Toward greater food security for India : an overview of issues and prospects

Discussion Draft sJ!i'tX3l'4;lll'sii-W tAGP-10 TOWARD GREATER FOOD SECURITY FOR INDIA An Overview of Issues and Prospects Country Case Study Report prepared as part of the Food Security Policy Work Program ACREP Division Working Paper No. 10 Prepared by: Economics and Policy Division Agriculture and Rural Development Department December 1977  TOWARD GREATER FOOD SECURITY FOR INDIA An Overview of Issues and Prospects Table of Contents Page No. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ..................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1 II. BACKGROUND ................................................. 2 Food Production: Facts ................................. 4 Foodgrains: Policy ..................................... 5 .Foodgrains: Politics ................................... 6 III. METHODOLOGY ................................................. 7 IV. RESULTS . ................................................... 10 Impact of Price and Distributional Changes on Calorie Consumption ........................................... 10 Impact on the Size of the Malnourished Population ........ 12 Consumption Deficit and Total Food Needs .... ............ 13 Projection of Total Food Needs and Total Production ............................................ 14 V. THE MAIN ISSUES ............................................ 15 The Issues from the Results ............ .. ............... 16 The Policy Issues ................... .................... 16 Equity through Price Changes: Consumption .... .......... 17 Equity through Price Changes: Production .... ........... 19 Administration and Politics ............ .. ............... 22  LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title 1 Land Utilization Statistics, India 2 Area Irrigated by Crop 3 Total Foodgrains Production, Imports 1954-76 4 Protein and Calorie Content per kg of Food Items, India 5 Average Per Capita Expenditure and Calorie Consumption, 1972 6 Aggregate Supply Data and Household Expenditure Survey, Calorie Consumption Comparison 1972 7 Human Energy Requirements in Calories, India 1972, 1985, 1995 8 Calorie/Cereal Income/Expenditure Relation, India 9 Price Change Effects on Calorie Consumption (1985,1995) 10 Income Distribution Change Effect on Calorie Consumption (1985, 1995) 11 Malnourished Population (1985, 1995) 12 Nutritional Gap in Grain Equivalents (1985, 1995) 13 Changes in Total Food Needs and Food Demand (1985, 1995) 14 Total Food Needs and Production 15 Total Food Needs, Food Demand and Production Projections  LIST OF CRAPHS 1 Price Change Effects on Calorie Consumption, 1985 2 Price Change Effects on Calorie Consumption, 1995 3 Income Distribution Effect on Calorie Consumption, 1985 4 Income Distribution Effect on Calorie Consumption, 1995 5 Malnourished Population 1985 - Low Growth 6 Malnourished Population 1985 - High Growth 7 Malnourished Population 1995 - Low Growth 8. Malnourished Population 1995 - High Growth 9 Nutritional Gap in Grain Equivalents, 1985 - Low Growth 10 Nutritional Gap in Grain Equivalents, 1995 - Low Growth 11 Nutritional Gap in Grain Equivalents, 1985 - High Growth 12 Nutritional Gap in Grain Equivalents, 1995 - High Growth 13 Food Needs and Food Demanded, 1985 14 Food Needs and Food Demanded, 1995 15 Total Food Needs, Food Demanded and Production Projections 1985, 1995  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION i. Using the 1971-72 Household Expenditure Survey for India and a population-weighted calorie requirement level established by FAO/WHO, more than 60 percent of India's population was identified as consuming below the minimum. This deficit in calorie intake translates into a nutritional gap (or the difference between total food needs in terms of calorie sufficiency for the malnourished population and food demand interpreted as market demand) of the order of 9 million metric tons, or approximately 9 percent of total foodgrain production for India that year. Projections to 1985 and 1995 under varying assumptions of income growth rates, changes in income distri- bution and price changes reveal a rather low sensitivity of the size of the deficit population to changes in the income distribution. Under assumed constant prices for foodgrains, the proportion of the malnourished population is reduced to 30-34 percent in 1985 and 14-18 percent in 1995 under the assumption of a high (3.0 percent) and low (2.5 percent) per capita income growth rates. This, in turn, implies a nutritional gap of 8-10 million tons by 1985 and 4-6 million tons by 1995. This generates a total food need, if prices are indeed going to remain stable, of nearly 190 million tons by 1985 and about 245 million tons by 1995. In contrast, a price decline (of 50 percent) for foodgrains, with no change in income distribution, results in a fall in the malnourished population of 9-11 percent, depending on growth rates, by 1985 and only 4-6 percent by 1995. ii. If the long-run annual growth rate of foodgrains pr'oduction of 2.5 percent is assumed to continue into the future, this would indicate a domestic availability of about 157 million and 199 million tons by 1985 and 1995 respectively. A food needs gap of 31-33 million tons would thus prevail by 1985 and 43-50 million by 1995, assuming no price or distributional changes. This  amounts to about 20 percent of domestic production projected for 1985 and about 23 percent by 1995. iii. Given these projected food deficits in 1985 and 1995 two issues become important. The first is India's ability to meet the overall food deficit through increased production and/or imports. Increasing production distinctly above the trend growth rate is a difficult but not an impossible task. Indian agricultural production has been known for its wide fluctuation, and increasing output towards self sufficiency, which has long been a goal of Indian policy, is a reasonable objective. Depending on the choice of periods, Indian agri- culture can be shown to have grown at a rate higher than that now required to attain self-sufficiency. In addition food requirements could also be met partly through imports which have averaged around 4 percent of annual con- sumption with a very wide range. The approach to increase foodgrain supply, adopted by the present government and supported by the Bank, through investments to increase irrigation, the use of fertilizers, to improve the agricultural credit system and to foster state-level institutional development appear to be steps in the right direction. iv. The second question relates to the more difficult task of attacking the nutrition problem among the poor. In this, despite inefficiencies, the subsidized distribution of foodgrains to target groups, particularly in the rural areas, still remains a useful approach. A suggestion to strengthen institutions, particularly the establishment of a unified management for overall food policy in the country seems the most useful one to offer given the difficulties of making price policy which affects a wide range of producer and consumer interests.  I. INTRODUCTION "God td Adam: In the sweat of thy brow shall thou eat bread" 1.1 Providential dictum notwithstanding, the concern over food, particularly India's, has a historical legacy that sets it apart from the rest of the developing world.-/ The sheer magnitude of the food problem--a population of over 600 million growing at an annual rate of 2.3%-- sets it in a class all by itself. Periodic crises of the past have been weathered but at a considerable price of human suffering. The prospects for the future however require a serious assessment and careful policy actions if crises are to be avoided and/or minimized. 1.2 The approach undertaken in this exercise is essentially an eclectic one. It attempts to thread together elements of income growth and distribution to projecta picture of the food situation in 1985 and 1995. The projection of 1/ Famines of varying intensities have plagued India throughout history. Major famines from the earliest 19th century would include: Date 1803-04 Place Estimated Deaths Western India Thousands 1837-38 Northwest India 800,000 1861 India N.A. 1866 India, Bengal, Orissa 1,500,000 1868 India, Rajpitana, Northwest and Central India, Punjab 33% of total in and Bombay population Rajpitana 1874 India N.A. 1876-78 India 5,000,000 1896-97 India 5,0C0,000 1899-1900 India 1,250,000 1943-1944 India, Bengal 1,500,000 1964 India N.A. Source: Clifton B. Luthell, "Food and Population: A Long View", Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (May 1976).  demand and total food needs is viewed against estimates of production or supply availability. These comparisons permit us to explore the implications of alternative economic and social policies on what has been identified as food security. The first of these constructs is the domestic food gap i.e., the deficit between what is domestically available (aggregate production) and total food needs or what is required in addition to market demand to eliminate calorie deficits among the malnourished segment of the population. It is this gap when taken against estimates of import availability that is referred to when discussing food security. The second construct is that of the nutritional gap which is the difference between total food needs and market demand. The nutritional gap is interpreted in terms of grain equivalents and related to the malnourished population (people consuming below a required minimum calorie intake). The study recognizes the difficulty and danger in viewing India's food sector as a monolithic structure. However, the analysis is indicative of the extent and nature of the problem. II. BACKGROUND 2.1 The broad aggregative figures of agriculture in India serve primarily to indicate its sheer size. The average gross cropped area for 1967/68 was about 164 million hectares. The substance, however, lies in regional variations and in the policies that generate the development of this sector. Although agriculture's share of net domestic product (measured in 1960-61 prices) has declined from 49% in 1960-61 to 40% in 1975-76, it remains by far the most important sector, being nearly two and a half times larger than industry in 1975-76. Aggre-gate estimates of the rate of growth of agriculture in India are not particularly useful. There is no unique "correct" way of estimating the growth rate; one could,with equal statistical propriety, fit a different curve  -3- with somewhat different results.-/ It is possible to conclude that, despite individual bad years, on the average agricultural growth has "kept up" with population growth (of about 2.3%). While the sources of growth of this sector have changed over time, the overall growth rate of agricultural production has not accelerated. In fact, despite technological change, the growth rate in the 1960s slowed from the level attained in the 1950s.-/ 2.2 As outlined in Tables 1 and 2, in 1967/68 India had a total gross area of 163.7 million ha, of which 33.2 million ha were irrigated. Increases in gross cropped area (the total of net sown and double cropped) only averaged 1.1 million hectares per year over the ten-year period 1960-70 and in the latter part of the period came more from increases in area double cropped than in the net sown area (64% vs. 36%). India was among the largest beneficiaries of the "green revolution". The success story was primarily, though by no means entirely, wheat. Between 1964/65 and 1971/72 the growth rate of wheat production was 11% and that of yield per acre 7.5%. This meant a crop of 26 million tons in 1971/72 or more than double that of 1964165. Yet perhaps the most significant part of the recent technological developments in agriculture is the farmers' willingness to invest and take risks, and, in the use of modern inputs. Ferti- lizer consumption (N+P+K20) increased from 300,000 tons in 1961 to 2.8 million 1/ It was possible, for instance, in 1974 to claim that the real trend had a declining annual growth rate at the end of 25 years. The 1974/75 fall in production continued that trend, yet the two succeeding years with its in- creases in agricultural production will have disputed that view. As indicative however, A.K. Dey in "Rate of Growth (of) Agriculture and Industry", Economic and Political Weekly, Review of Agriculture, June 1975, arrives at a figure of 2.6% over the period 1949/50 - 1973/74. 2/ C.H. Hanumantha Rao, Technological Change and Distribution of Gains in Indian Agriculture (Delhi: Macmillan and Company of India, Ltd, 1975) p. 3-4.  -4- tons in 1972/73; electric and diesel pump sets from 420,000 to 2.1 million; tubewells from 19,000 to 718,000; tractors from 31,000 to 173,000 and the area under improved varieties from 2 to 23 million ha. These developments were carried out (according to the 17th Round of the National Samply Survey) by an estimated 72.5 million rural households, 12% of which had no land at all (or less than a fraction of an acre) and nearly one-third owning land that was less than one acre. Food Production: Facts 2.3 Foodgrains, particularly rice and wheat, dominate India:s agricultural sector, occupying three quarters of the cultivated land area. Agricultural development policy has largely focused on foodgrain production. Additions to irrigated areas in the ten years up to 1960/61 showed 70% going to foodgrains; in the next ten years this percentage increased to 81%. Total foodgrain production grew at 2.3% annually from 1953/54 to 1975/76. The rate of increase was significantly higher in the more recent sub-period (1964/65 to 1975/76) at 2.8%, than from 1953/54 to 1964/65 at 1.9%.-/ The rate of increase in foodgrains area has remained the same while the rate of increase in yield has been some-- what higher in the recent period. This subsumes the more than doubling of the growth in wheat yield between 1964/65 - 1975/76 and 1953/54 - 1964/65. Table 3, shows the total production and consumption of foodgrains in India. 2.4 A disaggregation of the increased foodgrain production into its component 2/ units- indicates the acreage of unirrigated land (46%) as the primary source of production growth over the period 1949/50 to 1956/57. It remained a significant source from 1956/57 to 1960/61 (20%) and then receded to insignificance in later 1/ The base and terminal years of the two periods were chosen because they were all similar, good weather years, thus allowing a better comparison of the trend. 2/ John W. Mellor, 'Food and Rural Poverty - Some Observations with Respect to India and South Asia' (mimeo), January 31, 1976, pp. 8-11.  -5- periods. Irrigated acreage increased in importance (accounting for 29% of production growth) during the period 1964/65 to 1970/714then declined somewhat in 1970/71 - 1973/74. Fertilizer production also accounted for a significant increase in the growth (38% in the 1960/61 to 1964/65 period and 59% from 1964/65 to 1970/71). Foodgrains: Policy 2.5 Foodgrain policy, in its impact either on producers or consumers through the price of grain and the terms on which it changes hands, touches the lives of most of India's population everday. Yet, bred by famine traditions and prompted by recurrent droughts and scarcities, this policy reflects a patchwork of ad hoc expedients as new crises evoked newer stop-gap measures. The result has been an array of food policy instruments, including food zones, price controls, requisitioning and levees, support prices, below-market procure- ment prices, ventures into monopoly procurement, retail subsidies and rationing.-/ The system has been used mainly to handle the short term events of tight food supplies, famines and price rises and, on rare occasions, gluts and falling prices. It has not been a system to implement a comprehensive agricultural price policy against a background of high income and price elasticities of demand and low price elasticities of supply. The aggregation of these measures has provided inadequate stimulus to agricultural production, especially in the early 1960s and again in the 1970s. 2.6 The government's involvement in grain procurement and distribution grew rapidly from the mid 1950s to the present. From 1957 to 1968 grain issues, domestic procurement and imports on government account mounted steadily. By 1966 imports reached 10% of domestic production and 50% of issues. During the 1960s a large portion of imports were arranged on highly concessional terms. 1/ John P. Lewis, "Rethinking Indian Food Policy", (mimeo), March 1976.  -6- From 1968 to 1972 a jump in grain production resulted in declining imports, increases in procurement and issues lower than the peak in 1965-68. Production during the three years, 1972/73-1974/75, failed to exceed the 1971/72 peak. Domestic procurement fell below targets; demand for publicly-distributed grain rose; and the need to import sizeable quantities reappeared. Ironically, increased import requirements came during a period when world market prices for wheat and rice reached record high levels. Easy terms for imports were hard to arrange and India's balance of payments were under considerable strain because, among other reasons, of the rapid rise in petroleum and fertilizer prices. Good weather in 1975/76 and 1976/77 contributed to the two largest harvests on records, causing a decline in foodgrain prices, record procurement and curtailment of imports. The wheat and rice policies announced by the new government in 1977 abolished the. restrictions on grain movements and urged the States to eliminate levies as a means of procurement. Foodgrains: Politics-/ 2.7 Foodgrain policy is largely a reconciliation of confliciting interests of producers and consumers. On the governmental,level conflicting interest arise between the Center and States and among States. The Center's concerns are to maintain control of the food situation -- relieving conditions of open malnutrition, increasing procurement from surplus States, limiting demands from deficit States, limiting the use of public funds to finance the system and softening the impact of grain imports on the balance of payments. The Center is in the position of trying to influence States to overcome narrow State interests and to cooperate by taking a national view. States generally want to control their own food supplies. In times of overall scarcity, when prices are high, States usually 1/ John Wall, "Foodgrain Management: Pricing,Procurement, Distribution, Import and Storage Policy", Issues Paper, S. Asia Programs (November 1977).  -7- are more worried about consumers than producers. States with surplus. production try to limit exports while deficit States want to increase imports. Whatever the supply situation, surplus States usually argue for higher procure- ment prices. As the issue price is linked to the procurement price, deficit States, usually in alliance with the Center, want lower procurement prices., In the past one element of concord has been that both the Center and the States, whether surplus or deficit, wanted to increase procurement on government account and increase the proportion of marketed grain which government controls. However, in the current situation with foodgrain stocks larger than the government can conveniently handle, the government would prefer private trade to handle a greater share of the grain trade, although the price support operations have required government purchases in record volume. III. METHODOLOGY 3.1 Given the nexus of technical production and policy relations under which Indian agriculture operates, this exercise attempts to project alternative scenarios of aggregate supply and demand conditions and, consequently,estimates of the nutrition and total food deficit gap in 1985 and 1995. In doing this it adopts a "basic needs" approach. It adopts a minimum level of consumption, calculated in terms of energy (calorie) requirement, estimates the portion of population below that minimum in the base period (1971-72) and projects the situation into 1985 and 1995 under alternative assumptions of per capita income growth rates, price changes of cereals and changes in income distri- bution (as measured by changes in the Gini coefficient).  .-8- 3.2 With recognition of the caveats associated with the use of an absolute level of poverty,-/ this exercise bases its work on the information collected from the Consumer Expenditure (26th round) 1971-72, conducted by the Indian National Samply Survey (NSS) Organization. This survey provided the basis for tabulating the calorie values of food consumed in the country (Tables 4 and 5). As the NSS survey was not primarily planned as a nutrition survey, the main bulk of the tabulation work and the principal problem of computation consisted in converting quantity data of food consumption into corresponding energy units by using appropriate conversion factors. This was done in a special report prepared by the NSS for the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. 3.3 Two points become important in this calculation of calorie consumption by income classes. The first is its reliability. A plausibility check on the estimate from the expenditure survey was performed by comparing it with the estimate of per capita calorie intake from aggregate food production/consumption figurea (Table 6). 1/ The adoption of an absolute concept of a minimum level of calorie intake is subject to criticism. Amartya Sen criticises this measure because "the nature of measurement used provides scope for public policy to be concerned with the relatively richer among the poor, ignoring greater suffering." Thus a normative poverty line provides a restrictive perspective to policy measures for reduction of poverty. That is, pushing the person just below the poverty line a little higher brings in rich dividends while the credit for pushing up even poorer people is likely to be zero, unless they are pushed quite a bit. See Amartya Sen, "Poverty Inequality and Unemplovment: Some Conceptual Issues in Measurement", in Poverty and Income Distribution in India, edited by P. Bardham and T.N, Srinivasan, Statistical Publishing Society, (Calcutta, 1974). Also see T.N. Srinivasan, "Poverty: Some Measurement Problems", (Mimeo), Research Centre The World Lank, p. 15 for a thoughtful article on the philosophical and empirical problems in the measurement of poverty.  -9- This indicated an overestimate of the order of nearly 22% in the survey figures.- The consumption figures were consequently adjusted down to take into account this discrepancy. The second point relates to the calculation of the cut-ofE point as the critical minimum calorie consumption. This was done with a methodology employed by the FAO/WHO using the World Bank's population and age distribution projections and assuming average male and female body weights of 50 kg and 45 kg, respectively. (Table 7) . Comparing the calorie consumption in the base period against the minimum requirement of about 2130 calories per capita in 1971,we find that 62% of India's population was below what has been loosely termed the "poverty level".- The high sensitivity of the minimum calorie standard to the proportion of people below the calorie level (particularly since other studies have used different estimates) prompted a simulation of this exercise with a variation of - 200 calories from this required level. 3.4 With these base year conditions, projections of consumption and supply were made based on the calorie-income relation (Table 8). The consumption projections were made under three scenarios: (i) per capita income growth varying 1/ A similar comparison of survey estimates of calorie intake against aggregate food statistics, undertaken by Shlomo Reutlinger, revealed an overestimate in the survey estimates of 1973/74 by nearly 17 percent. 2/ This can be compared with the population estimate below a minimum of more than 60% in 1967-68 by Pranab K. Bardham, "On the Minimum Level of Living and the Rural Poor", Indian Economic Review, Vol. V, No. 1. (April 1970). But what is significant is that Bardham uses 2,700 calories - a definite overestimate - as his critical minimum. In contrast, V.M. Dandeker and N. Rath use 2,250 calories as their cutt off and find about 33% of the rural and about 50% of the urbanpopulation below the minimum level. See Dandeker and Rath, "Poverty in India: Dimension and Trends", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. VI, No. 1 (January 2, 1971), p. 30-31. On the other hand Sukhatme has shown that if instead of using a poverty line based simply on average calorie requirements, allowance is made for variations in individual require- ments, the estimated incidence of poverty in India is brought down from about 50% to 25% in urban areas and from 40% to 15% in rural areas. See P. V. Sukhatme Nutrition and Poverty, Ninth Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial Lecture (1977), New Delhi, Indian Agricultural Research Institute.  -10- from 1.8% to 2.2%, and 2.5% to 3%;-/ (ii) price changes of cereals at - 25% and - 50%; and, (iii) distribution changes in terms of a change in the Gini coefficient by --10%. Various combinations of these scenarios were also worked out and their implications were analyzed in terms of their effect on (i) the size of the malnourished population; (ii) total food needs; and, (iii) the nutritional gap in grain equivalents. The results are presented in Tables 9-15. 3.5 The estimates of total food needs are then projected against the best available estimates of aggregate production in the base period,and projections made by the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The result gives an estimate of the domestic food gap which would have to be met. The analysis makes no independent projection of aggregate production and does not consider the effects of price changes on production. The detailed methodology is described in an annex to the Integrative Report. IV. RESULTS 4.1 Although the focus of this analysis is on what has been defined as food security, it provides a better perspective if the results of the effect of the variations in price, distribution and changes in growth rates are described in some detail. The operational aspect of both the aggregate food deficit and the nutritional gap are analyzed in the next section. Impact of Price and Distributional Changes on Calorie Consumption (Table 9-10, Graphs 1-4) 4.2 The calorie-income functions fitted from household consumption surveys explores calorie consumption across income groups. According to this analysis 1/ Detailed results are presented only for a low growth rate of 2.5 percent and a high rate of 3.0 percent. The estimate of total food need and thus the aggregate food deficit is however presented for all growth rates.  in 1971, the poorest 12% of the population had a calorie intake which was about 50 percent of the minimum per capita requirement. In contrast the richest 7% consumed over 2900 calories per day,or approximately 38 percent above the minimum requirement. The effect of price changes on calorie consumption is large. Thus by 1985, under assumptions of low per capita income growth (2.5%p.a.) a 50% price reduction in cereal would reduce the portion of the mal- nourished population (i.e., calorie deficient) population to only about 12% of the total and by 1995 to much less than that. A high growth (in expenditure/ income) assumption has a small impact on calorie consumption and on the proportion of the malnourished population. 4.2 The effect on the consumption of calories, and, consequently, on the malnourished population, through changes in the distribution of income is small.- The portion of the malnourished population, under assumptions of low growth and constant prices, changes from the 62% in the base period to nearly 31% in 1985 and more than 16% in 1995. Results under high growth assumptions are roughly similar. Although a more significant change in the distribution of income (e.g., 50%) may have a more pronounced effect, the probability of its occurrence within the time horizon under simulation is remote. This variant was therefore not explored. 1/ Income redistribution is simulated through changes (- 10%) in the Gini coefficient, as calculated from the Household Expenditure survey. The Gini coefficient for India was calculated at .36. A more equal distribution of income is interpreted as a reduction in the Gini coefficient, income being redistributed such that it is taken more extensively from the richer groups and given more extensively to the poorest group but with the proviso that no group is allowed to be made absolutely worse off.  -12- Impact on the Size of the Malnourished Population (Tables 11 , Graphs 5-8) 4.4 With both price and income changes, the portion of the malnourished populationfalls from 62% in the base period, to 9% in 1985, and only 4% in 1995. This would result from a 50% reduction in the price of cereals and a more equal distribution of income (by 10%) but under the low income growth assumption. Again the effect of high growth on the malnourished population is small. The impact of higher prices has an asymmetrical impact on the population. Assuming an. increase of cereal prices (by 50%), high income growth and no distributional change, the portion of the population with a calorie deficit would be 45% in 1985 and 23% in 1995. The size of the malnourished population is much more sensitive to price changes than to either changes in the growth rate or in the distribution of income. 4.5 An assumed reduction in the minimum calorie standard by 200 calories/ capita would have a substantial impact on the numbers defined as malnourished, irrespective of what growth assumption is used. Under the same growth rate but across a range of price changes, the effect of distributional changes on the size of the malnourished population is of the order of 2-3% only. Across growth rates, i.e., between a high growth and unchanged income distribution and low growth and an improved distribution, the effect on the proportion of mal- nourished is almost similar. In fact, for price declines, the effect of a low growth rate and an improved distribution is only slightly larger than that of a high income growth and a constant distribution. The results of the simulations with alternative growth rates, prices and income distribution indi- cate the strong effect on the proportion of malnourished of changes in prices. Income growth rate changes and distribution changes have in comparison a very small effect on the proportion of people below a 'poverty line'.  -13- Consumption Deficit and Total Food Needs (Table 12-13, Graphs 9-14) 4.6 Starting with consumption patterns in the base period, the projections give us an estimate of the proportion of people below a minimum level of calorie intake under alternative assumptions of income growth, changes in income distribution and, most important, changes in the price of cereal. Con- sequently, as prices rise (by 50%), the malnourished population increases and the calorie deficit (in grain equivalents) also increases to 17 million tons (assuming low growth and unchanged distribution). Conversely, with the fall in prices (-50%), the malnourished population declines in size and the deficit becomes much smaller (2.3 million metric tons, assuming low growth and unchanged income distribution). 4.7 While the effect-on the deficit and the malnourished population is relatively clear, changes in price also have an effect on market demand. The net result of price changes on total food needs is therefore not in symmetry with the effect on the calorie deficit. As price falls, market demand increases but the calorie deficit declines. Since the market demand dominates,the total food needs increase. Conversely, as prices rise, market demand falls, but the calorie deficit (and the malnourished segment of the population) increases, and total food needs fall. Significantly, total food needs change proportionately with price changes. Thus for 1985 with a low growth assumption and no distri- bution change, a 50% price increase would reduce total food needs by about 4% to about 181 million tons (from nearly 188 million tons with no price change). This may be compared with an increase of nearly 10% to 206 million tons with a 50% reduction in prices. The implication of this asymmetric response of total supply needs to price change is important. An increase in prices would reduce total food needs slightly and at the same time increase the amount of food that must be delivered to the malnourished population outside the market.  -14- Projection of Total Food Needs and Total Production (Table 14, Graph 15) 4.8 The domestic food gap emerges through a comparison of projected total food needs with the estimates of production (from the International Food Policy Research Institute and the World Bank' . While total food needs will change under varying assumptions of growth, price and distribution change (Table 15) a summary comparison is made with no price and no change in income distribution In this situation, in terms of calorie equivalents, India is projected to realize a shortfall from its total food needs by 20-21 percent of projected production by 1985 and 21-25 percent by 1995. IFPRI's projections would change the figures to indicate an aggregate shortfall of about 38 percent of total production availability (of about 157 million tons in 1985 and nearly 200 million tons in 1995). 4.9 The impact of this domestic food gap is significant from the point of view of planning purposes. Even if no attempt was made to attack the problem of calorie deficits among the poor, there would be a gap of the order of 12 to 18% of market demand in 1985 (depending on the low or high growth assumption), or 16 to 19% in 1995 (with no price or distribution changes). To meet this domestic food gap, two approaches might be explored: (i) the possibility of increasing aggregate food production to a rate higher than the 2.5% assumed in the production projections; and (ii) the ability to increase imports of food when required. While either of these two options might meet overall food needs, a more important policy issue is the approach to be adopted in raising the (calorie) intakes of the malnourished portion of the population. 1/ The Bank's projections relate to of foodgrains (primarily cereals) only. Since the calorie consumption estimate include total consumption and since cereals constitute approximately 85% of total consumption, for an equivalent comparison to total food needs, the Bank's production projections were appropriately adjusted. Both the Bank and the IFPRI assume a 2.5% trend growth rate of production. See S. Hadler, "Developing Country Foodgrain Projections for 1985", World Bank Staff Working Paper 'No. 247 (!_V - 197A) IFPRI, "Food Needs for Developing Countries", (1977). 2/ Using Bank adjusted production figures.  -15- V. THE MAJOR ISSUES 5.1 This study is a preliminary effort to simulate demand under different assumptions and compare these estimates with available supply projections (of IFPRI and the World Bank). This yields a series of domestic food gaps that range between 20 to 38 of expected production.-/ Expected production assumes a straight-forward trend projection. However, the simulations of demand under the alternative assumptions of income growth, price and distribution changes themselves will have an impact on aggregate supply. This analysis does not capture this interaction. Ideally, what would be required would be to follow through the impact of the instruments on demand and evaluate their effect on aggregate production as well. 5.2 The issues connected with bridging the projected food gap involve not only those of increasing production but also those of regulating consumption such that the deficit among the malnourished population is eliminated. The issues identified therefore raise questions of policy, the parameters of which involve such things as the likely response of farmers to price, trends in domestic production, the availability of food imports, the feasibility of maintaining substantial average levels of government food stocks and the different propensi- ties of India's population to consume foodgrains in response to income and price changes. The discussion that follows relate first to the issues that follow directly from the analysis and second, to the implication of those issues in terms of policy. 1/ Assuming no price or distributional change. The appropriateness of this assumption is open to question. Table 15 however gives us an idea of the differences in total needs and projected production under different assumptions.  -16- The Issues from the Results 5.3 Three main issues are suggestea by the results of the study. Firstly, in terms of the impact on the proportion of the people consuming below the minimally-adequate calorie level, the impact of price chages is large and outweighs any other. The target population in deficit is reduced by more than 80% in the case of a 50% reduction in price under a low income growth (2.5%) assumption with no distributional change. The impact is even greater with an improvement in distribution. The effect of price change is,however, asymmetrical as a price increase of 50% under the same low expenditure growth situation reduces the target group by only 22%. Secondly, neither income growth nor improved distributions would ultimately be able to change sharply the proportion of people consuming below the minimum level. This analysis suggests that in 1985 an improvement in income distribution under the low growth assumption would still leave more than 30% of the people below the critical minimum and in 1995 about 23%. Thirdly, elimination of the deficit would require an import figure that varied from 20% to 37% of aggregate production in 1985 and 21% to 38% in 1995 (depending on which production estimates are used). The Policy Issues 5.4 Given the low sensitivity of the results to alternative income growth rates and/or distributional changes, the major policy issue that evolves is how in a country with unequal incomes (and consumption), a level of equity among consumers can be reconciled with a market system that is income responsive. On a more simple level the policy issue breaks down into two parts. The first relates to measures to be adopted to reach the poor - a necessary rationale for government intervention, as the means to bridge the nutrition gap - the gap bewteen total food needs and market demand. Second, what policies are to be adopted to increase production above its long run growth and therefore meet the overall food gap.  -17- Equity Through Price Changes: Consumption 5.5 If equity were the only objective of food policy, a consensus might emerge for abandoning the market and for having government (which somehow would collect producers' surpluses without damaging their incentives) give free rations to all the people in the economy's non-food producting sector. This may seem attractive initially since the market in foodgrains is imperfect and not always capable of handling foodgrains in a way that is in the national interest. But budgetary implications of such an approach are sobering. And even if the financial requirements were met the administrative feasibility of operating such a system isa problem which is no less serious. 5.6 A more feasible approach employs a more positive use of the market in the foodgrains field. The approach has involved the subsidized sale of food through fair price shops directed at low income groups. This has grown steadily since 1951 despite its administrative complexity and occasional abuse. One criticism has been the limited access to fair price shops which makes little or no provision for the rural poor, most particularly the landless labourers, and most especially those paid in cash rather than in kind.-/ Nevertheless, it is said that the location of the shops, the long Jines and the qualities of grain sold serve a rationing function that biases the distri- bution toward low income,urban-based consumers-/. 5.7 Yet inspite of its inefficiencies, this course of action has some merits. To dispense with fair price shops and attempt market stabilisation policies to protect the poor against the inequity of price fluctuation - and then concentrate the food subsidy budget on outright grants of food to vulnerable 1/ I.S. Gulati and T. N. Krishnan, "Public Distribution and Procurement of Foodgrains: A Proposal", Economic and Political Weekly, (May 24, 1975). 2/ An analysis of Pakistan's similar public distribution system concluded that the qualities of grain offered did effectively direct the grain to low income consumers. See B.L. Rogers and F.J. Levinson, "Subsidized Food Consumption in Low Income Countries: The Pakistan Experience." International Nutrition Planning Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 1976.  -18- groups is problematic. It presupposes a level of success in market s'tabilisation in terms of available supply, something which, given the dependence of Indian agriculture on the weather, would be difficult to achieve. 5.8 The subsidized sale of food on a wider scale in spite of its problems may be necessary. This approach raises questions of cost and administrative feasibility that are critical. It also raises the question of the objective and methods of grain procurement, government involvement in the grain trade and the building and operating of a buffer stock. All,of these matters require careful consideration. 5.9 The government involvement in foodgrains trade,has been subject to severe criticisms.-/ Yet the results of this study suggest that if the objective is to lift the large segment of the population above a certain minimum level of calorie consumption, the involvement of the government, even with all its deficiencies, appears to be the only feasible way.-/ The alternative to continued government involvement is not particularly attractive for the impoverished segment of the population. Criticism of the government's involvement should be interpreted as one of management rather than of policy. 5.10 At the same time, every opportunity of obtaining any concessional food aid should be capitalised. Although external credits have not yet been used for the purpose, the government of India could pursuasively argue that stock building out of domestic purchases in bumper years would be an appropriata object for funding from external sources including concessional development loans. 1/ Uma Lele, "Foodgrain Marketing in India. Private Performance and Public Policy", Cornell University Press, Ithaca (1971). 2/ Although public procurement as a percentage of total production has been rising it is still a small percentage of total production, never exceeding 10 percent, but this is roughly one-third of marketed amounts. The government's efforts to increase its share of the market is an unfortunate story. In 1973, when it attempted a total takeover of the grain trade there was widespread evasion and total procurement was less than in the previous year and the idea was abandoned. An attempt to share the wheat market 50/50 with private traders was similarly disastrous.  -19- 5.11 In the ultimate analysis, the most desirable objective would be the attainment of the level of food stocks that would stabilise food prices and thereby serve to diminish one of the worst inequities, remove a deterrent to expanded production and eliminate the worst bottleneck (food) to the rest of the development effort. But for the period 1985 and 1995 the depen- dence on the subsidized sales may be among the most attractive options to improve nutrition among the poor, particularly in the rural areas. Equity Through Price Changes: Production 5.12 The study has concentrated primarily on consumption and changes in policy to influence consumption. But the same changes in policy also influence production. Development prospects for smallholder agriculture are determined by tradition, existing technology and assets, climate, land features and availability of inputs. These factors have occasionally been put forward as 1/ arguments for a presumed low price response of farmers. Yet supply response-7 even if low according to statistical criteria, may still have a significant impact on aggregate production, and consequently,through government procurement, on the "malnourished population." The Indian concern over price policy has been aligned towards production and the marketable surplus and has received serious attention over the years. One result is an assortment of food zones, support prices, procurement prices, issues prices, procurement and imports, the inter- relationships of which are not entirely clear. The difficulty in operating under these structures has been debated for quite some time now-2/ Whatever approach one might take, this multiplicity of often contradicting prices provides in- 1/ Iqbal Sobhan, "Agricultural Price Policy and Supply Response: A Review of Evidence and an Interpretation for Policy", AGRER (mimeo), World Bank, (July (July 1977). 2/ Professor B.S. Minhas argues explicitly on the inefficiency, if not the futility, of government attempts to procure food at market prices (as well as the inefficiency of zonal balkanization of the national food system). Professor Minhas suggests a central food trading organization which would procure its food (at market prices) with a special kind of "food money".  -20- 1/ accurate signals to the producers-,, and require a rationalization to a uniform leve. 5.13 A comparison of agriculture and foodgrain terms of trade with production data for India indicate improved terms of trade for the sector following shortfalls in production. At the same time, a price decline following sharp increases in production also occurred. It is difficult however to say whether any specific level of the terms of trade constitute remunerative or incentive prices. That the terms of trade have fallen considerably in an area is not in itself sufficient evidence that production incentives are inadequate. The real question is whether farmers are producing as much as is desired and, if not, whether increased prices are necessary to motivate them to produce more. 5.14 The effect of the procurement price depends on the price elasticity of supply and whether the price covers the cost of production. A recent Bank- sponsored study has shown that production of wheat and paddy in India is quite price responsive.2/ This price responsiveness is more pronounced where HYVs are involved because success depends crucially on the provision of associated outlays which the farmer would be reluctant to incur unless assured of attractive prices for his output. Given the fact that Indian procurement prices for foodgrains have generally covered the cost of production, a more effective approach to increase production may be in the provision of technology for the HYVs, i.e. irrigation, fertilizers and credit. Investments in these three fields are among the most promising prospects for greater impact on output. 1/ For instance at the end of 1960 India evolved the practice of double support prices. There was a "minimum support price" described as a 'long term guarantee to the producers that, in the event of a glut, prices would not be allowed to fall below minimum levels (calculated to) not only cover the cost of production but also provide adequate incentives, At the same time, in the buyers market at the time, there was also - moderately above the support price and making it redundant - an official "procurement" price 'for the purchase of quantities needed by Government for public distribution and (to) include reasonable incentives for the producers'. 21 RaJ. Krishna and G.S. Ray Chandhuri, "Some Aspects of Wheat Price Policy in India", and "Some Aspects of Rice Price Policy in India", (Mimeo), University of Delhi, Delhi, India, (Jan. 1977).  -21- 5.15 While the preceeding paragraphs dealt with the probable effect of price on output, it would be useful to take an additional look at the food deficit gap. The estimates of the gap appear large at first glance. This of course reflects primarily on the long run average growth rate of 2.5 percent used to project supply (or aggregate production). But growth of Indian agriculture has fluctuated widely. The dependence on the weather is almost overwhelming despite efforts at surface and groundwater development to stabilise the fluctuation and minimize its dependence. However, an assumed 5 percent growth rate would give us a total production figure of about 168 million tons in 1985 and about 274 million tons in 1995. This appears to be an adequate level of production to meet total food needs by 1995 although not by 1985. Using an adjusted calorie concept, calorie self sufficiency would however be reached (with energy to spare) by 1985. 5.16 The moot question is the feasibility Of reaching a 5 percent growth rate in foodgrains production. A doubling of the growth rate (from the 2.5 percent assumed) is an extremely difficult but certainly not an impossible task. It must be remembered that between 1964/65 and 1971/72 the compound growth rate of wheat production was about 11 percent and that of yield per acre about 7.5 percent. While this may not be a totally valid comparisor it does provide an element of credibility that the prospects at least are positive and and hopeful. 5.17 It is difficult to estimate the probability of reaching this high growth rate in production. Initially the approach would, of course, be in the provision of additional resources such as irrigation, both surface and groundwater, fertilizer, credit and other ancilliary inputs. Subsequently the emphasis would have to shift to the increasing efficiency in the use of those resources. There is adequate reason to hope for a considerable expansion in both approaches. What seems to be essential to another spurt in foodgrain  -22- production similar to that of the late sixties, is a breakthrough in increasing rice output. In this, the Bank's approach through the intensifi- cation of agricultural extension and research is an appropriate step. Administration and Policies 5.18 Yet, while the country's and the Bank's approach to increasing production through a major thrust at State-level agricultural development is appropriate, the absence of a coordinating mechanism with the central pricing decisions - in essence the absence of an overall food policy coordinating agency - appears to be a serious handicap. In view of the problems associated with managing national food policy with nearly two dozen state governments, a strong unified system to oversee the development of stocks, transport, trading and production seems indispensable. 5.19 India does not lack legislative enactments, institutional amendments, expertise, planning commission recommendations, Ministry of Agriculture's approval or valid critical examination by special commissions on how to deal with the food and nutrition situation. Increasing production is of course the principal goal. But if serious efforts are to be made to reduce food needs among the malnourished population, it seems likely that the govern- ment will have to play an increasing role. The priority to food security has to be addressed, not as a stop-go strategy, but as a continuing effort to build this issue into the center of national development policy. By and large, this remains to be done.  Table Land Utilfration Sratiatica (Million Hectares) 195Q=5 i9S556 1960-6t 1961-62 1262o61 1A6 19646 1956 1966-67 1967-68 .19666 1969-70 17071 1917 Ceographical Area 326.8 Reporting Area for Land Utilization Purposes 284.3 291.9 298.4 299.2 305.2 305.3 305.3 305.3 305.5 305.6 305.8 306.1 305.3 305.6 a) Forests 40.5 51.3 54.1 54.2 60.5 60.7 60.4 60.3 63.5 63.6 64.6 66.0 66.0 65.8 b) Not available for cultivation 47.5 48.4 50.8 50.7 50.3 50.1 50.2 50.3 47.5 47.4 47.2 46.2 45.4 45.8 c) Other uncultivated land excluding fallovw 49.4 38.9 37.6 37.2 36.6 36.6 36.2 36.2 34.7 34.0 33.3 33.2 33.8 33.4 d) Fallow lands 28.1 24.1 22.8 21.6 21.3 21.3 20.4 22.4 22.5 20.7 23.1 21.9 19.7 21.3 e) Net area sown 118.t 129.2 133.2 135.4 136.3 136.5 138.1 136.2 137.3 139.9 137.6 138.7 140.4 139.4 f) Cross area sown 131.9 147.3 152.8 156.2 156.8 157.0 159.2 155.4 157.4 163.7 159.7 - - Area lrricat'e Gross irrigated area 22.6 25.6 28.0 28.5 29.5 29.7 30.7 31.1 32.8 33.2 35.4 37.3 38.5 38.6 Net irrigated area 20.9 22.8 24.7 24.9 25.7 25.9 26.6 26.7 27.5 27.2 2S.0 30.4 31.2 31.6 Go%err.ment canlal 7.2 8.0 9.2 9.3 9.7 9.9 10.1 9.9 10.3 10.2 10.9 11.4 11.6 11.9 Private canal. 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 .9 .9 Tarks 3.6 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.1 Wells 6.0 6.1 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.7 9.5 9.1 10.8 11.2 11.8 12.0 Other sources 3.0 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.6 Crons Irrigated Miice 9.8 11.0 12.5 12.9 13.4 13.3 13.6 13.1 -13.3 13.9 13.7 14.7 14.9 14.6 l.heat 3.4 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.4 6.2 6.5 7.9 8.6 9.8 10.3 Barley 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 I.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 Jowar .5 .6 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .8 .7 .6 .7 Baira .3 .4 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3. .3 .4 .,, .5 .5 .5 .5 Maize .4 .4 .6 .4 .5 .5 .6 .8 .8 .7 1.1 1.0 .9 .8 Other Cereals & klses 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 Sugarcane 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.7 Other Food Grops .9 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 I.5 1.7 1.8 .5 1.8 1.9 1.9 Cotton .5 .8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 I.b Other 'on-food Crops 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.8 SOURCE: P.C. Bansll, ARricultrual Statistics in India, New Delhi: Arnold Feinemann Publishers (India) Priv.ite Limited, 1970 and 1974. Also Government of India, Ministry of P1anlninA. Statistical Pocke: Book India, 1974. New Delhl: Central Statistical Organisation, Departmsent of Statiatics, 1975.  Table 2 INDIA Area Irrigated by Crop ('000 ha) Change Change Crop 1950/51 1960/61 1950/51-1960/61 1970/71 1960/61-1970/71 Food Grains Rice 9,844 12,523 2,679 14,917 2,394 Wheat 3,402 4,233 831 9,829 5,596 Jowar 463 655 191 626 -29 Bajra 336 320 -16 514 194 Maize 369 556 187 925 369 Barley 1,383 1,334 -49 1,328 - 6 Other Cereals 581 545 -36 444 -101 Total Cereals 16,378 20,166 3,788 28,583 8,417 Gram 974 1,107 133 1,244 117 Other Pulses 965 792 -173 784 - 8 Total Pulses 1,939 1,899 - 40 2,008 109 Total Food Grains 18,317 22,065 3,748 30,591 8,526 Non-Food Grains Sugarcane 1,183 1,674 491 1,929 255 Cotton 465 967 502 1,287 320 Groundnut 195 578 383 Other Oilseeds 226 444 218 Food Crops / 2,598 1,335 676 1,926 573 Fodder Crops 937 1,347 410 Others 563 450 -113 Total Non-Food Grains 4,246 5,915 1,669 7,961 2,06 Total Irrigated Area 22,563 27,980 5,417 38,552 10,572 1/ Includes spices, fruits and vegetables including root crops. SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate of Economics & Statistics  Table 3 IVDMA: FOODGRAIN PRODUCTION. PROCUREMENT, IMPORTS. 1950 - 1976 Closing Stocks Per Capita Calendar Productioni/ Procurement2/ Inports Issues with Availability4/ Year Govt. 3/ MilliOu Tons Million Tons Million Tons Million Tons 000'Tons Grames per day 1951 50.8 3.8 4.8 8.0 1.3 367 1952 52.0 3.5 3.9 6.8 2.0 361 1953 59.2 2.1 2.0 4.6 1.5 396 1954 69.8 1.4 0.8 2.2 1.7 441 1955 68.1 0.1 0.6 1.6 0.9 428 1956 66.9 neg. 1.4 2.1 0.3 417 1957 69.9 0.3 3.6 3.1 1.2 431 1958 64.3 0.5 3.2 4.0 0.9 395 1959 77.1 1.8 3.9 5.2 1.4 459 1960 76.7 1.3 5.1 4.9 2.8 448 1961 82.0 0.5 3.5 4.0 2.6 468 1962 82.7 -0.5 3.6 4.4 2.3 462 1963 80.2 0.8 4.6 5.2 2.3 442 1964 80.6 1.4 6.3 8.7 1.0 453 1965 89.4 4.0 7.5 10.1 1.9 526 1966 72.3 4.0 10.4 14.1 1.8 410 1967 74.2 4.5 8.7 13.2 1.7 401 1968 95.1 6.8 5.7 10.2 3.9 460 1969 94.0 6.4 3.9 9.4 4.4 446 1970 99.5 6.7 3.6 8.8 5.3 457 1971 108.4 8.9 2.1 7.8 7.9 470 1972 105.2 7.7 0.5 11.4 3.4 473 1973 97.0 8.4 3.6 11.4 2.9 425 1974 104.7 5.6 4.8 10.8 2.5 453 1975 101.1 9.4 7.4 11.3 7.9 410 1976 ~~~~~~~~120. 12.7 6.5 9.2 18.6 450 L977 IBRD provisional astimstes 111.0 0.2 1/ Production of foodgrains (cereals and pulses) in million tons during agricultural year (July-June) ending in Calendar year shown. Data fully revised up to 1965/66, final estimates to 1975/76. Bulletin of Food Statistics and Ministry of Agriculture. 2V Internal procurement of foodgrains on go'verinnt (both state and centre) account during Calendar year. Bulletin of Food Statistics and Ministry of Agriculture. 3| overrnmnt held stocks at the end of December. Bulletin of Food Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture. Closing stocks do not always equal opening stocks plus procurement plus imports minus distribution for unknown reasons. M Gross production minua 12.5X for seed food and waste plus imports plus net withdrawals from stocks divided by mid-year Population.  Table 4 INDIA Protein and Calorie Content per kg of Food Items- No. of Calories per Protein per kg Food Items kg. (in gm) Rice and its products 3,400 75.0 Wheat and its products 3,460 118.0 Jowar and its products 3,490 104.0 Bayra and its products 3,032 97.4 Maize and its products 3,420 111.0 Raji and its products 3,280 73.0 Barley and its products 3,360 115.0 Small millets and its products 2,615 97.0 Gram and its products 3,600 171.0 Cereal substitutes and its products 1,100 16.0 Pulses Gram 3,720 208.0 Peer 3,200 200.0 Soybean 4,320 432.0 1/ Edible portion only. Source: Government of India, National Sample Survey, Twenty-sixth Round, August 1975.  Table 5 INDIA Averaee Per Capita Expenditure and Calorie Consumption - 1972 Monthly Average Monthly Per Capita AdiustedV Expenditure X of Per Capita Average Per Capita Expenditure on Daily Per Capita Daily Per Capita Class Population _x:e:-iture Expenditure on Food Cereals Calorie Consunpricn Calorie Consumption (Rs) (Rs/Yonth) (Rs/Month) (Rs/MTonth) 0 - 15 2.7 7.5 6.07 4.90 1418 1052 15 - 21 8.5 _.0 14.70 11.82 1786 1336 21 - 24 6.6 22.5 18.20 13.10 2067 1558 24 - 28 9.8 ' 20.60 15.48 2193 1703 28 - 34 15.3 , .5 24.75 17.98 2402 1878 34 - 43 18.9 3 .5 28.90 20.34 2656 2094 43 - 55 16.7 ^9.o 34.25 23.81 2941 2335 55 - 75 14.2 65.0 43.50 27.50 3216 2654 75.-100 7.3 87.5 64.50 31.84 3518 2913 1. Adjusted to reflect aggregate _-_ 5ala=e availability. SOURCE: Special tabulation work _.fer:a: .or FAO - National Sample Survey: 26th Ro_nt- July 1971- June 1972; Department of S:a:s:_;, !.inistry of Finance, Governnent of India. (January 1976)  Table 7 INDIA Fitted Regression 2 Observed Fitted R d.f. S.E.R. T-Statistic -Value Value Residual 1. :alorie Intake/Income (1971-72) .993 7 30.54 16.81 1418.0 1020.0 398.0 CMAL = 999.0 + 997.18 LnY 1783.6 1893.3 - 109.7 (216.5) (59.3) 2066.9 2115.6 - 48.7 2192.9 2260.0 - 67.1 2401.9 2435.4 - 33.5 2656.8 2652.2 4.6 2941.3 2892.4 48.9 ,216.3 3211.0 5.3 3518.0 3470.5 47.5 :. :ereal Intake/Income (1971-72) .995 7 19.06 18.38 1231.9 1055.3 160.4 ::ER . -315.3 + 680.2 LnY 1548.1 1650.8 - 110.7 (135.1) (37.0) 1754.9 1802.6 - 37.7 isOO.0 1901.0 - 1.0 2315.1 2020.7 - 5.6 22:8.r 2168.0 42.0 237,.0 2322.0 53.0 2520.0 2550.0 - 30.0 273.0 2726.6 - 26.6 _. :od Expenditure!Incorze (1968-69) .913 7 1.82 6.6 5.6 7.0 1.6 = 54.3 + 23.5 LnY 14.7 13.6 1.1 (12.9) (3.5) -E.2 18.8 .o 23.6 22.2 - 1.6 25.3 26.3 - 1.0 2i.9 31.4 - 2.5 34.3 37.1 - 2.8 43.5 44.6 - 1.1 64.5 50.7 13.8 i-_Z_ 'CAL = total weekly per capita calorie intake weighted by the proportions of the pop.;arcr. in each income/ expenditure group. LnY 5 natural log of average per capita monthly i..co e (expenditure) weighted as above. .CER - weekly per capita calorie intake from cereal, weighted as above; in the absence of specific estimates on cereal consumption an approxirate ratio of 80 percent of total consumption of calories was made - with small variations between income classes. ExF . expenditure on foc per capita weighted as above. Since specific estimate fcr 1971-72 were not available this regression uses the figures from 1968-69 suitably adjusted. = standard error. '.'. = degrees of freedos. ..E.R.= standard error of regression  Table 14 rNDIA Total Food Needs and Prnduction 1985 1995 Bank IFPRI Bank Adjusted Bank 1Pr I Bank Adjusted Total Production 132.2 137.7 157.1 169.3 176.3 199.1 1985 1985 1995 1995 Low Growth High Growth Low Growth High *Zrowth Low Growth High Growth Low Growth High Growth To:al Food Needs Under: 1.8 Percent 2.2 Percent 2.5 Percent 3.0 ?zren | 1.8 Percent 2.2 Percent 2.5 Percent 3.0 Percent Z. CR -' U.c-.anged Income Dis:r'bution L -( - 50) 177.98 179.51 180.92 a 222.76 227.27 231.51 238.59 r.-!res C 184.52 186.30 187.76 l-:.-i 231.87 237.20 241.64 249.89 _ -50) 202.10 204.28 205.89 2Z5. 2 253.71 259.50 263.85 271.12 Urcc-_ ..ged Prices * S- 1) 184.97 186.61 187.97 231.90 237.13 241.26 248.64 S'a' C 184.52 186.30 187.76 :,:.-i 231.87 237.20 241.64 249.15 S (- 13) 184.14 186.10 188.73 1,:.-. 231.84 237.59 242.03 249.89 CR- 2,3 Unc-anged Income Distriljtion - 50) 170.76 172.66 174.22 !-- 216.38 222.13 227.00 235.15 ?rizes C 179.56 181.84 183.69 227.96 234.31 239.11 247.08 * ? ;- S0) 203.25 200.89 205.07 2:.:. . 253.21 258.99 263.28 270.48 U.changed Prices L G (- 10) 179.63 181.76 183.44 1 _ 227.58 233.59 238.39 246.37 Gi-i C 179.56 181.84 183.69 - 227.96 234.31 239.11 247.08 G (- 10) 179.67 182.15 183.99 15.2 228.63 235.05 239.85 248.40 Ur.c:-,as.e Income DiE Etrbafion I ^. i~ 50) 187.81 189.07 190.02 .. :. 231.58 235.21 238.57 244.13 Prices C 191.83 193.16 194.38 1.5 2 238.29 242.42 246.13 252.62 . 1- 50) 204.72 206.60 208.12 21D.5AS 255.70 260.96 271.62 264.94 Unchanged Prices r G (r 10) 192.41 193.68 194.77 ; 5 6 : 238.76 242.89 246.15 252.65 Gi-i C 191.83 193.16 194.38 1$i.52 238.29 242.42 245.13 252.62 L G (- 10) 191.25 192.67 193.97 196.:: 237.80 242.18 246.10 252.70 1/ CR - Minimum calorie intake of 2128 average. See Table for derivation of . calorie intake.  INDIR PRICE CHANGE EFFECTS ON CALORIE CONSUMPTION, 1985 3750 3500 o 3250 C 3000 z o 2750 2500 2250 2000 - 1750 0.. ~ LO 1250 PIEINRREOB 0 ECN CL 7500 5- 250