Colombia - Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 99 2 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ON THE COLOMBIA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 552-CO) January 26, 1976 ni r rnnrnxi fILE LaU)rT This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoration.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Summary i-V Project Performance Audit Memorandum I. Introduction I II. The Project 1 III. Project Implementation 5 Civil Works 5 Project Costs 7 Cutrr4iula Developmet and Staff Trai4ni ng~. Educational Objectives 8 IV. Operating Outcomes of the Project 10 The INEM Programs 11 Internal Efficiency 13 r7 mt - 1 n 1 V. Alle a LIsa RUl VI. Conclusions Attachment: Project Completion Repcrt Project Data A.1 Summary and Recommendations A.2 The Setting at Project Appraisal A.4 Political and Educational Developments Since Project Appraisal A.5 The INEM Project Implementation Organization, Management and Physical Execution A.7 The Performance of the INEM Schools A.14 Conclusions A.29 List of Annexes Annex 1: Colombia Completion Mission Methodology Annex 2: Loan 552-CO: Distribution of Costs in Thousands of Col$ Annex 3: Loan 552-CO: Disbursements, Actuals vs. Estimates Annex 4: Loan 552-CO: Total Expenditure, Forecast and Actual Annex 5: a - Loan 552-CO: Enrollment Development and Annual Intake b - Loan 552-CO: Actual Enrollment Pyramid in 1974 and Full Capacity Annex 6: Income Distribution in Colombia (INEM School Population Compared to Overall Urban Population) Annex 7: Teachers in INEM Project Schools This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their offilcialI duties. I'MonhItt Ma, n0ut Ostherwis ..ea u.~ flo...& Wffi Ut Wor.ABn aIu thriz CUS ttfSfui. - ii - TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Note: Currency Equivalent (Peso) 1968 US$ 1.00 = Col$ 16.25 (At Appraisal) 1969 US$ 1.00 = Col$ 17.36 1970 US$ 1.00 = Col$ 18.49 1971 US$ 1.00 = Col$ 19.98 1972 US$ 1.00 = Col$ 21.92 1973 US$ 1.00 = Col$ 23.67 1974 US$ 1.00 = Col$ 26.14 SUMARY Loan 552-CO for USS7.6 million was extended to Colombia in July 1968 to assist with the financing of construction, equipping and furnishing of 10 new enmnrAhAnsive Recondary achool. located in maior Colombian cities. The project evolved from a 1964-65 joint UNESCO/USAID planning mission which attached nicnifirant nrinritv to imnrovina the analitv of secondary education to build an appropriate manpower base for Colombia's agricultural and indus- trial HPvP1nm.Pnt. With U7SATD nuqfqtanroe the rovernment nlanned a maior reform of secondary education; comprehensive curricula, emphasizing pre- vocational options, were to be injtrodued~ t-o rep1-ae~ tho mTninl ArA4ATir- university preparatory curricula offered by the existing secondary school struction of 19 comprehensive schools, INEMs (Institutos Nacionales de after, judged project preparation data to be inadequately detailed and a TWVQOnArU T IJ n o FTCs Ae. T nw inrw.1 7 - asn4s 4 s 4& w- 9I4 -a" plann-1 n uLIES.alUSALP mison was amunted Un ealy Ivs L w Wn. naL * .LLA un. To avoid further preparation delays, the Bank recommended a reduction in the LLULU U scLUU llU aLL UUn L IAU f LLIC CUULLU.LIA sUULLU a .LjL I- J. schools for first loan assistance; the other 9 schools were supported by a secona Bank Loan, 679-COu of iiu. Project appraisal was undertaken during Late 1967. As a result of appraisal recommendations, excessive capital costs for the 10 schools were reduced, from US$18.8 million equivalent to u1. 5 million equivalent, through elimination of excess construction area. Estimated recurrent costs for the proposed schools, which had also appeared high to the appraisal mission, were re-estimated and found to be more economical than those at the existing smaller Government secondary schools. Economies of scale were expected to result from high utilization factors for staff and facilities and from improved retention rates at the iNE-s. Further, the large schools were to be operated on a double shift basis, to cater for 48,000 students. The INEMs, utilizing well-trained teachers and modern pedagogical techniques and facilities, were to provide an improved general academic back- ground and a common pre-vocational orientation to all students. Curricula streams, offered in humanities, science, agriculture, industry, commerce and social services would become more specialized in the upper cycles (grades 10-11). The roughly 80% of students expected to follow the pre-vocational streams (excepting commercial) would require further short-term technical training before entering the labor market. Original plans for the introduction of comprehensive education called for its early spread throughout the system by incorporation of the new curricula into the first cycle (grades 6-9) in existing secondary schools surrounding the INEMs. These schools would then feed students into the specialized INEM upper cycles. As an interim measure, each INEM was to begin operations in cooperation with at least one satellite school. - ii - The respni-1 14 -1fi fnir I4mnlnmvnnt-inn nf tbeo nrnnr nr4aci no construction, procurement of equipment, curricula development and preparation of pe-rsonnel, wasz nasgnaA i-n a r.n 4 t o- tm-t 4n the, O)ftln Admjjn±stratf- Para Programas Educativos Conjuntos (changed to the Instituto Colombiano de ConStruccnesn Esco-niares TXCE, after n- 196 _orgarrnizatn), a aenh4- autonomous agency in charge of all Ministry of Education (NDE) construction. development and the training effort; the introduction of the comprehensive mainly through cooperative programs with local universities. Negotiations were successfully completed during June 1968. The .LUC areCUntCL was stanuadU in OuILtent Uut U wu ounuitLzLUnc cUntaineu iu a supplementary letter on educational objectives were questioned by the Colombians W.L LCAI l LU yJLOLL±t.dL.Li.ty a C LCLLCULCL LUL il Z0<%.La.Ly ±LICLt± UCLLUILWU to attract qualified full-time teachers to the INEMs, and a requirement for estavblishument an equitaue university aUissUuu policy fur LNE grauuates. Both conditions were, however, retained by the Bank. Other important edu- cational objectives expressed in the letter included setting up a cooperative arrangement with SENA (the semi-autonomous National Apprenticeship Service), to obtain assistance for trEM curricula development and to establish complementary courses for INEM graduates, and the formation of local advisory coimittees for each En, to provide links with local enterprises. The loan agreement became effective during November 1968. Civil works under the project were satisfactorily implemented. Nine of the 10 schools were completed on schedule during 19/U though com- pletion of the final school was delayed until 1972. Design standards, while generally suitable, reflect some excesses in space allocation and impractical- ities with regard to fixtures. The quality of finished works varies from school to school owing mainly to uneven contractor performance. Maintenance allocations have never reached the 1%-1.5% of construction costs per year required in the loan agreement. Procurement of equipment was seriously delayed. As a result, the closing date of the loan was postponed from December 1971 to May 1974. Early inefficiencies resulted from inexperience on the part of the ad hoc project unit procurements staff, including a lack of familiarity with the Bank's requirements for international competitive bidding. Thereafter, ICCE adherence to low bid ceilings led to a proliferation of the number of bids to be eval- uated, prolonging the procurement process and contributing to the award of piecemeal contracts. Inefficient procedures for storage and delivery of goods, and problems associated with the issuance of import licenses, promoted further delay. Most of the schools began operations during 1970, having received only half of the planned equipment items. As a consequence of the fragmented procurement process, INNE equipment generally suffers from over- diversification. - iii- The final cost of the project, US$13.35 million eauivalent. reD- resented a savings of 12% over the US$15.15 million equivalent appraisal estimate, which included contingencies. Reductions in square meter costs. effected at Bank recommendation during 1969, kept construction costs in line with appraisal estimates though an underestimation of the necessary quantities of site works led to an overrun in that category. The overrun was offset by savings in the equipment/furniture rateaorv undpr thp nrnipst in turn partly due to ICCE procurement of a substantial amount of INEM equipment (US$1.15 million eauivalent) outside of the nraipnt -- A manaivra rnAeasvnarn largely to avoid further delay with equipment procurement. Of the final cost, only US$12.2 million eauivalent (which excluded equinment nrnrir A na.f-q4A= the project) was submitted for 50% reimbursement; US$1.5 million of unused loan proceeds was _anePlled. INEMs in 1970. The training effort proceeded satisfactorily through 1970 hil 1 U Yi- t 1ca _ t e - r e - *~ r fusl*f~ I*to- fia nc fLO1~ urther technical assistance, halted progress thereafter. Only brief in-service training for TWPM teaher coul be. proide by th prjc uni ed-ucaos Tm ~ ~ ~ ~ - - WYo~i 61L= JJ4UJ=_L ULL.. educators,~ .4--.,A r *fli - .LA LLU=U LW 0 QUIJFJ LL .L ILLL..V INEM operations and the spread of the reform met with limited success, largely dueto_- ac o cotiuiy i Gvenmet uouj~rt. LLIe satl.liteL programl, through which the comprehensive system was to have been spread, was not me ......A. u-m,OUto IJLUVCA LVU U1L.LVe* tit anticipaLed by the Government, the higher INEM teacher salaries provoked resentment on the part of %ou-L4nE secLnay LeaciL, bLate 170, the large differential has been reduced, as has the required teaching load in the INEMs. Further, universIie have, to date, connued to ase entrance examinations on the traditional general secondary curricula, and efforts to establish local INEM advisory comumittees and cooperative arrangements with SENA have failed. The LNUMS mooern facilities and comprehensive curricula have succeeded in providing a better educational environment and a more flexible educational background than the traditional secondary schools. In addition, the schools have introduced co-education on a widespread basis and initiated student counselling and social services. And, in line with project objectives, INEM teachers were found to be more highly qualified than other secondary teachers. An improved quality or teaching or academic subjects has been observed at the INEM's but some underutilization of vocational facilities, particularly in agriculture and industry, appears to be due to teacher inexperience. The need for improved orientation and in-service training for practical teachers, as well as for intensitled ICCE supervision of INEX operations, was recognized as early as 1970 as a result of a self-evaluation of INEM programs undertaken by the project unit educators. However, a shortage of funds, since that time, has prevented full implementation of follow-up measures by the ICCE pedagogic section. Further, some underutilization of vocational facilities has resulted from inclusion of inappropriate streams in particular schools, given local employment opportunities. - iv - INEM operating outcomes have been far less efficient than anticipated. Seve ~fl the 10U 1 schol wereJ'.L operUq~Uating on a A.jtUkle siL-Lft Ot ba i I. 1 07 lu+ school enrollments were expanded somewhat more slowly than planned, totalling 26,9166, Or rr6% of cathpacg1n trge for1197 had- bee 36,000, 75% of capacity. In large measure, the underenrollments can be attributed to school Osizes, iL have proved vtoo l~JJ.arg fort deignat A5.LC- c..atUcen areas, L-0 te.L While the INEMs have generally broadened access to secondary education, the IS.SU~~~~~~~~ US SaL .a.IL iC LLL .LiL %LkI I- LLIC jJLU6~L ai k\.LA ' dL LLLVt: %_LL LL1~ to hamper the access of students from low-income families, and, overall, LCUu L.LHLU Latta aL LlC AlLL ia t L LldVC L adLLtU U11 d di W LI those in the traditional schools, at a low 20% to 25%. INEM budgetary con- straints since 1i7, made more severe by an inefficient staffing policy, nave precluded the provision of student transportation services which would facili- tate eurolIment expansion and perhaps improve retention rates. The magnitude of savings to have been derived from operation of the large-scale INEMs, by comparison with traditional schools (35%), is not reflected in actual operating costs: INEM operating costs per student, at US$260 equivalent (in current prices) in 1974, were 84% greater than the cost per student at the traditional general secondary schools. Adherence to originally planned staffing ratios, at current enrollment rates, would reduce INEM operating costs by roughly 25%, to US$195 equivalent, considered reasonable for the diversified programs offered. Nonetheless, the INEMs, which have, as intended, served as an experimental model for the introduction of the comprehensive philosophy are, under prevailing Colombian conditions, too cost- ly a model on which to base diversification of the entire secondary system. At present, emphasis is being placed on urban common (pre-vocational) facili- ties centers, to be utilized by students attending nearby traditional secondary schools,and on agriculturally-oriented lower-cycle rural comprehensive schools. Conclusive evidence on the employment or further training of INEM graduates is not yet available though initial steps to establish tracer systems are being undertaken. The breakdown of students following the academic and pre-vocational streams has been roughly in line with appraisal estimates but 80% of a sample of 1973 graduates had applied for university entrance. While only 20% were accepted, the high proportion of students wishing to continue on to university is inconsistent with the project's manpower objectives. With regard to preparation and implementation of the first INEM project, the Bank played an important role in economizing on construction costs. As regards procurement of equipment and furniture, however, an effort by the Bank to brief the project unit procurements staff on required bidding procedures, and to recommend higher bid ceilings and bulk purchasing, might have improved the efficiency of procurement and the suitability of equipment. As regards operating outcomes, the Bank might have contributed to a more effective prolect had it encouraged more in-dpnth rpvipw (hovnd nA cohorts, birth rates, etc.) of socio-economic and demographic conditions in -v - tue aduuuol cLtcumu areas anu sensitivity anayses UL VpCKfLl[ Ug L . lil resulting information might have led to decisions to reduce school sizes, os altactively, to earler recognitiun of tne necessity for provision or student transportation services, as well as to the elimination of less apupsiate study options at some of the schools. Further, in view of the Colombians' lack of experience with comprehensive curricula and management of 'Lrge seconuary scuools, the Bank might have recommended an even more reduced and experimental first-phase project, comprising five or six smaller schools, prior to a widespread introduction of the larger comprehensive schools, without permanently violating the project's enrollment expansion and manpower objectives. In respect of loan conditions directly related to implementation of the INEM project, the Bank's insistence on special status for INEM teachers proved detrimental to INEM and to traditional school operations. A salary incentive attached to a smaller project might have provoked less outside teacher resentment. Finally, it appears that the complexity of the planned reform of secondary education and the time and, to some extent, the expenditure neces- sary for its implementation, were underestimated by both the Bank and the Colombians. Disappointing INEM operating efficiencies can be viewed only tangentially as a cause for delayed progress towards the reform. More impor- tantly, the necessary inputs -- especially continuity in Government support, both financial and political, and specifically, initiation of the satellite program, continued exposure of teachers to the comprehensive philosophy and public acceptance of the concept of comprehensive education -- were not forth- coming over the 1968-74 period. In combination with a smaller project, the Bank might have supported detailed planning for the continuing diversification of the traditional academic secondary system as a means to guide the progress of the ongoing reform.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM ON THE COLOMBIA FIKST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 552-UO) I. Introduction 1.01 This performance audit reports on the results of the Colombia First Education Project for which Loan 552-CO of 1968 was fully disbursed by May 1974. It is based on a study of the Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Bank's Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, on relevant docu- ments and important materials from the Bank's files and on discussions held with Bank staff involved with the project. An Operations Evaluation Depart- ment review of the project's implementation, through early 1971, has also provided background material for preparation of the audit report. 1/ The report gives a comprehensive assessment of the project and the Bank's participation in it while the PCR, which is attached and was based on more intensive investigation in Colombia, deals more.fully with the educational aspects of the project. Both the audit report and the PCR are somewhat longer than normally required for presentation under the project performance auditing system, mainly as a result of the complex nature of the project and of the planned reform of the Colombian secondary education system, of which it was a part. II. The Project 2.01 In response to a 1962 Bank recommendation for systematic education sector planning in Colombia, the Government requested planning assistance and during 1964-65 a joint UNESCO/USAID mission (with Bank participation on the steerine committee) was undertaken. In the course of its work, the mission assisted in the identification of priority areas for which early external project assistance might be sought. While the Colombians had placed major emphasis on the achievement of universal primary education, the Bank was unwillin to consider assisting projects at that level in part due to' the incomplete planning for the necessary expansion and improvement of quality of nrimarv edu-ation and to the framented administrative control of the primary system. More importantly, during the early 1960s, the Bank's newly fnrmilted edut,mtion lAndint noliev aimed at sunnortin2 nrolects which would contribute to the build-up of mid-level manpower in borrowing countries. In 196a-6 number of nroects sunnorted by the nlannina mission. mainly in higher education, were discussed with Bank staff; in the following years, some nf these npra. an el1 an nroinrtR at the nrimarv level. received external assistance from sources other than the Bank. The Bank, however, foCnoal f-c atanonn nn another nrinrinal rarnamnelatinn of the planning mission, for project assistance at the secondary level. The expansion, and more importantly, the 4mpravement of the ntiAlity of coneral neonndarv 1/ Bank Operations in Colombia, Report No. Z-18 of May 25, 1972 (pp. 150-153). - 2 - Pdniration wpre considered urgently needed to build an appropriate manpower base for Colombia's agricultural and industrial development. With USAID anist-ance. the Government planned a maior secondary education reform; com- prehensive curricula, emphasizing pre-vocational options and necessitating nw Mrrified farilitiea were to be introduced to replace the mainlv academic university preparatory curricula offered by the existing secondary . n? The rnlmhin r_vernment hegan looking into the nossibility of obtaining Bank assistance for a project comprising the construction and equipp4-g a f4,ro aron of j-mnrahPnaix annnnrv shooA Alurina 1965 and a formal loan request was presented during August 1966. A Bank pre- appra4al m4ca4rn unA a Anvin Mhar 1 QAA 4i1d nrniprt nranAratfon data to be inadequately detailed and during April-May 1967 a UNESCO/USAID project, comprising 19 large comprehensive schools, spread throughout the syllabi, being developed by the Ministry of Education (M0E) and USAID advisors, were saLLl in very Lative fvoru anu tla CatCnueun area s school sites had not been carefully studied. As a result, total enrollment estimates, choices of appropriate vocational specializations and acco-,uany4 enrollment structures for each school had not been completed and draft sched- 1e5 OL. accomIUanunion unu pruject I Iuac v n e mae. Stsosing the importance of on-site research, UNESCO assisted in the more detailed planning for a first school in the Bougua area, planing for other schools was then left to the MOE. In view of likely further delay with project prepa- ration, the Bank recommendec a reduction in the nanber of schools to be COn- sidered under a single project and the Government presented a short list of 10 schools for first loan assistance in Augus 1o0ut1. se revianuing uinu original schools were supported by a second Bank Loan, 679-CO of 1970.) 2.03 By the time of appraisal, during late 1967, preliminary planning for each of the 10 schools had been completed and the Bank's emphasis shifted to important issues related to project justification: cost estimates, both capital and recurrent, appeared high; and, the planned comprehensive schools, with pre-vocational options, I, in contrast to more specialized single-streamed vocational secondary schools, were questioned with regard to optimum invest- ment priorities in terms of immediate manpower needs. As a result of appraisal recommendations, excess construction area was eliminated and capital costs were reduced from an estimated US$18.8 million equivalent to roughly US$15.0 1/ Throughout the Audit Report and the PCR, the term "comprehensive" is used to connote curricula which provide a common core of academic and practical coursework, leading to specialization in one or tne oe. (As compared with traditional US and European comprehensive schools, however, the Colombian model was to De more work-oriented.) Specializa- tion in the practical streams, however, would provide only a general pre-vocational background; graduates would need further short-term vocational training prior to entering the labor market. - 3 - million equivalent. Recurrent costs for the proposed project schools were re-estimated and found to be more economical than those of the existing smaller Government secondary schools operating under inefficient conditions. Economies of scale were expected to result mainly from high utilization factors for staff and facilities at the large comprehensive schools and also from improved retention rates. In addition, the schools, with planned single shift caDacities of 1,500 to 3.000. were to be operated on a double shift basis. 2.04 Confirming the urgent need for formation of skilled workers for ariculture. industry and comerce, the mission supported the planned six- year secondary comprehensive program: the Government considered that the need for mid-level terhnicians could be more efficiently met through provision of comprehensive secondary education, followed by in-service training courses, than hv rnnAtritet-ion of new snecialized vocational schools. Along with well- trained teachers and modern facilities, the comprehensive curricula, comprising ntrnean in humanitia-n Ae-iene.- Industry ariculture- comerce and social services, were to provide an improved general academic education and a common pre-n-inan1 niant-Atinn rn All srudent-. For the rntuhlv 80% of students expected to follow the practical programs in the project schools, there would he 4nnrena4na ammit- r%f ano-inlim-atinn anerinllv in t-he unner evre ------------------------------------ (grades 10 and 11); 20% of students were expected to follow academic curricula. be considered fully trained: others would be expected to proceed to on-the- Jo tranin orLCLu sbr courses offered by SNA ....--j vata "..al.. Aa Aprendizaje) 1/ or the agricultural agencies, before entering the labor as the experimental model for the spread of the comprehensive system; in addition, tLLe schools were to itrouce co uduULatUio. .u U a rurtner coucern u tue appraisal miss.on nl vcu U uL L assurance that adequate numbers of qualified teachers, special staff and school administrators would be prepared to implement the new curricula and manage the large school plants. USAID had already launched a technical assistance program for the training of school administrators and had agreed to support similar efforts for counsellors and for teachers of the new curricula, largely through cooperative programs with local universities. The mission concluded that if these programs were carried out as planned, the project schools could be appropriately staffed. 2.06 Prior to negotiations, an issue which had arisen during project preparation, was finally settled. Original plans for the introduction of comprehensive education had called for its early spread through incorporation of the new curricula into the first four years (grades 6-9) in existing public secondary schools surrounding each new comprehensive school. These satellite 1/ SENA is the semi-autonomous National Apprenticeship Service providing specific technical training for workers at various levels. schools were to have served as feeders mainly into the upper grades of the new schools. In part due to the absence of relevant data on an estimated 50 such schools, the Bank recommended that the satellite proaram not be formally included under the first loan project. Nonetheless, the Bank supported the Government's intent to undertake the program on its own. each comprehensive school was to begin operations in cooperation with at least one official satellite school. 2.07 Nevotiations were carried out in June 1968- Onlv minor changa were made in the draft loan documents but the negotiating team raised aniqtions rewardinL qeveral loan rondition. The Bank had renmemnded the use of the double shift system in all schools from the beginning of operations iil- narppd t-n thp deontin-no r.amiP%t- to nn.ztnnr- V-nat- rnrcaat dAra it 1Q7rS in view of the anticipated complexity of management of the large new schools. Secondly, the nenntianr nvenlined thn t whi i-o en4u0rcl 1-gaa hna accaeted in principle the concept of comprehensive secondary education, their autonomy -recl ued an-, nasurance,asn requested-by ht he Ban, i-hat -nrado-,ae nf ith0 nOL schools would be admitted to universities on an equal basis with graduates of the traditional system; nonetheless, the relevant loan conditio n wa reained Finally, the negotiators suggested difficulties likely to arise from implemen- afn of an ,agr eesalar i4.nrenaseno t.-a-ners. in the na.ew schools aitneA to promote full-time appointment of qualified teachers in contrast to the tradition of low teces __11--_o and s-hecrnmma.n practric -f 0C -p-lk~4- 4-, more than one school) without a corresponding increase for secondary school condition. 2.08 The loan agreement was signed on July 31, 1968 and the loan, in ~~ .-C ' i ct £ 1-1 - .. -. - 1ff0 In - .r ___3J. 11L- - 11vb~ LLe amontULL , uLJ I.U MULJLI, Was LU J VeL IUU/o UL LU1"X.LL t:tAULLgU d4&U ILt/a of local costs of the estimated US$15.15 million equivalent project (including contingencies) . The agreed project consisted in construction, furnishing and equipping of the 10 comprehensive schools (Institutos Nacionales de Educacion Media, INEMs) and construction of 10 staff houses. All schools were to be operating on a double shift basis by 1975, at 75% of the 48,000 enrollment capacity (PCR 6.01). 2.09 The project was to be implemented during 1968-71 by a project unit set up in a semi-autonomous agency, OAPEC (Oficina Administrativa para Programas Educativos Gonjuntos), charged with the planning and execution of all MOE school construction projects. The unit would be responsible for curricula preparation and the coordination of teacher training as well as for construction and procurement, and was to be staffed with a director, a full-time project architect, a full-time project educator (all Bank approved) and the requisite support staff. Consultant architects were to be retained for design and supervision of civil works with assistance from regular OAPEC technical staff. 2.10 Loan conditions were standard in content and important supplementary letters specified project administration requirements and educational objectives. Among educational objectives not previously mentioned were the continuation of an ongoing reorganization of the MOE and OAPEC, 1/ to improve efficiency; a review of agricultural education at the primary and econdary leveil, completion of the new INEM curricula, with assistance from relevant agencies, including SENA, by 1969; and, the formation of local advisory commueiees for each INEM, to provide links with agriculture, industry and business. 2.11 The loan agreement became effective on November 4, 1968, after specified conditions -- final acquisition of school sites, establishment of the project unit and receipt by the Bank of the Government's legal opinion -- had been fulfilled. 11. Project Implementation 3.01 Civil works under the project were satisfactorily carried out. Nine of the 10 schools were completed on schedule, during 1970, and the final school was completed during 1972. Procurement of equipment, however, was seriously delayed and, as a result, the final closing date was postponed by more than two years to May 1974. The total cost of the project, US$13.35 million equivalent, was 12% less than the US$15.15 million equivalent appraisal estimate (which included contingencies at 14.5%) due mainly to a reduction in equipment procured directly under the project. With regard to the project's educational objectives, the new curricula were completed on schedule and first introduced in grades 6 and 7, and in grades 8 and 9, academic only, during 1970-71. The introduction of the comprehensive curricula and new teaching and administrative techniques to prospective INEM staff and to teachers in the traditional system proceeded satisfactorily through 1970; thereafter, the effort declined. Other measures included in the supplementary letter on educational objectives, intended to support the efficiency and effectiveness of INEM operations as well as the larger reform effort, have either largely failed or not yet been implemented. Civil Works 3.02 While nine of the project schools were completed by 1970, the final school, at Cartagena, was delayed by two years due to contractor problems. The 10 staff houses were deleted from the project, with Bank approval; housing requirements were met in other ways (PCR 5.11). 3.03 The quality of completed schools varied (PCR 5.17) in part due to unequal performance by local contractors and to the minimal construction neriod which strained the effectiveness of ICCE sunervisory staff. In addition, some inadequate detailing of architectural specifications by onnultant architects left design gans which could only be rnrrerted durina the actual construction period. Integration of design and supervisory functions (ag under the second loan) might have imnrnved the Pffiriency of construction. L .La&g-=% 1969 re rg ni ao.Ln *.j.L o L LW"1V.LGLW %A %"&90 L.& =0 O 04. L-M a 1969 reorganization. - 6 - 3.04 The INEMs, all large modern structures, are appropriately con- structed of brick, concrete and steel. (Only the Cartagena INEM suffered major defects as a result of inadequate soil studies.) The finished schools reflect some excesses in space allocation (PCR 5.09) and impracticalities with regard to plumbing and electrical installations as well as with windows and doors, which are too light to meet security needs (PCR 5.14). Maintenance manuals have been provided to INEM administrators, but direct supervision by ICCE has been minimal and budgetary allocations have never reached the 1% to 1.5% of construction costs per year required under the loan agreement. Procurement 3.05 Equipment and furniture lists were prepared carefully by educators representing the MOE, teachers and the project unit. Despite the thorough- ness of preparation, delays began to occur after tenders began to be called in mid-1969. At first, the ad hoc and understaffed procurement section in the project unit suffered from lack of familiarity with the types of equipment to be procured and inexperience with the Bank's guidelines for international competitive bidding. Specifications were not always complete, and in some cases, guidelines were not adhered to in evaluation of bids. Notably, the Bank required a re-evaluation of bids for furniture, where a higher than the agreed 15% preference had been applied to domestic goods. 3.06 Further inefficiencies arose during 1970. Adherence to low bid ceilings. in part resulting from ICCE's desire to stay within the aRreed project equipment allocation, contributed to substantial variation in the types and quality of equipment acceptable for contract awards. Planned utilization of bulk purchasing gave way to award of piecemeal contracts. In the Process. the number of bids to be evaluated grew to rouLhlv 3.000 (PCR 5.20, 5.30). The complexity of bid evaluation, necessary to fulfill inter- natinnal enmn t-1tivP hiddinc rPnuirPment.. in turn l-d to an incomnlPte consideration of performance and installation factors and further delayed procurement. As a reu1t, the con1 hogan operations during lnt. 1970 with only one-half of equipment items installed; and, finally, a substantial amount to avoid the complex procurement procedures and further delay. 3.07 Towards the end of 1970, and thereafter, the issuance of import "cese fo c.n. m.Aontrce oods. waso delayedA m-anl -- a1 n raeslt o~f lengt hy, administrative procedures. The Bank assisted in resolving the problem by procedures for storage, delivery and installation of goods were inefficient; WL.L.Lt IL11LPLUVCLI1rCHL W&1I i1ldUC LUWALUD LlC CU VL LLIC FLL.UL=iLLL. p A u . Lu average delay between arrival at the port of entry and installation of im- ported goods was 6.5 months Luhuuguh1 iI, andu p-iiferage vecame a pruvblem (PCR 5.21). 3.08 By the end of the implementation period the 10 I14EAs had received all furniture and almost all equipment as planned. Partially as a result of the piecemeal procurement process, however, workshop and laboratory equipment is over-diversified and some inadequate specifications were not -7- UeLecLU kra .4\ J J.Lg u J * rJU. * tiULL,LL L U UC Uk OPCokC PILLa 1OD CLa some industrial and agricultural equipment malfunctioning (PCR 6.11) and IL L.y am U 1 L ov1dalLCie mshave pLVCU eV \esi k *PC\ I .JU] LL A ust L.L1U procurements staff, continually recommended by the Bank throughout project AmyflmmuLaJLIn wuuLU LIave AILLUVZU LLM C-LL.L9.;.L=LUY UL pLUrULeILe HUW=VZL, a permanent procurements section, reporting directly to ICCE management, was ormeu only during 173. And, as allowed under more recent Bank guidelines, the use of local competitive bidding and/or local shopping, where appropriate, might also have reduced delay associated with compliance to required interna- tional competitive bidding procedures -- mainly, the prolonged evaluation process and the award of numerous small contracts. Project costs 3.09 Although construction costs rose about 10-15% between 1967 and 1971, cost control measures, including adjustments of designs and specifications to lower square meter costs, and minimal area reductions, were applied to detailed architectural drawings at Bank recommendation in 1969. As a result, construction costs were held close to the appraisal estimates (shown in PCR 5.22) without significantly altering planned educational utilization of the buildings and the cost per actual student place constructed was close to the US$275 equivalent appraisal estimate. The cost of site development, however, exceeded the appraisal estimate of US$1.17 million equivalent by 105% largely as a result of underestimation of the necessary quantity of earthworks. Over- runs were offset mainly from savings in the furniture/equipment category. 3.10 The loan disbursement pattern reflected the delays with procurement as well as the reduced amount of equipment procured under the project, with major disbursements made towards the end of the construction period in 1970-71, and smaller and slower disbursements, thereafter (PCR Annex 3). Delayed disbursements also resulted from lack of familiarity, on the part of the project unit's accounting section, with Bank withdrawal procedures. At Bank recommendation, additional staff were hired in 1971, but little improvement was made and the Bank sent a special Controllers Department mission to assist the accounting section during 1972. The loan was disbursed at 45.7% of total project costs, but at the agreed overall 50% of the US$12.2 million expenditures submitted for reimbursement (which excluded ICCE expenditures of US$1.15 million on the equipment items procured outside the prolect). It was planned to finance additional items from unallocated funds, but during the final staies of implementation, no reauests were submitted for Bank approv- al and US$1.5 million of unused loan funds was cancelled. Curricula Development and Staff Training 3.11 In line with the planned reform of secondary education and the construrtinn and niinning of the fir.t romnrPhPn.ivP aehnlq indpr thp project, emphasis had been placed on the preparation of new curricula and nPr.QnnnP1 ton imnpmpnt- thpm- riirririi1n_ inpirepe with ncci-tAr frnm TPRATT) - 8 - andu 11AU.LA-U-4 Lan e ucL.aLtors, were fina.L~tle U)' L* pCAa6J t g4 e-JLjJ. .11t &j - unit (comprising 32 educators) prior to introduction during 1970. They ICCE project unit. 3.12 The training effort, begun with USAID assistance during 1967, progesse satsfctorilyJ1. thog the.. end. of. 17l1U. LJUL.LJLr, 1:V I JJ Colombian universities participated in orientation and in-service courses on the comprehensive curricula; of the roughly 1,600 participating teachers, 356 were actually appointed to the INEM schools (PCR 6.27). A further 26 administrators and 20 counsellors were trained under USAID grants specifically for the INEM schools. 3.13 After 1970, the training of teachers and administrators for the planned reform came to a standstill. The universities suffered strikes which halted the training courses begun in 1971. Further, USAID technical assistance, on a grant basis, had been fully utilized by mid-1971 and contrary to plans, the Government refused to support the necessary continued assistance out of USAID program loan funds. The burden of training fell exclusively to the project unit educators, who, as a result of budgetary constraints, were confined to providing only brief in-service orientation for in-coming INEM teachers, without follow-up. Educational Objectives 3.14 A lack of continuity in Government and public backing impeded ful- fillment of loan conditions intended to support efficient operations at the INEM schools and the spread of the comprehensive system. Declining Government support, evident mainly after 1970, is partially attributable to a reduced planning emphasis on the expansion and improvement of secondary education, to frequent political turnover, and to some extent to financial constraints. Resistance to the special status assigned to the teachers in the rather large experimental project, and socio-political sensitivities aroused by the introduction of the INEMs and the concept of comprehensive education, have also detrimentally affected project implementation and progress towards the planned reform. Finally, and partially as a result of the lack of success with implementation of agreed supplementary measures in support of INEM opera- tions, emphasis is now centered on newer models for diversification of Colombia'E secondary system. 3.15 A new education sector plan, presented in 1970, assigned highest priority to the provision of universal primary education, grades 1-5. eventually to be extended to a compulsory nine-year basic cycle. Further nrioritv was naced on early orovision of nrimarv facilities in rural areas. which were seriously under-represented in the Colombian education system. The changing poliry emnhanis accounts in nart for trends in the overall expansion rates of primary and secondary education over the period: the - 9 - growth in the primary enrollment ratio has been more rapid than projected at appraisal; secondary enrollments have expanded more slowly, reaching 25! rather than the nrniected 37% of the relevant age group (PCR 4.02. 4.03). 1/ 3.16 Desnite the imnortance attached to expansion of primary facilities, the new plan continued, in principle, to support the INEM schools and the comprehensive reform. Judgments on the imnortance of the INEM proiect by the two Governments (and several Ministers of Education) in office since 1970 have been nositive enough to allow for the nhvRieal romnletion of the project but not to promote the full implementation of educational and reform nhiarrive - 3.1 Frequ-ent .prolitical tunoe and chaging. perceptIons- of the -EM project also filtered down to the ICCE project unit, impeding project im- nlawton r nrt-inn U4ahor landF Tr'rv ar3!ff andj irx~asr trol e i - nr nrn4o^1- unit staff underwent frequent changes. While the relatively smooth progress wit thL proFLjects cos tructionL1.pLrogtrami can' Ue .largl"5t L.L UUL L.I L.AIO continued presence of the original project architect through 1971, the pro- curement, pLepartionU o peLsonnel, evaluation (of curricula) ad schUol supervision sections suffered periodically from unfilled positions and turnover (rCn 5.u). as a result, an important ratiunale for placing the project unit within the semi-autonomous ICCE -- to isolate it from political considerations -- was largely eroded. in addition, the THEM operations have been separated from the rest of the secondary system and the more general planning efforts of the MOE. An original plan to shift control of wne inEns to the MOE, after a strengthening of the latter's planning, supervisory and evaluation departments, nas not yet been implemented. The absence of strong cooperative ties with the MOE, SENA and the universities further weakened the position of the ICCE project unit in regard to implementation/enforcement or special loan conditions. 3.18 In a climate of deteriorating support, aggravated by national financial constraints, already sensitive measures related to the project's educational objectives proved politically untenable. As anticipated by the Colombian negotiating team, the granting of special status to INEM teachers, in the form of two-thirds higher salaries than those of teachers in existing secondary schools, under conditions of full time employment (44 hours/week, including 26 hours of direct contact), provoked resentment on two sides: authorities correctly predicted the loss of better qualified teachers to the INEMs and the existing teachers' union protested the higher INEM salaries. After long strikes by non-INEM teachers, the Government has been forced to narrow the salary differential; by 1974, INEM teachers earned only 25% higher 1/ While Colombia's current secondary enrollment ratio is low by South Amandame ~ ~ ~ 4 U--A-A Ue --- k----- Ulama 1 ..- - LF t- 11 -- -- J 1LCL.LA.OLL 0 LLLu, L6 n1CO U==11 %LumpaLauJ W.LL i Vie eunoument LatsU in other countries with similar GDPs per capita, shown in the Bank's L&arUCL tablLe, Cuomparti~ve EducaLtion J[1UXLU[S1-. - 10 - salaries. In response, INEM teachers went on strike to demand more equal wrkinv conditions: their teaching load now averages less than 20 hours/week, as in the traditional schools, and the tendency to break full-time rules has increased (PCR 6.39). 3.19 It has also proved impossible, thus far, to establish appropriate arrangements with the Colombian universities to insure an equitable admissions Doliev for INEM graduates. The universities have continued to base entrance examinations on the traditional academic secondary curricula, indicating fnrmalv_ at- lPqt_ a discriminatory oolicv azainst graduates of the compre- hensive schools. 1/ 3.20 Similarly, possible infringement on SENA's autonomy appears to have . 4.4. -atn1 hl4chmort- nf rnnpratiup ormmPnt-, With thp TNEM-: SENA was to have provided assistance for curricula planning and training courses for TNEM graduates. And the fnilllrp t-n Pqtahli.-h the rernipred local advisory committees for the schools, to provide links with local business, appar t 1-e- due, mainly1.. to- a desire by, eduaional auithriri ties t-r nrP17Pnt- the loss of the INEMs' political independence (PCR 6.33). 3.21 Further, the planned satellite program (not officially included under ± I ItU. - -ULL A4 e t-hn. UL~ a1-f1 --O~ INEMs fed students into the new schools, but they were not themselves provided te necessary support to aU pt tne compen1u1 veL- - 4- L . U - -I- my as intended. The satellite program had been envisaged as the means by which to spread the comprehensive system; without its implementation, and outside of Bank-supported projects, the traditional system remains unchanged. 3.22 Finally, the efficiency of INEM operating outcomes (discussed in the next section) has been far less than anticipated, in large mueasue due to the Government's accession to the reduced teacher loads and to an ineffi- cient staffing policy. The disappointing early INEM operatUg outcoUmes appear to have reinforced the declining Government support of the schools, which included the allocation of austerity budgets for INEM operations. Most recently, the secondary diversification effort has focussed on smaller urban common (pre-vocational) facilities centers and lower cycle agriculturally oriented rural comprehensive schools (The Bank is assisting with both types of facilities under its third loan, 920-GO of 1973.) IV. Operating Outcomes of the Project 4.01 The INEM facilities and comprehensive curricula have thus far provided a more flexible educational background and a better educational environment than the traditional Colombian secondary schools. And, in line 1/ It should be mentioned, however, that ICFES (the semi-autonomous Colombian IHSLLUL LUL LIte D%CVelUpment of Highler ucoL nl '-as rcently vDegun an evaluation of INEM programs and graduates with the objective of altering LradliOaJ1 university LLraLLe edmilLna-ULIb LUL 1vNrL canuluates. unt rently, it is planned that the new examinations would be utilized, at least by the State Universities, beginning in 1977. - 11 - with project objectives, INEM teachers were found to be more highly qualified, in terms of educational background, than teachers in non-project schools (PCR 6.26). However, in 1974, school enrollments had reached only 75% of the planned 36,000 targeted for the following school year and important indicators of improved efficiency, on which the project schools were largely justified -- higher retention rates, economical student:teacher ratios and student:staff ratios -- had not been achieved. While it is still too early to fully assess the schools' external productivity with regard to the project's manpower objectives, available information suggests that a disproportionately high proportion of INEM graduates wish to continue on to universities. The INEM Programs 4.02 Conclusions drawn from student interviews conducted by the PCR mission at five project schools suggest that the majority of INEM students has a positive attitude towards programs of study and practical work, per se (PCR 6.09). The current student workload, 44 hours or less per week, is appropriate, as is the scheduling of students' class time over the six-year program -- with 31% of time allocated for specializations, 63% for general academic courses and 6% for optional or remedial courses. The experimental educational objective of the project schools -- to provide the more flexible comprehensive programs, utilizing modern student-centered teaching techniques -- has, however, suffered some alteration. Disciplinary and performance problems have necessitated the introduction of more rigid than planned requirements for students, including a reduction in the time allocated for optional courses in student schedules. Further, a tendency on the parts of educational authorities to view remedial courses (introduced in the INEMs to replace the traditional and inefficient system of renetition) as an indica- tion of poor quality has led to the elimination of a growing number of students on the haqiq of inadequate nerformance (PCR 6.23). A._0 The imnrnvPd nualit of TNEM tPnrhre han nntrfhuted rn more effective teaching, particularly in the academic subjects (PCR 7.08). However, limited exnnuire to the new rurrienla and tearhino techniiq and a lark of reinforcement by INEM supervisory staff, may in part account for underutiliza- d±on of onma nf i-ha -newy apecia J.Q f_d-14-,-a nn nvpment.6T npar-ticular, the teachers for agriculture and industry still tend to lack pedagogical and p acticl experiencea..a (Corloia.n u.niva.esi4 tie trann.n. -n1- F-- -r'A-r4, subjects. Under the Bank's second loan, advisors for agricultural and indus- .tia curr...4cu.la deve.lopmen and .n IteacAer-t-aln4n were. 4-o l.e reained,a 1-Ut Lt~~~~~~~~~~~ La %At j. *#..L uC V .JEL_L al. L.O L Lt.L 5 W L U U~ A. --a.S~C arrangements were finalized only during 1973-74.) Similarly, until recently, S LUUent uL. UL. L_Lio o1c. guidUance. counllors,UJ 4LLU4~ intouedfrtP ILe .44 firs LtiMee~ 1. the INEMs, has been minimal, suggesting an early inadequate understanding of the services available on the part of 'principals, teachers and students (see also PCR 6.17)-. 4.04 The need for increased utilization of guidance services as well as Lor more thorough pre- and In-service traIuIIg Lor eacners o practical subjects was cited by the project unit educators in an early self-evaluation - 12 - study basea on rirst year (i9iu) operating outcomes. also recommenuu were increased ICCE supervision of INEM operations and on-going evaluation, and modification of mNEM programs of study. Unfortunately, budgetary constraints, and to a lesser extent, staff turnover, have impeded the continual follow-up procedures originally planned by the project unit educators. Student Enrollments and Access 4.05 Though seven of the ten schools are currently operating on a double shift basis, 1974 enrollments totalled only 26,966 students, 56% of total double shift capacity (PCR 6.01). Slow, and in a few cases only marginal or even negative enrollment growth rates can be attributed to some extent to the Government's allocation of austerity budgets for INEM operations since 1972, to the introduction of selective entrance examinations and to higher than anticipated dropout rates. More importantly, and especially in the absence of provision of student transportation services, the schools have generally proved too large for the designated catchment areas. And, despite the initial effort to present the comprehensive schools with pre-vocational streams as an attractive choice, there is a tendency to view the INEMs as a second best option, as compared with the traditional secondary schools which prepare students for university entrance, and even as a means to force low-income students into non-academic vocational careers (PCR 6.02). 4.06 The INEMs have succeeded in broadening access for girls as well as boys through the introduction of co-education, and student interviews con- ducted by the PCR mission at five project schools (see PCR Annex 2) indicate that the project schools have catered for students from middle- and lower- income families (PCR 6.05). Despite minimal school fees, however, other types of costs continue to hamper the access, or to promote the dropout, of low- income students. The INEMs, located mainly on the outskirts of the depart- mental capitals, have extensive catchment areas. Bus fares, while nominal (USd5), are apparently prohibitive for low-income families (PCR 6.02). More- over, the INEMs have buses but lack funds for providing a student transporta- tion service. Further, principals interviewed suggested that the six year secondary education program is considered too long a period by low-income parents: often students must quit the program to begin earning money (PCR 6.24). 4.07 The structure of enrollments by specialization has been close to the annrnign1 Pqtimate for the ten schools according to the PCR upper cycle sample, grades 10-11 only (PCR 6.04). The estimates were, however, based on global projections of manpower needs- and not tailoredi Rpecfically to local opportunities in the areas surrounding the schools. As a result, utili- zation of the various vocational facilities is uneven among schools- of the three project schools visited by the PCR mission and offering the agricultural itsiown, LW e CPPtangU aU ULLupoustv res sed tla tid em andd.(i the excepton its own, reflecting a positive response to local demand. (With the exception of. agrcultre al sLCdL.~Ltamsi wer -ntr ALLUCe 4.t n1 echUI of Le te scol - 13 - Internal Efficiency 4.08 Actual student: teacher ratios in sample schools varied from 13:1 to 18:1, instead of the planned 25:1, mainly as a result of overstaffing. Each year, new teachers are hired on the basis of planned enrollment growth for the following year. Slower than planned enrollment expansion, especially since 1972, has not been accompanied by a reduction in the hiring of teachers. The student: administrative staff ratio at the sample schools has averaged 34:1 rather than the planned 45:1 (PCR 6.34). In contrast to the teacher situation, essential administrative support is more a function of the characteristics of the schools' physical facilities than that of enrollment sizes. Nonetheless, the numbers of teachers and other staff in the project schools are uneconomically high; there have been no attempts to consolidate small classes in core subjects, or administrative duties. Administrative efficiency has further suffered from frequent turnover of principals, whose performance largely determines the quality of operations, and from appointment of unqualified administrative personnel (PCR 6.34). 4.09 Apart from economic constraints on lower income students and poor performance. INEM dropouts have also resulted from prolonged teachers' strikes (PCR 6.24). And, a small number of students leave the INEMs early, by choice, to enter SENA training programs or to attend another secondary school with the hope of obtaining easier access to the university. Overall, despite plans for improvine efficienev in this area. INEM retention rates have remained on a par with those in the traditional system at a low 20%-25% over the six year secondary cycle (PCR 6.221. 4-10 AA a rpuI1t of oneratine inefficiencies the recurrent costs of the INEMs have been increasing each year. The average annual recurrent cost per -tndent at the five Ramnle Achnnl wa- nnit- TS92AA aqiivalent in 1Q74 (in constant 1970 prices) as compared to US$206 in 1970. 1/ The increase has nrcr,irrPri enHrely in the alArv rntanry: tpnrhinv scnff ws Pwnanded nnd the average teaching load per teacher was reduced. The total increase in real salary costs per student, T-asaou 46 (PrP A im Ri wit non- salary expenditures (including maintenance and consumable materials) have dPrrAnQed in nhanli-ea teria ech that the averall ^anating enate npr atudent increased by only 30% in constant prices. Salaries, thus, have absorbed an budgets, imposed by the Government for INEM operations beginning in 1973, have U~~ii Upp.L~II~iIE,i;o a.L..L.LWLL0 , CIL. LLLC A~ A . ~U L.L.ULL .LL pLLlane construction projects, and indispensable INEM expenditures have been covered. But, Le declining proportion allucatedu ur nou-salary expenitures nas con- tributed to the slow enrollment expansions in the project schools. it uZ equivalent figures derived from run o.3o. Me average rate or cumu- lative increase in teachers' salaries, 36%, was used to convert the 1974 Col$ average recurrent cost per student to constant 1970 Col$. Operating costs for 1970 and 1974, in constant 1970 Col$, were then converted to US$ equivalents at the exchange rate of 1970. - 14 - 4.11 Contrary to appraisal estimates, INEM operating costs per student have been substantially higher than average costs in the traditional secondary system. 1/ Preparation documents had suggested that INEM operating costs per student would be greater, by as much as 75%, than those in existing secondary schools. The main cost reducing assumptions introduced during appraisal appear to have been an increase in the student/staff ratio, from 31:1 to 45:1. and the introduction of the double shift, which implied some savings in non-salary expenditures (maintenance and overheads); but, these changes would not have significantlv reduced the estimate for recurrent costs per student. The magnitude of the appraisal estimate of savings to be derived from the nntimnl iit1iqtinn of the INEM schools. with their diversified facilities and highly qualified teachers, which was expected to be on the Order Of 357 of operating Paosts of the tradtional schonls in not reflected in actual operating costs: in 1974, recurrent costs per student at the INEMs, m-ldd -,. 1Jc9AO .n,,4%r l a,i- (4n f%t,ivrgrant- n-rrcz) irmorp R/L57 crrpnf-r than the US$141 equivalent cost per student in the traditional academic secondary Schools whI4ch sti411 acccount for about 70% of total public secondary choo%l enrollments. Even under optimal enrollment and staffing conditions and despite theC redcUJ tin inL salaryL difrnil the. !NE CLp---..L.4-- would be greater than those for the traditional academic schools, as shown in El"A.I V 'fL. k.LL shiouuU Ue notedL~ thLat t _ a SU0S poor quality, have improved their efficiency by absorbing greater enrollments cultural schools are more expensive than the INEMs, at US$314 equivalent per studet11 pe vear kLin current pri.ces' A ~.L i.LC~ tU~ at current enrollment levels would reduce INEM operating costs by roughly a Lili, LU US175 eqUivaleniL per stuutL peL aL, LUniUeLCU LCaoUale LfL the type of education provided, and should be pursued (PCR 6.42). Further, a more efficient staffing policy couu free fuunds LLL PLUviU.L studun Ltans- portation services which would facilitate enrollment expansion and perha' improve retention rates. 4.12 The INE- schools have, as intended, served as an experimental model for the planned diversification of the secondary system, and implemen- tation of the INEM project provided valuable experience to Colomoian eauca- tors, particularly in the fields of school administration and supervision, curricula development and evaluation and the hiring and training of personnel. However, the schools, themselves modeled on alien prototypes, have generally proved too costly a model on which to base the diversification of the entire secondary system in the Colombian context. As mentioned, the present diversi- fication effort is concentrated on the newer common facilities centers and the rural comprehensive schools. Both types of facilities appear to represent a more practicable interim approach to diversification of Colombian secondary education than the INEMs, the former by utilizing the existing traditional schools, as called for under the original satellite program, and the latter 1/ The appraisal estimate for 1972 INEM operating costs was US$113 equivalent per studeRL. LL is UseU oUn 17UJ prices andU cnverl ncu -u-L UO.. at ) u 1967 exchange rate. (No explanation is given to support its derivation.) ine esrimate fOr the traditiOnalL ScIuoS, UD?1- e quIVa lcLt, ±5 ab,SUUU to have been calculated on the same basis. - 15 - by narrowing fields of specialization to those most relevant to local condi- tions. Whe,ther the new, cetr wi,411 o,,ffav frn,n Oia - Vw a ^-f .n4"4-atv.- tive and staffing inefficiencies and public criticisms as the earlier INEMs, change in the use of the existing INEMs. If the plan is implemented, the mon. wouV Ltuv Lu vuwa.. naLLIIJ jJIusJ6Ldmei unLy, w uppeL eye re secoui1ary (grades 10 and 11) and post-secondary (grades 12 and 13) students. And, in tne sut r LU, witn trauional ur feeuer scnools continuing to offer general academic programs, a problem of underutilization of the INEMs could External Productivity . sviaence on tne employment or tne rirst ILNEIM graouates, or late 1973, is limited (PCR 6.31) but available information shows that about 5% enrolled in technical level institutions or in SENA training programs and 20%, out of 80% taking entrance examinations, were accepted for university entrance. The high proportion of graduates wishing to continue on to university is inconsistent with the project's manpower objectives, and reflects the con- tinuing prejudice against vocational careers. Nevertheless, the university acceptance ratio of INEM graduates, 1 in 4, is low; as mentioned, an equitable admissions policy for INEM students has not been formally agreed. Another 25% of graduates were employed in occasional jobs and 50% were unemployed or not continuing with further training. These outcomes, however, are prelimi- nary: the early studies have covered only a small sample of schools and have traced students too soon after graduation to provide conclusive findings as yet (PCR 6.31). It is also too early to judge the quality of INEM graduates, vis-a-vis further training programs and labor market needs, but in cooperation with ICCE educators, many of the schools plan to continue to develop tracer systems in order to make appropriate curricula changes and to improve guidance services. However, as discussed, other important measures for ensuring the appropriateness of curricula and community support for the INEMs, the coopera- tive arrangements with SENA and the local advisory committees, have not materialized. V. The Bank's Role 5.01 With regard to the preparation and implementation of the project, the Bank can be credited for its continued emphasis on cost control measures for construction works. Adherence to the Bank's recommendation to eliminate excess construction areas during final preparation reduced estimated capital costs of the project significantly, from roughly US$19.0 million equivalent to US$15.0 million. Reductions, mainly in design standards. undertaken as a result of the Bank's 1969 review of detailed architectural plans, served to keep construction costs in line with the appraisal estimate. By contrast. had the Bank more carefully reviewed proposed earthworks under the project and the soils studies for the Cartaeena school. more accurate detailed nlan- ning might have resulted, and the now necessary corrective measures for the Cartagena school might have been avoided. - 16 - 5.02 As regards procurement under the project, the Bank might have improved the efficiency of implementation had it devoted a short amount of time during early implementation to briefing project unit personnel on the required competitive bidding procedures, as it became evident that early delays were in part attributable to inadequate understanding of those procedures. Thereafter, had the Bank encouraged higher bid ceilings and bulk purchasing, the proliferation of bids and the resulting over-diversifi- cation of equipment might have been largely avoided and ICCE might not have resorted to procuring equipment outside of the project. The Bank did con- tinually recommend establishment of a permanent procurement section in ICCE, but such a unit was created only by 1973; its creation might have been required as a condition for the second loan. 5.03 Outside of its maior contribution to the efficient preparation and implementation of the construction program, Bank participation during the veriod of proiect preparation was limited. largely as a result of the coovera- tive arrangements with the USAID/UNESCO teams. Despite the relative thorough- ness of project preparation, a more concentrated Bank input at that time, particularly with regard to the locations and planned sizes of schools and the estimates for onerating costs. might have contributed to a strengthening of background information on which decisions on school sizes, and the final size of the project itself, were based. rini ;itpn for the 1nrcy -choR. rhoen aftPr thp qpnernl dPriRinnq on school enrollment sizes had been made, were limited to low-priced lands on the mutskirts of thao minr r1nmbiancitipc Tn thp nhconri of nccurncr on t1he planned growth pattern of the cities (PCR 6.02c), more consideration might hav ben gvento the relationtship ewe the locatio-s and the -I-es of the schools: the Bank might have encouraged the gathering and analysis of informaJt ion.L onfl exist.in hous, ingLOLL, industriL ..al, agricu lturaS l&t and tIl~& comecal activities and means of transportation in the areas surrounding each school ±UL ii Ud~..iL6 L UL LL~U1. Ziii _' 1, ,[\ _X J .'JUJ . ITIL-L-L U L..Jauu I'L L Bank had stressed the importance of on-site investigation, the tailoring of lte Size U' each SCh1UU LU LI IIitUmdlate n1CCU u L catdbLlUntL aea was incomplete. More careful review of prevailing socio-economic and demographic conditions in the areas surrounding each school might have lea to uecisious to reduce school sizes, or at least to the recognition that provision of student transportation services would be a definite requirement. In addition, decisions to eliminate less appropriate study options at some of the INEMs might have been made. 5.05 Similarly, more thorough consideration of recurrent project costs, based on sensitivity analyses of alternative operating outcomes, might have affected final decisions on school sizes. The appraisal estimates for recurrent costs per pupil were based on optimal operating conditions at the project schools which have not materialized; no signiticant improvement in the efficiency of operations of traditional schools over time was assumed. Given the important emphasis placed on the savings to be obtained from the - 17 - U& .LJ~A A A -LctlJ. .L1i.A-J ---1IVU-LM c10 CUIIIJL_t:!U U LIM LLaU.LLUL1 schools, possible alternative operating costs, developed by Bank staff or aS ank rcone nduuaLt'Ln, woulu have strengtheneU tne daa base ror final decisions on schools' sizes. 5.06 Operating outcomes at the project schools suggest that despite the considerable joint effort put into project preparation, the INEM schools nave proved too large and costly under prevailing Colombian conditions. The Colombians Lack ofL famtliarity with comprehensive curricula and management of large-sized secondary schools might have prompted the Bank to recommend a mure experimenal Lirsc-phase project, perhaps comprising rive or six smaller schools. Further, although the Bank and the Colombians viewed the construction of 19 INEMs as a single national program, the Bank might have recommended a minimal postponement of agreement on construction of the remain- ing schools, perhaps untli il-72: by that time, indicators of inefficiencies arising in INEM operations had begun to emerge and the problems associated WLLn setting up local INEM advisory committees and cooperative arrangements with SENA and the universities were evident. While somewhat smaller, the second mNEn project schools (planned to cater for a total double shift enrollment of 31,000) have apparently suffered some of the same operating inefficiencies as the earlier INEMs. The Bank might have delayed agreement on a second loan until some of the conditions intended to support efficient and effective INEM operations had been implemented. In this manner, more effective utilization of Bank and Colombian investment in the remaining INEMs might have been achieved. 1/ 5.07 In respect of loan conditions directly related to implementation of the INEM project, the Bank was made aware of likely problems to be encountered with regard to the required special status of INEM teachers and early in- troduction of the double shift system. In view of the substantial number of teachers required for the large project, the Bank's insistence on higher salaries for INEM teachers was inappropriate and detrimentally affected INEM and traditional school operations. A smaller, more experimental project might have incorporated salary incentives as a means to attract qualified full-time teachers without provoking outside resentment. A more gradual Bank requirement for double shift operations might also have been more appropriate; the lighter administrative load permitted under single shift operations could have improved the efficiency of early INEM operations. I WHaAC a DmdLLACL APLUJL uAn jJUCULg 4LU/UL d pUsLUemetL UL tHE scLUnU phase project, would have militated against the immediate objective of expanuig secouuary enrulmes, tue equally important objective oL pro- viding-qualified graduates, who with further short-term vocational/tech- nical training could cnter the Colombian labor market, might have been enhanced. Successful arrangements with SENA and local enterprises, and implementation or the satellite program, would likely have contributed to a more positive public attitude towards the INEM vocational programs as well as to the establishment of an early and continuing review of the adequacy and appropriateness of the INEM vocational training provided. - 18 - 5.08 Despite agreement on loan conditions intended to support the spread of comprehensive education throughout the secondary system, the Bank's direct contribution was limited to the INEM project. In retrospect, the delay with the planned reform is justifiable to the extent that operating outcomes have shown the INEMs to be a less economical model than anticipated, particularly in respect of staffing policy, slow enrollment growths and low retention rates. The larger issue, however, appears to be that the complexity of the planned reform and the time and support necessary for its implementation were under- estimated by both the Bank and the Government. (Comprehensive education was to have been provided to 28% of the existing secondary school population by 1975.) The necessary complementary inputs for the spread of comprehensive education were not forthcoming over the 1968-74 period -- initiation of the satellite system. continuing exposure of secondary school teachers to the comprehensive philosophy and acceptance by the public and the universities of the coneent of comprehensive education. In combination with a smaller more experimental first-phase INEM project, the Bank might have supported compre- hancive sectnr nlanninp- including develonment of a detailed olan for the further diversification of the traditional academic secondary system, as a means to auide the progress of the nanoing reform- (A. rpnired undpr the loan, more partial institutional improvements were undertaken: ICCE was reorganized na were narts of MOE and thp renired review of aericulturnl schools was carried out.) 5.09 A further institutional problem, recognized early on by the Bank, n.as been&f th islO Ja.tion ................4i 4nTrr............yri -Ina decision to house the project unit in ICCE, the Bank might have contributed to a greater continuitA of suppor-t foir the TEM rojeciat hadl It- reaired moIrs formal coordinating arrangements between ICCE and the MOE, SENA and the ITn4versItIes __ urther, In addition to approving key project personnel, the Bank might also have set as a condition a reasonable minimum period of tenure LL 4d 1 ..LL.uate V1~~ kln-L O. I UIISLLUCLiun UL L1i st aN projecL D . nuLa wa eL LiL_. y carried out and despite delays encountered in the procurement process, all *~~~~~Z - --- 1 ~ ~ ~ £ 1 n7. ",I-''L ten scools were equipped as planueu uy tne 1Lual 17/4 clusug uate. lue training component of the project, designed to familiarize staff with the new comprehensive curricula and management of the large schools, was satis- factorily carried out through 1970 but virtually terminated, thereafter. The short-lived nature of the training effort and the lack of success with imple- mentation of loan conditions related to the project's educational objectives proved detrimental to the efficiency and effectiveness of !NEM operations and the planned reform of the secondary system. The inability to carry out complementary measures -- the satellite program, cooperative arrangements with the universities and SENA, the establishment of local INEM advisory committees -- resulted from declining Government support for the program, in part due to financial constraints, from incomplete public acceptance of the concept of comprehensive education and, in general, from the political sensitivities aroused by the measures. - 19 - 6.u2 inerricient operations at the 11,1n schools have also res ue, however, from an inappropriate fit of the large schools to their respective catchment areas, perpetuated in part by a lack of provision of student [rans- portation services, and from overstaffing and high teaching costs per hour. Despite the suitability of curricula, without successful implementatoln of measures to improve operating efficiency, the INEM schools will likely remain too large and costly. As intended, however, they have servea as tne first experimental models for the diversification of the Colombian secondary system. 6.03 The Bank's emphasis on construction cost control helped consider- ably to economize on project costs both during preparation and implementation. Had other Bank inputs, particularly during the preparation stage, been strengthened, the efficiency and effectiveness of project operating outcomes might have been improved. The Bank's original reduction in the number of schools to be included under a first project might have been carried further. In view of the Colombians' inexperience with large comprehensive secondary schools, the Bank might have recommended construction of even fewer and smaller institutes under more experimental first-phase project, prior to the planned large scale introduction of the schools. More thorough investigation of socio-economic conditions in the schools' catchment areas and careful con- sideration of possible recurrent cost alternatives, might also have led the Bank to consider a project of reduced scope. 6.04 At the time of the 1971 review of the on-going INEM project (conducted by the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department), planned integra- tion of the INEMs with existing schools and a levelling off of operating costs were anticipated; neither has occurred. The diversification and planned expansion of Colombia's predominantly academic secondary education system continues to be a high priority in terms of manpower needs, but outside of the three Bank-assisted projects, the diversification effort has made little progress. Overall, the disappointing INEM operating outcomes and the delay with the reform suggest that the complexity of the task originally planned had been underestimated. An initial Bank contribution, in support of a smaller project and more detailed planning and preparation of complementary inputs necessary for continual progress with the reform, might have promoted a more efficient use of resources.  CO'UT1. DEORT FIR1T VD11CATION PRO.1ECT 1 Prnve.-t- lnta I v. ti I I. . Borrower RepuAtic u VCo1uibiI Lc.an Amount US$7.6 million Date of Loan Agreemrent July 31, 1968 Effective Date November 4, 1968 Original Closing Date December 31, 1971 Final Closing Date May 17, 1974 Teris of Loan 25 years Period 6l Grace 10 years Interest Rate 6-1/4% . . . . . . . . . 1/ . 1.ux The project would introduce comprehensivL secondary education in Colombia. The curriculum would be .suited to the country s needs, modern learning technologies would be applied and student counsdIling would be introduced. The schools would meet an urgent manpower need and widen access to secondary education for low-income groups. The schools would prepare the students for middle-level careers as well as for university entrance. Science and pre-vocational subjects would be given an equal status to academic sub- jects. Bogota and thL provincial capitals would be provided with schools operating at low costs because of an efficient use of staff and facilities and because of a reduction in repeater and dropout rates. 1.03 The project consisted of the construction and ecu-pmont of ten com- prehensive co-educational secondary schools (Institutos 'Nacionler de Educacion edia. INEM)...with erade. 6-11-and -niq i rnv v nrnrm . The ro nIr Iod enrollment was 48,000 students and the projected annual output 7,300 graduates. 1.04 The project cost was estimated at: US$1.5.2 inillion. It would bv f4n-moel by n Rank 1se - 1ICC2 *7 F.....ll ... ., .. ,........ * .r. iss n..:.. sr . 1--yi o f sV 'ss7 .* r 1:.sJ.A.L l sa% I&a1t1.11 1%1 44 J'I V I.' II 9'VtLL ;IL.IL k iUII L I J. I l US$7.6 million. Technical assistance would be provided throuph a 11SATI) progra coveng lIi OU 1-U-11 IunVVL VJEIV!I L .11M LRC Li el Irlu11 oI teachers, coisl I ov:.; aid school administraLors. A secOid project, including nine additional conprehcu- sive schools, woulu follow and a second Bank loan of US$6.5 million was !/The expression "comprehensive" is used in the report, although the project schools would be more work-oriented than the traditional U.S. or European comprehensive school. - A. 2 - approved in FY70 also supported by USAID technical. assistance. Further LUl.LUW-Up activLtes WC iC nIatAhUicu CIA L tALouanu oUOL UY'.. 2 l FY73. 1.05 The project was closed at May 17, 1974 after an extension of the Closing Date by almost two and a half years. All project schools are now in operation. 2. Summary and Recommendations 2.01 The INEM school reform was in most respects well conceived and educationally and economically sound. Nevertheless, the appraisal mission and the Bank accepted the education plans of the Colombian Government in power in 1967 too freely. More consideration should have been given to the practicability of those plans in a political situation which is characterized by cabinet and policy changes and potent pressure groups. Most of the project implementation problems were political in nature and reflected sub- sequent cabinets' different attitudes towards the education reform. The overall quantitative and qualitative developments of the education sector since 1967 reflected also those attitudes. A particular problem during the period was the special status of the INEM project in Colombia's education. It facilitated management and staff hiring but it caused also several admin- istrative and teacher problems. The Bank. should advise against the creation of a similar situation in future education projects. (Paras. 4.01, 4.10). 2.02 The edudation development has been uneven in Colombia since 1967 and neither the Government nor the Bank's projections were entirely cor- rert. Primary education Pxnanded faster and spcondarv education sloer than. projected. Higher education continued to proliferate, despite government n1nnac tnr ,rn,t rnl tho rdaujw1nnnrt_ V!Astn9tinn nnn n-rttpc fnr lt n-nnP r1-1------------------------------ - ----.........._m groups, particularly in rural areas, remain limited although the Bank- financed project schools have widene t-he acc~ess too ,r eeuatin for the oor.'~ Despite efforts to the contrary, the percentage of students in academic hLSUU iscusLuCU Are m e .1UAUuAu 7"tt ColLmbiantGvvumet launeu several qualitt- tive improvements which have been only partially implemented, .although the INEM project had important "spill-over' ' effects on other areas of education in teacher-training, learning content, teaching methods, etc. 2.03 The Colombian Government was successful in implementing the physical aspects of the Bank-financed project. Construction was generally-rapid. However, some problems and delays in the delivery and operation of the school equipment occurred. Maintenance and security problems have alsooccurred and the Government should be advised :3 improve the situation. (Paras. 5.14, 5.18, 5.30). 2.04 The actual project cost was close to the estimates and a major part of the contingencies could be cancelled. (Para. 5.23). 2.05 The Government has been less successful in meeting the quantitative targets of the project. The schools were used to 56% instead of 75% of their full two-shift capacity in 1974. The underutilization was nartiallv raied by some construction delays but the physical planning preceding the project should have hen more PnmnrPhPnciu* more Attantinn ahnihAA have ban ndA to student catchment areas, site location, appropriate school sizes, student - A.3 - transportation, need for school meal programs, etc. The Government should be advised to review the situation of each project school with a view to improve the use of staff and facilities. Cooperation with the communities, the universities and SENA should also be improved as it contributed to the sub-optimal enrollment. Bank missions should, if possible, conduct a more complete school mapping analysis in the appraisal of projects of this type and size. (Paras. 5.05, 5.06, 5.09, 5.10, 6.01, 6.03, 6.18, 6.21, 6.32, 6.33). 2.06 It is too early to assess the impact of the prolect on the middle- level job market. The percentage of project students in pre-vocational or vocational programs is close to the original estimates, and they receive a better training than in the traditional schools, but the dropout rates and the percentage of students aiming at higher education are higher than is feasible in a comprehensive school. The Government might be a4vised to follow on-going tracer studies closely and adlust education programs, counselling services and remedial teaching as needed. (Paras. 6.09, 6.17, 6.23. 6.31). 2.07 Thp nrnirr Anhonl_ hav h am-ePa.af1l in roarhina 1nw_nPrn families but some access problems remain. It has also increased the educa- tIo op fnnlHor womean throughl tho 4nt-rrAiPk4^ r% (Paras. 6.02, 6.05, 6.24). 2.08 The cutricula appear relevant to the needs of Colombia. The projct LaZ improvu lerning and tne learning environment in Colombia. This is particularly true for the sciences, languages and the pre-vocational subjects, although the practical facilities are not used to the intended extent. Some audio-visual equipment is less suitable. The Bank should sug- gest an austere policy in this area in education projects; textbooks, mimeo- graph machines and basic equipment should be given preference to language laboratories, film projectors and other sophisticated equipment. (Paras. 6.12, 6.15). 2.09 The project schools vary in quality. Some schools are of high quality with good student performance and dedicated staff. Other project schools are only slightly better than those in the traditional system. The performance of the school principal appears to be the most important school quality factor. (Paras. 5.18, 6.34, 6.35). 2.10 There are no staffing constraints. With the exception of,some vocational programs, the project schools are overstaffed. After some delays, qualified teachers and administrators have been trained in sufficient numbers, although university unrest has hampered the activities. The project has, nevertheless, improved teacher-training of the universities and raised the teacher quality. (Paras. 6.25, 6.27). 2.11 The project has not been successful in reducing recurrent costs per student. The costs are higher than those ori2inally estimated. OnA rpaqnn is-undersized classes; another is a low teacher workload. The Colombian Government was not abhle to adhere to thp nrlvinAl Awraomantf-a ^taner - A.4 - utilization and lowered the teaching duty after pressures from the teacher unions. The replicability of comprehensive education as conceived in the Bank-financed project is dependent on the Government's ability to reduce the overstaffing of the schools. The current student-teacher ratio in the project schools is below international standards and costly. The Government should be advised accordingly. (Paras. 6.25. 6.42). 2.12 The Government should be informed that the management of the project and of the INEM schools has suffered from policy and staff changes. The size of the proiect and the comDlexity of the INEM Rphonls hnve how- ever, had a positive effect on education administration at all levels and imnrnved data rol1etion. nlanninp. dnv-tn-dAv manoment ashoo%1 ,nm__ vision, evaluation, etc. (Paras. 5.03, 6.36, 6.39). 2.13 Comprehensive education is viable in major urban areas df Colombia under certain conditions. C-Aium staff-n an hsca tutuems be related to the specific socio-political conditions of the community in wich the school is to be located. rrThe first r nk project was too amtIous, despite a reduction from 19 to 10 school units. The schools' catchment areas were too u±i anU the programs too uLversi[rea, under given circum- stances and at this stage. It was, therefore, beyond the capacity of the authorities to implement all aspects of the comprehensive reform within the established timetable, despite laudable efforts. Political and managerial problems and the.need for a close cooperation with teachers and communities were underestimated. The lack of solutions to those difficult issues led to financial and educational problems. The INEM project met several objectives very well and the unsolved issues may tend to overshadow actual achievements. Nevertheless, the Government should be advised to consider the major issues raised in this report prior to a replication of the INEM schools. 2.14 According to the terms of reference, the mission evaluated the first INEM project only. The mission also visited 3 second project schools. The execution of the second project appears efficient (para. 5.31), but the major issues as discussed in the report remain. The conclusions are, there- fore, pertinent to the entire INEM reform. It is suggested that the second INEM project be evaluated in late 1976. The completion mission of the second project should focus on the employment and further studies of the graduates, unit costs, staff turnover and maintenance. 3. The Setting at Project Appraisal 3.01 The 1960's in Colombia were characterized by a high rate of popula- tion 2rowth. This growth led to a downward Shift In the nae d4stributon and a heavy migration of the population from rural to urban areas and to unemploy- mant in rprtain reonns. 3.02 Public 4nvestyments I ncreas ed wI thaviwtatinhgeprdc tivity in industry and agriculture and to increase employment. A larger and well-trained part Of the population would nave to De engaged in manutactur- ing, construction, and agriculture if the projected economic growth of 6% per annum were to be achieved. 3.03 Manpower studies showed that the existing education system would be unable to supply the skilled manpower needed. The Government, therefore. planned to restructure the system and increase the output. The major educa- tion constraints were at the secondary level. The plans involved an ePrnanson -A.5- of secondary education but more importantly a change from the existing system wnere nearly all secondUary CoUCaL1on WaM a pLepaL1U[1 kL1 Lit universities to a system of comprehensive secondary education (Instituros Nacionales de Educacion Media--INEM), including industrial, a,rIculturai, commercial and social services programs which would also prepare for the labor market. 3.04 A qualitative improvement of Colombia's secondary education was, furthermore, needed. The Government felt that it would be possible to in- crease the education productivity and efficiency through the suggested com- prehensive system. It would require new curricula, modern facilities and learning materials, well-trained staff and a system of study guidance. 3.05 It was also necessary to correct imbalances in education oppor- tunities. Because of the proliferation of fee-requiring private schools, the 10% of the population with the highest incomes had, in reality, access to 20 times as many secondary school places per capita as the remaininR 90% of the population. Low-income groups should have easy access to the comprehensive schools. The introduction of coeducational schools would improve the educational opportunities for girls. 3.06 Education costs of the existing system were high because of low effi- ipnry. The costs could be comparatively low in a comprehensive system. despite the many study programs, if school sizes were made economic, double shifts used, teacher workloads Increased and student dronout rates diminished as was the Government's intention. 3.07 The INEM comprehensive school project was appraised by the Bank in late 1967 after a UNDP/UNESCO identification in 1964. The identifica- tion had been followed by a lengthy preparation sihce comprehensive educa- tion would imply a substantial deviation from orevious education in Colombia. 4. Politleal and Eduratinnal DevPlonmPnrq Sinre Prniert Annrni1l appraisal. Since 1967, there have been three Governments in power and six PAiinntinn minntp~rc_ Tin the ior%na it- was the Go^vernment'so 4Ato A4-ersfy the whole of secondary education eventually. The necessary experimentation w uu-ld LLAU JUL LLL Lae carlred o nL11IUA WL_l.C1 WOJU' LUlill LIC HULICUS UL d new system. A specific legislation about the education reform was adopted wII-CI ISStill valiU. with a change in education ministers in the beginning of 1970, a change in attitude towards the INEMs occurred and less government support was given the project. In mid-197/, a new Qovernment was elected, whose initial reaction to the INEMKs was also negative. Following pressure from various sources, including the local areas where the schools were being located, the Government's attitude became less negative, but only insofar as the physical facilities were concerned. There was little support for teacher training and curricula development and the training programs begun through Technical Assistance (para. 5.27) were no longer supported. A mini- Asterial change two years later introduced new approaches to the INEM schools - A.6 - and trn thinir rpl-'Ation to hichor eritiration Tn 1974 n npw Gnvrnm6nt .Amn to power which appears positive to a modified INEM reform. The changes in policy inheren t in the frequilent got-ernment- wnd l n iaterval chnnanq has I- A a negative effect on the implementation of the INEMs. Most of the project origin. The quantitative and qualitative education developments since project appris~al as they ar anll~yze~U n.* tLe folwing, relc alo.~ political events in Colombia to a large extent. 4.02 Primary school enrollment continued to increase during the late 960s and early 1970's. The Bank's 19067 appraisal mission underestimated the expansion. The enrollment ratio which includes a third of overaged students is now close to 100% or 20% points higher than the 1q67 estimate. The expansion increased the demand for secondary school places. 4.03 Despite the increased demand for places, the secondary school enrollment has increased more slowly than was expected in 1967. The current enrollment ratio is approximately 25% which is one-third lower than the original projections. The percentage of students in private schools which was 50% in the 1960's has decreased but it is still high. 4.04 The INEM institutions have enrolled many students from the low- income groups (para. 6.05), but their overall impact is, nevertheless, limited so far. Tbe poor still has a restricted access to secondary educa- tion.-.In the mid-1960's, 60% of the secondary school students were in academic schools while the rest were in vocational schools and primary teacher-training institutions. It was estimated that the percentage of academic students would be reduced to 50% or below by 1975. The reduction has not occurred. It has not yet been possible to.increase to any consid- Prnhlp trnt the attractiveness of vocatinnAl Ptrdntin althnah the reason for this may be found outside the realm of education. The example sat v the TNPM sohnlc in roAdAntion hna hean folloaed hv other crhon%l and the education opportunities for girls have in this way increased. 4.05 Higher education expanded rapidly in the 1960's. Higher institu- LtUio mulLpliu LU a UitL aL WLil acLable sLdrLUds cUULU -UL Ue maintained. The Government was aware of this and the 1967 appraisal mis- sion reported Un contl measures wu.ich tne Governmen iuLUUeU LU LZ tas. in planning, financing, student admission, staff training, minimum examina- tion standards, etc. Tne appraisal mission questioned the execution of those measures and projected that higher education might continue-to in- crease from 43,000 students in 1965 to close to 200,000 in 1975. The enrollment did increase rapidly and quadrupled in ten years. The university graduates have had difficulty finding jobs and the employment forecasts of the appraisal mission have been largely verified. 4.06 The universities have been in turmoil during the last decade. These difficulties precluded major improvements and have had a negative influence on the implementation of the INEM project. - A.7 - 4.07 The qualitative developments of formal education in Colombia during the last decade took place primarily within the Bank-financed project. However, the teacher upgrading programs, the introduction of contemporary diversified curricula, of study guidance systems, of new teaching methods and better learning equipment have had some impact out- side the INEM schools. The overall retention rate remained, nevertheless, low, 20-25%; and the three Bank appraisals in 1967-1973 are fairly simi- lar in their characterization of the education system as comparatively inefficient with too academic study programs, and unsuitable facilities. 4.08 Colombia's education development during the last decade has been uneven and hampered by frequent policy changes. Notwithstanding quality problems, primary education has developed reasonably well. Secondary and tertiary education continue to suffer from weaknesses. An educational dis- parity between urban and rural areas and between socio-economic c1asses remains. There is still a shortage of skilled middle-level manpower and an overemphasis on academic careers. It is too early to expect a orofound impact of the INEM schools on the labor market. The INEM concept has also h4 no IN T?FM eAU^ntion pn s n thnr whhn ol 1rn r4d,oA -A technically and educationally sound, and the reform would doubtless meet a LCHI.L LCtU. 1eCVeLLIC LIM ±7Vf MFL4.Lb4.Ld M1.ULi anU Lt= JODILM c1Leu the plan and the reform proposal of the Government in power at that time too literally. nore consideration should have been given to the feasibility of those plans and their implementation in a political situation characterized by frequent policy changes and by potent pressure groups. The 1967 govern- ment plans were overambitious and the subsequent cabinets were not able or willing to execute them fully. Future BanK missions should pay increased attention to the practicability of an education project in different political situations. 4.10 The special status of the INEM reform comprised a specific political and educational development problem during the implementation. It is advan- tageous and practical to create a specific status for experimental and pilot projects in education. The specific status of the INEM project also offered advantages in the hiring of staff, in management, etc. But a project which might eventually include 48,000 students and employs2,000 teachers proved too big to receive a special status in the Colombia educational structure. It caused tension between teaching groups (para. 6.39), administrative and finan- cial problems (paras. 6.36, 6.40) and migtthave hampered the development of the other education sectors in Colombia. 5. The INEM Proiect Implementation Organization, Management and Physical Execution 5.01 As required by the Loan Agreement, a project implementation unit was set uo within the Ministry of Edueation. Staff that had hen atiinintei with the project in the Oficina Administrativa para Programas Educativos Conftntc (oAPe) was (pnintE for t new Tna4tiv rnlnIn de Construcciones Escolares (ICCE). - A.8 - 5.02 The Unit was headed by a full-time project director,ajId gne- rously staffed. Besides the director, deputy director, projece -rchitect and project educator, it Included three archLtects and 32 experienced educators. It was supported by the ICCE acounting and technical divisions, the Ninistry of Education professional services, the universities and the Central Planning Bureau. The overall performance was good. 5.03 The frequent changes of Education Ministers hampered the operation of the Proiect Unit. At the end of each presidential term the prospects for the professionals of the Unit were uncertain and the political developments led to a high staff turnovrr. All the officialq annointed at the initiaLion of the project have been replaced; the project director twice. The turnover The developments reduced staff morale and the operational capacity of the project unit in ICCE. The replacement procedures also deprived new staff of the experience gained by their predecessors. The Bank should explore ways and means to ensure that key staff of project units in Bank-financed education projects be given a reasonable tenure in those countries where political developments might otherwise lead to frequent and technically unjustifiable staff replacements. 5 .0 All ton*TNrM nrniet schools were provided as planned. The construc- tion and equipping of the facilities have been practically completed. Project 4.-1 ~-a -on, scheduled for 3-1/4 vears in the annraisal reoort was completed .LIiJ.LCL'L~LC. U.L n * r ;* in 5-1/2 years, due to delays in procuring furniture and equipment. School Sites 5.05 Selection of the large sites necessary for INETs was limited to 3ow- priced land at Lhe perip'ery of towns, close to areas pevouslys housing projects for families within the middle- and low-income brackets. Since decisions on physical planning were ade shorty ve3 e us of 6chool sites, the objective of making INEMs easily accessible to students from low-income groups was affected by: (a) the rapid and largely unplanned growth of cities that generally left little space for their appropriate location; (b) the lowest initial cost of land was a decisive reason for rejecting alternatives which might have offered better conditions; (c) the decision of the Ministry of Education (reinforced by the Bank) to Complete acnuisition of Rites during lQ7-68 reduced the chances for considering alternatives. - A.9 - 5.06 Tlh -elec Iion of t11e !chool sitcs had a negative influonce on the development of Lhe senools. lnik n.iions might require a more dLfaggrc-- gated, demographic analy-is to be conducted prior to site selections in education projects of this ma-rnLLide. In addition to data on ape cohorts, birthrates and famiily sizes, the analysis might ideally also inclide in- formation on hou--ing, industripl, agricultural and commercial devolo .op men t s, transportation means, need for school meal programs, etc. The latter data would have a decisive influence on school sizes and site locations. Design of Schools 5.07 The schedules of accommodation were the result of an evolving pro- cess durinR the 1960's. The comprehensive school concept was new in 1.tin America and the Ministry of Education was understandably unable to identify All nnPatnincr rPcmfrmPnt- ThPrPfer_ It ant-&Inntod tho n'hvea-f-w- m hav .. istics of the INEMs and relied on the beat examples of similar schools in 5.0 IR n 1967, a UTNVSCO nv^4e,t preparaton mission drafted the sched3le of accommodation for the-first INEM to be located in Bogota. USAID also asifC Ln talrn a ~ coprhesi eU oo suitabA. Lor,I UVU111111a I Ile Ministry, furthermore, asked local educators, professionals and businessmen for comments. Adverse comments were minimal. The Ministry,therefore,logically decided to follow the pattern of the first INEM for all project schools. 5.09 INEM's space standards are generally well apportioned, areas per student being larger than those used formerly by the Ministry of Education. Except for the cafeterias, all rooms have been utilized according to their specifications. The schedules of accommodation were systematically developed and based on reasonable criteria. Nevertheless, the facilities in some schools could permit more and larger classes. The Government should there- fore review the schedules of accommodation of each proiect school with a view to increase future space utilization despite current underenrollments (para. 6.01). 5.10 The INEM cafeterias were provided on the assumDtion that comnler meals would be served to all students. Subsidized school meals would he offered with foreian assistance but the aqRigtan-P did nnr mntarinlj Oil school started its own school meal program and offered nutritious meals for USe25 cnr orson but thP rot wo wre rnhibIt ipvly hIgh The two-shIft syve,.v with the students attending school from 7 a.m. to 1 p.m. and I p.m. to 7 p.m. with nn long hrpAnk. rodnm-e-. -hp nond foriman malnde rn% the Msn! Cafeterias, if operating at all, are underutilized. The Government the INEM schools and plan an appropriate use of the cafeteria areas. 5.11 The ten staff houses included in the original project were not Ouilt. -nis deletion which was approved by the Bank caused no special problems, and the housing of the teachers concerned was provided in other ways. A I Profcssional Services 5.12 TCCE shared the responsibil1ty for civil. works with consultant archircctural 1Ims. Most design work was carried out by nine consulting firms, carefully selected among 70 candidates. ICCE took over the field supervision. PerLormance of the nine consultants and the ICCE's architects in the basic designs was generally good. However, the working drawings and specifications left design gaps which had to be resolved by the resident supervisors. 5.13 The architects laid out master plans by arranging independent blocks connected by open walkways. The blocks were designed either for general, specialized or administrative use. Each INEM was originally to be administered in small semi-independent units. The administration was later changed to laree institutions without subdivisinnsq The ndminivtrntiuP change and the dispersed master plans combined to create some communication nrnhlpmc within thp zrhno1 nmnnond and Porned stents and tenachers o inclement weather. 5.14 Consultant architects worked carefully on general layouts but dis-- regarded details. ite buiLUig deign also iucULporates tne Colomlan systcm of cutting slots in the brick walls to embed plumbing and electrical installa- tions. These conduits remain hidden under wall plastering and out of reach for maintenance.. Extensive use of jalousies, instead of stronger windows has caused security problems and maintenance expenditures. Specifications did not indicate the need of heavy duty external doors, locks and similar fix- tures, which will require increasing maintenance. 5.15 Field supervision was carried out by 1.CCE's staff. Their perform- ance w4s generally good; however, the design gaps and the minimal construc- tion periods affected their efficiency. Construction and Maintenance 5.16 Construction was advertized for international competitive bidding but it attracted Colombian contractors only. Except for Cartagena, construc- tion of the ten schools was completed in less than two years which was a zood Derformance. Additional site developments lastpd from six to ten months_ 5.17 The anality of onstruction varipz Tf rnnge from ond in Medellin and Pasto to average in Bogota, Santa Marta, BucarAmanga and Cucuta; and eoAint-ren inRnrann,14llfs, Cali and monteri., hnvep~Il(,dfc tive work was corrected. The Cartagena INEM is being affected by soil prouLem whih uaIage LC structure U lie main tLeaching DIOCK and U0V T00r- ing of other buildings. 5.18 Minor works remain in some schools. ICCE is handling these works as maintenance but the maintenance crews cannot undertake them. There are also indications of inappropriate maintenance of the schools. It is reflected in missing doorknobs, broken light switches and leaking roofs. There is an obvious difference in the maintenance between the schools of the North and those of the highlands. The highland schools are in better shape. A review - A.11 - of the situation is necessarV to rcsolvv the problem and to co1plte til wirkt. Tt will he norp rn y tr (a) st rovthon IC' tn tIn-nc r :b rV I (b) improve communicotion betw(,en ICCE and the TIEM schools, (c) defiie t:: duties -f tkn. maintnnanc.. fnnmc n"yr] (ri) iinAntn nnr uly " * 1 1 tenance handbook. The necessary repair work in Cartagena must also be.undcr-- t U U L L alulmeunm.n I ULL1.1LULt: .111U FALIU.LellItf.I L 5.19 The furniture was tendered on an international baSIS. 1e Didding deviated from the Loan Agreement and the Bank requested ICCE to cancel the tender and call for a second bidding. The delivery was delayed by slow import permits. The furniture is of good quality and appropriate. 5.20 Equipment lists were prepared according to performance -objectives set by local educators, and the suggested equipment was satisfactory. How-- ever, the procurement staff had limited experience and despite the provision of otherwise useful technical assistance, the equipment procured is not as flexible and adaptable as desirable. Bids were accepted on no less than 3,000 items and evaluation was processed item,by item. These factors affected the supply and: (a) hid evaluation became rather complex because the items varied considerably in quality, performance and price; (b) bid evaluation disregarded often the installation and WainLHnanc sCLvices wLt subsequenu- ulays and per formance problems; (c) storekeepers and teachers received few instructions for tne equipment, anu many ftems weres therefvre, mI- placed or misused. These problems remain. Electrical equipment for some schouls was Still OsUU In a ware- house in November 1974; (d) the diversity and lack of adaptability have limited the use of the equipment; in the electricity laboratories many instruments cannot be connected. It has also been claimed that inappropriate considerations influenced the procurement in certain cases. 5.21 ICCE reports that losses for pilferage were US$10,000. The actual amount is probably higher. Most insurance claims'were belated and refunds from*insurers minimal. - A.12 - Proiect Cost and Loan Disbursenent S. 22 Thn nnnrni_qPA and noctia1 proc- cost,t7-i f4T% (ict -411S$-- (See also Annex'4). Appraised Actual Difference Construction Academic and Communal 6.80 6.92 + 0.12 + 1.76% Staff Housing 0.05 - - 0.05 -100.0 Z Site and Development 1.17 2.40 + 1.23 +105.1 Z Professional Fees 0.59 0.55 - 0.04 - 6.7 2 Subtotal 8.61 9.87 + 1.26 + 14.6 % Furniture 1.58 1.26 - 0.32 - 20.2 % Equipment 3.04 2.22 - 0.83 - 27.3 % Oubtotal 4.62 3.47 -1.15 - 24.9 Z Contingencies 1.92 -" - 1.80 - 93.8 % Total Cost of the Project 15.15 13.35 - 1.80 - 11.9 % 0.12 included in construction overrun. 5.23 In view of the anticipated variations of the peso's rate of exchange, the cost o' the project was estimated by the appraisal mission in U.S. dollar equivalencies. Under that basis, the actual total cost of the project was US$13.35 million against US$15.15 million estimated at the appraisal. Actual savings amounted to US$1.8 million, of which US$1.5 mil- lion were unused loan funds. The Bank received withdrawal requests on expenditures amounting only to US$12.2 million and disbursed accordinzly. 5.24 Cost overruns for construction and site development were offset by savings in equipment and furniture. Actual costs of civil wnrkc nd equipment differed from the appraised estimates; civil works had an over- run of US$1.26 million which was compensated by USS1.15 million a,incs in furniture and equipment. Difference in civil works was due to site works, which exceeded the appraisal estimate by 105. Artii:l IA rr ntur. was-20% and equipment 27% below the appraisal estimates. Some equipment was naid for with funds not inclined 4n the pojet hue.s of the - ment problems. - A.13 - 5.25 The loan was disbursed at the rate of 45.7% of total expenditures instead of the 50% establi!shed in the Loan A,,reerclnt. This disbursenient continued through the project. Annexe 5 and 6 show the appraised and actual dibursentwn schedules and nroiect expenditures. The Torhnirnl A.mir.tance Procram 5z.26A A n Ar-n,int-n cimnn1v nf ,,-rnn1 _qrnf F ;1 onrerouisite. for success- ful execution of the project. UNESCO, USAID and the U.S. Peace Corps education faculties (para. 6.27). USAID also assisted the 'Ministry-of Education .in ~UedcatiVona 4~L LG.U& A 1.~ ning, guidance and testing, personnel training and in the administration and organization of the 1vEMs. The assistance was furnished through con- tracts with U.S. universities or individuals. 5.27 USAID provided grants of $549,000 for technical assistance up to mid-1971, at which time it had been'agreed that the Colombian Government would continue the program through loan funds. The Government in power at that time refused to do so, and the continued training of administrators and other staff for the INEMs has been through in-service courses and super- visory visits by ICCE personnel. Twenty-six administrators and 20 coun- sellors were trained through the USAID grants, Of the 26 administrators, 11 are still working with the TNEMs.. The mission found that the adininistra- tors' DarticipAt3on in the training had been beneficial to school,management. In retrospect, and considering the changes in government support of the technieal assistance program, the program's overall quality was good. The Bank Procedures and qunqrviR1n .2 nhere were 7 Bank int----n-uen 10A-197L The Intervals between missions varied from 3 to 11 months, and averaged a satisfactory p MoULRS. rCULU1LidL1LC UL JdLL LMLL Wa 5,=O awa n v worse vu the Borrw-rv. might have received more advice on equipment procurement and on curriculum 5.29 The steady progress of civil works permitted a uniform Bank input from tne appraisal to te competion of te vuilings. 1ul Bank evaiuatlo of:consultants, of the project unit and of the Colombian construction indus- try was realistic. 5.30 Bank staff underestimated the efficiency of the Bnrroweir in prepar- ing equipment lists and in tendering equipment. Higher bid ceilings could have been established. Bulk bidding could have been carried out in a way which would have avoided the delays and the overdiversification of equipment in workshops and laboratories. Some inadequate specifications were not detected and some costly equipment was unnecessarily acquired. A closer assistance by Bank-educators during supervision missions might also have been helpful. An adherence to current Bank guidelines on the provision of learning equipment would reduce these problems in future projects. - A.14 - 5.31 The experiences of the first project have been applied in the execution of the Scrnd Ank-finnnierd INFM nroiect resulting in more effi- cient performance. 6. The Performance of the INEM School F,nolln~n~dSud c-A-~xu n- rZi-i-Int- Rql-w~rnnrl 1..kUU-Yrn r.., .~ . n...rl ,f,nn *Ine~ Lton projec scho Lr complet-e anL coul enol stt-tt in all study options to the originally planned amount. Many schools have more applicants Ln places vut Lte actual enolmn cutoinmovL .e 1.' wo. theless, only 56% of the full double shift capacity. The schools have expanded slower than planned in 1967 (Annex 7) fAccUUU tu the origXaL plans, the schools should have been filled to 70-75% of their full two-shift capacity by now. Enrollment Single Staff Planned Actual Capacity (Full Two Shifts) Cali 3,040 6,080 3,776 Barranquilla 2,670 5,340 2,671 Cartagena 2,450 4,900 1,563 Bucaramanga 2,060 4,120 3,091 Santa Marta 2,060 4,120 1,215 Bogota (Kennedy) 3,040 6,080 5,150 Cucuta 2,020 4,040 1,991 Medellin 3,000 6,000 3,964 Pasto 2,110 4,220 2,693 Monteria 1.585 3,170 852 Tet-al 24.035 48.070 26,966 6.02 There are several reasons for the Low enrollments, and Ay vary among the schools: (a) Enrollment has been rationed in many INEM schools due to financial constraints (para. 6.40). (b) The authorities have apparently restricted tjie intake of students below capacity in some schools on the as- sumption that some applicants have limited acadgmic abilities. (c) Transportation problems have increased dropout rates. The INEM schools were designed as large units to achieve a maximum economy while offering the students a comprehensive education program. The schools require large sites and were thus located on the out- skirts of cities. They have large catchment areas. Thir PffiriPn- iit-Ji1i ?1J7nn w.niilc nopti q~tiidPnf - A.15 - trnsportation system. ublic trnnsportation is available in most project school cities, but despite low fares (equivalent to 1ScS), miiny students cannot afford transportation and drop out of school. The schools visited by the mission have their own buses, but a shortage of funds prevents their being used for student commuting. In some cities, housing developments planned for the sthool catchment area never took place. (d) The INEMs have been less attractive than expected. It was expected that the diversified modern study programs of the INEM schools would be more attracti\ve to students than the often outdated academic program,s of secondary schools; the latter generally proviled in unsuitable rented houses without laboratoriesA. work- shops, sportgrounds, etc. This development has been less pronounced than expected nnd the old qrhnc hn%vf3 continued to attract students in some cities. One rpaon for this qitiiaion might h- th,e uoniworit-i pv' acceptance of the graduates of the traditional schools, graduates (paras. 6.24, 6.32). Cooperation with SENA no alo be sa n utenive th Wan UL iially a§sumed, thus reducing the value of the pre-vocational programus auu causug premature dropouts kparas. 6.24, 6.33). (e) Political problems have occurred. The INEM schools have been accused in some,cities of being a government attempt to force poor students into low status voca- tions and direct them from academic careers; this feel- ing would reduce their attractiveness. (f) Teachers have resisted the work schedules. The INEM schools have been designed for double-shift use, but there has been some opposition to double.shifts among the staff and at least one school operates with one shift only because of this opposition. (a) DPlava in the delivery of eauipment led to a reduced in- take of students in some schools. 6.03 The underutilization of the INEM schools is a serious problem be- development, secondary school enrollment is comparatively low and most INEM sChUo.a W".A be LUly utlizedu in due ime Lm M tq_ wih teA urr eUxpanson rate, the INEM schools will not be fully utilized until 1985. The Government should, therefore, be advised to take ieUdiatC ULCF0 LU UACLae Lhe elLA- sent expansion of the schools. - A.16 - 6.04 The. planned and actual distribution of the VNE4 studens al'ong the study programs is shown below. Enrollment in Grades 10-11 Program Planned Actual Science 12% 12% Humanities 11% 9% Industry 24% 33% Agriculture 13% 8% Commerce 30% 29% Social Services 10% 9% Total 100% 100% The students have had a choice of study programs, and 967. of the studentq interviewed claimed that they had received the desired program. The studeuts have thus not been forced into specific programs [para. 6.02(e)!. Actual enrollment is close to the planned and the only major differences are in the distribution of students between industry and agriculture. Agriculture has been less attractive than was expected. A comparison with the comprehensive school project in Ethiopia.L shows that the Colombian project schools have been more successful in creating interest in vocational programs. 6.05 The INEM schools have succeeded in reaching low-income families. A cordparison between the income distribution-of urban households in Colombia and the income distribution of the INEM school families as renorted by the students, indicates that a higher percentage of the INEM families may belong tn.1nw-innnmp grnin. (Annnc R). About 17L nf the ruidante. ntervioueA claimed that their studies were financed through scholarships; another 10%' wo.Yrt-rb4 Asir-ina fhoi- froo t-jmn W1141 9-h -r ut I f--4 - -thei Between 30-35% of the students did not pay fees, while 40% paid the minimum 'Lee kUY.L equivalent, per IoaAt1. : v i L L'IeJLL.,., 1IdIY LdCLUT t 1i n which hamper the access of low-income families to the INEM schools (paras. 6.02, .6.uo All tNEM schools were planned as day schools and funccion accordingly. Most students live within one hour commuting distance from the schoo1q. Only a quarter or the students live within 3 km walking distance. However, tne need for busing has created problems (para.- 6.02(c)]. If -Completion Report of February 14, 1973. - A.17 - 6.07 Further analysis of the INEM student interviews revealed socio- economic backgrouitds that in some respects were less favorable to successful studies than those of the students in the Bank-financed schools in Ethiopia and Thailand.!/ Ninety percent of the Colombian families comprised six or moremembe-rs as compared with 60% in Ethiopia and Thailand. Demonstrated parental interest in the children's studies was also lower as well as the students' coortunities to support their education by uaid Jobs. Principals referred to the poor nutrition 2 the Colombian students, but the student intervinc did not snnnort thici.- DPnit lnw fam*l inrenmnp tho Cnlnbian students appeared to receive regular meals more frequently than their fellow 1ht Letngdail d LU"dL ilII, EniViLU1Il!ZtlL o.Vo Tne Interviews snowea satisfaction witn tne INEM scnools ana tne learning environment. About 90% of the teachers found a positive correla- tion between the learning methods of the INEM schools and the students' aptitudes and performance. Half of the students had selected the INEM schools as their first choice and 90% were satisfied with the schools and their field of -studies. 6.09 INEM curricula are on the.whole suited to Colombia's development needs. Sciencd, practical subjects and foreign languages have been given greater emphasis. Regardless of future careers, all students are exposed to a curriculum which offers a core of general subjects and a vocational guidance program. In contrast to the situationn in rthe f-rditinnal oystm, the'students are not forced to premature study choices. Those who do not Pntb~r the labor market would hnve q f_qr1,n, t -n ^^eeA --c.-.4F..lly to further education or training under normal circumstances (compare paras. 6.3e 3).;* The vEs system i H tU UCsiitgCU LU PLUMULe social mobility. However, changes in government policies (para. 4.01) have led to frequent revisions of some syllabi and the teachers have rightly complained. The students have a positive attitude to current curricula and 75% claimed that they liked the academic programs while 15%-disliked them. The vocational programs were less appreciated; 60% liked and 25% disliked them; 15% were ambivalent; the girls were more negative than the boys. The students had, however, a positive attitude towards practical activities as suth. There was a significant desire that more time should be given to work in labora- tories, and in the field; 45% wanted more and only 15% wantdd less. A similar attitude was reflected in the vocational programs; the workshop activities were more appreciated than the theory lessons related to them. The schools had thus not been fully successful in selling the vocational programs Der so, but the practical activities were appreciated. This dis- tinction is important for future work to increase the attractiveness of vocational education. yThailand Completion Report of October 25, 1973. VIt has been claimed.that the social pattern in Colombia might prevent a fil frankness in t4e response to this question. - A.18 - 6.10 The students have a rca;oiiable work.load. Some 70% of the Iasl- year's students have a weckly load of 44 hours or less, including horwworl. The students have no complaints about the two-shitt system altliouslh 803 prefer a morning shift [compare parn. 6.02(f)]. The subject-room svstorl Is accepted and little time is lost by the students in moving fromt one' class to another. 6.11 The schools are well supplied with science laboratories, work- shops, sportgrounds and other teaching spaces. They compare favorably with most schools in Colombia. However, few of the schools visited used the laboratories for experiments. Despite access to suitable equipment -and improved training. many teachers apparently hesitate to experiment. A possible reason might be the additional time experiments require in lecture nrpanratin and follow-un wnrk- StudentR in one school had organized a biological exhibition, in others minor experiments were conductqd. In some elhanic tlnI 1Tho,rntrig uprp ncee for tr;4itionl clascsrom in,1ctr1tion The instruction was better in biology than in physics and chemistry. In tALe pre-vocaL±i&1al programs,L3 commerceC. Ufnlt soci~al Ser vi-_ CC.OILI ~~O while industry and agriculture were of lower quality. There were cases in which agricultural equipment nad remaineU unpaureU, while oLer equipment was malfunctioning. There were problems with maintenance and spare parts (para. 5.18). 6. 12 Ail NM schools are supplied with language laboratories and other audio-visual eqti'ment. The language laboratories were used in some schools. This was less true for other audio--visual equipment where a lack of spare parts had prevented a full use. The number of film and slide projectors could be reduced without any educational disadvantage. It is also doubtful thpt the inclusion of language laboratories in the project was fully justi- fied, despite the comparatively low costs. The instruction in foreign languages has improved since the inception of the INEM project, but this is more because of improved teacher training than because of the use of language laboratories.l/ The mission visited some language lessons in traditional classrooms which were characterized by a lively interaction be- tween teachers and students much in contrast to the situation in 1967. 6.13~ Textbooks are almost totallyJ missing_ In,n~e~nnn,, ~- Colombia. Textbooks are on the market but the cost (US$2-3 per book) is apparenly pLohibitve o mosttudents. M a,uuny. tCy L ecS'are &1O u relUCtant to use available books. The INEM teachers use mimeograph machines to produce Lecture sheets, manuals, etc. The mimeugrapheu lecture materia15 weleor adequate quality and reduced the disadvantage of the textbook shortage. The students made good use of libraries. Tne libraries were reasonably well equipped; several had 4,000-5,000 books. Some schools suffered from theft because of unsuitable library designs (para. 5.14). 1/_ l/International research findings on the use of language laboratories cast doubts about their effectiveness at secondary education level. - A. 19 - 6.14 A comparison with the non-project control schools showed that a greater percentage oL L[Ie sLUULen s nLIUE shlUUs we 1ISSals u wALII the learning and the learning environment. 6.15 The INEM schools provide a better learning and learning environ- ment than most traditional schools in Colombia. 1he curricula ute up to date, the learning methods have improved, the teachers are better trained (para. 6.26), the equipment and the facilities are on the whole adequate. However, the interschool variance is considerable.* Some schools are quite good; others only slightly better than the traditional public secondary schools. Overall progress has been somewhat less than originally expected in 1967. Studv Guidance and Social Services 6.16 The INEM schools were the first public education institutions in Colombia.to offer comprehensive social services. The services would include guidance counselling for the students, medical and dental services, school meals, encouragement of parent-teacher associations, etc. 6.17 Each INEM school has 3, 4 or more full-time guidance counsclors. Forty percent of the students interviewed had never been to a counsellor. Twenty-five percent had seen a counsellor during the last three months and 15% claimed that they had decided on study programs in collahoration with the counsellor., 'There is, however, an upward trend in the use of the counsellors. Eighty percent of the tcnchers had sent studentn to a LQUOSkOllo durin2 the last three months and 60% claimed that it was helnful. Accordinfy to the school principals, there has been little need for the counsellors in Ainrinlinnrv ;ituion-cz- The viidnrp qvtom will rpniiirp morn time to ho fully developed. Its usefulness should be studied closely as it is an expen- 4Vea name ,F *he cohan1 avam C10 A I TXT'rK~ l -I I I-C U.U £-±M L.LIL DOUUUS IaVe LUULID JLL meical a dentaLLU U SUL h SLVACUS. Nme schools have full-time staff. However, the equipment was missing in some schnools, sometimes due to blocked shipment from central warehouses, sometimes due to lack of response from ICCE to school requests. The doctors and den- tists therefore worked under unsatisfactory conditions in many of the LN1Ns. This situation needs to be remedied and it is recommended that a survey be made by.the government of the health provision situation in.each INEM and that priority be given to the follow-up of the survey findings. 6.19 The cafeteria and student transportation situation have been dis- cussed elsewhere. (Paras. 5.10, 6.02(c), 6.06). 6.20 A comprehensive school requires close cooperation among students, teachers and parents. Such cooperation was envisaged in the INEM schools. Many INEM schools offer nonformal activities in the evenings such us literacy training, typing and craft courses, cultural club activities, etc. The target groups are the parents and relatives of students and adults living in the neizhborhood of the schools. In addition- some qrhnnlk h.up nrtive parent-teacher associations. In all schools the teachers have formed teachev uzninnc~ anA nA.rtirinr,.p in ct-hrinn TnnnfvP~mP.n- nn ~ n, l~~., - A.20 - questions. There is no formal student participation in school ianagement; such participation is apparently regarded as a possible threat to the local authorities. 6.21 The INFM schools offer a beneficial. environment to the students which extends beyond the teaching. The extrac urricular activities and the naren t- teacher aqsociatins should therefore he further stimulated.despite political abuse of the latter associations in some places. A close coopera- Ition with t he co um'un i ty and th e p-arenlt s isa 11e ce,S -v y fr o -11-comp i(- iens J v r school. Measures previously agreed upon should be carried out in full. 1rocal ati.- i. ,t-knrj4t4ac with T4 nIPC'tivt1p ntriftip to the nnonPr.1- tion should be requested to review the situation (compare para. 6.33). 1ne internal Efficiency 6.22 The INEM schools were to be more officient thuan the traditional schools in Colombia. However, a study by the Instituto Colombiano de Pedagogia (ICOLPE) indicates that the 6-year course retention rates of the INEM schools might become no higher than the national average of 20-25%. The mission found that the average annual retention rates between grades in the INEM schools visited had decreased from 85% in 1970 to 77% in 1974, which would confirm the ICOLPE estimates. 6.23 The INEM schools have abolished the traditional repetition system. A student can fail two subjects and be promoted. A repeater repeats a semester rather than a full academic year. Students who fail subjects may- receive remedial teaching. Full information on the remedial teaching was uno tainable. But in one school, 14 teachers taught 400 students remedial courses in Spanish. foreign languages, mathematics and science. The student interviews revealed that 3% of the INEM students had repeated classes while ART had rPnnAtd nhiPtA However_ there arp IndInators of a rpcpnt less favorable attitude by the authorities towards remedial teaching and subject re-etition, An incnresng number of stndents have not een allowed to con- tinue their studies because of their performance. The remedial teaching is t...C . . --..A 4. *U-. I - -..an.m4, i nA -it. sould. A i- ^^ nnf*4-p. A . n t UCLA= L A% -L . u LL% LLA c U LS-. A UPL vC. SI~ b.24 The principals claimed that the main reason_or hUe noEn dropout rates was the socio-econoinic situation of the parents. Six years of second- ary education is considered too long by many parents and chnges in the family situation often imply that students have to quit school and start earning money. Transportation and other school costs are also considered too high by the low-income families [para. 6.02(c)]. Another dropout cause has been the teacher strikes--three since the start of the INEM schools in 1970. One strike lasted so long that many students never returned to the school [para. 6.39(a)]. The dropout rate may also be influenced by the higher education issues (para. 6.32). An increasing number of poor students have dropped out during the eighth and ninth grades to enter the SENA1/ train- ing. They apparently considered this a better alternative than a continuation in the INEM schools with an uncertain prospect of entrance to higher education or of emnloyment. 1/Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje. - A.21 - 6.25I The f 19Y:yp,iI L i2 LjJU. o cr]um LI11 tne seconoar reacuers were underutilized in Coobi. Thu INIM schools were to be more efficient and the cocer were to ho oiiployed fuill rime and have a weekly workload of 25-26 periods. The completion mission analyzed the teacher utilization and it tound that the workload overag,ed l14-20 in the schools visited., It found, moreover, that. the !1ols woiild have had a student-teacher ratio varying from 21:1 to 26:1 if the agreed class sizes and workloads hAd been fully applied and some ptovisioni given for remedial teaching. The actu- student:teachr ratio was 13:1 to 18:1. The INEM schools are overstaffed and th aridn nttrher ratinq Are Inu hv International standards. Teachers in Five First Project Schools Number of Teachers Actually Employed Required Academic 581 373 Vocational and Craft Subjects 156 167 Remedial Teaching 20 Total 737 560 Also considering the need for remedial teachers, the INEM schools visited by the mission had considerably more teachers than required, with the voca- tional.and craft subjects somewhat understaffed, while the academic subjects were overstaffed. The overstaffing.qh elonaly reland o the +-14-4ca issues (paras. 4.01, 6.39). The teacher situation at the INEM schools implies a waste of resources and an underuse of anAlifieAd prnF.4nnls 1/ 6.26 There is a positive correlation between teacher qualification and efficiency in uper secondary education. The completion missinn analyvd, therefore, the teacher qualifications in 8 INEM schools and 3 control schools. 1/ Within reasonable limits, class sizes have been shown to have none or only a marginal effect on teaching. ,(The 21 country comparative study by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) ). - A.22 - INEM Schools Control Schools Number of Institutions 8 3 Total Number of Teachers in Academic Subjects: 659 100% 64 100% Of whom qualified (15) or more years of education) 643 98% 21. 33% Of whom-unqualified 16 2% 43 67% Total Number of Teachers in Vocational Subjects, Physical Education, Arts: 366 100% 41 100% Of whom qualified (13 or more years of education) 212 58% 4 10% Of whom unqualified 154 42% 37 90% (See also Annex 9.) Almost all (98%) pf the 659 INEM teachers in academic subiects can be con- sidered competent. Of 366 teachers in vocational subjects, arts and physical education, 58% can be considered qualified, if no work experience from industry, commerce, social services or agriculture is required. The three control schools had 105 teachers who could be considered anualfipd- The toavc in the INEM schools were thus considerably better-trained than the teachers in the control schools. The provision of better teacharg was a marnr be- tive of the INEM project and the objective has largely been achieved. The project has contributed to a true Drofessionalism of thp tAnhing rrpa. However, the special status of the teachers in INEM schools has caused prob- lems [para. 6.39(a)]. 6.27 Teacher qualifications were improved through in-service courses. After initial delays, such courses were organized with some external assistance on the INEM philosophy and objectives (para. 5.261 Participation in In-Service Courses at 15 Faculties of Education, 1969 and 1970 No. of Tpachprs Toahere AnoNint- Year Participating by INEM Institutions 1969 1,425 262 1970 212 94 Total 1,637 356 A n~-1 The training effort dcclilorl in 1970 becausc of delayed allocntion of fun,'s. During 1 7 1 c-a L WsLv; Uik iini t ruu t. Zuutus use.&-.. -. A ~. AT r t, organized its own teacher training. 6.28 The INEM teachers are well qualified which should promote efticiency. Other factors have worked against high efficiency. The NEN schools are over- staffed and have gradually returned to a teaching utilization typical for Many traditionil schools. After an initial period with efficient use of the teachers, the Covernnent yielded to teacher pressures and accepted lower effi- ciencies [para. 6.39(a)]. The External Productivity 6.29 Comprehensive secondary schools have a two-fold teaching objccuivo. Thov should prenare the students for the labor market as well as for further studies. The majority of the students in the humanities and science programs wo.l i normally contimie on to the universities while the maiority of the students in the other programs would enter the labor market or receive further VoCational traininp. Tl i, a maior and difficult function of the study guidance system to achieve an appropriate balance between the number of students who continue their stirlis in the universities and the number of students who proceed to the labor market or vocational training programs. %UILuLrLaL _u L ---- t- im v-- i..ty nei ----- ---- tions as well as to the labor market's effective demand at different levels. the chosen study programs are therefore of interest. 6.30 The table shows how the study programs, vocational aspirations and the fathers' jobs were aistriouted as a percentage oL tIle total among Ile INEM studentsl interviewed by the mission. BreakArin ef qtvitindnt- (in % total) Stu.dy. Pr.ogr..am. R%T>.s,R nse*m a R r at-)'er*s, OLuuy ~ ~ " bttmu oUY By Vocatinales u smtt or Vocational Area Program Aspirations Jobs Humanities 14 Science 24 Industry 19 25 34 Commerce 19 24 24 Social Services 9 - - Agriculture 14 7 2 Government and Other Services - 33 25 (including teaching) (9) (4) Others or Unspecified 11 15 99% 100% 100 1/ Forty-six percent of the students were girls and most of them were in rom- merce, humanities- and social -er-,4,&. studyL nvrornas - A.24 - The table shows no large df ference btwei the f;it horn' .oh!; and the voca- tional aspiration!; at the stuent . There is, howover, a tiil d w y ft,i1 industry to government and other services. Over 80% or tih a tudent t ed that they intended t continiiue to higlier education after gr.tduiton. Th distribution of INEM students between educational programs is close t.o the original plans, which implied that the ratio of academic to vocational students in Colombia would eventually change from 5:1 to 2:1. The value of such change becomes minimal if 80% of the students aim at higher education. This percentage was as high in the INEM schools as in the three control schools. Forty percent would have been a more reasonable percentage. 6.31 Tracer studies are being conducted to follow the employment and furrhPr studie of th TNEM graduatp. The first stiidpnts crndinted a vpur ago and evidence on employment or further education is limited. The inform- arinn nunilhlp show.s tht R02 of those fir.t- TNRM crqadrntr, t-nll thp iniiyor- sity entrance examination but only 20% were accepted. A few graduates (5%) ivn~11=A in nfh4nr 4not4titf-inne r%-r in q17M~A tf4 nin W~4iF#- percent were not enrolled in any training institution and had no job two or three~~-. month afe-rda-n.Temnrt (5)wihi employed has occasional jobs. The survey covered few schools and was undertaken a short L L LLL iU LAULI. LL UUS SLAIUW LLLe naLUL oL 11NFj1'L.LVUi b.VLLY LU.dLiUV1t. It is too early to draw conclusions about the employment situation. The G-overnmenL shuuu u auviseu ou ulluw tu tracer sMUU4= UnCLCU-y CIIU u45t necessary adjustments in study programs and guidance counselling. 6.32 The universities' critical policy towards the INEM schools has negatively influenced the enrollment (para. 6.02), the efficiency (para. 6.24) and the external productivity (para. 6.31). University entrance examinations appear*to discriminate against INEM graduates since the cognitive part of the tests is based on the curriculum of the traditional secondary school. This difficulty.was predicted by the 1967 education appraisal and appropriate measures were to be taken by the universities. Such measures were only partially taken and a claim by the universities of "an insufficient academic preparation in the INEM schools" appears founded on a biased definition of preparation. There is, furthermore, international research evidence that afted students from comorehensive school svatems do as well rel-minr-m1y qz those from traditional secondary schools. 17 The higher education admission nrnhlpm for the TNIFM grndinat-p Tmit ka cld annl t-h on'ernment should be advised to take appropriate actions and, if necessary, revise university legslaionin thIs4 area 6.33 In order to assure high productivity and continued relevance.of the INEMs to the needs of Colombia, the Government intended to create advisory cormmittees in the schools and to develop close cooperation with SENA. The committees were never formed as there was a fear ahlong the .Iocal educational authorities that an active advisory role on the part oI.colum1ri-, industry and agriculture might endanger the independence of the INIM schools. Sporadic ccntacts with enterprises exist in a few schools through plint visits, short-training periods, and some contacts for job placement. Forrial 1/ The same study as referred to in para. 6.25. - A.25 - links with SENA are few. Accordingly, the role of the school in job finding or channeling students to training institutions is limited. Social workers comply with this function in some schools but their means are inadequate. It has thus not been possible to create the links between the INEM schools and the community and its economic activities as was planned and as is needed (compare para. 6.21). The School Nanagemnent 6.34 The INEM schools were planned to have a sufficient number of com.- petent administrative staff. The planned staff-student ratio was 45:1. The actual ratio varies from 62:1 to 12:1 and averaged 34:1 in the schools visited. There is, furthermore, a discrepancy between administrative posts approved and personnel employed. In one school 85 administrative posts were approved,and 91 people employed; in another school 60 posts were approved and 38 employed. There are more administrators than are needed. However, the quality is not always satisfactory. Apparently, political favoritism hae cnpmptimo infltinncd tht, hirinc, nolirv rathpr than nrnfeQn1nA1 ninliFi- cations. A frequent change of principals has hampered school management and project schools had been fortunate enough to have the same principal in 1974 as 41.1 170V (LU1cpar paraC1. 4t.01. The performance of Lte principal is perhaps the single most important school quality factor. It is difficult to imagine a lasting improvement of a school system without proressionalism and con- tinuity in the school management. 6.35 It has been said that the teaching, social services, extracurricular activities and maintenance vary among the INEM schools. Those interschool variances are primarily caused by differences in the quality of the school management. 6.36 Despite the problems caused by education policy changes, unsuitable staff hirine and the sneela1 TNVM Qt' sh wns . L . sa h--adt-f TM -. a the p-oject has had many beneficial effects on Colombia's school administration at all levels. Its implementation required improved data collection. planning' ay-to-ay mnaemen school supervision and program evaluations. The INEM Operating Costs and Financing- 6.37 The INEM schools were to provide better education"at"lower costs nAr ntttdpnt than rnrrPnenndinP schnoln in nlnmhin- Cnt ainc A11V-n1% the project execution indicated, however, that operating costs were high. The etnlorinn mican" QrntiAA tha-rof^va Oa ^t cos 4- Ap41 1/ uWFuLaL.L116 LLuJL aL= =ApL=bU 4n cureut C0rrU since no relcvant derlitor exists for secondary school costs. When a uniform price base was required, the mission estimated indices for salary increases. - A.26 - 6.38 The development of the operating costs per student of tho INF" schools-visited is shown below. Operating Costs Per Student 1970-1974 (in current Col$) 1970 % 3971 % 1972 % 1973 % 1974 Z 1970-1974 Salaries 3,250 86 4,200 92 5,090 93 5,490 94 6,470- 96 99% Other V C CA -n a 13 4 f% £ CO FIxpnitu re5L~ _J_JV .k" J'VV V _JU I VVI V /_QV 'I J 4 INEM teacher salaries increased by 36% between 1970 and 1974, and the total salary cost increase of 99% is, therefore, high and corresponds to a real cost increase of about 46%. Non-salary expenditures (mainly supplies and naintrennce) moved inversely: after a reasonable spending in the first year. the amounts dropped; spending in 1974 must be considered insufficient for satisfactory func- tioning of theesdhools. In the three control schools the salaries comprised 91.5% of the total expenditures in 1974. The per student costs vary considerably among the INEM schools. Variations in 1974 are shown below (in Col$). Salaries: TPearn 6930 -L270 AdminfAtrAtivP Staff 1-n20 - 2 ,66 Othe~r Expendtures A,qnnf - nA /.nf The recurrent cost per student is high if compared to traditional secondary education (para. 6.42). 6.39 There are three major causes for the high operating costs per student in the INEM schools: (a) Hign Teaching Costs Per Hour. The INEM teachers have received higher salaries than other secondary teachers. The difference was 69% in 1970. There wprc two reon for the salary difference. The INEM schools were to - A.27 - ary education and the quality of the teachers wan essen- '. Za IY .J~ U. Cvii e VA uy 0 , . among the best through a salary incentive. Furthermore, IivrA teacners woulu ve empluyeu ftill time, teacli 2o1. weekly periods and be present at the school for 44 hours per week. Consequently, they wOUld not De allowed to teach in different schools as did other secondary school teachers. The INEM schools attracted the best tcachers. But the enactment of the special status for INEM teachers for which the Bank shares the responsibility with the Colombian Government provoked some fears and resentments. School authorities feared. that the INEM schools would cause a lowering of quality in other schools because of the absorption of the best teachers. Teachers ixi the traditional sector resented the "privileges" of INEM teachers. The salary difference with the traditional sector narronwd in 1973 to 25% After strikes hv teacher.: in the traditional schools. As a consequence of the reuced alnru Aiffaornt-o TNRM tnrrhcro ;nciesel nn working conditions equal to those in the traditional sector. Thein4r grievnces.. umn_a,edA _1s0 in St$rikes which led to adjustments of INEM working conditions to- wards *tos of th te*col.Th ekytahn loads are now below 20. The adjustments were not as far- reaching as required, and the total outcome of the striKes appears to be a continued dissatisfaction among both teaching groups despite concessious Dy Le GoVere11L which have led to increased overall recurrent costs of the INEM schools and high teaching costs per hour. Ine in- tended positive influence of the special status of the INEM staff on Colombia's education might be questioned. (b) Overstaffing and Rigid Planning. ln 1974 the enrollment & of the first ten project schools was lower (c) than the projected enrollment. A sub-optimal enrollment does not necessarily affect staff costs if study programs are cancelled which attract only a few students and if classes are properly combined to obtain reasonab-le sizes. But the year-to-year central planning of the INEM schools and-the subseauent hirine of teachers and other-staff have apparently been based on a generous offering of rtudy nrnorams, on enrol lmpnt whirh dirl not mtrinli7A and on optimistic estimates of high retention rates. programs turned out to be lower than estimated or changed LUL ULti LeaULL %pae 6.2d0 Lhe du-ilULites were un- able to reduce the staff. This situation led to further decreases in teaching loads, to small teaching groups at - A.28 - the higher gradcs of some schools and to overstating (para. 6.25). The staff hiring has been based on programs and number of classes rather than on actual enrollments. Some staff has also been hired as if the schools were already being used at its maximum capa- city. During a building-up period, staff functions should be combined and part-time staff hired. The authorities had difficulties in managing schools of the INEM size in a cost-effective way despitc adminis- trative trainiug. 6.40 Financing problems appeared in 1973 when the initial operative bud- get for the INEM schools (Col$177 million) was too low, but no supplementary budget was conceded to close the gap. An additional Col$50 million had to hc provided,from ICCE's general funds, which implied a reduction of its school construction' programs. In 1974 the initial hudget attributinnc: wori, Puin lower (Col$171 million), yet a supplementary budget was eventually provided (r%l5sn_5 millirnl Another CnlA-AA miillion re en d o over 4-An-pe sable expenditures. These austerity budgets have been partially responsible fo ,te slo- -- 4 oF #-he C4irst projec -1-_ 4- 1Ql7> --A r1 /-M___ 10%) and the subsequent low enrollments. However, the enrollment freeze was n t- --------4-A 1-. n th s' fuY a Sy n l%sLCCZZt AA LC LUuenLL-LtulceL Latio. IL appears on the contrary that the decrease in the absolute costs might have been accoinpa- ried by some ircrease In the costs per student. 6.41. The financial constraints caused maintenance problems. Insufficient means have been available for non-salary expenditures and the percentage of the recurrent budget for other expenditures than salaries has decreased (pata..6.38). The commitment In a side letter to the Loan Agreement impliA that the allocation for maintenance and supplies should h1ave increased from Col$2.1 million in 1971 to Col$5.2 million in 1974. The actual allocation never exceeded Col$1.4 million. The allocations varied between the schools and'indicated inflexibilities similar to those of the teacher costs. 6.42 A correct cost comparison betweeu traditional schools and compre- hensive schools is difficult. The wide objectives and the diversity of acti- vities in comprehensive schools differ fundamentally from those of traditionnl schools. Nevertheless, the completion mission calculated the operating costs of the INEM schools if the standards of the Loan AvrrnmPnts had hrnn Follonod It compared those costs with actual INEM costs and the costs.of.other schools in rollntsa. Twon altnivess at usened INEM enro. llm - --- u itCO E at curen L L[ L 7/+ JLNJ5 ' enrollments and (b) unit costs at intended INEM4 enrollments. - A.29 - Goerat inc Cost Per Student Type of (rounded) qornzidinrv grlincil (rni q) Hoie Economics School 4,700 INEM at Optimal Enrollment and Optimal Staff Use 4,800 INEM at Current Enrollment but Optimal Staff'Use 5,100 Primary Teacher Training 5,900 Industrial School. 6,400 INEM Actual Cost at Current Enrollment 6.800 ARrieultural School 8.200 Given the above unit costs, an assumed transfer of the INEM students to tradi- tional schools corresponding to their current study options in INEM would leid to an average cost of Col$5.000 per transferred INEM student. The estimated optimal unit costs of the INEM schools are close to the average costs of t-rAnfPrrPd qtudants. The Government's oripinal cost estimates were not out of 'order. But possible constraints in student recruitment, teacher resistoln(e to Lhe ch ang-es in the ir uynrke conndlitionns aind nnl i t i n ises a n tfli - rforrn implementation had not been sufficiently considered in the original planniig. NmorthPles manc are avnilnhIp t rpdImr eurront hith unit rits .and tlit current Government should be advised to apply them. 7. Conclusions 7.01 The INEM school reform was in most respects well conceived and educationally and economically sound. Nevertheless, the appraisal mission and the Bank accepted the education plans of the Colombian Government in power in 1967 too freely. More consideration should have been given to the practicability of those plans in a political situation which is characterized by cabinet and policy changes and potent pressure groups. Most of the project implementation problems were political in nature and reflected sub- sequent cabinets' different attitudes towards the education reform. The overall quantitative and qualitative developments of the education sector since 1967 reflected also those attitudes. A particular problem during the period was the special status of the INEM project in Colombia's education- It facilitated management and staff hiring but it caused also several admin- istrative and teacher problems. The Bank should advia AAirinat thp P2eanf-in of a similar situation in future education projects. (Paras. 4.01, 4.10). - A.30 - 7.02 Expansion of Colombia's education continued during the last decade as estimated but the development was uneven. Although based on government plans, the 1967 appraisal mission's projections were 25% incorrect, confirm- ing that education planning must be flexible as long as few tools exist to manage the social demand for education and governments may s;hift priorities. The quality of staffing and cost estimates in education would be enhanced if enrollment prolections (also in Bank reports) included information on ranges or accuracies. 7.03 The Colombian Government planned several qualitative improvements o-t-irllv in qprandarv and hivher education durine the 1960's. With the exception of the INEM project, few of those improvements were fully imple- mentA A gl+-kh h -ha,n ayd "anill-vrar" affprt frr-m thi TNFM in lpn-rnincy content, teaching methods, etc. (Paras. 4.07, 4.08). 7.04 The physical execution of the Bank-financed INEM project was IJ. i r U J. LU. '.j%, t- L . _" uce su . Cn tuction was rapid'.J. Al betterA aA'.J -- -L to Bank advice would have avoided some delivery, maintenance and operational prob- lems U tne shoUU equiLment. M.datnancue pruvbles have occurreu anu the Government should be advised to increase the maintenance funds and improve the maintenance services. (Paras. 5.14, 5.18, 5.30). I.05 The schools were less successful in meeting the quantitative tar- gets reaching 56% of their capacity in 1974 instead of a planned 75% on a double-shift basig. A cause was the physical planning preceding the project execution. More attention should have been paid to student catchment areas, site location, appropriate school sizes, student transportation, etc. The slow development of the schools, the low enrollments, the student dropout rates, the overstaffing and the underutilization of some facilities might have been avoided with a more careful school mapping. Insufficient coopera- tion with the communities, the universities and SENA is another cause for the sub-optimal enrollment of the INEM schools. The Government should be advised to review the situation of each INEM school and with a view to improve the utilization of staff and facilities. The INEM authorities, furthermore, should be advised to renew the negotiations with the universi- ties and SENA to facilitate the transfer of -students from one institution to another. (Paras. 5.05, 5.06, 5.09, 5.10, 6.01, 6.03, 6.21, 6.32, 6.33). 7.06 The INEM curricula are suited to Colombia's needs. ,The.students haup elected Atudv orograms close to the original estimates and seem satis- fied. The programs have been less successful in reducing dropout.rates and in erpating Interest for middle-level careers. desDite a DOSitiVe student attitude to practical activities. It is too early to assess the project's impact nn thp lnhnr mnrkPt Thp Cnvernment Ahild hP ndviApd fn follow closely the on-going tracer studies and apply the findings on the INEM study programs. (Paras. 6.09, 6.17, 6.23,6 1) I.*1U/ lite L11Z411 LIIUUoo LInVe Ueen Duc Ls flLn LCeaLIhing 'LUW-LLicome Lami- lies. The Government should be advised to study the factors (busing, school meals, etc.) which could further increase access to secondary education for the low-income groups. (Paras. 6.02, 6.05, 6.24). - A.31 - I.U ine iNceM envirUmue isonuucive to good learnig, andu ect has, undoubtedly, contributed to an improvement of education in Colombia. The teachers are qualified and apparently letter trained than the average secondary teacher in Colombia, although the vocational teachers are less well trained than the academic teachers. The project has; raised the quality of teacher-training in Colombia. The teaching in science, lan- guages and pre-vocational subjects has improved, alhough the practical facili- ties are not used to the expected extent. Some audio-visual equipment is less suitable. The Bank should apply an austere policy in this area in education projects; textbooks, mimeograph machines and basic equipment should generally be given preference to sophisticated audio-visual equipment and language laboratories (para. 6.12). 7.09 The project schools vary in quality. Some schools areAof high quality with good student performance and dedicated staff. Other project schools are only slightly better than those in the traditional system. The performance of the school principal appears to be the most important school quality factor. (Paras. 5.18, 6.34, 6.35). 7.10 The INEM recurrent costs have been higher than the original estimates. The major reasons are high teaching costs per hour, under- enrollment, rigid management and continued high dropout rates. The efficiency is lower than iecessary. It would be possible to provide INEM education at reasonahl and enmnptitive cnsts ner student if the ori2inal decision on teacher workload and student-teacher ratios were adhered to. However, #--U - r.A nla ,raccivo a-rr%,,c In~ar opposed c svr a effirlernr'. mancirime and the replicability of the INEM comprehensive schools is, therefore, a costs are a high 96% of the total recurrent costs, and the staff-student ratio iH Lhe Jnr10 ui uLoUUALZ .L HAlUI Ui AeLAL tLo.LA sLanULLUDo. &LLCOD V.&J. V.&u, 6.42). 7.11 The management of the project and of the INEM schools has suffered from policy and starr changes. The size or the project and the complexiry of the INEM schools have, however, had a positive effect on the education administration at all levels and improved data collection, planning day-to- day management, school supervision, evaluation, etc. (Paras. 5.03, 6.36, 6. 39). 7.12 Comprehensive education is viable in major urban areas of Colombia under certain conditions. Curriculuui, staffing and physical structure must be related to the specific socio-political conditions of the community in which the school is to be located. The first INEM project was too ambitious, despite a reduction from 19 to 10 school units. The schools' catchment areas were too big and the programs too diversified, under given circumstances and at this stage. It was, therefore, beyond the capacity of the authorities to implement all aspects of the comprehensive reform within the established time- table, despite laudable efforts. Political and managerial problems and the need for a close cooperation with teachers and communities were underestimated. The lack of solutions to those difficult issues led to financial and educational - A.32 - problems. The 111ir"w1o1 project met severl Ujectives very well ano tne unsolveo issues may tend to overshadow actual achievements. Nevertheless, the Government should be advised to consider the major issues raised in this report prior to a replication of the INEM schools. 7.13 The Colombian Government should be advised about the findings and recommendation of the completion mission. It is, further-more, suggested that the second INEM project be evaluated in late 1976. The completion mission visited 3 second project schools and they encountered similar problems as '- the first project. The completion mission of the second project should f -as on the employment and further studies of the INEM graduates, on unit costs, staff turnover and maintenance. Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office May 1975 ANNEX 1 COLOMBIA COMPLETION MISSION TT,,o-, arriva,l t-he misson~rr me't Wt1k T)r Ohrpcrnn nf Trrv. nrd arranged with him the work plan for the two-week stay. The mission's %top priority was to visit as many of tHc TIZe nc neoscible- Accrdringyly, the first week was spent travelling to the selected schools. During the mission had discussions with ICCE and ministry personnel. Five schools were visited from the First Project: Cali, Cartagena, Santa Marta, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga. ThrCe Seconu Project schools were visited: Villavicencio, El Tunal in Bogota and Tun1a. In addition, three control schools were selected, two academic secondary schools (Santa Marta and Bucaramanga) and a girls' vocational secondary school (Cartagena). In each school visited, the mission conducted interviews with the principal and vice-rectors, toured the physical facilities and administered written questionnaires to teachers and students. The questionnaires were given to a group of 10-15 randomly selected teachers and to 35-40 students from the final or highest year in the school. The students were drawn from different optiong so that the overall sample included academic, industrial, commercial, social promotion and agricultural students. The anonymous student questionnaires covered family socio-economic background, student aspirations, attitudes and reactions to the INEMs program and environment. The teacher questionnaire (also anonymous) requested the reactions to the INEMs as well as the use by the teachers of the counselling services and the relationship between the training received by the teacher and present work functions. During the interviews with the directors of each school, the mis- ainn aathArAd data for the education worksheets. budget and cost sheets. teacher education and training sheets, and_the student flow charts. COLOMBIA Loan No. 552-CO INEM First Phase--Distribution of Costs in Thousands of Pesos Planned Site Professional Total Total Location Enrollinent Area Works B'uildings Fees Furniture Equipment Pesos/'O00 US/'OO Bogota (Kennedy) 3,040 18,952 6,171 16,027 966 3,070 6,183 32,417 1,667 Cali 3,040 19,887 4,319 16,052 1,022 3,221 4,852 29,466 1,515 Medellin 3,000 18,939 3,628 12,864 918 3,068 3,874 24,352 1,253 Barranquilla 2,670 16,680 4,150 14,051 1,066 2,702 3,531 25,500 1,312 Cartagena 2,450 16,300 5,656 17,337 1,639 2,640 4,551 31,823 1,637 Bucaramanga 2,060 + 14,172 3,946 8,826 820 2,295 3,388 19,275 991 Monteria 1,570 · 12,489 3,442 10,723 754 2,023 3,919 20,861 1,073 Cucuta 2,020 14,447 5,156 12,088 860 2,340 4,957 25,401 1,306 Pasto 2,110 -15,567 5,409 12,561 780 2,521 4,986 26,257 1,350 Santa Marta 2,060 15,760 4,085 11,506 948 2,553 5,142 24,234 1,246 Totals 24,020 163,193 45,962 132,035 9,773 26,43 3 45,383 259,586 Total in US$ 2,408 6,921 546 1,259 2,216 13,350 Percentages 18.04% 51.84% 4.09% 9.43% 16.60% 100% ANNEX 3 'COLOMBIA EDUCATION PROJECT COMPLETION Loan 552-CO Accumulated Disbursements in Actual Disbursements Fiscal Actual Thousands of US$ Equivalent as Percentage of: Yer TtlRevisedg Revised Reised~ Reised and Disburse- Appraisal Estimate Estimate Appraisal Estimate Estimate ju& tents Estimate jan. 72 Dec. 72 Esiae jam; 72 Dec. 72 1970 1 0.20 0.55 36 2 0.69 1.15 60 3 1.10 1.77 62 4 1.50 2.36 63 1971 1 2.47 3.21 76 2 3.26 4.03 80 3 3.93 4.97 79 4 4.10 5.80 70 1972 1 4.3 VI 69 2 5.03 6.51 4.17 77 120 3 503 6a83 493 73 10 4 5.04 7.01 5.45 71 92 1973 1 5.33 7.60 5.80 5.60 70 91 95 -I C CO K Cn C ATOC O 3 5.64 7.20 5.70 74 78 99 974 fou o 19 I 1 5.75 5.90 75 75 97 2 5.77 6.00 76 76 96 3 6.08 6.10 80 80 99 4 6.11 80 80 100 Colo'bia Education Project Completion 1[552-CO) Total Ex,enditure - Forecast and Actual US$ Ocillion~s) 18.00- 16.50 - 15.2 15.00 - - - 13.50- 12.8 12.CO 2 .22 1.3 3 i0. 50-1. IIý 9.00 - - -- - - 7.50-I t 4.50 - FORECAST ACTUAL 3.00 -- 1.50-1 1969 1970 1971 i972 1973 * As rucorde.d by tIBRD for disbursceen. ANNflX Sa COLOMBIA .- TNEM ENROLLMENT DEVELOPMENT AND .. . . ANNUAL INTAM, Number of 'Places and Enrollment 50,000 40,000 30,000 CUA ---56% of total capacity 20,000 10,000 C .- C P4c rL/ ? r e ir m,ve L ACtî970L 74 4 T 1vr071 9L 1 7. 1970 1971 - .. 1972 . ..1973 1974 1975 co1 A -NEM ACTUAL ENROLLMENT PYRAMIID-IN 1974 AND FULL CAPACITY FULL CAPACITY GR.ADE- 10, 9 8 7 500 10,000 NUMBER OF STUDENTS lInor:'Dist_ri bi t ie- Co1. IEEM Scho1l Popatrion .coL id to overall UrbanfPerulat_ion 25.2% 18.6% 18.6% 16.2% 15.1% 15.22 12.6 0-6000 6001 --J'2000 12000( - 00o000 18000 -24000 : ) -1- US$ (230) (/i60) (690) (920) INEM Project Schools j - All urban houscholds Source: Student questionnair(?s Source: "Public Expenditures on Education and Incene Di!tr:ihatioie: in Colombia", J.P. Jallaide Prco ect School mic year 1974 - .--- 1 0 . O F. C i. of Teachers lnadustria. ecper Sub:jeet By Leng Schoolin[ (years) Agricul tural, y i c ;. t f b)Žc or i-:dli, ( Including Te.cher Training) Co;:ercial Prac- 'r,a,-r r . of Su>jects tices in Ycars a a is11 1 41 16 16 _1 2 3 >3 2 2 12 8 4 'as s _. _ 109 . 106 2 1 5 7 6 'Jodern L:)nguages 126 2 19 3 2 7 7 7k 18 12 6 I ýSocial Sciences 17 10 2 1 1.47 8 7 6 6 7? 12 8 4> ~¶thuheati1cs 137 32 85 5s 8 1 6 Natural Scienc s U 2 88 3-_ . Phscl4 31 1I Education 78 3 17 7 6 8 36 1 c5 23 sthetic .23 !ocational 35 21 11 3 Subjects9 1 209 21 48 21 42 941 -26 35 2 io iThi i igu url lated. Total number 105 21 58 . 1 1 24 of teachers 1 025 25 {12 '30 62 24 2 48 112 The nuribers above the lines pertain to control schools ( sch,«olà), The numicrs jele th li es ertlin to A roje t choc1s 3 SchooIl) oI1IMfocz ehcsÏ eho-