Report No. 1144-JO FILE COPY Special Economic Report Jordan Review of the Five-Year Plan (1976-80) May 24, 1976 Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Document of the World Bank This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SPECIAL ECONOMIC REPORT REVIEW OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1976-80) Table of Contents Page No. Map Country Data Summary and Conclusions ..... .............................. i-vi I. CURRENT ECONOMIC POSITION ...................... ...... I Population, Employment and Manpower................... . Economic Structure and Growth. ......................... 2 Balance of Payments. ................................... 3 Public Finance. ........................................ 5 Money, Credit and Prices. .............................. 6 The Three-Year Plan (1973-75). ......................... 8 The Economy in 1976........................................ 9 IL. THE FIVE YEAkR PLAN (1976-80).............................. 12 Objectives, Strategy aid Growth........................ The Investment Program. ................................ 13 Agricultural Strategy and Projects..............12.....4 Industrial Strategy and Projects. ...................... 15 Capital Requirements and Financing....................16 Domestic Finance ......................... .......... 17 III. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH ...................... 19 Growth and Investment ................................. 19 External Borrowing and the Debt Burden ................ 20 IV. POLICY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................... 22 Issues in Planning ........................................ 22 Mtanpower, Planning, Employment and Training ........... 23 This report is based on the findings of an economic mission which visited Jordan in January/February 1976. The mission consisted of Messrs. Arshad Zaman (Mission Chief), Takashi Miyawaki (General Economist), Basil Al-Bustany (Planning Economist), Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (Fiscal Economist), Herbert Floyd (Agriculture Specialist), Phan Nam Thuyet (Industrial Economist), Thampil Pankaj (Transport Specialist), Mohammad Yasin (-ILO Consultant on Manpower), and Ms. Samia Chway-Chway (Mission Secretary). This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Table of Contents (Continued) Page No. Project Implementation and Follow-Up .................. 24 Inflation and Demand Management ....................... 24 Domestic Resource Mobilization ..................... 25 Trade Policies ........................................ 27 Coordination of Economic Policies .................. 27 ANNEX A: Manpower ANNEX B: Agriculture ANNEX C: Mining and Manufacturing ANNEX D: Transport STATISTICAL APPENDIX {BRD一1之IZQR 乍 Vete 1 of 4 peg- Lad het tie-ci>JOffiN SOCIAL INGNCATORI eda SWU?T JoRDAGÖ Rerite<Ct CounTRIES (1903 TOTAL 9P.1 gast RECENT c0 Aflae .. 1940 1970 c3TINATE PN~28 gEP. Tunista LegANmn 41P Pin CAPTA (uSM 190.0 339.9 340.0 300.0 320.0 700.0 POPULATION ag VITAL STATISTICS POPULATION tNI.. NILLIG15 1.7 2.3 2.3 1.1 5.1 2.7 POPULAT0N oENSity P%R soUAmt aN. 17.0 24.0 26.0 3.0 31.0 264.0 P%n $Ua*! tN. ANA8L LANS .. 98.0 $53.0 VITAL afatsttCl CAUDC grn #alt PER TNOUtANG 47.0 49.0 48.0 44.0) 34.4 41.0 CRU0 GetTN Raft PER THOUSANO 16.0 16.0 19.0 23.0 16.0 13.0 INANR NOITALITY aTE '/TN0u, .. .. .. .. 106.0 82.0 L1i7 91PCTANC at stark <tRS W2.0 1 14.0 51.0 61.0 16.0 sa.0 GROSS RPRODUCTION RATE 3.4 3.5 3.3 2.* 3.4 1.9 POPULATION &foliTd maTg ME 15TAL 2.4 3.1 3.3 2.6 2.1 2.5 JRIAN 1.0 .. 3.2 3.4 2.4 6.0 unga" POPULATION <z ar TOTAL) 44.# .. 43.0 30.0 40.0 1a 58.0 AGE SaiUCTURE (PenceN> 0 tO 14 YEARS 41.0 47.0 ' 47.1 42.0 46.0 j 43.0 15 TO 64 fEARs 51.0 49.1 Z, 49.1 53.0 50.0 a 52.0 65 YEARS AND Of24 4.0 3.5 / 3.0 5.0 4.0 ' 5.0 &at uprNOVICT Rafte 1.0 1.0 'b 1.0 0.9 1.0 . 0.9 EC010MIC atPINOENCT 16110 2.3 3.2 1 2.3 L" 1.3 1.8 b 1.8 FANELY PLANIN ACCEPTORS (CUNJLAIITZ. TmOU3 .. .. .. 108.0 87.0 U$us (2 37 NAINItO UGNEN> .. .. . .. 12.0 14.0 TOTAL LaSOR FRcE (TOUSaNO) 390.0 360.0 ibd 54.0 120.0 la 1400.0 570.0 LABOR FORCE IN AGtCULTURZ (3) 31.0 '4 29.0 'b.d .. 16.00 i7.0 e 19.0 UNfPLOYC (i Or LASOR r0CE) 7.0 8.0 74.4 .. .. 14-0 Zi 6.0 tecOent Og$StgufloUTI o R PIvATE tNCONE.RICC0 B- 1G1N0T 13 -OF POPULATION .. .. . 23.5 ' 26.0 ' mIGNEST 20% 0r POPULATION .. .. .. 11-1 4 15.0 ' L01cC 20 0 POPULATION .. .. -- .. Z Id 4.0 LOUCS1 401 OF POPULATION .. .. .. 11.4 I 11.0 ' OISTmtaurtON ot LaNg OWNERSIP % OUNte 9T TOP 10g ONtaS .. .. .. .-. 3.0 57.0 '4 % ~UN3O aT SMALLEST 10S OUNCIS .. .. -- 0.5 1.' WEALTN ANG NUTRITIN POPJLATI0N *ER P4Y5ICIAN 1900.0 /C 2680.0 2540.0 7260.0 5910.0 1470.0 POPULATION PER SURSING PERSON 1940.0 e d 1010.0 1020.0 670.0 7300 le 1050.0 e POPULArloN PER KOSPITAL gEo 680.0 7 963.0 930.0 170L 410.0 260.0 PER CAPITA SUPPLT ar . CALORIES (Z OF RcUIREXENTS) 90.0 .9.0 49.0 97.0 56.0 96.0 PROTEIN (GANS PER Dar> 57.0 60.0 65.0 40.0 4.0 70.0 -0 WKICK A#INAL AND PULMI 16.0 18.0 a .. 23.0 e 14.0 11.0 DCATH Ratt c/TWOU) 4GES 1-4 .. '10 . 80 COUCArioN 40JUSIEO ENIOLLNENT Raft0 PkINAmT IN0A. 76.0 /f 70.0 /h 1 .. 163.0 107.0 111.0 '4 SECONOART SCH03L 24.0 f[ 30.0 .. 21.0 20.0 60.0 TeqS 07 SC0OLING PROVID0 (FIRST fNf SEC2NO LEVeL) 12.0 12.0 12.0 13.0 13-0 12.0 VOCAftoqAL ?NROLLNENT (Z 0r SCC1NOART) 3.0 /1 3.0 Lki 3.0 i4.c 10.0 3.0 1.0 Id AOULT LITERACT RATE (93 32.0 g .. 62.0 /bj 50.0 . 69.0 NOUSING PERSONS MPE ROOM (AVERAGE) .7 Z.T2.1 OCCUPMO E WCELLINGS W9THOUT PtPto WAT?q (I) 790 la .. 60.0 a 34.0 ACCeSS T0 ELECTRICITY (X OF,ÅLL UOfLLINGS) 170 .. 26.0 g 98.0 RURAL UeLLINGS CONNCCTEo 0 EL9CIICITT (9) 1.0 .. . CONSUNPTION RAI0 9ECCIVERS <PER THOU POP) 38.0 160.0 203.0 69.0 77.0 ý215.0 PASSENGeR CARS (Pen TMOU POP$ 4.0 7.0 8.0 .. 1110 180 CLECTRICITT (<K~/TR PER CAP' 49.0 71.0 101.0 81.0 111.0 41.0 NEWIPRINT (KS/R PER CAP) 3.2 0.3 0.03 .. 0.1 17 -E .0 fE. . .................. . . ..... see '0f[3 ANG DCFZN[fom laSom REVERSE n p.p 1 iri li il¶t à t c no -3~ 1 r d Ilau 0~ gli" of 2 r _.1 En- Page 3of4 ECONOMIC INDICATORS GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1974 ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (%. constant prices) US $ M1n. % 1960-65 1965-70 197S GNP at Market Prices 1,151.8 100.0 11.4 0.9 2.0 Gross Domestic Investment 294.2 25.5 10.2 4.4 3.2 Gross National Saving - 87.6 - 7.6 Current Account Balance 206.3 17.9 Exports of Goods, NFS 359.0 31.2 17.1 -0.8 15.0 Imports of Goods, NFS 818.5 71.1 6.3 3.5 21.0 OUTPUT, LABOR FORCE AND PRODUCTIVITY IN 1975 Value Added 1 Labor Force2 (Estimate) V, A Per Worker USP Mln. % Thous. % US_$ % Agriculture 93.9 10.3 115.0 30.0 816.5 34.4 Industry 209.7 23.1 36.1 9.4 5,808.9 245.0 Services 604.1 66.6 223.7 58.4 2,700.5 113.9 Unallocated 7.0 Total/Average 907.7 100.0 382.8 100.0 2.3h. 100.0 GOVERNMENT FINANCE Central Government ( JD M1fn. % of GDP 1975 1975 L973-7s Current Receipts 3/ 161.0 48.8 45.3 Current Expenditure 125.0 37.9 37.6 Current Surplus 36.0 10.9 7.7 Capital Expenditures 4/ 77.2 23.4 19.3 External Assistance (net) 3/ 77.0 23.3 21.8 MONEY, CREDIT and PRICES Un7J 1972 . l A .g2 (Million JD outstanding end period) Money and Quasi Money 135.1 146.5 176.1 216.7 270.7 6/ Bank Credit to Public Sector 23.3 23.5 38.7 41.7 49.7 6/ Bank Credit to Private Sector 44.9 47.9 59.3 80.3 114.2 6/ (Percentages or Index Numbers) Money and Quasi Money hs % of GDP 60.5 61.2 70.4 64.7 82.0 General Price Index (1967 - 100) 5/ 119.7 129.4 142.9 171.5 192.1 Annual percentage changes in: General Price Index 4.3 8.1 10.4 20.0 12.0 Bank credit to Public Sector 307.6 -3.6 84.7 10.5 19.2 Bank credit to Private Sector 3.0 6.7 23.7 35.4 42.2 NOTE: All conversions to US dollars in this table are at the average exchange rate prevailing the period covered. 1/ nata refer to East Bank only. 2/ Total labor force; unemployed are allocated to sector of the normal occupation. "Unallocated" consists mainly of unemployed workers seeking their first job. 3/ Includes Foreign Budget Support. JD 73.5 million in 1975. 4/ Development expenditures. 5/ Annual Average of Amman Cost-of-Living Index. 6/ November 1975. not available not applicable Page 4 of 4 TRADE PAYMENTS AND CAPITAL FLOWS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (AVERAGE 1973-75) 1972 1973 1974 1975 US $ Mln % (Millions US $) Fruits & Vegetables 24.2 -..3 Exports of Goods, NFS 112.4 170.4 253.9 379.6 Cigarettes 2.0 2.1 Imports of Goods, NFS 330.0 416.6 611.4 952.7 Phosphate 43.2 45.2 Resource Gap (deficit = -) -217.6 -246.2 -357.5 -573.1 Cement 7.6 7.9 Chemical Products 3.9 4.1 Interest Payments (net) 9.4 15.5 20.9 28.4 All other commodities 14.7 15.4 Workers' Remittances 20.7 44.9 75.3 166.7 Total 95.6 100.0 Other Factor Payments (net) Net Transfers 191.2 197.4 270.5 437.5 EXTERNAL DEBT, DECEMBER 31, 1975 Balance on Current Account 3.7 11.6 9.2 59.5 US $ M1n Direct Foreign Investment -1.1 -3.5 3.3 11.0 Net MLT Borrowing Public Debt, incl. guaranteed 331.6 Disbursements 30.1 38.9 45.1 84.6 Non-Guaranteed Private Debt Amortization -11.7 -15.9 -16.2 24.1 Total outstanding & Disbursed Subtotal 18.4 23.0 28.9 60.5 1/ Capital Grants . . . DEBT SERVICE RATIO for 1975- other Capital (net) 0.3 0.2 1.7 - 1.1 % Other items n.e.i -2.5 6.8 -22.1 28.9 Increase in Reserves (+) 18.8 38.1 21.0 158.8 Public Debt, incl. guaranteed 5.0 Non-Guaranteed Private Debt . Gross Reserves (end year) 281.9 326.4 375.9 Total outstanding & Disbursed Net Reserves (end year) 269.9 312.5 349.8 RATE OF EXCHANGE (Average during the Period) IBRD/IDA LENDING, (February 1976) (Million US $): Through IBRD IDA 1972 1973 1974 1975 Outstanding & Disbursed - 31.7 US$ 1.00 = JD 0.357 0.327 0.321 0.319 Undisbursed - 27.9 JD 1.00 = US$ 2.800 3.055 3.119 3.130 Outstanding incl. Undisbursed 5 FOREIGN TRADE OF OIL (Million US$) 1965 1972 1973 1974 1975 Imports 9.05 12.78 12.81 15.93 18.67 (Petroleum) (5.97) (9.27) (10.27) (11.16) (12.21) Exports - - 0.52 0.43 0.28 Oil Transit Fees 4.80 8.60 10.40 3.60 7.51 1/ Ratio of Debt Service to Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services. not available not applicable SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS i. The last decade has been an exceptionally difficult period for Jordan. The 1967 war with Israel resulted in a severe dislocation of eco- nomic activities with the occupation of the West Bank, which accounted for some 35-40 percent of domestic production, and in a large influx of dis- placed persons to the East Bank. The following years were marked by severe fighting with Israel in the Jordan Valley, the internal disburbances of 1970 and 1971, the closure of the Suez Canal for eight years, and of the Syrian and Iraqi borders for over a year, and four alternate years of drought. As a result, Jordan's (East Bank) per capita income in 1975, estimated at around $630, is probably somewhat lower in real terms than it was in 1966, when more than a decade of economic growth, sustained at high levels, was disrupted by the war. The ability of the Government to prevent a substantial decline in the standards of living of the population, now estimated at some 2 million in the East Bank, is a tribute to the effectiveness of public economic policies, especially since 1971, as well as the effective mobilization of foreign re- sources, and to the resiliency of the economy. ii. Before the 1967 war, Jordan's real income grew at about 8 percent per year. Price stability prevailed, and high levels of foreign assistance permitted a sustained surplus in the balance of payments. Economic policy was guided by the objective of phasing out budget support by the mid-1970's, so that foreign aid could be channeled exclusively to development projects. On the eve of the war, firm budgetary control and resource mobilization ef- forts appeared to be yielding positive results. In the immediate post-war period, large budget support payments under the Khartoum Agreement encouraged a rapid rise in military expenditures to meet essential defense requirements. The emphasis of economic policy shifted to the short-run aim of revitalizing the economy through high government expenditures; support and encouragement of the private sector and the maintenance of price stability by absorbing ex- cess purchasing power through easy access to imports. These policies, and maintenance of the convertibility of the Dinar, to enhance general confidence in the economy, shifted the burden of economic stability to the balance of payments, through foreign assistance, and profoundly altered the pattern of resource availability and use towards a greatly increased reliance on imports. By the early 1970's, the critical task of short-run economic management had been accomplished; and the Government began to focus once again on medium and long-term economic policies. In 1971, the Jordan Development Board was re- placed by the National Planning Council, which was charged with re-activating economic planning and drawing up a Three-Year Plan for Economic Development (1973-75). iii. The Three-Year Plan was the first Jordanian Plan to be executed without revision or interruption. Like previous Plans, the Three-Year Plan called for increased employment (70,000 new jobs), high output growth (8 percent per year GDP growth), reduction of trade deficits, and elimination of budget support in the longer-term, and also recognized the need for better - ii - regional distribution of the benefits of growth. It proposed investments of JD 179 million ($500 million), during 1973-75. In view of its interim nature, it did not propose any fundamental revisions in either the growth strategy or the investment priorities that had prevailed prior to the 1967 war. Although a number of projects under implementation were executed, and new ones were ini- tiated, considerable work on project formulation and preparation was necessary during the first eighteen months of the Plan. Implementation, which did not get started at a full pace until the middle of the Plan period, could have been improved by tackling the shortage of skilled and managerial manpower; the delays in equipment deliveries and rising costs, which necessitated updating of feasibility studies and reappraisal of project proposals; and the lack of adequate preparation, monitoring and follow-up. Consequently, the physical rate of implementation of the Plan projects was low, even though financial disbursements on projects were high. Nevertheless the last few years saw the strong re-emergence of longer-term considerations of economic development in public policies. With the considerable experience gained during this period, the stage was set for the promulgation of the Five-Year Plan (1976-80). iv. The Five-Year Plan has been drawn around a comprehensive investment program. Most of the projects constituting this program have been the subject of study in Jordan for a decade or more. Executing ministries were formally involved in the preparation of the Plan; and the Board of Directors of NPC, along with the concerned Ministers, deliberated on the setting of priorities to scale down the requests for budgetary allocations by individual ministries. The fundamental objectives and strategy of the Plan are much the same those prior to 1967, and are appropriate for Jordan. The general development objective is to phase out the reliance of the economy on budget support by a specified date (say by the mid-1980's). The optimal strategy would be to concentrate investment on those economically justifiable projects that can contribute to the growth of national income, and allow increased domestic government revenues and exports. The Plan subscribes to these objectives and strategy, and adopts annual average growth targets for GDP of 12 percent (agriculture, 7 percent; mining and manufacturing, 26.2 percent); merchandise exports, 24.2 percent; with imports curtailed to 8 percent (elasticity of 0.7 with respect to GNP). Total investments under the Plan are envisaged at JD 765 million ($2.3 billion), of which 65 percent is allocated to the public sector (including public investment in the mixed sector). v. The agricultural strategy proposed in the Five-Year Plan is based on a reassessment of the agricultural potential of the economy. The Govern- ment has increasingly realized that a high growth strategy, necessary for at- taining economic self-sufficiency, entails a high level of agricultural im- ports, which in the short and medium-term are likely to widen the agricul- tural trade gap, both absolutely and relatively. Consequently, the Plan aims primarily at stabilizing agricultural production and raising productivity, by major investments in irrigation. It attaches primary emphasis to export- oriented production, particularly for the growing Middle Eastern markets, of high-value fruits and vegetables, in which Jordan has a comparative advantage. - iii - The Plan places less emphasis on import-substitution, particularly for cereals, where yields are low. To achieve these ends, the Plan calls for an integrated development of the Jordan Valley, where the bulk of agricultural investments are to take place (55 percent). Livestock feed and fodder pro- duction in the highlands are also emphasized. The Plan's major projects are designed to increase production of vegetables, fruits, wheat, milk, meat and eggs. Other projects involve soil surveys, research and extension, affor- estation and soil conservation. vi. With the realization that prospects for agricultural self-suffi- ciency in the medium-term are limited, the burden of economic self-sufficiency has been shifted to the generation of a substantial export surplus in indus- try. Broadly, the industrial strategy is to exploit the country's phosphate resources, as rapidly as possible, while encouraging exploration for other minerals; develop with active Government participation, an export-oriented mineral-based industrial sector (particularly fertilizer and cement); expand oil refining, partially for exports; and provide strong incentives to the private sector to develop manufacturing towards import-substitution in the short-run, and exports in the medium-term. To do this, the Government has committed a large part of the Five-Year Plan investment (around 30 percent) to the mining and manufacturing sector, and almost half the increase in do- mestic output projected in the Plan is expected from this sector. In en- couraging industrial growth, the Government is conscious of promoting effi- ciency in resource allocation, and industrial incentives are reviewed to eliminate excessive protection. In view of the recent outflow of Jordanian labor, in response to excess-demand prevailing in neighboring Arab countries, the pressure on domestic wages, and the absence of a clear comparative ad- vantage in labor-intensive production, the Government is increasingly adopt- ing a cautious strategy of higher capital-intensity in industrial production. vii. The principal mining projects are the expansion of phosphate pro- duction capacity from 2 million tons per year in 1975 to 5.4 million tons per year in 1980, and a potash mining project which is expected to yield one mil- lion tons of potash per year from the brines of the Dead Sea, when it goes on stream in the early 1980's. In manufacturing, the major projects are the construction, within the Plan period, of a phosphatic fertilizer plant, the expansion of the Zarqa oil refinery, the expansion of the cement plant at Fuheis, and the construction of a new one million tons per year cement plant in the South. (Contracts for the refinery and cement expansion were awarded in 1975.) These projects account for the bulk of planned investment in min- ing and manufacturing. Medium and small-scale industry, left exclusively to the private sector, is to be encouraged by the Government, in terms of incen- tives and financing. The Industrial Development Bank (IDB) is expected to play a significant role in this area. A special fund, established at IDB, is to provide financing and technical assistance to small industries. There is considerable scope for expansion of medium and small-scale industry for both import-substitution and export growth. Jordan's exports of pharmaceuticals, detergents, insecticides, cigarettes, and wet batteries to neighboring Arab countries have increased rapidly in recent years. - iv - viii. With the Government's serious concern with development issues, and a purposeful effort to restore the momentum of economic growth prevailing in Jordan prior to the 1967 war, as evidenced in the preparation and adoption of the Five-Year Plan and in efforts to strengthen planning institutions, there are good prospects for rapid economic growth in the medium-term, barring ad- verse political developments, even though the attainment of the investment and growth targets of the Plan may prove elusive. There is evidence of con- siderable Government concern about the provision of an appropriate policy framework for the successful implementation of Plan objectives and strategy. Even though the size of the investment program envisaged may tax the physical, human, administrative and financial resources of Jordan, the relative sec- toral emphasis of the investment program seems well-placed and the bulk of the projects are at an advanced state of preparation and of high priority. The Government is well aware of the limitations of the Plan document and of the fact that events may already have overtaken Plan targets. Nevertheless, the objectives of the Plan are commendable, and it is not unreasonable to expect that with sharp increases in phosphate output, in the initial years of the Plan actual growth may approach Plan targets. The rate of Plan imple- mentation, however, may be lower, and with the vulnerability of agriculture to weather conditions, the rate of economic growth would be affected by the performance of the agricultural sector, and may not be uniform. ix. Irrespective of the rates of economic growth attained, the ability of the economy to absorb investments well above previous levels will depend not only on securing financial assistance, but also on the availability of physical, administrative and human resources, as well as the materialization of the rapid growth in private investment called for in the Plan. While the JD 765 million is a target level of investment, the Government is aware that actual investment may be lower, for a variety of reasons. With low labor force participation rates, resulting from emigration of Jordanian labor to neighboring Arab countries in response to large wage differentials, the availability of manpower at all levels is likely to be a major constraint. Rapidly rising government expenditures, due to the size of the investment program, would exacerbate the already substantial inflationary pressures. In addition, considerable further project preparation work will be needed during the course of the Plan. x. Gross external borrowing requirements for the Plan investment pro- gram of JD 765 million have been estimated in the Plan document to be JD 334 million (just over $1.0 billion), of which JD 267 million ($810 million) rep- resents public borrowing, while most of the remaining JD 67 million ($200 million) for the private sector is expected to be covered by direct foreign investment, in addition to loans from Arab governments. This assumes budget support payments of JD 60 million ($180 million) per year. The projected debt service burden of a borrowing of this magnitude, with the assumption that exports grow at over 22 percent per year while import growth is held to 7.3 percent per year, is reflected in an estimated rise in the debt service ratio from 5.0 percent of exports of goods and non-factor services in 1975, - v - to under 10 percent in 1980. Of course, if the favorable assumptions, partic- ularly on import growth, do not materialize, the borrowing requirements, and hence the debt service burden, may be substantially higher. However, with the prudent economic management, which has been characteristic of Jordan in the past, future debt service payments, even under adverse assumptions, are not likely to be an incommensurate burden on Jordan's balance of payments. With the substantially improved prospects for economic development, expecta- tions of rapidly rising export receipts from phosphates and other manufac- tured goods, and the current and projected debt service ratios, Jordan can service substantial debt on conventional terms. However, in view of the high reliance of the economy on imports, and of the budget and the balance of pay- ments on current transfers from abroad, Jordan should continue to seek as much foreign assistance on concessionary terms as is possible, in order to minimize the growth in the external debt burden. Moreover, the proceeds from borrowings on conventional terms should be utilized to finance high-profit- ability projects in mining and mineral-based industries, while concessionary assistance should be used to finance projects in the social sectors and in- frastructure. xi. The Five-Year Plan attests to the Government's determination to em- bark on a high-growth path designed to bring about a fundamental structural change in the economy, which would eliminate its reliance on foreign budget support and transfer payments. Success in achieving Five-Year Plan objec- tives will depend crucially on strengthening development administration, coor- dinating economic policies, and on ensuring consistency between public policy objectives. In addition to strengthening development institutions, the Gov- ernment would also have to find ways to cope with inflationary pressures and the potential shortage of manpower resources, both of which are problems which have appeared only of late in Jordan. The emergence of inflationary pressures necessitates both an active recourse to short-term stabilization policies, hitherto little used in Jordan, and increases the urgency of adopt- ing economic policies conducive to the growth of domestic savings and resource mobilization in the medium and long-term. xii. To attain the development objectives of the Government, it is es- sential to ensure that economic policies in different spheres of economic activity are closely coordinated. As a first step, it is strongly recom- mended that starting in 1977, the Government supplement the Five-Year Plan with Annual Plans. The Annual Plans should be coordinated with the budget and should both review the performance in the previous year, and outline a detailed program of action for the next year identifying specific problems likely to arise in tone course or ?Ian Implementation, along with suggested policy actions. Sec- ondly, if the reliance of the economy on budget support is to be eliminated, say by the mid-1980's, direct action would be needed to insure the generation of a current budgetary surplus and a reduction of the trade gap. On the one hand, this would call for a concerted effort at increasing domestic govern- ment revenues through a greater tax effort, the strengthening of expenditure controls, and the provision of adequate incentives to private savers, partic- ularly through appropriate interest rate policies. On the other hand, export - vi - incentives should be supplemented by substantial increases in import tariffs, in order to have a direct impact on the widening trade gap. Care should be taken, however, that quantitative restrictions are avoided, and import tar- iffs are increased with due regard to maintaining adequate supplies in rela- tion to demand. To insure that economic growth takes place in an environ- ment of reasonable price stability, demand management through the use of fiscal and monetary policy instruments will be of crucial importance. In this context, the Government should consider the size of the public sector investment program in relation to the desired level of aggregate demand, in addition to a curtailment of the growth of current expenditures, and the generation of tax revenues. There is, therefore, a need to ensure that do- mestic and foreign resources which become available are used efficiently. Also for effective demand management, it is essential to strengthen the mac- roeconomic underpinnings of the Plan, and effort should be made to develop a set of macroeconomic indicators, both to monitor private sector develop- ments and to use as a basis for formulating policy decisions. xiii. Experience during the Three-year Plan has made the Government in- creasingly aware of the limitations of existing institutions for the formula- tion, preparation, selection, implementation, and follow-up of development projects. Urgent action is needed to develop administrative institutions es- sential for a successful implementation of the Five-Year Plan. The problem of skilled and non-skilled manpower, at all levels, is likely to get increas- ingly acute with the implementation of the Five-Year Plan. In addition to the need to develop a comprehensive system of manpower planning, implementa- tion and follow-up, Government policy should aim at increasing employment in higher productivity sectors, and the Government should exert utmost efforts to keep the expansion in purely administrative services at a minimum. There is particular need to focus on the likely shortage of workers in the construc- tion sector, where a properly phased construction program should be prepared and executed during the Plan period. Also, much greater attention needs to be given to workers' training programs, to include various forms of retrain- ing, skill upgrading, and refresher courses, and to attract women workers to the labor force. xiv. With effective public policies aimed at responding to the critical constraints identified by the Government, there are good prospects for the attainment of the objectives of the Five-Year Plan. I. CURRENT ECONOMIC POSITION 1. Jordan is a small country, with an area of around 97,000 square kilometers, of which about 6,000 square kilometers, lying on the West Bank of the Jordan river, have been under Israeli occupation since the 1967 war. 1/ The population is largely urban (about half) and is estimated at about 2 mil- lion in 1975, of which over two-fifths are estimated to be refugees from the 1948 war or persons displaced by the 1967 war. The bulk of the country is either sandy desert or barren mountains; only 500 thousand hectares are arable on the East Bank, of which about 30,000 hectares (12,000 ha in the Jordan rift valley) are currently irrigated. 36,000 ha more are potentially irrigable. Besides phosphate rock, the major Jordanian export, so far unex- ploited potash, some construction materials (stones, marble, etc.), and pos- sibly copper, there are few known mineral resources. With the exception of an inadequate wood supply, Jordan has no known fuel resources. Exploration for oil is being initiated, and an agreement has been signed with an American company. With limited known physical resources, the structure of economic activity (output and employment) is dominated by services, including a large public sector (civilian and defense) establishment, and imports provide a substantial portion of the aggregate supply (paras. 3 and 5). External grants, essentially in the form of budget support, are the main sources of financing the Government deficit as well as the trade gap, although in the last three years, workers' remittances have also contributed to the balance of payments (paras. 5 and 6). Population, Employment and Manpower 2. Although accurate data are not available (the last complete popula- tion census was in 1961 and substantial internal and external migration has taken place since then), less than 40 percent of the population is estimated to be of working age; and, with high rates of emigration of working age males to neighboring Arab countries (perhaps 5,000 in 1975), in response to prevail- ing excess-demand and high wage rates, the male/female ratio is thought to be comparatively low among the resident population. Together with comparatively low rates of participation (only 35 percent among males, which is low even by standards of the region), these factors account for an (East Bank) labor force estimate of just over 380,000 persons in 1975, of which only 2 percent were unemployed, largely due to frictional reasons. However, the reported outflow of agricultural and rural labor into the non-farm and urban sectors, indicates the existence of considerable hidden and seasonal unemployment in agriculture. Agriculture accounts for some 20 percent of population and employment, while some 18 percent of the labor force is employed in the high-productivity indus- trial sector, and the bulk of the labor force (60 percent) is employed in the services sector, which consists mainly of public administration and defense, commerce, transport and other services (Statistical Appendix, Table 1.3). (Public administration and defense alone employ about 40 percent of the labor 1/ This report confines itself to the economic position and prospects of the East Bank of Jordan, to which all statistics refer, unless explicitly stated otherwise. - 2 - force.) Even though, by comparative regional standards, the general level of education and training of the labor force is high, the Government is aware of the considerable need for vocational education and training, particularly for women, as well as for adult literacy programs, and is taking remedial steps in this direction. Economic Structure and Growth 3. The Jordanian economy is an essentially open and laissez-faire eco- nomy, although since the mid-1950's the Government has acted in a regulatory and promotional capacity in sponsoring industrial financing and in providing equity for industrial investment. With sustained Government effort over the last two decades, industry (mining, manufacturing and construction) accounted for almost one-fourth of domestic production in 1975 (as compared to 12 per- cent in 1960), which is over twice the share of agriculture. However, to some extent, this change also reflects the recent increase in industrial prices (particularly phosphates), relative to agriculture. Apart from the large export-oriented phosphate mining sector, industry is dominated by a few, some relatively large, capital-intensive units engaged in cement production, oil refining, basic metal industry (casting and forging), food-processing, tex- tiles, apparel, cigarettes and medicaments. Agricultural production, account- ing for 10 - 15 percent of domestic output, fluctuates considerably with weather conditions. Wheat and barley, planted in about three-fourths of the crop area, are particularly affected. Irrigated area, mostly under high-value exportable fruits and vegetables, has been increasing in recent years, result- ing in higher yields and greater stability in production. Nevertheless, the productive base of the economy remains small, as services (mainly public serv- ices and commerce) continue to account for about two-thirds of GDP. With a narrow resource base, Jordan exports mainly phosphates and some agricultural goods, although exports of manufactured goods have grown recently, while im- porting a comparatively larger quantity of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and capital equipment and producer goods. The trade deficit has traditionally been financed from external budget support and transfers, and in recent years, workers' remittances, which together have accounted for 37 percent of GNP dur- ing 1971-75, on average. 4. In t975, Jordan's (East Bank) GNP per capita is estimated at $630, which in real terms is estimated to be somewhat lower than it had been in 1966, when more than a decade of stable economic growth was interrupted by the 1967 war, and the occupation of the West Bank. I/ Considering the influx of refugees and displaced persons into the East Bank in 1967, and the loss of some 35-40 percent of domestic output of the West Bank, Jordan's ability to prevent a sub- stantial decline in real per capita income over the last decade is a tribute 1/ Systematic analysis of postwar economic developments is inhibited by the unavailability of reliable national accounts, particularly in real terms. At current prices, East Bank national accounts are now available from 1971 to 1975; and preliminary estimates at constant 1971-72 prices were provided to the Bank for 1973-75. Reliable price indices, however, are still not available. - 3 - to the effectiveness of public economic policies especially since 1971, and the resiliency of the economy. The years following the 1967 war were marked by severe fighting with Israel in the Jordan Valley, the internal disturb- ances of 1970 and 1971, the closure of the Suez Canal from 1967 to 1975 and of the Syrian borders from July 1971 to December 1972, and the severe droughts of 1968, 1970, 1973 and 1975. Reflecting the particularly poor agricultural conditions, as well as a slow growth in commerce and services in the wake of the October 1973 war, economic growth during the Three-Year Plan period 1973- 75 averaged around 3 percent per year. 1/ Over the same period, the rate of inflation is thought to have exceeded 14 percent per year on average, having averaged about 5 percent per year during 1967-72, and under 2 percent per year for over a decade prior to that (Statistical Appendix, Table 9.1). 5. The ability of the Government to prevent a substantial decline in the standards of living of the population, in a period marked by external political turmoil and vicissitudes of weather, has largely been a result of the effective mobilization of foreign resources and the adoption of expan- sionary economic policies aimed at revitalizing Jordan's postwar economy. Inevitably, these policies have significantly changed the pattern of resource availability and use. With sustained high levels of public investment, which first exceeded private investment in 1974, the rate of capital formation in- creased from around 16 percent of GDP in 1966 to around 28 percent in 1975 (both at current prices), despite very slow growth of domestic production during this period. This has implied a very high reliance on imports, both to maintain the pace of aggregate expenditure growth and to curb inflationary pressures. As a result, the share of net imports in total available resources increased from 20 percent in 1966 to 35 percent in 1975; or alternatively, im- ports of goods and non-factor services rose from 45 percent of GDP in 1966 to over 90 percent in 1975. Despite rapid growth in export receipts (over 15 percent per year), only large infusions of Arab grants, and to some extent growing workers' remittance inflows in recent years, served to strengthen the budgetary and the balance of payments positions, despite the maintenance of high levels of public expenditures, provision of incentives to private invest- ment, and the pursuit of rather liberal trade policies, in an effort to main- tain'price stability. Although increased reliance on imports has been associated with a growing level of domestic dissaving, private savings have grown appre- ciably, particularly in the last few years. Balance of Payments 6. Despite growing export receipts, expansionary fiscal policies aimed at reviving the postwar economy, and liberal trade policies, coupled with periodic supply shortfalls due to a poor harvest, led to a gradual widen- ing of the trade deficit, from a stable average level of around $125 million prior to the 1967 war and immediately thereafter, to over $250 million in 1973. Notwithstanding a doubling of export receipts in 1974, reflecting a tripling of phosphate prices, the trade deficit widened to $330 million; and in 1975, when exports fell somewhat, largely due to a decline in exports of cement, the deficit reached over $570 million. 1/ IBRD estimate. Table I: SUMMARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1973-75 (In millions of current Jordanian Dinars) Preliminary 1973 1974 1975 A. Trade Balance -84 -106 -184 1. Exports 24 50 49 2. Less: Imports -108 -156 -233 B. Services (Net) 23 22 63 1. Workers' Remittances 15 24 53 2. Interest (Net) 5 9 9 3. Other Services (Net) 3 -11 1 C. Current Transfers from Abroad 65 87 140 D. Balance on Current Account 4 3 19 E. Other Items (Net) 8 4 32 1. Net Capital Inflow 6 10 23 2. Other items (n.e.i.) 2 -6 9 F. Change in Reserves (- = increase) -12 -7 -51 Source: Statistical Annex, Table 3.1. 7. In addition to the sharp rise in international inflation, which has severely affected Jordan's imports, particularly of capital goods (mainly electrical machinery and transport equipment, with the price index of the latter rising by 65 percent in 1974 alone), a number of other factors also account for this sharp deterioration of the trade position. First, imports of manufactured goods increased, as consumer demand rose with the high rate of economic growth in 1974, as well as with increased liquidity in the eco- nomy, in the wake of a sharp rise in budget support financed local currency expenditures of the public sector. Secondly, shortages in agricultural pro- duction led to a depletion of stocks and necessitated large imports of grains and fruits and vegetables (as well as rice and sugar in 1974). Thirdly, the "trade deficit" with the occupied West Bank has widened as payments were made for "imports" of goods (mainly fruits and vegetables) from the West Bank; and leakages resulted due to a substantial trade deficit of the West Bank with Israel. Finally, the rate of implementation of the Three-Year Plan, partic- ularly in the transport sector, increased substantially in the last two years, both as project preparation was advanced and as uncertainty in the area abated after the October 1973 war. In 1975, imports rose sharply for the second successive year, mainly due to a more than doubling of imports of machinery and transport equipment, partly reflecting temporary imports of construction equipment by foreign contractors for the implementation of - 5 - development projects. Added factors were the continued growth in imports of manufactured goods (over 40 percent), and the fact that starting 1975, Jordan agreed to pay market prices for her imports of crude oil. Thus, during the last two years, there has been a definite shift in the structure of imports towards a higher share of capital and intermediate goods; while over the last decade, there has been an increase in the share of manufactured goods in Jordan's exports. 8. Jordan's balance of payments has traditionally been in surplus, as transfers and remittances have more than offset the trade deficit, and re- serves have been accumulated with limited recourse to foreign borrowing. In 1975, the balance of payments was in surplus (over $150 million) for the fourth successive year, and gross reserves rose to over $480 million, equiva- lent to about 8 months of merchandise imports. The recent rise in external reserves, however, is due to the sharp increase in budget support from Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments in the wake of the Rabat Conference, and rising levels of workers' remittances, mainly from Jordanians resident in neighboring Arab countries (estimated at some 400,000 in 1975), which ex- ceeded commodity export receipts in 1975. As a result, the current account was in surplus (some $60 million) in 1975. The Jordanian Dinar tradition- ally has been one of the strongest currencies in the region, and was equiva- lent to US$2.80 until January 1973, when it appreciated against the U.S. Dollar, and the prevailing rate at the end of February 1976, was equivalent to US$3.03. 9. Capital inflows have been remarkably stable in the past, averaging almost $25 million net, during 1971-74. In 1974, however, a small but signi- ficant inflow of private long-term capital took place, and increased to almost $10 million in 1975, reflecting direct foreign investment in the Housing Bank, the Jordan Fertilizers Industries Company, the Jordan Ceramics Company, tex- tiles and other ventures. In 1975, net capital inflows rose sharply to over $60 million, as disbursements on medium and long-term public loans doubled in response to increased rates of Plan implementation. Nevertheless, Jordan has contracted substantial foreign debt in recent years. External public debt rose from an estimated $260 million at end 1972 to over $560 million as of end 1975. Of the latter, over $230 million is undisbursed. In 1975, debt service payments, estimated at almost $19 million, amounted to 5.0 percent of exports of goods and non-factor services. Public Finance 1/ 10. Largely through the operations of the Central Government the public sector in Jordan plays a major role in the economy. In 1975, it employed about 40 percent of the labor force, and accounted for over a third of the economy's consumption expenditures and over half of the capital formation. Due both to the relatively limited tax base, and the heavy expenditure 1/ Due to data limitations, discussions in this report concerning fiscal performance of the public sector are confined to the Central Government budget, which reflects only partially the outcome of financial operations of the public authorities and the few mixed public-private enterprises. - 6 - requirements resulting from the Government's economic development efforts and the maintenance of a sizable defense establishment, the budget has had to rely on large external grants (mainly budget support, but also some technical assistance), and increasingly, on foreign loans. As indicated in Table II below, the 1975 budget envisaged expenditures of over $680 million (some two- thirds of GDP), of which a quarter, were allocated to defense; and over 60 percent of non-defense expenditures, to development. With a shortfall in the implementation of development projects, actual expenditures in 1975 are esti- mated at over $630 million, which, with revenues of over $260 million and external grants of $240 million, resulted in an overall deficit of around $130 million. Over $80 million of the deficit was externally financed, but more significantly, perhaps $15 million were financed by non-bank domestic borrow- ing, which is becoming increasingly important. 11. Fiscal performance, which significantly influences the growth of money and credit, has been characterized in recent years by rapidly growing domestic revenues combined with sharp increases in current expenditures and capital outlays. The buoyance in domestic revenues, which rose from about 16 percent of GDP prior to the 1967 war to over 25 percent in 1975, reflects both the increases in tax and non-tax revenues (particularly receipts from phosphate export royalties). The relative share of direct taxes has increased in recent years (though still less than 16 percent of tax receipts and only 10 percent of domestic revenues) primarily due to the expansion of the corporate tax base and greater collection efforts by the authorities. The rapid rise in current expenditures since 1971 has, to a significant extent, resulted from the pay increases granted to Government employees to compensate for the erosion in their real incomes due to the high inflation experienced in the last few years. 1/ In 1975, current expenditures were about 38 percent of GDP, with the non-defense component being 21 percent of GDP. The growth of non-defense current expenditures, which had risen to about 55 percent of current expendi- tures in 1975 from 36 percent in 1970-71, has in recent years been signific- antly higher than that of defense expenditures. To some extent this also re- flects the growth of expenditures on social services, and complementary cur- rent outlays in the wake of higher levels of public investment. The current domestic deficit has remained fairly stable at about $125 million in the last four years, while the overall deficit has grown substantially. However, in- creasing inflows of external grants (mostly from Arab countries) and, to a lesser extent, of foreign loans, have mitigated the need for increased re- liance on domestic borrowings. Money, Credit and Prices 12. The Jordanian economy experienced rapid monetary and credit expan- sion in 1975, as it did in the two preceding years (Statistical Appendix, Table 6.1). The growth of the money supply (currency and demand deposits) and quasi-money (savings and time deposits) accelerated to 28 percent and that of 1/ To some extent this also reflects the fact that due to re-classification of budgetary expenditures starting 1973, some capital expenditure items were re-classified as current expenditures. In 1975, these re-classified items are estimated at around JD 20 million (16 percent of total current expenditures). - 7 - TABLE II SUMMARY OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET, 1973-76 (In millions of current Jordanian dinars) Preliminary Actual Attual Budget Budget 1973 1974 1975 1975 1976 .A. Revenues and Grants 91 126 161 160 183 1. Domestic Revenues 46 66 84 96 107 2. External Grants 45 60 77 64 76 B. Expenditures 124 148 202 218 263 1. Current 83 106 125 119 135 (of which Defense & Public Security) (47) (51) (56) (55) (60) 2. Capital 1/ 41 42 77 99 128 C. Current Domestic Deficit -37 -40 -41 -23 -28 (A.1 minus B.1) D. Overall Deficit (A minus B) -33 -22 -41 -58 -80 E. Financing 1. Domstie-Findheing (gross) 15 5 14 12 12 2. Foreign Borrowing (gross) 11 17 26 46 68 3. Other 2/ 7 - 1 - - Memo Items: As Percentage of GDP (m.p.) Domestic Revenues 21 23 25 Current Expenditures 38 37 38 (of which Defense & Pub. Secu.) (22) (18) (17) Note: Budgetary data on borrowings from domestic banking system differ from monetary data due to differences in coverage and timing. External grants in the budgetary data are different from those in the national accounts and the balance of payments due to differences in statistical coverage. The discrepancies between the budgetary and balance of payments data are particularly large: JD 21.6 million, JD 16.1 million, JD 24.3 million, and JD 61.5 million in 1972, 1973,*1974 and 1975, respectively (see Table 3.1). coverage. 1/ Includes domestic and foreign loan repayments (JD 6.6 million in 1973, JD 4.5 million in 1974, JD 8.9 million in 1975, and JD 6.3 million in 1976). 2/ Residual item, including changes in cash balances and limitations in data coverage. Source: Statistical Appendix, Table 5.1. - 8 - credit to the private sector to 44 percent. (There was no net increase in the volume of net credit extended to the public sector in 1975.) The sharp growth of credit to the private sector in 1975 took place despite the exist- ence of selective credit controls. The greater part of the expansion of pri- vate credit (mostly in the form of overdrafts) was for trade and construction. Interest rates on deposits (2.5 to 6 percent) and loans (commercial banks, 6.5 to 9 percent; specialized credit institutions, 4 to 8 percent) were essentially the same in 1975, as those which have prevailed tor several years. Unlike 1973 and 1974, when the growth of domestic liquidity was primarily induced by increases in net domestic assets, in 1975 accumula- tion of foreign assets provided the major impetus for domestic liquidity growth. 13. Following a period of relative price stability prior to 1967 and a number of years thereafter, Jordan has experienced substantial inflationary pressures in recent years. Although the rate of inflation cannot be gauged reliably due to deficiencies of the available price indices, the Amman Cost of Living Index registered increases of 11 percent, 20 percent and 12 percent in 1973, 1974 and 1975, respectively. The sharpest rise stemmed from in- creases in food prices, despite subsidies on certain staple items. The rise in food prices was heavily influenced by large increases in the price of vege- tables and fruits, due to strong export demand. The inflationary pressures in Jordan, which seem to have abated somewhat in the past year, are caused by a number of factors related to rising excess-demand pressures (see paras 22 and 53). The Three-Year Plan (1973-75) 14. By the early seventies, the critical task of short-run economic management, which had occupied the Government exclusively in the years follow- ing the 1967 war, had been accomplished; and in 1971 the Government re- placed the Jordan Development Board (JDB) with a newly created National Plan- ning Council (NPC), which was charged with re-activating medium and long- term economic planning in Jordan, and in particular to draw up a Three-Year Plan (1973-75) for economic development. Like the Five-Year (1962-67) and the Seven-Year (1964-70) Plans, the Three-Year Plan called for increased em- ployment, high output growth, reduction of trade gap, and elimination of budget support in the longer-term; and also recognized the need for a better regional distribution of the benefits of economic growth. In physical terms, investments of $500 million during 1973-75 were to create 70,000 jobs; result in 8 percent per year GDP growth; 16.4 percent per year export growth; 7.5 percent per year import growth; and a 12 percent per year growth in government revenues, with average annual budget support envisaged at $112 million. 1/ Except for growth in export receipts (42 percent per year at current prices and 19 percent in constant prices) and Government revenues (31 percent per year in current prices and possibly 17 percent in constant prices) during the Plan period, the Plan fell short of its other physical targets. In addition 1/ Conversion to US$ at the then prevailing exchange rate of JD 1.00 = $2.80. - 9 - to the particularly unfavorable circumstances of the Plan period, two drought years severely affected the attainment of GDP growth targets. However, the formulation and implementation of the Plan served to reactivate the process of economic planning in Jordan. 15. The strength of the Plan lay in its value as a first attempt after the 1967 war, to formulate and implement a coordinated medium-term investment program for the East Bank. Reflecting the emergence of medium and longer-term considerations in the formulation of economic policies in Jordan at that time, and having necessarily an interim nature, the Plan did not propose any funda- mental revisions either in the growth strategy or in investment priorities that had prevailed during the pre-1967 years. Although a number of projects under implementation were executed, and new ones were initiated, considerable work on project formulation and preparation was necessary during the first 18 months of the Plan, and the implementation of the Plan at a full pace did not really get moving until the middle of the Plan period. In addition, project implementation could have been improved by tackling the shortage of skilled and managerial manpower; the delays in equipment deliveries and rising costs, which necessitated updating of feasibility studies and a reappraisal of project proposals; and the inadequate system of monitoring and follow-up. 16. Public investments during 1973-75 amounted to over JD 75 million at 1971-72 prices compared to the target of $JD 100 million at 1972 prices, while actual private investment amounted to almost JD 67 million at 1971-72 prices compared to a target of JD 79 million at 1972 prices. While the rate of in- vestment was high (around 25 percent of GNP), the rate of physical progress in the implementation of the public sector program was low (perhaps around 55 percent) during 1973-75, with probably the lowest implementation rate in agri- culture and irrigation (perhaps around 30 percent); while mining, electricity, transport and communications recorded better rates (possibly around 70 percent). The slow rate of physical progress on public sector projects resulted chiefly from: the uneven preparation of the projects in the Plan, which led to con- siderable additional preparation work and, in some cases, to the redefinition of projects; to the political and administrative constraints which prevented the new planning structure from becoming rapidly effective; and to the polit- ical uncertainties in the area, compounded by the October 1973 war, which severely affected the pace of implementation of the most vulnerable projects, for instance irrigation in the Jordan Valley and the development of Dead Sea Potash. Nevertheless, the Three-Year Plan period saw the strong re-emergence of longer-term concerns of economic development in public policies. With the considerable effort in project preparation, experience with project imple- mentation and follow-up, and the development of planning institutions, the stage was set for the promulgation of the current Five-Year Plan (1976-80). The Economy in 1976 17. Real growth prospects for 1976 are good, and GDP may grow by 7-10 percent, partly as a result of particularly depressed levels of mining and agricultural output in 1975. Preliminary indications are that agricultural production in 1976, would be only slightly above the depressed levels of - 10 - 1975. Wheat and barley production may be expected to be at around 65 thousand tons and 16 thousand tons, respectively; but irrigated vegetables should reach a high level of production. There are good prospects that egg and poultry production will be at or above normal. The industrial sector (mining, manufac- turing and construction) is expected to grow substantially, mainly as a re- flection of growth in phosphate production. Phosphate production is expected to reach 2.5 million tons, although a decrease in the export price would reduce the growth in current value-added. Pharmaceutical products, chemicals, beverages, cigarettes, paper products, metal products, leather products and clothing are all expected to record considerable growth. The construction sector is expected to grow substantially due to the increasing demand for housing and construction of the Plan projects. 18. The balance of payments position in 1976 is expected to remain in surplus, with growth in export receipts and workers' remittances, and partic- ularly high levels of expected transfers ($340 million). Although phosphate prices are now expected to remain at early 1976 levels, exports are expected to increase to 2.5 million tons in 1976 from 1.1 million tons last year, re- sulting in a sharp growth in export receipts. On the other hand, the resource gap for 1976 would be of the order of some $600 million, due to anticipated food imports following the 1975 drought and expected capital goods imports in response to higher investments under the Five-Year Plan, but with large expected transfers from abroad, the current account would be roughly in balance. Capital inflows, in the form of direct foreign investment and medium and long-term loans for large industrial projects and the housing sector, may also be expected to increase due to the investment program underway. Although disbursements of already contracted loans as of December 1975 are projected at over $110 million during 1976, the debt service ratio is expected to remain low (6-8 percent). 19. The 1976 budget forecasts increases of 28 percent and 8 percent in domestic revenues and current expenditures, respectively, over 1975 preli- minary actuals (Statistical Appendix, Table 5.1). The actual outturn, how- ever, may show a considerably larger current domestic deficit than the JD 28 million which is forecast, since current expenditure growth may exceed the 8 percent target, in keeping with recent trends, and due to the general pay increase, not included in the budget, which was granted to all Government employees at the beginning of February 1976 at a cost of JD 6-7 million for the balance of the year. The budget estimate of the 28 percent increase in domestic revenues in 1976 depends heavily on phosphate royalty receipts, which are estimated in the budget to increase from JD 11 million in 1975 to JD 27 million in 1976. However, a decline in phosphate prices and a prob- able lower volume of exports than assumed in the budget are likely to result in lower royalties than forecast for 1976. 20. The budget anticipates the continuation of external grants at about the same level as in 1975. Capital expenditures (excluding loan repayments of about JD 6 million) are estimated to be about JD 122 million, as compared with the JD 98 million target of the Plan. The total deficit of JD 150 mil- lion is to be financed by about JD 80 million of gross borrowings (JD 74 mil- lion net), of which about JD 68 million would be external; and the balance - 11 - by external grants. Since the budget's estimate of the domestic current deficit is optimistic, a smaller fraction of the estimated external grants would be likely to be available for financing capital expenditures than the budget foresees. Thus, given the assumptions about the inflows of external grants and capital expenditures, borrowing requirements of the public sector would exceed the JD 80 million that is budgeted. Alternatively, the level of public investment may fall short of target, partly also due to the constraints on non-financial resources. 21. The course of monetary expansion in 1976 will be significantly in- fluenced by the fiscal outturn. Government deficit financing is likely to be the primary source of liquidity injection into the economy. The Central Bank's attempts to limit the expansion of commercial bank credit to 10 percent in the first half of the year, and another 10 percent in the second half (plus any increase due to the expansion of credit to joint-stock industrial compa- nies, not subject to the credit ceilings), may not be consistent with the accumulation of commercial banks' reserves, which is likely to result from the expected increase in net foreign assets in 1976. 22. The continued pressures on domestic resources arising from rapidly growing domestic aggregate demand could be relieved, to some extent, by the liberal import policy which is being pursued and an expansion in domestic output. However, given the supply inelasticities of non-tradable goods and services, expansion of imports could only reduce, but not completely neu- tralize the pressures on domestic resources, which are also being augmented by the export demand for Jordanian goods and labor. Of course, since interna- tional rates of inflation are still high (though declining), Jordan, by heavily importing goods and services, will, as it has in the last few years, import considerable inflation too. In short, the Jordanian economy is likely to con- tinue to experience substantial pressure on domestic prices in 1976, as it did in 1975 and the preceding two years, due to both external and domestic factors. - 12 - II. THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1976-80) 23. The Five-Year Plan has been drawn around a comprehensive investment program. Most of the projects constituting this program have been the subject of study in Jordan for at least a decade or more. During the last few years, considerable preparatory work has been done, and a large majority of the proj- ects are at an advanced state of preparation. In early 1975, a High Planning Committee, composed of the President and Secretary-General of the National Planning Council (NPC), senior members from the executing Ministries, the University of Jordan, the Central Bank, the Royal Scientific Society, and the private sector, was set up to prepare the Five-Year Plan. Executing minis- tries were formally involved in the preparation of the Plan document, unlike the experience in early 1973, when ad hoc sectoral committees, set up in executing Ministries to handle investment requests and project selection in cooperation with NPC, proved ineffective and were abandoned. Subsequently, the Board of Directors of NPC, along with the concerned Ministers, deliberated, under the chairmanship of H.R.H. Crown Prince Hassan, on the setting of priori- ties to scale down the investment programs, proposed by individual ministries. Objectives, Strategy and Growth 24. Economic self-sufficiency, in terms of a substantially reduced trade gap and the elimination of a deficit in the current budget, remains the funda- mental long-term development objective of the Government. Other objectives are to raise per capita income, increase equity of income distribution, pro- vide full employment, increase labor productivity, and ensure a balanced regional distribution of the location of economic activities and the fruits of growth. To achieve these goals, the Plan proposes an export-oriented growth strategy emphasizing rapid development of the productive sectors (agri- culture and industry), with heavy investment in related infrastructure (par- ticularly transport). The Plan recognizes the important role of the private sector in the development process, and envisages that about 35 percent of the planned investment outlays will be made by the private sector. (Government contributions to mixed enterprises will bring up the share of the private sector in capital formation to half of planned investments.) Finally, the Plan calls for increased cooperation with neighboring Arab countries, promo- tion of economic integration efforts, and encouragement of joint ventures in Jordan. 25. The macroeconomic targets of the Plan, summarized in Table III below, are an average annual growth in GDP of 12 percent (agriculture, 7 per- cent; mining and manufacturing, 26.2 percent); in commodity exports, 24.2 percent; with import growth curtailed to 8 percent (import elasticity of 0.7 with respect to GNP); resulting in a reduction in the trade gap both absolutely (from $575 million in 1975 to $400 million in 1980) and relatively (from 47 percent of GNP in 1975 to 23 percent in 1980). In the public sector, the Plan calls for domestic revenue growth of 16.5 percent per year, while growth in public consumption is to be held to 7.1 percent per year, with defense spend- ing growing by 5 percent per year. Private consumption is envisaged to grow at 7.3 percent per year, implying a marginal propensity to consume of 68 percent (out of disposable income, which is to grow at 9.4 percent per year). - 13 - Table III: FIVE-YEAR PLAN TARGETS As % GDP (fc) Annual Average Rates of Growth Actual Target Historical Plan Targets 1975 1980 1959-66 1967-72 1973-75 1973-75 1976-80 GDP (fc) 100.0 100.0 6.9 3.7 3.5 8.0 11.9 Agriculture 10.3 8.3 9.0 4.1 -2.8 6.4 7.0 Mining and Manufacturing 15.6 28.3 15.7 3.3 10.1 14.0 26.2 Construction 7.6 5.3 10.3 - 6.6 11.2 4.1 Government 19.0 15.2 5.7 7.5 2.8 8.2 7.0 Services 47.6 42.8 5.3 3.1 5.1 6.9 5.7 As % of GDP (mp) Public Investment 16.1 10.9 13.8 2.5 ( ) 12.4 3.4 Private Investment 12.4 11.0 2.3 3.1 ( 3.5) 22.0 8.6 Public Consumption 37.9 30.8 6.4 6.8 7.5 8.0 7.1 Private Consumption 89.1 67.4 8.1 1.4 6.6 6.7 7.3/1 Exports (g+nfs) 36.7 40.5 11.1 - 27.2 16.2 22.7 Imports (g+nfs) 92.2 60.1 3.9 2.0 19.9 8.2 7.3 Net Factor Income 18.9 11.0 20.0 29.0 48.9 5.4 10.6 At current prices Const. Price Government Domestic Revenue 25 30 n.a. 8 31 12 16 /1 Estimated from Plan projections. The text of the Plan cites a 7.0 percent growth rate. Source: Plan Documents; IBRD, Economic Reports; and Bank estimates. The Investment Program 26. Total investment envisaged under the Plan amounts to JD 765 million (over $2.3 billion, or over $460 million per year, compared to over $290 million spent in 1975), of which 65 percent is allocated to the public sector (includ- ing public investment in the mixed sector). 1/ Plan allocations (see table 1/ The JD 765 million figure excludes anticipated investments by Alia, the Royal Jordanian Airline, which are expected to be around $120 million over the Plan period; and are expected to be financed exclusively from grants from Arab countries and internal cash generation of Alia. - 14 - below) reveal a marked shift in investment priorities towards industry and agriculture, at the expense partly of infrastructure, but mainly of social services. (However, in absolute terms, investment in social services are to increase from around JD 45 million per year under the Three-Year Plan to over JD 80 million per year under the Five-Year Plan.) Mining is viewed as a leading sector of the economy, and is expected to generate the bulk of the increase in export receipts (60 percent), as well as a major part (almost 50 percent) of the growth of domestic revenues of the Government. The time- profile of investments is such that around 65 percent of the investment is to take place during 1976-78, so that both absolute investment and the rate of investment is planned to decline after 1977. Also the major projects in mining, manufacturing, power, and railways and port expansion account for some 20 percent of total investments, with a very high import component. Table IV: SECTORAL ALLOCATIONS OF PLANNED INVESTMENTS (JD millions) Three-Year Plan (1973-75) Five-Year Plan (1976-80) Public Private Total % Public Private /1 Total % Agriculture 23.5 4.1 27.6 15.5 12.0 28.0 40.0 5.2 Irrigation /2 - - - - 72.1 - 72.1 9.4 Water /2 - - - - 25.3 - 25.3 3.3 Mining ) 5.8 20.3 26.1 14.6( 27.2 32.8 59.9 7.8 Manufacturing ) ( .3 168.9 169.2 22.1 Electricity 5.7 4.1 9.8 5.5 35.5 7.3 42.8 5.6 Transportation 27.8 8.0 35.8 20.0 111.2 8.7 119.9 15.7 Housing & Govern- ment Buildings 3.4 31.5 34.9 19.5 23.0 63.0 86.0 11.2 Municipal & Rural Affairs 14.1 0.7 14.8 8.2 38.8 - 38.8 5.1 Others 19.3 9.7 30.0 16.7 36.6 74.3 110.9 14.5 Total 99.6 79.4 179.0 100.0 382.0 383.0 765.0 100.0 /1 Including public investments in the mixed sector. /2 Investment allocations for water and irrigation are included in agricul- ture in the Three-Year Plan. Source: Plan Documents and NPC estimates. Agricultural Strategy and Projects 27. The agricultural strategy proposed in the Five-Year Plan is based on a reassessment of the agricultural potential of the economy. The Government has increasingly realized that a high growth strategy, necessary for attaining economic self-sufficiency, entails a high level of agricultural imports, which - 15 - in the short and medium-term are likely to widen the agricultural trade gap, both absolutely and relatively. Consequently, the Plan aims primarily at stabilizing agricultural production and raising productivity, by major invest- ments in irrigation; and attaches primary emphasis to export-oriented production, particularly for the growing Middle Eastern markets, of high-value fruits and vegetables, where Jordan's comparative advantage lies. It places less emphasis on import-substitution, particularly for cereals, where yields are low. To achieve these ends, the Plan calls for an integrated development of the Jordan Valley, where the bulk of agricultural investments are to take place (55 per- cent). Livestock feed and fodder production in the highlands are also em- phasized. The Plan's major projects are designed to increase production of vegetables, fruit, wheat, milk, meat and eggs. Other projects involve soil surveys, research and extension, and afforestation and soil conservation. 28. Almost 80 percent of the increase in agricultural production is to come from irrigated agriculture. Planned investments in irrigation (JD 72.1 million, or $218 million) consist mainly of the construction of the Maqarin Dam ($77 million), which has been delayed by one year to allow for a complete feasibility study, extension of the East Ghor Canal ($51 million), installation of sprinkler irrigation in the valley ($27 million) and irriga- tion projects in Wadi Mujeb and the southern Ghors ($26 million). Together, these investments are expected to increase irrigated area from around 30,000 ha in 1975 to over 62,000 ha in 1980, which is optimistic. A more realistic figure for 1980 would be 38,000 ha. 29. The bulk (55 percent) of the total investment in agriculture (JD 40 million, or $120 million) is allocated to the private sector; while over 60 percent of the Government investment is devoted to three projects: the Rainfed Farming Project, comprised of wheat and fruit production ($14.4 mil- lion), the Dairy Cows Project ($13.6 million) and the Irrigated Farming Project ($5.8 million). As a result, by 1980 production of vegetables, mainly tomatoes, is to increase by 90 percent; wheat production, by 36 percent (to 220 thousand tons from 162 thousand tons in 1975); and fruit production by 148 percent. Industrial Strategy and Projects 30. With the realization that prospects for agricultural self-sufficiency in the medium-term are limited, the burden of economic self-sufficiency has been shifted to the generation of a substantial export surplus in industry. Broadly, the industrial strategy is to exploit the country's phosphate re- sources, as rapidly as possible, while encouraging exploration for other min- erals; develop with active Government participation, an export-oriented mineral-based industrial sector (particularly fertilizer and cement); expand oil refining, partially for exports; and provide strong incentives to the private sector to develop manufacturing towards import-substitution in the short-run, and exports in the medium-term. To do this, the Government has committed a large part of the Five-Year Plan investment (around 30 percent) to the mining and manufacturing sector, and almost half the increase in domestic - 16 - output projected in the Plan is expected from this sector. In encouraging industrial growth, the Government is conscious of promoting efficiency in resource allocation, and industrial incentives are reviewed to eliminate excessive protection. In view of the recent outflow of Jordanian labor, in response to the excess-demand prevailing in neighboring Arab countries, the pressure on domestic wages, and the absence of a clear comparative advantage in labor-intensive production, the Government is increasingly adopting a cautious strategy of higher capital intensity in industrial production. 31. The principal mining projects are the expansion of phosphate pro- duction capacity from 2 million tons per year in 1975 to 5.4 million tons per year in 1980, at a cost of about $73 million (excluding transport and related infrastructure of about $50 million); and a potash mining project ($75 million) which is expected to yield one million tons of potash per year from the brines of the Dead Sea, when it goes on stream in the early 1980's. 1/ Construction of the trial dike (the Pilot Project, or Phase I of the full project) is expected to start by the second half of 1976. In manufacturing, the major projects are the construction, within the Plan period, of a phos- phatic fertilizer plant ($185 million), the expansion of the Zarqa oil re- finery ($118 million), the expansion of the cement plant at Fuheis ($25 million), and the construction of a new one million tons per year cement plant in the south ($65 million). 2/ (Contracts for the Zarqa Oil Refinery and the Fuheis cement expansion were awarded in 1975.) These projects account for the bulk of planned investment in mining and manufacturing. Medium and small- scale industry, left exclusively to the private sector, is to be encouraged by the Government, in terms of incentives and financing. The Industrial Develop- ment Bank (IDB) is expected to play a significant role in this area. There is considerable scope for expansion of medium and small-scale industry for both import-substitution and export growth. Jordan's exports of pharmaceuticals, detergents, insecticides, cigarettes, and wet batteries to neighboring Arab countries have increased rapidly in recent years. Also, small industries are being supported by the provision of technical assistance and finance, through a special fund established at the IDB. Capital Requirements and Financing 32. The Five-Year Plan, however, does not focus sufficiently on providing a consistent plan of financing, distinguishing local from foreign costs, and constant from current price estimates and projections. According to the Plan document, the saving-investment gap is to be financed as indicated in Table V, below. It appears, however, that the JD 765 million investment target includes an unknown magnitude of escalation, for some of the major projects. Thus, this figure, which appears in the projected national accounts, public finances, and the balance of payments, increases the margin of error in all Plan projections. I/ The Plan document was based on a target increase in phosphate production capacity to 7.2 million tons in 1980; but this target has been revised to 5.4 million tons, since the publication of the Plan. 2/ The $65 million cost estimate in the Plan, for the cement plant in the south, would have to be revised upwards to at least $150 million, on the basis of reports of recent tenders submitted for similar size plants. - 17 - The national accounts, which presumably are intended to be in constant 1975 prices, therefore, include an overestimate of investment and hence savings; whereas, budgetary projections, which presumably are at constant prices, imply a numerically higher deficit in current terms. Further complications in interpreting Plan projections arise from the appearance of identical exports and imports figures in the national accounts and in the balance of payments, which presumably are at current prices. These features of Plan projections should be borne in mind in subsequent discussions of Plan figures and ratios in this chapter. Table V: PLAN FINANCING 1976-80 (Five-Year Totals) (JD mlns) ($ mlns) Public Private Total Public Private Total A. National Savings -100 271 171 -303 821 518 B. Investment 382 383 765 11157 1,161 2,318 Gap 482 112 594 1,460 340 1,800 C. Net Transfers from Abroad 297 35 332 900 106 1,006 D. Net Foreign Capital Inflow 200 62 262 606 188 794 1. Gross Inflow (267) (67) (334) (809) (203)(1,012) 2. Less: Debt Repayment, etc. (-67) (-5) (-72) (-203) (-15) (-218) E. Domestic Transfers -15 15 -46 46 1. Gross Public Borrowing (110) (-110) (333) (-333) 2. Repayment of Public Debt ( -6) ( 6) (-18) ( 18) 3. Public Loans to Private (-119) ( 119) (-361) ( 361) sector Source: Five-Year Plan. 33. Consequently, the planned investment program of JD 765 million may actually be higher in current prices and lower in 1975 prices. Thus, the borrowing requirements for the planned investments are likely to be greater than the Plan forecast, even if the favorable assumptions, noted earlier, concerning savings, imports and exports growth rates, can be attained. Domestic Finance 34. According to Plan projections, the target investment of JD 765 million may be decomposed into private investment of JD 265 million, and total public sector outlays of JD 501 million (ID 382 million of direct in- vestment, and indirect investments of JD 119 million, in the form of loan and equity participation in mixed enterprises; see Statistical Annex, Table 10.10). Private sector investment (including the mixed sector) of JD 383 mil- lion, is to be financed by national savings (70 percent), foreign borrowing - 18 - and transfers (25 percent), and net borrowing from the public sector (5 per- cent). This financing plan is contingent on the generation of JD 306 million of private savings (including current transfers from abroad) over the Plan period. This is based on the assumption that private consumption grows at only 7.3 percent per year, on average, over the Plan period, while disposable income grows at 9.4 percent; implying a marginal propensity to save of over 30 percent. 35. In addition to the JD 501 million Government capital expenditures target during the Plan period, amortization of domestic and foreign debt (excluding interest charges, which are part of current expenditures) is esti- mated at JD 73 million, yielding a target total capital outlay of JD 574 million by the public sector over the five years (see Table V). The public sector capital outlays are to be financed by a current account surplus of JD 176 million, gross external borrowings of JD 267 million, gross domestic borrowings of JD 110 million (JD 75 million of bond sales and JD 35 million of short-term borrowings from the banking system), and economic and technical assistance of JD 21 million. To realize the current account.surplus of the budget, the Plan envisages external grants of JD 305 million (at the constant rate of JD 61 million annually) 1/, domestic revenue growth of 16 percent (in real terms) per annum and current expenditures growth of 7.6 percent (again, in real terms) per year. The latter is based on annual growth rates of about 10 percent for non-defense expenditures and 5 percent for defense outlays. 36. On the domestic revenue side, the average annual growth rate of 16 percent is based on two crucial circumstances. First, the projected phosphate royalty receipts are assumed to increase progressively from the preliminary estimate of JD 11 million in 1975 (when world phosphate prices reached $68 per ton) to JD 42 million in 1980, representing 24 percent of domestic revenues in that year (as compared to 13 percent in 1975). Secondly, the Plan projects a growth of 23 percent per year in direct taxes between 1975 and 1980. Thus, the feasibility of attaining the current account surplus target of JD 176 million is critically dependent on both of these assumptions, as well as on meeting the assumed expenditure growth target. 37. The implications of the projected deficit spending for monetary expansion, in the course of the Plan period, particularly to the extent for- eign grants and loans are used to finance local currency expenditures, are not fully explored in the discussions of the macroeconomic framework of the Plan. The Plan document states that the goal of monetary policy should be to endeavor to restrain the growth of money supply to 10 percent per annum during the period 1976-80. The implicit underlying assumption seems to be that monetary authorities are able to control the growth of money supply independent of the spending and savings decisions of the private sector and the Government. However, it is clear that the public sector, in particular, through the size and composition of the financing of its deficit, profoundly shapes the course of monetary growth in the economy, and the rate of inflation. 1/ To be consistent with the macro-framework of the Plan, the projected levels of annual external grants must be interpreted to be in constant 1975 Jordanian dinars. - 19 - III. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 38. With the Government's serious concern with development issues, and a purposeful effort to restore the momentum of economic growth prevailing in Jordan prior to the 1967 war, as evidenced in the preparation and adoption of the Five-Year Plan and in efforts to strengthen planning institutions, there are good prospects for rapid economic growth in the medium-term, barring ad- verse political developments, even though the attainment of the investment and growth targets of the Plan may prove elusive. While the macroeconomic underpinnings of the Five Year Plan could be strengthened, there is evidence in the Plan of considerable Government concern about the provision of an ap- propriate policy framework for the successful implementation of Plan objec- tives and strategy; and even though the size of the investment program envis- aged may strain the physical, human, administrative and financial resources of Jordan, the relative sectoral emphasis of the investment program seems well- placed and the bulk of the projects are at an advanced state of preparation and of high priority. The Government is well aware of the limitations of the Plan document and of the fact that events may already have overtaken Plan targets. Nevertheless, the objectives of the Plan are commendable, and it is not unreasonable to expect that with sharp increases in phosphate output, in the initial years of the Plan, actual growth may approach Plan targets. The rate of Plan implementation, however, may be lower,- and with the vulnerability of agriculture to weather conditions, the rate of economic growth would be affected by the performance of the agricultural sector, and may not be uniform. Growth and Investment 39. In the medium-term, the overall rate of economic growth is more likely to be a determinant of the rate of capital formation, than the effect of investments. The prime determinants of the rate of economic growth during the next five years will be the growth of phosphate production, contingent mainly on adequate export demand at favorable prices; performance of the agri- cultural sector, dependent critically on favorable weather conditions, at least until the early 1980's when production will become more stable due to the implementation of the major irrigation projects; and the growth of the services sector. Nevertheless, even with current expectations of stable international phosphate prices, and the continued possibilities of droughts affecting agricultural production, a medium-term average growth rate of 8 percent per year appears feasible, although in favorable years the rate of growth may approach the 12 percent per year growth target set in the Plan. 40. Growth in mining and manufacturing is projected in the Plan at 26.2 percent per year, without a decomposition between the two sectors. This rate of growth was based on initial plans for the expansion of phosphate pro- duction from 1.4 million ,tons in 1975 to 7.2 million tons in 1980. Revised - 20 - targets are for a phosphate production of 5.4 million tons in 1980. As a result, growth in mining and manufacturing may decline. Considering the low base year value in 1975, the actual rate of growth would be still high, if projects are implemented on schedule and there are no further adverse devel- opments in the export market. The phosphate expansion plan, including invest- ment in complementary transport infrastructure, is well-advanced, and imple- mentation is expected to be on schedule. The potash mining project is ex- pected to commence production after 1980; hence it would not contribute to industrial growth in the next five years. Growth in manufacturing will depend largely on the expansion of the oil refinery and the cement plant, which are both underway, and the construction of a fertilizer plant and a new cement plant. In view of the initial capacity bottlenecks in oil refining and cement production, the rate of manufacturing growth is likely to be lower during the first years of the Plan, but is likely to accelerate considerably in the last half. On the other hand, growth in the construction sector, estimated at 4 percent per year in the Plan, is likely to be exceeded, with the implementa- tion of the investment program. On balance, there are good prospects for very rapid growth in the coming five years in mining, and mineral-based industries, and for small and medium-scale manufacturing, both of which should yield con- siderable export revenues. 41. Prospects for agricultural growth depend mainly on the implementa- tion of the major irrigation projects (King Talal Dam, Maqarin Dam, and East Ghor Canal Extension) and complementary investments. Since the time-phasing of these projects is towards the latter part of the Plan period, however, and with the expected continuation of labor migration from agricultural to urban areas, the agricultural rate of growth is not likely to reach the 7 percent per year target of the Five-Year Plan. 42. Irrespective of the rates of economic growth attained, the ability of the economy to absorb investments well above previous levels will depend not only on securing financial assistance, but also on the availability of physical, administrative and human resources, as well as the materialization of the rapid growth in private investment called for in the Plan. While the JD 765 million is a target level of investment, the Government is aware that actual investment may be lower, for a variety of reasons. With low labor force participation rates, resulting from emigration of Jordanian labor to neighboring Arab coun- tries in response to large wage differentials, the availability of manpower at all levels is likely to be a major constraint. Rapidly rising government expenditures, due to the size of the investment program, would exacerbate the already substantial inflationary pressures. In addition, considerable further project preparation-work will be needed during the course of the Plan. External Borrowing and the Debt Burden 43. Gross external borrowing requirements for the Plan investment pro- gram of JD 765 million have been estimated in the Plan document to be JD 334 million (just over $1.0 billion), of which JD 267 million (around $810 million) - 21 - represents public borrowing, while most of the remaining JD 67 million (around $200 million) for the private sector is expected to be covered by direct foreign investment, in.addition to loans from Arab governments. This assumes budget support payments of JD 60 million ($180 million) per year. The projected debt service burden of a borrowing of this magnitude, with the assumption that exports grow at over 22 percent per year while import growth is held to 7.3 percent per year, is reflected in an estimated rise in debt service ratio from 5.0 percent of exports of goods and non-factor services in 1975, to 9.5 percent in 1980. Of course, if the favorable assumptions, par- ticularly on import growth, do not materialize, the borrowing requirements, and hence the debt service burden, may be substantially higher. However, with the prudent economic management, which has been characteristic of Jordan in the past, future debt service payments, even under adverse assumptions, are not likely to be an incommensurate burden on Jordan's balance of payments. 44. The Five-Year Plan proposes a package of high-priority export- oriented investment projects, most of which are at an advanced state of preparation, and lays the groundwork for fundamental structural changes in the economy, which would once again place Jordan in a position to aim at economic self-sufficiency in the foreseeable future. With the substantially improved prospects for economic development, expectations of rapidly rising export receipts from phosphates and other manufactured goods, and the current and projected debt service ratios, Jordan can service substantial debt on conventional terms. However, in view of the high reliance of the economy on imports, and of the balance of payments on current transfers from abroad, Jordan should continue to seek as much foreign assistance on concessionary terms as is possible, in order to minimize the growth in the external debt burden. Moreover, the Government would be well advised to utilize proceeds from borrowing on commercial terms in financing the high-profitability proj- ects in mining and mineral-based industries which are net generators of for- eign exchange receipts, while utilizing concessionary assistance to finance projects in the social sectors and infrastructure. - 22 - IV. POLICY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 45. The Five-Year Plan attests to the Government's determination to embark on a high-growth path designed to bring about a fundamental structural change in the economy, which would eliminate its reliance on foreign budget support and transfer payments. Success in achieving Five-Year Plan objectives will depend crucially on strengthening development administration, the coordi- nation of economic policies, and on ensuring consistency between public policy objectives. In addition to strengthening develpment institutions, the Govern- ment would also have to find ways to cope with inflationary pressures and the potential shortage of manpower resources, both of which are problems which have appeared only of late in Jordan. The emergence of inflationary pressures necessitates both an active recourse to short-term stabilization policies, hitherto little used in Jordan, and increases the urgency of adopting economic policies conducive to the growth of domestic savings (resource mobilization) in the medium and long-term. Issues in Planning 46. The fundamental objective of the Government is to reduce the re- liance of the budget and the balance of payments on foreign grants, in the medium to long-term. It is doubtful, however, whether the target rate of growth of output of 12 percent per year, or the size of the planned level of investment of JD 765 million, necessary for a quick export-oriented structural diversification of the economy and a rapid growth in per capita income levels, is fully consistent with this objective. The Five-Year Plan does not fully explore the conflict among the objectives listed. However, preliminary analysis indicates that the growth and investment targets of the Plan, may well result in a widening of the trade gap, due to domestic supply inelasti- cities leading to high import growth, reflecting also the capital import requirements of the Plan, and the increase in aggregate demand induced both by economic growth, and increased liquidity, and in an increased reliance of the budget on external receipts, in the wake of widening budgetary deficits. In- creasing inflationary pressures may also affect the competitiveness of Jordanian exports, in the medium-term. In addition, the size of the invest- ment program envisaged would considerably strain Jordan's physical, human, administrative and financial resources. Thus, even if external financing in the amounts called for is available, and the debt burden is manageable, the Government would have to adopt appropriate policies, if the investment program is to be implemented at the scale envisaged in the Five-Year Plan, in order to mitigate the pressures on resources, reduce inflationary pressures, curb the widening of budgetary and balance of payments deficit, and restrain the growth in both the domestic and external debt burden. 47. The main uncertainty in the formulation of the Five-Year Plan re- lates to the magnitude of domestic and foreign resources likely to be avail- able over the Plan period, for financing the investment program. There is, therefore, a need to ensure that resources which become available are used - 23 - efficiently. The size of the investment program envisaged is only loosely related to the macroeconomic framework, which is more a forecast of events, than a target from which requisite investment levels and complementary policy are derived. To some extent, this is due to weaknesses in the data base, but it is also a reflection of the fact that the Five-Year Plan is much more of a public sector investment program. The Government is aware of these deficien- cies, and is making increasing efforts to institute better collection of economic data and wider dissemination of information, in order to monitor economic developments as a basis for decision-making on economic policy. This effort should be accorded high priority, in view of the large role of the pri- vate sector envisaged in the Plan, and particular efforts should be directed to monitoring private sector developments, in the attainment of investment and growth targets for production and exports, availability of inputs, etc., as a basis for formulating public policies, and judging their effectiveness. 48. The bulk of the Plan projects are at an advanced state of prepara- tion, are of high priority, and the relative sectoral emphasis seems well placed. Moreover, with minor modifications in conception, these projects con- sist of virtually all the projects ready to be implemented in Jordan. Many were initially Seven-Year Plan (1964-70) projects and subsequently Three-Year Plan (1973-75) projects, which could not be implemented due to political events in the wake of the 1967 war. With completed feasibility studies, and anticipa- tions of considerably higher levels of external assistance than before, the Government views all these projects as priority projects, to be implemented as speedily as possible. Nevertheless, in view of the potential difficulties outlined above, the Government should aim at ensuring efficient utilization of resources, and give more careful attention to drawing up a financing plan, distinguishing local from foreign currency expenditures, and the sources and terms of finance. Manpower Planning, Employment and Training 49. The Plan document recognizes, in general terms, the manpower con- straints to a successful implementation of the Five-Year Plan. However, it does not undertake a systematic analysis of the country's existing manpower problems, and does not suggest comprehensive measures for meeting the country's manpower requirements over the next few years. Jordan's shortage of skilled workers in nearly all sectors (including agriculture), appears to stem largely from the outflow of skilled Jordanian workers to the Arab oil-exporting coun- tries, and the absence of adequate training programs for skills in short supply. A coordinated study to identify specifically the country's manpower needs, is urgently needed, and should be followed by instituting further em- ployment, education and training programs, to augment and strengthen current Government efforts. During the Five-Year Plan period Government policy should aim at increasing employment in higher productivity sectors and in keeping the expansion in purely administrative services at the minimum in the public sector. In order to overcome the shortage of workers in the construction sector, it is recommended that a properly phased construction program covering the construc- tion elements in all the sectors be prepared and executed during the Five-Year - 24 - Plan period. The workers' training programs, which have been recently estab- lished by the Government, should be expanded, and special efforts should be made to train and attract more women workers to join the labor force. The training of workers should be widened to include various forms of retraining, skill upgrading and refresher courses, and should also cover the needs of the medium and small firms. 50. The Government is aware of the severe problems posed by the man- power question, and is implementing remedial policies. In addition to the establishment of workers' training centers, the secondary education cur- riculum is being diversified to include technical and industrial education. Also the educational period is being reduced at both the secondary level (from 3 years to 2 years, by expanding eight-month sessions to eleven-months ones) and at the University level (by instituting a three-year B.A. program, rather than a four-year one). However, there is considerable scope for additional efforts to tackle the manpower, education and employment problems that Jordan is likely to face in the coming years. Project Implementation and Follow-Up 51. Experience during the Three-Year Plan has made the Government in- creasingly aware of the limitations of existing institutions for the formula- tion, preparation, selection, implementation, and follow-up of development projects.Y in 1975 the Government commissioned foreign consultants to study the overall planning situation in the country and suggest appropriate mea- sures to improve the machinery for economic development. The consultants submitted their recommendations in January 1976. The Government is studying their report, which defines responsibilities for planning and implementing projects, suggests measures to strengthen the National Planning Council (NPC), proposes a system of management information, develops a scheme of training staff in project management, and stresses the need to tackle the problem of skilled manpower shortage in the country-/ The Government is well advised to examine the consultants recommendations critically, and act urgently on strengthening administrative institutions, which is essential for a success- ful implementation of the Five-Year Plan. Inflation and Demand Management 52. A difficult task facing Jordan, as it intensifies its development efforts, is to ensure that economic growth takes place in an environment of reasonable price stability. The potential economic and social costs of rapid inflation in a country heavily reliant on external assistance and encumbered by a large wage-earning public sector could be high. In particular, a high rate of inflation would affect the competitiveness of Jordanian exports, and thereby defeat the fundamental objectives of the Plan to create a self- sufficient economy. 53. The rapid rise in the rate of inflation in recent years has been induced by excess-demand pressures stemming from sharply rising aggregate de- mand, slow growth of domestic output, supply inelasticities of non-tradable - 25 - goods as well as some services, and, possibly, physical limitations on im- ports 1/. Moreover, Jordan's unusually high volume of imports in relation to domestic output also renders it highly vulnerable to cost-push inflation, due to rising international prices. The rapid growth of aggregate demand has been generated largely by a sharp rise in domestic liquidity, induced by a rising Government deficit, largely financed through external grants and an accelerating inflow of workers' remittances. Rising external demand for Jordanian labor and goods (particularly certain agricultural products), gene- rated by the regional upsurge of economic activity and prosperity, has been an added element in exacerbating pressures on domestic resources. It is likely that over the next few years, most of the factors mentioned above will continue to be potentially important sources of inflationary pressures. Hence, demand management through the use of appropriate fiscal and monetary policy instruments will be of crucial importance for containing domestic in- flation to tractable levels. In this context, two interrelated policy issues need to be considered. The first is the size of Government investment ex- penditure program, which has been discussed earlier, and the second relates to the measures required to reduce, and eventually eliminate, the currently substantial negative domestic public savings, as part of the broader effort to achieve economic self-sufficiency through the mobilization of domestic resources. Domestic Resource Mobilization 54. The public sector could play a crucial role in domestic resource mobilization directly by increasing its domestic revenues at a faster pace than the growth of current expenditures, thereby moving towards the goal of generating positive public savings in the medium to longer term, and indi- rectly by adopting policies which would promote private savings and their mobilization through the financial institutions. The Government is aware of these facts, and is taking effective measures to these ends. 55. Although domestic revenues have risen sharply since 1972, there is still substantial scope for augmenting them, particularly through a greater tax effort. Direct taxes, which currently are about 2.6 percent of GDP and 10 percent of domestic revenues, can be considerably increased through both a greater enforcement effort and a broadening of the tax base to include agricultural income, capital gains on real estate and inheritance and gifts. There is also scope for augmenting indirect taxes by substantially increasing import duties, particularly on non-essential consumer goods, and changing the tariffs on the few imports now subject to specific duties to ad valorem basis. (The Plan projections, however, indicate that indirect taxes will decline from 1/ Some indication of recent excess-demand pressures may be gleaned from the fact that during 1974-75, aggregate expenditures in nominal terms increased by about 75 percent while real aggregate supply increased by under 30 percent. Over the same period net imports (imports less ex- ports) in real terms increased by about 72 percent, accounting for most of the rise in real supply. - 26 - 11 percent of GNP in 1975 to 10 percent in 1980.) Further revenue efforts should include, as the Plan document recognizes, a reconsideration of the rates charged on publicly-provided services with a view to recovering the operating costs and an appropriate share of the capital costs. On the cur- rent expenditure side, there is continued need for fiscal discipline to be exercised to restrain the growth of (non-defense) current expenditures to the targets of the Plan, which are well below the nearly 30 percent average annual rate of growth experienced in the past three years. 56. Over the last few years, the Government has made a concerted effort to tap private savings through floating bonds and encouraging private sector purchases of the new equity issues of some of the semi-public enterprises. Bonds placed with the nonbank sector bear a preferential, tax-exempt interest rate of 8 percent per annum, as compared to the 6.25 percent per annum pay- able on the bonds purchased by the banking system. (These interest rates were increased to their present levels for the new issues beginning in 1975.) The rapid increase in national private savings (as evidenced by the national accounts data, and perhaps more reliably by the sharp rise in savings and time deposits both in absolute terms and relative to the expansion in the money supply) indicates that a larger portion of public investment expendi- tures could be financed from domestic reosurces. It would be extremely de- sirable for the Government to aim initially at financing at least the local currency component of its planned expenditures from private savings. This would help to absorb some of the excess liquidity that exists in the banking system, and also redirect credit to sectors that could increase the real output of the economy. In this connection, the Government would be well advised to consider the monitoring of foreign-exchange receipts and expendi- tures of the public sector, to implement and monitor a program designed to eliminate external financing of local currency expenditures. 57. Recognizing the need to rationalize the level and structure of in- terest rates in the wake of the recent inflationary experience and the devel- opment finance needs of the economy, effective January 1976, the Central Bank imposed minimum interest rates payable on savings and time deposits with com- mercial banks. However, there is still considerable scope for following a more active interest rate policy for savings mobilization and improved re- source allocation. In this context, the progress that has been made in pro- moting specialized credit institutions -- virtually the sole source of medium and long-term credit in Jordan -- needs to be reinforced. It would be de- sirable to strengthen the role of these institutions in mobilizing private savings by enabling them to offer debt instruments -- particularly long-term -- on appropriate terms. In short, a more active policy aimed at further developing financial intermediation in Jordan should include measures to in- crease the variety and attractiveness of the financial assets offered to the private sector and to redirect the flow of savings from the commercial banks -- which normally do not provide medium and long-term credit, other than on a rollover basis -- to specialized credit institutions, which could improve the allocation of credit to the various sectors. - 27 - Trade Policies 58. Direct fiscal intervention, aimed at supplementing public revenues while curtailing expenditure growth, should be suppplemented by trade poli- cies aimed at reducing the exceedingly high reliance of the economy on im- ports. There is scope for substantial across the board increases in import duties, particularly on non-food consumer goods, with the joint intention of reducing imports, supplementing public revenues, and increasing savings (by reducing consumption). The inflationary impact of higher import duties is likely to be small, if the choice of goods on which duties are increased is appropriate, and complementary fiscal and monetary policies are instituted to utilize the additional public revenues to reduce liquidity growth and thereby curtail the growth of aggregate demand. Of course, increased import duties should be supplemented by administrative measures to curb potential smuggl- ing, due to low import duties in neighboring countries. Moreover, in view of Jordan's membership in the Arab Common Market, revision of import duties would have to be closely co-ordinated with the other member countries. Never- theless, unless direct intervention by trade policies takes place, there is little likelihood of a reduced trade deficit in the medium-term. However, quantitative restrictions should be avoided, in order to mitigate inflationary pressures. 59. Higher import duties should be supplemented by increased efforts at export promotion, particularly in terms of assistance in marketing, both agri- cultural and industrial products, for exports to neighboring Arab countries. There is considerable scope for Jordanian exports of medium and small-scale industrial products, which have grown significantly in recent years, to the Arab countries. Finally, the Government should consider providing special in- centives to promote the growth of workers' remittance inflows. The recent decision to allow banks, which have been permitted to open non-resident for- eign currency accounts (including Jordanians working abroad) since April 1973, to exclude their non-resident deposits from reserve requirements, may be a significant inducement for commercial banks to offer special incentives on non-resident deposits, in order to attract a higher inflow of remittances. Coordination of Economic Policies 60. To attain the development objectives of the Government, it is es- sential to ensure that economic policies in different spheres of activity are closely coordinated. A first and most significant attempt at increased con- sistency should be made in instituting a formal mechanism to ensure consist- ency between the actions of NPC and the Bureau of Budget. This has not been fully possible in Jordan. As noted earlier (para. 20), the 1976 budget is- sued at the end of December 1975 was already substantially different from the Five-Year Plan document. It is strongly recommended that starting in 1977, the Government prepare Annual Plans, within the framework of the Five-Year Plan, both as a formal means of updating the Five-Year Plan in the light of changing circumstances, and for the purposes of creating a consistent link between the Plan and the budget. This would create an effective means of supplementing the Five-Year Plan, which outlines broad medium-term priorities and policy directions, with a detailed program for action, and of monitoring the effectiveness of past policy decisions. - 28 - 61. The Annual Plan should review progress of the Five-Year Plan in the previous year, both in terms of growth and investment targets, and analyze differences in targets and actual performance. In coordination with the pro- posed budget, the Annual Plan should outline the major projects and programs to be carried out during the year, and give estimates of costs, available re- sources, and financing plan. Perhaps most importantly, the Annual Plan should identify specific problems likely to arise in the course of Plan implementa- tion, and propose specific fiscal, monetary, credit, trade and other policies to be adopted during the year to achieve the annual targets. It is only by a coordinated use of all policy instruments available to the Government that the objective of economic self-sufficiency, prosperity and social justice is likely to be achieved. The implementation of annual planning may well be the vehicle for obtaining these ends. ANNEX A Page 1 MANPOWER 1. Current estimates of population, labor force, employment, etc. are all subject to wide margins of error, and suffer from inconsistencies of con- cepts, coverage and classification, and above all from time lags. The last complete population census was in 1961, and no accurate information of sub- sequent population movements, particularly after the 1967 war, exists. Never- theless, in 1975 the total East Bank population is estimated at 1,951,000 of which 56.9 percent is under 20 years of age, 4.3 percent is over 60, and only 38.8 percent is between 20 and 60 years old. The preponderance of population under 20 indicates the burden on the educational system. Official estimates place the male/female ratio at 1.037, which would seem to be high in view of indirect evidence of substantial emigration of working-age males. The rate of growth of population of 3.5 percent per annum adopted for the Five-Year Plan period also appears high. On the basis of estimates of the current and expected natural growth and the impact of the current and expected emigration of Jordanians, a growth rate of around 3.2 percent per annum appears more rea- sonable. The 19.6 percent estimated labor force participation rate for Jordan in 1975 (34.9 percent males, 3.8 percent females) based on the household sur- veys reflects not only the small share of females in the labor force, the young age of population and the high rate of school enrollment, but also the large emigration of the largely male labor force, which has taken place in recent years. Nevertheless, of the estimated labor force of 380,000 in 1975, only 2.1 percent are unemployed. The rate of unemloyment is affected by the rate of emigration in any given year. While accurate data regarding emigra- tion are not available, data on arrivals and departures from Jordan indicate that an average of almost 29,000 persons left Jordan annually during 1972-74. At current labor force participation rates, it is estimated that some 5,000 persons (1.3 percent) left the labor force to seek employment abroad in 1975. Estimates of population on the West Bank, and Jordanian residents abroad are as follows: JORDAN - Resident and Non-Resident Population (1975) (000's) East Bank 1,951 West Bank 658 Kuwait 150 Lebanon 350 Syria 200 Iraq, Gulf, Libya, Saudi Arabia 100 Source: IBRD Estimates. ANNEX A Page 2 2. In order to accurately estimate the population of Jordan it is necessary to undertake a census of population at the earliest possible date. It is also necessary to undertake a systematic study to determine the impact of emigration on the rate of growth of Jordan's population. Recent Development (1973-75) 3. To a large extent the employment situation in Jordan appears to have improved during the Three-Year Plan period as a result of outflow of Jordanians to secure employment in neighboring Arab countries. Productivity in the non- farm sectors decreased during the Three-Year Plan period not only due to the emigration of better qualified Jordanians, but also because a large part of employment and its increase was in the lower productivity sectors. The un- restricted policy of expanding employment under the Government administrative services and the unplanned migration created manpower shortages generally, and more particularly in skilled and unskilled manual, science-based professional, and sub-professional occupations. The agricultural sector remained stagnant during the Three-Year Plan period, resulting in large movement of workers to urban areas. Partly due to increased internal demand and partly due to emigra- tion, serious shortages developed in the agricultural sector during the last two years of the Three-Year Plan, and manpower shortages are also being faced in a number of occupations in almost all the non-agricultural sectors. During the Three-Year Plan period the increases in salaries and wages granted by the Government were unable to catch up with the prices. The neighboring Arab countries continue to offer increasingly higher salaries/wages, which aggra- vates inflationary pressures in Jordan. Yet, in view of the special relations between Jordan and the host Arab countries, the open door policy in Jordan of allowing its nationals to be recruited by foreign employers, continues to exist. The Five-Year Plan 4. During the Five-Year Plan period agriculture is expected to conti- nue facing manpower shortages as a result of continued outflow of workers from the agricultural areas. The surplus agricultural labor is expected to move to non-agricultural activities, as a result of which by the end of the Five-Year Plan 24,000 or 5.4 percent of the total labor force may be unemployed unless they can be absorbed in special internal programs, or can successfully find employment in neighboring Arab countries. Measures to overcome agricultural labor scarcity should include mechanization, collective exploitation of land, increased emphasis on training programs, introduction of incentives to retain young persons in agricultural areas, mobilization of untapped manpower resour- ces in remote agricultural districts and among pastoralists, programs of ef- fective utilization of the retired personnel of the defense services, provi- sion of adequate infrastructural facilities and education and health services in the agricultural zones. ANNEX A Page 3 5. Future Government policy should aim at increasing employment in high productivity sectors, and keep the increase in the low productivity sectors under strict surveillance. In the public sector, the Government should set a high standard of management and keep the expansion in purely administrative services at the minimum. In order to overcome the acute shortage of manpower in the construction sector, it is recommended that a properly phased construction program covering the construction elements of all the sectors be prepared and executed during the Five-Year Plan period. In addition, the ongoing technical and vocational workers training programs should be expanded. Also, special efforts should be made to train and attract more women workers to joint the labor force. Recommendations 6. Training in Jordan appears to be considered a one-time function, and institutional training suffers from many weaknesses. The proposed "Labor Vocational Preparing and Training Corporation," the Board of Education and the newly formed Ministry of Labor should look into the weaknesses and gaps in the education and training programs of the country and take steps to improve the coverage and quality of training programs falling in their respective jurisdictions. There is, however, a need for adopting a coordinated interdis- ciplinary approach under the leadership of the National Planning Council. 7. The Statistics Department should be reorganized and strengthend so as to be able to formulate and undertake a coordinated program of collection of statistics strictly in accordance with the needs of economic and social development planning and plan implementation. There is also a need to create a unit within the Statistics Department to collect statistical information from neighboring countries in the region on a mutual exchange basis. 8. The Manpower Section of the National Planning Council should be strengthened and enabled to participate in all stages of planning for eco- nomic and social development so as to effectively perform its functions relating to manpower planning and implementation on a coordinated basis. This would, however, require a vigorous activation of the other units of the Coun- cil, and collaboration of the Government ministries in manpower planning. ANNEX B Page 1 AGRICULTURE 1. Jordanian agriculture has been characterized over the past eight years by low and stagnant yields of cereals and high imports of some food commodities, leading to a food production-consumption gap. The country is neither endowed with large areas of fertile land nor with abundant rainfall. Unfortunately, little has been done to develop the modest potential that exists. The Three-Year Plan for 1973-75, accomplished little in terms of increased production as most of its objectives remain unfulfilled. Economic Self-Sufficiency 2. Agricultural production has lagged behind consumption in the past few years, and is unlikely to catch up in the near future. It will be vir- tually impossible for Jordan to cover the cost of imported agricultural products with agricultural exports, without radical increases in crop pro- duction and/or significant reductions in resident population. Value of Trade in Agricultural Products (JD 000's) Preliminary 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Imports 20,920 28,392 32,327 43,893 50,675 Exports 4,003 5,070 4,774 10,039 10,612 Trade Deficit 16,917 23,322 27,553 33,854 40,063 % Exports/Imports 19 18 15 23 21 Source: Department of Statistics and the Central Bank. Note: 1971 and 1973 were affected by civil disturbance and war, respectively; 1973 and 1975 were years of severe droughts; only 1974 was considered an excellent crop year. Rural Population and Land Ownership 3. About 360,000 people, or 18 percent of the total population are classified as farmers, farm workers, and rural population. Not all the farm- ers and farm workers reside in rural areas; some live in the larger towns and cities. (This is probably more true of farm owners than farm workers.) How- ever, almost three-quarters of the 50,791 farms included in the 1975 census were reported as owned or in ownerlike possession by the operator. The re- mainder were operated under various rent, share-cropping, and partnership ar- rangements. Approximately 80 percent of the holdings (41,000) were less than 10 ha in size, while 17 percent (8,522) were less than 0.5 ha. ANNEX B Page 2 Labor 4. There is evidence of wage pressures and shortages of specific types of labor, which could have serious implications for future development. This shortage manifests itself in various ways. Day laborers are available in the Jordan Valley, but at wages about three times those prevailing one or two years ago. In the Highlands it is now difficult to find labor for the olive harvest, and most of this work is performed by children and women. The Forest Service has difficulty in finding men to plant trees. It is in the more modern agricultural skills, however, that the shortage is most severe. Qual- ified tractor drivers, farm machinery operators, and mechanics are in short supply. Most Government agencies are experiencing difficulty in finding technically-trained staff. Booming economic conditions in the neighboring Gulf States as well as in Amman, are attracting labor away from agriculture. In the long run, the recent shortage of day laborers may be salutary, signal- ing the transition of agriculture from subsistence to a more productive type, and thereby releasing excess labor for other sectors while labor productivity and rural wages increase. However, although this may benefit agriculture, it is unlikely to do so without social consequences in urban areas, which may have difficulty in absorbing the low-cost rural labor. Wheat Production 5. The area planted with wheat remains fairly constant at about 245,000 ha while production varies considerably from 50,000 tons in dry years to 245,000 tons in wet ones. National average yields vary from 200 to 1,000 kg/ha, as very little yield stability has been built into wheat farming. Ferti- lizer use, is almost non-existent, land preparation and weed control are badly done and high quality seed of improved varieties, is scarce. In addition, farms are badly fragmented and not conducive to economic use of modern machine- ry. Wheat prices are subsidized at high levels. Bread wheat is purchased from farmers at $184/ton and durum at $195/ton. Last year's subsidy program cost the Government $12.5 million. Yet, annual imports of 96-147 thousand tons of wheat and flour have been necessary to feed the population. The FAO/ UNDP project in the Irbid governorate, where 61 percent of the wheat area is located, is off to an impressive start and is awakening considerable interest among farmers in improved wheat technology. The project is based on demonstra- tions of improved farming practices to farmers in the area, and needs to be continued and strengthened during the next five years. Livestock 6. Jordan's principal livestock asset is the national flock of sheep and goats, numbering about 1,190,000 head. Cattle are much less important with only 47,000 head. The camel population is given as 16,000. Though livestock numbers vary from year to year, production of meat and milk appears to be stagnant. The country imports over 80,000 tons of dairy products and eggs annually at a cost of about $12 million (1974). In 1975, imports of dairy products ($10 million) and of live animals ($15 million), amounted to around 16 percent of total agricultural imports. The main limiting factor for ANNEX B Page 3 livestock production is lack of feed. Of the nearly 8.5 million ha clas- sified as rangeland or desert, perhaps no more than a million ha would sup- port grazing. Very little quality forage is available except for small commercial dairy herds, which probably number no more than 2,500 head. A project is underway to import 3,500 dairy cows and set up a modern milk- producing unit, but is ill-conceived and is likely to have little effect on milk production. No effective action is being taken to increase the fodder base or to improve rangeland. There has been a keen interest in Shami milk goats following a successful introduction of these animals from Syria, and farmers are willing to pay high prices (up to $240) for a good milking nanny. 7. There has also been a rapid increase in egg and broiler production, which is almost entirely in private hands. Practically all of the baby chicks are produced locally, and some are exported to neighboring countries. The poultry meat market (about 5,000 tons) is said to be entirely supplied by do- mestic production now. Egg production is expected to satisfy demand by the end of 1977, even without the proposed Government initiatives. Bedouins and Range Management 8. For social as well as economic reasons, the Government would like to settle numbers of Bedouins on irrigated highland farms and help them move to a more modern life. Present efforts are not succeeding very well. Bring- ing such land into production as part of a social experiment is both difficult and uneconomic, and will continue to depend on direct subsidies. Unfortunatly, there is no effective program underway to develop the considerable potential of the rangeland where the Bedouins have traditionally grazed their flocks. A FAO/UNDP report has recommended the establishment of a long-range program for the development of range resources. The Bank concurs in this recommenda- tion. It should be stressed, however, that the role of the Bedouins be con- sidered as part of such development, as the two problems are really one. Credit 9. Credit does not appear to be a limiting factor. Most of the short- term production credit is provided by private commission agents. The Agri- cultural Credit Corporation (ACC), partly funded by IDA funds, and the Jor- danian Cooperative Organization (JCO), provide short and medium-term loans. Of these three major sources, only ACC provides long-term credit to farmers. Interest rates vary from 6 percent on long-term loans to 8 percent on produc- tion credit. No reliable information is available on the rates charged by private agents. Default on repayment of ACC loans, which was as high as 75 percent in 1967, had fallen to 50 percent by 1974. The ACC is aiming at a 90 percent repayment rate by 1980, and is tightening supervision of lending. The JCO has a somewhat better record, though they also have experienced repayment problems. In 1974, 68 percent of the borrowers repaid on time, and by 1975, the rate had risen to 73 percent. The ACC now has nearly ANNEX B Page 4 $30 million in outstanding loans. The last year for which complete records are available shows lending to 2,122 borrowers for a total of nearly $7 mil- lion, with an average loan of $4,300. The JCO now has about $3 million out on loans. Marketing 10. Wheat is marketed through the Ministry of Supply's network of buyers and warehouses. Since prices are subsidized above free market levels, there is no black market. Vegetables are marketed through a system of private com- mission agents, wholesalers, and retailers. They are reputed to make excel- lent profits. Both the Agricultural Marketing Organization (AMO) and the Jordanian Cooperative Organization (JCO) attempted on occasion to displace these agents. However, all attempts failed, since the agents have a complete grip on the market. The AMO has tried adding services (grading and packing) and new crops (potatoes for local consumption and peppers for export) and has succeeded in these endeavors. Future efforts will be restricted to activities which do not directly compete with the private agents, yet enable the farmer to get a higher return for his produce. The Jordan Valley 11. The Jordan Valley represents the largest and most important food producing resource in the country. Several efforts are now underway to de- velop the Valley, and production could increase sharply during the next five years. The recent introduction of plastic greenhouse technology is revolu- tionizing vegetable production and completely altering old concepts of pro- ductivity and profitability. For example, yields of cucumbers have been in- creased seven-fold through the use of these relatively simple structures. Jordan Valley Commission 12. The Jordan Valley Commission, organized in 1973, has initiated a dynamic and effective program of development. It is working hard to co- ordinate the various activities and investments. It is currently busy with canal extension, installation of sprinkler irrigation, rebuilding the main Valley road, construction of housing, provision of public utilities, creation of a new grading and packing station, coordination of agricultural credit, and formation of Farmers' Associations. Problems are being solved. Produc- tion is increasing. Future prospects are encouraging. Jordanian Cooperative Organization 13. The Jordanian Cooperative Organization, under new leadership, is expanding its activities and improving its services. Membership has increased from 12,000 in 1973, to 22,700 in 1975. In the same period, the share and reserve capital of the various co-ops have increased from $1.6 million to $3.7 million. More money is out on supervised credit than ever before. The JCO ANNEX B Page 5 is contributing its fair share to the development process and getting organized to do even more, and it deserves continued support. Performance During Three-Year Plan 14. Development policy and strategy were translated into 40 agricultural and irrigation projects, which were to be completed by the end of 1975. Nine of these are 80 percent or more completed, seven are less than 80 percent com- pleted, and 24 were never begun. In addition to objectives being overly opti- mistic, many factors accounted for these shortfalls in performance. The un- certainty due to the war of 1973, undoubtedly delayed or cancelled some of the projects. Failure to obtain financing, shortage of technical personnel, in- flation and inability to mobilize resources were other factors involved. 15. Though many of the objectives of the Three-Year Plan remain unful- filled, other accomplishments put Jordanian agriculture in a better position to begin the next Plan. Few of these are quantifiable. There has been en- hanced experience in coordination of various agencies. The Cooperative struc- ture and leadersip have improved as has farmer participation. There has been increased investment by private interests in agriculture, and there is now a greater appreciation of the potential profit in food production. There has been a better understanding of marketing problems and this is generating more realistic proposals for their solution. A Faculty of Agriculture with an energetic and dedicated staff has been created and soon its graduates will begin to contribute to development. Some utilizable research results are now available and should permit easier adoption of high-production technology. Credit organizations have been able to define their problems and chart their future with greater clarity. There has been slow but steady progress in soil conservation and watershed protection. Perhaps most important, farmers and farm workers have gained more experience with new technology, particularly in vegetable and poultry production. The use of insecticides, fungicides, fertilizer, plastic greenhouses, and machinery has spread along with irriga- tion. A livestock feed industry is pacing the rapid development of more modern chicken and egg production. Investment Under the Five-Year Plan 16. The plan calls for a total investment in agriculture of about $130 million. Of this, $71.6 million or 55 percent, will come from the private sector. The remainder, slightly over $58.3 million, will come from the Gov- ernment budget, loans, and technical assistance. $36.3 million (62 percent) of funds from these sources will be invested in three sectors. Rainfed agri- culture will get 26 percent, irrigated agriculture, 11 percent, and dairy cattle, 25 percent. In view of the unfavorable prospects for Government suc- cess with dairy projects, the returns on public investment are likely to be higher in rainfed and irrigated agriculture. This is also true of other activities where private capital traditionally does not venture (watershed protection, afforestation, and research). ANNEX B Page 6 Balanced Development 17. Jordanian planners have rightfully pointed out that while the coun- try is relatively self-sufficient in vegetables and some fruits, it must rely on increasing imports of milk and meat to satisfy demand. The new plan is going to try to balance investments to correct these deficiencies, hence the large dairy investment. But Jordan's agricultural resources are not balanced. It is not a country with natural dairying potential, so that any investments in dairying will be very costly, and should be closely scrutinized. Perhaps it would be advisable to consider continued importation and subsequent recon- stitution of milk powder as a means of supplying the nation's milk needs. Alternatively, a greater effort could be made with the Shami goats which are proving popular. Magarin Dam 18. One of the major provisions of the Jordan Valley Commission's Seven Year Plan (1975-82) is for a dam and power station on the Yarmouk River, which forms the boundary between Syria and Jordan. The dam would have a mean height of 125 m, a storage capacity of 150 Mm3, and would cost $94 million. It would provide sufficient irrigation water to bring an additional 15,000 ha of arable land into production on the East Bank, more than doubling present irrigated area in the Jordan Valley (11,700 ha). In February 1976, a contract was signed between the JVC, the Harza Co. of Chicago and the El Handassah Co. of Beirut to carry out a feasibility study. This study is scheduled for completion by next March, at which time the whole project will come up for consideration. Agricultural Planning & Coordination 19. The recent decision to set up a committee to determine policy and strategy for agricultural development is welcome. Almost all previous ob- servers have commented on the absence of any mechanism for deciding priori- ties and laying out courses of action. This committee, which includes the Secretary General of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture, and representatives of the National Planning Authority and the Jordan Valley Commission, should be an asset in future planning and im- plementation. Production, Exports & Imports 20. Total agricultural production is likely to increase about 20 per- cent over the next five years. Considerable increases may be expected in vegetable, fruit, egg and poultry production. However, milk and meat produc- tion are unlikely to increase at all. Possibilities for further increases after 1980, depend greatly on completion of the Maqarin Dam. If completed, production could increase by more than 20 percent. Exports are increasing, but so is domestic food consumption. Other countries in the Middle East such as Iraq and Egypt, are also developing plastic greenhouses and may cut ANNEX B Page 7 into Jordanian export markets. Between 1975 and 1980, exports can be expected to increase about 10 percent. Between 1980 and 1985, exports might increase by 20 percent if the Maqarin Dam is completed, but by only 5 percent if it is not. Between 1971 and 1974, imports increased by 110 percent. Though this pace is unlikely to continue, there is strong demand pressure for almost all agricultural products. It seems likely a further increase of 50 percent in imports will occur during the next five years. Future Prospects for Technical Assistance & Loans 21. The absorptive capacity of the agricultural sector for external technical assistance and development loans has probably reached its limit at present. However, future involvement of external donors should give priority to further development of water resources and irrigation in the Jordan Valley. The Rainfed Farming Project at Irbid merits consideration for strengthening and further support. It has the most potential to increase production of wheat, the nation's basic cereal. Agricultural research, which has had some modest accomplishments, nevertheless still needs reorganizing and re-orienting. This may require some investment. No good answer has been found to the re- lated problems of range management and economic self-support for the Bedouins. Present efforts are inadequate. A study is greatly needed to suggest future lines of action. ANNEX C Page 1 MINING AND MANUFACTURING 1. In 1975, some 27,400 workers were employed in the mining and manu- facturing sector (3,400 in mining), which accounted for about 15.5 percent of GDP (mining, 2.5 percent). The sector accounted for 7.3 percent of total employment (mining, 0.9 percent). Small artisan type enterprises predominate, with the bulk of the employment being in food processing (mainly flour milling, oil pressing and olive preserving), metal product fabricating (making of hand tools, structural metal products and metal furniture), the making of wearing apparel, cement manufacturing, structural clay product making, furniture and fixture manufacturing and shoe making. The greatest contribution to value- added, on the other hand, is made by the oil refinery, basic metal enterprises (casting and forging), cigarettes and medicaments. The larger units benefit from substantial tariff protection. The mining sector is dominated by the Jordan Phosphate Co. Ltd. (JPMCO), with its two mines (El Hassa, 105 km south of Amman, and Russeifa, north of Amman) with all other units being quarries and stone-crushing operated by a few men. 2. Mining and industry grew by 17 percent per year in real terms over the Three-Year Plan period 1973-75, compared to a target growth rate of 14 percent per year. The high growth was due mainly to an increase in produc- tion of phosphate rock in a period when prices more than quadrupled. Manufac- turing taken separately from mining, has grown steadily at an average annual rate of 6 percent. On the other hand, growth of mining and industry, both in terms of output and value-added, has been uneven during the past three years. 3. Success in project implementation has been mixed, but even if allowances are made for a redefinition of some projects and escalation of costs, the overall implementation rate has been high. In comparison to the employment target of 9,000 in the Plan, 8,000 jobs were created in industry. Exports of manufactured goods have also registered remarkable progress, having doubled from previous year in 1973 and again in 1974. With high industrial demand, excess capacity in industry fell from around 25 percent at the beginning of the Plan period to around 5 percent in 1975. The Five-Year Plan (1976-80) 4. In comparison to the Three-Year Plan, the sectoral growth targets (26 percent per year) and investment target (JD 229 million) are substan- tially higher. Although the target growth rate refers to both manufacturing and mining, manufacturing alone is likely to grow at more than the actual 6 percent per year growth recorded during the past three years. Much of the contribution to the combined high target growth rate of 26 percent per year reflects expectations of growth in mining, or phosphates. Phosphate production is expected to grow from 2.5 million tons in 1976 to 5.4 million tons in 1980. However, price prospects for phosphates are not as favorable as before, and revenues from phosphate mining may come under pressure. ANNEX C Page 2 5. It would be extremely desirable to specify Plan targets for manu- facturing separately from mining. Nevertheless, on the basis of the expansion planned in phosphate mining, it can be estimated that phosphate mining would grow rapidly during the next five years. Partly due to the low base year values, average growth rates over the Five-Year Plan period of 35 percent per year in mining and perhaps 10 percent per year in manufacturing may be feasible. Higher rates would be possible only if the potash project can start production before 1980 and the fertilizer project early enough to have impact on the growth rate of the sector. 6. Exports of manufacturing, largely from medium-size industries, have made very substantial progress in the recent past, and can be expected to con- tinue this trend in the next five years, as Jordan's share in the Arab common market expands and Jordan's goods improve in quality. The Five-Year Plan pro- jections of exports of "other manufacturing goods" (JD 3 million increase a year, implying a decreasing rate of growth) are conservative and a higher rate of growth is not out of reach for exports of manufacturing in the next five years, despite the fact that Jordan has no clear comparative advantages in terms of natural resources. 7. The major industrial projects (7 out of 14) costing JD 184.5 mil- lion out of total planned investments of JD 229 million, consist of phos- phatic expansion, potash development, a new fertilizer project, oil refinery expansion, a new cement plant, a new textile plant and an expansion of the existing cement plant. All are at a fairly high degree of preparedness. Nevertheless, the potash project by its nature will not become operational on an industrial scale before 1980. A closer review of the copper project will have to be made to decide whether or not the project should be implemented at all. There seems to be little reason for the project to be implemented in the present pilot form (known as the copper "cottage" industry) when it has been already established that the full-scale project is not feasible. 8. Over 40 percent (JD 99 million or over US$300 million) of the in- vestment cost of projects is expected to be financed by direct foreign in- vestment and/or foreign loans. Industrial Development Strategy 9. Despite Jordan's small resource base there is considerable scope for developing medium and small scale industries. A strategy for developing Jordan's manufacturing must be based on the possibility of promoting these medium and small industries and in the process increasing their export- orientation and reducing their present inefficient, protected position. There is considerable scope for developing further both import substitution and export-oriented industries. Import substitution industries need not be inward looking and what should be done in this respect is a gradual dismantling of the present system of heavily protective tariffs and other forms of protection. ANNEX C Page 3 As regards export-oriented industries, Jordan's economy is the one case where one should not look for clear -and lasting conventional comparative advantages in identifying export potentials or providing areas for investments. Its geo- graphical position and a relatively higher level of skilled labor are never- theless positive factors which appear to have helped push Jordan's manufac- tured goods into the Arab common market in recent years. These exports have increased more than twice in the past two or three years. Pharmaceuticals, detergents, insecticides and cigarettes, wet batteries, and cement were among the leading exports. It appears that there is considerable scope for further developing these and other exports, clothing and footwear, in particular to other Arab countries. Incentives System 10. Jordan's adequate system of industrial incentives is being supple- mented under a new draft law of Investment Encouragement. Present import tariffs are generally not high, except for a few goods being highly protective. The draft new tariff system reportedly exempts all machinery and raw materials from import duties, as incentives to industrial investment. (Raw materials are presently subject to import duty, except if the end product is exported.) This will also enable Jordan's goods to be more competitive with imported goods from other Arab countries where similar exemptions on raw material im- ports are in force. However, currently prevailing administrative procedures for industrial investment would have to be further simplified if foreign capital is to be attracted. Prospects 11. The industrial sector outlook for 1976 is good, with very high expected growth, reflecting higher phosphate production (2.3 million tons compared to 1.36 million tons in 1975), as phosphate prices have stabilized in early 1976, and the company has already received orders for the full capacity production. In the medium-term higher level of production of a number of large and important industries (oil refinery, cement, textiles) can only be achieved with an early implementation of the planned new projects, since existing industries are approaching full capacity. Longer-term prospects for continued development in the industrial sector are reasonably good, in prin- ciple, as considerable scope for developing further medium-scale industries still exists, and the export potential of manufactured goods has not been exhausted. Because of the inherent instability of phosphate prices, an early implementation of some large projects in manufacturing will provide an im- portant element of stability into future industrial growth of Jordan. Long- term prospects for the mining sector will depend of course on world market prices in particular; but with expectations of falling prices during this decade, Jordan's rock will hold its competitive position better than other major producers in view of the lower cost of Jordan's rock. It is expected that phosphate prices will further stabilize some time before the end of the Plan period (perhaps 1978 or 1979). ANNEX D Page 1 TRANSPORT 1. Development of the transport sector has received great emphasis in Jordan during the past two decades, and particularly during the Three-Year Plan (1973-75) when an integrated project for phosphate mining, rail trans- port and port facilities was initiated and implemented. As a result, Jordan has at present a relatively well-balanced and efficient transport network, adequate to meet the present level of requirements in most areas. Continued development of the transport sector would, however, be crucial for meeting the growth in transport demand arising from the planned growth in exports, imports, transit trade and internal trade during the Five-Year Plan (FYP). In fact, strains are already visible in some subsectors (example: port facilities) in trying to cope with the growing traffic, and more such bottle- necks would soon develop in other subsectors if further development of trans- port facilities does not keep pace with the growing tempo of economic activity envisaged under the Five-Year Plan. The Plan clearly recognizes this need and has rightly provdied for large investments in the transport sector, amounting to about JD 120 million, nearly 16 percent of the Plan's total outlay of JD 765 million. 2. Overall, Jordan has achieved commendable progress in implementing the transport projects covered under the Three-Year Plan and has very nearly fulfilled its targets in this sector. In financial terms, the total expendi- ture on public sector transport projects was JD 39 million, as against the Plan provision of JD 27.8 million. This includes some cost overruns, some expansion in scope of work particularly under some road projects, and a few incomplete projects. The physical achievements have been of the following order: 100 percent in railway (projects: strengthening El Hassa-Hittiya line, and building new Hittiya-Aqaba line for moving phosphates from mines to the port); 100 percent in ports (project: Master Plan preparation and buying some equipment); about 90 percent in roads (eleven out of the eighteen projects were completed in full; three about 90 percent; the rest -- includ- ing some studies, etc.--much less); and about 70 percent in civil aviation projects (mainly airports at Amman and Aqaba). The total investment in the transport sector during 1973-75, including private sector investments, amounted to about JD 70 million; according to NPC, the transport sector was the single largest contributor to Jordan's'capital formation during this period. 3. The bulk of the transport sector investments under the Five-Year Plan would be designed to cater to the mining, export and manufacturing proj- ects which form the backbone of the Five-Year Plan; other transport objec- tives include providing valuable transport inputs to help agricultural devel- opment by adding new and improved feeder roads, assisting general industrial- ization and expansion of internal trade by improving arterial roads, and strengthening the economic ties with other Arab countries by increasing tran- sit trade facilities. ANNEX D Page 2 4. The transport plan strategy is to undertake most of the proposed investments under the public sector; this would cover all investments in roads, railways, ports, and airports. Investments in the private sector would be relatively small -- and would mainly be in road transport vehicles and related services. The Five-Year Plan envisages a total of JD 120 mil- lion for the transport sector, including an indicative provision of JD 7.5 million in the private sector. The Plan estimate, however, excludes a major private sector investment of about JD 40 million, which thi Jordanian Airlines, Alia, plans to spend in expanding its international fleet. 5. The main transport projects in the public sector include: (i) Acquisition of more locomotives and wagons so as to increase the capacity of the railway in moving phosphates from El Hasa mines to Aqaba Port from an expected 1.2 million tons in 1976 to 4.0 million tons in 1980. (ii) Expanding the capacity of the road network with a view to supplement the railway in carrying the phosphates to the port and to the new fertilizer factory, as well as to meet the heavy demand on road transport to handle the growing internal and transit traffic (the expected transit traffic to Iraq alone, passing through Jordan's port and road system, being 600,000 tons by 1978 under an agreement between the two Governments). (iii) Expanding port facilities by adding a new berth, new storage silos and new mechanized loading plants for handling phosphate exports; and building four general cargo berths and other an- cillary facilities to augment the port's general cargo facil- ities. (iv) The completion/expansion of the Aqaba and Amman airports and the construction of a large new international airport at Amman. 6. The projects are generally well-conceived, and generally adequate to meet the transport demand during the Five-Year Plan. It is, however, necessary to recommend a review and modification of some of the projects. It is recommended that three of the road projects (Zarka - Mafraq - Syrian border; Yutum - Wadi 2 road; and Azrak - Bayer - Jafer road) should be started only after their economic justification is established through studies; the first two are tied with pending decisions on railway traffic through the same areas. In the port projects, there will be no need to build a new bulk phos- phate berth at Aqaba as provided in the Five-Year Plan, in view of the scal- ing down of the phosphate export forecasts; but there is need to include some emergency additional general cargo facilities to meet the immediate conges- tion problem at the port. It is also considered advisable to change the de- sign of one the four new general cargo berths so as to handle the growing ANNEX D Page 3 roll-on roll-off type traffic. In view of the time-lags involved in port construction, a review of future port needs (including the need for a bulk berth) after 1980 should be made around 1978. In civil aviation, there is a strong case for re-examining the priority assigned to the JD 25 million in- ternational airport project. 7. Most of the projects are in an advanced state of preparation, and can start according to schedule. Subject to financing arrangements being completed, the railway and port projects for the phosphate traffic are ready to start. The general cargo berths are under design, and work can start in 1976. In civil aviation, all the three projects, have already been started. In roads, out of the JD 37 million projects, six projects totalling JD 12 million are in progress, and two projects for JD 7 million are about to be tendered; four projects for JD 8 million are under design. The other road projects are under various stages of study. 8. The projects would be mostly undertaken through contractors. How- ever, shortages of technical personnel in Government to supervise and coor- dinate the projects may prove a constraint during plan execution. It is important to emphasize that procurement of railway rolling stock, loading/ unloading equipment and storage facilities at the port according to a strict time schedule would be critical during the Plan Period and should be care- fully monitored. It is also essential that the training of operational staff on railways be attended to on a priority basis. 9. In the fields of transport pricing, tariff policies and institu- tions there is need for improvement in many areas. The Government is aware of these problems, and is moving to solve them. At any rate, none of the ex- isting deficiencies in the system is likely to pose major obstacles in at- taining the Five-Year Plan objectives in the transport sector. STATISTICAL APPENDIX Table No. 1. Area, Population and Employment 1.1 Area and Land Use, 1974 1.2 Estimated Population of Jordan (East Bank) by Governorate as of end 1974 and as on Census Day 11/18/61 1.3 Estimated Labor Force By Economic Sector in Jordan (East Bank), 1970 and 1975 1.4 Structure of Labor Force (12-65 years) in Jordan East Bank by Level of Education in 1973, 1974 and 1975 2. National Accounts 2.1 Summary of National Accounts (1971-75) at Current Prices 2.2 Summary of National Accounts (1971-75) at 1971-72 Constant Prices) 2.3 Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Product 1971-75 at Current Prices 2.4 Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Product 1971-75 at Constant 1971-72 Prices 3. Balance of Payments 3.1 Summary of Balance of Payments 1971-75 3.2 Composition of Merchandise Exports (f.o.b.) 1971-75 3.3 Domestic Exports by Commodity According to SITC 3.4 Quantity and Price Indices for Principal Exports 1971-1974 3.5 Composition of Merchandise Imports (c.i.f.) 1971-1975 3.6 Imports by Commodity According to E1 3.7 Quantity and Price Indices for Principal Imports 1971-1974 3.8 Terms of Trade 3.9 Balance of Payments, Invisibles 1971-1975 3.10 Geographical Distribution of Foreign Trade 1971-1975 3.11 International Reserves 4. External Debt 4.1 External Public Debt Outstanding as of December 31, 1975 4.2 Historical and Projected Service Payments on External Public Debt 5. Public Finance 5.1 Summary of Central Government Budget, 1970-76 5.2 Central Government Domestic Revenues 1970-1975 Actuals and 1976 Budget 5.3 Central Government External Receipts, 1970-75 Actuals and 1976 Budget 5.4 Revenues and Expenditures of Municipalities 5.5 Outstanding Debt of the Central Government 6. Money and Credit 6.1 Monetary Survey 6.2 Factors Affecting Changes in Money Supply 6.3 Assets and Liabilities of the Central Bank 6.4 Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks 6.5 Liquidity of Commercial Banks 6.6 Outstanding Commercial Bank Credit by Sector 1970-1975 6.7 Consolidated Balance Sheet of Specialized Credit Institutions December 31, 1970-75 6.8 Interest Rates on Deposits and Credit in the Banking Sector and for Treasury Bills and Government Bonds as of January , 1976 7. Agricultural Statistics 7.1 Agriculture Production 1970-75 7.2 Agricultural Income 1970-73 7.3 Jordan's Main Agricultural Exports and Imports, 1974. 7.4 Livestock, 1960 and 1967-1974 7.5 Number of Agricultural Cooperatives in the East Bank 7.6 Farmers, Farm Workers, and Rural Population 7.7 Number and Area of Holdings by Tenure and by Location of Holding 7.8 Number and Area of Holdings by Tenure and Size of Holding 8. Industrial Statistics 8.1 Industrial Production 1970-1975 8.2 Value Added in Mining and Manufacturing 1967-1975 8.3 Distribution of Establishments in the Industrial Sector by Principal Cities (1974) 8.4 Distribution of Establishments in the Industrial Sector by Size of Employment, 1974 8.5 Employment in Industrial Enterprises Engaging 5 Workers or More, 1975 8.6 Fixed Assets and Gross Output of Single Establishment Industries 1974 8.7 Capacity Utilization in Manufacturing 1970-1975 8.8 Production and Export of Phosphates 8.9 Construction Permits Issued. 197^-'r. 8.10 Electric Energy Generated and Consumed by Manufacturing Industries, Electricity Companies and Municipalities During 1968-1974 8.11 Aqaba Port - Traffic 1970-75 8.12 Hedjaz - Jordan Railway Traffic Data 9. Prices and Wages 9.1 The Amman Cost of Living Index, 1968-75 9.2 Basic Salary Scales in Government 9.3 Comparison of Wages in East Bank Establishments by Occupation, 1970 and 1975. 10. Five-Year Plan 1976-80 and Three-Year Plan 1973-75 10.1 Economic and Social Plan, 1976-80 10.2 Sectoral Distribution of Investment Allocation Under the Five-Year Plan 1976-80 10.3 Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Product at 1975 Prices 10.4 Expenditures on Gross National Product at 1975 Prices 10.5 International Transactions 10.6 Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services 10.7 Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services 10.8 Government Revenues and Grants 10.9 Government Current Expenditures 10.10 Gross Capital Formation of Central Government and Municipalities 10.11 Sectoral Distribution of Investment Allocations Under the Three-Year Development Plan, 1973-75, 10.12 Investment and Financing Under the Three-Year Development Plan, 1973-75 Table 1.1: Area and Land Uses (km)2 1974 East Bank 91,000 Cultivable Land 5,000 Cultivated (4,000) (Currently irrigated) (300) (Total irrigable) (660) Range and Desert 86,000 West Bank 6,000 TOTAL AREA 97,000 Source: Department of Statistics. Agricultural Statistical Yearbook , 1974 UNDP/FAO, Development and Use of Groundwater Resources of East Jordan, 1974, and Jordan Valley Development Plan, 1975. Table 1.2: ESTIMATED POPULATION OF JORDAN (EAST BANK) BY GOVERNORATE AS OF THE END OF 1974 AND AS ON CENSUS DAY 11/ 161 (In 000's) Governorate _ _ 1961 1974 Male Female Total Male Female Total Amman 231 203 434 543 522 1,065 Balga 40 39 79 62 60 122 Irbid 137 136 273 273 265 538 Karak 35 32 67 50 48 98 Ma'an 26 21 47 34 33 67 TOTAL 469 431 900 962 928 1,890 Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1974 Table 1.3. Estimated Labor Fore By Economic Sector in Jordan (East Bank), 1970 and 1975 1970 1975 SECTOR/CATEGORY _ No Jqq0 s00 No (000's) Employment by Sector 1. Agriculture 115.0 32.9 73.0 zi 2. Mining and Quarrying 30 0.9 3.4 3. Manufacturing 21.0 6.0 24.0 4. Electricity, Gas and Water 10 0.3 2.1 5. Construction 7.0 2.0 40.0 2/ 6. Wholesale and Retail Trade Restaurants and Hotels 23.0 6.6 25.2 7. Transport, Storage and Communication 11.0 3.1 19.0 8. Finance, Insurance and Real Estate and Business Services 40 1.1 3.3 9. Cqfmmunity, Social and Personal Services 340 9.7 57.0 10. Not identifiable, including army 82.0 23.4 127.E TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 301.0 86.4 374.8 SEEKING WORK 49.0 14.0 8.0 TOTAL LABOUR FORCE 350.0 100.0 382.8 TOTAL POPULATION 1668.0 1,951.0 LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE 21.0 1/ The reliability of these estimates are affected by the political events of the last quarter of 1970. 2/ Permanent employment in agriculture is estimated at 73,000 persons. uowever, an additional 40,^") persons are tl7ought to find transitory employment in agriculture; of which, some 30,000 are from construction, and perhaps 5,000 each are from the Transport (category 7) and unidentifable (category 10) sectors. Source: 1970 estimates reproduced from IBRD Sector Report on Manpower Situation and Prospects in Jordan, October 1972; 1975 estimates are based on the adjusted 1975 field survey and household survey results, supplied by the Department of Statistics Table 1.4. Structure of Labour Force (12-65 years) in Jordan East Bank by level of Education in 1973, 1974 and 1975 (Percentages) Educational Level 1973 1974 1975 Less than Elementary 38.1 42.0 39.0 Less than Preparatory 30.8 29.0 30.5 Less than Secondary 7.1 7.2 7.2 With Secondary Completion 15.0 13.2 13.8 Post Secondary Diploma 2.3 2.7 3.4 B.A., B. Sc. or License 6.0 5.3 5.4 M.A., Msc. or M.B.A. 0.3 0.4 0.4 Ph. d. and others 0.2 0.1 0.1 Diploma after M.A. 0.2 0.1 0.2 ALL LEVELS: 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Department of Statistics, Household Survey3 April 1972, 1973 and 1975. Table 2.1: Summary of National Accounts (1971-75) 1/ (In Millions of Current Dinars) 1971 1972 1973 1974 2/ 1975 2/ Gross National Product (m.p.) 196.7 213.8 237.8 316.8 392.3 Gross Domestic Product (m.p.) 187.0 203.0 218.0 286.0 330.0 Gross Domestic Product (f.c.) 167.0 179.0 189.0 252.0 290.0 Agriculture 24.0 22.0 18.0 38.0 30.0 Industry 3/ 25.0 29.0 38.0 61.0 67.0 Trade 31.0 34.0 36.0 41.0 55.0 Government 39.0 41.0 41.0 45.0 55.0 Services 48.0 53.0 56.0 67.0 83.0 Indirect Taxes 20.0 24.0 29.0 34.0 40.0 Domestic Consumption 210.6 234.7 243.6 320.6 419.1 Government 60.0 70.0 77.0 119.0 125.0 7/ Private 150.6 164.7 166.6 201.6 294.1 7/ Domestic Investment 44.0 46.0 55.0 80.0 94.0 Government 17.4 24.0 46.0 53.0 Private 4/ 28.6 31.0 34.0 41.0 Resource Gap 5/ 67.6 77.7 80.6 114.6 183.1 Imports (G & NFS) 97.3 117.9 136.4 196.1 304.4 Less: Exports (G & NFS) 29.7 40.1 55.8 81.4 121.3 Domestic Savings -23.6 -31.7 -25.6 -34.6 -89.1 National Savings 22.7 47.4 58.8 83.0 113.0 Government 10.7 11.8 13.7 3.6 51.2 7/ Private 12.0 35.5 45.1 79.4 61.8 7/ Less: Net Transfers from Abroad 36.6 68.3 64.6 86.8 139.8 Government 31.9 59.1 54.5 75.6 1?8.5 Private 4.7 9.2 10.1 11.2 11.3 Less: Net Factor Income from 9.7 10.8 19.8 30.8 62.3 Abroad 1/ Pertaining to East Bank only. 2/ Preliminary Estimates. 3/ Mining, Manufacturing and Construction. 4/ Includes changes in stocks. 5/ Some minor revisions have been made in these figures based on the balance of payments data provided by the Central Bank, and hence they differ from those supplied by the NPC. 6/ Unlike the balance of payments elassifications (Table 3.9), "UNRWA and Other UN- trans- fers are classified as "Private" in this table. Government Transfer Payments in in the budget (Tables 5.1 and 5.3) are different from those in the national accounts and the balance of payments, due to differences in statistical coverage. 7/ Public consumption (and saving) are estimated from budgetary statistics. Consequently, for reasons outlined in footnote 6 above, the decomposition of total consumption andC saving into public and rivate, maV understate public consumption and private saving, perhaps by as much as JD 60 million. Source: National Planning Council Tnble 2.2: Suimmiary of National Accounts (1971-75) 1/ at 1971-72 Constant Prices (Millions of Dinars) 1971-72 1973 1974 1975 Gross National Product (m.p.) 205.3 223.0 248.4 271.f Gross Domestic Product (m.p.) 195.0 205.2 22.8 230.0 Gross Domestic Product (f.c.) 173.0 177.2 199.0 202.0 Agriculture 23.0 17.9 27.1 20.9 Industry 27.0 33.4 36.2 36.6 Trade 32.5 33.8 36.1 38.0 Government 40.0 40.8 42.0 44.0 Services 50.5 52.0 57.6 62.5 Indirect Taxes 22.0 27.3 26.9 28.0 Domestic Consumption 2/ 222.7 234.1 264.3 301L2 Government 65.0 74.0 98.1 83.8 Private 157.7 160.1 166.2 217.4- Domestic Investment 45.0 42.0 49.2 S.S Government 18.3 28.3 28.6 Private 23.7 20.9 22.2 Resource Gap 3/ 4/ 72.7 70.9 87.7 122.0 Imports (G & NFS) 107.6 122.6 144.1 202.9 Less: Exports (G & NFS) 34.9 51.7 56.4 80.9 Domestic Savings -27.7 -28.9 -38.5 -50.9 National Savings 35.0 46.9 47.9 83.8_.1// Government 11.3 10.9 2.1 38.05/ Private 23.7 36.0 45.8 45.837 Less: Net Trensfers from Abroad 52.5 58.2 63.8 93.26/ Government 45.5 49.1 55.6 85.7E/ Private 7.0 9.1 8.2 7.5_/ Less: Net Factor Income from Abroad 10.3 17.8 22.6 41.5 1/ Pertaining to East Bank only. Preliminary estimates 2/ private consumption is estimated as a residual. 3/ Minor revisions have been made to the estimates provided by NPC (See note (5) to Table 2.1). 4/ Deflators for exports and imports are different from export and import price indices (Tables 3.4, 3.7) due to the difference in coverage. 5/ See footnote 7 to Table 2. 1 6/ See footnote 6 to Table 2.1. Source: IBRD Estimates. and National Plpnninp Council Table 2. 3: Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Products 1971-75 at Current Prices 1/ (Million of Dinars) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Agriculture 24.0 22.0 18.0 38.0 30.0 Mining & Manufacturing 2/ 18.0 20.0 23.0 44.0 45.0 Construction 7.0 9.0 15.0 17.0 22.0 Electricity & Water 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 Transportation & Communications 15.0 17.0 18.0 21.0 26.0 Trade 31.0 34.0 36.0 41.0 55.0 Banking & Finance 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 Ownership of Dwellings 11.0 12.0 12.0 14.0 17.0 Public Administration & Defense 39.0 41.0 41.0 45.0 55.0 Other Services 17.0 18.0 20.0 24.0 30.0 GDP (f.c.) 167.0 179.0 189.0 252.0 290.0 Indirect Taxes 20.0 24.0 29.0 34.0 40.0 GDP (m.p.) 187.0 203.0 218.0 286.0 330.0 1/ Preliminary estimates. 2/ For 1973-1975, separate estimates for the mining and the manufacturing sectors are as follows: Mining: 4.2, 11.2, 14.5; Manufacturing: 18.8, 32.8, 30.5. Combined estimates may properly reflect the actual trend of the mining and manufacturing sector. But separate estimates do not seem right. In particular, current price value added of the manufacturing sector. declines in 1975 while constant price valued added increases. Source: National Planning Council Table 2.4: Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Product 1971-75 at Constant 1971-72 Prices 1/ (Million of Dinars) 1971-72 1973 1974 1975 Agriculture 23.0 17.9 27.1 20.9 Mining & Manufacturing 2/ 19.0 23.4 27.2 26.6 Construction 8.0 10.0 9.0 10.0 Electricity & Water 2.5 3.0 3.3 4.3 Transportation & Communication 16.0 16.8 17.9 18.4 Trade 32.5 33.8 36.1 38.0 Banking & Finance 3.0 3.0 3.8 5.0 Ownership of Dwelling 11.5 11.5 12.5 13.3 Public Administration & Defense 40.0 40.8 42.0 44.0 Other Services 17.5 17.7 20.1 21.5 GDP (f.c.) 173.0 177.9 199.0 202.0 Indirect Taxes 22.0 27.3 26.9 27.9 GDP (m.p.) 195.0 205.2 225.9 228.9 1/ Preliminary estimates 2/ For 1973-75, separate estimates for the mining and the manufacturing sectors are as follows: Mining: 4.8, 7.4, 5.5; Manufacturing 18.6, 19.8, 21.1. See note (1) to Table 2.3. Source: National Planning Council Table 3.1: Summary of Balance of Payments 1971-75 (Millions of Current Dinars) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1/ Exports 29.70 40.14 55.78 81.42 121.26 Merchandise (f.o.b.) (11.44) (17.01) (24.15) (49.75) (48.88) Non-Factor Services 2/ (18.26) (23.13) (31.63) (31.67) (72.38) Imports 97.32 117.87 136.36 196.05 304.37 Merchandise (c.i.f.) (76.19) (94.88) (107.80) (155.68) (232.94) Non-Factor Services (21.13) (22.99) (28.56) (40.37) (71.43) Resource Balance -67.62 -77.73 -80.58 -114.63 -183.11 Net Factor Income 9.74 10.75 19.78 30.83 62.34 Interest & Dividends (Net) (4.77) (3.34) (5.08) (6.70) ( 9.09) Workers' Remittances (4.97) (7.41) (14.70) (24.13) (53.25) Unrequited Transfers 36.61 68.29 64.60 86.74 139.77 Private (1.12) (2.33) (3.51) (2.31) (1.32) Official (35.49) (65.96) (61.09) (84.43) (138.45) Balance on Current Account -21.27 1.31 3.80 2.94 19.00 Private Capital (Net) -1.28 -0.38 -1.14 1.06 3.50 Long-Term (-0.17) (-0.12) (-0.24) (0.66) (3.96) Short-Term (-1.11) (-0.26) (-0.90) (0.40) (-0.46) Medium and Long-Term Government Loans 7.67 6.58 7.54 9.26 19.34 Disbursements (9.41) (10.76) (12.74) (14.45) (27.03) Less Amortization (1.74) (4.18) (5.20) (5.19) (7.69) Other Public Capital 0.35 0.11 0.05 0.56 -0.35 S.D.R. Allocations 0.88 0.88 - - - Net Errors and Omissions 1.83 -1.79 2.23 -7.08 9.25 Changes in Reserves (-Increase) 11.82 -6.71 -12.48 -6.74 -50.74 1/ Preliminary Estimates 2/ Includes Oil Transit Dues Source: Central Bank of Jordan Table 3.2: Composition of Merchandise Exports (f.o.b.) 1971-1975 (In JD 000's) .- Jan-Uct 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1975 Food & Live Animals 3,683 4,773 4,650 9,565 10,203 8,808 Fruits & Nuts 1,005 1,578 1,716 4,274 6,377 5,529 Citrus Fruits 743 1,203 1,411 3,732 5,645 4,902 Bananas 78 106 36 47 68 66 Watermelons 55 76 65 237 76 76 Vegetables 2,056 2,500 2,371 4,886 3,236 2,852 Tomatoes & Tomato Juice 1,183 724 916 1,836 1,276 1,161 Eggplants 240 291 400 512 482 377 Beverages & Tobacco 411 452 862 869 1,006 690 Cigarettes 368 398 546 711 751 555 Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuel 2,347 3,716 _,558 20,033 20,107 15,545 Phosphates 2,238 3,497 4,020 19,531 19,585 15,048 Mineral Fuels, Lubricants & Related Minerals 31 - 170 129 246 75 Animal & Vegetable Oils & Fats 320 297 124 474 409 269 Olive Oil 275 277 82 464 365 245 Chemicals 382 311 644 1,244 1,946 1,526 Manuf. Goods Classified by Mat. 1,077 2,426 2,213 5,860 4,085 3,588 Cement 471 1,922 1,296 4,078 1,656 1,650 Machinery & Transport Equipment 335 451 453 586 470 383 Batteries & Accumulaters 333 433 409 495 87 87 Misc. Manufactured Articles 194 179 295 671 1,598 1,309 Commodities & Transactions, n.e.s. 37 1 41 7 5 3 Total Domestic Exports 8,817 12,606 14,010 39,437 40,075 32,198 Re-Exports 2,817 4,398 10,141-1/ 10 315 8,749 4,784 Total Exports 11,440 17,004 24,151 49,752 48,874 36,982 1/ Including JD (5.2) million "non-monetary gold" Source: Department of Statistics & Central Bank of Jordan Table 3.3: Domestic Exports by Commodity According to SITC (In Tons) Jan. - Oct. 1973 1974 1975 Food & Live Animals Fruits & Nuts 68,120.8 116,547.7 124,397.8 Citrus Fruits 57,910.5 95,932.2 104,023.6 Bananas 999.2 1,403.0 2,314.6 Watermelons 2,646.7 11,132.6 3,878.0 Vegetables 88,770.4 147,699.9 100,199.2 Tomatoes & Tomato Juice 38,186.9 82,603.6 49,475.1 Eggplants 17,987.4 22,959.2 17,421.8 Beverages & Tobacco Cigarettes 333.7 403.3 294.5 Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuels Phosphates 1,088,575.0 1,468,958.0 841,531.0 Mineral Fuels, Lubricants & Related Minerals 24,356.5 7,530.3 2,420.0 Animal & Vegetable Oils Olive Oil 253.6 1,133.9 570.7 Chemicals 741.8 1.650.4 2.214.4 Manufactured Goods Classified By Material Cement 196,304.7 209,181.0 73,108.0 Machinery & Transport Equipment Batteries & Accumulators 2,026.5 1,952.0 241.2 Misc. Manufactured Articles 840.5 792.5 1,906.5 Source: Department of Statistics Table 3.4: Quantity and Price Indices for Principal Exports 1971-1974 (1962 = 100.0) 1971 1972 1973 1974 Quantities All Products 168 237 269 361 Grain and Grain Products 20 46 3 1 Vegetables and Legumes 145 111 103 223 Fruits 85 119 141 68 Raw Material 181 266 304 410 Electric Appliances 1,028 1,204 998 961 Manufactured Material 638 688 925 1,138 Prices All Products 101 113 113 243 Grain and Grain Products 131 135 130 242 Vegetables and Legumes 104 120 145 183 Fruits 131 149 151 158 Raw Material 85 93 75 325 Electric Appliances 72 80 91 114 Manufactured Material 94 106 98 120 Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1974. Table 3.5a Composition of Merchandise Imports (c.i.f.) 1971-1975 (In JD 000's) Jan.-Oct. 1971 1972 1973 1974 1979 1975 Food & Live Animals 20,125 27,296 30,813 42,7.0 49,420 33,866 Live Animals 778 1,182 2,955 2,373 3.185 2,520 Dairy Products & Eggs 2,451 3,235 3,311 3,880 4,822 3,872 Wheat & Flour of Wheat 3,843 6,099 7,037 7,137 6,824 6,249 Rice 1,306 1,289 1,396 4,276 1,867 854 Sugar 2,186 5,186 1,779 6,758 11,534 2,383 Fruits, Vegetables & Nuts 3,961 3,887 6,439 8,669 9,570 8,234 Coffee, Tea, Cocoa & Spices 2,084 1,958 2,523 2,347 2,923 2,491 Beverages & Tobacco 1,161 1,187 1,081 940 1,265 1,086 Crude Tobacco 956 935 809 601 673 593 Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuels 2,326 2,819 3,166 4,384 5,865 4,654 Wood, Lumber & Cork 486 841 1,175 986 2,746 2,094 Textile Fibers & Their Waste 546 761 490 970 1,092 899 Oil Seeds, Oil Nuts & Oil Kernels 812 429 629 803 539 398 Mineral Fuels, Lubricants & Related Minerals 4,844 4,566 4,160 5,214 24,89 4,972 Crude Oil 4,137 3,312 3,335 3,590 22,794 3,252 Animal & Vegetable Oils & Fats 795 1,096 1,514 1,153 1,255 967 Chemicals 3,216 5,362 5,718 8,058 12,204 10,364 Medical & Pharmac. Products 1,257 2,172 2,258 2,843 3,919 3,179 Essential Oil & Perfume Mat. Polishing & Cleansing Preps 396 723 827 1,386 1,811 1,648 Manufactured Coods by Material 11,916 19,026 23,187 33,892 44,838 36,611 Rubber Manufactures 657 1,091 1,198 2,198 3,086 2,501 Paper & Paper Board 1,009 1,846 1,919 4,243 3,712 3,074 Textile Yarn, Fabrics Made-Up Articles & Related Prod. 5,625 7,204 7,646 8,921 12,<87 9,986 Machinery & Transport Equipment 16,193 15,589 17,193 35,339 74,038 51,575 Elect. & Non-Elect. Mach. 5,038 9,864 10,927 17,733 3/,486 30,089 Transport Equip. & Parts 11,155 5,725 6,266 17,606 36,251 20,885 Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 4,175 6,757 6,185 8,742 16,789 14,572 Clothing & Footwear 1,583 2,246 2,280 2,627 7,965 8,212 Scientific Inst. Photo Equip., etc. 927 2,289 1,252 1,742 3,116 2,597 Commodities & Transactions, n.e.s. 11,876 11,612 15,183 16,045 3,4-t- .92B Total Imports 76,627 95,310 108,200 156,507 2141 013 161,345 Source: Department of Statistics & Central Bank Table 3.6: Imports by Commodity According to SITC (In Tons) Jan.-Oct. 1973 1974 1975 Food & Live Animals Live Animals 377.0 238.4 487.5 Dairy Products & Eggs 84,790.2 87,954.3 81,424.8 Wheat & Flour of Wheat 147,437.7 104,926.1 96,064.9 Rice 16,082.9 23,332.8 5,323.2 Sugar 19,298.0 48,304.2 10,658.1 Fruits, Vegetables & Nuts 122,043.4 143,852.8 135,604.6 Coffee, Tea, Cocoa & Spices 6,141.5 5,496.9 4,808.6 Beverages & Tobacco Crude Tobacco 864.0 685.0 529.2 Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuels Wood, Lumber & Cork 42,149.3 22,753.2 39,363.8 Textile Fibers & Their Waste 2,919.1 4,357.0 3,402.5 Oil Seeds, Oil Nuts & Oil Kernels 5,340.5 5,026.4 2,023.0 Mineral Fuels, Lubricants & Related Materials Crude Oil 706,145.0 773,263.0 698,140.0 Animal & Vegetable Oil & Fats 8,444.9 5,617.9 4,070.8 Chemicals Medical & Pharmac. Products 1,118.5 1,068.2 1,233.3 Essential Oils & Perfume Material Polishing & Cleansing Preps. 2,792.5 5,005.6 5,387.9 Manufactured Goods by Material Rubber Manufactures 3,801.8 4,812.3 3,655.3 Paper & Board 13,222.7 17,304.6 11,535.3 Textile Yarn, Fabrics, Made-Up Articles & Related Products 12,531.7 11,140.6 10,763.5 Machinery & Transport Equipment Electrical & Non-Electrical Machinery 9,095.9 12,771.9 20,077.1 Transport Equipment & Parts 2,000.8 3,232.1 5,681.0 Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles Clothing & Footwear 1,464.7 1,446.9 1,925.3 Scientific Instruments, Photographic Equipment, etc. 443.1 571.3 1,430.0 Source: Department of Statistics Table 3.7: Quantity and Price Indices for Principal Imports 1971-1974 (1962 = 100.0) 1971 1972 1973 1974 Quantities All Products 165 176 203 190 Grain and Grain Products 121 180 206 61 Vegetables and Legumes 122 86 175 152 Fruits 86 80 108 102 Textiles 44 54 59 52 Electric Appliances 51 48 112 64 Transport Equipment 113 84 131 189 Prices All Products 130 130 144 177 Grain and Grain Products 132 133 153 209 Vegetables and Legumes 112 118 154 179 Fruits 98 99 107 118 Textiles 108 113 115 141 Electric Appliances 168 156 130 157 Transport Equipment 138 145 181 299 Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book 1974. Table 3.8: Terms of Trade, 1971-74 (1969 = 1OC.0) 1971 1972 1973 1974 Gross Barter 95.08 97.40 87.94 68.97 Net Barter (Commodity) 61.95 68.47 65.94 105.54 Food & Live Animals 56.33 59.86 47.50 46.13 Beverages & Tobacco 89.90 93.26 95.35 108.13 Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuels 74.37 56.43 93.87 195.38 Mineral Fuels, Lubricants, Etc. . . Animal and Veg. Oils & Fats 127.63 107.66 92.54 60.88 Chemicals 81.64 88.49 100.42 92.18 Manufactured Goods 89.03 109.46 97.14 154.76 Machinery & Transport Equipment 54.37 57.53 57.54 69.85 Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 75.10 65.12 90.17 129.17 Income (Capacity to Import) 56.49 77.67 81.22 184.43 Memorandum Item: %Change Over last year Gross Barter TOT 5.2 2.4 - 9.7 -21.6 Commodity TOT -20.2 10.5 - 3.7 60.1 Income TOT -27.2 37.5 4.6 127.1 Source: Central Bank Table 3.9: Balance of Payments, Invisibles 1971-1975 (In JD 000's) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1/ Commodity Balance -64.75 -77.87 -83.67 -105.93 -184.06 Non-Factor Services Receipts 18.26 23.33 31.63 31.67 72.38 Travel 6.35 8.30 10.71 17.29 35.72 Oil Transit Dues 3.43 3.07 3.39 1.16 2.40 Other Services 8.48 11.76 17.53 3.22 34.26 Non-Factor Services Payments 21.13 22.99 28.56 40.37 71.43 Travel 9.69 11.27 11.28 17.43 33.76 Other Services 11.44 11.72 17.28 22.94 37.67 Resources Balance -67.62 -77.73 -80.58 -114.63 -183.67 Factor Income From Abroad (Net) 9.74 10.75 19.78 30.83 62.34 Workers' Remittances 4.97 7.41 14.70 24.13 53.25 Interest & Dividends Receipts 5.75 4.39 6.34 8.81 11.33 (Less) Interests & Dividends Payments 0.98 1.05 1.26 2.11 2.24 Unrequitted Transfers Received 36.61 68.29 64.60 86.74 140.33 Private 1.12 2.33 3.51 2.42 1.88 Official 35.49 65.96 61.09 84.43 138.45 Arab Government (19.11) (23.19) (23.66) (46.60) (106.21) U.S.A. (12.82) (35.95) (30.83) (25.31) (22.32) UNRWA & Other UN ( 3.56) ( 6.82) ( 6.60) ( 8.86) (4.42) Other ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( 3.66) Unrequitted Transfer Payments - - - 0.11 - 3,3 Current Account Balance -21.27 1.31 3.80 2.94 19-M 1/ Preliminary estimates Source: Central Bank of Jordan Table 3.10 Geographical Distribution of Foreign Trade 1971-1975 (In JD 000's) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Domestic Exports 8,817 12,606 14,010 39,437 40,075 Arab Common Market 1/ 4,092 5,356 5,998 8,708 9,424 Other Arab States 2/ 2,590 3,799 4,080 9,720 7,471 E.E.C. 4 51 20 63 1,978 Communist Bloc 626 412 348 2,039 6,391 India 956 1,405 1,191 6,576 1,973 Japan 173 625 704 3,790 1,909 Other Countries 376 958 1,669 8,541 10,929 Imports 76,627 95,310 108,200 156,507 234,013 Arab Common Market 1/ 7,055 7,897 11,883 14,409 14,115 Other Arab States 2/ 9,704 8,479 9,841 12,042 32,220 E.E.C. 18,980 26,991 30,525 45,629 76,970 Other European Countries 2,946 3,491 4,097 6,905 16,676 U.S.A. 18,133 16,887 11,263 17,583 24,176 Communist Bloc 5,177 8,236 7,730 14,296 18,745 India 1,071 1,397 1,415 2,968 4,339 Japan 4,191 4,598 5,349 7,379 17,106 Other Countries 9,370 17,334 26,097 35,296 29,666 1/ Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Kuwait 2/ Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar Source: Department of Statistics Table 3.11: International Reserves (In JD 000's) March End of period: 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Foreign Assets 92,885 100,692 10.372 118,390 174903 212,034 Central Bank 89,237 96,857 100,427 110,250 162,273 192 8 Gold 8,957 10,810 10,810 10,810 10,810 26,207 IMF Gold Tranche Position 2,057 2,236 2,236 2,236 2,236 2.21A SDR's 1,831 2,932 2,920 2,868 2,864 2,864 Foreign exchAnge 75,392 80,879 q4,461 94.336 146,363 161,261 Commercial Banks 3,072 3865t 12,451 19,315 Government 576 446 390 179 179 151 Foreign Liabilities 4.396 4,340 3,606 4,963 l0,_8 Central Bank!/ 1,900 1,900 1,000 700 600 Commercial Banks 2,496 2,440 2,606 4,263 10,348 15,392 Net International Reserves 88,489 96,352 103,766 113,427 163,955 .. 1/ From Table 6.3. Note: There is a slight discrepancy between the figures in the table and those in IMF, International Financial Statistics, due to the currency evaluation. Source: Central Bank of Jordan. Table 4.1: External Public Debt Outstanding Including &s Of December 31, 1975 (In Thousands of U.S. Dollars) Type of Creditor Debt Outstanding Creditor Country Disbursed Undisbursed Total Suppliers, Credits Belgium 3,351 - 3,351 France 1,589 - 1,589 Japan 921 - 921 Spain 1,564 - 1,564 United Kingdom 2,900 - 2,900 USA 3,264 - 3,264 Total Suppliers, Credits 13,589 - 13,589 Private Bank Credits USA 6,831 - 6,831 Multiple Lenders 1,746 - 1,746 Total Private Bank Credits 8,577 - 8,577 Loans from International Org. - Arab Func Ec. Soc. Dev. - 16,916 16,916 IDA 32,692 29,259 61,951 Total Loans from International Org. 32,692 46,175 78,867 Loans from Governments Abu Dhabi 1,981 12,714 14,695 China, Republic of 1,840 6,160 8,000 Denmark 7,063 2,256 9,319 Germany (Fed. Rep.of) 73,380 52,127 125,507 Iran 10,317 18,585 28,902 Japan - 9,912 9,912 Kuwait 47,245 29,220 76,465 Qatar 3,000 - 3,000 Saudi Arabia 13,500 - 13,500 United Kingdom 63,039 36,290 99,329 USA 55,524 18,330 73,854 Total Loans from Governments 276,889 185,594 462,483 Total External Public Debt 331,747 231,769 563,516 NOTE: 1. Only debts with an original or extended maturity of over one year are included in this table. 2. Debt outstanding includes principal in arrears but excludes interest in arrears. Source: External Debt Division, IBRD. Table 4.2. Historical and Projected Service Payments on External Public Debt (In Thousands of US$) Debt Outstanding At Beginning of Period Transactions During Period Disbursed Including Service Payments Year Only Undisbursed Principal Interest Total 1968 79,393 114,153 956 949 1,905 1969 97,504 145,124 2,840 1,600 4,440 1970 106,623 151,265 2,699 1,755 4,454 1971 119,602 173,227 4,876 2,679 7,555 1972 146,764 191,966 6,857 2,804 9,661 1973 167,422 260,588 10,247 3,489 13,736 1974 218,228 441,811 10,843 5,233 16,076 1975 286,406 545,962 12,945 5,980 18,925 1976 331,747 563,521 1/ * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * 1976 331,747 563,521 20,284 7,817 28,101 1977 413,036 531,738 23,217 9,455 32,672 1978 459,990 508,521 24,990 10,008 34,998 1979 457,989 483,536 22,532 9,588 32,120 1980 445,373 461,001 20,871 9,260 30,131 1981 433,006 440,130 24,914 9,003 33,917 1982 412,509 415,219 24,955 8,563 33,518 1983 388,931 390,261 24,005 8,034 32,039 1984 365,721 366,259 23,453 7,385 30,838 1985 342,793 342,815 24,622 6,834 31,456 1986 318,190 318,190 24,022 6,316 30,338 1987 294,171 294,171 23,178 5,742 28,920 1988 270,992 270,992 23,130 5,200 28,330 1989 247,867 247,867 22,883 4,661 27,544 1990 224,983 224,983 22,816 4,129 26,945 1991 202,171 202,171 22,019 3,612 25,631 1992 180,153 180,153 22,053 3,140 25,193 1993 158,102 158,102 20,286 2,670 22,956 1994 137,816 137,816 16,596 2,252 18,848 1995 121,224 121,224 16,411 1,911 18,322 1996 104,813 104,813 14,081 1,581 15,662 1997 90,736 90,736 11,436 1,313 12,749 1998 79,305 79,305 7,955 1,144 9,099 1999 71,350 71,350 6,213 1,014 7,227 2000 65,136 65,136 5,659 887 6,546 1/ Projections are based on debt outstanding (including undisbursed) as of December 11, 1975. Source: External Debt Division, IBRD. Table 5.1: Summary of Central Government Budget, 1970-76 (In millions of current Dinars) Prelim. Prelim. Actual Actual Actual Budget Budget 1970 1971 1972 1973 /47Z 1975 1975 1976 I. Revenues and Grants 65.7 71.1 82.0 91.0 126.3 161.0 159.7 182.5 1. Domestic Revenues 30.3 35.7 37.6 46.0 66.2 84.0 95.8 107.0 2. External Grants 35.4 35.4 44.4 45.0 -60.1 77.0 63.9 75.5 a. Budget Support (33.1) (34.9) (44.0) (44.7) (5f.4) (73.5) (60.4) (72.0) b. Economic and Technical Assis- tance (2.3) (0.5) (0.4) (0.3) (3.7) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5) II. Expenditures 80.7 83.1 98.8 123.7 148.8 202.2 218.2 263.0 1. Current 59.0 60.7 76.6 82.5 106.4 125.0 118.9 135.2 (of which Defense & Public Security) (38.1) (38.7) (44.8) (46.8) (51.3) (56.2) (55.1) (60.2) 2. Capital 1/ 21.7 22.4 22.2 41.2 42.4 77.2 99.3 127.8 III. Current Domestic Deficit (1.1 - 11.1) -28.7 -25.0 -39.0 -36.5 -40.2 -41.0 -23.1 -28.2 IV. Overall Deficit (I-II) -15.0 -12.0 -16.8 -32.7 -22.5 -41.2 -58.5 -80.5 V. Financing 1. Domestic 2/ 6.0 18.2 13.1 15.3 5.3 13.7 11.9 12.0 Central Bank Advances (1.4) (5.0) (5.1) (8.1) (-6.0) (5.4) Other Advances (0.4) (1.8) (3.1) (0.4) (1.3) (-1.7) Treasury Bills (net) (4.2) (8.4) - (2.8) (5.0) (1.0) (3.0) Bonds - (3.0) (5.0) (4.0) (5.0) (9.0) (9.0) 2. Foreign Loans (gross) 2.1 3.6 10.2 11.2 17.2 26.5 46.6 68.5 3. Other 3/ 6.9 -9.8 -6.5 3.2 - 1.0 - - Note: Budgetary data on borrowings from domestic banking system differ from monetary data (Tables 6.1-6.4) due to differences in coverage and timing. External grants in the budgetary data are different from those in the national accounts and the balance of payments due to differences in stat stical coverage. The discrepancies between the budgetary and balance of payments data aru particularly large: JD 21.6 million, JD 16.1 million, JD 24.3 million and TD 61.5 million in 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975, respectively (see Table 3.1). 1/ Includes domestic and foreign loan repayments (JD 3.3 million in 1972, JD 6.6 million in 1973, JD 4.5 million in 1974, and JD 8.9 million in 1975 and JD 6.3 million in 1976). 2/ Includes IMF drawings of about JD 1.0 million per year during 1970-72 as SDR's and JD 1.6 million in 1971 and JD 1.1 million in 1973 as compensatory financing. 3/ Residual item including changes in cash balances and limitations in data coverage. Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Jordan. Table 5.2: Central Government Domestic Revenues 1970-1975 Actuals and 1976 Budget (In millions of current? Dinars) Prelim. Prelim. Actual Actual Budget 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Domestic Revenues 30.3 35.8 37.8 46.0 66.2 84.0 107.0 Tax Revenues 21.5 23.3 28.1 34.0 43.1 55.1 61.1 Indirect Taxes 19.0 20.4 24.8 30.2 37.3 46.5 48.8 Customs./ (9.1) (7.7) (9.5) (12.5) (16.3) (19.8) (20.9) Excisel/ (5.1) (6.9) (7.7) (7.8) (9*0) (9.5) (10.6) Licenses (1.9) (2.1) (2.8) (3.6) (4*6) (5.2) (5.9) Fees (1.5) (2.2) (2.9) (4.0) (4.3) (5.6) (6.1) Additional Tax (1.4) (1.5) (1.9) (2.3) (3.1) (6.4) (5.3) Direct Taxes 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.8 5.8 8.6 12.3 Income Tax/ (2.47) (2.85) (3.20) (3.70) (5.70) (8.40) (12.04) Property TaxI/ (0.02) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.20) (0.25) Non-Tax Revenues 8.8 12.4 9.7 12.0 23.1 28.9. 45.9 Post, Telegraph & Telephone 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.2 Oil Transit Dues 1.0 3.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 - - Royalties from phosphate mining - - - - 4.1 11.0 27.0 Interest & Profits 4.8 5.1. 3.8 6.0 11.0 12.5 13.8 Miscellaneous 2.0 2.6 2.3 2.4 4.1 3.6 2.9 1/ Including fines and confiscations. 2/ Including the Social Service Surtax. 3/ Consisting of Buildings and Land Tax, Livestock Tax and Capital Gains Tax. Source: Ministry of Finance. Table 5.3: Central Government External Receipts, 1970-75 Actuals and 1976 Budget (In millions of current Dinars) Prelim. Prelim. Actual Actual Budget 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Foreign Receipts 37.496 42.373 55.844 57.346 77.300 103.500 144.000 Budget Supportl/ 33.070 34.928 44.001 44.692 56.400 73.500 72.000 U.S.A. - 16.976 21.090 20.900 14.200 20.500 18.000 Arab 33.070 17.952 22.911 23.792 42.200 53.000 54.000 Economic and Technical Assistance!' 3.354 0.459 0.454 0.352 3.750 3.500 3.500 Development Loans 2.072 3.556 10.206 11.197 17.150 26.500 68.500 U.K. 0.262 1.769 1.257 1.570 1.800 4.200 2.980 West Germany 0.133 0.554 5.215 2.379 5.275 2.850 11.155 Kuwait 0.277 0.262 0.654 1.045 4.090 3.465 3.113 I.D.A. 0.143 0.172 0.810 1.259 2.100 3.935 2.672 U.S.A.I.D. 0.757 0.442 2.270 4.944 2.180 4.190 8.742 Saudi Arabia 0.500 0.357 - - - - - Other - - - - 1.705 7.860 39.838 1/ External grants in the budgetary data are different from those in t[,e national accounts and the balance of payments due to differences In qtatistical coverage. The discrepancies between the budgetary and balance of payments data are particularly large: JD 21.6 million, JD 16.1 million, JD 24.3 and JD 61.5 millinn In 1972, 1973. 1974 and 1975. resDectively (see Table 3.1). Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Jordan Table 5.4: Revenues and Expenditures of Municipalities (In millions of current Dinars) Prelim. Actual 1973 1974 1975 Revenues 5.860 5.608 6.550 Tax Revenues 3.658 3.607 4.153 Non-tax Revenues 2.202 2.001 2.397 Current Expenditures 2.951 3.351 4.800 Surplus on Current Accounts 2.909 2.257 1.750 Capital Expenditures 4.695 6.517 10.226 Development Expenditures 3.017 3.788 8.579 Repayment of Loans (including interest) 1.678 2.729 1.647 Surplus (+) or Deficit (-) Financing -1.786 -4.260 -8.476 Domestic Borrowing 1.661 2.712 6.103 Foreign Borrowing and Assistance 0.125 1.548 2.273 Source: Ministry of Finance. Table 5.5: Outstanding Debt of the Central Government (In millicns of Dinars) End of period 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Domestic debt 14.3 31.4 40.6 53.3 58.9 65.4 Treasury bills l/ 12.6 21.0 20.2 23.0 28.0 29.0 Banking system (11.5) (19.9) (17.5) (21.2) (26.1) (27.4) Other holders (1.1) (1.1) (2.7) (1.8) (1.9) (1.6) Government bonds -- 3.0 8.0 12.0 20.0 23.0 2/ Banking system (--) (1.3) (4.8) (6.4) (8.2) (8.2) Other holders (--) (1.7) (3.2) (5.6) (11.8), (14.8) Loans and Advances 1.7 7.4 12.4 18.3 10.9 13.4 Central Bank 3/ (1.7) (6.7) (11.7) (18.0) (10.9) (13.4) Commercial banks (--) (0.7) (0.7) (0.3) (--) Foreign debt 4/ 41.8 49.6 61.2 68.3 79.7 109.5 Total debt 56.1 81.0 101.8 121.6 138.6 174.9 Source: cztral Bank of Jordan except for the 1975 foreign debt figure, provided by the Fxternal I)ebt Division, TBRD. 1/ Issues of Treasury bills commenced in 1969 and bonds in 1971 2/ The increase in bonds outstanding at the end of 1975 differs from the budgetary data which indicate net issues of JD 6 million during the year. The discrepancy may be due to differences in coverage and timing. 3/ Includes IMF drawings of about JD 1.0 million per year during 1970-72 as SDR's and JD 1.6 million in 1971 and JD 1.1 million in 1973 as compensatory financing. 4/ Includes government guaranteed debt. Foreign debt data differ from those in Table 4.2 for most years due to differences in coverage and timing. Table 6.1: Monetary Surveyl/ (In millions of Dinars) End of Period 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Foreign assets 97.4 93.5 100.3 107.0 118.2 174.7 Claims on Government2/ 13.2 27.9 34.1 45.7 45.3 51.7 Claims on public entities 2.8 3.2 4.4 5.8 9.0 11.5 Claims on private sector 43.6 44.9 47.9 59.3 80.3 115.6 Assets - Liabilities 157.0 169.5 186.7 217.8 252.8 353.5 Money 105.4 108.0 115.1 139.3 170.2 218.5 Currency (82.4) (83.0) (81.5) (97.5)(115.5)(139.0) Quasi-Money 23.7 27.1 31.4 36.8 46.5 59.3 Foreign liabilities3f 3.7 4.4 4.4 3.7 4.9 10.9 Government deposits 11.2 7.8 8.6 12.8 12.6 26.1 Capital accounts 13.7 13.1 14.0 14.0 15.5 18.2 SDR allocations 1.0 1.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 Other items (net) -1.5 7.2 10.3 8.3 0.2 17.6 Sources: Central Bank of Jordan and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 1/ Including assets and liabilities of commercial bank branches in the West Bank. 2/ Including SDR allocations of about JD 1.0 million per year during 1970-72; equivalent amounts were advanced to the Government, raising the Central Bank's claims on the Government. 3/ Including counterentry for compensatory purchases of JD 1.7 million in 1971, JD 1.1 million in January 1973, a repurchase of JD 2.2 million in October 1973, and JD 0.5 million in April 1974. Note: Due to rounding, components may not add up to exact totals. Table 6.2: Factors Affecting Changes in Money Supply (In millions of Dinars) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Changes in Money and quasi-money 10. 6.0 11.4 29.6 40.7 61.0 Money 9.2 2.5 7.0 24.2 31.0 48.3 Currency (11.1) (0.6) (-1.5) (16.0) (19.0) (23.5) Demand Deposits (-1.9) (1.9) (8.5) (8.2) (13.0) (24.8) Quasi-money 1.1 3.5 4.4 5.4 9.7 12.7 Foreign assets (net) -1.5 -11.82/ 6.8 12.53- 6.8 50.75/ Domestic assets (net) 11.8 17.8 4.6 17.1 33.9 10.3 Credit to private sector 0.1 1.3 3.T 11.4 21.0 35.3 Credit to public entities -0.1 0.4 1.2 1.4 3.2 2.5 Net credit to Government 12.2 18.1 5.4 7.4 -0.2 -7.1 Other items -0.4 -2.0 -5.0 -3.1 9.9 -20.4 Changes in per cent Currency 16 1 -2 20 18 20 Money 10 2 7 21 22 28 Money and quasi-money 9 5 8 20 23 28 Credit to private sector -- 3 7 24 35 44 Sources: Central Bank of Jordan and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 1/ Included is the liability to the Fund resulting from the compensatory purchases in 1971 and 1973. 2/ Excluding the effect of the currencies realignment in December 1971, which resulted in an upward valuation of net foreign assets of JD 7.2 million. 3/ Excluding a loss of JD 5.0 million from realignment of currencies in February 1973. 4/ Excluding a net revaluation profit of JD 3.2 million. 5/ Including a net revaluation loss of JD 0.2 million. Note: Because of the factors mentioned in footnotes 2,3,4 and 5, the data in this table differ from the changes that may be derived from the monetary survey table. Table 6.3: Assets and Liabilities of the Central Bank (In millions of Dinars) End of period 1970 1971 1972 1975 1974 1975 Foreign assets 1/ 91.5 90.4 96 9 100.4 110.5 162.3 Claims on Government 9.9 19.5 17.9W 28.7 30.4 27.2 Claims on public entities -- 0.2 0.8 2.2 4.0 4.3 Claims on banks 1.7 1.5 0.4 -- -- Unclassified assets 4.1 4.8 5.6 5.5 12.2 9.1 Assets = Liabilities 10 _0 116.0 121.6 136.6 156.9 202.9 Reserve money,5 of which: 97.3 99.5 100.7 117.2 140.5 173.6 Currency outside banks (82.4) (83.0) (81.5) (97.5) (115.5) (139.0) Currency in banks (2.0) (1.6) (1.9) (2.1) (2.5) (2.9) Bankers' deposits (12.8) (14.9) (17.2) (16.7) (21.7) (30.5) Quasi-money deposit 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 Foreign liabilitiest 0.2 1.9 1.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 Government deposits 2.5 1.7 2.4 6.7 4.2 14.1 Capital accounts 5.7 5.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 SDR allocations 1.0 1.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 Unclassified liabilities 0.2 5.4 7.5 2.6 2.1 5.5 Sources: Central Bank of Jordan and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 1j Including Treasury-IMF position. 2/ Including SDR allocations of about JD 1.0 million per year during 1970-72; equivalent amounts were advanced to the Government, raising the Central Bank's claims on the Government. / Includes JD 6.4 million revaluation profits transferred to the Government as an advance. 4/ Includes small amounts of claims on private sector. 5/ Includes small amounts of demand deposits held by public entities. Note: Due to rounding, components may not add up to exact totals. Table 6.4: Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banksl/ ( In millions of Dinars) End of period 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Reserves 14.8 16.5 19.2 18.8 24.5 35.8 Foreign assets 6.1 3.1 3.4 6.6 8.0 12.4 Claims on Government 3.3 8.6 16.2 17.0 14.9 24.5 Claims on public entities 2.8 3.0 3.6 3.7 5.0 7.2 Claims on private sector 43.6 44.8 47.9 59.3 80.3 115.6 Unclassified assets 5.7 6.3 5.3 6.2 10.5 17.7 Assets = Liabilities 76.4 82.2 95.5 111.6 143.2 213.2 Demand deposits 23.0 25.0 33.5 40.9 54.0 78.3 Public entities (2.2) (2.0) (2.5) (3.2) (3.4) (3.9) Private sector (20.3) (23.0) (31.0) (37.7) (50.6) (74.4) Time and savings deposits 23.4 26.5 31.1 36.6 46.0 59.1 Public entities (0.7) (0.6) (0.9) (1.0) (1.0) (0.6) Private sector (22.7) (25.9) (30.2) (35.6) (45.0) (58.5) Foreign liabilities 3.5 2.5 2.4 2.6 4.3 10.3 Government deposits 8.7 6.1 6.2 6.1 8.4 12.0 Credit from Central Bank 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.4 2.9 Capital accounts 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.5 12.2 Unclassified liabilities 9.5 13.4 13.9 17.2 20.6 38.4 Sources: Central Bank of Jordan and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 1/ Including commercial bank branches in the West Bank. Note: Due to rounding, components may not add up to exact totals. Table 6.5: Liquidity of Commercial Banksl/ (In millions of Dinars) End of period 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 A. Cash, balances with the Central Bank holdings of government bonds and bills and foreign exchange 24.25 28.07 38.74 42.32 47.30 72.73 Cash 1.98 1.59 1.91 2.07 2.49 2.89 Balances with the Central Bank 12.86 14.86 17.27 16.76 21.97 32.91 Holdings of government bonds and bills 3.34 8.55 16.17 16.94 14.88 24.48 Foreign Exchange 6.07 3.07 3.39 6.55 7.96 12.45 B. Total deposits2/ 57.67 59.65 72.89 85.75 111.98 158.04 Demand deposits 30.79 30.43 39.44 47.44 62.97 92.51 Time deposits 21.01 21.88 23.90 25.92 33.11 43.06 Savings deposits 5.87 7.34 9.55 12.39 15.89 22.47 (Government and semigovernment deposits) (8.74) (6.11) (6.21) (6.14) (8.40) (12.03) (In per cent) C. Liquidity ratios As per cent of demand deposits 78.8 92.1 98.2 89.2 75.1 78.6 As per cent of total deposits 42.0 47.1 53.1 59.4 42.2 46.0 Balances with the Central Bank as per cent of total deposits 22.3 24.9 23.7 19.5 19.6 20.8 Source: Central Bank of Jordan 1/ Including assets and liabilities of commercial bank branches in the West Bank. 2/ Including deposits by nonresidents. Table 6.6: Outstanding Commercial Bank Credit by Sector 1970-1975 (In millions of Dinars) End of Period 1970 1971 1972 1975 1974 1975 Municipalities&Public Corporations 2.829 2.039 3.602 3.678 5.046 7.180 Agriculture 0.583 0.799 0.804 2.061 3.745 3.608 Mining 0.729 0.672 0.291 0.386 0.371 0.283 Industry 4.029 3.916 4.354 5.873 10.087 14.831 General Commerce &Trade 16.890 18.964 21.45d 25.079 30.302 51.372 Construction, purchase of land & 11.288 10.506 10.671 14.442 18.839 26.280 buildings Transportation 2.426 2.616 2.421 2.192 5.293 3.691 Tourism, Hotels &Reservations 0.978 0.886 0.924 1.379 1.527 1.783 Financial Institutions 0.184 0.254 0.342 0.599 0.739 0.336 Professional &Private Individuals 4.142 3.278 3.894 4.455 5.470 7.402 Other 1.530 2.008 1.829 1.673 2.559 4.666 TOTAL 45.548 46.928 50.548 61.817 83.978 121.432 Source: Central Bank of Jordan Table 6.7: Consolidated Balance Sheet of Specialized Credit Institutions DECEMBER 31, 1970-1975 (InImillions of Dinars) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 19751 Liquid Assets 2_337 2.288 1.726 2.063 5.934 8.995 Cash - - 0.002 0.007 0.012 0.055 Balance with Banks 1.340 1.088 0.773 1.227 5.101 7.938 Balance with Central Bank 0.277 0.325 0.058 0.180 0.329 0.177 Government bonds Bills 0.618 0.768 0.590 0.225 0.245 0.084 Other 0.102 0.107 0.303 0.504 0.247 0.741 Negotiable Assets 0.985 1.65 1.971 2.542 1.531 2.170 Loans 14.072 14.867 16.237 17.517 22.487 28.529 Private Sector 9.736 10.093 11.166 12.173 16.776 22.075 Public Sector 4.341 4.774 5.071 5.344 5.711 6.454 Fixed Assets 0.437 0.341 0.327 0.376 0.445 0.685 Other Assets 0.148 0_277 0.347 0.565 0.718 0.904 ASSETS - LIABILITIES 17.984 19.138 20.608 23.063 31.115 41.283 Grants &Aid from Public Sector 0_325 0.348 0.374 0.755 0.767 1.416 Borrowing From 5.595 5.976 6.349 7.970 9.471 10.572 Government 1.868 1.804 1.841 1.677 1.618 1.718 Central Bank - 0.225 0.536 1.937 3.553 3.653 Foreign Institutions 3.577 3.697 3.737 3.836 4.152 4.852 Other 0.150 0.250 0.250 0.520 0.148 0.349 Other Liabilities 1.025 1.020 1.265 1.005 1.472 2.124 Capital 10.528 11.247 11.822 12.492 15.285 17.398 Reserves 0.511 0.547 0.798 0.841 1.005 1.065 Deposits - - - - 3.115 8.708 1/ As of October 30, 1975. Source: Central Bank of Jordan. Table 68 : Interest Rates on Deposits and Credit in the Banking Sector and for Treasury Bills and. Government Bonds as of January 1976 (In per cent per annum) Interest rate Central Bank of Jordan Discount rate 5.0 Interest rate on advances 5.0 Interest rate on 3-month time deposits 4.0 Interest rate on deposits subject to notice 3.0 Interest rate on loans to specialized credit institutions (5 -15 yrs)4.0 Commercial banks Overdrafts 7.5-9.0 Bills discounted 6.5-9.0 Sight deposits 5.0-6.5 Savings and time deposits 5.25-7.0 Specialized credit institutions Agricultural Credit Corporation 6.0 Industrial Development Bank Medium-and long-term loans 7.0 Housing Corporation Long-term loans 5.0 Jordan Cooperative Organization Loans of any duration for cooperatives 6.0 Loans of any duration for persons 8.0 Municipal and Village Loan Fund Municipality loans for 10 years 5.5 Village loans for 15 years 4.5 Housing Bank Loans of 1-15 years 7.5-9.0 Savings and time deposits 4.0-5.5 Demand deposits 5.0-5.5 Jordan Treasury bills Three-month maturity 4.9 Government bonds JD 5.0 million- issued February 1972 - 5 years' maturity 6.0 JD 2.0 million- issued November 1972 - 6 years' maturity 6.01 JD 4.0 million-issued August 1973 - 6 year§' maturity 7.51 JD 5.0 million- issued April 1974 - 6 years' maturlty 7.51/ JD 3.0 million- issued January 1975 - 6 years' maturity 7.5- Ji A.n nillion- issued July 1975 - 8 years' maturity 6.25-8.0 ./ Source: Central Bank of Jordan. 1/ With JD 10,000 lottery prize each six months. 2/ JD 2.0 million for sale to the public at 8.0% and JD 4.0 million for banks and other financial institutions at 6.25%. Table 7.1: Agriculture Production 1970-75 1/ (In Thousands of Metric Tons) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Wheat 55.5 168.1 211.3 50.4 244 51 Barley 5.2 26.2 34.0 5.9 4C 13 Tobacco 1.2 1.1 0.7 1.1 .9 - Other Field Crops 11.4 35.9 36.3 13.9 49 - Tomatoes 137.4 137.0 152.7 83.1 133 86 Cucumber 6.8 9.8 17.7 10.4 15.7 7.3 Snake Cucumber - - - - 2 2 Fggplant 23.0 44.9 32.5 14.7 32 14.7 Other Vegetables 70.2 89.8 93.4 65.0 54.8 - Olives 3.0 18.5 35.0 5.2 40.5 4.8 Crapes 6.4 18.6 18.2 22.1 18 - Citrus Fruits 48.9 41.2 20.9 15.4 33.6 - Watermelons 22.8 27.1 63.0 56.0 39.6 - ther Fruits 22.5 14.5 15.8 5.2 17.2 - Lentils 6.5 20.8 22.4 4.8 29.5 - /1 East Bank only. - Not available. Fnurce! DeDartment of Statistics Table 7.2: Agricultural Income 1970-73 1/ (Millions of Current Dinars) 1970 1971 1972 1973 Grains and Legumes 3.06 7.94 8.00 3.63 Vegetables 8.91 8.42 8.50 7.54 Tobacco 0.22 0.33 0.35 0.33 Fruits and Olives 8.14 9.83 10.00 6.07 Forest products 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 Sales of animals 10.89 8.16 8.20 8.16 Poultry 3.27 2.89 3.30 3.33 Fish 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.02 Construction on farms 0.24 0.38 0.40 1.04 Increase in livestock values - 0.02 - 2.03 Total value of agricultural production 38.91 43.95 44.87 40.50 Less: Cost of production 12.68 6.14 5.87 8.58 Net farm income 32.21 37.81 39.00 31.92 /1 Includes estimates for the West Bank. /2 Fast Bank only. Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Department of Statistics TABLE 7.3 - JORDAN'S MATN AGRT,H9T7TRAT.EXPORTR AND TMPART 4 Exports Imports Value Quantity Value Quantity J.Ds. (Metric J.Ds. (Metric Commodity (FOB) Tons) (CIF) Tons) Wheat 2260 29 2704985 30529 Barley 5152 112 6478 157 Lentils 1540521 10853 552290 4713 Chick-peas 105 3 256773 2394 Tomato 1836128 82604 211262 663 Eggplant 511569 22959 7200 39 Pepper (green) 90583 2886 - - Potato 21531 660 967207 21480 Cabbage 71697 3558 65 2 Cauliflower 126390 5117 - - Beans (green) 52006 1943 14117 105 Carrot 2096 71 29596 934 Marrow 106649 4280 - - Cucumber 112772 3824 - - Watermelons 191391 9481 95513 3604 Melon 45539 1651 - - Onion 25914 1217 288942 9188 Garlic 808 14 70694 568 Okra 22097 679 - - Banana 46677 1403 45 0.5 Citrus 3731624 95932 3626914 72101 Olives, fresh 5075 63 - Grapes, fresh 120535 4001 105976 1498 Apples & Pears 3456 68 653758 9832 Peaches 1054 26 21632 219 Plums 39154 1139 21139 273 Cherries 1524 45 12146 118 Akidunia (loquat) 17 0.5 15743 171 Total 8714434 - 9662475 - Source: Department of Statistics, External Trade Statistics, 1974 Table 7.4: Livestock, 1960 and 1967-1974 _(thousands) Year Total Sheep Goat Cattle Camel 19601-L 1,205 609 513 62 21 1967 1,197 768 377 41 11 1968 1,245 792 400 40 13 1969 1,445 854 528 49 14 1970 1,056 664 350 32 10 1971 1,103 691 361 34 17 1972 1,185 723 394 52 16 1973 1,416 850 502 46 18 1974 1,253 791 399 47 16 /1 Includes West Bank. Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Department of Statistics Table 7.5: Number of Agricultural Cooperatives in the East Bank Amman, Irbid and Balqa and Northern Zarga Chor Area Karak Ma'an Total 1973 1974 1973 11974 1973 1974 1973 1974 1973 1974 Credit and savings cooperatives 19 17 38 37 18 17 7 7 82 78 Agricultural cooperatives 0 0 5 6 0 0 0 0 6 5 Multipurpose cooperatives 5 7 0 19 1 4 0 2 6 32 Marketing cooperatives 7 5 3 3 0 1 0 0 10 9 31 29 46 65 19 22 7 9 104 124 Source: The Jordan Cooperative Organization and Department of Statistics. TABLE 7.6: FARMERS, FARM WORKERS, AND RURAL POPULATION Farm Population Male Female Total Holders and their families 176,965 174,001 350,966 Others living on farm (not holders) 4,089 2,926 7,015 Total 181,054 176,927 357,981 Farm Workers Permanent but non-paid 36,264 23,909 60,173 Temporarily but not for pay 2,946 3,750 6,696 Occasional, but not for pay 3,776 3,073 6,849 Permanent Paid 8,807 1,080 9,887 Temporary Paid 6,842 1,164 8,006 Occasional Paid 21,988 6,013 28,011 Totals Permanent Workers 45,071 24,989 70,060 Temporary Workers 9,788 4,940 14,702 Occasional Workers 25,774 9,086 34,860 Totals 80,633 38,989 119,622 Definitions: Permanent but non-paid: a person who rents or works on the farm for a share of the produce. Temporarily but non-paid: same as above but works at least 2/3rds of his time on the farm. Occasional but non-paid: same as above but works less than 1/3rd of his time o) the farm. Many of the last two categories will be friends or relatives of the farmer, wEch are usually classified as "Permanent non-paid." Holder & his family: may not necessarily live in a rural area. May live in Amman. However, many of them do live on or near their farm. Others living on Farm: may include members of an extended family or share- croppers. Source: Department of Statistics TABLE NO. 7.7: - NUMBER AND AREA OF HOLDINGS BY TENURE AND BY LOCATION OF HOLDING Area in dunums (10 dunums = 1 ha) - HOLDINGS OPERATED UNDER ONE FORM OF TENURE II -- - - - - - - - - I - - - - - - - - - I -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I I II LOCATION OF HOLDING HOLDINGS OPERA- I OWNED BY THE RENTED FROM ON SQUATTER UNDER TRIBAL UNDER OTHER TOTAL OF I TED UNDER MORE I HOLDER OR IN OTHERS BASIS FORM SINGLE FORMS HOLDINGS I THAN ONE FORM I OWNERLIKE OF TENURE REPORTED I 0 TENURE I POSSESSION GOVERNORATE NO. AREA NO. AREA NO. AREA NO. AREA I NO. AREA NO. AREA NO. AREA AMMAN 7965 981240.0 526 124192.0 5646 680819.7 1756 171183.3 18 1625.5 5 715.0 14 2704.5 I R B I D 29915 1966671.9 2834 253918.4 23574 1527805.5 3298 154210.5 177 27272.0 3 2240.0 29 1225.5 BALOA 5467 228948.0 525 43682.8 2655 105735.2 2264 78500.0 17 830.0 0 0.0 6 200.0 K A R A K 5896 559984.2 687 94878.8 4203 385278.4 915 68897.0 69 6105.0 17 3350.0 5 1475.0 M A A N 1548 167186.8 138 20645.4 1307 137428.4 43 2481.0 58 5132.0 2 1500.0 0 0.0 FINAL TOTAL 50791 3904030.0 4710 537317.4 37388 2837067.2 8276 475271.8 339 40964.5 27 7805.0 54 5605.0 Source: Department of Statistics, Amman. TABLE NO. 7.8 NUMBER AND AREA OF HOLDINGS BY TENURE AND BY SIZE OF HOLDING (AREA IN DUNUMS) HOLDINGS OPERATED UNDER ONE FORM OF TENURE S I Z E HOLDINGS OPERA- OWNED BY THE TOTAL OF TED UNDER MORE HOLDER OR IN - UNDER OTHER HOLDINGS THAN ONE FORM CWNERLTKE RENTED FROM ON SQUATTER UNDER TRIBAL SINGLE FORMS REPORTED OF TENURE POSSESSION QTHERS BASIS FORM OF TENURE NO. AREA NO. AREA 1 NO. j AREA NO. AREA NO. AREA NO. AREA NO. AREA LESS THAN 5 8522 16038.9 94 277.5 7817 14132.9 530 1504.5 75 121.5 0 0.0 6 2.5 5 AND UNDER 10 3825 25679.2 105 746.7 3004 20145.5 689 4615.0 23 145.0 0 0.0 4 27.0 10 AND UNDER 20 6926 92233.2 348 5153.6 4861 64540.6 1673 21975.5 31 384.5 0 0.0 13 179.0 20 AND UNDER 30 5337 121890.5 470 11346.8 3561 81174.7 1269 28555.0 26 581.0 1 20.0 10 213.0 30 AND UNDER 40 4666 150824.5 494 16683.7 3048 98791.8 1105 34727.5 14 448.0 0 0.0 5 173.5 40 AND UNDER 50 2968 125914.4 399 17474.3 2048 86685.6 500 20860.5 16 683.0 1 40.0 4 171.0 50 AND UNDER 100 8634 570793.2 1332 93171.8 5936 391047.9 1279 81352.5 81 4861.0 2 125.0 4 235.0 100 AND UNDER 200 5479 701828.7 880 117268.4 3871 493892.4 680 84709.9 32 3709.0 13 1786.0 3 463.0 200 AND UNDER 500 3359 933770.0 464 131494.4 2400 668419.2 468 126606.4 20 5291.0 6 1734.0 1 225.0 500 AND UNDER 1000 719 452125.2 91 59273.2 547 342391.1 64 40545.0 12 6700.0 2 1100.0 3 2116.0 1000 AND UNDER 2000 253 299725.5 23 28847.0 208 243588.0 15 18570.0 5 5920.5 1 1000.0 1 1800.0 2000 AND UNDER 5000 84 220487.5 7 19350.0 70 185767.5 3 6250.0 3 7120.0 1 2000.0 0 0.0 5000 AND UNDER 10000 10 58920.0 1 5430.0 7 43490.0 1 5000.0 1 5000.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 10000 AND UNDER 25000 9 133800.0 2 30800.0 7 103000.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 25000 AND OVER 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 AREA , NOT REPORTED 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 FINAL TOTAL 50791 3904030.9 4710 537317.4 37385 2837067.2 8276 475271.8 339 40964.5 27 7805.0 54 5605.0 SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS AGRICULTURAL CENSUS 1975 Table 8.1: Industrial Production 1970-1975 1/ Product Units 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Phosphate (dry) 000 tons 938.9 640.0 709.0 1080.9 1674.8 1362.8 Cement 000 tons 377.6 418.9 661.3 616.8 596.2 572.1 Petroleum Products 000 tons 445.8 556.7 605.1 675.3 748.4 328.0 Sole leather & wool tons 276.8 397.4 661.6 369.9 555.6 531.6 Upper Leather 000 sq. ft.1302.0 1887.6 2174.9 3750.5 2647.8 2359.1 Detergents tons 1709.0 2592.0 2528.0 2736.0 2973.0 4201.0 Liquid batteries 000 batts. 66.8 40.0 36.4 40.1 47.0 44.1 Cigarettes tons 1619.0 1536.0 1510.0 2156.0 1973.0 1966.0 Spirits & Alco. Drinks 000 litres 2162.0 2396.0 2421.0 2927.0 3288.0 5503.0 Paper tons 2692.0 2109.0 2749.0 3072.0 3536.0 4148.0 Electricity Mill. KWH 120.0 133.7 158.0 181.4 213.4 256.7 Iron 000 tons 24.1 9.2 30.2 28.1 25.4 31.3 Textiles 000 yards 478.0 748.0 744.0 703.0 722.0 954.0 Fodder 000 tons 25.6 34.2 44.2 41.5 33.3 35.8 Pharmaceutical liquids 000 litres 104.7 154.0 190.2 193.0 262.1 358.8 Other pharmaceutical products tons 43.1 40.1 60.0 72.0 68.5 113.3 Industrial Production 2/ 3/ index 95.9 113.7 139.1 152.9 162.2 173.9 Industrial Production change in index - 14.9 -17.8 25.4 13.8 15.9 11.7 1/ East Bank only 2/ 1966 = 100; index weighted by 1970 prices and quantities 3/ Pharmaceutical products excluded Source: Central Bank of Jordan Table 8.2: Value Added in Mining and Manufacturing 1967-1975 (In JD million) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1. Mining and Quarries 2.70 3.14 3.28 3.83 2.44 3.37 4.22 11.203 2. Food Industry 2.82 2.70 2.86 3.26 3.40 3.50 3.97 5.651 3. Beverages 0.30 0.43 0.49 0.31 0.40 0.49 0.51 214 4. Tobacco 0.97 0.89 0.95 0.56 0.58 0.66 0.83 1.928 5. Textile 1.10 0.93 0.82 0.66 0.87 0.92 0.98 2.718 6. Clothing and Footwear 1.21 1.50 1.86 1.13 1.35 1.58 1.75 1.842 7. Wood cord 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.098 8. Furniture 1.20 1.11 1.34 1.22 1.32 1.50 1.57 0.981 9. Paper production 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.335 10. Printing and Publication 0.55 0.66 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.57 0.59 n.a. 11. Leather Tanning 0.06 0.25 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.880 12. Rubber Production 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.008 13. Chemicals Product 0.86 1.04 1.18 1.02 1.20 1.32 1.41 1.126 14. Petroleum Products 2.05 2.36 2.45 1.86 2.80 3.10 4.03 4.810 15. Non-Metallic products 1.47 2.70 3.16 1.51 2.00 3.80 3.97 3.265 16. Metallic products 1.11 1.27 2.37 2.26 1.95 2.59 2.79 4.835 17. Non-Electric Machinery 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.014 0.057 18. Electrical Machiner and Equipment 0.16 0.19 0.32 0.28 9.22 0.20 0.23 0.660 19. Transport Equipment 0.28 0.28 0.70 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.73 n.a. (Including Assembly and Maintenance) 20. Miscellaneous 0.43 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.730 TOTAL 17.50 20.05 23.12 19.77 20.56 25.23 28.60 45.090 Source: Department of Statistics: Industrial Census 1974 (in Arabic), February 1976. Table 8.3: Distribution of Establishments in the Industrial Sector by Principal Cities (1974) Mining Manufacturing Cities No. Est. No. Emp. No. Est. No. Emp. Amman 72 2341 450 9534 Zarqa 11 90 26 1110 Irbid 24 196 12 98 Salt 3 22 3 179 Karak 4 51 1 17 Ma'an 0 0 0 0 Aqaba 0 0 0 0 Total 114 2700 492 10938 Source: Department of Statistics, "Employment Survey for Establishments Engaging Five PersonR or More," Anril 1974. Table 8.4 Distribution of Establishments in the Industrial Sector By Size of Employment, 1974 Mining Manufacturing Size of No. No. No. No. Employment Estab. Employ. Estab. Employ. 5 - 9 65 388 231 1243 10 - 24 47 519 185 2379 25-49 0 0 42 1392 50-99 1 86 17 1065 100-199 0 0 10 1359 200 or more 1 1707 7 3500 Total 114 2700 492 10938 Source: Department of Statistics, Employment Survey for Establishments Engaging Five Persons or More, April 1975. Table 8.5: EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES ENGAGING 5 WORKERS OR MORE, 1975 No. of No. of % of Branch of Industry Est. Workers Workers A. Manufacturing 1. Food Manufacturing 97 1993 13.6 2. Textile, clothing and leather Ind. , 1414 2820 19.2 3. Wood and Wood Products 47 367 2.5 4. Paper and Paper products 35 691 4.7 5. Chemicals 31 2529 17.2 6. Non-Metal Minerals 60 1657 11.3 7. Manuf. of Fabricated Metal Products 38 494 3.4 8. Basic Metal Industry 38 959 6.5 B. Mining 92 3166 21.6 TOTAL 1852 14.676 100.0 Source: Department of Statistics, Employment Survey for Establishments Engaging Five or More Workers. April 1975. -a-Dle 0.6: FIXED ASSETS AND GROSS OUTPUT OF SINGLE ESTABLISHKENT INDUSTRIES, 1974 thousand JD Fixed ISIC number Asset Depreciation Gross output 3140 Cigarettes 2076 596 5958 3231 Leather 499 205 940 3530 Petroleum Refinery 18841 11298 14"-2 3692 Cement 7883 1895 7304 3710 Iron and steel rolling 1060 311 3324 3839 Batteries 715 271 1195 Source: Department of Statistics, Industrial Census 1974(in Arabic). February 1Q74. fable 8 * CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN MANUFACTURING 1970/75 1/ Year Capacity Utilization 1970 about 70% 1971 about 78% 1973 88-90% 1974 about 90% 1975 about 95% ]/ Level calculated as a weighted average, correlated to employment, and based on reports from about 50 large enterprises. Sources: 1970 Government of Jordan Survey. 1971 Industrial Survey. 1973 NPC - derived from estimates of value of production. 1974 ) Department of Industry, Ministry of Commerce and 1975 ) Industry - derived from estimates of value of production and demand for investment as reflected in applications for industrial licenses. lable b*.8: PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF PHOSPHATES (In thousands of metric tons) Cumulative Production Change in Change in Exports Stocks 1/ Stocks Year Wet Dry (Dry) (Dry) (Dry) 1962 681 579 372 207 191 1963 615 523 368 155 346 1964 604 513 627 -114 232 1965 842 716 605 111 343 1966 1,001 351 755 96 439 1967 1,314 918 882 36 475 1968 1,590 1,162 1,095 67 542 1969 1,320 1,087 928 159 701 1970 1,099 939 657 232 983 1971 786 -651 -11 972 1972 921 709 952 -243 729 1973 1,375 1,081 1,089 -8 721 1974 2,147 1,675 1,469 206 927 1975 1,210 1,110 250 350 Sources: Department of Statistics and Jordan Phosphate Company 1/ Taken as the difference between production (dry) and exports. Table 8.9 : Construction Permits Issued, 1970-75 (Area in 000 m2) SOLELY RESIDENTIAL Amman Zarga TOTAL No. of No. of No. of Permits Area Permits Area Permits Area 1970 727 142 205 29.7 932 171.7 1971 454 94.7 185 21.6 639 116.3 1972 909 197.6 415 55.2 1324 252.8 1973 1113 241.9 573 85.4 1686 327.3 1974 779 217.5 299 43.9 1078 261.4 1975 1568 274.6 516 77.9 2084 352.5 RESIDENTIAL AND OTHER Amman Z TOTAL No. of No. of No. of Permits Area Permits Area Perr-its Area 1970 124 37.6 72 10.7 196 48.3 1971 105 29.2 113 8.7 218. 37.9 1972 129 43.4 140 18.4 269 61.8 1973 204 89.3 204 27.7 408 117.0 1974 166 73.5 104 14.4 270 87.9 1975 193 43.8 131 22.3 324 66.1 Source: Municipalities of Amman and Zarqa Table 8.10: ELECTRIC ENERGY GENERATED AND CONSUMED BY riANUFACTURIAG INDUSTRIES, ELECTRICITY COMPANIES ANI MUNICIPALITIES DURING 1968-1974 (In 000 K.W.H.) Particulars Manufacturing Industries Electricity Municipalities Year Consumed Generated Consumed Generated Consumed Generated 1968 39,427.5 39,597.4 92,669.5 1-094111.9 L,710.9 6,604.6 1969 67,243.8 67,600.1 107,981.3 129,685.2 2,327.1 2,551.4 1970 54,537.8 55,oo.1 107,039.5 129,829.0 2,369.8 2,524.8 1971 60,327.9 60,893.5 123,765.4 145,431.1 2,870.1 3,781.1 1972 73,235.1 73,603.0 145,815.0 171,826.2 2060.6 3,450.5 1973 80,412.4 80,742.6 166,084.6 196,171.0 2,481.1 3,674.8 1974 76,107.1 78,502.3 192,4.7 229,606.7 3,045.7 4,107.8 Source: Data gathered by Jordan Electricity Authority from unicipalities. ,,ectricai Comp-.is and Manufacturing Industries. Table 8.11: AQABA PORT - TRAFFIC 1970-75 (Tons '000) Year Exports Imports Total Total Imports dischared Bulk General General Excluding Including To To Phosphate Cargol/ Total Cargo Transit Total Phosphate Phosphate Quay Lighter 1970 155 31 186 185 10 196 227 382 158 38 1971 318 69 387 264 14 278 347 665 241 37 1972 677 28 705 517 2 519 547 1,224 £92 127 1973 770 41 811 428 6 434 475 1,245 304 130 19.4 1,058 58 1,116 356 11 367 425 1,483 253 114 1975 824 47 871 616 672/ 683 730 1,554 398 285 1/ Includes phosphate in bags. 2/ Increase from mid-1975 with re-opening of Suez Canal; mostly for Iraq and Saudi Arabia; also for LeV'nrn S Ith cloqure of Reirut. Source: Aqaba Port Department, and Report by Rendel, Palmer & Tritton. Table 8.12 HEDJAZ - JORDAN RAILWAY TRAFFIC DATA 1971 1972 1973 1974 - 1975 Tons Dist. Ton Tons Dist. Ton Tons Dist. Ton Tons Dist. Ton Tons Dist. Ton (000) (km) km (km) km (kn) kmn (k) km (km) km (mill) (mill) (mill) (mill) (mill) FREIGMr Phoshate: Rus eifa to Beirut 19.5 76 1.48 24.2 76 1.84 22.1 76 1.68 25.7 76 1.95 16.3 76 1.24 Rueeifa to Ras en Naqb (for Aqaba) - 280 - 15.4 280 4.31 9.4 280 2.63 - 280 - 280 - Total .5 1.48 39.6 6.15 31.5 4.31 25.7 1.95 16.3 1.24 General Cargo: To Syria from Amman 0.5 87 0.04 - 87 - - 87 - 0.2 87 0.02 1.5 87 0.13 From Syria to Amman 35.0 87 3.05 32.1 87 2.78 29.5 87 2.57 60.6 87 5.27 35.4 87 3.08 To Ras en Baqb from Amnan - 280 - 0.5 280 0.14 0.1 280 0.03 - 280 - - 280 - From Ras en Naqb to Amman 54.5 280 15.26 113.7 280 31.84 73.9 280 20.69 0.2 280 0.06 - 280 - Total 90.0 18.35 146.3 34.77 103.5 23.29 61.0 5.35 36.9 3.21 Total phosphate plus general cargo 109.5 19.83 185.9 40.92 135.0 27.60 86.7 7.30 53.2 Service 20.6 200 4.12 19.3 200 3.86 17.5 200 3.50 4.7 200 0.94 6.0 200 1.20 Grand Total 130.1 184 23.95 205.2 218 44.78 152.5 204 31.10 91. 290 8.24 59.2 74 4.41 No. Dist. Pass. No. Dist. Pass. No. Dist. Pass. No. Dist. Pass. No. Dist. Pass. (000) (km) km (000) (km) km (000) (km) km (000) (km) km (000) (km) km I./ (mill) V/ (mill) (mIll) (mill) (mill) PASSENGERS 1.6 87 0.L4 0.6 87 0.05 33.2 87 2.89 80.1 87 6.97 93.5 87 8.13 No. Dist. Train No. Dist. Train No. Dist. Train No. Dist. Train No. Dist. Train (km) km (km) km (km) km (km) km (km) km (000) (000) (000) (000) (000) TRAINS Amman - Dera'a & return - mixed 1,216 200 243 1,392 200 278 1,211 200 242 2,189 200 438 1,509 200 302 Amman - Ma'an & return - freight 929 474 440 2,102 474 996 1,323 476 627 959 474 455 622 474 295 Ma'an - Ras en Naqb & return - freight 464 86 40 978 86 84 674 86 58 7 86 1 - 86 - Total 2.609 723 4.472 1,358 3.208 927 3 894 2J31 597 ] Border problem between Jordan and Syria (1970 number - 16,800) Source: Jordan Railways Table 9.1: The Amman Cost of Living Index, 1968-75 (1967 = 100) ----------------------------Yearly Averanes--- Expenditure Groups 1968 1969 19/0 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 All groups 99.7 107.5 114.8 119.8 129.4 142.9 171.5 192.1 Food (Weight: 35.0%) 97.8 118.8 128.1 136.1 151.2 179.7 242.3 279.9 Cereals and bakery products 100.0 101.5 106.8 100.0 99.5 103.7 111.7 110.5 Meat, poultry and fish 100.3 107.3 108.9 113.4 126.2 130.8 205.3 206.5 Fruits and vegetables 94.0 146.0 170.9 186.2 214.8 289.6 392.2 499.5 Fruits 111.8 138.9 176.6 181.0 231.1 365.4 562.3 737.9 Vegetables 87.3 148.8 168.2 188.2 233.6 260.6 326.9 407.9 Dairy products and eggs 96.4 109.5 111.7 116.6 126.8 137.6 161.9 170.1 Other foods 100.6 105.9 110.0 126.7 137.5 151.0 190.8 206.7 Housing (Weight: 32.3%) 100.9 101.2 107.3 111.3 120.3 125.0 135.0 141.5 Rent 102.9 106.2 107.3 113.7 126.7 130.9 136.0 141.9 Fuel and utilities 100.0 100.8 102.4 106.6 108.3 111.6 112.4 112.4 House furnishings 96.8 100.0 110.7 110.7 119.3 129.5 154.5 161.9 Household operations 99.1 102.7 109.9 108.6 118.0 112.8 139.1 157.2 Clothing (Weight: 12.1%) 99.5 101.3 107.2 112.4 119.5 133.1 150.4 160.5 Men's and boys' clothing 98.7 100.0 104.2 106.4 115.3 129.1 146.5 153.4 Women's and girls' clothing 100.5 102.6 108.9 118.5 126.9 144.0 160.1 171.4 Infants' wear 100.0 102.9 120.4 107.3 112.7 116.3 128.1 136.4 Footwear 98.8 102.1 111.2 111.0 109.6 111.7 134.8 155.0 Other goods and services (Weight:20.6%) 101.1 101.4 108.5 109.9 112.3 114.1 120.7 140.4 Transportation 100.0 100.2 100.2 101.3 101.4 102.5 102.5 130.1 Medical care 100.0 100.6 118.0 118.6 118.6 119.6 140.1 186.8 Personal care 99.8 104.7 119.9 120.1 122.6 125.0 129.7 136.7 Reading and education 99.6 101.1 104.6 112.1 126.4 131.1 148.8 169.0 Recreation 101.8 102.5 110.8 112.3 113.4 114.8 124.1 145.0 Tobacco 104.4 106.2 109.0 109.0 109.0 111.4 113.7 114.9 Source: Department of Statistics. Table 9.2. Basic Salary Scales in Government Effective Since 5/1/75 (In J.D. Per Month) Grades First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth Ninth Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year I - A 102 120 124 128 132 136 140 144 148 B 102 105 108 111 114 117 120 C 92 94 96 98 100 II 82 84 86 88 90 III 72 74 76 78 80 IV 62 64 66 68 70 V 52 54 56 58 60 VI 46 47 48 49 50 VII 41 42 43 44 45 VIII 36 37 38 39 40 IX 31 32 33 34 35 X 26 27 28 29 30 Note: A family allowance of varying amounts not exceeding JD 9/= per month is also allowed for one wife and up to four children. Lource: Civil Service Department Table 9.3. Comparison of Wages in East Bank Establishments by Occupation, 1970 and 1975 Daily Wages in Average Daily Wages Occupation July 1970 for Both in April 1975 Sexes For For Min. Max. Males Females J.D. J.D. J.D. J.D. Chemists 1.0 2.6 2.7 3.2 Physicists 2.8 4.9 4.9 Architects and Town Planners 3.9 5.2 - Civil Engineers 3.9 4.0 5.4 5.3 Electrical and Electronic Engineers 3.4 4.5 4.8 - Mechanical Engineers 2.5 3.9 4.8 3.3 Chemical Engineers 3.0 3.7 5.4 7.5 Metallurgists 3.6 5.2 - Mining Engineers 2.9 3.7 5.9 - Biologists and Zoologists 1.8 2.1 - 5.1 Bacteriologists 1.5 6.5 - Medical Doctors 3.2 4.9 3.2 4.0 Dentists 2.8 4.1 4.6 4.6 Veterinarians 2.7 4.1 4.6 Pharmacists 2.5 3.6 3.8 Accountants 1.4 1.6 2.0 1.5 University and Higher Education Teachers 2.9 3.8 6.1 2.8 Secondary Education Teachers 1.1 1.4 8.5 1.2 Production Managers 2.2 3.9 3.4 Trade Managers 2.3 5.0 - Services Managers 1.7 4.2 - Draughtsmen 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.1 Civil Engineering Technicians 0.7 1.9 1.9 - Electrical & Electronic Engineering Technicians 1.0 1.9 1.0 - Chemical Engineering Technicials 1.3 1.4 3.1 - Medical Assistants 1.7 1.0 - Dental Assistants 0.9 1.3 - Veterinary Assistants 0.6 0.9 1.2 Pharmaceutical Assistants 0.9 1.5 1.3 Professional Nurses 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.5 Professional Midwife 0.9 1.6 1.8 Medical x'ray Technicians 1.0 1.6 1.0 Elementary Education Teachers 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.2 Pre-elementary Teachers 0.4 0.6 - 0.6 Preparatory School Teachers 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.6 Stenographers and Typists 0.5 1.1 1.5 1.5 Cooks 0.7 1.3 1.3 0.9 Orchard, Vineyard Workers 0.5 1.2 - Poultry Farm Workers 0.6 1.0 Table 9.3 (cor't) Page 2 Daily Wages in Average Daily Wages Occupation July 1970 for Both in April 1975 Sexes For For Min. Max. Males Females J.D. J.D. J.D. J.D. Nursery Workers and Gardeners 0.6 1.2 Animal Husbandry Workers 0.5 0.8 1.2 - Forestry Workers 0.5 0.7 3.4 3.4 Production General Foremen 0.6 1.7 1.8 0.9 Miners and Quarrymen 0.8 1.4 - Mineral and Stone Treaters 0.7 1.2 2.3 - Well Drillers (Other than oil and gas) 0.8 1.0 1.2 Metal Casters 0.8 1.1 - Knitters 0.5 1.2 0.7 Tanners and Fellmongers 0.8 0.9 - Grain Millers 0.8 1.1 - Food Preservers 0.7 1.1 1.0 Dairy Product Processers 0.5 1.0 1.0 Bakers/Confectionary Makers 0.6 1.0 1.0 Cigar Makers r 1.3 1.1 '0. 7 Cigarette Makers 0. 2.0 1.2 Tailors and Dress Makers 0.6 1.2 0.8 Cabinet Makers 1.0 1.5 0.8 Blacksmiths and Hammersmiths 0.6 1.4 - Motorvehicle Mechanics 0.7 1.4 - Machinery Fitters 0.7 1.5 1.3 Electrical Wiremen 1.0 1.9 - Electrical Linesmen 0.8 1.9 Plumbersand Pipe Fitters 0.4 1.1 Welders and Flame Cutters 0.6 4.2 Glass Formers and Related Workers 0.6 1.2 - Rubber and Plastic Product Workers 0.6 0.9 0.5 Paper and Paper Board Makers 0.4 1.1 0.7 Compositors and Typesetters 0.9 1.5 - Painters (Construction) 1.1 1.2 Brick Masonsand Tile Setters 1.3 1.6 1.2 - Dockers and Freight Handlers 0.7 1.1 0.8 Earthmoving Machine Operators 1.1 2.2 - Motor Vehicle Drivers 1.0 1.5 0.4 Laborers, not elsewhere classified 0.6 1.1 - Source: 1970 - Wages in the East Bank Establishments, National Planning Council, March 1973. 1975 - Provisional data from field survey of April 1975 covering non-farm establishments employing five and more workers. Table 10.1: Economic and Social Plan, 1976-80 Major Projects (anticipated disbursements in million dinars) 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1976-80 I. Agricultural, Irrigation and Water A. Agriculture 5.9 8.4 9.3 8.2 8.2 40.0 Development of fruit trees 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 8.0 Integrated Agricultural Develop. .9 1.4 1.4 1.3 .6 5.6 Others 26.4 B. Water Resources .4 .5 .4 .3 .3 2.0 C. Irrigation 9.2 6.2 8.7 19.5 28.5 72.1 Maqarin Dam .4 1.0 4.0 8.0 12.0 25.4 East Ghor Canal Ext. 2.3 1.5 1.0 4.0 8.0 16.8 Mugib .2 .3 1.0 3.0 4.0 8.5 Others 21.4 D. Domestic Water Supply 8.3 9.1 2.9 1.8 1.2 23.2 II. Mining and Manufacturing 46.8 65.3 54.0 34.2 28.4 229.1 A. Mining 11.5 7.5 8.0 11.0 11.0 59.9 Phosphate 10.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 1.0 24.0 Potash 1.5 2.5 3.0 8.0 10.0 25.0 Others 10.9 1. Manufacturing 27.3 49.0 34.0 11.0 8.0 134.2 Oil Refinery 16.0 17.0 6.0 - - 39.0 Cement 4.3 5.0 4.0 8.0 8.0 29.3 Chemical Fertilizers 7.0 27.0 24.0 3.0 - 61.0 Others 4.9 C. Private Sector 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 35.0 Iii. Electricity 8.3 7.5 7.5 6.5 3.5 43.0 Hussein Thermal Station 5.8 4.6 4.9 4.4 2.3 21.9 Amman Area Expansion 1.7 1.6 .9 .9 .9 6.0 National Grid .8 1.3 1.7 1.2 .3 5.3 Other 9.6 IV.Tiansport and Infrastructure 11.8 12.4 16.6 12.3 - 119.0 Major Roads, Railways 3.5 6.01 7.9 6.8 - 24.5 Aqaba Port 8.3 6.4 8.7 5.5 - 28.9 Other 65.7 continued . . . Table 10.1 (con't) Page 2 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1976-80 V. Housing, Services, Etc. 14.8 16.3 17.7 17.3 17.0 237 Private and Housing Corp. 14.8 16.3 17.7 17.3 17.0 83.0 Other 154.0 Total PlAnned Investments 765.0 Specific Projects 414.0 Other 351.0 Source: National Planning Council, Five-Year Plan Document, 1976-80 Table 10.2. Sectoral Distribution of Investment Allocations Under the Five Year Plan, 1976-80 (In millions of Dinars) 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1976-80 Agriculture 5.9 8.4 9.3 8.2 8.2 40.0 Wter 17.9 15.8 12.1 21.6 29.9 97.4 Mining 12.3 9.6 11.4 14.2 12.4 59.9 Manufacturing 34.5 56.1 42.6 20.0 16.0 169.2 Tourism and Antiquities 2.8 3.5 4.5 6.2 7.4 24.4 Electricity 10.9 12.2 9.4 6.7 3.6 42.8 Trade .4 1.1 1.5 .8 3.8 Transport 27.1 30.3 30.9 23.6 8.0 119.9 Communications 5.3 4.5 3.4 3.2 3.7 20.1 Culture and Information .5 1.3 .9 .1 .1 2.9 Education and Youth Welfare 5.6 8.0 7.9 7.1 5.9 34.6 Health .8 1.4 2.0 2.4 2.5 9.0 Social Work .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 1.0 Labor and Vocational Training .8 1.0 .8 .6 .6 3.8 Housing and Gov't Buildings 15.6 16.9 18.0 17.8 17.8 86.0 Municipal and Rural Affairs 7.0 8.5 9.5 7.8 6.1 38.8 Miscellaneous 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.5 11.3 TOTAL 150.6 881.5 166.6 142.5 123.9 764.9 Source: National Planning Council TaLle 10.3 Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Product at 1975 Prices ( JD million ) 1 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1. Agriculture 30 32 34 36 39 42 2. Mining and Manufacturing 45 67 84 95 114 144 3. Construction 22 26 32 32 30 27 4. Electricity and Water 5 6 8 9 10 11 5. Transportation 26 28 31 35 39 43 6. Trade (wholesale and retail) 55 60 64 69 74 78 7. Financial-Institutions 5 7 8 9 10 11 8. Ownership of dwellings 17 19 21 24 27 30 9. Public administration And defence 55 59 63 68 72 77 10. Other Services 30 33 36 39 42 45 11. Gross Domestic Product at factor cost 290 337 381 416 457 508 12. Indirect taxes 4o 44 48 53 58 63 13. Gross Domestic Product at market prices 330 381 429 469 515 571 14. Net factor income from abroad 38 43 46 49 55 63 15. Gross National Product at market prices 368 424 475 518 570 634 Source: National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980. Table 10.4: 'Expenditures On Gross National Product at 1975 Prices ( JD million ' Total 9 7 2-6 1977 1978 1979 1980 (1976-1980) 1. Consumption 396 425 456 488 520 561 2450 a) Private Consumption 271 290 310 332 355 385 1672 b) Public Consumption 125 135 146 156 165 176 778 2. Gross Capital Formation 94 150 181 166 143 125 765 Total Expenditures (1+2) 490 575 637 654 663 686 3215 3. Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services 83 112 136 157 196 231 832 4. Less: Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services 243 306 344 342 344 346 1682 5. Expenditures on Gross Domestic Product at market prices 330 381 429 469 515 571 2365 6. Net factor income from abroad 38 43 46 49 55 63 256 7. Expenditures on Gross National Product 368 424 475 518 570 634 2621 Source: National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980. Table 10.5 :International Transactions ( JD million T 1975 1976 197I 1978 1M 1980 1976-1980 1. Exports of goods in- cluding re-exports 50 74 93 109 141 169 586 2. Travel & Tourism 21 24 28 32 37 42 163 3. Other Non-Factor Services 12 14 15 16 18 20 83 4. Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services (1+2+3) 83 112 136 157 196 231 832 5. Remittances from Jordan- ian Working Abroad 28 37 42 47 54 63 243 6. Interests and Profits 12 9 9 9 9 9 45 7. Gross Factor Income From Abroad (5+6+7) 40 46 51 56 63 72 288 8. Current Transfers to private Sector 7 7 7 7 7 7 35 9. Current Transfers to government (Incl.Technical Assistance) 74 64 65 65 66 66 326 10. Total Current Transfers (9+10) 81 71 72 72 73 73 361 11. Total Current receipts (4+8+11) 204 229 259 285 )32 376 1481 12. Imports of Goods 203 265 301 298 299 300 1463 13. Travel & Tourism 19 20 21 22 23 24 110 14. Other Non-Factor Services 21 21 22 22 22 22 109 15. Imports of Goods & Non-Factor Services (13+14+15)243 306 344 342 344 346 1682 16. Interests & Profits 2 3 5 7 8 9 32 17. Total Current Payments (16+17) 245 309 349 349 352 355 1714 18. Surplus in Current account (12-18) -41 -80 -90 -64 -20 +21 -233 Source: National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980. Table 10.6: Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services ( JD million ) Total 12Z5 1926 1977 1978 1979 1980 1976-1980 1. Commodity Exports 50 74 93 109 141 169 586 1.1 Agricultural Products 7 7 7 8 9 9 40 1.2 Phosphates 21 44 61 73 81 96 355 1.3 Fertilizers - - - - 20 30 50 1.4 Other Manufactured goods 22 23 25 28 31 34 141 2. Non-Factor Services 33 38 43 48 55 62 246 2.1 TraVel And Tourism 21 24 28 32 37 42 163 2.2 Other 12 14 15 16 18 20 83 3. Total Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services (1+2) 83 112 136 157 196 231 832 Source: National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980, Table 10.7: Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services ( JD million ) Total 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1976-1980 1. Commodity Imports 203 265 301 298 299 300 1463 1.1 Consumer goods 144 152 170 177 193 202 894 1.2 Raw Materials 36 39 45 46 46 47 223 1.3 Capital goods 23 74 86 75 60 51 346 2. Non-Factor Services 40 41 43 44 45 46 219 2.1 Travel and Tourism 19 20 21 22 23 24 110 2.2 Other Services 21 21 22 22 22 22 109 3. Total Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services (1+2) 243 306 344 342 344 346 1682 Source: National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980. Table 10.8: Government Revenues and Grants ( JD million) 197 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Domestic Revenues a) Direct Taxes 9 11 13 16 20 25 b) Indirect Taxes 4o 44 48 53 58 63 c) Income from property and Investment 21 32 41 49 54 69 d) Other Transfers 10 11 12 13 14 15 TotAl Domestic Revenues of Central Government 80 98 114 131 146 172 Current Revenues of Municipalities 8 9 12 13 15 18 Total Current Domestic Revenues 88 107 .126 144 161 190 Current Transfers to Central Government from abroad 71 61 61 61 61 61 Total Current Revenues 159 168 187 205 222 251 Source: National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980. Table 10.9: Government Current Expenditures ( JD million) 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 A. Gentral Government 1) Civil Service 57 63 69 76 84 93 2) Emergency Expenditures incl. food subsidies and relief 14 13 13 12 10 9 3) Armed Forces 48 51 53 56 59 62 4) Public Security 7 8 9 9 10 10 5) Interest, on public debt & foreign loans 4 7 10 13 13 14 Current Expenditures of Central Government 130 142 154 166 176 188 B. Municipalities Current Expenditures of hunicipalities 5 5 6 6 7 7 Total Current Expenditures (A+B) 1 147 160 172 183 195 Minus: Transfers from Govern- ment and Municipalities to private sector 8 9 9 10 11 11 Minus: Transfers to the Rest of the world 2 3 5 6 7 8 Total Consumption expenditures 125 _1)5 l6 156 6 176 Source: National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980. Ta'&le 10.10. Gross Capital Formation of Central Government and Municipalities ( JD million ) Total 1225 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1976-1980 1. Current Revenues 159 168 187 205 222 251 1033 2. Current Expenditures 135 147 160 172 183 195 857 3. Surplus on Current account (1-2) 24 21 27 33 39 56 176 4. Capital Transfers from abroad (Technical and economic Assistance) 3 3 4 4 5 5 21 5. Foreign Loans 25 72 81 60 42 12 267 6. Government Bonds 11 12 12 15 18 18 75 7. Borrowing from the banking system 18 7 7 7 7 7 35 8. Total Revenues Available for Capital Expenditures (3 thru 7) 81 115 131 119 111 98 574 9. Expenditures on Gross capital Formation 53 76 86 80 77 63 382 10. Repayment of Internal & External Debt and obligations 10 17 13 14 14 15 73 11. Loans and grants to Private Sector 18 22 32 25 20 20 119 12. Total Capital Expendi- tures 81 115 131 119 111 98 574 13. Change in Cash balances (8-12) - - - - - - Source: National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980. Table 10.13: Sectoral Distribution of Investment AI1ocations Under the Three-Year Development Plan, 1973-75 (In millions of Jordanian Dinars) Public Private In Sector Sector Total Per Cent Agriculture 8.9 4.1 13.0 7.3 Irrigation 14.6 -- 14.6 8.2 Mining and Industry 5.8 20.3 26.1 14.6 Tourism and Antiquities 2.1 5.1 7.2 4.0 Electricity 5.7 4.1 9.8 5.5 Transportation 27.8 8.0 35.8 20.0 Communications 6.7 -- 6.7 3.8 Trade 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.4 Education 7.7 3.2 10.9 6.1 Public Health 0.9 0.6 1.5 0.8 Social welfare and labor 1.4 0.1 1.5 0.8 Housing and government buildings 3.4 31.5 34.9 19.5 Municipal and village affairs 14.1 0.7 14.8 8.2 Miscellaneous 0.3 1.2 1.5 0.8 Total 99.6 79.4 179.0 100.0 Source: National Planting Council, Jordan Development Plan 1973-75 Table 10.12. Investment and Financing Under the Three-Year Development Plan, 1973-75 (In millions of Jordanian Dinars) Total Over Annual Distribution Plan Period 1973 1974 1975 Investment expenditures 179.0 58.0 60.3 60.7 Private sector 79.4 22.9 25.6 30.9 Public sector 99.6 35.1 34.7 29.8 Financing 179.0 58.0 60.3 60.7 Savings 116.5 38.1 38.9 39.5 Private sector (106.1) (34.6) (35.3) (36.2) Public sector (10.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.3) External loans and grants 39.2 12.1 13.8 13.3 Private sector (net) (8.0) (1.4) (2.8) (3.8) Public sector (53.0) (17.0) (18.0) (18.0) Less repayments (-21.8) (-6.3) (-7.0) (A8.5) External technical assistancel/ 16.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 Specified net change in foreign assets 0.5 -- -- 0.5 Unspecified net change in foreign assets 6.3 1.8 2.1 2.4 Sources: National Planning Council, Jordan Development Plan 1973-75, and the Central Bank of Jordan. 1/ Imputed value in public sector.
Groupe de la Banque mondiale · Pre-2003 Economic or Sector Report
Jordan - Special economic report : review of the five-year plan (1976-1980)
Voir le document original
Le texte intégral est hébergé par l’organisation qui le publie. lawenc.com indexe les métadonnées et renvoie vers la source officielle.
Texte intégral
Informations clés
Organisation
Groupe de la Banque mondiale
Type de document
Pre-2003 Economic or Sector Report
Pays
Jordanie
·
Tous les documents
Source
Banque mondiale