Namibia - Education And Training Sector Improvement Program (Etsip) and Support of ETSIP Project

 ICRR 14189 Report Number : ICRR14189 IEG ICR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. Project Data : Date Posted : 12/20/2012 Country : Namibia Is this Review for a Programmatic Series? Yes No How many operations were planned for the 2 series? How many were approved? 2 Series ID : S109333 First Project ID : P086875 Appraisal Actual Project Name : Education And US$M ): Project Costs (US$M): US$7.5 US$7.5 Training Sector Improvement Program - Etsip L/C Number : L7447 Loan/ US$M): Loan /Credit (US$M): US$7.5 US$7.5 Sector Board : Education US$M): Cofinancing (US$M ): Cofinanciers : Board Approval Date : 05/24/2007 Closing Date : 12/31/2008 12/31/2008 Sector (s): Secondary education (33%); General education sector (33%); Primary education (12%); Vocational training (11%); Tertiary education (11%) Theme (s): Education for all (33% - P); HIV/AIDS (17% - S); Education for the knowledge economy (17% - S); Improving labor markets (17% - S); Administrative and civil service reform (16% - S) Second Project ID :P109333 Appraisal Actual Project Name : Support Of Etsip 1 Dpl Project Costs (US$M): US$M ): US$7.5 US$7.5 2 L/C Number : L7596 Loan/ US$M): Loan /Credit (US$M): US$7.5 US$7.5 Sector Board : Education US$M ): Cofinancing (US$M): Board Approval Date : 11/18/2008 Cofinancers : Closing Date : 12/31/2009 06/30/2011 Sector (s): Vocational training (40%), Secondary education (40%), Tertiary education (10%), Primary education (5%), Adult literacy/non-formal education (5%) Theme (s): Education for the knowledge economy (50% - P), Education for all (50% - P) Evaluator : Panel Reviewer : ICR Review Group : Coordinator : Susan Ann Caceres Judyth L. Twigg Navin Girishankar IEGPS2 2. Project Objectives and Components: a. Objectives: There is no clear statement of objectives as outcomes expressed in the Program Document . The Program Summary notes that the Development Objective is : "the DPL1 supports: (1) the development of specific policies and policy instruments to guide and give effect to planned sector reforms; (2) legal instruments to enforce policy implementation; and (3) institutional capacities required for effective implementation of planned sector reform " (p. viii). b. If this is a single DPL operation (not part of a series), were the project objectives/ key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? No c. Policy Areas: The Program Description describes five policy areas and government actions under the Education and Training Sector Improvement Program (ETSIP), which is supported by multiple donors, as well as by this loan (Program Document, pp. 13-20). The policy areas point to outcomes, except for one (strengthening delivery capacity and the response to HIV/AIDS). The aims of the ETSIP include: (1) quality/effectiveness; (2) equity and access; (3) development relevant and responsiveness; (4) delivery capacity and management; and (5) efficiency of resource mobilization and utilization (Program Document, p. 30). The specific strategic objectives of the first phase of the program were: (1) strengthening the supply of middle to high level skilled labor, (2) improving the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of general education, (3) systematizing knowledge and innovation, (4) improving the effectiveness and relevance of the tertiary education system, and (5) strengthening the policy and legal framework for access to lifelong learning (Program Document p. 30). The same objectives were also noted in the second Government letter of Development Policy (Program Document p. 36). (1) Equitable expansion of access to post -basic education and training The education and training system fails to supply the middle - to high-level skilled labor required to meet current labor market demands. The government actions were to include : expanding access to post -basic education and training; using existing resources more efficiently by increasing the student -teacher ratio at the secondary level to 35:1; creating six magnet secondary schools in the poorest regions to boost output of graduates in science, mathematics, and information/communication technology; and construction of new vocational -technical centers. (2) Improving education quality and effectiveness as manifest in student learning The government was to take specific actions to improve quality at all levels of the system (early childhood development, general, vocational, and tertiary education, and training ). (3) Eradicating inequalities in the distribution of resource inputs The government was to take specific actions to eradicate inequalities in access to pre -primary education, establish input norms across schools, introduce per capita financing for general education, create a quota system to enable children from disadvantaged areas to gain entry to grade 11, and conditional grants for schools to ensure successful participation and graduation of orphans and vulnerable children . (4) Improving efficiency in resource mobilization and utilization Government actions were to include an automatic promotion policy, measures to reduce the grade 10 push-out rate, increasing the student -teacher ratio, de-linking of teacher salary increments from irrelevant qualifications, and restructuring the pace of teacher salary increments, since the sources of inefficiency are repetition rates, unmanaged teacher salaries, and under -utilization of teachers. (5) Strengthening delivery capacity and the response to HIV /AIDS Government actions were to include the articulation of policies and legal and institutional frameworks to underpin the implementation of reforms, division of labor /responsibility across areas, and restructuring of the Ministry . Management capacity was to be strengthened though training . d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates: Project Cost : The total program cost was estimated to be US$ 488 million, of which IBRD provided US$15 million for the two DPLs (ICR, p. 2). Financing : This loan was delivered through two single -tranche DPLs of US$7.5 million each, for a total of US$15 million. The Bank was one of 13 development partners financing the overall education sector program . Borrower Contribution : Since this was a DPL, financing went to the Borrower's budget . Dates : The first DPL was approved on May 24, 2007 and became effective on December 20, 2007. The second DPL was approved on November 18, 2008 and became effective on December 16, 2010. A 23-month delay in the signing of the second loan agreement was due to Government concerns about the negative pledge clause (a standard part of IBRD loan agreements ), and legal and procurement issues (ICR, pp. 4-5). Because of this delay, the operation closed June 30, 2011, eighteen months later than anticipated . 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design: a. Relevance of Objectives: Objectives : Substantial Program objectives supported by the two DPLs were and continue to be substantially relevant to Namibia's education sector and economic development needs to address the country's shortage of skilled workers, improve learning outcomes, improve efficiency in use of available resources, and strengthen capacity to implement reform. As noted by the most recent Interim Strategy Note (FY08-09), which examined Namibia's national development policy agenda, Vision 2030, education and skills training were key areas of engagement for the Bank. This Note also suggests that key challenges for Namibia were creating jobs and producing the skills required to meet the needs of the growing service and manufacturing sectors (p. 7). Analytic work undertaken by the Bank diagnosed the shortcomings within the education and training sector . This DPL's objectives were substantially relevant to the attainment of national priorities outlined in Vision 2030 and the Education and Training Sector Improvement Program, and the Ministry of Education's Strategic plan . In the region's response to IEG's draft review, the region indicated that the Government has launched its National Development Plan, where education is one of the five key enablers for economic growth . b. Relevance of Design: Design : Modest The policy areas supported by this loan were : (1) equitable expansion of access to post -basic education and training, (2) improving education quality and effectiveness as manifest in student learning, (3) eradicating inequalities in the distribution of resource inputs, (4) improving efficiency in resource mobilization and utilization, and (5) strengthening delivery capacity and the response to HIV /AIDS (Program Document pp. 12-19). They were appropriate to the sector's needs; however, there were several design weaknesses . First, there was no discussion or assessment of the macro framework in the program document or Policy Matrix, as suggested by OPCS Good Practice Guidelines. Second, the scope was broadly focused and involved too many subsectors, given that this was the Government's first IBRD DPL a more focused design was warranted . Third, there was a logical link between most of the Government activities and policy areas, but the link was unclear with the Government activities and actions related to strengthening delivery capacity and response to HIV /AIDS. Fourth, during the time period of the program, it was not reasonable to expect attainment of many of the results in the DPL policy matrix, since it would likely take more time than the course of this loan . 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy): The Bank was one of 13 Development Partners supporting Namibia's education sector program (ICR, p. 13). The ICR did not report whether a stable macro economic framework was maintained . The ICR reported output and outcome indicators in relation to the policy areas, rather than the three policy objectives . This review organizes the indicators according to the policy areas under the respective objectives . Development of specific policies and policy instruments to guide planned sector reform : Modest Outputs related to equitable expansion of access to post -basic education and training : A quota system for distributing grade 11 places for students from low income families has been applied . A quota system was piloted in 2008 that provides subsidies to private schools that have at least 10% of total enrollment as orphans and vulnerable children . ICR indicates that there is no systematic monitoring of this program (p. 8). A plan to establish conditional grants for orphans and vulnerable children was approved and rules were issued in 2008. Outputs related to improving education quality and effectiveness as manifested in student learning : A policy for standardized assessment tests was established for grades 5 and 7, with a specific division under the Directorate of National Assessment responsible for the assessment . A revised curriculum at the pre-primary, primary, and secondary levels to define competencies was developed and approved by the National Examination Assessment Certification Board . An information/communication technology policy was established . A policy for early childhood education was approved by the cabinet in March 2008.  An early childhood development curriculum was established . An education conference was held in June 2011 to provide inputs into the national education policy, however, the overall national education policy has not been revised . Outputs related to eradicating inequality in the distribution of resource inputs : A teacher incentive system was established and implemented in FY 2010/2011 to attract teachers to rural areas. The ICR (p. 17) indicates that there are proposals in place for a per capita funding system, but no agreement has been reached. In the region's response to IEG's draft review, the region indicated that a new system of zero-based budgeting and new per capita funding formula has been introduced . Introduction of a policy on per capita funding for primary and secondary schools was a prior condition for the first tranche (Program Document p. 16), which the ICR (p. 7) reported was completed in September 2008. Outputs related to improving efficiency in resource mobilization and utilization : A school register of needs is being established to monitor school inputs; however, the ICR (p. 10) reports that this program has been stalled for some time . Teachers salary scales were restructured in 2006 as part of re-grading teachers. Outputs related to strengthening Ministry capacity and response to HIV /AIDS: A sector policy for HIV/AIDs was developed by Cabinet Decision No . 13th/20.05.03/002. Outcomes noted in the ICR are reported in the implementation objective, given the overlap that is found between that objective and the objective of policy instruments to guide planned sector , so that reporting is not duplicative . Legal instruments to enforce policy implementation : Modest Outputs related to equitable expansion of access to post -basic education and training : The Vocational Training Act became operational in 2008 and established the National Training Authority . The ICR (p. 12) states, that "the evolution and establishment of operational structures of these agencies took more time than anticipated and has not jump -started the process of change and rapid progress ." It took almost three years to appoint the Chief Executive Office of the National Training Authority, and the agency is understaffed. An Act established the National Council for Higher Education . Outputs related to improving education quality and effectiveness as manifested in student learning : A cabinet resolution transferred responsibility for pre -primary education to the Ministry of Education . Outputs related to eradicating inequality in the distribution of resource inputs : None Outputs related to improving efficiency in resource mobilization and utilization : Teacher Training Colleges were merged into the University of Namibia by Cabinet Decision in 2010. The ICR did not report any legal instruments related to strengthening Ministry capacity and response to HIV/AIDS, nor outcomes of the legal instruments for the policy areas . Institutional capacities required for effective implementation of planned sector reform : Modest Outputs related to equitable expansion of access to post -basic education and training : A plan was adopted to increase enrollment in senior secondary education and training . A fund to promote research in science and technology was established . Regulations are ready but still need Cabinet approval. Increased enrollment in pre-entry mathematics by 106 students, physical sciences 105 students, biology 105 students, information/communication technology 114 students, and English 106 students, which exceeded each respective target of 50 students. 100 new post-basic classrooms were constructed . One new secondary school was constructed (out of the planned six). In the region's response to IEG's draft review, the region indicated that the idea of the magnet school concept was delayed to determine its feasibility. Competency-based education and training was introduced in the Vocational Training Centers .  Education Management Information System modules were developed for vocational education and training . Outputs related to improving education quality and effectiveness as manifested in student learning : An unit for national assessment for Grades 5 and 7 was established within the Directorate of National Examinations and Assessment. Information/communication technology equipment was provided to 245 schools, 5 vocational training centers, 4 colleges, 23 Teacher Resource Centers, 29 libraries and community centers, and 13 Community Skills Development Centers. Outputs related to eradicating inequality in the distribution of resource inputs : Construction was started on 100 pre-primary classrooms in under privileged areas . In the region's response to IEG's draft review, the region indicated that the number of 5 and 6 year old children enrolled in pre-primary education who are orphaned and vulnerable increased from 1,127 in 2008 to 5,066 in 2011. From this information, the proportionate increase of all 5 and 6 year old children who are orphaned and vulnerable and enrolled in pre-primary is not clear. In the region's response to IEG's draft review, the region indicated in 2011 50% or more of orphan and vulnerable children had access to school feeding programs in 65.7% of schools, which increased from 25.8% of schools in 2008. In the region's response to IEG's draft review, the region indicated that in the four regions with the lowest share of qualified teachers, the share of qualified teachers increased from 65.7% in 2008 to 73.6% in 2011. Outputs related to strengthening Ministry capacity and response to HIV /AIDS: An HIV/AIDS Management Unit was created in the Ministry . Procurement staff were trained, but the ICR (p. 19) indicates that the Procurement Unit is not operational due to staffing and leadership problems . Planned financial management training did not take place . The planned leadership training for management staff was not done . According to the ICR (p. 12), the lack of successful implementation of these planned capacity development programs "had negative consequences on the overall performance of the program." Outcomes related to equitable expansion of access to post -basic education and training : 60% of new senior secondary education and training places were created in the poorest regions, which met the target (60%). However, the ICR reports that it was not able to verify this figure, since the Ministry does not track student places by level of education (ICR, p. vii). 15.7% increase in the grade 11 intake in 2011, which exceeded the target of 7%. 55.7% increase in vocational and education intake in 2011, which exceeded the target of 14%. Grade 10 push-out rate decreased from 47% in 2005 to 32.6% in 2011, which nearly met the target of 30%. Outcomes related to improving education quality and effectiveness as manifested in student learning : 16.9% of children entered primary education with an adequate level of readiness for grade one in 2011, which did not meet the target of 20%. In the region's response to IEG's draft review, the region indicated that in 2010 89.5% of pre-primary children achieved the school readiness level, and remained at that level (89.8 percent) during the next period of measurement . 42.5% of learners who complete lower primary have acquired core skills and competencies in 2011, which exceeded the target of 35%. The ICR (p. 30) indicates that this was measured as the number of students passing the grade 5 national assessment. In the region's response to IEG's draft review, the region indicated that 43% of Grade 5 students achieved basic competency in mathematics and 46% achieved the basic competency in English in Grade 5 in 2011. The region did not report the percentage of students attaining the highest level of competency . There was a 48 point increase in the national average Southern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality (SACMEQ) reading score (from 449 in 2000 to 497 in 2011). No target was established. There was a 42 point increase in the national average SACMEQ mathematics score (from 431 in 2000 to 473 in 2011). No target was established. Outcomes related to improving efficiency in resource mobilization and utilization : Grade 1 repetition rate increased from 19.6% in 2005 to 20.2% in 2011, which did not meet the target of 16%. There is no evidence that this increase was due to changes in standards for movement to the next grade . Grade 5 repetition rate remained steady from 22.1% in 2005 to 22.3% in 2011, which did not meet the target of 20%. In the region's response to IEG's draft review, the region indicated that the average dropout rate in Grade 5 reduced from 5.2% in 2008 to 3.3% in 2010. Grade 8 repetition rate increased from 23.1% in 2005 to 26.4% in 2011, which did not meet the target of 19%. Average basic education repetition rate remained steady at 15.5% in 2005 and 15.4% in 2011, which met the target of 15%.  Primary student-teacher ratio decreased from 31:1 in 2005 to 29:1, which did not meet the target of 33:1 Secondary student-teacher ratio decreased from 25:1 in 2005 to 24:1 in 2011, which did not meet the target of 28:1. Primary teachers' salaries as a percentage of the recurrent budget decreased from 95% in 2005, to 88.4% in 2011, but did not attain the target of 85%. This was designed to increase the share of budget devoted to books and instructional materials, relative to salaries . 1.3% of the 2011 budget was allocated for books and instructional materials at the primary level, which did not meet the target of 5%. Secondary teachers' salaries as a percentage of the recurrent budget decreased from 92% in 2005 to 89.7% in 2011, but did not attain the target of 85%. This was designed to increase the share of budget devoted to books and instructional materials, relative to salaries . 3.1% of the 2011 budget was allocated for books and instructional materials at the secondary level, which did not meet the target of 5%. The ICR did not report any outputs related to improving efficiency in resource mobilization and utilization, nor outcomes relate to eradicating inequality in the distribution of resource inputs and strengthening Ministry capacity and response to HIV /AIDS. Overall, the ICR (p. 19) acknowledges that limited progress was made in relation to capacity building, but it provides a favorable assessment of the overall achievement of the loan, stating that 65 out of 78 (83%) of the main activities supported under the DPLs were completed (ICR p. 20). The ICR does not provide information on a large number of the performance targets noted in the Program Document; thus, limited overall progress is apparent, which is consistent with the statement from another Development Partner "that the report [ICR] is too positive with regard to equity objectives and achievements, since many systems are still not in place to prompt a more equitable delivery of quality education " (ICR, p. 50). 5. Efficiency (not applicable to DPLs): 6. Outcome: Relevance of objectives was substantial, as the program's objectives are directly aligned with the Bank's country strategy and with Namibia's education sector and economic development needs, while relevance of design is modest. All three of the objectives were rated as modest . There is no indication that policy reforms, instruments, legal reforms, and institutional capacities have resulted in effective sector reform and no indication that institutional changes in the Ministry have produced meaningful results . a. Outcome Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating: While the government has exhibited commitment to improving the education sector as a means of increasing economic growth, there are some moderate risks to the development outcome . Many of the program's actions are still not fully embedded with the Ministry . There is a lack of education planning knowledge and proper monitoring and evaluation practices in the Ministry . There are still inequities in resource distribution to regions . However, according to the ICR (p. 22), the Ministry acknowledges these shortcomings and it is willing to address them. a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Moderate 8. Assessment of Bank Performance: a. Quality at entry: The Bank conducted analytic work on the education sector to identify weaknesses and necessary steps to improve competitiveness. There was analysis of the fiduciary system for delivering direct budget support, but there was no assessment of the political economy factors likely to impact the proposed reform efforts . The Bank played a pivotal role in mobilizing other development partners to contribute resources toward strengthening the quality of the education and training system . During preparation, Bank staff were able to engage the government and resolve areas of disagreement related to program content . The ICR (pp. 23-24) suggests that the policy dialogue was not sufficiently robust at entry among the various Ministries, contributing to problems later in the loan and delaying signing of the second loan . The time period that it  would take the government to implement the policy reform and achieve anticipated outcomes was underestimated. A Quality Enhancement Review was held at the design stage (January 2007) and confirmed the appropriateness of the instrument for this program . Assessment of the macroeconomic and credit risk suggested that the conditions were sufficiently robust to utilize a DPL . Country ownership of the reform was evident. A programmatic approach was used, since the loan covered all subsectors of education from early childhood development through tertiary education, as well as training . Namibia had no prior experience with the IBRD, as this was its first IBRD loan, and so a focused DPL program design would have been warranted . The Policy Matrix was designed with twenty output indicators linked to the supported policy actions (Program Document, pp. 41-44). For most indicators, baseline data were provided, and targets were established for three points in time over the course of the two DPLs . However, indicators related to strengthening delivery capacity and the response to HIV /AIDS specified conditions/inputs that had already been satisfied at baseline. Given the short duration of a DPL, many of the indicators for the other policy areas (access, education quality, inequality, and efficiency ) may not have been attainable . There were shortcomings in the program document . There was no clear statement of objectives and no assessment of the macroeconomic framework . Eleven prior actions were included . There were inconsistencies between prior actions noted in the loan agreement and program document . at -Entry Rating : Quality -at- Moderately Unsatisfactory b. Quality of supervision: Given that this was Namibia's first IBRD loan, more staff time and effort was needed to establish an effective working relationship with the client . More analytic work was needed to provide a road map for implementation, but this work was not conducted . The program document for the second tranche lacked assessment of the macro economic framework . Because the country did not understand Bank procedures, misunderstandings arose that Bank staff were not able to resolve . There was insufficient follow-up on identified problems, including the need for more technical support and training for the Ministry . There was an insufficient number of in-country missions, and no permanent Bank staff on the ground, but there were staff located in South Africa. Both loans became effective even though all prior actions were not completed (ICR, p. 7), which does not conform with OPCS guidelines . Supervision of monitoring and evaluation was not adequate (see Section 10). Quality of Supervision Rating : Unsatisfactory Overall Bank Performance Rating : Unsatisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance: a. Government Performance: The government focused on education and skills development as a means for improving competitiveness and economic growth, as identified in the government's Vision 2030. To realize these efforts, the government aimed to strengthen the country's education and training system through a 15-year Strategic Plan (Education and Training Sector Improvement Program ) to address a shortage of skilled workers . The government exhibited high political will during the first loan, as evidenced by the number of polices and legal instruments signed or approved without much delay . However, there were several shortcomings in government performance . There was significant delay in signing the second DPL, which adversely affected disbursements and implementation . Nearly all prior actions and triggers were completed, but not all . There was less progress in the early childhood development area than planned because of lack of consensus on what constitutes a Holistic Index of Child Development .  There has also been lack of progress in development of the school register, implementation of per capita funding, and revision of the vocational education and training funding formula, as well as capacity development activities. There were delays in the construction of magnet (Vision) schools and Community Skills Development Centers. Other factors identified by the ICR (pp. 13-14) that negatively impacted performance were frequent changes in management and coordination of the program, as well as the lack of a structured monitoring and evaluation system ). Data on many indicators specified in the Policy Matrix were not collected (see Section 10). Government Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance: The Government was the implementing agency, and so the above discussion and rating also apply here . Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization: a. M&E Design: The Policy Matrix included output /outcome indicators, as well as baseline data . There was a large number of indicators, and some of them were not ones typically collected by the education sector . There were weaknesses in the plan for how the various sub units with the Ministry were to coordinate and supervise monitoring and evaluation functions. No structure existed at the regional level . b. M&E Implementation: As a result of the lack of formal structure, monitoring and evaluation activities were disregarded and implemented. Data on certain indicators required by sub -programs were not monitored, or indicators were not established. This major shortcoming severely impacted the ability to assess progress . After some indicators were selected, the Ministry realized that data could not be collected and so "no government official was able to provide information on [many of] the specific indicators." (ICR, p. 16). c. M&E Utilization: Data utilization was low because of the lack of monitoring and evaluation structure within the Ministry and regional levels. M&E Quality Rating : Negligible 11. Other Issues a. Safeguards: b. Fiduciary Compliance: The ICR reports that the fiduciary requirements were met satisfactorily (p. 26). However, the ICR (p. 42) also reports that procurement within the Ministry is done haphazardly, with procurement plans no longer developed and a planned procurement unit never made functional due to staffing and leadership problems . Similarly, planned training in financial management did not take place (ICR, p. 12), negatively impacting program implementation. c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative): None reported. d. Other: 12. 12. Ratings : ICR IEG Review Reason for Disagreement /Comments Outcome : Moderately Moderately Relevance of objective was substantial, Satisfactory Unsatisfactory while design was rated modest. All three of the objectives had modest efficacy. There is no indication that policy reforms, instruments, legal reforms, and institutional capacities have resulted in effective sector reform and no indication that institutional changes in the Ministry have produced meaningful results. Risk to Development Moderate Moderate Outcome : Bank Performance : Moderately Unsatisfactory There were major shortcomings in the Unsatisfactory Bank's performance both at entry and during supervision, which contributed to weak implementation. There was insufficient analysis of macroeconomic framework, political economy factors, inadequate attention to monitoring and evaluation, and insufficient in -country supervision and follow-up on identified problems. Borrower Performance : Moderately Moderately While the Borrower was committed to Satisfactory Unsatisfactory the reform, there were significant shortcomings that impacted the attainment of the objectives. Key activities were not implemented, and capacity development was weak . Data were not collected on many indicators, making assessment of progress problematic. Quality of ICR : Satisfactory NOTES: NOTES - When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. - The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons: IEG concurs with the ICR (pp. 26-27) on the following lessons, which are particularly relevant for other countries with little or no prior experience with the Bank : Less complex design and activities should be planned for a country with little or no prior experience with the Bank. This loan was ambitious, covering all subsectors in education, and put a strain on the Ministry's implementation capacity. It would have been more prudent to begin with a less complex operation,  establishing a successful foundation that subsequent efforts could build upon . More time should be allocated to preparation /appraisal when a country has little or no experience with the Bank. This would permit the gathering of stakeholder understanding and agreement and also permit the Bank to establish a greater presence in the country and foster a relationship that can minimize misunderstandings. This also would allow for greater assessment of government implementation capacity prior to project execution. More support must be provided by Bank staff in countries with little or no experience with the Bank . 14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No 15. Comments on Quality of ICR: The ICR is clear, concise, and evidence -based, and it provides a candid assessment of Bank performance and shortcomings. The discussion of efficacy lacks data on many of the program's established indicators, which may be due to shortcomings in monitoring and evaluation . The ICR did not report whether a stable macro framework was maintained. a.Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory