Mali - Highway Maintenance Project

Document of The World Bank RETURN TO iREPOP<Ts rv7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 19 13 FI LE COPllrY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MALI FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 197-MLI) February 16, 1978 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MALI FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 197-MLI) Table of Contents Page No. PREFACE PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET HIGHLIGHTS PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. Introduction 1 II. Points of Special Interest 2 III. Conclusions 6 ATTACHMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Introduction A.1 II. Project Preparation and Appraisal A.1 III. Project Implementation and Costs A.3 IV. Economic Re-evaluation A.10 V. Conclusions A.12 Tables 1. Actual and Expected Project Implementation - ConstructiorL of Feeder Roads 2. Feeder Road Design Standards 3. Workshop Staff Trained in Mali 4. Overhaul & Purchase of Highway Equipment 5. Comparison of Highway Maintenance Output: 1971-1974 6. Highway Maintenance Program 7. Technical Assistance to the Workshops 8. Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs 9. Allocation of Proceeds 10. Appraisal Estimate & Actual Disbursements 11. Expenditures for Road Maintenance from Road Fund (Actual and Budgeted) Map This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MALI FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 197-MLI) Preface This report presents a performance audit of the Mali First Highway Project for which Credit 197-MLI in the amount of US$7.7 mil- lion was closed, fully disbursed, in 1976. The report consists of a Project Performance Audit Memorandum prepared by the Operations Eval- uation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the West Africa Region. The memorandum is based on the PCR, discus- sions with staff members and findings of an OED mission to Mali. The transcript of the Executive Directors' meeting of June 2, 1970 has been read and the project files have been reviewed. The audit agrees with the principal conclusions of the PCR, but amplifies on certain aspects of the project and attempts to identify some problems, which are common for highway projects for construction and maintenance of low class roads.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET MALI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 197 MLI) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 9.3 9.4 Overrun (M) 1 Credit Amount (US$ million) 7.7 8.9 /1 Disbursed ) 7.7 8.9 Cancelled ) 0 0 Repaid (June 30, 1977) 0 0 Outstanding to IDA 7.7 8.9 Date Physical Components Completed 06/74 12/74 Porportion Completed Under Project Feeder Roads % 100 32 /2 Maintenance % 100 50 /2 Economic Rate of Return (%) 20 12 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Est. Actual 1egotiatione 04/ /70 2ard Approval 06/02/70 Credit Agreement Date 06/17/70 Effectiveness Date 09/09/70 Closing Date 03/31/76 03/31/76 Borrower Republic of Mali Executing Agency Ministry of Industrial Development and Public Works Fiscal Year of Borrower Calendar year Follow-on Project Name Second and Third Highway Projects Credit Number 383-MLI and 599-MLI Amount (US$ million) $9.5 million and $10.0 million Credit Agreement Date 5/23/73 and 01/09/76 MISSION DATA Month, No. of No. of Date of Item Year Weeks Persons Manweeks Report Appraisal 12/69 2 2 4 5/19/70 Supervision I 7/71 1 2 2 7/71 Supervision II 9/71 1 1/2 1 1 1/2 9/71 Supervision III 3/72 1 1 1 8/72 Supervision IV 7/73 2 1 2 8/73 Supervision V 6/74 1 1/2 2 3 6/74 Supervision VI 2/75 3 1/2 2 7 4/75 Supervision VII 10/75 1 3 3 11/75 COUlTRY ESCMANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Malian Franc (MF) Year: 1970 Exchange Rate: US$1 = MF 555 Average during project US$1 = MF 457 1976 US$1 = MF 490 tl Includ*& US$1.2m for exchange adjustment /2 Estimates.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MALI FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 197-MLI) Highlights Under this project, the Association assisted with the financing of a highway maintenance program, construction and betterment. of feeder roads, technical assistance and feasibility studies. The project included a partial reorganization of the Public Works Department, which was satis- factorily implemented. The training component for equipment maintenance has been successful. Due to a serious shortage of local funds, road main- tenance and feeder road construction remained well below appraisal expec- tations. Costs per km of road maintained and built were higher than an- ticipated because at the time of appraisal, the equipment depreciation cost had been underestimated. The ex-post economic return for the main- tenance program was 20% and for the feeder road component 3%. Points of particular interest are: The need for a more thorough method to determine availability of local funds for recurrent costs (paras 6-7 and 23); the heavy cost of spare parts shortages (para. 10, 12 and 24); and the successful work of the training consultants (paras 18-19 and PCR, paras 3.17-3.19).  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM MALI FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 197-MLI) I. Introduction 1. Mali is a landlocked country, and its economy is predominantly agricultural. Its northern portion forms part of the Sahara desert, where farming is only possible in irrigated areas along the Niger River. The central and southern parts, in which the project roads are located, how- ever, consist of fertile farm land. Predominant crops in the areas served by the feeder roads built under the project are groundnuts and cotton, but the same areas also g:ow such other crops as rice, millet and fruit. 2. In 1970, IDA extended a credit of US$7.7 million to the Republic of Mali for a highway maintenance and feeder road construction and better- ment program. The total project cost was US$9.4 million, which was only 1% over the appraisal estimate, but the projectts targets were only par- tially achieved. The credit was fully disbursed. The project consisted of the following main items: (i) A highway maintenance program, including con- struction and equipment of workshops; spare parts for overhauling existing equipment; and new road maintenance equipment; (ii) construction and betterment of 1,450 km of feeder roads; (iii) technical assistance for equipment maintenance and management and staff training as well as assistance with the use of the equipment in highway maintenance operations; and (iv) feasibility and engineering studies for the reconstruction of 392 km of bituminous surfaced trunk roads. The principal institutional requirements were the partial reorganization of the Public Works Department and the reactivation of the Road Fund. 3. As explained in the attached PCR, the organizational conditions required for the feeder road and maintenance components were complied with: a new Works Division and a Planning Division were created in the Public Works Department (PWD), the Road Fund reactivated, and the consultants ap- pointed. Furthermore, the workshops included in the project were built and equipped, the equipment rehabilitation program was carried out and the new equipment was procured, albeit with some delays. The consultants' per- formance on the equipment side was satisfactory and the training program was a success. Much of this was possible because of the interest and ac- tive participation of the Director and staff of the PWD. In spite of this, - 2 - the project results remained well-below target, with only one third of the feeder roads constructed (PCR, Table 1) and implementation of the maintenance program fell considerably short of target (PCR, Table 6). 4. As the PCR points out, the shortage of local funds was an important cause for the reduced output under the project, but it ap- pears that difficulties in obtaining parts and supplies also played a significant role. Furthermore, the maintenance program would probably have benefited from a more substantial input of technical assistance at an earlier stage. As explained in the PCR (para. 3.11), the main efforts to improve the maintenance organization started only about 1-1/2 years after the equipment arrived. II. Points of Special Interest Shortage of Local Funds 5. The implementation period for feeder road construction and highway maintenance started after the arrival of the new equipment and covers the years 1972-74. During that period, MF 336 million was sup- posed to be available in local operating funds for feeder road construc- tion, according to the appraisal report, but only MF 276 million was pro- vided, which was about 80% of the original estimates. There has also been a proportionate reduction in the IDA funds spent on materials and operating cost, with remaining funds reallocated to other categories under the credit. 6. During the same three-year period, according to a Side Letter to the Credit Agreement, MF 4,400 million was to be provided for highway maintenance, while actually only MF 3,372 million or 77% was made avail- able. The amounts set out in the Side Letter represented a substantial increase in expenditure on road maintenance; the amount for the initial year of the project was 60% more than the amount spent in the previous year and about double the amount spent in 1969. To meet the requirements of the project as set out in the Side Letter would have meant that expend- iture on road maintenance would have to increase from 3% of the Govern- ment's budget to 5%. In addition, the other components of the project also required some local expenditure which would have accounted for an- other 1% of the budget. Thus the project did require the Government to give highway maintenance a significantly higher budgetary priority, a decision which experience shows is never easy since expenditure on main- tenance is frequently regarded as postponable in any emergency. In fact, this is precisely what happened in Mali since the country was hit by the Sahel drought in 1972 and 1973. During the years 1972, 1973 and 1974, expenditure on road maintenance rose on the average by about 25% per year in nominal terms, but inflation, increased fuel prices and currency re- alignments during the period reduced the real value of these funds. The agreement itself on the funds to be provided, i.e., 60% increase in road maintenance expenditure in one year, may have been somewhat unrealistic, and a more gradual approach to increased spending would have been more reasonable. - 3 - 7. There was considerable discussion within the Bank during the preparation of this project concerning the Government's ability to meet these financial obligations and the subject was also discussed during Board presentation. The Government's inability, in the event, to pro- vide adequate operating funds for a road maintenance project is not an isolated case; the saue problem was encountered in several other coun- tries.l/ Generally, few government officials fully recognize the im- portance of road maintenance, while from a budgetary point of view, it usually is difficult to increase the regular outlays for maintenance. Since recurring outlays are crucial to an effective road maintenance program, this project re-emphasizes the need to pay attention to their fiscal implications while designing Bank-supported highway maintenance programs, and to obtain government agreement to them. 8. The limited availability of funds has contributed to under- utilization of the equipment procured under the project. Stocks of spare parts are frequently depleted, leading to delays in repairs which some- times result in the immobilization of an entire equipment unit. There were also periods when equipment was idle due to a lack of money for fuel. In addition, procurement procedures are cumbersome and cause delays in authorizing purchase orders.2/ Low Equipment Utilization Due to Spare Parts Shortages 9. One reason for spare parts problems - the shortage of funds - was already mentioned. In a country such as Mali, it is particularly serious when insufficient spare parts are stocked, because, due to the landlocked position, delivery of parts by surface takes a long time, while transporting them by air is much costlier. In addition, customs and other formalities can result in delays. PWD officials unanimously felt that equipment suppliers did not have sufficient parts in stock, but one of the main suppliers claimed that his stocks were ample and that parts were always ordered promptly when not in stock. The audit mission could not verify the situation. LO. It was clear, however, that pieces of equipment were immobilized for considerable periods, while waiting for parts. The stock of spare 1/ E.g., PPAR No. 1819 of December 13, 1977 on CAE Highway Maintenance Project (Credits 146 and 199-CA) and PPAR No. 1768 of October 25, 1977 on the Benin Maintenance and Highway Engineering Project (Credit 215-DA). 2/ Ironically, one case was reported to the audit mission where new fuel supplies had been authorized, but meanwhile the road had dete- riorated to such an extent that the private fuel company did not want to travel on it. Finally, a PWD tanker was dispatched. parts was exhausted to the extent that parts from other pieces of equip- ment were used. The mission observed a case, where one out of three bull- dozers had been permanently under repair: a part was ordered but by the time it arrived, other parts had been removed to keep the remaining two machines operating. One unit of equipment was altogether immobilized be- cause both loaders were out of order, one already for several months. Cost Increases of Feeder Roads 11. According to the PCR (para. 4.09), the cost of feeder road con- struction per km was about 3 times the amount estimated at appraisal. The overrun on materials and operating cost per km was 130%, while the remainder resulted from higher than anticipated depreciation charges on construction equipment. On the basis of available data on minimum wage levels, fuel costs and cement prices, it appears that over the three year project period, inflation, currency realignments and increased oil prices accounted for about 30% of the operating cost increase. The procurement cost of the equipment was virtually what had been estimated in the appraisal report. It appears, therefore, that at appraisal operating and materials costs had been underestimated. 12. Another reason for the sharp cost increase per km is that, after about six years of use (1972-77), the equipment apparently is showing se- rious signs of wear, while it has produced only about one third of what was expected at appraisal. As a result, a much higher amortization cost has to be taken into account per km of road. The rather rapid equipment depreciation, in spite of the low output, probably results from both oper- ation and periods of idleness while exposed to harsh climatic conditions as well as from operating partly defective equipment or those overdue for maintenance. Much of this would be the result of a lack of operating funds, maintenance materials and spare parts. It appears, therefore, that in Mali and countries with similar problems, the equipment input for road betterment as well as for ordinary maintenance will be more costly than could normally be expected. This factor requires due attention in project appraisal and economic return calculations should take this into account. Problems of Road Maintenance and Overloading 13. The audit mission found that part of the new feeder roads were not being maintained. Some of the roads, built four years ago, were for the most part in remarkably good condition, but also had some badly dete- riorated sections. These were mostly in the lower areas where water col- lected during the rainy season. No information was available on whether traffic is already interrupted during heavy rains, but if no maintenance is carried out soon, some of the roads will be cut in the wet season which would negate part of the rationale for building them. 14. The Credit Agreement contains the standard clause that "The Borrower shall cause its road network to be adequately maintained ...". -5- The problem was, however, that most of the feeder roads were not officially classified as part of the road network. The Director of PWD mentioned that the Government is aware of the problem and that measures are now being taken. It should be noted, however, that traffic on the feeder roads is only about six vehicles per day, against an estimated traffic of 34 ve- hicles per day on gravel roads which are supposed to be under the main- tenance program, but of which presently only 50% is actually maintained. The question, therefore, is, firstly, whether it is correct to build such roads where traffic is so low and, secondly, should IDA have required the Government to maintain such roads when it cannot properly maintain roads with higher volumes of traffic. 15. The Credit Agreement also includes a commitment by the Govern- ment for steps to ensure that: (a) axle loads of vehicles using the road network will be consistent with the structural and geometric design stand- ards of the roads; (b) legal axle loads are duly observed; and (c) the move- ment of heavy vehicles is restricted where necessary during periods of rains, through the use of adequately staffed rain barriers. 16. The maximum axle load is supposed to be 13 tons, but there is no proper enforcement because weigh scales to be financed by USAID have not yet been bought, while the maximum fine for overloading is only about $10 equivalent, which, PWD officials believe, is not an adequate deterrent. Some trucks now appear to be overloaded and could easily cause damage to the roads. The rain barriers are reportedly successful and are, according to PWD officials, generally used, which was confirmed by the mission's limited field observations. More Labor-Intensive Road Work 17. It appears that labor-intensive work methods have not been con- sidered seriously in the project design, perhaps partly for good reasons. Among them may be the fact that application of such methods would be hand- icapped by the sparse population and often long distances between villages. The CPS is now collaborating with the Regional Projects Department, in con- nection with the Fourth Highway Project appraisal, in a detailed review of the appropriateness of construction technology presently used in Mali. Consultants' Services under the Project 18. As the PCR points out (paras 3.17-3.19), the consultants for the maintenance project (ILO and BCEOM) performed well. Apart from some minor problems, the Government also seemed to be satisfied. The PCR men- tions especially that ILO's best accomplishment was in training, where it drew on its experience in the field of adult education. It should also be noted that the cost per man-month for the ILO experts was only two thirds of the cost of the BCEOM staff, employed under the same project, to assist with the organization of highway maintenance. 19. When the project was presented to the Board, questions were asked about -the appropriateness of financing staff of a UN specialized - 6 - agency from an IDA credit. It was done, however, because ILO was already assisting road maintenance in Mali and the Government preferred continuity in this assistance, while neither the UNDP nor ILO had funds for the ex- panded task. ILO normally charges the full direct and indirect costs of the experts (such as salaries, social charges, local allowances, etc.) plus a 14% overhead fee. The latter is similar to the Bank's charges to the UNDP when it acts as executing agency. Overhead fees charged by com- mercial consulting firms are normally much higher. 20. As explained in the PCR (paras 3.20-3.21), the consulting firm carrying out the preinvestment studies met with difficulties, which led to claims against PWD. The firm has been trying to involve the Associa- tion in the dispute and the matter was reported on to the Board on February 16, 1977 (IDA/Sec. M77-34). Reasons for the Reduced Economic Justification 21. The economic return on the feeder road component was estimated at 15% when the project was appraised. The PCR found an economic return of only 3% which was primarily due to the higher than expected costs (see para. 13). The PCR found an ex post economic return of 20% for the main- tenance program against an appraisal estimate of 23%. In this case costs were higher but, as the PCR explains, it was reasonable to take much higher benefits into account for the maintenance of paved roads. III. Conclusions 22. The project was intended to achieve three objectives: to improve road maintenance, to strengthen the institutions responsible for road main- tenance and to carry out a program of feeder road construction. The proj- ect fell short of its first objective; for example, in 1975 normal mainte- nance was carried out on only 67% of the length of roads expected at ap- praisal and minimum maintenance on only 28%. Nevertheless, the economic return on this part of the project is now estimated at 20% as against 23% *at appraisal. The institution building objectives were by and large achieved and the PWD, reorganized and with better maintenance forces, has been respon- sible for two follow-on highway projects. The feeder road program was the least successful of the three project components; construction costs were substantially higher than expected and only 470 km of feeder roads were built as against an appraisal target of 1,450 km. The rate of return on this part, which represented about 40% of the total cost of the project, is estimated at 3%. 23. The main reasons for the shortfall in the maintenance program were the shortage of local funds and reduction in equipment availability resulting from a shortage of spare parts. The project required an increase in spending for roads amounting to the equivalent of 3% of the total Govern- ment budget. While the projected increase in maintenance expenditures seems to have been somewhat too optimistic, the serious drought which hit Mali in 1972 and 1973, and the high world inflation contributed to the failure to increase local expenditure on the project as planned. Considerable concern -7- was expressed within the Bank about the feasibility of this increase, but it appears that an in-depth analysis, to determine whether Govern- ment revenues could be increased or Government spending in other sectors be curtailed, would have been desirable. 24. Equipment availability has been sharply reduced through a short- age of spare parts. This problem is not unique to Mali, but is aggravated by the country's landlocked location. PWD did not have the resources needed to maintain a sufficient stock of parts and, at least according to PWD of- ficials, the suppliers' stocks were also inadequate. In part the situation results from the very anall size of the market. With only a limited number of pieces of equipment in use in a country, keeping large stocks of spare parts at all times entails the distinct risk of having parts left over once all the equipment is scrapped. This would result in commercial losses to suppliers, which obviously they want to avoid, or the risk that officials will be censured for improper parts management of Government stocks. From the Government's point of view, the risk of losses on spare parts, however, appears the lesser of two evils, because it will be cheaper (if kept within reason) than having equipment immobilized for long periods. Since the parts problem.is not an isolated case, it may well merit a special review. Fur- thermore, in view of the widespread difficulties which the Bank has expe- rienced in ensuring adequate maintenance of roads and of equipment in high- way projects, it would be unrealistic to assume that road maintenance would be brought up to a reasonable level any time soon after a project is com- menced. In estimating the extent of physical progress that can be expected in maintenance projects, this factor should be taken into account. Economic return calculations should also take this into account as well as the fact that, as discussed below, equipment depreciation both for maintenance and force account construction in Mali is greater than normally is expected to be the case. 25. As a result of the shortage of operating funds and spare parts, the equipment has had a much lower output than expected at the time of ap- praisal. Yet, the equiipment has deteriorated about as much as under normal use with the result that a higher cost has to be assigned per km built or maintained. This is the main reason for the ex post economic return of only 3% on the feeder road component of the project. This part of the proj- ect does not therefore appear to be economically justified. However, this return takes into account only vehicle operating costs and it can be argued that, in addition to agricultural development, some low traffic feeder roads are justified for reasons not of a strictly economic nature. These might include, for example, facilitating exposure of the rural population to modern technology, improving Government administration, education, etc. There is, however, as yet no way in which such social benefits can be quantified and brought into relation with an economic rate of return. A systematic review of this question seems to merit attention.  ATTACHMENT MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 In 1966, the appraisal mission for a railway project (the first Bank Group operation in Mali) identified the need for a country-wide transport survey. This survey was carried out by the Belgian consulting firm Tractionel under UNDP financing, with the Bank as Executing Agency, in 1967-1968. The consultant's report concluded that, generally speaking, the road system could serve the major current and short-term transport needs of the country without heavy investments. The report also drew attention to the need to reorganize and strengthen highway maintenance and to construct agricultural feeder roads. 1.02 In line with these recommendations, the Public Works Department (PWD) prepared a maintenance program, partly with the assistance of two experts from the International Labor Organization (ILO), and a feeder road construction program. The project based on these programs was appraised in December 1969, negotiated at the end of April 1970, and approved by the Board on June 2, 1970. The Credit Agreement, signed on June 17, 1970, became effective on September 9, 1970. II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 2.01 The project, t.o be implemented with the assistance of consultants, consisted of: (i) a four-year highway maintenance program and a feeder road construction program, aimed at improving mainte- nance operations and constructing 1,450 km of feeder roads by force account; and (ii) preinvestment studies for the reconstruction of the Bamako-Faladig-Bougouni (170 km) and Faladig-S6gou (222 km) roads. Highway Maintenance and Feeder Road Construction Programs 2.02 In 1970, the state of the highway network was generally poor. Only the most recently paved roads were in satisfactory condition. The secondary gravel and earth roads, which are a vital complement to the trunk road system, were in especially poor condition.. Lack of adequate feeder roads was hindering the progress of two major agricultural development efforts launched by the Government to promote the production of cotton and groundnuts, its two major cash crops. - A.2 - 2.03 The objectives of the project were to strengthen and re-equip the Public Works Department (PWD), so as to enable it to undertake a highway maintenance program and a feeder road construction program which were the two main components of the project. It also included preinvest- ment studies to prepare future projects. The following actions were to be taken before full operations could start on the highway maintenance and feeder road programs: (i) reorganizing Public Works Department (PWD); (ii) renovating and expanding maintenance workshops; (iii) overhauling existing salvageable maintenance equipment; and (iv) purchasing highway maintenance equipment and spare parts. The project provided for two teams of consultants to help PWD take these actions, to train PWD's staff, and to implement the programs. One team was to be assigned to PWD's workshop operations and rehabilitating highway equip- ment. The other team was to assist in reorganizing PWD, improving highway maintenance operations and constructing feeder roads. 2.04 In 1970, PWD was responsible for about 5,300 km of primary and secondary roads. It performed normal maintenance on 1,050 km, and minimum maintenance on the remaining 4,250 km. During the maintenance program, PWD was to take over responsibility for an additional 2,900 km of secondary and feeder roads, thereby eventually to perform normal maintenance on 5,250 km, and minimum maintenance on the remaining 2,950 km. 2.05 Under the feeder road construction program, PWD was to construct about 1,450 km of feeder roads by force account (Table 1). Two sets of design standards had been retained: "A" Type, or normal type, was an all- weather gravel road with a 5.5 m roadway; and "B" Type, or minimum type, was a dry-weather earth road with a 4 m roadway (Table 2). About 420 km of feeder roads, with an annual traffic of more than 4,000 tons, were selected as "A" Type roads. Another 1,030 km of feeder roads, carrying an annual traffic of between 1,700 and 4,000 tons, were selected as "B" Type roads. Preinvestment Studies 2.06 The project also included economic feasibility and engineering studies for the reconstruction of two trunk roads, Bamako-Faladid-Bougouni (170 km) and Faladig-Sggou (222 km). These two roads, the oldest bituminous surfaced roads in Mali, had been constructed between 1955 and 1959 and had not been resealed since then. Although their pavement was still serviceable, it gave evidence of fatigue and breaking, and maintenance was becoming in- creasingly costly and not sufficient to avoid further deterioration. - A.3 - III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS A. Highway Maintenance and Feeder Road Construction Programs Reorganizing Public Works Department 3.01 In 1970, within the Ministry of Industrial Development and Public Works, PWD was responsible for highway planning, design, construction, maintenance and administration through its Directorate of Roads and Bridges (DRB). DRB's central organization comprised three services (the Engineering Office, the Equipment Division, and the Administration and Accounting Service). Its field organization consisted of 13 subdivisions, grouped into 6 geographical divisions. 3.02 DRB's control over field operations was limited, however, to administrative and financial matters. The subdivisions had a large measure of freedom in determining the scope and nature of their maintenance operations. As a result, the quality of highway maintenance varied from one subdivision to another. 3.03 To improve planning and to strengthen supervision of maintenance works, PWD was extensively reorganized in 1971-1972. The Engineering Office and the Equipment Division were put under PWD's direct responsibility while DRB concentrated on supervising road maintenance and construction., Two new services, also reporting directly to PWD, were created: (i) the Office of Planning and Control (OPC), in charge of: - processing traffic counts, - preparing road investment and maintenance budgets, and - programming and assessing execution of road maintenance; and (ii) the New Works Division, in charge of constructing feeder roads by force account. Both services were staffed with qualified local personnel and are functioning satisfactorily. Reorganizing Workshop Operations 3.04 All of the highway equipment assigned to PWD's various services is rented from the Equipment Division, which regularly inspects the equipment and operates a central workshop in Bamako with a large inventory of spare parts. The rent only covers major repairs and overhauling, since routine maintenance of the equipment is carried out by the various services in their own field workshops, and renewal of equipment is financed by a separate budget allocation. At project appraisal, the central and field workshops were poorly equipped and managed, and distribution of spare parts from the central workshop to the field workshops was not properly organized. - A.4 - 3.05 ILO was in charge of assisting PWD in reorganizing workshop operations. In a preparatory phase (October 1970-March 1971), ILO pre- pared a program consisting of: - reorganizing highway equipment management and maintenance, - rehabilitating and expanding the workshops and their equipment, and - training the staff. This program was implemented under the First Highway Project from April 1971 to June 1973 and was extended under the Second Highway Project by one year (July 1973-June 1974). 3.06 To reorganize highway equipment management and maintenance, PWD created three administrative services: - the Equipment Inspection Service, in charge of supervising equipment maintenance in the field subdivisions, and con- trolling the condition of the equipment; - the Performance Accounting Service, in charge of determining the cost of every repair operation and issuing a monthly breakdown of all expenses incurred; and - the Purchase and Inventory Service, in charge of purchasing and managing the 17,000 different spare parts and other supplies necessary to repair and maintain the highway equipment. 3.07 The workshop rehabilitation program was carried out between mid- 1971 and early 1974. Two Senegalese contractors, selected after local competitive bidding, constructed a large shed at the central workshop of Bamako between July 1971 and July 1972. After some delays in preparing the design and supplying materials, PWD rehabilitated and expanded the Subdivision workshops by force account from end-1972 to early 1974. New workshop equipment for all of the workshops was delivered by suppliers from April to June 1972, after international competitive bidding was called in mid-1971. 3.08 Great emphasis was put on the training of the staff of all work- shops. A temporary training center was set up at the central workshop, where an ILO expert, his Malian counterpart and two Malian instructors provided various technical and administrative courses to professionals, subprofessionals, specialized workers, operators, drivers and clerks (Table 3). All nine Malian counterparts were appointed at the end of the preparatory phase, and received training abroad. Six of them attended twelve weeks of training in equipment maintenance at ILO Headquarters in Torino, on UNDP fellowship. Two others benefited from two nine-month training courses at the French truck maker Berliet's training center at Lyons and the other counterpart attended a one- month training session at its workshop in France. - A.5 - Overhauling and Purchasing Highway Equipment 3.09 ILO was also in charge of assisting the Equipment Division in overhauling existing salvageable highway equipment and purchasing some new equipment. During the preparatory phase, 441 pieces of equipment were inspected. A total of 41%, or 182 machines of US and Western European origin, were overhauled between 1971 and 1973 with spare parts procured after international competitive bidding. The remainder, which were mainly of USSR origin, were rapidly falling into disuse. Since no spare parts for this equipment were available or could be purchased under the project, 171 pieces were cannibalized, and their parts used to temporarily repair the 88 pieces which were in better condition (Table 4). 3.10 PWD also needed new equipment to perform highway maintenance on its extended network (para. 2.04;)and to start constructing feeder roads. International competitive bidding was called on November 15, 1970. The list of equipment differed only slightly from the appraisal estimate (Table 4). Contracts were awarded to the lowest evaluated bidders. Most of the Equipment was delivered during the first semester of 1972, after delays of three to six months, mainly because of the lack of capacity of the Dakar-Bamako railway. Some suppliers had to reroute their equipment through Abidjan to haul it by rail to Bobo-Dioulasso and from there by road to Bamako. Highway Maintenance Program 3.11 In accordance with the project priorities agreed upon at appraisal, improving maintenance field operations received far less emphasis than reor- ganizing the Equipment Division; only two experts from the French consulting firm BCEOM -- the mission chief on a part-time basis and an accountant for one year -- were assigned to carry out the task. These experts organized some training courses for the subdivision engineers and technicians and pre- pared forms for data collection (road inventory, traffic counts, maintenance activity reports, cost analysis), mainly to allow DRB to have a clearer view of highway maintenance needs, costs and output. In fact, efforts to improve maintenance organizatioa really started in late 1973 under the Second Highway Project. 3.12 New or overhauled equipment was assigned to field subdivisions during the first half of 1972. Consequently, maintenance operations were conducted with proper equipment only during the 1972/1973 and 1973/1974 dry seasons. The comparison of maintenance output for various types of works between the 1971/1972 and 1973/1974 seasons shows a substantial increase in both mechanical and manual maintenance output (Table 5). Reconciling the appraisal objectives, (expressed in kilometers of roads and maintenance levels) with the actual achievements, (measured in square or cubic meters of materials and type of works) required some interpretation. However, the results are expressed in Table 6. In 1975,.PWD carried out normal maintenance on 3,499 km, or 67% of the 5,263 km expected at appraisal, and minimum maintenance on 818 km, or 28% of the 2,957 km expected at appraisal. More could have been achieved through the project had the Government been able to earmark more funds for road maintenance as it had agreed to do at negotiations (para. 3,28 ). - A.6 - Feeder Road Construction Program 3.13 The New Works Division (para. 3.03) was created in early 1971 to construct feeder roads by force account, with BCEOM assistance. From June 1971 to June 1973, the consultants defined the works to be undertaken, prepared a performance accounting system for the two feeder road brigades, and conducted on-the-job training for newly hired staff who lacked experience. Equipment deliveries were made during the first half of 1972, and the brigades started working at full capacity in May 1972, two months before the rainy season. BCEOM provided one road foreman and one expert mechanic to each brigade, as well as the chief of mission, who worked partially on the feeder road program. 3.14 Execution was initially scheduled in three nine-month dry seasons (October-June) from 1971/1972 to 1973/1974, with an annual output of about 500 km. This objective was, however, too ambitious as it assumed that the brigades would always work at full capacity. The actual average output between 1972-1974 was about 160 km p.a., declining from 199 km in 1972 to 157 km in 1973 and to 114 km in 1974 (Table 1). As a result, only 470 km were constructed under the project., 3.15 This poor output was the result of various difficulties. At first, cumbersome Government administrative procedures in disbursing local funds caused delays in the delivery of supplies and payment of salaries in the New Works Division.!V Then the energy crisis and worldwide inflation considerably increased costs of imports, while the Government had to allocate its scarce resources to Sahelian drought relief, making it impossible for the Government to provide the additional local funds needed for the feeder road program. 3.16 In early 1974, in the light of the experience gained in constructing feeder roads during the first two years of the project, consultants BCEOM proposed to retain only one type of feeder road, the standards of which would be in between those of "A" Type and "B" Type feeder roads. Those new standards (Table 2) are being used under the Third Highway Project which is financing the continuation of the feeder road program. The new annual output objective was also lowered to 320 km, but it is doubtful that the two brigades will actually be able to construct more than 200-250 km p.a. as their work is often slowed down by delays in procuring materials and spare parts, in part due to the land- locked situation of Mali. To relieve the Government's budget, the Association has agreed to finance 75% of total operating expenditures under the Third Highway Project (55% in the First Highway Project), and to provide a revolving fund of US$500,000 to speed up disbursements. B. Services of Consultants Technical Assistance 3.17 ILO was retained to assist PWD in reorganizing workshop operations under the project. ILO had been assigned the task of improving the performance of Malian state-owned enterprises under a UNDP Special Fund contract (MLI/llJanuary 1969), and two experts were already working on the problems of highway equipment maintenance. 1/ The Government financed 45% of all operating costs. - A.7 - 3.18 ILO provided 268 man-months of technical assistance under the project between October 1970 and June 1973 (270 man-months were foreseen at appraisal), and another 72 man-months under the Second Highway Project between July 1973 and June 1974 (Table 7). This one-year extension was necessary, as the ILO program progressed more slowly than initially antici- pated because of delays in the delivery of equipment and spare parts, and in the renovation of the workshop. Generally speaking, the ILO team per- formed well and established good relations with DPW staff. Counterparts for each of the experts participated effectively in the program. ILO's best accomplishment was training, where it drew on its vast experience in the field of adult education. 3.19 Consultants BCEOM were selected (from a short list of three consulting firms) to provide technical assistance in improving highway maintenance and constructing feeder roads. BCEOM provided 148 man-months of technical services under the project between May 1971 and February 1974, and another 65 man-months under the Second Highway Project between March 1974 and September 1975. As in the case of ILO, this 17-month extension was necessary because of late equipment delivery and also because some of the 3CEOM-trained staff left the feeder road brigades to work in the private sector. As a whole, BCEOM succeeded in helping to set up a well-structured highway maintenance organization and an efficient New Works Division, which has since been operating satisfactorily in spite of severe financial problems (para.3.29). In retrospect, it appears that the appraisal report had been somewhat optimistic in assuming that such comprehensive reorganization and strengthening of PWD could be carried out by consultants in three years. Thus, ILO's and BCEOM's technical assistance was extended to about four years, which is still a remarkably short period, considering the tasks involved. Preinvestment Studies 3.20 The Government shortlisted four foreign consulting firms, each of which had submitted a proposal to carry out the preinvestment studies of 392-km of two trunk roads. The Government proposed to select consultants Kez International Lt6e. (Canada), whom the Bank accepted although the con- sultants' proposal was only rated third. Apparently, a consideration of the Government in selecting Kez was its preference to use a relatively small and new firm, thus reducing dependence on more powerful, well-established firms. Kez contract was signed by the Government on January 31, 1971. The work comprised two phases: a seven-month first phase for feasibility studies and preliminary engineering, and a three-month second phase for final engineering and preparation of bidding documents starting two months after the end of the first phase. 3.21 Kez-met difficulties in carrying out these studies, and submitted several claims for payment for additional services. -PWD reviewed the claims, accepted some of them and proposed a settlement which was rejected by Kez. Since then, Kez has been trying to involve the Association in the dispute. - A.8 - C. Costs and Time Schedule 3.22 At the time of appraisal, the total cost of the project including taxes l_ was estimated as follows: US$ million2/ A. Maintenance and Feeder Road Programs 1. Workshop renovation and expansion 1.07 2. Equipment and spare parts 4.38 3. Imported materials for feeder road construction 0.28 4. Operating costs for feeder road construction 1.24 5. Technical Assistance 1.87 B. Preinvestment Studies 0.6 TOTAL 9.30 1/ For goods locally procured only 2/ US$1 = MF 555 3.23 IDA Credit 197-MLI of US$7.7 million covered the entire foreign exchange component of the project cost plus subsistence allowance for con- sultants. The remaining local component of the project cost (US$1.6 million) was borne by the Government, which also had to bear the recurrent expenditures of the highway maintenance during the four years of the program estimated at a total of US$8.0 million, increasing from US$1.7 million in 1971 to US$2.6 million in 1974. The Road Fund was to provide all the local funds. 3.24 PWD started implementing all project items and carried out its extensive reorganization expeditiously. Later, some delays occurred: late deliveries of equipment because of Mali's landlocked position (para. 3.10), longer than expected reorganization of workshop operations (para. 3.05) and workshop rehabilitation (para. 3.07), slow start of operations of the New Works Division (paras. 3.13 and 3.14), and slow progress of the con- sultants in charge of the preinvestment studies (paras. 3.20, 3.21). Physical completion of the project items was thus about one year behind schedule. 3.25 Actual project costs (Table 8) cannot be meaningfully compared with appraisal estimates. The project was hit by the 1973-1974 world-wide inflation, and funds were disbursed as needed to cover the cost of the various project components until exhausted. The original and actual allocation of proceeds is given in Table 9. - A.9 - D. Government's Observance of Credit Covenants 3.210 The Government tried to follow as closely as possible the covenants incLuded in the Credit Agreement. As expected, it created a New Works Division (para. 3.03), started collecting (para. 3.11) and processing (para. 3.03) road data, and established a cost accounting system (paras. 3.06, 3.11 and 3.13). In two covenants of particular importance, the Government had agreed to: (i) re-establish its Road Fund (Article IV, Sec. 4.06 (c)); and (ii) ensure adequate budgetary allocations for PWD current operations (b). Re-establishing a Road Fund 3.27 Ordinance 5/CMLN, dated March 4, 1971 of the Ministries of Public Works and Finance established the Road Fund (RF) as an autonomous account with the Malian Development Bank. The account is administered by the General Director of Public Works under the joint supervision of the two Ministers. The RF is supplied directly by revenues of special import taxes on petroleum products. The proportion of these revenues usable for highway expenditures is defined in the annual RF budget; any surplus is transferred to the Treasury. Arratg interminis- t6riel 259/MFC/MDITP-FR dated March 24, 1971 defined practical functioning of RF. Financing Road Maintenance 3.28 A side letter dated June 17, 1970 defined minimum allocations for road maintenance during the 1971-1974 period. These allocations are compared to actual outlays in the table below (in MF million): 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Minimum allocations (at 1970 prices) - 1,250 1,350 1,450 1,600 Actual outlays (at current prices) 778 697 906 1,123 1,343 Although the Road Fund was established and provided funds for road maintenance, road maintenance outlays were clearly below expectations, since they prac- tically stayed at the same level if expressed in constant prices deflated on account of the high world--wide inflation. In retrospect, the minimum allocations were too ambitious as they involved a twofold increase in spending for road maintenance between 1970 and 1974, particularly in the face of the drought which struck Mali during that period. The Third Highway Project also set very high targets for road maintenance expenditures and is experiencing the same difficulties as the Government again cannot meet these targets. The Association is reviewing the problem with the Government with a view of defining more realistic financial objectives for road maintenance. - A.10 - E. Disbursements 3.29 Disbursements were made somewhat ahead of schedule (Table 10), because of inflation which increased unit costs faster than forecast a.- m(, than compensated for the slow execution of the project. The Credit was closed as expected, on March 31, 1976. IV. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION 4.01 The objective of this project was to ensure that the countryrs economic development would not be hindered, either by the deterioration of the road network used for carrying a substantial portion of the external trade, or by the lack of reliable feeder roads necessary for fostering agricultural development. The economic benefits of the maintenance and feeder road improve- ment programs were assumed to be avoiding increases in vehicle operating costs (voc) ir paved roads and reducing voc for non-paved roads, including feeder roads. Highway Maintenance Program 4.02 A consideration of the growth trends in the highway sector of Mali during the project period indicates that the timing and scope of the highway maintenance program had economic merit. In the period 1966-67, freight traffic on the road network amounted to about 110 million ton-km per year, whereas in 1974-75, this figure increased to nearly 280 million ton-km per year. The growth of freight transport was accompanied by a high rate of escalation in the voc differential between well-maintained roads and roads without maintenance. 4.03 The economic appraisal of the project was based on the assumption that savings in vehicle- operating costs would evolve gradually during the project implementation period. From the fourth year on, benefits were assumed to grow according to the estimated 5% annual traffic growth. The analysis period was eight years, corresponding to the estimated average economic life of the equipment. Benefits were estimated differently for paved roads and for gravel roads. For paved roads, benefits were conservatively estimated as avoidance of a 10% increase in vehicle operating over an eight-year period. On gravel roads, however, benefits were calculated in terms of savings in vehicle operating costs per kilometer on a well maintained road versus a road with little or no maintenance. Because of the conservative estimates of benefits on paved road, the appraisal estimate of a 23% return was also on the conservative side. 4.04 At re-evaluation, savings are estimated in terms of savings per vehicle km on paved roads as well as on gravel and earth road. A weighted average vehicle operating cost saving of 29 MF per vehicle km was used for paved roads, assuming that passenger cars accounted to two thirds of the traffic, and a weighted average of 78 MF/vehicle km for gravel roads assuming that trucks constituted 55% of traffic. In 1974, paved roads had an ADT of 135 vehicles while gravel roads had an ADT of 34 vehicles. - A.11 - 4.05 The reduction in local funding for road maintenance during the period 1975-78 compared to the 1974 level (Table 11) reduced maintenance output and thus vehicle cost savings. The re-evaluation analysis estimates a reduction in benefits commensurate with the decrease in funding for road maintenance. At re-evaluation, the estimated rate of return of the maintenance project was calculated at 20%. 4.06 The most significant long-run benefit of the maintenance program in the First Highway Project may well be the institution building aspect. The reorganization of PWD (para. 3.03) and workshop operations (para. 3.04), as well as the creation of maintenance forces, trained and equipped under the project, served not only as a catalyst. for expanding maintenance operations in 1975, but also constituted the basis for continuing the maintenance program under the Second and Third Highway Projects (Cr. 383 and Cr. 599 respectively). The importance of providing adequate local funds for maintenance to ensure the continued increase in the flow of benefits is the subject of an ongoing dialogue with the Mali Government. The problem for the Government is to achieve balanced allocations of funds between new construction and maintenance. Feeder Roads Program 4.07 In Mali, marketing of main cash crops, such as groundnuts and cotton is dependent on serviceable feeder roads. As such, the improvement of feeder roads constitutes a basic requirement for the national effort to expand cash crop production and agricultural exports. 4.08 At appraisal, it was shown that "normal" betterment was justified for feeder roads carrying more than 4,000 tons per year (type "A" roads) and "minimal" betterment could be carried out on roads with traffic volumes over 1,700 tons per year (type "B" roads). The rate of return for the feeder road program was calculated to be 15%. 4.09 - The average cost of improving feeder roads to type "A" standards was estimated at MF 1.13 million per km at appraisal. The actual cost, however, was about three times higher at MF 3.30 million per km. For roads improved to type "B" standard the actual cost per km was MF 1.42 million compared to the appraisal estimate of MF 0.44 million per km. The weighted average construction cost per km was MF 1.83 million. The technical assistance cost was MF 150 million. Part of this cost must, however, be considered as long-term training. At re-evaluation MF 86 million of the technical assistance cost, corresponding to 10% of construction cost, is included in the cost stream. No maintenance costs are included for the first four years after road completion. In the 5th year an allowance for reconstruction of 15% of the roads is included. Routine maintenance costs averaging MF 68,000/km are included for the remaining economic life of the road. 4.10 At appraisal, savings in truck operating costs were estimated at MF 106.5 per km for type "A" betterment and MF 89 per km for type "B" betterment. According to 1974-75 estimates of vehicle operating costs, the average savings for both types of betterment was about MF 95 per vehicle/km, which was used in the re-evaluation. Average daily traffic was estimated at 8 trucks for type "A" roads and 4 trucks for type "B" roads, and a traffic growth rate of 5% was assumed. A 1974 overall traffic survey indicated an ADT of 6 trucks on both types of feeder roads. From this low traffic base, the post-evaluation employs a traffic growth assumption of 9% for the first five years and of 5% for the - A.12 - remaining five years of the estimated economic life of the road. The higher traffic growth rate for the period subsequent to the Sahelian drought seems warranted in view of the upsurge in agricultural production with the resumption of a normal rate of rainfall. The same traffic growth assumptions were incorpo- rated in the appraisal of the feeder road component of the Third Highway Project. 4.11 Reflecting the steep increase in construction costs, the economic rate of return of the feeder road project is estimated at about 3% at re-evaluation, compared to 15% estimated at the time of appraisal. V. CONCLUSIONS 5.01 The project fully reached its main objective of institution building, which is the necessary basis for continuing to improve the road network in future projects. It initiated an extensive reorganization and strengthening of the Public Works Department and the comprehensive training of part of its staff. This could be achieved because of the Government's strong support of the project and PWD's continuous efforts to implement it. Especially, the success is attributable to the following: (i) the Director General of Public Works managed the project efficiently and made all the necessary decisions quickly; (ii) the Government appointed all Malian counterparts at the start of project implementation; (iii) most of PWD's staff was involved in the reorganization process; and (iv) the two teams of foreign experts were dedicated and performed well. 5.02 The physical targets for the highway maintenance and feeder road construction programs, however, were over-ambitious and proved far above what could be implemented. Mali's landlocked position involves long delays in procuring equipment, spare parts and imported materials. In addition, the last two years of the project implementation coincided with high world-wide inflation and the severe Sahelian drought. 5.03 Experience gained under the First Highway Project showed that it was not realistic to consider two different design standards according to the traffic volume on feeder roads. The type A standards proved excessive, while the type B standards proved too low. As a result, the feeder roads being constructed under the Third Highway Project have uniform standards, which are in between previous type A and type B standards. 5.04 Mechanized brigades were selected to construct the feeder roads. Experience has shown that, all factors considered, this is the appropriate technology for Mali provided that the brigades are efficiently operated. Mainly because of adverse outside conditions, however, the brigades could not be properly utilized under the First Highway Project, which led to higher than anticipated construction costs. These conditions have now improved, and a continuation of feeder road construction is being implemented satisfactorily under the Third Highway Project. - A.13 - 5.05 The economic slowdown due to the Sahelian drought and the escalation of construction costs were main factors reducing the rate of return of the feeder road project. Cost escalation was due to world-wide inflation following the energy crisis as well as the lower output per construction brigade than anticipated. The 3 per cent rate of return of the feeder road project should be viewed as an interim evaluation indicative of poor project implementation. The narrow concept of benefits expressed as savings in truck operating costs, ignores developmental aspects of rural road improvements. In future evaluation of feeder roads in Mali, the wider economic benefits should be evaluated in the economic analysis. Provisions for a monitoring system to gauge agricultural benefits and the distribution of these benefits should also be built into future feeder road projects in Mali. 5.06 The maintenance project showed a satisfactory rate of return (20%) even at a lower than expected level of output. The institution building as- pects of the maintenance project also laid the basis for further maintenance components under the Second and Third Highway Projects and the continued emphasis on maintenance in the strategy of transport sector development in Mali. MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Actual and Expected Project Implementation Construction of Feeder Roads Third Highway First Highway Project Project Appraisal Estimate Actual Actual Total Total 1972-1974 1972-1974 1972 1973 1974 1975 Feeder Road Output (Km): Type AV! 420 204 48 106 50 2/ Type P1/ 1,030 266 151 51 64 203 Total 1,450 470 199 157 114 203 Total Expenditures (MF million)3/ 840 516 171 176 169 215 Cost per km:.V MF thousand 580 1,097 860 1,123 1,482 1,061 Us$11 1,040 2,400 1,880 2,460 3,270 2,320 1/ Type"A"feeder roads are all-weather gravel roads with a 5.5 m roadway and a complete drainage system. Type"B"feeder roads are dry-weather earth roads with a 4 m roadway and a summary drainage system. 2/ With new design standards, see Table 2. 3/ Without equipment amortization. E/ Appraisal estimate: US$1 = MF555; Actual: US$1 = MFh57. Table 2 MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Feeder Road Design Standards First Highway Project Third Highway Project Type A: Normal Type B: Minimal Clearing width 9 m 7 m 12 to 16 m Roadway width 5.5 m 4.0 m 4.3 m Laterite surface course % of total length 100 % 50 % 70 % Thickness 15 cm 8 cm 13 cm Drainage Ditches, culverts, Ditches, out- Ditches, outlets dikes and con- lets and stone and stone fords crete fords. fords Table 3 MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Workshop Staff Trained in Malil Subdivision Central Workshops Workshop Total Professionals 17 17 Sub-Professionals 13 - 13 Mechanics 39 70 109 Electricians 11 4 15 Braziers 11 8 19 Blacksmiths 25 2 27 Body work mechanics 6 3 9 Carpenters 24 3 27 Drivers 176 10 186 Operators 79 2 81 Bookkeepers 20 - 20 Total 421 102 523 1/ No appraisal estimate is available MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Overhaul & Purchase of Highway Equipment New Equipment Purchased Existing Equipment Actual- For For Temporarily Over- Highway Feeder Road Appraisal Discardd Repared hauedMaitenanceConstr cin Tctal Estimatc Bulldozers - - 6 7 13 13 Graders 15 11 16 18 7 25 25 Loaders 2 1 12 9 4 13 13 Towed-ty,re-rollers (11 tons) - - 11 2 13 13 Steel-rollers - - - 6 - 6 6 Water Tank Trucks 16 37 1 16 4 20 20 6 m3 Dump Trucks - - - 33 16 49 49 4 m3 Dump Trucks 72 13 53 37 6 43 - 2 m3 Dump Trucks 9 6 - - - - 43 Agricultural Tractors - - 13 11 2 13 13 General Purpose Vehicles 13 1 31 24 3 27 25 Others 44 19 56 20 6 26 27 TOTAL 171 88 182 190 58 248 247 Table 5 MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Comparison of Highway Maintenance Output: 1971-1974 Without the Project With the Project % of increase between 197111972 1972/1973 1973/1974 1971/1972 and 1973/1974 Clearing - 554 km 438 km - Reshaping 3,410 km 4,464 km 6,617 km 94% Patching of Gravel Roads 52,000 m3 42,000 m3 73,000 m3 40% Regravelling 77,000 m3 240,000 m3 250,000 m3 225% Patching of Paved Roads 52 m3 480 m3 900 m3 1630% Single surfacing - - 33,000 m2 MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Highway Maintenance Program Level of Maintenance Total Before project(1970) Project objectives Actual (1974) Type of roads Length Normal Minimum Nil Normal Minimum Nil Normal Minimum Nil Primary Paved Roads 1,595km 0km 1,595km Okm 1,595km Okm Okm 1,031km 104km 460km Secondary Laterite Roads 871km 639km 232km Okm 871km Okm Okm 843km 28km Okm Other Roads and Tracks 5,754km 398km 2,423km 2,933k 2,T97km 2,957km Okm 1,625km 686km 3,443km TOTAL 8,220km 1,037km 4,250km 2,933km 5,263km 2,957km Okm 3,499km 818km 3,203km (D~ Table 7 MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Technical Assistance to the Workshops (man-month) ILO Experts Malian Counterparts Appraised Estimate Actual First First Second First Second Highway Highway Highway Highway Highway Assignment Project Project Project Total Project Project Total Chief of Mission 33 31 11 42 33 11 44 Professional Training 33 22 15 37 15 12 27 Workshop Renovation Central Workshop 30 17.8 0 17.8 24 12 36 Subdivision Work- shops 0 14.7 12 26.7 14 12 26 Equipment Inspection 33 27.9 6 33.9 24 2 26 Cost Accounting 18 26 2 28 26 2 28 Supply and Inventory 18 26.2 7 33.2 26 12 38 Equipment Maintenance in Gao 30 26.9 12 38.9 32 12 44 Kayes 25 25.8 0 25.8 27 0 27 Sikasso 25 19.6 0 19.6 21 0 21 Mopti 25 18.4 7 25.4 20 7 27 Segou 0 12 0 12 0 12 12 TOTAL 270. 268.3 72 340.2 262 94 356 Table 8 MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Actual and Ap2raisal Estimates of Project Costs (In US$'000) Appraisal Estimate Actual Cost IDA Govern- IDA Govern- % IDA ment Total % IDA ment Total Technical Assistance ILO 86% 1,035 172 1,207 85% 961 168 1,129 BCEOM 86% 575 92 667 75% 704 234 938 Preinvestment Studies 86% 396 66 462 67% 494 249 743 Workshop Equipment 90% 457 45 502 100% 530 0 530 Highway Maintenance Equipment & Spare Parts 91% 3,980 398 4,378 94% 3,984 246 4,230 Imported Materials 83% 230 46 276 65% 184 98 282 Workshop Construction 60% 343 227 570 54% 220 191 411 Feeder Road Con- struction 55% 684 560 1,244 55% 623 507 1,130 Total 83% 7,700 1,606 9,306 82% 7,700 1,693 9,393 Table 9 MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Allocation of Proceeds Original Allocation Disbursed Category number and description (April 1970) (April 1976) 1. Advisory services of two team of experts for highway maintenance and feeder road betterments, ex- cept allowances described under Category 6 $1,300,000 $1,750,673.14 2. Consultants services for feasibility study and detailed engineering, except allowances decribed under Category 6 300,000 285,840.68 3. Tools and equipment for workshops 400,000 530,407.90 4. New highway maintenance equipment and related spare parts together with spare parts for over-haul of existing equipment 3,500,000 3,984,642.44 5. Imported materials for the construction of drainage structures for feeder road betterments 200,000 184,097.28 6. Subsistence allowances for foreign experts and consultants 150,000 120,381.44 7. Construction and extension of work- shops and stores for the maintenance of highway equipment 300,000 220,889.74 8. Execution of agricultural feeder road betterments, except materials described in Category 5 above 600,000 623,067.38 9. Unallocated 950,000 - 0 - $7,700,000 $7,700,000.00 Table 10 MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Appraisal Estimate & Actual Disbursements IDA Accumulated Disbursements Cumulative actual Fiscal US$'000 Equivalent Disbursement as a Year and Appraisal Actual Percentage of Semester Estimate Disbursements Appraisal Estimate 1971 1st 143 2nd 1,000 561 56 1972 1st 2,118 2nd 3,600 5,080 141 1973 1st 6,074 2nd 5,900 6,681 113 1974 Lst 7,178 2nd 7,200 7,482 104 1975 1st 7,604 2nd 7,700 7,694 100 1976 1st 7,700 7,700 100 MALI CREDIT 197-MLI - FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Expenditures For Road Maintenance From Road Fund (Actual and Budgeted) ME11te Va1l Prancs Administrative Current Maintenance YEAR Cost Expenditure-- TOTAL 1970 142 636 778 1971 157 540 697 1972 176 730 906 1973 246 877 1,123 1974 151 1,192 1,343 1975 250 695 945 1976 250* 660 910 1977 250* 961 1,211 Sources: Tables - Appraisal Report Third Highway Project (Report No.888a-ILI) and Supervision Report Third Highway Project 12/14/76. 닙，