Chad - Agriculture Sector Memorandum

Document of R To The World Bank 7 ADK FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 UZ S FILE COPY CONFIDENTIAL Report No.1438-CD CHAD AGRICULTURE SECTOR MEMORANDUM February 16, 1977 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENT EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit CFA franc (CFAF) US$ 1.00 CFAF 245 CFAF 1,000 US$ 4.08 ABBREVIATIONS ADF African Development Fund BEAC Central Bank for Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo and Gabon CARE A private American aid agency CCCE Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique CMPA Centre de Modernisation des Productions Animales COTObTCHAD Société Cotonnière du Tchad CSPC Caisse de Stabilisation du Prix du Coton CTFT Centre Technique Forestier Tropical FDAR Fonds de Développement et d'Action Rurale IEMVT Institut d'Elevage et de Medecine Vétérinaire des Pays Tropicaux LCBC Lake Chad Basin Commission ONDR Office National du Développement Rural ORSTOM Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-Mer SERARHY Service des Amenagements Ruraux d'Hydraulique UNDAT II United Nations Development Assistance Team (based in Yaoundé) UNSO United Nations Sahelian Office (based in Ouagadougou) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL CHAD AGRICULTURE SECTOR MEMORANDUM Contents Page No. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. i - iii 1. SECTOR DESCRIPTION 1 A. Background 1 B. Recent Trends 2 The drought of 1972 and 1973 2 Foodgrains 2 Cotton 3 Irrigation 5 Livestock 5 Fish 6 Forestry 7 Pricing policies 7 2. SECTOR STRATEGY 9 A. Background 9 B. Government's Apparent Strategy and Policies 10 Drought-proofing: cotton versus foodgrains 10 Technical packages for the Sahelian Zone 10 Promotion of food crops in the Cotton Zone 11 Storage of foodgrains 11 Large versus small irrigation schemes 12 Livestock productivity 13 Cotton production 13 Distribution of costs and benefits of cotton 13 Distribution of net benefits from cotton within the public sector 14 Distribution of net benefits from cotton between the public sector and producers 15 Cereals price policy 15 Livestock marketing policy 16 Income distribution 17 C. Proposed Bank Approach 17 3. PROJECTS 18 A. Current and Pipeline 18 B. Proposed Bank projects 21 This document has a restri.ted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the peormance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoriation. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 1. With generally hostile natural conditions, a transport cost of CFAF 30,000 (US$130)/ton to ocean port, the aftermath of the worst drought in 50 years, and a persistent internal rebellion, conditions and prospects for Chadian agriculture are bleak. Yet two substantial and very encouraging changes in farming techniques have recently taken place: the application of fertilizer and insecticide to cotton, and the use of work oxen, have both about doubled between 1973/74 and 1975/76 after a decade of slow albeit sus- tained growth. These changes have occured in the Cotton Zone, defined as the five provinces generally south of the 1000 mm isohyet, which includes about half the rural population but only 10% of the area of the country. Further north, as rainfall declines and becomes more variable, rainfed cropping becomes increasingly precarious and transhumant pastoralism increasingly important. In this area, best considered as two zones - the Transitional and the Sahelian - demarcated by the 600 mm isohyet, no significant changes in livestock manage- ment or in farming techniques have taken place. Nor, however, has there been much official effort to promote change or even to research possible changes. 2. Government has no stated agricultural sector strategy and no explicit targets or goals other than for cotton. The agricultural invest- ments that do get undertaken reflect the ability of particular executing agencies to obtain finance (which entails an acceptable kind of rough justice whereby the less efficient executing agencies do not obtain finance) and the different suppositions of the various foreign aid agencies about what is good for Chad; the latter can and does lead to ill-advised investments. Bank Group Strategy 3. Conclusions and recommendations which are implicit ahd/or scattered in the text of the memorandum are summarised below by four subheads in each of which particular points are listed in priority order. 1. Guiding principles 1.1. Given the lack of senior Chadian staff, which is probably even more acute than in neighboring countries, and the difficulty of attracting good expatriate personnel, the Bank Group should not try to do too much and should seek to persuade the many other aid agencies to tailor their activities to the managerial competence available. 1.2. The approach to project identification and selection should be two-pronged. First, projects should be sought in those subsectors where there is unexploited potential in respect of staff and known techniques. Second, sou-hd proposals for microprojects in any subsector should be encouraged and grouped into fund-type projects. 1.3. An important service should be rendered to other aid agencies by indicating priority areas for action. These - ii - would include staff training, notably in fisheries at all levels and in forestry at senior levels; applied re- search, notably in variety selection for cereals and leguminous crops - in the Sahelian Zone in particular - and in forestry plantations; and in specific narrow studies, notably in the competitiveness of meat exports by air and in the supply of.construction and fuel wood to N'Djamena. 2. Policies to be advocated to Government (on all appropriate occasions but particularly during negotiations) 2.1. Direct beneficiaries should contribute to the costs of specific services rendered. 2.2. Unenforceable price decrees for cereals, leguminous crops and livestock should be dropped. Where Government can now intervene with some effect, in paddy and wheat, prices should be increased towards import parity, although coor- dination with Cameroon will be required for paddy. 2.3. The ostensible need to safeguard against food shortages arising from drought dces not entail the switching of resources from cotton to food; rather, it requires a re- allocation of expenditures for research and extension between the Sahelian Zone and the Cotton Zone. The policy should be to promote known techniques of cereal production and to investigate new methods in each zone. This would provide some safeguard against drought in the Sahelian Zone, but in the Cotton Zone the principal effect would be to free land and labor for non-cereal crops and livestock. All discussion of drought-proofing should be removed from the context of the 1973 drought, of which the probability is 0.02. 2.4. In the cotton subsector, where it is in the public interest to promote use of improved inputs down to an incremental yield of 350 kg/ha, different input packages hould be be devised by area and priced differently; the share of net benefits from -cotton accruing to the public sector should be re-allocated in favor of the Treasury, but the distribution between the public sector as a whole and the cotton farmers could well be changed in favor of the latter. 2.5. The temptation to set up new institutions to replace or take away some of the functions of the less effective government agencies, namely FDAR, and the four departments of Livestock, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, should be resisted. Reform rather than replacement should be the key. - iii - 3. Project Work - The current lending program for the sector (para 3.01.) should remain unchanged on the understanding that Livestock II may well involve nore than one project and, possibly, require more than $15 millidn, and that Lake Chad Polders II and Sategui-Deressia II be regarded as possible substitutes for each other, although the aggregate amount would not change. 4. Sector Work - The following questions deserve detailed study, although not necessarily by Bank staff nor by Bank- supported projects: 4.1. Why has there been such an abrupt increase in the applica- tion of improved inputs to cotton and in the use of work oxen in the last two years? (FED would presumably look into this as part of its evaluation of the 1973/74 - 1976/77 cotton productivity program); 4.2. What investments might be undertaken in.the Logone Valley? (The Terms of Reference prepared by UNDP in early 1976 are now being reviewed but no project is likely to emerge until 1979 at the earliest); 4.3. Why has there been such gross under-utilization of the Casier A rice irrigation project? (This may be examined as part of the Logone regional plan; alternatively it would be looked into during preparation of Sategui-Deressia II). CHAD AGRICULTURE SECTOR MEMORANDUM 1. SECTOR DESCRIFTION A. Background 1.01. Agriculture in the broad sense of crop, livestock and fish production represents over 50% of GDP, provides a livelihood for over 80% of the population, and accounts for over 90% of all exports. The natural conditions are generally hostile: nearly 75% of the area of the country receives average rainfall of less than 600 mm/year, with a coefficient of variation of 25-30% or more; in the better-watered areas, floods render most roads impassable for several months per year. The distance to ocean port is at least 1,700 km and entails a minimum cost, at early 1976 bulk freight rates, of CFAF 30,000 (US$ 130)/ton. 1.02. Total population is growing by about 2%/year with a rural rate of 1.5%/year and an urban rate of about 5.5%/year. About half the rural population lives in the southwest or Cotton Zone, which covers only 10% of the area 6f the ccuntry, and where smallholders cultivate cereals and cotton on family farms of about 3 ha under adequate and reliable rainfall conditions. Further north, as rainfed cropping becomes increasingly precarious, pastoralism becomes increasingly important. The country may be conveniently divided into three zones, with the general characteristics shown below. Unit: Cotton Transit- Sahel & Total or Zone ional Zone Sahara Zone Average Area '000 km2 130 205 949 1284 Average rainfall mm/year >1000 600-1000 4600 Total population - 1975 million 1.9 0.8 1.3 4.0 Rural population - 1975 million 1.7 0.6 1.2 3.5 Density rural population Nd./km2 13 3 1 3 Average rural per capita '000 CFAF income from3 griculture per year 1975/76:- Crops 13.4 1/ 10.6-?V 10.0 5.4 9.3 Livestock 0.9 0.9 4.6 6.2 3.4 Fish 0.3 0.3 2.8 2.8 1.6 Total 14.6 11.8 17.4 14.4 14.3 Source: Table 14. 1/ With productivity cotton. 2/ With traditional cotton. 3/ Intra-zonal variations substantial, particularly within the Transitional and Sahel/ Sahara Zones. - 2 - 1.03. Although the average population density, even in the Cotton Zone, is still low, local densities exceed 50/km2. There is already evidence of soil erosion in the Koros region as well as emigration from that area into the middle Chari Valley. 1.04. The potentially irrigable area in the Cari-Logone system alone has been estimated at about 200,000 ha. Presently, about 50,000 ha/year are used for uncontrolled flooding of paddy and about 25,000 ha/year are planted to sorghum behind the receding floods; only about 1,000 ha have been fully equipped for controlled irrigation. B. Recent Trends The drought of 1972 and 1973 1.05. The drought was essentially confined to the Sahelian Zone but, since much of that zone was outside the control of the central Government, not much is known about its effects. The most dramatic effect was the decline in foodgrain production, which was estimated at 40% in 1973/74 (Table 3.2) although it was probably much less. Probably the most important effect of the drought was the depletion of the stock of animal protein, mainly cattle but also fish, by about one-third. The long-term effect of the reduction in the cattle herd is shown at Table 4; it appears that pre-drought levels of meat and milk output from cattle will not be resumed until after 1985. Foodgrains 1.06. Domestic production of foodgrains prior to the drought was about 690,000 tons/year of which rainfed millet and sorghum, including flood recession output, was about 630,000 tons. In 'normal' years, Chad was self-sufficient in foodgrains except for imports of wheat of about 12,000 tons/year (Table 3.1). For the worst recent drought year, 1973/74, there is no official estimate of foodgrain production. A multi-donor mission of October 1973 estimated millet and sorghum production at 380,000 tons (as at Table 3.2). The apparent nationwide deficit of about 250,000 tons implied shortfalls in the Cotton, Transitional and Sahel/Sahara Zones of about 15%, 50% and 70% respectively. Although these relative orders of magnitude are probably about right, the absolute shortfall in each zone was probably much over-estimated; receipts of food aid, mostly cereals, amounted to only 30,000 tons/year and there is no evidence of the calamity that a net deficit of around 200,000 tons would have entailed. In 1974/75 and 1975/76, 'normal' production of millet and sorghum has resumed and, except for belated supplies of food aid, there have been no recorded imports of foodgrains other than wheat. 1/ 11 1976/77 is another drought year although not as bad as 1973/74. The former is examined in some detail and compared to the latter in the Project Brief for the Sahelian Zone Drought Relief and Development Fund Project. -3- 1.07. There appear to have been no official programs explicitly geared to improve foodgrain yields per unit area. No work appears to have been done on seed selection and there appears to have been no effort to promote use of other improved inputs, neither on millet/sorghum nor on rice, by smallholders. It seems that foodgrain production in Chad is 'traditional' in the strict sense of the term. It is often claimed, however, that in the Cotton Zone the resid- ual effect of fertilizer applied to cotton is a yield increase in the subsequent millet/sorghum crop of 250 kg/ha. (The standard cotton fertilizer has been changed from year to year; it is currently 100 kg/ha of 19-12-19-5 (sulphur) - 1.8 (boron).) No evidence has been found to support the residual-effect contention. If it were valid, the aggregate effect in 1976/77 would be about 30,000 tons and the incremental effect vis-a-vis 1974/75 and earlier would be about 20,000 tons. This is not really significant in view of estimated food- grain output in the Cotton Zone of over 300,000 tons. It could be significant at the farm level, however, as an additional incentive to use improved inputs on cotton. Cotton 1.08. Throughout the 1960s, seed cotton output was about 100,000 tons except for 1968/69, a season of unusually favorable rainfall, when production reached 148,000 tons. Production remained at about 110,000 tons from 1969/70 through 1973/74. Subsequently, cotton output increased to 145,000 tons in 1974/75 to 175,000 ons in 1975/76 and current plans are for 190,000 tons in 1976/77 (Table 8) 1 . Throughout this whole period, the total area planted to cotton has been about 300,000 ha. The rapid growth in output in the last two years has been due partly to favorable weather but mainly to a sharp increase in the area cultivated with improved inputs under the cotton 'pro- ductivity program'. The program provides an ostensibly subsidized standard package per hectare (100 kg compound fertilizer, 4-5 insecticide applications and seed protection) throughout the Cotton Zone. The area planted to cotton under the productivity program increased from about 50,000 ha/year in the period 1969/70 - 1973/74 to 75,000 ha and 125,000 ha in the following two years. 1.09. This rapid growth coincided with an increase in average producer price from CFAF 29.9/kg in 1973/74 to CFAF 41.3/kg in 1974/75, accompanied by a modest increase in the farmers' contribution, from CFAF 5,500 to CFAF 6,500/ha, to the cost of the input package. At the representative incremental yield of 550 kg/ha, and excluding both the additional labor for cotton and the residual-yield effect on foodgrains, the private benefit: cost ratio to farmers using improved inputs increased from 2.8:1 in the early 1970s to 3.5:1 in 1975/76 (Table 9). While some increase in demand would be expected, the observed increase was quite dramatic. Is it to be inferred that 3.5:1 is sufficient but that 2.8:1 is insufficient to induce large number of farmers to use improved inputs? Wasn't 2.8:1 already a good inducement? Perhaps there was some rationing 1/ As of December 1976, just prior-to the opening of the cotton markets, the harvest is estimated at 165,000 tons. Input use did increase vis-a-vis 1975/76 but rainfall distribution was unfavorable. -4- of input supply in the early 1970s? It might even be argued that input use has at last 'taken off' as the cumulative result of 15 years' effort to promote their use and, even, that the favorable change in the private benefit: cost ratio was not really relevant. The reasons for the abrupt increase in input use merit further study particularly since, in Central African Republic, a similar 'productivity program' has had no comparable effect. 1.10. The unit cost of the input package escalated from about CFAF 12,000/ha in the early 1970s to CFAF 27,000/ha in 1975/76 and is estimated at CFAF 20,000/ha in 1976/77 (Table 10). The farmers' contribution declined from about 45% to about 25%. The apparent subsidy was financed,initially, mainly by FED and, later, increasingly by the CSPC. On the other hand, for the past six years at least, the producer price of seed cotton has been consistently lower than the export parity farmgate price. The difference has accrued to the public sector, namely CSPC, Government, COTOUTCHAD and the local textile mill, and in that order. The net effect of subsidized inputs and both overt and covert taxation of the output was a net transfer from farmers to the public sector in 1971/72 - 1973/74, no net flow in 1974/75, a transfer to farmers from the public sector in 1975/76 and a further reversal of the direction of the transfer is anticipated in 1976/77 (Table 11). Throughout this period, the public benefit: cost ratio of improved inputs was considerably greater than unity, although fairly variable (Table 9). 1.11. The total area planted to cotton in 1975/76 was 330,000 ha or about a 107. increase on the virtually unchanged level of the last 15 years. This increase partly reflected the expansion plans and corresponding coercive measures of the previous government, which purported to realize a total planted area of 750,000 ha in 1975/76. It also partly reflected the increasingly general availability of animal traction. The number of work oxen in the Cotton Zone has nearly doubled.in the last two years to 120,000 head. This increase has been realized while there was no credit program for the acquisi- tion of oxen and, indeed, just after the abandonment of the previous program. The increase in work oxen was certainly facilitated by the depressed livestock prices during the drought but it was sustained through 1975 despite the very high post-drought livestock prices. There is no simple solution to this paradox except, perhaps, a take-off after many years of sustained extension effort, somewhat akin to that suggested in regard to productivity cotton (para. 1.09). Total cash payments made in 1975 for oxen and equipment by farmers in the Cotton Zone amounted to nearly CFAF 1 billion. (Table 7). Since farmer's total cash income in 1974/75 was only about 7.8 billion 1/, there appears to have been quite a remarkable investment in animal traction. 1/ Total net income from cotton was CFAF 5.5 billion. The total value of net agricultural income excluding cotton was CFAF 15 billion (aggregated from Table 14), of which millet/sorghum accounted for CFAF 7 billion, of which the best estimate of marketed production is 15%. Assuming that a similar proportion of all non-cotton outputs is marketed, the non-cotton cach income was only CFAF 2.3 billion. -5- Irrigation 1.12. Despite the great potential (para 1.04), irrigated crop production continues to be relatively insignificant. Current paddy 'production, mainly from uncontrolled flooding of the Logone plain, is about 40,000 tons/year and current wheat production, from the Lake Chad Polders area, is about 7,000 tons/year; in sum irrigated foodgrain output represents only about 7% of rainfed foodgrain production in a normal year. 1.13. A large partial water control scheme, the 'Casier A' near Bongor, has been operational since 1958. The main dyke permits irrigation of about 18,000 ha but, and even though the soils are in part unsuitable for irrigation, the area that has been irrigated has been only about 2,000 ha/year. A simple explanation of this gross under-utilization would be 'bad management and maintenance', but this is not very helpful if similar disappointments are to be averted in future. The experience of Casier A deserves detailed study. The two main full water control schemes, the 'Casier B' with 500 ha and the scheme near Doba with 300 ha, have been operating for several years; in both cases, management of all aspects of production continues to be assured by expatriates. Yields are impressive - 10 tons of paddy/ha at Casier B - but the participation of the local population is negligible. 1.14. Construction is just beginning in the two irrigation projects in which IDA is involved. The Sategui-Deressia project (Credit 489-CD) will permit partial water control of 5,000 ha and the Lake Chad Polders project (Credit 592-CD) will permit full water control of 1,000 ha. Total. production at full development would be 15,000 tons of foodgrains and 3,000 tons of cotton, i.e. irrigated foodgrain output would still be less than 10% of rainfed food- grain production in a normal year. In this context, and in view of the great potential for irrigation, both projects are essentially pilot operations, under- taken partly to begin the process of evolving a high technology agriculture, and partly to devise appropriate construction methods and production arrange- ments; in addition, both projects would be profitable by producing mainly rice and wheat as import substitutes. In view of the experience with Casier A, however, the Sategui-Deressia project is hardly a pioneer project. By contrast, the Lake Chad Polders project is a pilot exercise in the best sense. The area has very favorable climatic and soil conditions but is remote and has a relative- ly low population; any sizeable investment would entail settlement. The terrain does, however, permit development by a series of investments in particular polders whereby the risk of under-utilization could be reduced. Livestock 1.15. The national livestock herd represents a poorly exploited asset in terms of annual offtake: about 11% for cattle, and about 30% for sheep and goats, as well as in terms of carcass weights; about 130 kg/head for cattle and about 12.5.kg/head for sheep and goats. Prior to the drought, the national cattle herd was about 4.5 million head. Cattle production accounted for about 75% of total offtake, expressed as meat and offals, of over 100,000 tons/year and a similar proportion of total production of milk of about 180 million liters/year for human consumption (Table 4). The value of milk was over 30% - 6 - of the value of meat and offals and was a major part of the subsistence diet in the Sahel/Sahara Zone. Total livestock exports, expressed as meat and offals, amounted to about 45,000 tons/year of which cattle exports represented over 40,000 tons, with about 70% on the hoof (Table 5). 1.16. The immediate effect of the drought was to reduce the cattle herd to about three million head although the other livestock species proved to be much more resistant. For 1975, total livestock offtake expressed as meat and offals was about 70,000 tons. Compared to 1970, cattle offtake had fallen from about 80,000-tons to about 40,000 tons whereas offtake of sheep and goats was about the same*at 25,000 tons. Total livestock exports had fallen from 45,000 tons to about 30,000 tons. Cattle still represented about 90% of all livestock exports but the proportion moving on the hoof had increased to about 80%. Local consumption of meat and offals declined even more severe- ly, from about 60,000 tons to about 35,000 tons, and per capita consumption has declined from about 16 kg to about 9 kg/head/year (Table 5). Curent livestock prices are about double pre-drought levels. 1.17. Although Government revenue from the livestock sector has been substantially less than the sector'; share in GDP would suggest, it has been consistently in excess of Government expenditure in the sector. The Livestock Department budget over the last 10 years has been in the range CFAF 120-160 million/year, and at the lower end of that range in the last few years; salaries alone have generally accounted for over 80% of the departmental budget. What work has been done, almost exclusively with foreign assistance, has been concentrated in the fields of animal health and provision of stock watering facilities, both in the open range and along the three main stock routes. No work directly related to improvement of animal husbandry methods seems to have been undertaken, other than the pilot operation in the LCBC Assale-Serbewel project. Fish 1.18. Chadian waters are undoubtedly rich in fish and fishing is a major traditional activity. Traditional exports of dried fish to neighboring countries have probably been of the order of 10,000 tons/year. In the pre- drought period, the total catch was of the order of 60-70/,000 tons mainly from Lake Chad and the lower Chari but also from many smaller fishing grounds. Unfortunately, not much more than this is known about Chadian fishing. By contrLst, ORSTOM has conducted research into the fish of the Lake Chad Basin since 1953 and a considerable literature has accumulated on fish species and breeding habits. At present, there is a complete hiatus between research into fish and development of traditional fishing. Until about 1972, the CTFT provided technical assistance to the Department of Fisheries but remark- ably little is now known about their activities, with one notable exception. The CTFT developed a simple fish-drying technique that involved a substantial reduction in waste through salting prior to drying and good packaging. Reported- ly, some fishing co-operatives were organized, the new drying technique was - 7 - introduced, and exports reached several hundred tons per year before CTFT abruptly withdrew. Currently, the Department of Fisheries is a poor sub- division of the unimpressive Direction des Eaux et Forgts 1/its present staff number 12 - one technical assistant and 11 moniteurs - and its field activities are, literally, zero. In view of the reported lack of any trace of the drying technique introduced by CTFT.,. it would be premature to undertake anything other than micro-projects in the fishing subsector until many more trained local staff are available and continuity can be assured. 1.19. In 1973, the waters of Lake Chad fell to levels that had not been observed since 1900; in effect the Lake became three separate bodies of water. This made fishing relatively easy and the catch has been estimated at 120,000- 160,000 tons. By the same token, the stocking of fish breeding grounds upstream from the Lake was impeded and no sound estimate has been made of the reduced catch that will ensue. Forestry 1.20. The brief study made in late 1975 1/ reviewed the limited literature on experience with forestry projects and proposed some detailed studies (scope for management of natural forests) and small-scale field trials (gum arabic and acacia albida). The proposals were restrained in view of the incompetence of the senior staff in the forestry service, and the limited and disappointing experience with plantations. The only experience on any scale was acquired in the vicinity of N'Djamena in the five-year period 1970-74. Despite a major effort by Government and multiple external assistance from UNDP/FAO, WFP, USAID, British, Canadian and other bilateral agencies, and with a work program origin- ally aimed at establishing some 400-500 ha/year and ultimately 1,000 ha/year, the result by late 1975 was that "only 113 ha could be considered to.be reason- ably well established as far as plant survival was concerned". The study attributes this miserable result to "above all else... the heavy clay soils of the Chari River Basin which have a high water table and are sometimes season- ally inundated". After this experience, any plantation program in the next several years should be cautious and preceeded by adequate field trials. Pricing Policies 1.21. With the exception of cotton inputs and output, and implements for animal traction, Government's attempts to intervene in price determination have been wholly ineffective. Regardless of the merits of particular policies, effective intervention in pricing in Chad is difficult since it is a large, sparsely populated country with many points of access to its several neighbors. Furthermore, there is no agency capable of implementing price policies. For millet, sorghum and rice, the FDAR has a cereal marketing department which, in effect, is an embryonic grain marketing board. For millet and sorghum, FDAR's purchases have averaged about 2,000 tons/year, whereas total production was 630,000 tons with perhaps 75,000 tons marketed. FDAR"s purchases of paddy have varied from 1,000-6,000 tons per year whereas total production 1/ This Direction, and the Forestry subsector as a whole, were reviewed in the report of J. Howell, Forestry Consultant on the Chad RPF appraisal mission. -8- was about 40,000 tons with about 20,000 tons marketed. Interventions on this scale accompanied by the practice of selling only by 100 kg lots, have evident- ly had no effect on domestic prices, except for the relatively few selected - consumers to whom such quantities were sold. That FDAR's performance has been so poor is particularly disquieting, since the agency has ostensibly had its own source of revenue from a specific tax - which should have netted about CFAF 200 million/year - and has received at least 20 man-years of technical- assistance since its inception in 1965. A Commission of Inquiry is now exami- ning FDAR's financial history through June 1975. It will probably find evidence of appropriation by the Treasury of funds due to FDAR as well as corruption practised by the previous management. 1.22. In June 1975, the new Government decreed maximum prices payable for cereals and leguminous crops. Provision was made for price differences between provinces but there was no definition of quality and no statement of the level in the distribution chain nor of the period of the marketing year to which the prices related. In view of these omissions, as well as the absence of effective intervention agencies, the decree was,fortunately, largely unenforceable. Nor has there been any statement of the policies underlying the decreed maximum prices. It would appear that the major concerns were to restrain urban consumer prices and, thereby, civil servants' demands for increased salaries, and to reduce intra-year price fluctuations. 1.23.. Cattle and meat prices rose very rapidly throughout West Africa in late 1974 and early 1975 as herd owners began to reconstitute their stocks yet Nigerian demand remained firm. In mid-1975 Government decided, both to protect domestic consumers and to boost the dwindling exports of meat by air, to impose maximum liveweight prices. This policy was of course not enforceable. Late in the year, a ban on the export of live animals was introduced. At least during the following flood season, when the number of points of access to northern Cameroon/Nigeria was reduced, this ban was enforceable.to some extent and domestic prices have been restrained vis-a-vis prices prevailing in north- eastern Nigeria. Paradoxically, this probably aggravated the pastoralists' task of re-building their herds since, to raise any given amount of money, they were obliged to sell more animals. 1.24. The cotton producer price was unchanged throughout the 1960s through 1970/71 at CFAF 26/kg. In most years this level.was in excess of the export parity price and the difference was paid by FED. Differential pricing by two grades was introduced in 1971/72. Subsequently the lower-grade price has been virtually unchanged; the higher-grade price was increased by small annual increments to CFAF 31/kg in 1973/74 and then to CFAF 43/kg in 1974/75 where it has remained (Table 8). The share of the lower grade, defined as yellow and unsorted, in total purchases has fallen from 20% in 1972/73 to 10% in 1974/75. 1.25. Cotton inputs are supplied as credit-in-kind, with repayments effected at the cotton market. Repayment rates were around 90% in the mid- 1960s, fell to about 75% in 1969/70 and 1970/71 but have since recovered to 95%. In the last few years, the simple technique of refusing to supply inputs to farmers who did not fully repay the previous season's credit-in-kind has evidently been very effective. 2. SECTOR STRATEGY A. Background 2.01. Government has no stated sector strategy and no explicit targets and goals. The only subsector for which targets have been fixed is cotton. A four-year extension of the current productivity program has been submitted to FED but the document is still deemed 'secret'. 2.02. That Government has no formal sector strategy is not really surprising in view of the necessarily short-term focus of all work during the drought, the political upheaval and continuing uncertainty but, above all, the acute lack of staff in the responsible Government departments. Senior Chadian staff are overwhelmed with day-to-day administration; expatriate 'planning' staff, among whom there is little continuity, also find themselves involved more in administration than planning. The numerous para-statal bodies, invariably with an expatriate in one of the two top positions, are generally better staffed than the ministries and some of these bodies have produced 'plans' for their spheres of activity. These plans vary from the elaborate programs of ONDR and COTONTCHAD to the simple shopping-lists of the FDAR. 2.03. Almost all investments, and many recurrent operations, are financed through foreign assistance. In the absence of any sector view from the res- ponsible Government departments, the foreign aid agencies tend to work with those Government executing.bodies with whom they are able to establish some rapport. What agricultural investments actually get undertaken do not, there- fore, represent any given sector strategy. Rather, they reflect the ability of individual executing agencies to obtain finance and the suppositions of foreign aid agencies about what is good for Chad. The former is, if anything, to be encouraged; ONDR, SERARHY and CMPA are successful in obtaining financial assistance and are tolerably efficient executors; FDAR, the Livestock Department and the Agriculture Department are nct so successful in obtaining finance and are less than tolerably efficient executors. Given the acute lack of senior Chadian staff, this kind of rough justice will probably serve the country well over the next few years, however untidy it may seem to those observers who deplore the absence of integrated operations. Some aid agencies have set up enclave projects in those subsectors where national agencies appear particularly defi- cient in planning and/or execution, notably in.1ivestock, fish, and farmer training in the Transitional and Sahelian Zones. This is evidently not a use- ful approach but the corollary is that any projects in subsectors where national agencies are weak must involve institutional change and staff training. 1/ Better cooperation between aid agencies should be able to eliminate the worst of the anomalies. 1/ Agricultural education and training are reviewed in the Education Sector Memorandum (draft of February 9, 1976). - 10 - B. Government's Apparent Strategy and Policies Drought-prcofing: cotton versus foodgrains 2.04. Given the problem of detecting Government's strategy, what follows is a best guess of Government's objectives and intentions and the thinking behind them. The major concern appears to be to provide some safeguard against food shortages in future drought years; this is sometimes expressed as the 'need' to switch resources from-export crops to foodgrains. In framing an approach to drought-proofing, much depends on the assumptions made regarding the kind of drought to be proofed and the desirable extent of the proofing, and the pro- bability of the occurence of such a drought and the extent of the vulnerability of different climatic zones. Current discussion has been conditioned by the acute drought of 1973 and, implicitly at least, this is the kind of drought against which Government wishes to proof. The recent SCET/SEDES study 17 covering the whole Sahelian region concludes, from analysis of rainfall records from 1900 and review of earlier diaries and chronicles, that the probability of an acute drought year.such as 1973 is only 0.02. It is important, then, that discussions of drought proofing be removed from the context of an occurence of such low probability. Attention would more usefully be focussed on droughts with a probability of perhaps 0.20. To assess the vulnerability of production to an acute drought year, the SCET/SEDES study developed the 'drought resistance index', defined as the output of vegetable matter (in cereal equivalent) in an acute drought year divided by the output in an average year; for the Cotton, Transitional and Sahelian Zones respectively, the index is 0.85, 0.75 and 0.27. In 'moderate' drought years, such an index would be close to unity in the Cotton and Transitional Zones although disturbingly low in the Sahelian Zone. This is therefore the vulnerable zone but, and contrary to other Sahelian countries, no export crops are grown there in Chad. The apparent issue of export crops versus foodgrains disguises two real issues: the allocation of expenditures - on extension staff, input supply and research - between the Sahelian and the Cotton Zones; and the desirability of aiming to produce a food surplus in the Cotton Zone with which to withstand periodic food shortages in the Sahelian Zone and further north. Technical packages for the Sahelian Zone 2.05. Government does now seem genuinely concerned to increase develop- ment expenditures in the Sahelian Zone, at least in that part of the area that is accessible to Government technical staff. Some senior staff appear to believe, however, that since there are no proven technical packages for foodgrains that would entail dramatic improvements in productivity and in resistance to drought, nothing should be attempted. Yet modest results could be realized through selection, multiplication and promotion of short-cycle varieties of both cereals and legumes and through improvement of cultural practices. A careful review of the program managed by BDPA throughout the 1960s, of which senior technical staff seem now to be quite unaware, would provide indications of the priorities to be given to different aspects of a 1/ Essai de R6flexion sur les strategies anti-s6cheresse possibles dans le Sahel de l'Afrigue de l'Ouest, Januarq 1976. - 11 - seed and cultural practices improvement program. In addition, variety selection work in the Sahelian Zone should be started forthwith. Promotion of food crops in the Cotton Zone 2.06. A few government and rather more foreign aid officials argue that the objective should be to produce a food surplus in the Cotton Zone with which to withstand shortages elsewhere. Within the Cotton Zone, however, food crops and cotton are essentially complementary; improvements in cultural practices adopted for the latter have had favorable implications for the former, quite apart from the residual yield effect contention. But despite its relatively high and regular rainfall, whence its apparent comparative advantage in food- grain production, the Cotton Zone is about 500 km from the settled Sahelian Zone, which includes N'Djamena. At CFAF 20/ton-kilometer, this distance re- presents CFAF 10/kg. Moreover, within the Sahelian Zone, there is no other major marketable crop. It: is therefore not surprising that N'Djamena has traditionally, and once again in 1975, been supplied from its own, Sahelian, hinterland. The traditional supply lines would lengthen if the expected rapid growth of N'Djamena entailed increased demand in excess of the rate of growth of supply from the capital's traditional sources of foodgrains. Conceivably, the northern fringe of the Cotton Zone would begin to supply coarse grains as well as paddy to N'Djamena on a regular basis. In general, however, there is little scope in the near future for regular trade in foodgrains between the Sahelian and Cotton Zones; this makes the practical problem of satisfying irregular demand arising from periodic droughts in the Sahelian Zone even more difficult. 2.07. The key differences between government assistance to foodcrops and to cotton are that ostensibly subsidized fertiliser is not made available for food crops and that there is no official buyer able to pay a guaranteed price for food crops. Even if no sizeable market for foodgrain output from the Cotton Zone develops, it would still be worthwhile to test the demand for improved inputs for use on foodgrains. In the absence of market outlets, increased yields would permit a reduction in:the area and labor time devoted to foodgrains, thereby freeing those resources for cotton and/or groundnuts and/or cattle fattening. Storage of foodgrains 2.08. The scope for an official or an officially-recognized buyer to pay guaranteed prices for foodgrains is closely related to a further drought- proofing remedy that is advocated by some though increasingly few people. Storage, even on a limited scale, has so far proven costly and difficult to manage. In mid 1974, Government accepted an FAO-proposed short-term storage strategy, namely to constitute an emergency reserve of 10,000 tons. This was based on the capability of the internal distribution system in the expected three-month lag between notification of a foodgrain shortage and the first deliveries from overseas. As a first step, this was a sound proposal. Despite serious efforts, however, it is as yet only partly implemented. One of the problems, the financial mismanagement of FDAR under the previou.s govern- ment, has now been overcome. It will nonetheless take a few years to get the emergency grain reserve working effectively, even on the supposition that - 12 - sufficient priority is given to provision of staff training and an assured working capital fund. Until this is achieved, nothing further should be ven- tured in the field of grain storage. Large versus small irrigation schemes 2.09. Government recognizes that rainfed crops have by far the best development prospects in the agricultural sector since there is much unexploited potential, even given the limited amount of research that has been undertaken. Government perceives, too, that irrigated production is not relevant to drought- proofing in the next 10 years, given the long lead-times and gestation periods of such projects. Rather, Government.wishes to expand irrigation because the potential is so large and the accumulated experience is so small. Under the previous Government, there was something of a fixation on large irrigation schemes although the only projects that reached implementation are not parti- cularly large: Sategui-Deressia will cover 5,000 ha and the Lake Chad Polders Project, 1,000 ha. The new Government retains its predecessor's desire to realize an irrigated sugar project near Sarh but is also concerned to promote small-scale irrigation perimeters and bottomland developments. This position is not contradictory. Sugar is the only agricultural commodity other than wheat which is imported in any volume; imports have been 20-25,000 tons/year at a cost of about CFAF 2 billion/year or 10% of total recorded imports. Given the transport cost from the coast at 6 U/lb, there are intuitive grounds for supposing that a sugar complex geared to a local market of about 30,000 tons/ year would be worthwhile. A detailed proposal for a US$ 65 million project has been made but it involves suspiciously high investment costs of over $2,000 per ton of capacity and contains no economic analysis. Government is nonetheless seeking financiers and convened a meeting in mid-1976 of those institutions, including CCCE, that had expressed interest. Government has not, in the recent past at least, formally requested Bank support for the sugar -complex nor does it appear to intend to do so now 2.10. The new Government's interest in small-scale irrigation stems in part from the high cost per beneficiary family involved in large irrigation schemes. It also and perhaps to a greater extent stems from the observed scope for beneficiary participation in smaller schemes and the expected scope for local staff to take over management of implementation and subsequent supporting services fairly quickly. A pilot program of small-scale pump irrigation schemes along the northern Chari River will be expanded up to about 1,000 ha in 40 perimeters under the new Rural Projects Fund. While costs per beneficiary family are low (US$650 in 1976 terms), the overall costs are not as low as the designation "small-scale pump irrigation" implies; whereas the pump cost is only US$200/ha, the aggregate cost is still US$2,600/ha. Even so, such schemes provide profitable and probably the mest practicable investment opportunities in irrigation in the next several years. 2.11. A regional planning exercise for the Logone system is shortly to be undertaken with UNDP assistance. This would be a two-year exercise and should provide a sound basis for flood control, irrigation, power and transport investments, in which the Bank Group could take the lead, to be made in the early 1980's. By that time, and in the light of the first Lake Chad Polders project, the issue of the relative priority to be given to investments in 1/ In December 1976, it appeared that a French consortium had assured the financing of the sugar complex. - 13 - reclamation of the polders,vis-a-vis major flood control works on the Logone will arise. Livestock productivity 2.12. In the livestock subsector, Government is presently rethinking its traditional policy of provision of animal health services and watering points.. It is now beginning to be understood that large and sustainable increases in output can only be achieved by some kind of grazing control and by improved husbandry; and that, since it is easier to restrain herd growth than to reduce absolute numbers, it is important to take the opportunity afforded by present, post-drought, low stocking rates to encourage pastoralists to accept some constraints on their management of the rangelands. Although Government is understandably cautious regarding any new initiative towards the pastoralists, there does appear to be a genuine desire to devise a suitable mix of sticks and carrots using the results of the recent livestock census (report expected: January 1977) and the reports of the range and livestock survey and the taxation study (both financed under 309-CD). 2.13. Government is keen to encourage a better mix of livestock and crop farming; a beginning was made in the current FED program in the Cotton Zone, of which one component was geared to the health and feeding of work oxen. The latter aspect has had very little success despite the provision, at no cost, of cotton seed to owners of oxen. A major problem in the develop- ment of the large, as yet untapped, potential of mixed farming stems from the narrow content of staff training programs. A first step in the right direction was taken in the 1975/76 academic year with the introduction of an animal husbandry course into the curriculum of the veterinary college at N'Djamena. Cotton production 2.14. Government policy regarding cotton appears to be to expand pro- duction as far and as fast as possible, even though the management of COTONTCHAD foresees physical bottlenecks on export routes once the volume of lint reaches 80,000 tons or 220,000 tons of seed cotton. The critical limits are the Yaounde-Douala stretch of track and the capacity of Oubangui River traffic, for both of which studies have only just begun. In spite of this, it is understood that the Government request to FED for the next cotton productivity program envisaged cotton output of 300,000 tons by 1980/81. Distribution of costs and benefits of cotton 2.15. With regard to the pricing of cotton inputs and outputs, Government is considering an increase in.the producers' contribution to the cost of the standard input package from CFAF 6,500 to CFAF 8,500/ha and this may become effective at the 1976 harvest (although no announcement to this effect had been made at the time of 1976 planting!). The structure of the distribution of the costs and benefits from cotton is quite complex (Table 11) and few in -14- Government have a clear grasp of what is going on. The current discussion of a possible increase in the producers' contribution has probably been prompted by the diminishing percentage subsidy provided under the current FED program, rather than by reflection on the desirable private benefit:cost ratio to farmers using the input package. Nor does any thought appear to have been given to future trends in input and output prices. The net effect of Bank price forecasts for fertilizer and cotton lint is a small favorable change in the ratio of output to input prices. Given this context, a few alternative approaches to the allocation of costs and benefits of the productivity program are indicated at Table 13. It emerges that there is little scope, except by a reduction in producer price, to realize a substantial surplus on the public sector account for productivity cotton. For each of the last six years, with the exception of 1975/76, it has been worthwhile for the economy to encourage use of improved inputs down to an incremental yield of about 350 kg/ha (Table 9). Given the favorable price outlook, this would be a worthwhile incremental yield for the foreseeable future. The input and output prices that would gen- erate a farmers' benefit:cost ratio of (say) 2.5:1 in.areas of relative- ly unfavourable soils and/or climate would, however, imply far higher ratios in the more favorable areas. This suggests that the uniform input package through- out the Cotton Zgne should be reviewed and that different input packages for different areas should be devised and priced differnntly. Distribution of net benefits from cotton within the public sector 2.16. For the whole cotton subsector for the six years through 1976/77, the share of net benefits available for distribution which has accured to the public sector has been about 35% (Table 1.3), although the share accruing to the Government Treasury has been only about 11%. The formula by which the Government export tax revenue is assessed is based on an absolute amount per unit volume; since that amount has not changed since before 1970, Government revenue has simply increased with output. The CSPC, whose share is determined as a residual, has received a widely fluctuating absolute amount butin aggregate will have received about 60% more than the Treasury. After expenditure of about CFAF 3.5 billion, of which 50% on COTONTCHAD's investment program and subscribed capital, there appears to be a net cumulative balance of CFAF 4 billion (Table 12) 1/. COTONTCHAD's share, also determined as a residual., has amounted to about half the Treasury's share and has been used mainly to finance new invest- ments. For a total investment program over the three-year period, 1974/75 - 1976/77, of about CFAF 6 billion, COTONTCHAD's self-financing amounts to about 40%. The CSPC seems to have acquired cumulative assets far in excess of its possible needs, in view of the estimated trend in input and output prices, and COTONTCHAD has acquired cumulative assets sufficient to finance an unusually high proportion of its current, substantial investment program. Whereas it would appear that there is ample scope for the Treasury to increase its share of the aggregate net benefit arising from cotton, quite apart from the possi- bility of changing the shares of producers and the public sector as a whole, Government seems not to be disposed to increase the Treasury 'take'. General 1/ It is not known whether this balance really exists, but there are no grounds for suspecting misappropriation particularly since most of the surpluses were realized after the overthrow of the previous regime. - 15 - Djogo, until recently the Minister of Finance and Planning and now the Minister of Health, implied that since the cotton subsector is one of the few well- managed branches of the Chadian economy, Government should not increase the Treasury take. This was a remarkable statement of confidence in COTONTCHAD, an essentially expatriate-managed organization which keeps a consolidated account of its own activities and the CSPC. The stakes are, however, quite high. From a public sector share of aggregate benefits of CFAF 14.7 billion, 1971/72 - 1976/77, COTONTCHAD and CSPC together will have received over CFAF 10 billion; on an annual basis, this is equivalent to over 10% of total Governnent domestic revenue. Redistribution of the net benefits from cotton within the public sector in favor of the Treasury would seem to be an urgent priority. The IMF is pursuing this. 2.17. The respective share in aggregate net benefits of producers and the public sector as a whole is necessarily something of a bargaining process. One misconception, at least, needs to be cleared up. In the view of many senior Government officials and most foreign aid agency personnel, the cotton farmers are a privileged group among the Chadian rural population. Orders of magnitude of rural incomes (Table 14) do not bear this out; the 'traditional cotton' producer has a per capita income appreciably lower, albeit more stable, than the Sahelian pastoralist/farmer; and the 'productivity cotton' producer has a per capita income very slightly higher than that of the Sahelian pastotalist/farmer. There is therefore no compelling reason why cotton pro- ducers should be taxed more heavily than other rural people except for reasons of administrative convenience and therefore cost. Moreover, the rural popula- tion of the Cotton Zone appears to have a high propensity to invest (para. 1.11) and there is much to be said for increasing the producers' share of the net benefits from cotton. Cereals price policy 2.18. Government policy for cereals' pricing seems to be inspired by a desire to restrain price.fluctuations and thereby to eliminate 'speculation'. Since there is an acute lack of basic information on cereals production and marketing, it is difficult: to identify the main deficiencies in the private marketing system. Price fluctuations within any marketing year are reportedly severe.- To some extent, this would be attributable to the extremely poor quality of cereal storage facilities in the commercial sector, which would entail significant losses over a 12-month period. There would thus be scope for a program of improved storage facilities and management, rather than price decrees. To the extent to which seasonal price fluctuations arise in excess of those occasioned by poor storage, the quantities to which the high prices relate are probably very small. In this context, small-scale 'price-stabilizing' interventions by a cereal marketing authority would be effective. Inter-year cereal price differences are also reportedly severe. This is to be expected in view of fairly inelastic demand and the small proportion, perhaps 15% 1. 1/ Production et Commercialisation des C6r6ales - Tchad, UNDAT II January 1974, suggests, after a careful review of all available evidence, that 11-12% of total millet/sorghum production is marketed. - 16 - of average total supply that is marketed, where aggregate total supply is a function of factors other than price. A large storage program, entailing acute management problems, would be required in order to intervene effectively in inter-year price fluctuations. For the next few years, priority should be given to the limited but still difficult task of making the emergency grain reserve of 10,000 tons work effectively; the required annual roll-over of stock of 5,000 tons would permit intra-year price-stabilizing interventions. 2.19. With regard to paddy in particular, where Government does have some scope to intervene effectively, the official producer price has recently been raised from CFAF 20 to CFAF 25/kg but is still very low; the import parity farmgate price is about CFAF 55/kg. Since the main rice producing area is adjacent to a similar area in Cameroon, some coordination of price policies is essential. Rather than prohibit the operation of private rice mills in Chad, it would be desirable to lift the penalty that the low official buying and selling prices impose on the two officially-operated mills. 2.20. With regard to wheat, where local production is so small and erratic, an agreement has been concluded with the N'Djamena mill, owned by the Grands Moulins group, that the price delivered to the mill will be CFAF 50/kg subject to periodic review. The import parity price to the mill is currently about CFAF 80/kg. The mill is working very far below capacity and will continue to do so even after the first Lake Chad Polders project reaches full development. Although the mill suffers from unusually heavy overheads, the agreed price is very low and, in the periodic reviews, pressure should be put upon the mill to increase it. Livestock marketing policy 2.21. Government is currently re-thinking its livestock pricing policy in view of the impossibility of enforcement. No clear position seems to have been taken with regard to the Nigerian market. It tends to be viewed not only as a threat to domestic meat prices and to the trade in meat exports by air, but also as a means by which the livestock sector avoids tax payments both on live animal exports and on imported consumer goods. Rather than attempt to ban live animal exports, a useful starting point would be to recognize the potential afforded by the Nigerian market, including exports of meat by air, and to attempt to take maximum advantage of it. This co.uld entail a review of the licensing system for live cattle exports, with possibly increased license fees and reduced export taxes, and provision of water and animal health services along the main export routes. Another aspect of this problem, name- ly the relative incentives to be given to exporters of live animals and to exporters of meat by air, is also under review. Meat exports by air reached 12,000 tons/year in 1971 and have since been at 3,000-6,000 tons. The export tax on live cattle is about CFAF 1,500/head, and there is evidently much eva- sion, whereas the taxes on exported meat are equivalent to about CFAF 4,500/ head, and the export-geared abattoir is working far below capacity. This is one of the issues to be addressed in the livestock taxation stydy. The - 17 - structural change in West. African livestock prices subsequent to the drought may, however, have eliminated the competitiveness of meat exports by air; this question requires urgent, detailed study. Income distribution 2.22. Government professes to be concerned to reduce income differences between the urban and rural sectors although its actions in the realms of price policy and provision of public services such as health and education are not consistent with its avowed intentions. With regard to income distribution between income groups within the agricultural sector, Government's view is that income differences are not marked and that the striking feature of the rural population is the uniform level of poverty. This view is borne out by the income levels shown at Table 14 where per capita incomes in the four 'models' range from CFAF 11,800 to CFAF 17,400 (US$50-75)/year. Within each model, there is little variation in the crop income. The partial agricultural census of 1972/73 showed that farm size is essentially a function of family size; 90% of all farms are of less than 5 ha and over 99% of all farms are of less than 10 ha, with the larger farms corresponding to polygamous households. There may, however, be important variations in income as a function of livestock owner- ship; but this effect would be partially offset by milk, which accounts for 30% by value of all livestock products, and which accrues to the herders rather than the owners. 2.23. Until very recently, Government has adopted a policy of provision of basic services, including village water supplies, pastoral wells and vaccines, at no cost to the recipients; Government has been unable to provide such services to even a majority of the rural population. There is now a widely-held view that Government could and should attempt to obtain payment from direct bene- ficiaries for specific services rendered. C. Proposed Bank Approach 2.24. The policy and institutional changes that might be supported are implicit in the foregoing discussion are stated in the Summary and Conclusions It has also been pointed out that Government policy in many respects has changed or is under review and that the direction of change has in general been welcome. In view of the good Bank/Government relations, it may be possible to exercise some influence on policy quite apart from the leverage that might be exercised in project work. 2.25. The notion of target groups of beneficiaries defined by income levels is not very helpful in the Chadian context. The notion of priority areas is useful, however,and from three related points of view. Government is very keen to make itself more visible in the Sahelian Zone but has not been able to identify sound practicable projects let alone prepare them. Government might, therefore, be more willing to undertake institutional reform in the framework of a project located in the Sahelian Zone. Secondly, since it is indeed difficult to identify projects in that zone, foreign aid agencies have tended to concentrate their sustained in conttast to their relief activities - 18 - in other areas; many subsectors are 'overcrowded' with different agencies, and particularly in the Cotton Zone. Thirdly, because the Sahelian Zone has been somewhat ignored, little has been done to improve the present low productivity of livestock, and particularly cattle. 3. PROJECTS A. Current and Pipeline 3.01. Current and imminent IDA agricultural projects are outlined below: Project Credit Effective Closing Main Amount Components (US$ million) Livestock 2.2 11/28/72 06/30/77 wells, well unit, Development 1/ studies Drought Relief 2.0 03/22/74 12/31/77 eight subprojects Fund 1/ Sategui-Deressia 7.5 01/27/75 12/31/79 5,000 ha controlled Irrigation 2/ 8.0 flooding Lake Chad Polders- 5.0 02/26/76 12/31/80 1,200 ha full water control Rural Projects 12.0 01/77 12/79 seven subprojects Fund 4/ plus management 1/ 100% IDA. 2/ zDF Loan: $3.9 million; Government: $0.6 million. 3/ ADF: $5.0 million; USAID: $1.0 million; FAC: $2.0 million. - 4/ FAC: $0.9 million; Government $0.1 million; Beneficiaries: $0.4 million. There have also been two highway projects, both concerned primarily with maintenance, and two education projects, of which one financed a teacher trai- ning college at Moundou and the other a secondary technical school at N'Djamena and agricultural technician training center at Sarh. A third project in each of the highway and education sectors is scheduled for FY 78. 3.02. The total foreign non-military assistance provided to Chad in Calendar 75 was about $70 million; the main financiers were: FAC: $18 million; FED: $14 million; UNDP: $10 million; CARE: $5.5 million; IDA: $4 million and USAID: $2.5 million. The break-down of external assistance by sectors was follows: - 19 - External Assistance by sectors: 1975 Pre-investment 1/ Investment --------- ($ million) -------- Agriculture - Crops and work oxen 10.4 - - Livestock 6.5 1.2 / - Fishing 0.1 - - Forestry and Wildlife 0.4 - - Irrigation 0.3 1.6 1/ - Institutions and Training 0.6 - - Statistics 0.1 - Subtotal: Agriculture 18.4 2.8 Education 5.3 4.3 Health 0.8 1.8 Industry 1.0 0.6 Water 1.8 1.3 Transport 0.7 2.7 General Economic/Social Planning 9.2 Emergency/Drought 17.3 7/ Other 0.6 - Total 55.1 13.5 8! 9/ Source: Adapted from Rapport sur 1'assistance ext6rieure au Tchad, 1975, UNDP, N'Djamena, March 1976. The foreward notes. that commitments and disbursements could not easily be distinguished; the data are best estimates of disbursements. 1/ Broadly defined; included technical assistance of at least $13 million (or 35% of the total excluding emergency/drought funds), and a subs- tantial but unspecifiable amount for recurrent costs (other than direct budget support from France which is not included here). 2/ Pastoral wells under 309-CD and USAID. 3/ Initial expenditures for Sategui-Deressia and Lake Chad Polders. 4/ Excluding at least 40 Mainland Chinese technicians. 5/ Excluding 65 Russian teachers. 6/ Mainly FAC ($8.3 million) for 166 technical assistants classified as: Administration: 32; Economic development:33; Social development: 60; Infrastructure: 23; Others: 8; not possible to break them down by sector. 7/ About 80% food aid. 8/ Total external assistance of about $70 million is about equal to total Government domestic revenue (CFAF 15 billion). 9/ COTONTCHAD's annual investments, over the three-year period 1974/5 1976/7, are about $8.7 million (Table 12), mainly in expansion of ginning capacity and two new oil mills. - 20 - Even after exclusion of emergency/drought aid, 'pre-investment' activities are alarmingly high at 75% of non-military external assistance. Within the broadly- defined pre-investment category, technical assistance personnel account for at last 35%; although many of these are holding line positions, it is nonetheless surprising that so few investment projects have been prepared. Again, better aid cooperation should have a big pay-off. 3.03. The agricultural projects in the pipelines of the major financiers are as follows: FAC: A new arrangement whereby a Franco-Chadian Commission meets early in the calendar year to discuss the FAC program for that year was in- troduced in 1976. Other than its participation in the Lake Chad Pblders project and the Rural Projects Fund, FAC appears to have undertaken no new activities in Chad in 1976. The political climate has, however, been improving and some new activities can be anti- cipated in 1977. No indication of the direction of future FAC activities has been obtained other than participation with FED in an extension of the cotton productivity program to be called Inte- grated Rural Development of Southern Chad. FED: The current Cotton Productivity Program ends with the 1976/77 season. An interim program has been prepared for 1977/78 and a further three- year program is under active discussion. Informed sources report that these follow-up projects will assign greater priority to the care and feeding of work oxen and the provision of implements and, in areas of poor soils, to groundnuts; for cotton, input packages defined by area would be introduced. These are all welcome changes. UNDP: No new UNDP projects are envisaged in 1977 and no indication of the direction of the program in 1978 or later has been obtained. It wqas intended to launch a planning project for the Logone system and detailed terms of reference were drawn up in early 1976. The planning project, which was to have included power and transport as well as flood control and irrigation, appears to have been deferred to 1978 at least. IDA should urge that this project be given high priority in UNDP programming. USAID: The agency launched an important project identification/preparation exercise in early 1976. Four possible projects are at various stages of the cycle: (a) technical assistance and training in agricultural economics, statistics, research and extension; this project could become operational in mid-1977; (b) cereals: seed production, market- ing and storage; USAID will hopefully follow IDA advice and separate out the seed selection an( prcduction work as a separate project; (c) fishing: an identification mission went to Chad in mid-September; (d) integrated rural development in three pilot areas in each of the Sahelian and Cotton Zones; this project idea seems to have provoked - 21 - much interest within USAID but, as presently envisaged, it is far too elaborate and staff-intensive for Chad. B. Proposed Bank Projects 3.04. It has been suggested that a technical assistance credit would be appropriate for Chadian conditions. The quantity, if not the quality, of technical assistance is, however, already appreciable; and unless Bank staff would be willing to be seconded to Chad, recruitment for a technical assistance credit would be made from much the same pool of people as is used by those agencies who are already financing technical assistance. Within the agricultu- ral sector, additional technical assistance is envisaged by USAID (project (a) above), by FAO (the first of a three-man project planning team has recently taken up his post) and by IDA (two training specialists to be provided to the Ministry of Agriculture under the Third Education project, and one agricultural economist under the Rural Projects Fund). In sum, this represents about ten additional positions in agricultural planning and it will be no easy task to find competent people to fill them. No further technical assistance in agri- cultural planning can be envisaged in the foreseeable future. 3.05. There are three areas where little or no work is being done and some new initiatives are required. For variety select'ion of foodgrains, there is now a widespread appreciation both in Government and among aid agencies that such work should be initiated in the Sahelian Zone. USAID is presently pre- paring a seed selection project and it is probably the agency best-equipped to undertake the work. The Bank Group role should be limited to urging USAID to treat seed selection as a separate activity from its cereals marketing and storage proposals and to proceed with it as a separate project as soon as possible. In fishing, the acute lack of trained local staff prohibits any sizeable project even though the subsector has much and essentially untapped potential. The Bank Group role should be limited to urging USAID to follow-up on its identification mission, while keeping open the option to include small- scale activities in one of our fund-type projects. In forestry, the absence of competent senior staff prohibits any sizeable plantation program or forest management exercise. In the near future, small-scale field trials of gum arabic and acacia albida should be set up and a detailed study of wood supply to N'Djamena should be undertaken. The Bank Group role should be limited to urging that the several agencies already involved in the forestry subsector proceed along these three lines while, again, keeping open the option to include small-scale activities in one of our fund-tupe projects. 3.06. The current IDA agricultural lending program is as follows: FY Project $million 78 Sahelian Zone Drought RK1ief and Development Fund 1/ 4 79 Livestock II 15 80 Rural Projects Fund II 15 81 Lake Chad Polders II 15 82 Sategui-Deressia II 20 1/ Details in project brief. - 22 - The Livestock II project had, until recently, been envisaged as a herd re- constitution exercise accompanied by improved husbandry methods in Kanem. It could now be rather broader in scope in view of an UNSO livestock project proposal for herd reconstitution in Kanem and a Government request that a Bank Group project be 'as broad as possible'. The former UNDF project, Livestock Development Unit, through which several of the studies financed from 309-CD were executed, did not even begin to approach its main objective, namely the preparation of a national livestock plan. Now, however, the following studies are or will very shortly become available: (a) Agrostological maps covering about 200,000 km2, executed by IEMVT, financed by EEC - Drought Relief; (b) Livestock census, executed by SEDES, financed by EEC - Drought Relief; (c) Livestock taxation, executed by BEI-Agrer, financed by 309-CD; (d) Sheep and goats, financed by 309-CD; (e) Batha range and pastoral plan, financed by 309-CD; (f) Fattening trials at Koundoul (LCBC), Douggia (IEMVT/CMPA), Lake Chad Polders (IEMVT/SODELAC) and Mandoul (COTONTCHAD); (g) Calf mortality, executed by IEMVT, financed by FAC; (h) Assessment of the Assale-Serbewel project (LCBC). 3.07. The Rural Projects Fund II would be a direct follow-up to the project that is about to start and which includes financing for preparation of a second phase. It could become a line-of-credit operation in contrast to the tightly-structured first phase and would, hopefully, attract considerable co- financing. The Lake Chad Polders II project would be conditional on the success, particularly in regard to labor availability and staff training, of the first phase. The Sategui-Deressia II project would also be conditional on the success of the first phase. In contrast to the Lake Chad area, flood control works on the Logone involve lumpy investments but the area is already substantially settled. By about 1980, the issue of the relative priority to be givern to reclamation of the Lake Chad Polders vis-a-vis major flood control works on the Logone-Chari system will arise. Experience with the two ongoing IDA projects, and the UNrP regional planning exercise on the Logone, and the continuing LCBC planning activities, should provide a sound basis for assessing investments in irrigation to be undertaken in the early 1980s. 3.08. It is recommended that the current lending program remain un- changed but on the understanding that (a) Livestock II may well involve more than one project and, possibly, require more than $15 million, and (b) Lake Chad Polders II and Sategui-Deressia II be regarded as possible substitutes for each other. List of Tables 1. Some Key Indicators 1.1 Gross Value of Crop, Livestock, and Fish production 1.2 Livestock: Production and Utilization 1.3 Cotton: Distribution of Costs and Benefits 2. Production and Value of Crops, Livestock, and Fish 3. Cereals 3.1 Cereals Balance Sheet: 1969-71 Averages 3.2 Millet/Sorghum: Regional Demand and Supply 3.3 Aggregate Cereals Demand and Supply: 1970-85 4. Livestock: Prodmction ane Value 5. Livestock: Utilization 6. Livestock: Future Utilization 7. Animal Traction 8. Cotton Production, Costs and Revenues 9. Returns to the `Productivity Program' 9.1 For Farmers 9.2 For the Economy 10. Financing of the 'Productivity Program' 11. Cotton: Distribution of Costs and Benefits 12. COTONTCHAD and CSPC: Apparent Use of Funds 13. The Cotton Productivity Program: Approaches to the Distribution of Costs and Benefits 14. Incomes from Crops, Livestock and Fish: 1975/76 и •+ .. r С,,, и ..1 ' Г� .� , а 41 ^i в. п'� �1 1 д g I н � I 1П. I �± � �„ k" д .� " L и` ' J� �f г :: Л А wои..и�л . (.й�. . I � . �1' I V Ч' � 9 й 9 Р t� 9 ; О (.' iв •. '� У у 1 :µ � :! ♦ У н. V �' [ ., у й i. ю� ,. . W W О й в�1• •i Е� а U w�n в� Ппй д у А.• n J У У и и Г. УΡ в� •t1 •ii Ч � .в � � д О и� 4 4 Й У в .) О в, н. ;~ о в W� п . и w .i iг i� 1 н 1. О й л �,' i. � . � W n U ii� �� и .�i D� {У �� i уΡ�� .: . И П У Рw р] У•. ь .,>. U У . а`д Y F•гв ,� г , л � ' ^ t '1 .i .: 1� �. .� .в в . М 1' " а � л� У т� У] � V и Р 1 Г- .� W r• 1i )г, .�. �1 i� W,и С л в iы ��i' Pv �1W и w w 4 о 8 д .. дд у V � Р 11 и .� д , � С . 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' в� и:1 � д i й: �� � > а•Q or•�иGио�t рΡи л.ировп.п(�+рΡ w i:� R S�г�и v -. �ii�n в .. � v.. ",ь' П �' �г i�1YгuZni%=,i�uwi�(и�ио. i-•о�ио.lиi.,�сСнС•�ш�и � и цц и д��1•° �г�� о' й в- й � v n �л i й - '" .д а ь+ �;> ;�1 о и � � ' � п .�-. ,с � ] ry L ✓ У р р t; ° У:% �т �7 й .н и. о1л,`и •о'v ы 1�ооив-•и .о -v � : �'т .,.:�о "'i�n, �� ir ti N .-<..�«.•��.�• , .-�У�,:и`;.�•„ы�.F.� � .. - , :{ " �{ а ., � й ; в� иа� 2i С.� и п У ' {{! О� � Л О N 1р йо�й д ООгlОiиn,ио4' L' , Оо.�•,+и. д1 Р д г [' � b tt 1 '^ глi-•v,iui-i�vi..i'•�ь-k-w �.вь-о�:и�,����ьFп1..лi i i o�ni� ' .i.'ч � .iб� а vi�-�u u1iy�,a ti ... .. , . i п. п, 25 • 1., А и и ` �и ,и й ооооv,и�гд;��дг.,и�и .п�.. ь,..f..1'uIiIL1.� !�\i и i-{ ;лпвг., и':.,.., � t Г ! 1„ ' ; г t и о. и, i7 и i., n � Й. li l�( �и 1 С', i., al .i г• п, в V О J.и t-.{` �1 I ГI�fI.д•О ч�' UвИ.Л�П .,�.,�.1У�1�нU 4•�Ла-�1.1.i�,�!'r.1.�FJO. 1 Iyi .и •_ .и •(., У tl � �,• . N ь 'а �� •i, и. , 1•� � и �'в' 'б л� г', К'i� Ч ti, •а+ �: �й м� i� ж ё''w".ы 'к � и о Р., ,.. S I';1 1в, �.. , и. „` �.' д, п, ieЫe 2 СРЛ9 eGAECC2P,'АЕ 5ЕС^ut NP;10R;,,vOU!1 � Таl1s 2: Ртодис:lоа аад '7а1ив af Cr;ae. Livescock а� '+аа Огlgfn aF ,гоаа иа!с !961 1958 1969 1970 l971 I972 197] 1974 1Э7i Уеiив af Crow 1967 1ЭТ5 Food Czaas ,- �- Ч111еС апд 5orghum Ргодиссlол ас0 сопа 53о 54Т 551 ь5t ыо 38s агs =_е0 531 Pcroducer Рг1са CFAF1kg 10 10 10 1l 12 l) U 2) Grosa :'aLue С:дЕ п(111оп о,300 5,4Т0 5,610 Т,[61 г,320 7,605 7,055 8,Э50 [2,213 ?5 Зг Paddv Ргодисб оа 000 сопа 77 32 31 7Т '9 41 42 JO ]б Ртосисег ?rica CFлF kg !3 13 14 +.5 '.0 24 27 32 Czose :'гlие cFAr пillion 49! 4L8 54Ь 535 663 д2❑ 1,Оа8 910 1,152 3 + 4'heat Ртодиссlоп ООО сопд 5 5 Ь 8 8 3 7 5 7 ?тодисег Рт1и CFAF,+kg Э! 32 ]0 30 72 34 1i ь0 +2 Сгоеа 7а1ие CFAF mYl2foa 15} [5д [90 =40 23Ь 170 =59 -_40 12б _ _ 9иЬ-тса1: Сегеаlе G°АЕ a;llfoa Ьу9Э6 7,U7Ь 7'2_39 %i_6 8,:39 �595 8i22 9_+G _16 l3�_91 39_ 41 сгоипдпись Ртодиссlал ПОО сат 92 98 L!0 115 96 7S 70 78 89 Р:одисат Ргlсе CFAFlkg 17 l8 21 2Ь 21 22 Т4 27 7G Сгоаа 9вlие CFAF mi111on 1,}Ьч ,594 2,310 2,4L} 2,O16 1,Ы0 1,680 Т,10Ь 2,Ь40 9 8 5иsеяе Producdon '000 сапе l2 l2 24 12 12 14 I9 10 9 Ртодигат 7гlсе _FAFlkg 29 3! 32 )2 Э7 39 62 54 ЬО Сгоьа !'аlие [FAF aiLllon 74В 772 __=8 732 �"4ь 346 79В 340 »80 2 _ 5иЪ-тса1: .1l seada CFAF mt111on 1у12 �у95б 2i-58 ?.Т57 2у60 �[9б 2jL7g j6:_6 )у70 _ !_3 ОсЬет Еоод Lmpa ?сод•:ссlоп '000 сопа .гб 292 289 294 J00 706 Т85 259 3I! ?гедисег 7т1се СЕАЕ;!cg 21 22 27 24 25 2? Э1 J7 Gross t'aiue с?АЕ mi111on 5j?96 .2^J. Ь.ПЬ 5.762 7''-СО 7i-`�; д.__65 ду_39 1у 12 _ :;L�scr•а! Ccoos Cecron ?годиссtоп '000 tons 123 :02 149 l!8 95 109 104 L13 1'+4 ?reducer =т:се cFлF/ig 26 25 25 26 26 7.г zs.1 29.9 a.1 ::roas 'а1�е С?.1F тг1'.соп 7,19д 2,652 7,97+ ],G68 2,470 3,019 2,922 7,4Э9 5,9+7 -� !5 c-�n Aze3ac ?roduccLOn сот 564 1,Э90 1,С79 5Ь5 6)2 б58 176 :9 250 r-ducer ?г.се СРл?/<g 7} 75 35 J5 »0 40 40 50 70 оггвs Sa1ue CFAr да3;iоа 23 L7 39 20 23 25 7 4 iд ЧiЫscus arodvcclan тла 120 :00 100 110 124 71 39 70 ?годисег Рг1се CFAFlkg 70 70 70 80 92 92 90 100 l10 cross :alue СгАЕ паll:ол д 7 7 9 11 7 + - 7 7sbacca ?тодиссlоп .ons • - - 18 32 9] L42 13} 172 Ртодиеег Рт1се CFAFli; • - - 50 55 59 Ы 63 67 сговs Са1ие ГАР п1111ал - - - ( } 5 9 9 -. 5иЬ-[оса1: Iпduscr:a: CPAF miillon стооs 3.:29 2.706 ]�919 7.�__99 2,-}09 3�05Э 2у 3.532 уЭ_Э lЭ 5 А11 C:oos: Cross ';а«е C:AF лL1llan I7,97) 1� 2-р.?}� М.�ВЭ 2П��409 21,+94 2� 2s? 9�G7 ]2,Э'.7 h0 !=0 п гопsсапс pr.cas, :i67-69 aven;e) СгАF btLlion 1В.+ '9.0 20.0 i9.] 1В.2 18.0 13.8 15.6 19.� Llvesceck: Огеаа salue � 4/ �евс гпд оЕгаi+ � CF�F' niiLion },227 }.495 },747 5,50В 7,28I 9,127 [0,56Т 8,39г 9,:53 tl1!k CFAF mltlion 1.69В ,'.,113 1у9:7 у у7 уб1$ у_47 2i_11 7�_ОЬ iосц CFAF riLlion �925 Ту'_'_0 j564 Э.503 у 10.7 �33• У.ЬЭО 11у_14 1:�_7i (in сепасапг рг:па, ?567-59 a�erage) Сг.1Е S(L11on 7.S 7.3 7.4 у.4 7.7 7.J 10.I 6.1 5.2 F!sh тади<сlоп '000 cons 60 ЬЗ БЬ 69 д0 12'J 140 160 320 ?годисег Рг1се CF.',9Гkg Э7 ?7 )3 77 40 41 +б 46 L6 Lccaa ':в4,,е СЕА? aS1'.1on 1у?90 2,079 237LC 2у533 3.200 у б.�?40 ._60 5.5'20 �!а сопвсап[ ргlсее, �AF 5i111oa :.0 ... 2.2 2.7 2.7 L.0 ч.7 }.4 :.0 I9Б7-69 averиgal G[and '.оса1: Gcoaa Caiua Сцгтеп[ Рг1<ая СFлЕ Ьl321оа 26.8 27.2 30.3 J1.7 33.2 37.4 41.1 52.7 }0.1 Conacant Р[lсеа CFAF ?1111оа 27.) 27,4 29.6 24.0 28.6 29.7 ЗО.б 27.1 27.Ь 5оитсее: L'ватlгиlLига о "ёlеи¢е ссhадlела 3 еtа�гета 1ед chifftes, 1%2-71, Dapatcoea[ о! 9Cat1s[1cs, 1и1у 1972; Ааливl Rаротга of Ott[дt; Aanual .Zepocca of che Сепстаl 9ank; :1ьь:оа eaeSaa[ea. !i Саlвпдв[ yearr, сгоо даи £от (е.;.) ?96Т га[есе са сF.в harvaв[ а[ епд I96б; сЫ• 2вg дова оос аrlва for 1lvescoet агiд £1аб. _/ Decalla sг Т.вЫв : � З� 'lаlиед ав I1ve aolsals. =i Aasmes 50'. of сЬа десltле !п [ha сдгtl¢ herd vas сдавиааед. 'еС�е ? C9AD дGдINLNRF. SECi'OR :RгDPA:9L"Н *аЫе 3: Gтввlа 1. Cereals Ваlапс¢ 5heet: 1оБ9-71 dvaragea _ Doaeaclc Ргадисс'.оп :тропе(+) 2оса3 дvallabtlLCV 3.оаеав �/ Tocai .^onsmocim �/ 'ocai Per heed с-.тп'_ оориlагlоп L/ сг Ет�огtв(-) ;ога1 _ г.еад wcal ooaulactan Z! ToceL _-- сосаl о acten (�000 сап.а) lkglу¢аг) ('000 сдпs) ('000 сааа) 9 (кВlУеагl (�000 [опо) ('G00 tгпа) агь3!;:гвг;и� 8111ac!-aorgЛum 671 1s3 - 631 17э ь9 sы 174 Радду 42 13 - +1 12 3 Э4 1! гhаас 7 2 ♦ 32 14 3 - :4 5 ;laizв е э_ 9 э l 3 -.оса1 Сегеаlн Ьа9 2ll + 12 701 19Э l] 628 172 5оигге: FACF, ?er5oecclve 5сида оп A¢riculcural OsvaleDman[ aR che Sahellmm Zoaa гоиnетlаа. ХвксЬ 1975 (С^�5.4/ELeP/706); Mluion пeimwe 1! 3.2э т1111оп 1в 19J0 31 5вад, Раед, iluee, Noo-lоод иааа 2/ 7.Е4 mi111on 1n 1970 0( In gгоав tetms, 1.е. baLoca т1111аа lоаваs 2. НlLie[/9огйиа: Ввяiасаl Oeaiand тд 5иууlч А. 2с а'Чогтдl Теад' Э. 1л 1973Г4 _еаеое =! цее _ У1а1д � Ргодис[1о¢ Demaad3� 5игрlип/(DeB1ei[} цав цеа vith Yiaid аг ?codur.:o¢ .uc7lueii9eгtc1cl по У1е1д гтаiддят ('000 па1 ('к8lЪа) ( От 00 сvсв) ( ООТО cans) ( U0� (`000 he) (Т) ('Rglha: ('000 сдпаl : 00� Zone 5ид �liлgle cropp:ng 171 800 142 :!lхед ccnpping 3Ф 370 _Ьб SиЬсоса3 480 �.0 368 326 �BZ 780 _ ?00 270 (5Ь7 Zone �nM 7S.c.i. 2 40q 1 9 ( 8) - - - - ! Э1 '.аг 23 460 8 16 ( 3) 20 :0 330 6 (1G1 iсвггд 40 СОО 16 32 (16) 40 'о0 200 (30} 'ЭасЕа 100 500 50 ц ( 1) 100 :0 300 L8 {3}) C:wr1-dagui:.�1 i03 650 б7 i8 !11) l00 13 �.00 34 (44) Оиадда?1B11гine 190 550 99 i7 22 L:0 GO ЗгЮ ц (52} 7иега 60 540 эЭ ЗО 1 '_0 7э 300 16 (14) 3аlатас 30 Ь50 20 14 5 20 20 500 10 ( 51 SиЬсасэl 3.8 550 294 ЭОЬ � 410 ]Ь 770 111 (1Э5i T.ow1 3,018 590 Ь02 Ьц (3Z} Э50 4S0 381 (S1) !SOd1_•1car.vrt �! -_ +1В +18 + +56 �56 леvlавд госаl Ь20 (14) +77 (195) 5о=_ге¢: l:R1AT Ii, co3uctlon ес Comerciallaatlan дев Секеаlве , 7оlиавв i- Scfiad, Ju1y 1974 1/ Е5с1да[ед `.rna дди ол cv3clvacad area/Е®11у Е:ет FЮ 5атрlе Agгlculcural Ствnв (1972) тд нтаl уориlвс!оп Ьу prolесеека еагвроlаспд :"гот 1964 eenpLe саавив. 2/ '$езс aaclaaces" Ьу tП9ц; по селsид даев aoai1a61a. 9Г/ Еsсlтдсед :гот cha "Socin•Есо^:aic 5ucvay af a.wcham [4ад'• 1465 (5IDPS7, кhа у'D)®аоа •houea4old budgec винеу oF 1911(2 аед, :аг other агеав, рц своlи сопаиарсlоп 1пЕесгед :гтт reiaelve auaLLaba11[у сс' ingumea а�д ааiгвl ркодиега. 4J As еsе;тв:ед Ьу [ha :!и1[Сдопог °ission оЕ ОеtоЬп 197Э 5) ut :ha аал�посlап chnc che 2ат 5ид 1а salf-вnflleime л аакавl уткв апд vaa аlао sвfF-aailцlтг Ia 1973l74. 'Eha UlФц II гврогс alao fuggвцa cSac спа ворагтс :eaaL�lпg даР1с!г oi 193,000 гопв vав зцЪвгттtlsilу acar-eat'�всед. 1, Акякедесе Сегеаlа 7emid and 5unolr. 1970-85 �9?0 19Н5 Dотеацс Таса1 5игр иа 1Ютеасlс Soul 5итр3ие двvЧед taca3 5игрlие� Revlaed Sots Зигрiиз/ ртодиссlоп Do=d 1/ 7егlсlе ?CaducCiaa=/ =--�=-7Г (Oeilгit3 Deeumd !J Oeilгic . 7ете:д Е� �/ lPe:ic:c) "----'°------"'--"--°------"-----`---'-----°' '°'--°--'`000 соаа ----------------"- Уц1ес/4orghгe ЬЗ1 631 - ;92 861 (79) ЭЬ1 (79) 925 (�71 Радду 42 42 - 64 60 7б (12) гб 1.С) 4Ъеас 7 14 (I2) 3] ц (12) 4i (32) 55 (72) !4aize 9 9 11 S i41 15 (� г 4} ?осаl Carгals Ьд9 101 (12) Э70 961 (91j 997 (2.')) 9б3 ;91) 1! '•2оеа1 Desшid" ia 1970 1s idmтltal со 'госаl Avalisbflцy" ас 1 аЪоvв. 2/ Coascmmt producticn рет tead а� уа нrаl populaclw (й.01 а111iод 1п 1983) рlиг (а) радду Етот SaCa=ul-Dpaesaia (10,000 ее¢а/уааг} ттд Wiгi В(2,000 :отlуеаг) шд (L) uhen: :гот 1а:са Chad р�lдега f7,000 caas%уеаг) вад 8рР атв11-всаlа 1пlgвeion (1,000 епаlуеаг}• 7/ Сапасдiс demrmd евг head оЕ еЪа саеа! рориlвсiоа (4-9Э mi111on 1д 1985).. ' �/ Ад а: 7/ ezcepe cF.ac (а) vЬеаС деаапд оаитвд со lacreaie л 11ае v1cб.urbm populacion ттд (Ъ) 50А оУ 1970 радду дтгад us®ед [о L•оетаи¢ 1а 11ае vt[h игсаь popula[iaa. 7/ А� вс G( едсерс ehac т111ес/aarghm дтеад аааиоед ео дасllдв Ъу сЪе.iаоа aбeoluta а@итк ы vhaae агд раддр damimd lпекаыаs. Table 4 CHAD AGRICULTIORE SECTOR MIDRANDMI Table 4: L ve5t.ckz production and Val-4e Annual Rate Unit 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1980 1985 1975-M Cattle '690 2,970 075 Herd number I/ thousand head 4,530 4,600 4, 3,261 3,261 3,690 4 Offtake rate 113 8 9 10.4 Average carcass weight kg/head 130 130 11.0 UO 130 130 132 135 Total meat and o;fals 3/ thousand cons 81.3 82.2 77.4 118.3 60.9 42- 54.8 71.5 5.4 Producer price CFAF/head liveueight 9,500 10,500 11,500 10,000 15,000 20,000 Value meat and offals CFAF Million 4.755 5,313 5,934 .8,600 5,625 5,220 Volume milk 4/ million litras 131 132 135 35 94 96 106 U7 2.2 Value milk T/ CFAF milli= 1,559 1,742 1,944 1,411 1,767 2,350 Sheep and Goats Herd number 6/ thousand head 5,000 5,100 5,200 4,900 5,000 5,150 5,970 6,920 Offtake rate 1. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 Average carcass weight kg/head 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 1-1.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 Total meat and oitals 7/ thousand tons 21.0 21.5 21.9 22.7 21.0 21.7 25.1 29.1 3.0 Producer pr,ce j/ CFAF/head liveweight 887 979 1,073 933 1,400 1,500 Value eat and ffals CFAF million 1,331 1,498 1,674 1,511 2,100 2,318 Vol=e milk 9/ million litres 10.0 W.6 31.2 29.4 30.0 30.9 35.3 41 5 3.0 Value milk CFAF million 357 404 4419 4as 564 773 Cw,e Is iierd number 101 zhousand head 555 560 560 545 560 $66 398 632 O"take rate 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Av;-ze carcass weight kg/head ISO 150 ISO .150 150 153 150 "so -C.1 meat I'll thousand tons 4.2 1-2 4.2 4.1 4.2 1. 4.5 4.7 1.0 Producer price IZ/ CFAF/he.d li-eight 15,200 P5,793 13,397 16,003 24,000 25,714 Value meat CFAF million 412 470 515 672- 727 Vol=e ilk 13/ million litres i5.0 15.2 15.2 14.7 15.2 15.3 1.0 Value milk 1 CFAF million 179 201 219 244 286 393 i tal meat and z4 als 14/ Volume thousand tons 106.5 107.9 103.S 145.1 86.1 68.3 84- 105.3 -1.4 Value CFAF million 6,508 7,281 8,123 10,547 8,397 8,265 ,ocal milk V.Iume million litres 1776 178 181 129 139 1410 158 176 2,3 Value CFAF illion 2,095 2,347 2,612 2,143 Z,617 3,506 Tot al Value: Meat and Qffals and milk. CFAF aillion 8,603 9,628 LO,735 12,690 11,0t4 11,77L Sources: Volume data until 1973: Annual Reports of the Livestock Department; 1974 through 1985: Approvi3ionmement en Viande da VAtrique Cencrale It 7chad, U'..DA= 11, Yaounde, 1916 Mission estimates. 11 Herd growth 1976-80: 2.5%/year-, 1981-5: 2.0%/year. TV Offtake in 1973 assumed to be 50% of the decline in hard numbers betwem 1972 and 1973. ncludes offals estimated at 25% of carcass weight. 247 oi cattle are cow3 In nilk, 12) 1 itres/head/ year av&ilable ! r human consumption. 'Jmt values interred Zr= 1975 price of CFAF 25/liter and the index of liveweight cattle prices, except that the 1973 value is taken ac the id-poinc bet-en 19-2 and IG74 rather than the lower value implied by -he index. 6/ 'Rerd grcwth 1976-85: 3.57.1year 7/ Includes orfals esc tmated at 15% of carcass weight 3/ L974 and 1975: reported data; pre 1974: inferred y applying the ind" of lWavaight cattle prices. / 30. females in milk, 40 liters /headlyear of which 50% available for human consumption. 10/ Herd growth 1976-85: I%Iyear. 11 Excluding offals which are, reportedly, not consumed. 12-/ 1974:reported datum; 1975: increased iit same proportion as sheepigoat price; pre 1974- inferred by applying the index of liveweight cattle prices. 13-1 M . of total camels are females in milk, 150 litres/head/year available ior human consumption. 41 Production from pigs, horses and donkeys is estimated at less than 300 tons/year and is excluded. Eq--ally, the produttion "lost" through the increase in crk 3xen. notably a 1974 and 1975, (set Table 7), is not reflected in the above table; even im 1975. hcwe .r, t" "lost" production is only of the oraer cf -,COO tctz. *аЫе 5 сCЭд0 ACAICцL^,!АЕ SECTOR ESE`S1Rti:Dц`L ТвЫе 5: L.veatcek: �cillмCico 1970 l974 o-g �_о, лvетааа Сатсавя 7ai с iucai :гцкпс N=, дvетаке Carcaas ОеiаЬс :a.ai цеlк:с Vo. Аvег�че Сасснап �е�гt: iccal t: :�г (kead) (k8/head) (сопа) Феед) (3гЬlпеад) (сопа� (hвад) С<g/haad) ,-о::а� Catcla 1, Соастоllед 51aug6zez For ед?ott 70,89Ь 162 11,458 Э9.480 169 5,647 17,606 159 2,763 Foz lccal mazkec д'О�таге ;$,778 - 152 ],862 26,286 141 7,695 24,096 L37 7,Э13 SагЬ 5,ц5 126 $22 $,Э76 120 о'44 1 35,000 iц +,025 ' ц1 ochec (агЬвn) 2б,951 L14 3,Э00 34,26$ 114 3,915 ) 1, Live a:гFazts �� COncmllad Э1,ё00 )14т 21,75t1 24г670 } 143 21,02$ )120,000 143 1;,400 Сдсоnетоllад 118,200 ) 120,ЗЗ0 3, Uacaacrollad 8leughcac FOr вкрогг ав дк1�9 тоаг3/ 20,Ооо 10о z,ooo s7,9oo 1о0 s,790 1ь,0оа 1оо 1,600 Рог 1оса1 urkec _ 201.120 110 22у173 66•°93 :03 7у03а 48.,98. 1С9 6а829 Тоса1 OfEtake $00.300 '(.30) б$у06$ }73.000 (1� :Ву150 261.70С�, (130) 33i30 OEfals пс 2$й IБ,266 ц,1д8 Э,.д3 .Оса1 тегес аад оЕЕа1а 81,3Э1 60,938 с2 дtз OF VЬЛ...Ii. а ?осзl ?лялггs: 24a,g96 42у116 242.ЗВ0 �43t �$5 133,h06 27 317 L1ve 130,000 27,188 !45,000 :6,2di .-�,.LФ' дТ;?"f'р Dried ueat 4 '.0,000 2,500 $7,90D 7,27: 16,000 2,700 Drcad агfца � - 970 - 3,090 ур0 Fкохаг Т0.896 11,4$8 ]9.4В0 6,647 [i,50ti 2,763 ?acal ЕОт 1аса1 :Jazkac 2$4,ЬС4 Зу 1Э2.620 у 107 J9t_ !$уд0 [г�D�апваа .5,Э78 4,828 26,.66 4,619 24,09гi [�1 Sazh 4,ц$ 65Э $,Э76 ВО$ 3,900 7lЭ Окhет итЬа 28,951 Э,519 34,26$ 4,844 ЭО,ООП 4,712 5uбcacai; urSaa 58,484 9,I00 Ь5,927 10,318 $9,C5�i 9,172 в,lш,св: �гта1 2ог,120 зо,гц ьь,ь43 7,эьs 4а,29д s,92a 5heea аад G�aca ('000 hesd) ('000 Ьавд) ('000 hгад) 1. Салсхоliад "alaughtar гот елратк 13 19 ц9 12 19 228 9 1В.$ 167 Рот 1оса1 markec ::'Djameпa $ 14 4S 18 ц.$ 24Э 19 12.$ 2З8 .__ а:Ьег (иг�ап) �/ ?6 14 4g/ yf '2j 601 4у 17 510 2, Live ырогеа 5/ Сопстоцед 14 )и,$ 1,3Э8 24 ) 12.$ 1,68В ) 1рр 12.$ 1,ц0 Jосодстаi!ед 43 ) 111 ) , 3, LЪсодстоllед чlaughcer Fos 1оеа1 markec =/ 1уЭ9 12 16i068 1•.+q0 L1 1; � 1,�12 [2.I 16_�84 Тоса1 GEEtalсв 1L (12.2) 1В�227 1•g00 (12.2) 18у'_'..0 1,545 (12.27 i9.949 Jf?а1а ас 13z 2у'3+ 2j_35 °у_28 T.ow1 гиат аад aF:зle ..0,961 20,476 2!,Е77 оЕ Jhich; ?otaS Eиyozta 120 iyб9 147 2а169 109 1i_0$ L1ve 107 1,574 v$ 1;4L :00 ,С39 Рток,т 13 229 I2 228 9 ' lbi ?агаl Еог шw1 :arkec 1i 19у293 1уЭ57 (8.В07 1у_L36 20�7] S!.0lасеаа 5 104 18 .79 l9 Ochev игSад Зб $72 43 691 �.$ 702 subzacaE;urbBn 41 681 6Э 970 ti:. 9'5 еаlапее: гигаl 173Э9 1В,$ ц 1,290 !7,837 1,7'12 19,095 C:�se1e 7/ (Ьеад) (Essd) (Ьед) Тоса1 OESeake 27,7$0 ц0 4,1{3 28,800 ц0 ,200 28,700 15D +,2Si Тоеа1 Zдporte 14,7$0 ц0 2,21Э ц,000 ц0 2,2;0 1.$,300 ц0 :,:95 Tota1 £от 1.агп1 riazkat (Rara1) 13,000 150 1,9$0 17,000 ц0 1,9$0 1Э,О�М �i50 1,950 Рет ол Е/ Соавшао�l-�оn Тога1 YeiqЬt Р,�ориlа[1аа � боо [1оа '"аtлl W1aEt PooulatSaa °f Coпeumnclan а:в1 ':е1'-' (.D00I (kg/haad) � ('000) (kg F.ead) � f'050) (t6lсаадl д11 Меа: дnд а?$а1а ' 1рБ,4 Р5А 5д.3 :аса2 �rlогга I-O/ -�46.0 47.5 ?3.2 Тоса1 far Laca1 Чдкkе[ 3,640 1б,б �2$) 60.4 Э,940 9.8 3г).5 4А20 9•2 37•= оЕ vй1гЬ ц'Dlamem ц7 Э1.4 (]В) 4.9 206 2Э.8 4.9 220 i9.9 4.5 s.аг зэ v,2 <te) о.7 4з lв.7 о.3 44 [ь.3 и.7 Ochar 2ц 19,5 (ц) 4.2 З51 21.4 5.6 274 18.0 5: $ubcocaiiгuб�m 4i6 23,g (2Q) у,$ $10 22.1 11,3 $38 18.6 i0.2 9аlакка: rural 3,230 ц,7 (14) 5О.5 7,4Э0 7.9 ё7.2 3,488 7.8 26.9 5ои� тса: EtiDA2 1, дaoroviaiarлmeac еа ylmda де ['дктlеие Стстlвlе- 1е Тедад, ior 1974; :от�19Т аед 1975: ТаЫевитs вratiвtiouи дев вetirltFa Св 1'abeeroSr 'тiдоГ_1i4na дв Farc:a, а.7д vieeioo eвtimcee. � 1/ Eeci�acad Ьу UУЛА: 1г at 145,000 1а 1974 аад varlEiвd bу.екюа-cЬeeklag srSCh laport даса !а nelgi:boariag eo.mtrlea. 2! sл=опвд £гда твготдад exposta of дгiвд аеас; 25kg дтlед meat%hmd, 3/ 3у CiY.ieraace Ьвпn® [осаl aEfcake аад praceadfag lгеев. 4/ IаfепгА Егод тееагдвд тцракtа оЕ дгlед Oifala; caovasala¢ £апог: 2.З. 5/ 51auRhL•егiпсв о! aheey ы.д доаСе е[ 5ыh nец!q161в. t/ Zetloal:ed Ъ. 7Н➢,1; II at 1З5,000 1а 1?74; croesкhaelcag riih lдроrt dsta ia nвiфboariag e�mtrlss ws iаеаасl;хвl•в. �/ 0![л1е гераггадlу аог еодаитвд. 7/ 1у^0 PnoulaCica: оГ:1е.а1 sstimate 'неед en 1Э64 автяlв еиаат. 9/ 19'%5 ft>puLaeloc: 3:�. ааеlисе (МsтсЬ 19Э53: Ai'_Оеагiоа 6etмen urbaa вгева obtaiaad ЬТ иаовlаg 7%/_rv Гаг Х+Оjатвда, ;)S/усвт Гет Sarh, лад �%iyear tor ocSet •�га.д сгагега. 10/ Ае eeCYZated Ьу Sc,..^т'.S !а 1969 лдд quoted Ь7 ONDAT IZ. Tahle 6 iäs AGRICULTURE SECTOR YWIORANDn Table 6: Livestock: Fut-are Ut4-iqaticn n75 Tztal rriductcn mest and cffals 31 ýCrn tons !C6.4 EÄPc r, o,sýn;:t4cr. 3reakdo-wn Lýcal ýcnsl=Ct40m. Meat and ',"-'2!s Population: 1000 -b,0 4C2O 4L66 405, :1 j amena 157 --20 339 L-3 ---tåer urban 213 4c6 537 41n 715 3230 3482 7:;]ý Ln, n capita ccneu=ption:V 31.4 19.9 23.0 2 C,ther urbam. 17.7 l_.7 i- c- - z0.9 2i- ubtotal. 23.9 1-6 Rursl 1,.7 --5 T-tal -.2 i_ 3 12.2 7v.al -tnsx-=týcn '900 tons N Ur . :ýan ur`an 9. 6.9 7o t a-ý "3-a- Milk avlil-atle fur `U=ar tmns= _tr. 4c liter$ cf -jhich: :attle and zanels S' ec ý and gcats 20 312 Breakdc-.-n czns=---n ýf tilk R-are, rop.aiat40a: 10CO 3230 t422 ton LDne 1590 167C 1600 Zlseýnere n- 195- ý"otal Consu=ztýcn ý/ t C;S Zcne 16 -,3 Else~re ý0 ý24 ?er cari-a ccrs=pticn 1iters/ C4ttcn Zone year 10 -.0 1-0 --ý"-sew"-ere 95 69 -2 7! Tab.Le 5. 2/ In, est-. tes ( m ch 1975); =ban POPIIIE,-cn f=ther brQken dwý ur. the ass=týon ef 7,5,'vear ;rvwnth cf N'Djamena- 5,ncreases of 3kg/heaå --'cr eec*- f`ve-year re-icd at NIDja=ena, lkg/'-ead fzr ea--*.- fý*ve-year period ia rural aress; other urban areas-constant- 4/ Detailed estimates exa avcýilable by prefect*ý" for 1975; the aggregate rural poculat,*on grovth rate is amplied to each zone. .435'=ing ý0- of shec-, and gcat zElk is c--ns"=ed in the Cotzon --ona e-ad urban ccns=ption is negligible. Nate: Alternative assu=ptions regarding.per capita cansu=ption of =est and offals yield the fo_~Oving resulta: 1920 1985 Local Exports Docc EX-ort3 Consu=tion Consu=rtion 1. Constant 1975 aggregate per capita consu=tion L1.1 L3-3 15.3 59.5 2. Constant 1975 mer capita consu=Dt4.cn by populaticn group 42.6 41.8 Lo.9 55.4 Å-tai=ert in 1085, off 19-10 per capita cons=m- ticn by population group 150% or th-at increase by 1980) 59.7 24.7 36.3 la., CHAD Table 7 :AGRICULTURE SECTOR SURVEY Table 7: Animal Traction Unit 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Trained work oxen 1/ '000 head 65 69 75 95 120 3/ Ploughs 1/ '000 units 29 31 35 39 48 Price to farmers 2/ CFAF/unit 9,000 7,500 7,500 Weeders No 600 1,700 Hoes No 900 1,000 Carts '000 units 10 9 9 10 11 Price to farmers 2/ CFAF/unit 31,000 22,500 30,000 Sources: ONDR Annual Reports; Mission estimates for 1975. 1/ The ratio of trained work oxen to ploughs becomes increasingly unfavorable. No satisfactory explanation has been found for this apparent trend. 2/ Offered at full cost under a credit program until 1972. Thereafter, offered at 50% of cost (with 50% FED subsidy) but on a 'cash only' basis. Farmers' demand in 1974 and 1975 reportedly exceeded quantities available (12,000 ploughs and 1,100 carts). For 1976 provision has been made for supply of 25,000 ploughs, 4,200 earts and 3,000 weeders. 3/ The increase in the number of trained work oxen between 1974 and 1975 represented acquisitions of cattle as follows: (a) absolute increase in numbers: 25,000; (b) replacement of mortality losses (5%): 5,000; (c) replacement of 25% of the oxen available in 1971: 15,000; total acquisition: about 40,000 head. At a minimum of CFAF 20,000/head, this represents a cash investment of at least CFAF 800 million by farmers in the Cotton Zone. Farmers' cash contribution to implments acquired in 1975 amounted to an additional CFAF 125 million or CFAF 925 million (US$4.1 million) in total as cash outlays. The net income of cotton producers was CFAF 5.5 billion in 1974/75 and CFAF 6.5 billion in 1975/76 AGRIC'LTURE SEC'OR E.?.AyDO Table 8: Cotton Csrto.. Costs ar: Reve.ues Untt 1969/70 i 1970/71 1971/72 1972173 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 P:rduction, Area and Ytelds Seed cotton production 1/ '000 tons 117.9 95.0 108.8 104.2 115.1 143.6 175.0 Area cultivated by small Earmers '000 ha 291.2 301.6 301.9 .75.6 269.0 272.3 330.0 Averag. yield kg/ha 402 315 359 377 45 526 533 '?roductivity Program Ares r--r 'ow ha 44,.1 4c.6 42.0 44.7 51.9 '5,0 425.0 Share of total area cul:iv3aec by small farmers 7. 15 13 14 16 20 23 33 Average yield kg/ha 322 765 809 872. 915 930 900 Production '000 tons 36.3 31.1 35.4 39.0 50.2 69.3 11..3 Share of total proc::an 31 33 33 37 44 49 65 Other area ('trad:ijnal') ' '000 ha 217.0 260.0 259.9 230.9 214.2 191.2 203.0 Average teld Ss/ha 777 245 236 231 Ž99 372 299 r rcs ad incomes Pr.ce: 'hito CAI/kg 26 23 29 73 43 43 Pr;cn: Coll.w and C7arkd 0FAF/hg 26 26 26 74 24 25 25 Average prce paid CiAF/kg 2 26 27.7 22.1 79.9 41.3 41.3 Gross value to cr-onrs . ; CAF r. i'1.:n ,065 2,-70 3,014 2,928 3, 4l 5,931 7,223 Inc=,e .nr ha undar orotivlt '000 C7AF;ha 15.9 14.4 16.9 79.0 20.9 31.9 30.7 incere per ha :n -o,ch: area .3 6.4 7.9 .9 8.9 5 12.4 Lins Ostout and Utilisatiar. Av.rag, yielå at an.er;as 37.0 37.2 37.7 37.3 37.1 36.3 37.0 Lir: ou:p: '000 :ons 43.3 35.4 41.0 33.9 42.7 92.9 64.3 Less: Sales to laval mill " .2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.9 Ex~orts " 42.1 34.2 39.7 37.7 41.5 31.9 53.9 Csst Szruccure Äverage rodocr price C5AF/kg 27.7 :0.1 29.9 41.3 41.3 Colloionacosns 3.4 3.2 3.1 4.0 4.0 Cast ed jzt:en Ielivered ginneries 31.1 31.3 33.0 45.3 45.3 0,:ay:1oe ir tnz 02.5 83.9 88.3 123.1 172.4 .l.nerv costs 26.2 31.0 31.3 32.0 35.0 Expor: taxes 17.2 17.2 18.3 -3.7 i3.s r-anrt zo t" 20.9 23.3 23.3 30.0 33.0 Solia =osts "3_ . ' 6.9 1 :,sts 70 150.4 159.2 170.1 210.0 veroagn price OB 001.3 107.7 71 Saralus (DefLci:) " 30.3 27.9 109.7 3.1 37.6 B h/ CFAF million 7,194 7,054 11,612 11,319 16,141 Less: Costs incurred outside Chad - 558 582 780 1.095 1,4n -st uated value at Chadien frontIer " 6,636 6,472 10,832 10,224 14,7:6 Lnss: rarsrnrt Iinner, to frontier 412 439 ' '94 779 i _4 a'-e of exvorts so-gi-nery 5.22 6.333 0,332 _ 9, 45 43 Pius: :al sales t textili. .4l 212 155 -69 7 vav "a.lue f all Int ex-gir.very " 6.436 6,188 0,507 9,62c _.4 Less: 7ir.ning ana collecti:an cost " 1,443 1.547 1,708 2.273 t.972 Gross :ncome fras cat:an croductioa 7/ " 4.993 ..641 6.799 -,37 '3.35 of h_,tn: Froauction " 3.014 2.922 3,5:1 .93` 7.22 Govern.ent (d.ty and taxes) 728 696 768 976 .2C Cotonchaa cst-tax Drofits " 1,251 1.017 4.590 _uc 2 o which 30% to capCe 1.001 14 3,672 52 ,936 20% ta COatontchad " 250 203 918 -8 '4a Sources: OIMR, Cotontohad, CSPC, Mission estimates. 1975/6 data are provisional. 1/ The agricultural year, i.e. plancing in June 1969, harvesting end-1969 and early-1970, delivery to ginneries completed by =id-1970. 2iaj sales of lint oiten continue into the following calendar year. 2/ Almost all fro small farmers; research stations and others produce a few hundred tons per year. / 100 kg composnd fertilizer and 4 or 5 Insecticide sprayings per ha. i/ Often but misleadingly called 'traditional'; no fertili:er or nasecticide but may be ploughed with oxen; cottan was Inaroduced to Chad ;n. the 1920s. 5/ Net of farmrs' contribution ts fertilizer and insecticide costs: CFA? 5,500/ha through 1973/4; CFAP 6,500/ha thereafter. 6/ Selling costs and 50% of trasport to port. 7/ Excluding revesues from sales o: cotton seed; in most years. cotton ed cannot be profitably extcrted and local. salen are regligtble. .az.le 0 CMA ACRICUIJTIRE SECTOR IEMORAMDML Table 9: Re:urns to -he 'rZ:actit: ?r;ra:' Unit 1971/72 1972/73 1973/71. 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1. For Farmers - At 'national average' incremental yields Incremental Yields 1/ kg/ha 523 591 616 533 601 Producer Price CFAFIkg 27.7 28.1 29.9 41.3 41.3 Incremental Benefit thousand CFAF/ha 14.5 16.6 18.4 23.0 2.8 Farmers' payment for inputs " " 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.5 6.5 Benefit: cost ratio ratio 2.64:1 3.02:1 3.33:1 3.54:1 3.82:1 - At representative' incremental yields Benefit: cost ratio at: 650 kg/ha ratio 3.27:1 3.33:1 3.53:1 4.12:1 4.12:1 550 kg/ha " 2.76:1 2.82:1 2.98:1 3.49:1 3.49:1 450 kr/ha ' 2.27:1 2.29:1 2.45:1 2.86:1 2.36:1 .-,... .75:1 1P79:1 1.90:1 32222.2 2: 2. For the ecor.cmy - A: 'national average' incremental yields Farm-Gate Value 2/ CFAf/kg 45.8 44.9 77.5 51.2 62.2 67.1 7/ Incremental Senefit chousand CFAFIha 24.0 26.5 47.7 28.6 37.4 38.8 3/ InpuCs: Fertilizer .3/ CFAF/ha 5011 5659 5605 7184 11043 9644 9/ Insecticide 4/ " 3560 3710 4158 5676 11715 6798 9/ Sprayers " 360 380 390 440 496 496 Delivery to farmers " 440 475 560 611 611 611 interest 5/ " 774 844 533 1172 1969 1448 Seed protection " 120 130 150 229 229 229 Staff 6/ '. 1000 1000 1000 1072 i072 i072 Total iput costs " 12198 12746 16684 27'4u 20298 Benefit cost ratio ratio 2.13:1 2.17:1 3.74:1 1.71:1 1.38:1 1.91:1 At 'representative' incremental yields Benefit: cost ratio at: 650 kg/ha ratio 2.64:1 2.39:1 3.95:1 1.99:1 1,49:1 2.15:1 550 kg/ha ' 2.24:1 2.02:1 3.34:1 1.69:1 1.26:1 1.82:1 4530 kg/ha " 1.83:1 1.66:1 2.74:1 1.38:1 1.03:1 1.49:1 350.:1 1.29:1 2.13:1 1.47:1 0.0:1 1.16:1 .A. cg,: C..a. .--- - 250 k&'iha 1.02:1 0.91:1 1.52:1 O.??:1 0.57:1 0.33:1 Sources: G. Faurie, La culture cotonniere au ithad: Etude de prix de revient, BEAC, August 1975; ONDR; Mission estimates. 1/ Table 8. 2/ FOB price less selling, transport and ginnery costs, converted at ginery yield, less collection costs. 3/ Includes 8% provision for losses in transit to Chad.- T/ From 1973/74, includes 10% provision for losses in transit to Chad. 3/ 5.57./year for 18 months. Z/ Accurate for 1974/75 only; others inferred. Includes all costs of ONDR's Input Supply Division (3.A.L.), 507. of ODR's general budget and 50% of "additional personnel". 7/ Based on 8% increase on 1975/6 20 price and on intermediate costs. 8/ Inferred from simple average of 'national average' incremental yields, 1971/72 - 1975/76 of 578 kg/ha. 2/ Accurate data; orders for the 1976/77 season were placed in lace 1973. Note: (I) 7'he ratios shown above do not take account of the after-effect on millet/sorghum yield of compound fertiliter applied to cotton; it has been claimed that the incremental cereal yield is 250 kg/ha. (2) The national average incremental yield from 'productivity cotton' over-atates the effective increment since, in general, the better soils are planted to productivity cotton. A better estimate of the incremental yield i given soil coditions would be 550 kg/ha. Table 10 CHAD AGRICULTURE SECTOR MEMORANDUM Table 10: Financing of the 'Productivity Program' 1971/72 1972/73 1.973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 Costs Inputs per ha 1/ '000 CFAF/ha 11.3 12.2 12.7 16.7 27.1 20.3 Area under productivity 2/ '000 ha 42.0 44.7 54.9 75.0 127.0 145.0 Total Cost 3/ CFAF million 475 545 697 1,253 3,442 2,944 Financed by: 1. Farmers 4/ CFAF million 217 236 287 464 785 896 2. FED 5! " 218 250 246 375 824 519 3. Cotontcha- 6/ " 41 39 43 53 65 70 4. Government 7/ " 82 78 86 106 130 140 Subtotal- 558 603 662 998 1,804 1,625 Balance (= CSPC) 8 (83) (58) 35 255 1,638 1,319 1/ Table 9. 2/ Table 8. 3/ Not including FAC-financed components, i.e. ONDR expatriate staff, training of extension staff and agricultural research. 4/ CFAF 5,500/ha until 1973/74; CFAF 6,500/ha thereafter; less amounts unrecovered: 6% in 1971/72, 4% in 1972/73, 5% thereafter. 5/ For fertilizer, insecticide and sprayers: 42% of landed cost in 1973/74, 35% in 1974/75, 27% in 1975/76 and 20% in 1976/77; pre 1973/74, a more complex subsidy formula was operative and the average subsidy was about 55%. For seed protection: 100% in 1971/72, 55% in 1972/73, 40% in 1973/74, 30% in 1974/75, 20% in 1975/76,. 10% in 1976/77. Additional ONDR personnel, of whom 50% chargeable to the 'productivity program', are wholly paid by FED. 6/ CFAF 1/kg fibre. 7/ CFAF 2/ke fibre. '/ Not enmiged when the current cotton productivity programns drawn up. 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Аьггпил 1.г��Jн..аг Уг1ао .пд Гнvиг�ш,гп(лггв гьvглие уггьа.пlг +гс ии.ьглИ•д (гг,т 197s/7ь. сы.и�(.ь.а у.,ы-гв„ уr.,[1ь .ыlл,гга ,. v.г ..е1. б ыгб 1ип.и..в 1.<wг. ч И., ты,1в Ч. г.,г[нл[. '!. ^.at1a ц СхлD лCкICJLTORE 5ELT00. :�рАS'OON ^аЫв ц: Weonlс'-ад вад CS?С: lpca:en! 8ев of £илде :971/72 1972/73 1973 71 1974l75 1975 76 1975/77 Тпса1 А. _У' t. п'ясlтасе• Соссап аоссиак оаг апlсиlкиглl яааа,,., ---"-'-'---'-----"-'-'-"'-----'--------••-••-(CFAF o111fan)'---'-'-------"'"'-'-'--'--"'----"-"""'--'- Сосогсссhад роас•са:с рг•:Е1и 1,х51 1,017 »,590 440 2,42] 7,546 'Э,.Ь7 СSУС• Отоев aecelpta: 90" �. abora 1,001 BI4 З,б7х 752 1,938 2,ЕЗ7 10,51G tesa: produccLviCy ргоgгат ра;лапса 183) г59 Э3 23Si 1i7В 1у119 у5 [�гг гесаlрса оа тесипеn[ оратааlдт 1уС8_. 872 3ffiJ7 97 300 h_.В 7�с08 цаs: ЭО^.. Coconschad'а "ртvгзlоп fos гвnаьпlе" Т� 166 д"о 4Ь7 1Ь6 266 .,J1 рагtlеlрагqда Сосоцеhад Lnveacaaaгa З/ - - _ - 108 80 ' 139 �воовiса vleh Тгаааигу гГ ЗОВ 300 163 200 200 200 1,3Ы "ртеlеvтеЛге" Р г_�iaaa оЕ lосаllт boldlaga 1а Coeon2chsd J - - - 1.°0 48 - 2'-9 Аррагвпt Ьдlаасе 510 30б i (5с91 (322) �_78 3„90 -- бдыlасivе 510 1.Dlб 3.423 1.874 2,552 J,г90 СпсапtсИад• сгоаа 2еааlрс, хю хоз 91а еб 4as 709 2,ыз Lear. Ytoducclvlcy pmgr� ра�аа[а '1 �9. 4Э 53 53 70 ц1 Ve[ iпсоое аа гхипаяс opataciona � 1Б4 В73 7� +20. 639 '_.у'? fваа: 102 а! "provis Иа !ог геаеwlа" 67 '1Т 117 67 67 - 335 Dt+ldende ' 6Г 34 34 50 3b 54 54 з24 Iдап гараутааса ТГ - -с 116 [ц 192 1В2 627 лррегвпг balaaee � 3i L L227) 1� 1-'0Э 1iW -- Сига,lасlvе 88 181 767 340 657 t,J60 8, Cocnncciad EscL.-aгa:�es tL^ш+с1а1 faмticeiln� цваг СогсасеЪад Родг-сп prolics 1,ц9 1,:70 i,600 Ь77 2.423 8/ 7,Э46 9/ 1Э,503 Oioeraa ггсегрса 10/ (б) 27 U 50 50 50 !86 Рто<еедв о! ааlаа Erum ягоска 1D/ 0 37 377 602 160 400 �. i.ase: сат^-over acacis � 77 577 602 !ЬО 400 ' vec pmilc рет Сlатсlаl уеаг 1у д �Т 4у588 969 2�_2ЭЗ 3i97a 13�Е91 Lгss: 7мvisiaa Еог raaeval ЗЭЭ 8� 5В4 33Э ЗЭ3 _ : б�б Эаlвдсе: лчаi1а61е !ог aiscrlSusloa 9�3 S`4 4=СО.: б�б 1•900 3,о._с"у у С5Р!': Спае &егаlрса: 807, оЕ baieaca а+аi2ааlв Сог dlaeribuelm 7Ь4 Б27 3,1D3 5119 1,520 7,I97 9,5х0 рауяегsа 213 2Lx 798 675 1,994 1,599 5у_97 лррагг„г sцааса 3з9 :вs 2,ю5 (цб} (а747 ±,598 � •- С•sв+Lac:ve 339 7.4 3,129 3.00Э 2,529 4,ц7 :о[]пССЪад' Gvuea 4есеlрса: 20'L af Ьаlапев вrаilлЫв Сог dlstrlbotloa 19i 107 80i ц7 380 799 1,:115 рауааасе 95 9з 2ц 7h8 301 ЗОЬ 1у_58 лррагепс Ьаlапсе 96 цв 586 (121) 19 493 _ -- Cuшiastve 9Б 110 696 573 654 1,147 1- ' (1974/15-1975/77' С. :оса1 Lr�eaxenc ?rooraa -2� toeal мве 1.470 1,566 2,967 2,33б 3,Бб7 F1uar.ce: СС[Р 549 бЫ Эх7 1,3Э9 Ссаяатссит аЕ lоиl Ът1с+ � у� L1/ 38в 872 4ц 1,е73 COFpCE " 276 70 ц.б СЗЯС - 108 80 t88 •'Se1f-f:aaacfag" 5S2 14I 637 1,069 414 2,ц6 Pucdiag о! ао1.-l1:+впсL8 С197ц72-7976/77) лррагаn[ глс balanca 9Ь 14 586 (ц1) 79 493 _,i47 Prwlaiaa Еог гапмlа 73з 93 3&1 3зз 37] - 1,ЬЬЬ Arortisacг.un аl:аьапсе 117 214 2Ы 290 730 5Ь0 1,922 - дL 606 ]ц 1,411 692 761 1,цЭ ,i35 2/ 2аЫв Ё: огsgгдац7 Cram CaemtcLd'в дпf! ааа;аl :воагс. 197b/�.рава 13• ла дг А:тга 1, pagn 1б оЕ Co[oncchaa'а draft аатаl героп, 1974/75. �/ Ав ia hш:d-vzi:caa поге :кат сЬе ?resldaac of СSРС. _'/ ла аг .аЬЕе 3, psge 3% :i СасапсеЬад'а dzafc адшиl гароп 1976/73, Ьие vLCЪ ао вауlааеlоо. :tass зи tцlидв вддltlлеаl ^деровlев vlcb Ттеаsику' и va13 и concriЪu[1om го арвсlсiе _/ davelopnmc ртgгая. лс tta _псерс!дп 1а tЭд, Cacoacchad'а wpltal о: Сl1V ЬОО mLlliдa wa еиЬвстl4ад 43i'.� Салаsтс. 30i Ь9 Со[оvlгп, IT. Ъу CY11I, 31 Ъу CCrE пд 5i !7 [цае 1ои1 саlаlу EarвLp-awed baлka. The Р:ааlдпс of С8рС гарогсвд•cSai С.вд Fлд Iасгвваед 1са М1д1ад со i51 аа о! еагlу 1976 вад lataffiд га go fbrtheк, it 1д hага ивгтед [bat [Ьа l'ft!f holdlag wuld аас Ъа аRиlпд _`ог Che Ltxe Ъеlгц, б/ 9S оа С?N b00 ai112oa. 7/ ,и а£ pega 16 а! Cotoneeiad'а dratc агтиаl к•рагс, 1974/73. $/ Сосоа[еЬпд еасlмсее ,юас-га: pmfl[ ае 44АУ1Ьц mi111aa at в POD ргца о[ (9АТ 240/1с6- 'СЬа вltве[1и �аvагвав EVB ртlи вев СРА7 ц2/kg от. foc 11ас ааlи of 65,000 соаа, рове-!п 9/ pmiiea vare lаепваед Ъу сУАР 780 гц113w, со С!АР 2 793 ц111оп. Batlaacad роас-сп peoEie !кт Раке: s о! tLL eaЫe 1s tecaiaad Ъеп. _ СасопссЪад еsсlдагаа роас-сп pmf1C ас CFAP 1,i50 а1111аа ас а pRD рг1'е оЕ СУАР 265Пц. дС а'встдакд' laEL[1ад Еаесог аЕ 8L оа CFA! 252/kg, !Ьв ?Ob рНсе uerold Ьа С?А? 278/1cg ог, Еот 11ас аа2аа оЕ 70,000 coas ровс-[п ртгlСа voald he 1а¢ееаад Ъу СРАУ 2,710 ацllоа. 'басlтв[ед роа[-еп ptofl[ fra Раге А ot сЫв [аеlа ц cauiaad hara. �ОГ ле ае paga 13 о! Caecacehad'а dmfe ттиаl тероп, 1974175. �� Fovmбeт 1 - ОсосоЬат з1 � _ N ае Атих 4 f Спео¢есыд'а dmft агпсиl героп 1974/73. ti7! 3у dlEferaaee. 1�/ Iafeпed Стт Cotaa[сlид даса аь iollow: аррвгеас Ьаlпеео Еот 1971172 and 297х/7з lков toosollda[ed С9рС аад Coeonechad весатг: CFAl (3з9 + 185 + 96 + 16) � Вз4 а1111да but аирравед am�lsгlva Ъаlаасе еад 1972/7]: СРАр 282 цlliоа (paga 3з оЕ 1974/7S dzafL аштаl гgюп); the дцlекеап 1в Ф/V 552 afilloa vЬ1сЬ ia tЪа аррагеае 'вalf-ilaeaelag' cvacribut:oa со сЬс еосаl laveaCaeac pmgza¢, (IIAD AGIffCjijj'URE si-,WTOR ME.MORANDWI Table 1.3 Table 13: The Cotton ProductLytt-n=ajli- A pronches to the DIstrIbutlon of Costs and Beneflts rer ha Pýr .145,011n lin Total Producers Ptjbttc Total Producers Puh I te Sector Sector (Inna crAv) ------- --- (C FA F b III ton)---- 1976177: Gross Income 11 60.4 37.2 23.2 8.7 5.4 3.3 Less: Opportti-tty Cost of Productivity Cotton 2/ 23.5 14.5 9.0 3.4 2.1 1.3 Iiicremeåtal Output 36.9 22.7 114.2 5.3 3.3 2.0 Less: Input Cost 20.3 6.5 13.8 2.9 0.9 2.0 In.é'remýt,ttal Income 16.6 16.2 0. 18 2.4 2.4 - .Benefit: Cnst r atio 1.82:1 3.49.-1. 1~03:1. Iljus: FED Subsidy 3.6 0.5 Revised Incremental Income 4.0 0.5 I-ncreniental Income (excluding FED Subsl.dyy with: Ilypothests 1* (a) private benefit: cost ratio to producers of 2.5:1 and (b) producer price of CFAF 41.3/kg; whence (c) producers' contributlon to Input costs Increases to CrAF 9,100/Iia 3/ 1.6.6 13.6 3.0 2.4 2.0 0.4 2 (a) 2.0:1 and (b) 41. 3 wimice (e) ý 1.1,400/ha 4/ 1.6.6 11.3 5.3 2.4 1.6 0.8 3 (a) 2.5:1 and (b) 45 wlience (c) = 9,900/Iia 5/ 16.6 14.8 1.8 2 .4 2.2 0.2 (-0.4) 71 4 (a) 2.0:1 and (b) 45 wimuce (c) = 12,400/Iia 6 1.6.6 4.2 2.4 1.8 0.6 (-0.4) 7/ 5 (e) 6,500/Iia, (a) = 2.5:1 whence (b) -- 29.5/IKP, 16.6 9.8 6.8 2.4 1.4 1 . 0 0-1. 3) 71 1,1 900 kg/ha at MAX 67.ljkg prLce ni for "totaV' an,,! at MF 61.3 te producern. 21 350 k.Iiia, the yleld which. could be obtalne(1 wIthout Juiproved Inputs. With hypothests 1, the private beneftt: rost ratlo to producers who obtaln an yteld of 350 kg/ha, whIch Is it Hi. ntlrpi.i nF Yýr.iffr-al,illt-v fnr lite Pconomv ('1';il)I.e 9). woul(1 be 1.59:l. 4/ Reneftt: cost ratio at 350 kg/ha: 1.27:1 -ý/ Benefft: cost ratto at 350 kg/ha: 1.58:L Beneftt: cost ratio at 350 kg/ha: 1.21:1 Effvet of the producer price change oncotton output otlier than the Incremental productIon arlslug from tite productIvLty program. �,i �� р ПГ�.(� �т,.1Л � � ыi, � ^'Э �{ "• 3 1 "�b �.ni^й и,..^I,1I ^;1 ^'г',о r. r. ' �„� �. оо8 �,^ �..�.г, . �.. �iV .� �' ч��q о � �� . � .у � .i •-� г� � �' . , _., , . . , е � � <q к ,. ., у �. � а н�� �� � тi� ?'v .�� � � � t�Г� �" з �'� а � _`угV�; i иЧ. .ч .; °0�,. ."1�:1=7 �^ '" tЭti д1� .�о Р� �: а�Ф .��i�; .п�.�.-�I '°.и. 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