that the ORD were not sufficiently staffed to fulfill their functions as foreseen. 2/ Together with project management, IDA worked out staffing proposals which the government adopted, 3/ but the ORD did not receive the budgetary funds to hire the addi- tional staff. As a stopgap, IDA agreed to finance out of the remaining credit funds 40 farm level extension workers to be in charge of RDF subprojects. 4/ 5.10 This lack of extension staff could have serious implications for the ultimate success of subprojects. The simple works that were constructed provide only limited water contol, and crops thus continue to be subjected to the vagaries of the weather. An intensive extension effort would have been needed to (1) enable participants to make the best use of these schemes; and (2) collect the hydrological data needed to correct possible design de- ficiencies and make improvements rendering cultivation more reliable. The danger of a failure to do so was highlighted by a FAC-financed bottomland development program, carried out during 1969-1972, in which about 35% of the developed area was abandoned. 5/ There is no hard evidence that this has happened under RDF. Project management reported that in cases where the extension service was insufficient farmers.could not achieve the expected results but were still able to get higher yields than under unimproved condi- tions. 6/ The few data on bottomland rice production the completion mission could obtain are in Annex 6. 1/ A.R., para. 5.14. 2/ Letter of project manager to DDR of June 19, 1973; Marc Ls. Bazin, letter to Minister A. Dakoure of August 14, 1974, p. 3. 3/ Telex of February 26, 1975. 4/ A.R. 640-UV, para. 3.11. 5/ A.R. 640-UV, Annex 2, para. 32. 6/ "Les 0.R.D. se trouvant tres souvent dans des situations financieres difficiles, il leur etait pratiquement impossible de remplir ces taches et les zones amenagees etaient laissees aux mains des paysans incapables materiellement et financierement d'assurer a l'amenagement une rentabi- lite acceptable." "Il convient neanmoins de noter que ces zones ayant fait l'objet d'un amenagement avaient un rendement a 1'hectare meilleur que celles sans amenagements." FDR/BND, Avant Projet du Second Fonds de Developpement Rural, Janvier 1975, p. 22. - 33 - 5.11 An RMWA staff member visiting Paris in September 1974 was to discuss with FAC the possibility of extending the assignment of the RDF/PWD road engineer, which was ending in July 1975, by at least one year. 1/ No record could be found of this discussion; so one can only speculate that the decision not to extend the engineer's stay was influenced by the planned creation of SERS, the staffing of which was also to be discussed with FAC. b. Organization 5.12 An essential point in subproject selection was the interest of the people concerned, expressed through their willingness to provide free labor for subproject execution -- except for feeder roads. 2/ After some initial hesitation, farmers strongly supported well construction, bottomland develop- ment, erosion control as well as feeder roads, and free labor was provided as foreseen. In the case of village storehouses, however, farmers' interest and willingness to supply free labor had evidently been overestimated at appraisal. Moreover, the ORD, which had a keen interest in this type of subproject, did not have the staff to implement the programs they proposed as foreseen. Local artisans were available, but because of the delays in the supply of materials and the uncertainty of finding unskilled help, they often lost interest in this kind of work. Thus, it quickly became clear that the appraisal estimates could not be achieved without a change in approach. Project management proposed, 3/ and IDA accepted, 4/ to give the artisans full responsibility for construction and increase the payment they received for each completed storehouse to a level that would also enable them to pay their- unskilled helpers (half a wage). Project management admitted that this meant a departure from the original project concept, but saw no other way to save the program. 5.13 Once the road engineer had arrived, work on the feeder road program began, but the original plan to use existing PWD or rented equipment 5/ proved uneconomical, as PWD was not always able to provide the needed equipment and rental from local contractors was too expensive. 6/ Since the road program under Cr. 442-UV (Drought Relief) 7/ also had to be reformulated, because the initial concept appeared to be not workable to PWD, 8/ the project manager 1/ Terms of reference, July 22, 1974. 2/ See paras. 4.1 (d) and 4.5. 3/ Letter of February 1, 1974. 4/ Telex of March 21, 1974. Approval was initially given for a trial period of one year and extended when the approach proved successful. 5/ A.R., Annex 8, para. 3. 6/ FS, February 1, 1974, para. 2.5. It is not clear whether the employment of contractors -- A.R., Annex 8, Dara; 3 -- has been tried and also found to be too expensive. 7/ The credit was managed by RDF. 8/ FS 1 442-UV, Janaury 15, 1974, para. 4.04 (c). - 34 - and PWD proposed to combine the two road components and purchase the required equipment from credit funds. 1/ IDA accepted this solution. Bids were opened and evaluated in mid-1974, and about 80% of the ordered equipment arrived in time to be used during the 1974/75 campaign. The rest followed shortly afterwards. 2/ c. Other Covenants 5.14 Besides providing free labor, farmers were to pay an annual levy to cover the direct costs incurred by the ORD for the maintenance of bottomlands and small irrigation schemes. 3/ The levy was not paid, as the government felt that it could not demand payment from RDF farmers while none was required under other similar projects. IDA tacitly accepted this position. 4/ The quality of maintenance done so far was not always satisfactory, but project management expects it to improve. The question of how maintenance costs will be met was left open. 5.15 Under Sec. 4.01 of the credit agreement, RDF was to keep adequate accounts and have them audited by independent auditors. RDF accounts were well kept, but inadequate as a management tool because expenditures were re- corded by rather broad categories only. 5/ Determining the cost of individual subprojects -- required under Sec. 3.02 (c) of the credit agreement -- or providing a detailed breakdown of expenditures involved time-consuming addi- tional work and was therefore not normally done. Although project management had requested CCCE in November 1974 to arrange an audit, the accounts were audited for the first time in early 1976. Upon the urging of IDA, the gov- ernment had appointed independent auditors in 1975 who delivered their first report 6/ a few days after the RDF II credit agreement was signed. 7/ A second and third (final) report were prepared in 1977 and 1978. 8/ 1/ Ibid., para. 5.11. 2/ FS 4 and 5 442-UV, May 22, and November 19, 1975. 3/ C.A., Sec. 3.08 (b). 4/ See para. 9.3 below. 5/ Until 1976, there were two categories: "equipment" (equipement) and "all other" (investissement). See Annex 4, Table 2. 6/ Coopers & Lybrand, Situation financiere ... au 31 decembre 1975. 7/ IDA put aside its concern about the non-compliance and did not hold up project processing until the audit report was received. See G.F. Darnell, office memorandum, April 20, 1976, para. 4. 8/ Dated June 15, 1977, and June 15, 1978. - 35 - VI. CHANGES IN THE SECOND RDF PROJECT 1. Choice of Project Area 6.1 While RDF I financed subprojects throughout Upper Volta, RDF II concentrates on the five ORD of the Mossi plateau (Ouagadougou, Koudougou, Koupela, Kaya, Yatenga), because (1) the RDF approach is most beneficial in a situation, as on the Mossi plateau, where there is little scope for large agricultural development projects; and (2) large projects are being implemented in the other regions. Exceptions are well construction, which continues to be financed nationwide, and high priority projects, for which up to 10% of the project funds can be allocated. 1/ 2. Choice of Subprojects 6.2 RDF II finances the same types of subprojects as RDF I, with the exception of feeder roads; in addition, it finances tubewells, village centers, and medium-term credit for agricultural equipment. 2/ 6.3 Although the feeder road improvement under RDF I was successful, no road component is included in RDF II, as Cr. 579-UV was made in August 1975 with the objective to staff and equip SERS, develop low-cost roads in regions with significant agricultural and rural development programs, and preserve the important investments in the rural road sector through proper maintenance. 3/ Tubewell drilling equipment financed under Cr. 442-UV was estimated to have a remaining useful life at the end of the project that would permit the drilling of about 180 tubewells under RDF II. The village centers will provide a place for teaching, meetings and other village activities, and a small room for the storage of medical supplies and the use by health officials. Medium-term agricultural credit was found to be almost totally unavailable in Upper Volta; therefore, a US$0.5 million revolving fund for this purpose was included in RDF II, following the example of a small USAID project administered by RDF. 4/ 3. Staffing and Organization 6.4 Since most problems of RDF I stemmed from the lack of staff and deficiencies in organization, 5/ RDF II provides funds to strengthen all institutions involved in project execution. I/ A.R. 640-UV, para. 4.01. 2/ Ibid., para. 5.04. 3/ Report No.'738a-UV, Appraisal of a Rural Roads Project, June 6, 1975, para. iii. 4/ A.R. 640-UV, Chapter V. 5/ Ibid., para. 3.07. - 36 - 6.5 Two (UNDP financed) evaluation officers have been added to RDF's staff, and assurances were obtained at negotiations that they would give priority to the evaluation of the programs already carried out by RDF. 1/ Following this evaluation, a monitoring system for RDF's current programs will be designed. As a condition of credit effectiveness, an assistant to the director of RAER 2/ was appointed to coordinate all RDF activities handled by HAER. 3/ Four'technicians are provided by FAC. Since tubewells need regular maintenance that cannot be done by the villagers themselves, a small maintenance brigade has been established. Under RDF II, RAER is responsible only for the more complicated land and water development schemes, whereas the ORD assume responsibility for the others, especially erosion control and bottomland development. Since the ORD will thus be in charge of all phases of the subproject cycle, higher standards are expected. 4/ To help them fulfill their new role, technical assistance, equipment and staff are financed under the project, and assurances were obtained at negotiations that the government would "provide, promptly as needed, the funds, services and facilities ... to ensure the continued and efficient operation and main- tenance of" the subprojects. 5/ 6.6 Technical assistance is complemented by the training of Voltaics. The training component includes: (1) scholarships for project evaluation officers, engineers and technicians, principally counterparts of expatriate staff; (2) short rural development courses for ORD staff or villagers; and (3) consultancy services for an extension training study. 6/ 6.7 The auditor proposed a revised accounting system which RDF adopted and put into operation in 1976/77. 7/ 1/ C.A. 640-UV, Sec. 3.04. 2/ Hydraulique et Amenagement de l'Espace Rural; successor of HER. 3/ C.A. 640-UV, Sec. 6.01 (b). 4/ A.R. 640-UV, para. 3.10. 5/ C.A. 640-UV, Sec. 4.03 (c). 6/ A.R. 640-UV, para. 5.21. 7/ Coopers & Lybrand, Situation financiere ... au 31 decembre 1975, Chapter IV and Annex VI. See also Annex 4, Table 4. - 37 - VII. ECONOMIC EVALUATION 1. Appraisal Estimates 7.1 At appraisal, the RDF project was expected to benefit between 300,000 and 450,000 people, and its economic rate of return was estimated to be 15.6%, excluding the feeder roads component. A sensitivity test showed this rate to vary between about 9% and 19%. The rates for individual subprojects ranged from 6-14% for erosion control to 10-24% for bottomland development. 1/ 7.2 Project benefits were expected to come from: (1) increases in labor productivity and small livestock, and savings of energy spent fetching water -- from wells; (2) increased farm production (paddy, sorghum, cotton, groundnuts, peas) -- from village storehouses and land and water development schemes; and (3) reduced transportation costs or increased farm production -- from feeder roads. Production was valued at current minimum producer prices which, taking account of marketing margins, were found to be in line with Bank forecasts. 2/ These prices were (in CFA/t): Paddy 18,000 Sorghum 12,000 Seed cotton 30,000 Groundnuts (in shell) 14,000 Cowpeas 25,000 7.3 Project costs (net of taxes) included the full cost of administra- tive management, but only about 40% of technical services needed for land and water development. Since the scale of these subprojects was small, it was felt that technical management costs per unit would become "artificially high" if they were fully allocated. In view of the pilot nature of the program it was therefore "decided to base technical management costs per unit area devel- oped on experience gained in other countries, and to allocate the remainder" to the preparation of future projects, and thus to exclude it from the calcu- lations. 3/ Skilled labor was costed at full wages, but the unskilled volun- tary labor that farmers were expected to provide for subproject construction was costed at zero, on the assumption that there were no other employment opportunities during the dry season when construction was to take place. 4/ 1/ A.R., Annex 13, Table 1. The minimum acceptable rate for feeder roads was to be 10% (A.R., para. 6.11). 2/ A.R., Annex 13, para. 2 (d) (ii). 3/ A.R., Annex 13, para. 2 (c) (i). 4/ Ibid., para. 2 (c) (ii). - 38 - 2. Actual Estimates 7.4 The project is now estimated to benefit about 230,000 people. Since actual data on economic costs and benefits are incomplete or missing for the reasons given in Section VI. 2 above, the recalculation of the rate of return is based mostly on estimates. They differ from the appraisal estimates in the following points: 1/ (a) Benefits from village storehouses consist of reduced grain storage losses, because cotton production declined sharply on the Mossi plateau where the storehouses were built and the ORD have used the storehouses to store foodgrains bought from farmers. (b) Because of the decline in cotton production, cotton has also been excluded from the rate of return calculation for erosion control schemes. (c) Vegetable gardening, financed under "unidentified subprojects", has been combined with small irrigation schemes below existing dams; similar projects financed under Cr. 706-UV (West Volta Agricultural Development Project) provided the basis for estimating benefits. (d) Voluntary labor supplied by farmers for subproject implementation has been given a value, as it is now accepted that the opportunity cost of rural labor in the dry season is rarely zero. For lack of a better estimate, a percentage of the minimum pay for unskilled labor during the dry season has been chosen. (e) The full cost of technical services has been allocated to the sub- projects concerned. 7.5 Economic farmgate prices are based on the latest IBRD forecasts, 2/ except for peas, the price of which is an updated appraisal estimate. Average prices for the ten-year period 1973/74 to 1982/83 are (in CFA/t): Paddy 55,600 Sorghum 50,600 Groundnuts (in shell) 60,100 Peas 3/ 41,800 7.6 On this basis, the weighted average rate of return of the project is 19.1% including the feeder roads component, and 22.2% excluding the feeder 1/ Excluding adjustments to 1976/77 base. 2/ Details are in Annex 7, Tables 12, 13 and 14. 3/ Voandzou and niebe. - 39 - roads. With benefits reduced by 10%, the group of agricultural subprojects (as defined by A.R., Annex 13, Table 1) still shows a rate of return of 18.5%. Details are in Annex 7. This favorable result in the face of substantially increased costs -- about 60%, comparing total economic costs 1/ estimated at appraisal and rw 2/ -- is clearly due to the much higher prices used now. In the -- not very likely -- event of a price decline, the project's rate of return would decline correspondingly. 3/ 1/ Excluding feeder roads. 2/ A.R., Annex 13, Table 1, and Annex 7, Table 1 (Total 1 plus 40% of cost of technical services). 3/ It would take over 30% reduction in benefits to reduce the rate of return below 10%. - 40 - VIII. IDA, CO-LENDER, RDF AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 8.1 The performance of the parties involved in executing the project has already been described in the sections above. A few further points are discussed below. With the exceptions mentioned, the government has respected the conditions of the credit agreement, and due to the efforts of project management the Rural Development Fund is now regarded as a success by officials and farmers alike. Project supervision by IDA was regular, and working rela- tions with project management and government agencies became increasingly constructive. Supervision could have been more thorough with fewer staff changes -- the nine missions between August 1972 and April 1977 were carried out by six different people -- and less tight mission scheduling -- the fourth mission had 21 days to supervise three projects, the ninth had 19 days for five. 1/ Contacts with co-lenders were not as close as in the case of some other jointly financed projects, 2/ and IDA was therefore not always up-to-date on their contributions. 3/ Co-lenders and government did not actively partici- pate in IDA project supervision, as is sometimes done in other countries to mutual benefit, 2/ and supervision reports were not sent to them or project management on a regular basis. Although the Interdepartmental Technical Committee met less frequently than expected at appraisal, it provided a useful forum to make RDF plans known and gather support for project management. 8.2 When it became clear that the ORD's lack of staff hampered project progress, IDA could only finance a stop-gap measure with remaining uncommitted credit funds. One wonders why neither the government nor IDA nor project management followed up on CCCE's earlier statement that it was prepared to consider financing field staff salaries. 4/ Perhaps the condition "if RDF activities assume proportions that exceed present projections" 4/ discouraged such,,a move. In any case, CCCE did not restate its offer and did not finar-e any field staff. 8.3 Under Sec. 3.08 (b) of the credit agreement it was foreseen that the maintenance charge farmers were to pay would be "annually reviewed in consulta- tion with" IDA. Reading through the supervision reports, it appears that the subject was never discussed, and the appraisal team of the second RDF did not address it either. It is unlikely that the government would have changed its position not to demand payment, and it was probably correct for IDA not to insist, as farmers, even when there was no drought, were still not sure that they could achieve consistently higher yields than "without the project". But the question, including its financial implications, should have been discussed with the government, and a clear position reached and put on record. 1/ Details on IDA supervision are in Annex 8. 2/ See, for example, SecM78-430, May 1978, PPAR Cameroon - SEMRY Rice Project (Credit 302-CM), para. 1.24 and p. A31. 3/ The cost of technical assistance provided by CCCE and FAC was estab- lished for the first time by the project completion mission. 4/ FS 1, October 25, 1972, para. 5.05. -41 - 8.4 Although the inadequacy of RDF's accounting system as a management tool must soon have become evident, neither IDA nor the other parties involved pressed for improvements. Likewise, the need to have RDF's accounts audited was not stressed by IDA until the preparation of the second RDF project got under way in 1974/75. 1/ 8.5 About feeder road maintenance the appraisal report said: "It is im- practical to assume that-free labor could be mobilized for road maintenance except possibly for the short sections passing through villages. The local government units, collectivities rurales, now responsible for the maintenance of feeder roads are short of both funds and equipment for this purpose. The situation is being studied by consultants financed by FAC, and it is possible that IDA will be asked to finance a road maintenance project. Until then PWD should be responsible for the maintenance of project roads." 2/ Assurances were obtained from the government that adequate funds would be allocated to PWD's budget for this task. 3/ 8.6 The consultants suggested the creation of a separate maintenance division for secondary roads within PWD, an idea which IDA found to have great merit and to deserve further consideration. 4/ RMWA was charged with the follow-up in connection with the rural roads project it was preparing. SERS was established in January 1975 and Cr. 579-UV was signed in August 1975. 5/ During credit negotiations it was agreed that the road equipment bought under ongoing IDA-financed agricultural projects would be transferred to SERS upon completion of their feeder road components. This was first estimated to be in 1977, 6/ but was later changed to mid-1976. 7/ Since the quality of RDF road improvements had deteriorated after the road engineer had left in August 1975, 8/ SERS was with immediate effect to provide some specialized personnel and general technical assistance to RDF. 7/ During appraisal of the second RDF project the government tried to keep the feeder roads unit within RDF, 9/ but IDA refused to make an exception, ignoring the drawbacks of the transfer particularly in this case. 10/ The equipment was turned over to SERS in June 1976, as stated in the side letter the government had been asked to sign. 11/ 1/ Immediately after an RMWA mission visited Upper Volta to review existing and discuss future projects in the rural sector, RDF management asked CCCE for the first time to have the project accounts audited. 2/ Para. 5.17. 3/ C.A., Sec. 3.09. T/ FS, February 1, 1974, para. 6.3 5/ See para. 7.3. 6/ Telex of July 16, 1974. 7/ Abidjan Office Memorandum, January 13, 1976, para. 5. 8/ See para. 6.11. 9/ Proces verbal, Preparation du Second Fonds de Developpement Rural, Octobre 1975 (reunion du Comite Technique Interministeriel Restreint pour le Fonds de Developpement Rural). 10/ Abidjan Office Memorandum, January 13, 1976, paras. 6-8. 11/ Minister of Rural Development to IDA, June 15, 1978. - 42 - 8.7 Under RDF I a clear distinction had been made between feeder road improvement, carried out by labor-intensive methods to benefit the largest possible number of rural poor, and feeder road maintenance, carried out by conventional methods. No convincing explanation could be found why this had to be changed under RDF II. Whatever the reasons, the way IDA handled this matter is still resented by RDF as well as the Comite de Coordination du Developpement Rural. The view may be different on the receiving side, but PWD cannot be pleased either, considering the poor performance of SERS so far. 1/ 1/ Telex, March 31, 1978. - 43 - n r=n ex C,-. -3- 7 - Description of the Project The Project consists of the following parts: Part A: Staffing and equipping the RDF. Part B: Strengthening the personnel of and equipping the HER and the PWD. Part C: Construction of: 1. about 5 sections of feeder roads, by the PWD. totaling about 270 km; 2. about 500 wells:, 3. about 700 warehouses; 4. facilities for about 190 small land and water development projects covering about 2,700 ha in total: and 5. such other facilities as the studies carried out under Part D below will show to be technically and economically sound and of high development priority. Part D: The carrying out of studies, including studies on the implications of the execution of the Project to the Borrower's budget, the ip-.pact of increased economic activity brought about by RDF and the feasibility of collecting repayments for project costs from the farmers, and a study on the impact of the Project on the health condition of Project participants. Such study may encompass remedial measures eventually to be taken in this field. * * * The Project is expected to be completed by December 31, 1975. - 44 - AnneX 2 .anjle 1 ?ABAL D!V'LOENT FL?0 PROJEC Acoralsal Cost !st.mates :ChA COCC 1972/73 1973/76 197JA/75 Total Total 2 1/ 'n.t cost (C2A) ?roject Manacenent 26,201 22,701 22,?01 71,60 71,03 :mcrea equipment 3,i000 - 3,00 Personnel and coerating costs 21,850 21,750 21,750 65,350 Contingencies 951 951 951 2,853 Technical Se-vices (.R, .1) 52 163 LLZ3 LL26 138,689 tLLL :moorted equipment 0 - -9 ?ersonnel and operatin,u costs 41,925 L1,925 L1,925 125,775 Contirgencies 1,236 1,338 1,338 3,91L Suburojects a) Wells (500) 96 355 53,553 66 651 216 559 222,736 L.-,oo0 Imported equicment i0,350 - - Locall' bougnt equipment 2/ 12,000 - - 12,000 Fersonnel, matertals ano supplies 37,965 49,731 61,989 u9,685 Cont;.ncencies 6,0t0 3,322 L,662 1.h,524 b) Villaze Storehcuses (?00) 13 000 11,250 1 Li ?10 L1,710 60,000 Toort,ec equLpment ,l - - ",10 Personnel, materials and supplies 6,L00 9,300 15,300 31,500 Contingencies 1,500 1,450 2,160 5,1lo c) Fottomland De7elooment (1,500 ha) 21 375 27 421 32 328 32 '12L 113,036 75,000 Locally ocugnt equipmpnt 2/ Vi6 C,.b ,to C Tractor rental 3,000 5,000 7,000 15,000 Personnel, materials and supplies 10,234 13,159 16,307 39,700 Contingencies 1,875 2,L96 2,753 7,124 d) -rosicm Control (1,000 ha) 2 900 3 75 4 575 10 950 U 556 15,000 Locally bougnt equipment 2 1 ,200 , , Tractor rental 800 1,200 2,000 L,000 Personnel, materials and suoplies 650 750 900 2,300 Contingencies 250 325 375 950 e) Small -rigation Works (200 ha) 10 550 13 310 19 500 L3,360 5i,60L 258,000 Locally cougnt ecuipment 2/ 1,4 ,aO 2- Tractor rental 1,600 2,L00 4,000 8,000 Personnel, materials and supplies 6,800 8,L00 12,00 28,000 Contingencies 750 1,110 1,500 3,360 f) Feeder Roads (270 kxm) 38 50 27,350 2 00 Q2 I UL,16 42L,00 Importea equip-rnt 2,5 - -2,00 Locally bought equipment 3,500 - - 3,500 Fersonnel, materials and supplies 30,700 25,700 25,000 81,00 Contingencies 2,150 1,650 1,700 5,500 g) Studies ard 'Jnioentifled Subprojects 11,000 31,000 31 000 73 000 Base costs 7,000 Cont,-ngencxes L,OCO L,000 4,000 12,000 SND ?.emuneration 2,500 2,500 7,500 ,500 TOTAL ?ROJICT 275,39L 235,323 267,178 778,395 778,395 - Base costs, -ncluaing taxes 256,640 215,681 2-47,739 723,060 kTaxes) ( 53,9L1) ( 26,99) ( 30,887) (113,522 - Contingencies 1,751 17,1L2 19,4,39 55,335 I/ Cost of tecnrical suoervi3ion, aeslgn and engineering allocated to subpro.ects concernea. 2/ Mostly hand :aals. Source: Report lo. ?A-127a of May 16, 1972, Annex 9. RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Original Financing Plan Total Cost I DA VAC/CCCE Goverrnent CFA '000 US$ mIn. % CFA '000 US$ min. % CPA '000 IS$ mln. % CPA '000 US$ nln. 7 Imported Equipment 1/ 60,350 0.24 8 36,210 0.14 60 - - - 24,140 0.10 40 Subproject Construction Cost: a) Materials, applies, locally bought and rented equipment, operating costs of pcoject management and technical services 351,824 1.37 45 263,868 1.03 75 - - - 87,956 0.34 25 b) Labor 96,136 0.38 12 96,136 0.38 100 -- - - Salaries and IND Overhead: . a) Project management and technical services - Expatriate staff 2/ 97,500 0.38 13 - - - 97,500 0.38 100 - - - - Local staff 2/ 48,750 0.19 6 48,750 0.19 100 - - - - - - b) IND Overhead 7,500 0.03 1 7,500 0.03 100 - - - - - 1 Studies and Unidentified Subprojects 61,000 0.23 8 54,900 0.21 90 - - - 6,100 0.02 10 Subtotal 723,060 2.82 93 507,364 1.98 70 97,500 0.38 14 118,19b 0.46 16 Contingencies 55,335 0.22 7 55,335 0.22 100 - - - - - - TOTAL 778,395 3.04 100 562,699 2.20 72 97,500 0.38 13 118,196 0.46 15 1/ Cars, pick-ups, trucks, cement mixers, brick presses, drilling and topographic equipment. 2/ in contradiLLlon to A.R. para. 4.03, Annex 9 (Table 2) shows expatriate staff coat of CPA 118.5 million and local staff cost of CFA 27.75 mil- lion. In fact, it became clear during the first supervision misaton (August 1972) that the position responsible for the disciepaicy (road engineer, CFA 21 million) could not be filled by a Voltaic as agreed at negotiations. Source: Report No. PA-127a of May 16, 1972, para. 4.03 and Annex 9. RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJE(;T Cr. 317-UV Physical ImplementatiLon of Subprojects July 1 - June 30 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 Total X Wells Appraisal estimates 1/ 120 160 220 - - 500 100 Actuals 2/ 20 117 3/ 102 17 3/ 6 262 52 Village Storehouses Appraisal estimates 1/ 150 200 350 - - 700 100 AcIuals 2/ - 226 401 17 - 644 92 HotLonand Development (ha) Appraisal estiates 1/ 300 500 700 - - 1 ,500 100 Actuals 2/ 94 454 494 391 286 1,719 115 0 Erosion Control (ha) Appraisal estimates 1/ 200 300 500 - - 1,00() 100 ActuaLs 2/ - 167 478 337 413 [,395 [40 Sma II I ri i gation Schemes (ha) Appraisal estimates 1/ 40 60 100, - - 200 100 ActIIals 2/ - 29 38 4/ 4 4/ 5 76 38 Feeder Roads (km) Appraisal estimates 1/ 270 5/ 100 Actuals 2/ - 366 5/ 136 6/ 1/ Report No. PA-127a of May 16, 1972, Annex 9. 2/ R.D.F. management. 3/ Including 12 experimental tubewells in 1973/74 and 8 in 1975/76. 4/ Vegetable gardening not foreseen at appraisal. See Annex 4, Table 3. :- 5/ In 1974, this component was combined with the feeder roads compotient of Cr. 442-UV (DRF). The comiiied 0 a3 target of about 510 km could not be achieved, largely because of the decision to transfer all. road ( X equipment to SERS by the end of 1975/76. 6/ 72% of the combined target for Cr. 317-UV and 442-UV. RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Physical Implementation of Subprojects by ORD Village Bottomland Erosion Small Irri- Feeder ORD Storage Livestock ORD Wells Storehouses Development Control gation Schemes Roads 1/ Buildings 2/ Pens 2/ (ha) (ha) (ha) (km) Ouagadougou 8 3/ 84 332 930 24 65 - - Koudougou - 97 490 231 5 51 2 4/ - Dedougou - 26 167 - - 74 - - Bobo-Dioulasso - 93 - - 30 5/ 21 - - Banfora - 52 - - 7 5/ - - - Kaya - 94 285 234 55/ 79 - 21 Fada N'Gourma 138 15 55 - - - 3 6/ - Yatenga 28 78 323 - 5 7/ 65 - - Bougouriba - 40 67 - - - - - Koupela 88 8/ 65 - - - 11 3 9/ - Total 262 644 1,719 1,395 76 366 8 21 1/ Cr. 317-UV and 442-UV combined. 2/ See Annex 4, Table 3. 3/ Experimental tubewells. 4/ One of 300 m2 and one of 200 m2. 5/ Vegetable gardening not forseen at appraisal. See Annex 4, Table 3. 6/ One of 300 m2, two of 250 m . 7/ Part of perimeter of Tougou; the rest is financed by Cr. 640-uv. 8/ Of which 12 tubewells. 9/ Of 250 m each. Source: R.D.F. Management. RORAL DEVELOPM"ENT FlUNDlPOE" Cr. 317/442-UV - IMplutaOLLlon of Feeder Road CUm11nliew Improvement (kin) ORD Road Target Actual 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 195/l6 19/b/17 I --.---.- .--- - - Y&Iunga OiutbIguaiyn-Kotumbri-Ban 65 1/ 65 1/73-------- ---------12/73 12/73 1 3/75 Dedougou Sai-Gassan 73.5 73.5 4/74------10/74 4/74 10/74 Ouagadougou Zorgho-Yarghin 70 65 1/73-------- ---------12/73 4/74 3/75 Kaya Kaya-Tema 79.5 79.5 1/74-------- ----------1/75 9/74 7/75 Bobo-DIOilason Banunkeledaga-Tokoro 25 16.5 9/74---------3/75 9/74 3/75 NNI-Koro 4 4 2/75-- - 6/75 I 9/74 3/71 Kodougou RNI-Sadon 51.2 51.2 9/S ---------I/ 7 9/74 3/75 Sadun-oueaaa 38.8 0 2/76---------o/1/6 Koupela Bisliga-Hoago-Tenkodogo 5) 11 1/7 ---------------- 1/76 (/76 Fada N'Goirmna Fada-Kominianga 50 0 -. 507 365.7 Source: KID M.'atiagement, 1/ ociginally 77.3 kin. ----- Target ___ Actual (disregards breaks due tO rainy season) KURAI. DVL.MIMil'I fI-NI) 'dOICCT Cr. 311-lV Total ActUal Project Cot aund Fl in ung 1/ (CFA '000) 1972/73 1973/14 1974/75 1975/76 1976/17 l,.al 7. Intel 2 2/ 7 thil C-, t ett n 1,97 28,6972_ 22122 18,952 379 96 264 I i6 96,164 11.6 Eq lipu t 2,016 2,961 3,787 1,334 1,803 11,901 PeIsne,,l an d p eraig18 COOLD 11,1 1 25,736 18,335 17,618 11,993 84,863 "c. _tet.i. 26,148 46d 26.437 11276 12922 1 212 14.7 61,600 7.4 Equip 13,023 13,)62 2,175 61 - 28,421 Iers.nnel and operaing costa 13,125 33,267 24,262 11,215 12,922 94,/91 .pre 7382 121,330 300,257 _157,776 29999 616 744 a) W-lik (262) 31 5 60,61 83,291 3 03 5,642 187,845 22.4 206 .100 24./ 789,100 E,uilpent 334 33,295 21,734 5,967 - 61,330 PIO-mel, umierliala and supplica 4,894 27,386 61,557 27,036 5,642 126,515 y1 Vi2,tS meb,.ses (644) 2,148 2442 23,54 6.517 494 57,119 6.8 51i 19 6.8 88,70 Equip-t,4 - 4,721 2,054 - - 6,75 pe&nnek.I, maIe r lala and suppilies 2,148 19,699 21,486 6,517 494 5,344 c) liotu d Ievelopu,cnt (1,719 ha) 6 8621 13,694 17,225 10,464 255q00 6.o 82,1 0 9.8 47,8410 Eq>upment - 249 2,186 2,279 194 4,908 Per,.....nel, materala and auppliles 6 8,372 11,508 14,946 10,270 45,102 d) (si Coi,col (1,395 ha) 565 503 -0.8 1i __0_ l. i 7,6c0o Eqilp.n t 240 50 - - 290 Pe a.,nel, -t.eial and supplies -325 453 - 5,371 6,149 i) .iIl _, ,itaatIionSlheaea <34 ia) 4/ - 4,702 2.031 961 5,895 13,!89 1.6 .14 487 1.7 126, 101 Eup nt..1 - 490 60 - - 550 PersonieI, imteriala and oupplies 4,212 1,971 961 5,895 13,.39 f) Feeivr Miada (366 k..) 5/ - 14? _24 .599 94,295 679 238,050 28.5 242, 40 29.» 662,100 Equ,l pme.,nt 469 51,792 9,253 - 61,514 le ...-....el, .ae.,ilala and supplies - 18,008 72,807 85,042 679 116,536 g) siudi, iAn ident tte Subprojets 6/ - _3 84. 52,599 5,77 1 _454 63.692 /.6 .4,11. 1.) Vi>exe l gék'dvnj"8 (42 in) - - 13,334 3,029 - 16,363 <1,4,< 4>'i, li0 Othes 1/ - 3,864 39,265 2,746 1,454 41,129 Total eq,dp~nat 15,373 55,587 83,838 18,894 1,997 175,689 21.0 1.tu i per~mnnel and> operating couta 32,J54 )40,869 264978 169,110 54,720 66.603i 79.0 3>is>i p-tI ",.t _46 727 96,6 348,8L6 188,ool 56,717 836,20 12L loA f>,.in..itg 21,154 136,666 282,693 167,391 37,943 645,847 77.2 Ient-h fln nc ng 20,329 37,920 19,917 6,710 11,486 96, 162 11.5 ove re t i..a1ting 5,244 21,870 46,206 13,903 7,288 94.511 11.1 / I i,d ls. bienth ehh <al alaLane and 'r. 442-liV funds to, the feder road compoent. 2/ T,-<h ica..$ >l iitek bluff allocated to tie subprtjecth concerned, using ubprojeet c tbis as weiights. 3/1 m hl- n 20 exp-is-mntmt nbw ls 5/ i' li /--iv a-l . 442-11V , . lom vd. / Pe- s-- l . . e ial and 0-1 ~11plies only, r k/ - del alls 1ee .1'ab ve I I-at r Mbles 2- I ol th s 1 nn . RURAL DEVEILO'IENT FUND PiOmEc Cr. 317-uV Actual Project Cost 1/ (CFA '000) futal 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 Total % given in AudiL Report 2/ ProjeCL Management 3 76 10J74 1 1 13796 62,014 10.5 Equiipment 2,016 2.961 3,787 1,334 1,803 11,901 Personnel and operating costs 1.749 7,788 10,965 17.610 11,993 50.113 Trecihnical Services (IIAEK. TP) 1 2 13§89 4 1 660 10.4 60 95 Equipment 13,023 13,162 2.175 61 - 28,421 Personnel and operating costs 2,228 13,295 11,715 4,505 1,436 33,179 SubprocL a) Wells _528 668 8329 03 5 1874 31.9 184 6b Equipwamt 334 33,295 21,734 5.967 - 61,330 Personnel, materials and supplies 4,894 27,386 61,557 27,036 5.642 126,515 b) VilIUge Storehouses 2.14 24.4O _6.1117 494 3/ 57j11 9.7 5 Equipment - 4,721 2,054 - - 6,775 Permunnel, materLala and supplies 2,148 19.699 21,486 6,517 494 50,344 I c) Boottmland Development 6 8 1369 17,225 10,464 52610 8.5 Equipment - 249 2,186 2,279 194 4,908 Personnel, materials and supplies 6 8,372 11,508 14,946 10,270 45,102 d) Erosion Control - 565 503 - 5,37 6,43 1.1 Equ i pien t - 240 50 - - 290 Personnel, materials and supplies - 325 453 - 5,371 6,149 e) Usuall Irrigation Schemes - .4.72 2.03 961 5.89 13459 2 3 Eu1 I pmnent - 490 60 - - 550 Personnel, materials and supplies - 4,212 1,971 961 5,895 13.039 t) leeder Roads - 18.47 _022 2 - 87,231 14.8 Equ ipmenat - 469 972 - - 1,441 Personnel, mater(als and supplies - 18,008 67,780 2 - 85,790 g) SLu1ieso and UnIdentified Subprojects 4/ 52,599 5.775 1,45 6A69 10.U 71.77 Equipment . . . . . Personnel, materials and supplies - 3.864 52,599 5,775 1,454 63,692 TOTAL* 2 8 158536 273.0582 4452 58939 100.0 9539 Equipmet 15,373 55,587 33,018 9.641 1,997 115,616 19.6 Personuel, materials aid supplies 11,025 102,949 240,034 77,360 42,555 473,923 80.4 1/ Excluding cost of French techinical assistance (Table 6) and portion of feeder road component fland-ed by Cr. 442-ilV (Table 7). 2/ Coopers & Lybrand (Paris), situation financiere au 31 wars 1978 du cridit 317 U.V. (rapport de cloture), 15 juin 1978, Annexe ill. 3/ Purchase of materials only. n 4/ Fo details see Table 3. S.ulce: Rt.D.F. H.auagement. RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Studies and Unidentified Subprojects (CFA '000) 1972/73 1973/7h 1971/75 1975/76 1976/77 Total Development of the Ouissiga Depression - 347 2,028 - - 2,375 Construction of 8 Large ORD Storage Buildings 1/ - 3,517 23,361 110 - 26,91W Study of the Kamadena Plain 2/ - - 13,876 ?,19 - 16,325 - LnJ Development of Vegetable Gardening 3/ - - 13,331 3,029 - 16,363 Construction of Livestock Pens for the Production of Manure b/ - - - 187 - 187 SchoLarships (E.T.S.H.E.R.) - - - 1,4511 1,I5 Total - 3,86b 52,599 5,775 1,)4511 63,692 I/ Of 200-300 m2: ORD Koudougou 2, ORD Fada N'Gourma 3, ORD Koupela 3. / Located southeast of Nouna in the ORD of Dedougou (Black Volta). 5/ Total 2 ha, of which ORD Bobo-Dioulasso 30 ha, ORD Banfora 7 ha, and ORD Kaya 5 ha. T/ Total 21., ORD Kaya. Source: R.D.F. management. (D X -52 - RURAL DEVFLOPMENT FUND PROJEC: Cr. 317-UV Actual Project Cost 1976/77, New Breakdown 1/2/ (CFA '000) Salaries and Operation and Enoluments Maintenance Equipment Total (03) (04) (05) Project Management 4,553 7,640 1,803 13,796 Technical Services 191 1,245 - 1,436 Suboroiects Wells 3,717 1,925 - 5,642 Village Storehouses - 494 - 494 Bottomland Development 6,187 4,083 194 10,464 Erosion Control - 5,371 - 5,371 Small Irrigation Works 454 5,441 - 5,895 Feeder Roads - - Studies and Unidentified Subprojects 1,454 - - 1.454 Total 16,556 25,999 1,997 42,552 1/ Excluding cost of French technical assistance and portion of feeder road component funded by Cr. A42-UV. 2,/ Based on new accounting system proposed by the auditor (Coopers & Lybrand, Paris) and adopted in 1976. Source: R.D.F. Management. tURAL DEV.LO1ENT FIND PirJCr Cr. 317-U1V Actual l1roject Financl i!A (CFA '000) 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 Total IEA Govt. IDA Govt. IDA Covt. IDA Govt. IDA Govt. IDA Govt. Total Project Management 3,468 297 9,425 1,324 12,888 1,864 15,957 2,995 11,757. 2,039 53,495 8,519 62,014 Trechnical Services 14,872 379 24,197 2,260 11,898 1,992 3,800 766 1,192 244 55,959 5,641 61,600 Suibpro Iects a) Wells 4.396 832 56,025 4,656 72,827 10,464 28,407 4,596 4,683 959 166,338 21,507 187,845 b) Village Storehouses 1,783 365 21,411 3,009 19,888 3,652 5,409 1,108 410 84 48,901 8,218 57,119 c) Bottomland Development 5 1 7,198 1,423 11,737 1,957 14,684 2,541 8,685 1,779 42,309 7,701 50,010 d) Erosion Control - - 510 55 426 77 - - 4,458 913 5,394 1,045 6,439 e) Small irrigation Works - - 3,986 716 1,696 335 798 163 4,893 1,002 11,373 2,216 13,589 f) Feeder Roads - - 15,416 3,061 57,229 11,523 2 0 - - 72,647 14.584 87,231 g) Studice anA Unidentified Stibprojects - - 3,208 656 44,010 8,589 4,794 981 1,207 247 53,219 10,473 63,692 Total 2/ 24,524 1,874 141,376 17,160 232,599 40,453 73,851 13,150 37,285 7,267 509,635 79,904 589,539 Revised TOtal 3/ 21,154 5,244 136,666 21,870 226,846 46,206 73,098 13,903 37,264 7,288 495,028 94,511 589,519 1/ ExCluding technical asuistance financed by FAC/CCCE and portion of feeder road component linanced by Cr. 442-11V. 2/ Prepared for completion mission, March 8, 1978. / lew giand intals given in telex of Aune 7, 1978; annual totale estimated on the basis of data prepared in March 1978 and I 1A isrsens secolds. Source; .I).F. Maiiagement. ,,:1 '-, RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV French Technical Assistance I/ (CFA '000) 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 Total Project Management 9-2 17,90 7,370 - 31750 Project manager 2/ 9,432 11,318 - - 20,750 Evaluation officer 3/ - 6,630 7,370 - - 1,000 Technical Services 1O,897 19,972 12,547 _±7112 th 86 61 61? Senior rural engineer 3/ 1/ 7,10.9 9,701 8h? - - 17,967 Rural engineer 3/5/ 1,739 h,383 3,138 2,526 5,305 17,091 Surveyor 3/ 5/ - 1,739 L,383 3,559 - 5,836 15,517 Well technician 3/ 6/ - - 2,651 3,951 345 6,747 Road engineer 3/7/ - 1,505 2,552 233 - 1,290 Total 20,329 37,920 19,917 6,710 11,b86 96,362 1/ Actual cost and financing. 2/ Provided by CCCE. 3/ Provided by FAG. Fi/ ER coordinator for RDF activities. 5/ Head of IER bottomland development unit. / Fourth HER well digging unit; not foreseen at appraisal. 7/ The position was expected to be filled by a Voltaic at appraisal. Source: Data provided by CCCE (Paris) and FAC (Ouagadougou). Annex L - 55 - Table 7 RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-1T Cr. hb2-UV Funds for Combined Feeder Roads Comonent (CFA '000) 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 Total Equipment - 50,820 9,253 - 60,073 0 & M - 5,027 85,040 679 90,76 Total - 55,867 94,293 679 150,819 Source: R.D.F. Management. Annex 5 - 56 - Table 1 RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Allocation of the Proceeds of the Credit Original 1/ Final Category US$ US$ I. CIF (Ouagadougou) cost of equipment imoorted under Parts A and B of the project 3/ L1,500 4/ 6.4 245,145 11.1 II. Construction costs, equipment, materials and supplies for Part C of the project; office and other equipment, all operating costs and salaries of the road engineer and local personnel for Parts A and B of the pro- ject; costs of studies under Part D of the project 3/ 1)834,000 5/ 83.4 1,954,855 88.9 III. Unallocated 22L,500 10.2 - - TOTAL 2,200,000 100.0 2,200,000 100.0 1/ Credit Agreement, Schedule 1. / CTR-DD memorandum of June 27, 1977, to WA1C. / The project description (C.A., Schedule 2) is in Annex 1. / 100% of foreign expenditures. / 83% of total expenditures. Annex , -57 - Table 2 RURAL DEVELOPENT F,:D PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Estimated and Actual Disbursements (Cumulative, USS '000) Original Revised Estimates End of Period Estimates 1/ A 2/ B 3/ Actual June 30, 1973 4/ 320.2 September 30, 1973 499.0 87.1 December 31, 1973 677.8 10 104.3 March 31, 1974 749.4 243.4 June 30, 1974 940.6 oo has oL.8 September 30, 1974 1,131.8 700 W04.8 December 31, 1974 1,322.2 900 670 888.9 March 31, 1975 1,409.8 1,100 1,089.8 June 30, 1975 1,639.3 1,200 1,400 1,434.9 September 30, 1975 1,869.2 1,400 1,580.3 December 31, 1975 2,098.7 1,600 1,900 1,7LL6.1 March 31, 1976 5/ 2,200.0 1,850 1,8U6.5 June 30, 1976 - 2,000 2,200 1,960.5 September 30, 1976 2,100 2,050.5 December 31, 1976 2,200 2,11.9 March 31, 1977 2,186.7 June 30, 1977 6/ 2,200.0 1/ PA-127a of May 16, 1972, Annex 10, Table 3. 2/ FS, August 19, 1974 ("This new estimate is very tentative ..".). 3 FS, November 12, 1975, and March 19, 1916. / The credit was signed on June 26, 1972, and became effective on October 16, 1972. 5/ The project was expected to be completed by December 31, 1975 (C.A., Schedule 2) and the original closing date was September 30, 1976 (C.A., Sec. 2.0). 6/ With payment of Application No. 18 the credit was fully disbursed on June 23, 1977. RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Actual Disbursements by Category (Cumulative, US$ '000) Disbursed Average End of Period Category Category CFA Exchange Undisbursed I II Total Equivalent 1/. Rate 2/ September 30, 1973 38.4 L8.7 87.1 17.57 201.6 2,112.9 December 31, 1973 47.3 57.0 104.3 21.15 202.8 2,095.7 March 31, 1974 60.0 183.4 243.4 55.97 229.9 1,956.6 June 30, 1974 106.7 298.1 604.8 95.27 235.3 1,795.2 September 30, 1974 106.7 298.1 W04.8 95.27 235.3 1,795.2 un December 31, 1974 186.1 702.8 888.9 206.86 232.7 1,311.1 co March 31, 1975 186.1 903.7 1,089.8 250.52 229.9 1,110.2 June 30, 1975 213.0 1,221.9 1,434.9 319.l3 222.6 765.1 September 30, 1975 213.0 1,367.3 1,580.3 38.78 220.7 619.7 December 31, 1975 216.4 1,527.7 1,744.1 384.67 220.6 455.9 March 31, 1976 222.7 1,621.8 1,844.5 408.27 221.3 355.5 June 30, 1976 229.3 1,731.2 1,960.5 435.64 222.2 239.5 September 30, 1976 238.2 1,812.3 2,050.5 h57.76 223.2 149.5 December 31, 1976 245.1 1,896.8 2,11.9 b8o.57 224.0 58.1 March 31, 1977 245.1- 1,91.6 2,186.7 491.75 224.9 13.3 June 30, 1977 265.1 1,954.9 2,200.0 495.03 225.0 - 1/ Million. 2/ CFA per US$. IBRD/IDA, Controller's Department. RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Bottomland Rice Cultivation, 1975/76 1/ Area Total Total Yield per Yield per 2 Number of Developed Cropped Harvested Paddy Cropped Harvested Harvested Area - ORD Bottomlands under RDF Area Area Production Area Area Highest Lowest (ha) (ha) (ha) .(t) (t/ha) (t/ha) (t/ha) (t/ha) Ouagadougou Based on RDF data 22 150.6 171.5 174.5 268.8 1.5 1.5 3.0 (9.8) 0.2 (10.3) Based on ORD data 40 . 314.0 31[.0 L65.7 1.5 1.5 .. Koudougou Based on RDF data 12 182.5 151.0 115.6 131.5 3/ 1.6 1.8 3.2 (7.5) 0.1 (5.0) Based on ORD data .. . 41l.1 393.5 514.2 1.2 1.3 .. .. Dedougou Based on RDF data 3 16.5 .. 7.4 27.4 .. 3.7 5.1 (4.2) 1.3 (2.0) Diehougou (Bougouriba) Based on RDF date 1 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.5 0.6 0.6 Kaya Based on RDF data 6 50.0 51.8 36.3 86.9 1.7 2.4 2.8 (12.0) 1.8 (3.8) Based on ORD data 8 . 31.8 22.3 42.4 1.3 1.9 1/ Partial survey conducted by RDF. ORDs Yatenga and Fada N'Gourma are not covered. 2/ Figures in parentheses are areas on which yields were achieved.' / Resulting from 8[ he of cropped (72.3 ha of harvested) area. Production data for the rest of the area are missing. Note: ORD data shown here do not agree with those in ORD annual reports. Ce - 60 - Ar.nex 5 able 2 RURAL :7ELOPMNT FUND ?RCFCT 317-UV Bottomland Rice Cultivation Yield cer CriL,7ed Harvested ?addy Crocoed Harvested Highest Lovest. OR Area Area Production Area Area Yield 1/ ield 1/ (ha) (ha) ft) (t/h (t/ha) (/haa- Cuagadougou (Centre, 1975/76 L21.2 .. 526.5 1.3 .. 3.6 (o.6)2 1;76/77 366.L .. 365.3 1.0 .. 2.1 1.) 0.1 (9.5' Koudoukou 1975/76 L/ 336.9 .. 22L.8 0.7 1976/77 T/ 97.6 .. 333.0 0.3 Decoug:, (13.0)5/ li75/76 66.2 63.9 93.5 l.1 1.5 3.0 0.6 (2.5)5/ 1976/77 .110.1 6/ 72.8 135.6 1.2 1.9 Kaya 1975/76 1976/77 7/ 88.5 .. 132.5 1.5 ?ada N'Gcurna 1975/76 1976/77 Yatenga 1975/76 172.6 132.5 126.0 0.7 1.0 1.1 (65 C6/ 0 6 (17.nN5/ 1976/77 239.1 L8.7 L3.2 0.2 0.9 1.2 (7.0)3/ 0.1 (0.2; Diebougou (Pougcuriba) 175/76 1976/77 1/ Figures in Darentheses are areas on which yields were achieved. 7/ Arerage yields of 3.1 t/ha were reported for ?1 ha of cropped area in the Moctedo subsector. / Average yields of 2 t/ha were reported for 1L ha of crcpped area in the Mactedo subsector. 2/ As reported by RDF management. 7/ Harvested area. 5/ Of 127.1 ha developed area. 7/ Provisional. zcurce: CP.D annual reports. Note: F1ark spaces indicate that data should be available, but cc]d not be c'llected because of tire c=nstraints. MIRAL DEVLOPMENT FlJNI) PROJPCT Cr. 317-3V Welgigted Average Rate of ReLurn Cost During Share of 2/ Iate ut Retuirks 1lillemtmation Period - implemientation Cost - Total 1 Ttal 2 Total 1 Total 2 Total I Total 2 Base lenefåts Benefits -1071 Base flenefits Ilentefits -107. (CFA '000) () (7) (1) () () (7.) Wells (262) 276,100 298,600 44.5 31.5 39.4 29.5 11.0 9.3 9.7 8.0 3/ Storehknuseu (644 + 8) 116,500 116,500 18.8 13.3 15.4 11.5 35.5 29.5 35.5 29.5 bottomImlanId bevelopment (1,719 ha) 159,800 236,500 25.7 18.3 31.2 23.4 55.2 48.1 31.4 26.6 Erosion Control (1,395 hia) 10,800 30,000 1.7 1.2 3.9 3.0 80.4 74.7 31. l 27.6 Small Irrigatlon (34 + 42 ha) 58,000 76,300 9.3 6.6 10.1 7.5 31.6 26.5 18.4 14.,4 Subtotal 621,200 757,900 100.0 100.0 30.1 25.8 22.2 18.5 Femder Roads (366 km) 254,300 254,300 29.1 25.1 10.0 .. 10.0 -. Tota k 875,500 1,012,200 100.0 100.0 24.2 19.1 1/ Total for PY 1-5 as shown in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9 of thla annex. Total 2 Includes the slare of tecknical services und ilie est mt ed valtje Kf vountmmLary labor. 2/ Subproject shares are used as weiglits In caiculating the average rate of return. 3/ Including O01(0 storage hul Idings which are assumied to produce a rate of retuern comparable to that ot village storehouses. 4/ Miiiimumin areptable rate for feeder roads financed under Rwi 1 usedi here for lack of speeifSc liloimial (on. D Annex 7 - 62 - :aole 2 RURAL DEELC NT FUD PROJECT Cr. 317-[7 Est:iate of Econcmic Costs 1/ :n constant 1976/77 prices (CFA '000) 1972/'3 1973/7L 1974/75 1975/76 1?76/77 Total :noex of :nflation 59.3 73.6 38.1 91.9 100.0 ?ro ect Costs 2/ ?roject management 20,h60 35,98 23,320 13,37L 12,765 110,903 Technical services 25,182 3L,394 1,622 L,LO 1,313 79,915 Suboro.4ects Wells 15,306 87,199 91,678 36,132 5,L72 236,537 Village storehouses 3,283 30,878 24,622 6,277 L52 65,512 3ottomlano development 6,781 22,573 20,737 18,952 13,603 87,6L6 7rosion control 368 2,247 1,338 277 6,070 10,300 Small -.rrieation schemes 567 6,1h99 2,157 925 5,388 15,536 Feeder roads - 21,870 136,969 91,380 621 251,310 "Unidentifieo suboro'ects" - ORD storage buildings - L,368 21,236 105 - 28,709 - Vegetable gardening 681 723 13,886 2,917 - 13,207 Total suoprojects 27,986 179,657 315,623 157,165 36,606 717,337 Total project 73,628 250,035 353,565 180,23 50,68L 908,155 Allocation of Management Costs to Suborojects 3/ Wells 6,077 10,687 6,926 5,457 3,791 32,938 Village storehouses 3,L98 6,153 3,988 3,1L2 2,183 18,961 Eottomland development, including erosion control 7,357 13,818 3,955 7,055 L,902 L2,587 Small irrigation schemes 3,028 5,326 3,451 2,720 1,889 16,1L Total management costs 20,160 35,984 23,320 18,371 12,765 110,903 Allocation of TR Costs (Technical Services) to Subprojects L/ Wells 5,036 6,879 2,924 881 263 15,983 Bott'mland development 13,317 18,229 7,750 2,33L 696 L2,356 Erosion control 1,662 2,270 965 291 37 5,275 Small irrigation schemes. 2,367 3,233 1,375 1 123 7,512 Vegetable gardening 2,770 3,783 1,608 181 14L 8,789 Total technical services 25,182 34,39L !1,622 4,101 1,313 79,)15 1/ Based on financial costs with technical assistance staff alccated to the subpro.ects concerned (Annex L, Table 1, Total 2), exclucing taxes on zersonnel and operating costs '3.6%, following Report No. 1068b-UV, Appraisal of Second R-al Development Fund ?ro- lect, Kay 24, 1976, para. 6.02). 2/ Excluding studies and "unidentified subprojects" not listed below, totalling CFA 20,795 thousand. 3/ Using tne same key as Report No. ?A-127a, Annex 13, :ara. 2 (c). / Following Report No. ?A-127a, Annex 13, :ara. 2 (c), 2CS has 'een -- scmevnat arbitrarily -- allocated to well construction and the restto land and water develop.ent subprojects. RURA. OEVELOPMENT FUND PROJEI, Cr. 317-UV EconomJe Costa and RenefiLs of Welli (CFA '000) 1972/173 1973/74 1974/175 1975/76 1976/177 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/8) 1981/82 198213-91/92 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-20 Plytial Impleemntation 20 117 102 17 6 SubpozalecI coot 15,806 87,499 91,678 36,132 5,472 Shalc of project iaagilf;emn't 6,0377 10.687 6,926 5,457 3,791 Salakis ol iER Otaff 1/ 500 2,925 2,550 425 150 Total I (Iotii,,edl) 22,400 101,100 101,200 42.000 9,400 VUolnt.ary (ilbor 2/ 500 2,325 2,550 425 150 SIarc of tecinical services 3/ 5,036 6,879 2,924 881 263 Maimenlance 4/ - - - 5 29 26 4 / 29 76 14 TuIut 2 (ound,,.3eds 27,900 110,900 106,600 43,300 9,900 0 0 0 0 0 > E n.ic ieicfita 51 lcaltl henelfts 61 1/ - 80 5,549 9,680 10,368 10,611 10,611 30,61) w0,633 10,b11 10,611 heiLigLy ,avil s 6/ 8/ 1,180 7,924 11,931 12,261 10,853 11,410 12.067 32,422 12,4/1 12,t49 AJd3 t fosaj gonat¯iik prodocrion 6/ 9/ - 960 6,576 I 472 12 288 32,56 12 576 12,576 327 56 12 57t, 2,5)6 Tatal (rnndedN - 2,900 20,000 33,100 34,9011 34,000 '34,600 35,300 35,601 35,/00 i.80) 1/ fata fron, PA-127a, Annex 13, Table 4, aditisced to 1976/77 base and acital in.plemnentation pattern. 2/ 500 man-daya per weil (PA-127a, Annex 14), valved at CFA 50 per man-day. equivalent to 252 of the ,ijimumto pay of an wnokl)ed workel, iin jr dy Sm.-» , / e ö Tabl 2. 4,/ F'ivc mank-dtayu per weil every four years, valued at CFA 50 per man-day. 5/ lenefitS start in rie year folloving contstructIon. t/ Samc approach as PA-127a, Annex 13, Tble 4. 7/ The valuje of atditional output adjusted to 1976/77 base la CFA 135 per day. 8/ årcc of snrgh.ii,s da cal-.ålateJ in Table12. 9/ Thme p lte of mlik ln rural arvas is abo.t CFA 20 per liter. Kle: Tie asOmmej cconnmic lfe of a weil I 20 yea&s (VA-127a, Annex 13, Table 1). RURAL DEVELOPMKNT FIND PROJECT Cr. 317-IIV Economic Coats and Benefits of Storehouses (CPA '000) 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/h5-86/87 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1I- 15 A. Village Storehouses Physical Implementation - 226 401 17 - Fcu'Coomic Costs Suibproject cout 3,283 30,878 24,622 6,277 452 Share of project manageumnt 3,498 6,153 3,988 3,142 2,183 Maintenance, repairs 1/ - - - 1,209 2,145 91 - - - - Total (rounded) 6,800 37,000 28,600 10,600 4,800 100 - - - - Economic Benefits 2/ Reduced grain storage losses 3/ - - 18,500 44,200 43,600 37,700 39,600 41,900 28,000 1,1 100 ii. ok R Sinrte Buildlogs 'lyalal Implementallon - 1 - - Ecouomic CoutU Sobproject cost - 4,368 24,236 105 Maintenance, tepairs 4/ - - 36 323 610 862 862 862 Total (rounded) - 4,400 24,200 100 0 300 60o 900 900 900 Econiomic Hlenefits 5/ I/ Lits frout PA-127a, Aiknex 13, Table 5, adjusted to 1976/77 base and actual Implementation pattern. 2/ benofits start in the year following construction. 3/ At appraisal, It was expected thaLt village srorehouses would be used to store farm inputs; in tact, they were ased to store loodgrdios the 01(1 bouighl. from [armers. The eaLinates are based on the assumptions that about 9 E of sorghum are stored in eath storehouse and that the loss reduction compared wilh otlier types of storage ia 15%. 4/ 0. i *onstroctiion costs iII the two years tollowing construction, 1% in the third, 2% In the fourth, 3% in the flith and later years. 5/ Assimied to produce a rate Of relourn1 comIparable to that of village storehouses. Note: The assumed coumii life of a village storehouse as seven years (PA-127a, Annex 13, ratle 1). IDRAI. DEVEL.OPMENT FUNI> PROJEC:T Cr. 317-1iv Econ.omlc Costs and Benefits of Blt;toimland Rice Cutlilvalilon. (CFA '000) 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83-8b/87 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 l - 1 Phyiclal Iiplentation (i< 94 454 494 391 286 Econ,oie C115t5 Sub>ro 5ect. Cost 6,781 22,573 20,737 18,952 18,603 Share of pioect managemenlt 1/ 7,857 13,818 8,955 7,055 4,902 Fertilizer 2/ - 1,824 5,904 6,144 10,145 16,008 22,797 29,633 34, 04 2 36,332 26,714 3/ Maistenance 4/ - 164 959 1,823 2,508 3,008 3,008 3,008 3,8 3,008 1,911 -/ Total 1 (rounidedN 14,600 38.400 36,600 34,000 36,200 19,000 25,800 32,600 3/,000 19,31 28,6011 V,ktltntary Iablor 5/ 1,880 9,080 9,880 7,820 5,720 shar ot techisical GerviceS 6/ 13,347 18,229 7,750 2,334 696 total 2 (rounded) 29,900 65.700 54,200 44,100 42,600 19,01 25,800 32,600 37,000 39,300 28,60 Ecoloiic Belhefits 7/ Valie of paddy production ?/ - 6,000 41.900 52,900 61,900 83,200 107,600 135,800 157,900 169,400 t[6,500 3/ 1/ licindlikg eroslon conitrol. See Table 2. 2/ se. Tahle 6. 3/ Average for the retsidual period -- until tle laut (PYS) group of bottowlands hias reached tie ed of its ec,,nomric lite. 4/ The muaijitenance levy, which has not been charged, Is replaced by the number of man-days spent by the farm fa,mtily go compacL lmds anid leve their plot -- 35 man-daya per ha -- valued at CFA 50 per man-day. 5/ 400 mas-days per ha (PA-?7Ma, Annex 14), valued at CFA 50 per man-day. 6/ See Table 2. 7/ The firat crop Ile harvested ine Ilhe year after [lhe lao-ftonds is developed. rot1 e: The ass4ed econonmc il te of a bas-fonde is ten years (PA-127a, Annex 13, Tlle 1). IKAI. iEvi1.,11'MENT FilNil PRall il Ci. 317-IIV Dutio luand Paddy Produc ti I,. and V..r til ei li.e 1972/173 1973/74 1914/15 1975/176 1976/177 1977//8 1978//9 1919/811 1980/81 it/8i .9 /11 Paddy pruduction of 1/ 94 lia - 75.2 84.6 112'.8 141 169.2 185 588 I88 88 [8mS 454 ha - - 363.2 408.6 544.8 681 817.2 9118 9()m 9()8 908 494 li - - - 395.2 444.6 592.8 741 889.2 988 988 988 391 ha - - - - 312.8 351.9 4b9.2 586.5 701.8 782 /82 286 ia - - - - - 228.8 257.4 341.2 429 514.8 571 Total prod,.:1.t, (t) , 75.2 447.8 916.6 1,443.2 2,023.7 2,472.8 2,914.9 5,256.8 3,580.8 1,4 Im r.conichu n aagate prIce of paddy - 79,300 93,500 57,700 42,900 41,100 43,5001 46,600 49,111 50,1o1 5I.90 (CFA/) 2/ Et.oouIc valute of pr.d"tloil - 5,963 41,869 52,888 61,913 83,174 1107,56/ 135,8>4 5/,94, 169,5/8 1/8,41,1 (CFA '0l0) lirea use uin 3/ 94 h - 4.7 4.7 7.0 9.9 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.5 l4.l 14.l 454 ha - - 22.7 27./ 34.1 47./ 68.1 68.1 68.1 68.l 68.l 494 ia - - - 24.7 24.7 37.0 51.9 74.1 /.. l 74.l 74.l 391 ha - - - - 19.6 19.6 20.3 41.1 58.6 58 6 58.6 5 286 ha - - - - - 14.3 14.3 21.4 __ _.() 4 .9 42.9 Total ut ca use (1) - 4.7 27.4 54.4 88.3 132.7 117.7 218.8 244.9 257.8 257.8 Ecu~øoslt pi IcC (CFA/i ) 4/ - 270,500 146,800 82,200 85,000 90,400 93,700 98,400 100,400 101,70) liI9,615l E,noioæl coat uf ui.a (CFA '0001 - 1,271 4,022 4,422 7,505 11,996 16,650 21,530 24,588 26,2l6 28,155 Supe.phosphate ise o. 5/ 94 ha - 2.3 2.3 3.5 4.9 7.0 /.0 7.0 1. 7.50 /.01 454 ha - 11.3 11.3 17.0 23.8 34.) 34.0 34.0 )4.0 14.0 494 h. - - - 12.3 12.3 18.5 25.) 37.0 /.I 3/.11 /.5 3911 ha - - - - 9.8 9.8 14.) 20.5 '9. 1 29.1 P9.3 286 hø - - - - - _.i _ Il557 __ _5.1 21.4 21 4 Total superphosphate use (t) 2.3 13.6 27.1 44.0 66.2 88./ 109.2 .t 5255 / 12M.i k.nutalc P. ICC (FA/[ ) 4/ - 240,400 138,400 65, /I)I 605,0 60,GD0 69, jou /4,/1041 //, /8t,i0 S'. 8111 Fenu.,,Ic -ual of 8speos ha te 553 1,52 5,6/2 2,.41> 4,552 6,141 8,10>1 #,4',4 l0,11 s0.S1. (CFA '5S0) 1/ Yle,iS, aie aum ... to i .. reoae as 5,11 lows (VA-127a, Atunett, 13, Table 8): year I - 800 kg/ha, year 2 - 900 kg/ha, y-a., - 1.2 /i.., yea 4 - 1.5 i/la, yeai 5 - 1.8 L/la, year 6i - 2 t/ha. 2/ Vito, labl. 1 3/ is e... aSig Irm, 505 kg/la in ye.,i l . 150 kg/lha li. year 5 ånd later (SA-127a, Annex 13, Table 8). 4/ Ibnit g,.owi, eaies (it.o.. k No. 814/78, p. 54) apple, to 19/6/77e i ate. in i niJ~li I g rnm 25 kg/hia 1.n yeal I to 75 kg/ha lin yemr 5 and later (rA-121a, Aniex 13, TaSble 8). RURAL DEVIELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV Economic Costs and Benefits of Erosion Control (CFA '000) 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/81-86/81 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-15 Physical Implementation (ha) - 167 478 337 413 Econoimtic Costs subprojecr coat 868 2,247 1,338 277 6,070 Operating expenditures 1/ Total I (rounded) 900. 2,200 1,300 300 6,100 Voluntary labor 2/ - 1,670 4,780 3,370 4,130 Share of technical services 3/ 1,662 2,270 965 291 87 Total 2 (rounded) 2,500 6,200 7,100 3,900 10,300 Ecoiomic Benefita 4/ Incremental groutidnvut production 5/ - - 80 221 440 946 1,042 941 827 958 689 Incremental sorghum production 5/ - - 749 3,143 6,666 9,717 12,754 14,968 15,408 15,470 11,607 Incremental pea 6/ production 5/ - - 44 214 465 772 956 1,049 1,049 1,049 779 Tutal (rounded) 900 3,600 7,600 11,400 14,800 17,000 17,300 17,500 13,100 1/ In PA-127a, Annex 13, Table 9, this item consisted exclusively of Inputs for cotton production, which hais been excluded for use reason given in the following table (footnote 1). 2/ 200 man-days per ha (PA-127a, Annex 14), valued at CFA 50 per man-day. 3/ See Table 2. 4/ The first benefits accrue in the year after the scheme is developed. 5/ For details see the following table. 6/Voanidzi an. 611eble. Note: The asskimnd economic life of an erosion control scheme is ten years (PA-127a, Annex 13, Table 9). This does not agree with VA-121a, Annex I, Table. 1 uiLh says 20 years, Iut is In line wiLh the assumptions about bottomlands and sMAll Irrigation schemes. RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr, 317-UV Production Development in Erosion Control Schemes Phya sical Incremental Production V Economic Price V.1Iue of In<Lrenivntal 1,odcLIn PY Year Implementation Groundnuts Sorghiim Peas 2/ Groindnute Sorghum Peas 3/ Zroundnuts Sorghum Peas Tot al (ha) (t) (-) (t) (------------CFA/r---------------) (----------------CFA '000-------------------- 1 1972/73 - - - - - 2 1973/74 167 J67 - - - 3 1974/75 478 645 0.78 12.5 1.05 103,000 59,900 41,800 80 749 44 8/3 4 1975/76 337 982 3.77 60.8 5.11 58,700 51,700 41,800 221 3,143 214 3,578 5 1976/77 413 1,395 8.32 134.4 11.12 52,900 49,600 41,800 440 6,666 465 7,571 6 1977/78 - 1,395 14,08 226.5 18.46 67,200 42.900 41,800 946 9,717 172 11,435 7 1978/79 1,395 17.57 282.8 22.88 59,300 45,100 41,800 1,042 12,754 956 14,75? 8 1919/80 1,395 19.60 313.8 25.10 48,000 47,700 41,800 941 14,968 1,049 1b,951 1 9 1980/81 1,395 19.60 313.8 25.10 42,200 49,100 41,t00 827 15,408 1,049 17,284 Co 10 1981/82 1,395 19.60 313.8 25.10 48,900 49,300 41,800 958 15,470 1,049 17,4/1 11 1982/83 1,395 19.60 313.8 25.10 43,700 49,500 41,8100 857 15,533 1,049 1I,4>9 12 19111/114 1,395 19.60 313.8 25.10 46,200 49,700 41,800 906 15,596 1,01,9 11,551 13 1984/85 1,228 17.20 276.3 22.10 48,900 49,900 41,800 841 13,781 924 15,552 14 1985/86 750 10.40 168.9 13.50 51,700 50,100 41,800 538 8,462 564 9,564 15 1986/87 413 5.80 93.0 7.40 52,000 50,100 41,800 302 4,659 309 5,270 1/ YIeld Increases are taken from PA-127a, Annex 13, Table 10. Cotton is excluded as cotton production declined sharply on the M"SHI plateat where the erosion control schemes are located. Shares of cultivated area of groudnlute, sorghum and pens are assimllv to ie 7%, 75% and 18% Lroughokt. 2/ Voandzois and nlebe. 3/ Tentative estimalte. RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJIECT Cr. 317-UV Economic Costs and Benefits of Small IrriRaLioIn Schemes 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 19t1/82 1982/83-86/81 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-15 Physical Inplementation (ia) - 29 38 1/ 4 1/ 5 Economic CoaLS Subproject cost 1,248 7,222 16,043 3,842 5,388 Share of project management 3,028 5,326 3,451 2,720 1,889 Operating costs 2/ - - 661 3,423 3,755 3,872 3,996 4,103 4,147 4,169 2,784 Total I (rounded) 4,300 12,500 20,200 10,000 11,000 3,900 4,000 4,100 4,100 4,200 2,800 Voluntary labor 3/ - 870 1,140 120 150 Share of technical services 4/ 5,137 7,016 2,983 898 267 Total 2 (rounded) 9,400 20,400 24,300 11,000 11,200 3,900 4,000 4,100 4,100 4,200 2,800 ON ELconomIc Benefits 5/ Value of paddy production - - 4,067 4,039 3,333 3,501 4,098 4,530 4,920 5,171 4,148 Value of vegetable production - - - 16,805 18,558 18,558 18,558 18,558 18,558 18,558 11,485 Total (rounded) - - 4,100 20,800 21,900 22,100 22,700 23,100 23,500 23,700 15,60(0 1/ Vegetable gardening schemes financed-under "unidentified subprojects". 2/ See Table It. 3/ 600 maindays per ha (PA-127a, Annex 14), valued at CFA 50 per man-day. 4/ See Table 2. 5/ benefits start in Lhie year following conatruction. Nute: The asumed economic life of a small irrigation scheme is ten years (PIA-127a, Annex 13, Table 1). SIRIAl. loEVEL.jOQj9rr I-UIND IlI>(ll.Ér Cr, 317-1V Small Irrigsatiten Sch,emed: ProductioL ivve _ 1974/75 1975/76 197611 7 1977/78 19181/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981 /182 1982/83 1981/18t, I 9IV /85 '15i'8, l"ti. I/J 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 4 I5 l.... c. ic Pricen (IFA/L) Vøddy 1/ 93,500 57,/00 42,900 41,100 43,500 4b ,6)0 49,10(1 50, wo 51,9o0 52,"mo 5t ,9k 54, 'lil> 55, .11 Stinl g be-ms 2/ 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,0o0 85,ooo 85,0 85,tiøe 85,0 89, tis.oo 85,00 8.,n Greel lelipel 2/ 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,00 20,000 20,000 20,>> o,0 m.l00 2,100 2i, i T-mategs 2/ 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,100 Im,00 , 40 'omi 40,01)1 40t,i8toi 40,091 1, 0, 000 4> li,1w. i lrr ital lin 8e he kxlst lellg _am,(34 hia) Paddy production (L) 3/ 43.5 - 4/ - 7,5 16.5 19.5 22.5 25.5 28 5 30.0 3D.ll il. 0 lio Valuac o1f pa,ddy production (CFA '000) 4,067 - 308 718 909 1,105 1,278 1,479 1,58/ l,117 1.,4/ ,f5, V'Stble Gardei'R (42 ha4) _5/ Prud..Lu.i naf 38 ha (L) 6/ string tibans l' - 85 85 85 65 85 85 85 85 ti5 h5 G.ceI pepperø 7/ - 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 - T-,,ut.c 7/ 112 112 112 112 112 112 11 112 112 II/ - luddy 7/ - 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 10 71) · Prod,ucio øL 4 had (L) 8/ String bedni 7/ - - 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 C .Gpc. pppers / - 27 27 27 27 27 il 27 21 27 / T at e 7/-- 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 lli. 2 11 .2 l 1.2 Il .2 11.1 I,addy 7/ • - 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.1 7.7 7.7 1.1 I / - 'lotal produetioi (t) S i ing beana - 85 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 9 lheen1 peppern - 255 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 181 2 T-n.es a 112 123.2 123.2 123.2 123.2 123.2 123.2 123.2 121.i 121 . 11.2 Paddy - 70 77.7 77.7 77.7 77.7 77.7 77.7 77.7 7/.7 71.7 1.1 - V le>,., .f Løotll pr.>d,,4 t lun (CFA '000) Str bel.'Lal - 7,225 7,990 7,990 7,990 7,990 7,990 7,99» 7,990 1.990 7,99» 1.5 - Clreen >eIpperf - 5,1100 5,640 5,640 5,640 5,640 5,640 5,640 5,640 5,64>' 5,(141> 54 - 1,o-.atoea - 4,480 4,928 4,928 4,928 4,928 4,928 4,928 4,928 4,9.'m 4,928 448 - raddy - 4,019 3,333 3,333 3.333 3,333 3,333 3,313 3,333 3,11 i,3>1 42> - - 20,844 21,891 21,751 21,938 22,179 22,13 22,451 22,591 22,m.8 27,/.f ,l. 1/ Yl Tab. le l j. I.a[aie ricem Ienm Hep rt N,.. 1380c-tiU, Weat Velea Al:rItiltiral 1>evelop rent Pro)ct, Api, >1 , 197>, Anne, t, ' I ble 5. i/ Su,e asalspi i-e, is l'A- 127a, Aneic 13, 1nble 12: yield increasee froms I L/lla to 4 L/ha over seven yearmS 5117. 4o cell I valeed area dutible cropped. // 29 li d.vel,pe. n 191'/74 were lin..nd.ated and destroyed. 5/ .a Is..ae haa.d on Hprt No. 1380c-UIV, Anex 6, Table 5, 6/ Ilry sesun: 17 he Ceacl unhda atl ing 1h0un sed green, lieppele; raiiiy seasun: 14 lea under tmearoen, 20 wondui PaddI.y. // Yl,,Ida aie 5 1/h4 lor stri--11 Ieanalee, 15 L/hin for gr.etn peppera. 8 i/la for inatøe. a..d 3.5 t/lie for peaddy. 8/ ry seas.on: 1.8 li ee.' ,ideir 1 rIng li,as, il geen" p,epils a, r. iny øeamu.: 1.4 ha inder t< e, 2.2 he t I.ddy. RtURAL. PEVEI.OMW'1- kONI) PROJECT' Cr. 317-INV Smal t Sarli tison S,chen,s : IssplL L.b(li 1974/175 1975/76 1976/177 1977/78 1978/79 19719/80 l980/81 1981/8. 1982/83 1983/84 1984/8N 1985/86 198,I/li/ 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 I 1' 5 k..a / 146,800 82,200 85,00) 90,400 93,/0( 98,400 100,400 k0l,100 109,6()0 118,0» 127,201 127,201 12/, ' Suprphoaphase I/ 138,400 61,700 60,000 60,600 69,100 74,200 77,310 78,60O 84,800 95 *1,01 99,110i 99,00» 901) pl'amai..m chlo e 1/ 61,600 41,400 35,000 36,700 39,8)l 41,900 43,900 44,,0U 46,000 41,3»0 48,700 49,900 51.1 ,0 Ioa (34 ha) (sca (t) 2/ 2.9 - - 0.5 0.75 .. 1.0 .0 10 0 1.0 1.» o.> Sea (CFA 000) 426 - - 45 70 98 100 102 110 l18 l21 12/ 1?7 Sipemphospha t ) 2/ 0.73 - - 0.13 0.25 0.38 (1.18 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 .38 .18 Superphoate (CFA '00) 101 - - 8 17 28 29 30 32 35 38 38 i8 (Une,.tIcide (CFA '050) 3/ 96 - - 16 16 16 16 l6 16 16 56 it6 16 Ma>ntenance (CFA '00) 4/ 38 - - 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 Total peratin8 costa 661 - - 76 110 149 152 155 165 176 188 188 IM8 Ve'geb le Gurdenn.g (42 hia) lrta (t) 5/ - 4.64 5.13 5.13 5.13 5.13 5.13 5.13 5.13 5.l3 5.13 0.4' - Urea (CFA _000) - 381 436 464 481 505 515 522 562 605 653 62 S.perphusupale (I) 6/ - 60 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.63 b.63 6.63 6.63 6.6> 1.63 - nple...pshake (CFI'A '0l>0) - 370 398 402 459 492 512 521 562 608 656 62 - eol,asa>, c iom Ide (t) 7/ - 4.8 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 .5 - Potssj,un cil.o1Je (CFA '000) - 199 186 195 211 222 233 236 244 251 258 25 - ýe,i (CFA '000) 8/ - 113 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 12 - laae,l.J,de (CFA '000) 9/ - 178 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 18 5.ow- t pa...ping (CFA '000) Vegetal.es (C.FA 28,001/ha) - 1,344 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 , 1,484 1,484 1,484 14o Pladdy (CVA 3.500/ha) - 750 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 812 82 maintenanca 4/ - 88 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 1 - Total operatIna8 cost* - 3,423 3,755 3,796 3,886 3,954 3,995 4,014 4,103 4,199 4,3102 41 - 1/ hk,, go.h tute@ (Report No. 814/18, p.154) tipplied to 1976/717 etite. 2' Pame assumptiona as lA-12/a, Auin.ns 13, Tab)e 12; rat of trea risitig from 100 kg/ha I, the first to 2»» kg/i,a In the 1Ird and> tllowing yea&s; trøe of s,perh,.osphate ribing from 25 kg/ha in tle first to 75 kg/Ika in the thlird and foliowinig yeaks. 1/ cFA 3,300/ha, PA-127,a, Aiintex 13, Tible, 12, adjtiaLed to 1976/77 hle. H/ane.nance levy ir~,a PA-127a, Annem 13, Table 12, adjusted to 1976/77 base. Althouglh thte levY ha5 not. been1 pald, 1t i, luken, tåa a p8xy fir tihe coat of correctly CHUmaItaining [Ile ficheme. 5/ 80s klg/ha flis v.getéibl,s, 40 kg/h.a for paddty. (i 100 kg/ha jo. ve ,>tble, 6» kg/ha for paddy. 7/ 1I0 kg/hn 1o. vgetables. il' CVA 2,000/hsa (,»i ait >nP, beas and tom,atoe, CFA 3,000/h-a for green peppera. CVA , l/h H,s5 »ceport No. 1'8k-kIV, Ani,ex 6, arable 5. kIIRAL IEVELI2PKCr ~ND LIOJECTf Cir, 317-i1V Ecoaomnic Fnrugate Pr_ee of Sorjrelu i/ Constlnt 1977 Ten»a Ult 1973 1974, 1975 2/ 1976 1977 2/ 1978 1979 1980 1981 1i82 91195 k I1S 9No. 2 yellow, kOII C.lt pots 3/ us$/L 148.8 l54.7 123.9 115.4 88.4 98.2 109.7 115.9 11/.s 1o l. Jl20./ kl../ Ocean freigik and insurance US$/t 56 45 39 38 35 35 35 35 35 15 ' 11 CIF Abid)a US$/t 204.8 199.7 162.9 153.4 123.4 133.2 144.7 150.9 l52 I1 I. fl .1 Ljf AhLdi5n, rsu LVA/t 4! 511,200 48,900 39,900 37,600 30,200 32,600 35,500 31,000 37 ,200 317 .500 Stk, i o18 3b ini11 I4adling, poi 1 4:bar.,o, agging CFA/t 5,100 5,10 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,00 5,100 5.100 5, 00> 5,B0o 5,,lu käll taanapori to r,uoadou,gou CFAl 17,400 17,401 ]7 ,400 17,400 17.400 17,400 17,400 17,400 1 0 .4041 l '0>o 1 ,40 1 o 4un - - - - - - - - - - -- - --- -- - --- - f PrCe In 0ua0adougou CFA/l 72,700 71,400 62,400 60,100 52,700 55,100 58,000 59,500 59,15t 61, 600 ho,fino bl bil Auergge tr»nsori,. to producer CYA/L (2,200) (2,200) (2.200 (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,201) (2,2200) (2.20) 2L0411) Mot IkttI m II rg in CFA/t (3,300 (3,300) (3,300) (3,300) (3,300) (3,300) (3,300) (3,300> (3,300) (3,1001 (3,1nu) (1, un) Loscea / CFA/t (6,100> (6,000) (5,200) (5,000) (4,300) (4, 500) (4,800) (4,900) (4.90o) (5,110) (5,so1ko> (5 6cojum fal l,gie prike eYA/4 61,100 59,900 51,700 49,600 42,900 45,100 47,700 49,1010 49, lii 49,500 5s,111 o, B00 1/ Imipor1 1uan,I, t t.1 lu . p ite. 2/ Ilolilng,, ori ii ge», l bagging, rail anud road tLOAnISpOIL and oilier d~westic: coats adapoed frm Rep'rt No. 10686-IV, Annex 12, Ta,le 2, uiong o.h 1 oi inet2 asa lonal 11l hat ion. 31/ va", kieporl No. 814/78, p. 1ib. 41 Eiauge &ale ovst ant CfA 245 per s$1. 5/ lit of fli, harveled weJiglt. RURAL. DEVEI.OPMik HI>ND PRO IEC1 Cr,. 317-IV Ecoomic varmngie P1r1eL of Paddy _/ Cunstant 1977 Terms Unit 1973 1974 1975 2/ 1976 1977 2/ 1978 1979 1980 1981 l962 1985 199() I,å41 57. ha.c,ken., 1118 lkIgkok 1/ IS$/c 560.0 693.1 402.0 279.1 268.0 288.0 314.0 335.0 343.0 38. ) ilit, .1) $91.01 25% red u o fot' 1,ality ]if(erence 1s$/ (140.0) (173.3) (100.5) ( 69.8) ( 67.0) ( 72.0) ( 78.5) ( 83.7) ( 85.7) ( 89.5) ( 9,.01 ( 99.5 O nfk.eI,ht anld linsuranceL us$/t 56 45 39 38 35 35 35 35 35 35 15 35 CliF Ab>Idjtl IIS$/t 476.0 564.8 340.5 247.3 236 251 270.5 286.3 292.3 301.5 12 111.5 &:Il, Abid)al, rul. d CFA/t 4/ 116,60 138,400 83,400 60,600 57.600 61,500 66,300 70,100 1,600 /4.4001 79,100 81,/lo 1nlng, pott chdjiL-t CFA/L 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,90(0 1,9l)0 1,900 Ial traapLut to (u8gadougou CFA/L 17,400 17,400 17,400 17,400 17,400 17,400 17,400 17,400 17,40) 17,400 17,401 1,41 Trade ~161,t CIA/c 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,t00 2,800 w1.leame Irice lo, Ogadougou CrA/t 138,700 160,5011 105,501 82,700 79,900 83,600 88,400 92,200 93,700 96,500 101.21m Il1.6b0 Tranoport tro, mill cu markeL CFA/t (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,200) (2,2o) (2,2<(2200 Ex-,al pal~ cc CrA/t 136,500 158,300 103.300 80,500 77,700 81,400 86,200 90,000 91,50( ) 4,10 99.00( 11,60 Vuddy q,ivaleIL 5/ CFA/t 88,700 102,90( 67,100 52,300 50,500 52,900 56,000 58,500 59,500 61, 10 64, 1)() 66,001) C.liec.Lon and mnilling costs CFA/L (9,400) (9,400) (9,400) (9,400) (9,400) (9,40) (9,400) (9,400) (9,400) (9,40) (9,400) (9,400) E krlqott 1>figa.pice i puddy GFA/t 79,300 93,500 57,700 42,900 41,100 43,500 46,600 49,100 50, l1m) 51,9()) 54,900o1 56,6ci) I/ lmorI .,ubar. inu,t0on pU(te. 2/ lld,jlig, pg. I chare., ai.. a,nd road transport blnd otier domtest ic cosL adapted frnm Report No. 1068b-ØV, Annex 12, Table 3. }/ Fromn R.p~L ?l,-. 814/78, pý. 1)9. 4/ I xhange saLe COSL.æ CFA 2451US$J. 5/ At (.65. RIJRAI, DEVEl.OPMENT FIND PROJE(7 Cr. 317-uV Econo.c Farmgåte Price of Groundnuts 1/ Constant 1977 Terms illiL 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1985 jo Any origin, ohellvd, CIF Rotterdam 2! US$/t 629 776 501 465 551 503 433 398 439 401 456 463 (kean freigh. and inas,aunce US$/t 37 29 25 25 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 21 F01% Ab,idIan US$/t 592 747 476 440 528 480 410 375 416 34 433 44o F01I Abidjna CFA/t 3/ 145,000 183,00o 116.600 107,800 129,400 117,600 100,5010 91,900 101,9m0 91,1w > 0b, 101 107 ,d0 litndling, port clta.ge CPA/t 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,90,0 1,900 190o 0 1 0 9()0 1, 1, i kall trabaport Lo <4.agudougåk;ot (FA/t 18,800 18,800 18,800 18,8o0 18,800 18,800 18,800 18,80o 18,80k 18,840 18,80m 18,81 P. i i n ,.agad,.goo CFA/t 124,300 162,300 95,900 87,100 108,700 96,900 79,8o0 71,200 81,2(11) /1,400 85,400 81.1m) tuva.lnt in sel-i (70) CFA/c 87.000 113,600 67,100 61.000 76,100 67,800 55,900 49,800 56,800 51,40) 59,800 61 .0o0 Collection andt mak.ting costa CFA/t 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,540 5,500 5,50n 5,sm) 5,500 5,500 Lotse 4/ CFA/t 3,900 5,100 2,900 2,600 3,400 3,000 2,400 2,100 2,400 2,20o 2,600 2,6(0 Econlomlc kärigaLe plice CFA/t 77,600 103,000 58,700 52,900 67,200 59,300 48,000 42,200 48,90o 43,/mo 51,100 52,900u !/ Exporå parity pi itu - aJapted froo Report No. 10683-l1V, Annex 12, Tuble 4. 2/ ra . ltpo. i N.,. 814/78, p. 135. 3/ Exchnge rat. -n.t t-n C- A 245/US$1. 4/ About 51 ot tj.ld hUrvealed wegsht. x RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-UV IDA Supervision Missions ToR Report, Date 1/ No. of Days No. of Persons 1st Mission (K. Haasjes) 11 AUG 72 FS, 25 OCT 72 15 (21 AUG - 4 SEP) 1 + 2 2/ 2nd Mission (M. Huas) 27 MAR 73 BTO, 2 MAY 73 9 (15 - 23 APR) 1 FS, 8 MAY 73 3rd Mission (J. Pelissier) 17 NOV 73 FS, 15 JAN 74 3 (28 - 30 NOV) 1 4th Mission (C. Bourgin) 2 MAY 74 FS, 19 AUG 74 21 (08 - 28 MAY) 3/ 1 5th Mission (C. Bourgin/M. Burer) 4 OCT 74 FS, 10 DEC 74 18 (15 OCT - 1 NOV) 4/ 2 6th Mission (M. Burer) 1 APR 75 FS, 22 MAY 75 13 (11 - 23 APR) 4/ 1 7th Mission (M. Burer) 15 SEP 75 FS, 12 NOV 75 13 (27 SEP - 9 OCT) 4/ 1 + 1 5/ 8th Mission (M. Burer) 16 JAN 76 FS, 19 MAR 76 18 (07 - 24 FEB) 4/ 1 9th Mission (A. Otten/F. Reeb) I APR 77 BTO, 28 APR 77 19 (04 - 22 APR) 6/ 2 (Reeb) FS, 1 JUN 77 (Reeb) 10th Mission (P. Streng) 17 FEB 78 CMP 20 (20 FEB - 11 MAR) 7/ 1 1/ BTO = Back-to-Office Report FS = Full Supervision Report CS = Combined Back-to-Office and Full Supervision Report CMP = Completion Report 2/ Iuertas (FAC), 24-31 AUG; de Bagneaux (PMgr.), 27-30 AUG. 3/ Total time spent on 3 projects (Cotton, RDF, Drought Relief). 4/ Total time spent on 4 projects (225, 317, 442, 496). 5/ Mr. Wissink (consultant); part-time. 6/ Total time spent on 5 projects (225, 317, 442, 496, 640). 7/ Total time spent on 3 projects (225, 317, 442). -76 - Annex 9 RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT Cr. 317-LV Basic Documents CRRD/IDA Report No. PA-127a Aopraisal of a Rural Development Fund Project - Upper Volta (May 16, 1972) IDA Credit No. 317 UV Development Credit Agreement - Rural Development Fund Project (June 26, 1972) IBRD/IDA Report No. 738a-UV Appraisal of a Rural Roads Project - Upper Volta (June 6, 1975) DBRD/IDA Report No. 1068b-UV Appraisal of Second Rural Development Fund Project - Upper Volta (May 2N, 1976) IDA Credit No. 640 UV Development Credit Agreement - Second Rural Development Fund Project (June 21, 1976) IBRD/EDA Report No. 1380c-UV Appraisal of West Volta Agricultural Development Project - Upper Volta (April 1, 1977) IBRD/IDA Report No. 811/78 Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities (June 1978) Coopers & Lybrand RAPPORT ADRESS A MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE DU DEVELOPPEMENT (Paris) RURAL DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE HAUTE-VOLTA SUR LA SITUATION FINANCIERE DU FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL - AU 31 DECEMBRE 1975 (15 juin 1976) - AU 31 MARS 1977 (15 juin 1977) - AU 31 MARS 1978 (15 juin 1978) John C. de Wilde Pilot Project for Rural Development in Upper Volta - Proposal for Establishment of a Fund to Finance Small Projects (September 3, 1970) A.R. Whyte/A. Otten Upper Volta - Mission to review existing and discuss future projects in the rural sector (November 13, 1974) BND/FDR AVANT PROJET DU SECOND FONDS DE DEVELOPFEMENT RURAL (Janvier 1975) IBRD/IDA EIRD, Mission Regionale en Afrique de 1'Cuest - Republique de Haute-Volta, Deuxieme Projet de Fonds de Developpement Rural (25 juin 1975) REPUBLIC OF UPPER VOLTA RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS (ORD) AND ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS (CERCLES) COTTON PROJECT AREA 00 2S A H E L 0 20 40 60 80 100 K OMETESA T E N G 4 ° 10 29 12 AY Ao 7 173 a 26 BOAUFARAABDOUGOUI°27 T 4-37 4 2 25 b 3 Psil 4 Spn 38 29IPR OT OBOohGg 3 1 3 Z5 2 i o 22. Fon A6 Do$s A2 Noo'l 3GOURM A FRI 4 33 37 35 6- 28 29 2'o 8 ENN 0UDOUsTO o World BnkOuddalanfl12t.soulsa O23 ouadugo 34 Tebel 2 03obo 13 Pisilat24 Saponel5 PoaPPER VOLT 2.3,Tita4oKaya 25 om, boissr 36ndU Leo R 4i 4.rabigoya 15Zohare 26 Ztorgoo 37o Te0d 5 Tougan 16 Bousse 27 Koupela 38 Boromo A F R40 0 A 6, Gory13a6 8 Fd 'oum 9 Hud |0" his aphs benprpardbyhe 7 Segenea 1 Tom 29 Diaaga40 Bbo-1oua3s - * orlBan'sstffecluwelyor Kogousi 1 Nona 3 Tekodgo 4 Ordar theonvmeneotheeadrso 9 Baraloo 0 De0 gu 3 aano4 afr I T dnomtossdn he 1 BOgdean 22 Koudougo 33 Zýabre .g 44 Gaebel bonae shown on 3& mapl 1 Sa . PE OT 42~~d no Tmly ,n the par ofy Koo,heiý e 50 jugmn on the oea sttu Bofse 2 o p 8 Brm anyertororny -dmen Admmasaog 0 e uou 3 tGaraiv ni o undari nfor 2hi ----s- - h. -o d -- -oduo -- Znae r ea Bond 4e 2att