Rural development in China

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'мц' , �,� �,1'6� н'f J . ,"¥ RURAL DEVELOPHENT DI C 11 M A, As the increasing number of observations to the effect that every- where the Chinese population appears well-nourished, adequately clothed, reasonably educated (the entire yo-unger generation is allegedly literate) and gainfully employed continues to remain uncoatradicted, the achievement of a decent life for all Chinese under the Illaoist regime can iao-longer be doubted. This accomplishm-ent is all the more impressive whe'a one realizes that in other Asian countries, also plagued with a high man-land ratio, starvation of sizeable numbers is still, if not an*actuality, at least a real possibility. The Chinese success is not a function of impressive growth rates, but of far-reaching c1hanges that have brought about socialist inst:L-. tutions, groL?-coascious men and-modern technology. This paper, oriented toward agriculture and rural development, has', the dual purpose of familiarizing the reader with wbat has actually happened in China since the 1949 revolution and then presenting elements of the Chinese experience that may be insightful in terms of promoting rural development in other countries. A statistical comparison with India.is included in order to provide perspective. 1. PERFORMMCE A--ND ORGLNIZATION China3e Agricultural Perfornaace China's agricultural performance has not been spectacular, but it has been satisfactory. Although data Pn agricultural procluction in general -2- is sketchy and often cuspect, m! ost exp:?rts seem to have confidernce in the series on grain production pieced together by Den Stavis, primarily from- the Chinese press and presented in Tabl- I. This series reveals rapid re- covery from wartime levels from 1949-52, followed by a slower rate of in- cree,se during the period of the first Five-Year Plan 1953-57. Urged on by Soviet advisors, the Chinese during this period poured most of their resources into large-scale industrialization. Increased agricultural pro- duction was to come from collective reorganization and mobilization that resulted in increased water management, application of more organic ferti- lizer, deeper plowing, closer planting, and the more rigorous use of other traditional inputs and techniques. The Great Leap Torward, latnz:ed in 1958, was Oesigned to trans- form China into a developed country virtually overnight by the intensive mobilization of labor resources in the coutryside and high rates of invest- mat in heavy industry. The union of 20,000 or more peasants into unwieldy cocunes wreaked havoc in the countryside, producing a sizeable decrease in grain production. The Comunist Party, lead to the realization that reorgani- zation by itself could not lead to greater agricultural productivity in the, prevailing situation of seriously diminishing returns to traditional inputs,- introduced in 1962 an agriculture first policy, whereby agricultural re- quirements were to assume top p-riority. Since then, China has concentrated increasing amounts of modern industrial resources and technical e-partise in the 11 regions called "high and stable yield regions," where food production is now assured by 1/ Anthony Tang has demonstrated that the vigorous assault at the tradi- tional margins in the 1950's occurrd at the expensc of a decline in total factor productivity from 100 in 1952 to 93.5 by 1957 and 83.3 by 1960. -3- mchanized irrigation. The entire packag of modern inputs applied in these regions, vhich contain about 20Z of total arable land, has produced yields that are high by international standards. The rest of China's arable land is in a transitional phase, using some modern inputs but not the full complement. Because -the best land was modernized first, the rate of growth of grain production was bound to slow down, however, the fact that the rate of growth has slowed down so substantially, to 1.7%/year, since 1967 can be explained by a combination of factors: (1) The Chinese are allocating a major part of their agricultural effort to diversification now that per capita grain consumpt-on levels exceed average daily standards. Good data on diversification are impossible to find, but such statistics as a trebling in hog population since 1956, and high levels of vegetable consL=ption (1/2 kg. per person per day) . indicate increased variety in the Chinese diet. (2) China may be at a point where diminishing returns even to modern inputs is great. (3) Often the emphasis is not on maximum output, but on the elimination of output fluctuations. Unlike other countries', during the last 14 years China has only experienced one setback from.a steady upward trend (and the setback in 1972 was minor). (4) The Cultural Revolution 1966-1969 and its aftermath may have been disruptive. For example, the replace- mant of managers at some levels, often by less experienced and well-trained individualc, as well as the closing of basic research facilities, the abolition of scholarly journals and the gradual process of relocating agricultural colleges in rural areas may have had an adverse effect on production and productivity. Food shortages at the beginning of the 1960's forced China to import large quantities of grain for the first ti=e since the revolution. Since than China has continued to import wheat (6.5 million tons in 1973/74) and occasionally corn (2.3 million tons in 1973/74), although it normally exports some rice (1.4 million tons in 1973). The value of foodstuff ex- ports surpassed imports for the first t=ze in 1965, export earnings from animal products, fish, fruit and vegetables more than com=ensating for negative grain balances, and by 1970 exports were almost double imports. Owing a policy of storing grain everywhere and the difficulty of transport- ing grain from the inLerior to the coastal cities, China remains a net importer of grain, with imports equal to about 3% of total production. -5- TBLE I CRAILN PRODUCTION IN CHINMA2! Grain-Equivalent Production, Nil- (%) Compound Growth Year and Period lion Mtric Tons Increase Rate for Period Recovery from War 1949 134 1950 143 6.7 1949-52; 7.5% 1951 155 8.4 1952 166" 7.0 First Five-Year Plan 1953 170 1.5 1954 176 3.5 1955 182 3.4 1952-57; 2.3% 1956 188 3.3 1957 186 -1.1 Great Leap, Crisis, and Racovery 1958 205 10.2 1959 170 -17.1 1960 150 -11.8 1957-63; -0.37 1961 160 6.7 1962 170 6.2 1963 182 7.1 Period of Rapid Technological Change 1964 195 7.1 1965 200 2.6 1963-67; 6.0% 1966 220 10.0 1967 230 4.5 Period of Stagnation 1968 (234) 1.7 1969 (237) 1.3 1970 240 1.3 1967-74; 1.6% 1971 246 2.5 1972 240 -2.4 0 1973 .250 4.2 1974 257 2.8 1/ From B%!nedict Stavis, "Making Creen Revolution," Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New .York, 1975. -6- CiIna-Ind La Cop ar. on A number of ilnter22stIng compariso'ns can be wade by juxtaposing lndian and Chinese data.1 Some of th results of Subrar,tanian Swamy's detailed anal,sis of Ir.dian and Chinese stati,,tcs are presented in Tabl II. Table II 2/ A-TIUAL GROWTH PWIES C1AINA A'ID IDIA- (in %/yaar) China IndTia Foodrain Outut 1952-59 ~4. 3 2.7 1952-70 2.2 2.9 Value-added in Agriculture 1952-65 .4.8 2.5 1952-70 2.2 2.9 - Industrial Production 1952-65 7.0 7.0 1952-70 6.7 6.1 Net Do-estic Product 1952-65 3.0 3.6 1952-70 2.3' 3.7 The, broad conclusion is that growth rates from 1952-1970 have been relatively similar in the two economies, although proportionally more of China's. growth 1/ Chinesa. eta is particularly difficult to find and substantiate. Occa- sionally the data ued in these co-parisons come from different sources and thus may not be consistent. 2/ Sce Subramanian Swamy. "Econoric Growth in China and India, 1952-1970" in Economic Dovelopmnt and Cul-Cural Chac, University of Chicago Press, Vol. 21, Numiber 4, Part II, July 1973. -7- occurred in the first decade, and India seems to have a slight overall edge over China. However, whan population changes are also considered, the lead switches to China. For example, the 1972 FAG Production Yearbook reveals a 1% rate of growth of per capita food production from 1961-1965 to 1970-72 for China, but orily 0.3% for India. The 1974 World Bank Atlas claims a 2.6% rate of growth of per capita GNP for 1960-72 in China versus only 1.4% for India (population grew at the rate of 1. 8%/annum in China and 2. 3%/annum in India during the period under consideration). When absolute level comparisons are made, both in economic and welfare terms, Chinese standards are invariably higher than' Indian as shown in Table III. TablT II STATISTICAL COMARISONS OF CHILA AND INDIA- China India GNP per capita- 170 110 (US$) - 1972 3/ Per capita cereal- production - 1972 268 190 (kg/perzon) Average yields for cereals - 1970-72 1,789 1,130 (kg/ha) Commercial fertilizer application - 1971 40 16 (kg/ha) Irrigated area as % of cultivated area 31 18 Daily average per capita calorical consumption - 1969-71 2,170 2,070 Average protein con- sumption - 1970 63 53 (grams per capita) Life expectancy at birth (years) - 1972 53.4 52.6 Infant rortality 105 128 (deaths/1,000) - 1972 Adult literacy 57 29 (% over 15 years) - 1972 School enrollment 58 44 (% of population age 15-19) - 1972 Ratio of Income of top 4.6 8.3 (1964-68 20% to bottom 20% (1961) average) I/ From Uphoff and Escan, Local Or-anization for Rural Davelopment: Analysis of Asian Expecienco, Cornall University Press, Ithaca, Ncw York, 1974, unless otherwi5o specified. 2/ World Bank Atlas 1974. -9- These China-India comparisons should be interpreted with some backgrouind considerations in mind. Although data is limited, post-revolu- tionary China appears to have had a headstart over post-indepandence India in many respects, including higher per capita grain production and irrigated acreage. China also benefits from better rainfall distribution. However, India has more than twice as much arable land per capita, (0.3 hectare per person versus 0.1 hectare per person), a warmer climate which should permit more multiple cropping, (not less as is the case at present) and has received considerably more foreign aid and technical assistance. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the Chinese population requires more- agricultural output per capita due to a larger physical size and a colder climate. THE SOCLALIST TRANSTORMAL\\TION OF CFLTNESE AGRICULTURE The socialization of Chinese agriculture, whose goal has been to reap the economic, political and sociological benefits of cooperation has been implemented by a gradual progression through the following five organizational forms: (l) Temporary rutual-aid teams, encouraged by cardres during the 1949-52 land reform were patterned after the tradi-- tional gr-)upings of 4-10 families that had existed in - pre-revolutionafy China. They pooled labor, draft power and implements during peak periods, without any change in ownership or land management, and settled compensation for pooled labor and materials on the spot or after the harvest. - 10 - (2) PCrIRMNIt LUtLual-aid L -:. were rormed aTter a year or so from temporary tczias in order to pool labor for certaiLl activities during slack pariods and to acquire capital goods jointly. The successful functioning of one teen encouraged the formation of others so that by 1954, 58% of all households, generally the poorer house- holds, were members of a team. (3) Production cooperatives, also called lower level or elemen- tary cooperatives, were encouraged after 1953 to.achieve the economies to scale inherent in the coordinated manage- ment of small holdings. T'e-e cooperatives embraced 30 to 40 households, often the c=bi=Tion of several mutual- aid teams. Although each householI: still retained title to its on land, it maintained czect control of only a small private plot. Draft animals and implements were rented or sold to the cocperative. After each harvest, the output was first used to cover state taxes, procure- ment obligations, and operating expenses. Allocations were then made to special investment and/or welfare funds before the residual was distributed to the mem.bers in the form of dividends for lad and capital contributed and wages for work performad. There was no standardized ratio between dividends and wages, nor was there any single basis for the determination of wages. Often the Soviet system of labor days or workpoints as they are called in - 11 - China ;a3 applied, wlhereby payment was based on hours worked but hourly rates varied in accordance with the difficulty of the task performed. *By the end of 1955, although some cooperatives had been encouraged to dis- band due to poor performance or a lack of qualified administrators, 14% of all households belonged to co- operatives. A nationwide campaign during the winter of 1956 resulted iu the novement of the entire peasantry into cooperatives. (4) Collectives, or higher level or advanced producer cooper- atives as they are called by the Chinese, were patterned after the Soviet collective Farm. The high tide that brought 100% of the households into cooperatives in winter 1956 swept 90% of the cooperatives into collectives by early spring. Collectives differed from cooperatives in that they were not only larger, averaging about 200 households, but they also refused to recognize personal owhership of land and other productive assets (except for a small private plot), basing remuneration exclusively on labor. (5) Communes, lauded as the key to the Great Leap Forward, were created in 1958 throughout China by the merger of 25 or so collectives with local governmental institutions. They were designed to permit the large-scale mobilization of labor for water management projects and to reduce the strain on the national economy by promoting local small- scale pruduction of iron, steel, fertilizer, tools, bricks -12- and othar products. in addition, their mushalis, child care ccntars and other facilities were to free woime,n-poJ;er for work in the fieldsi and abolition of all forms of private property from private plots down to kitchen utensils was to eliminate once and for ever all capitalist tendencies. The commune, as initially conceived, proved to be too much too soon. By mid-1959 the process of restoring private plots, closing messhalls and dismantling backyard blast furnaces began. Co=munes were made smaller and r:ore and more authority was devolved onto the production brigades, or former collectives, and then the production ters, or former cooperatives. The sixty articles pronulgated in. 1962 established the basic 5-tier system of rural local governance that has bea2 -ai=tained over the last 15 years. These articles guaranteed the continiance of private faily plots, 1/ restricted in size to no more than 5% of total arable land.- They estab- lished the production team as the basic accou-ting unit, that is the pnit in which daily production decisions are made and through which output is dis- tributed. The brigade assumes authority only in those areas that affect 2 or more of its teams and the commune enters the picture only when 2 or more brigades are involved. Afew select local activities, not delegated to the cofiaune, are assumed by representatives of the state at the county level. The chart that follows summarizes the organization and functions of 1/ The fact that private plots provide about 20% of a family's income is generally felt due to the high value crops and. animal products raised on thcm, and not to higher- per hectare yields. иlлст 1 - иnир9г идхл! sP1:1[ах • `� , !1хА1.1lV1L и1ti1t�Ь]1M113I11к•4 ь. . }'г идиг [ 1un 1У и•1..с ( lип Haurehold _ г Traw_ Мlалдг_ Се `пг го�ггr! z!т: тлпltу Ьа�г. хи-аи Са,11[н, •vегаь:(ь,µ 1bu ргорlп иСиг;г иг .. ..1 rtll,µг., гппргСв• io•J!1 Ьгtи<дев ог 2l!,c�n-4�,G[У] р<ер:е. tй-15 гом.vгг. (2п-5U Ьгс[аггаl, 1ng ы�ли1 1д-7b ргоJис[Саа сим иг Prive[г Р'•о[ lид п 0.2 heccare). l,[H1b ргирlг. Уам1гг�пе Oidoat vor.{ин гг1г. 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(o11wa7 Cthe регсеп[ages hu[1оо Ьу геде[lning tевпи, � , ' � агг оррга•сlпы[г) l) grвnt!ng рггтlлlоп [о gcw h1Fh-pco- [ft. whaidl.ry ггорг, t1 lапд с.к - 7!, 2} dlatrlбu[1пg асгтсг lnpuu, i) Рго,:исеlоп гоьtг [[ог outnlJa• tn- , �) дегеппlп!пР. писl,ет о[ prople from рли )- УSТ.. each [гап vho ратисtрвсе ln поп- Л µcaerve [ипд С[ог Lnvгиtmenl впд agrlcul[игвl аг[fvlc(еа. ' агогпqе о( дга!п) - 10а, й) вепдlпд вklfled ndrea доип to рооггг а 4) 11г1fыгс (ипд (Гог punr ind(v1Ju�1e) [едпг, ]i. 5) lпготе dlstrlhu[гд [о memбurf 1п ассогдлпд vlrh мед впд vorY potnta tarned) - 55�.. . . L'е1!дтг p.o1r Саге о[ с6!lдтеп впJ о1д [olk, Gre [аг hвпдlиррид (гт1)tгв апд Operatlon о[ hroleh <се[1оп (?•7 Ьагг- Sal1 hoapltвl, Porxr соипtг апvlсен а�сЬ гг ед.Свtlоп, • c1Nldleaa old folke сhгиЧl;lь veltare . Loot Joгtore). гггепвlпп впд tcscecr агг[!ам асг 1n 7ипд• • М[дд1• вehooltn=, ehe ргосги оГ Ьг1пг Тг•пefrrre3 [а ch< Prlгигу achoallnµ. сопr.игг. - , • tLd1e[lоп af e1v{l дlари[аг- � Orgaпsratinn аГ prapagunda впд г[иду . . сгтрлil;п•[. � Г1п•пгtпг 5l1I-flnвnced [оггрt !от оссв<3апа1 Se[С•[!мпегд ех[<р[ Сог осслгlапаl 8гlГ-Сlпипггд еасгрс адпlnlв[л[оги Адвlпlпrа[оп дте рвlд lтоп thr аеви Гlпвпеrд Ьг виц hudcrt- lоапг Гглв Dг1,;вдг credl[ coopera[1ve. luan• Сгоп heuaelwlJн, Ьг(лгди <пд/ог .гг р.lЛ Ьг [hrle wn [ел,. Cor v61cA ЬидУгс. гип.,шпr (oulv for punrrc tгт,�).г Chry o.urt contlnuc Со vorY м а рятс. • г1п�r Lгв1в, lМrеlорпигп[ рго)<сгs апд vгlhre wec Ьг - ilмпсед Ьу [ипда гппед froe еwлпипг enurprtrca. , . • !/ Th: солсу Еочггп..гс[ la апдгг [hc goverr.xnc о[ ehe provlncr, иг[опопоиа ггуlоп иг гипlгlргlftУ v1.Ccu 1п inrn 1r пидгг thr мtlопаl µoverrмrnt, 13 oacli o C tli .! 5 ticro. The only orgnnizationa'. ch ,n'-- Lffoctt-cll by tle Cultuc -. RcvnclutLua has been the c nac-e of wana-.2-nent to re-%/olutionarv coz-mittoes which must cont--in a certain perca: tage of women, soldiers, youth, party m.embers and othar interested gro-, ps. II. POSSIBLE LESSC;NS Cormarative Analysis oE So,,rilat and-Clhillesia Sc,_-ializaltion Stratec,,,ies The combination of.factors that z-Z-1a t1he Chinese atterapt to form cooperatives more successful than its Soviet cotmterpart and forced the Llovement Of 100% of the Ch-Laese peasantry iz-_o collectives in less thar, o ne year (versus 7 years in the Soviet Uhlc- a7z; -;ithout the extensive and p er- sistent- opposition en.couztered in the Sovist are listed below: (1) The gradual trans f o rmation frcm seasonal to permanent mutual-aid tepms had ba:--ttar - -rez=ad t-71-le Chiaese peasant first for coooeratives and t1na-, for collectives. (2) In the case-of collectivization, many of the Chinese peasants viewed their land as a gift from the Partj and consequently %,7ere more to surrr.nder it for the sake of the Party. (3) Unlike the Soviet Party, the Chinese Cormunist Party had a la-rge num_ ar of cadres recruited from the country- side. These cadresknew to pro pagandize successfully artiong the peasant masses. (4) Ualike Sov-LOL agriculture, Chinese agriculture stood to gain considerable economies o-f` scale from cooperation, for example, holdings were often pathetically small in - 14 - China and irrigation, that could only be built, co- ordinated and maintained in large-scale units, was critical in many areas. Cadres could legitimately quote statistics on how yields could be increased and stabilized by cooperation. (5) The Chinese, unlike the Soviets viewed organizational solidarity as crucial, but exceedingly difficult to develop, requiring months or even years of patient effort to recondition members to think and then par-. ticipate as a group. Although the Soviets also held meetings, meetings in China were more frequent and led by experienced cadres who encouraged everyone in turn to express his preferred operational strategy and to criticize others, not just for faulty planning, but also for personality problems that impede clear thinking and finally even to criticize himself. (6) Opposition from the formerly privileged classes was less in China because members from these classes were treated more like individuals whose thinking needed to be remolded than like criminals who needed to be'punished. Incentive Scheme Although the Chinese ideologically stress moral incentives, they are very willing to admit to the critical importance of material incenLives. For this reason, the technique used by production teams to distribut? the .gross value of production is geared to guarantee that increased productivity is met with increased consumption. The state tax, the first claim on - 15 - incomz, is lump-scm anA fi::cd for extendzd p-riods of tirz, so it dos not In.pair incentives. The second claim on income, prodiction expenses, generar..lly has n3t increased ove- time because although more coomercial inputs are now consumed, their prices have been declining. Guidelines limit the aount of incremental income that can be allocated to the third claim on income, the investment and welfare funds, to less than the total increment. Consequently, any increase in per capita production must result in an increase in the resi- dual fund, remaining after the first three claims have been met and that is to be civided among the members of the team. This approach means that the Chinese peasant knows that increased efJfort is to be rearded with increased material well-being, and consequently - be -ore rotivated to work than his counter-art in other countries where tne fruits of inereased labor often accrue to the landlord, Money lender and/or the state.- A certain percentage of the resid -, sually from 4O-60%, is divided acng the tea- members in accordance with need. The rest, which is distributed as a function of work points accumulated,also takes advantage of the power of material incentives. Tnere are three basic methods for the allocatiofn of workpoints: (1) Wage system (Soviet method) - in accordance with its difficulty each task is assigned a certain number of workpoints per day of work. In some teams to facili- tate bookkeeping, each worker is assigned a daily workpoint level based on his overall skill and receives -this fixed number of workpoints for each dayhe work4., irrespective of the task he performs. 1/ Tiiis includes some co-,min'ist countries where agriculture surplus is gecrally requisitioncd for industrial expa-nsion. -16 (2) Fieccwork zystcIm - c.ch task is assi.nd a certain numibar of wurkpoints irrespective of the tL::Le it actually takes to p-rForm the task. (3) Tachai syste. - individuals evaluaLe their own per- formance (considering dedication as well as skill) and th group publicly discusses the evaluation until a concensus is reached on the number of work- points to be allocated per individual per day worked. Because it is recognized that none of the three methods are prob- lem free, each te-n is fre to choose its own method. The Tachai system was encouraged during the Cultural Revolution, but because most teams ap- peared to lack a sufficient degree of 6olidarity, this approach is no longer s t:ress ed. PUblic Works Mobilization The thtoroughness by which the Chinese are able to mobilize labor for public works projects appears unequaled elsewhere. This mobilization potential can be attributed not only to the disciplined nature of the Chinese, and the occasional use of coercive tactics, but also to two other factors worthy of further consideration, production team financing and a system of collective organization. Nobilization for public works projects follows a procedure ini- tiated by the lowest level that can encompass the entire project. Conse- quently, everyone involved with the project stands to benefit from it. The level which initiates the project calls on the groups in the next lowest level to provide labor, equipment and materials for the project, with each group providing resources in proportion to the extent to which -17- it is ex:pcted to benefit. This lowar level in turn calls on the level below it until the productLon team is reached, at N,hich point the actual illocations of labor, equipment and materials are made. Tear :embers sent to work on publfc wor'-s projects earn ..orkoints just as if they had stayed home to work-directly for the team. This systea of team financing means that -public works programs in China are not limited to the extent to which local administrators can beg or borrow funds. Collective o-nership, in addition to providing the channels necessary for mobilfiation and coordination, also facilitates the implemen- tation of public works projects by eliminatin.g complex issues involved with land overship end water rights. Furthrmore, recruits may very well work harder, because they know that not just a select fe';, but the entire collec- tive including the=selves and their fa=ilies, will benefit from the proj ect. :.hasis on Local Self-Raliance Vacist ideolcgy, which is based on faith in the inherent capabil- ities of the masses,- stresses local self-reliance. Each commune, and often each team, is to be self-sufficient in grain, and many other agricul- tural products, the implication being that a locality must grow what it wishes to consuma irrespective of its coparative advantage. With very few exceptions, each local level must also finance its own development. For example, a bri- gade may have to wait until its' pig sties have generated enough surplus to finance a flour mill that in turn can produce sufficient funds to pur- chase a pump. In the area of agricultural research and extension, the 1/ The tcchniques, often judged highly successful, used by the Chinise to organize work gangS may also be of interest to the reader, but for lack of present information are not treated here. / In accordance with the motto, "Learn from the lowur and riddlo income .peasants," urban intellectuals have baen sent to the countryside to work for some tip.-, as simple peasants. emphasis on self-reliance has meant that basic rcsaarch has been sacrificed Lfor a research effort, often carried on by the commune itself on experi,.,an- tal plots, which is directed toward current problems and whose results are immediately made available to all interested parties. Much industrial development is also considered to be a local affair. Cuidelines suggest the establishment in each county of a complementary set of the "Five Small Industries," designed to produce iron and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, energy (coal, electricity) and machinery on a small (or mediun) scale. Estimates for 1971 and 1972 indicated that .40% of total cement production and 60% of chemical fertilizer production came from such 1/ small-scale local industry.-L A three-.avel network for machinery repair and manufacture is advocated with repair shops at-the brigade level, repair and assembly facilities at the comm-a.e level and manufacturing facilities at th.county level. Light industry for the processing of agricultural and sideline products is suggested for brigade, commune or county level. Taken as a whole, the industrial complex at any one level is supposed to be self- financing: This means that 'light industry which generally experiences a considerable profit must finance heavy industry which often runs a deficit. All enterprises operate in an environment where they do not have to worry about competition from large-scale producers. The cost-effectiveness of small-scale fertilizer plants, steel ills, machine shops, and other similar facilities is open to debate. The disadvantages of small-scale must be wnighed against'transport costs, coordination costs, resettlement co9ts, learning-by-doing benefits and other costs and benefits. 1/ Jon Sigurdson, "Rural Industry," China Quarterly, April/June 1972, 19 - T_ Lck o( ra: L o Th._ policy throu,hout China is not to waistc a thing. All avail- able materials that contain concentratious, no iatter how minimal, of 1/ valuable itutrients are applied as frtilizer.- These include not only animal manure, nightsoil and compost, but also pond mud and the former walls of homes, in particular kitchen walls. Multiple cropping and interplanting are employed to the extent that somb land may yield up to 12 crops of vege- talbes in any one year. All edible wastes, including household scraps, withered flowers, and weeds, are fed to the family pig (there is now one pig for every 3 people) and small hydroelectrical stations are installed along strea=s wherever a drop of even as sliZht as five feet can be obtained. The e=Dhasis on the equality of women, by which nationwide campaigns for women's rights fight such traditional concepts as the inacceptability of b 41h conat rol , the e1c-ui cnf WOMEn1 ZrOM '_:~.eSIns, p.c apy, and4 the three obeys by which girls are ordered to o`ey their fathers, wives, thei-r husband and older women, their sons, means that the productive poten- - tial of women is not wasted by an economy that does not feel it can really afford to *waste anything. It is the Chinese who have developed polyculture to its most advanced point, a standard example of which is that of mulbarry trees grow- ing around a fish pond. The dr'oppings of the silk worms fall from the trees directly into the pond where they feed the fish. -Eventually the pond is drained, its mud being used as fertilizer before it is restocked with fish in order to begin the cycle anew. 1/ It can be argued that such policies which treat labor as a free good waste labor. -20- In an effort to facilitate control and/or promote development, c,;pecilly local deopment, the (Ätinese Covernient iu willing to impose cartan strictios on its population that many other governments view as sevare limitations on prsonal freedom. These restrictions result in: (1) limited geographical mobility-individuals are generally not allowed to leave' their place of birth, free migration to urban areas being impossible begause individuals and belongings cannot be transported without. official permis- sion, and living space, jobs, and ration coupons in cities are unobtainable without authorization. (2) limited occupational choice--irresp.ective of birth, all individuals raised in rural areas and all urban adoles- cents sent inte the countryside must remain as ordinary tep= me=bers unless salzcted by their team or brigade to fill vacant spots in local enterprises or to receive advanced training. (3) inability to vaccumulate wealth-the wealth redistribu- tion that follosed the revolution combined with the ex- istent income distribution policy and emphasis on income redistribution means that hard work and talent can never again generate large concentrations of wealth. (4) negligible contact with outside world--almost all Chinese, ,ith the exception of a few intellectuals who are con- sidered able to cope, are not aware of the values, con- sumption standards and much of the technical expertise of the rest of the world. ERcc'tBrthI Cc,., Lrol1 China appearc; to hava ow3re2d its population growtlh rate to about 1.87 per anaurmt over t.he past 10 years. A numb2r of techniques 'have been 11 usUd to accoMplisI t'is reduction,- including: (1) Prov:ision of free or cheap family planning services, including abortions, near the home or place of work often by paramedics and non-professionals who come from the saEe local area. (2) Encouragement of late marriage and small family size, supported by health prograss that increase the likeli- hood that any'cne child will survive and welfare programs that provide for childless old people. (3) Delegation to production team and,other groups of the responsib4lity of preparing their on group birth plans. For example, the group may decide that only 2 couples each year should have children and then proceed to decide which year each couple should h.ave a turn, giving top priority to newlyweds and those who have not had a child in several years. 1/ For a excellent triatmLnt of this topic, see "Family Planning in"China," by Nr. P. C. Chen distributed by the Bank Sacretary 7/1974 - Sec.M74-487. Report by: Judith Gravs:n;w